Mutual Economic Interdependence and Military Occupation: Evidences of United States Passive and Active Strategies in Iraq for Oil Security

Abstract

Oil contributes significantly to the energy mix of United States. Data reveal that United States import crude oil from the Middle East, primarily from Saudi Arabia, Iraq and Kuwait. Historically, there have been several disruptions in oil supplies from Middle East to the United States. From 1991 to 2003, there have been two wars between Iraq and United States. During and after the first Iraq war, supply of crude oil stopped from 1991 to 1995. However, US imports of crude oil from Iraq peaked during 2004, soon after United States occupied Iraq. United States use various active and passive strategies to secure its oil supplies. The article takes the case of United States and Iraq mutual oil trade data for further investigation to empirically examine evidences of passive strategy. The article focuses on finding effects of passive strategies, such as mutual economic interdependence, on oil supplies by using cointegration and Granger’s causality tests. Moreover, the article elaborates on the circumstances under which United States use active strategies (military intervention) to ensure its oil security by taking the example of US invasion of Iraq in 2003. The outcome of the empirical analysis establishes the absence of causal relationship between economic interdependence and oil security, which highlights the lack of effect of passive strategies on oil supplies between United States and Iraq. Conclusions drawn from the available research literature consolidate that US active strategy of military invasion and occupation of an economically weak Iraq resulted from its passive strategy to isolate Iraq on the context of perceived threats from Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) from Iraq. It helped United States to secure oil supplies from Iraq.

Keywords

Oil Security Passive Strategy Active Strategy Mutual Economic Interdependence Military Occupation

Introduction

Data reveal that in 1990, just before the operation Desert Storm, United States was importing 25.58 million metric tonnes per annum (MMTPA) of crude oil from Iraq against its total imports of 277.64 MMTPA. During and after operation Desert Storm, United States did not import any crude oil from Iraq from 1991 to 1995. However, in comparison, during US invasion of Iraq in 2003, United States was importing 23.94 MMTPA in 2003 and its imports from Iraq peaked at 32.66 MMTA in 2004 (after US occupation of Iraq). Crude oil import-dependent countries use various passive economic and political strategies. They also use active strategies such as crude oil source diversification and military intervention to safeguard their long-term crude oil supply interests. Researchers have time and again hypothesized the concept of mutual economic interdependence between countries as a potent passive strategy for influencing important international decisions. Interdependence theorists note that such interdependent relations, particularly economic ones, are increasing, while the use of military force is on the decline. However, researchers have also stated earlier that with modernization and development of Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD), mutual interdependence would get more complex (Morse, 1969). Some researchers also predicted a complete system breakdown, as the complexities of mutual interdependence increase or overrun the capacity for management (Scott, 1977). This research primarily tries to establish or contradict the hypothetical relationship of mutual economic interdependence (passive strategy) with oil security for cause–effect relationship through empirical studies by taking 31 years of time series data (1980–2010) of United States and Iraq crude oil trade. Moreover, the research also discusses the context of US invasion of Iraq for securing supplies of oil from Iraq.

Generally, the concept of energy security is limited to crude oil importing countries only. However, the concept of energy security has evolved in recent years. Several major drivers have convinced experts and policy makers that energy security is the responsibility of both consumers and producers. This article assumes that vulnerability from security of demand (SOD) and security of supply (SOS) of crude oil exporting and importing countries, respectively, can be used as a passive strategy to foster mutual economic interdependence (ID_i) and influence decisions on crude oil supply (IT_i), which is synonymously used as ‘oil security’ in this research. In the research, efforts have been made to establish this causal relationship between ID_iand IT_i. The proposed study aims to establish linkages among these variables to analyze the influence of ‘asymmetric’¹ mutual economic dependence as a significant ‘passive strategy’ for ‘oil security’. Further, for examining circumstances under which active strategies such as military intervention for oil security are used amidst complex interdependence (i.e. with the development of WMD), the researcher has taken the example of US–Iraq relationship for further analysis.

The article attempts to answer the following questions:

What is the relationship between mutual economic interdependence (proxy for passive strategy) and crude oil supply (proxy for oil security) between the United States and Iraq? Whether ‘asymmetric’ interdependence affects oil security and mitigates use of force (active strategies)?

What were the circumstances under which United States invaded Iraq? Did it help US oil security?

To provide some answers to these questions, this article develops an empirical framework that examines the cause–effect relationship between economic interdependence and oil security. The article makes two main contributions. First, it tries to quantify mutual economic interdependence and empirically analyze its effect on oil supplies between two countries. To the best my knowledge, no published study has empirically tested the cause–effect relationship of mutual economic interdependence and oil security to consolidate or contradict the theoretical concept that passive strategies such as mutual economic interdependence influence oil supply security. Second, the article attempts to provide circumstances under which military invasion is used as an active strategy for oil security by citing the example of US occupation of Iraq.

The rest of the article is structured as follows: Section 2 presents the literature review; Sections 3 and 4 present data description and the econometric methodology, respectively; Section 5 presents the Empirical Analysis and results; Section 6 presents the Conclusion.

Literature Review

Mutual Interdependence

Interdependence means increasing reciprocal effects and vulnerabilities among nations on an increasing number of different issues, including energy. The term ‘complex interdependence’ was developed by Keohane and Nye (1977) and refers to the various complex transnational connections (interdependence) between states and societies. Keohane and Nye (1977) highlighted vulnera-bility interdependence or ‘asymmetric relations’ as a source of power, which can be converted into decisional influences. Deutsch (1978) in his book, ‘The analysis of International Relations’, pointed out that different degrees of relative vulnerability also involve different capacities to manipulate interdependence to enhance influence over international outcomes. Bengt (1980) pointed out that economic interdependence could also be measured in terms of international trade. He further mentions that mutual interdependence can also be measured in terms of trade flows between two countries. Interdependence exists where there is relatively equal or balanced exchange of not easily substitutable goods (Inkeles, 1975). Caporaso (1978) attempted to quantify economic interdependence and defined such dependence of actor A on actor B as ‘the extent A relies on B for large quantities of important goods, which cannot be easily replaced at sufferable costs, while B acquires small quantities of unimportant goods from A which can be easily replaced’. Caporaso (1978) then calculated the interdependence of A and B as the net difference between their dependencies.

However, it cannot be ascertained from these studies the extent to which asymmetric economic interdependent relations can affect international outcomes because further analyses were not carried out to empirically test for any ‘cause–effect’ relationship. This research uses the concept of mutual economic interdependence between Iraq (oil exporting country) and United States (importing country) to find possible causal relationship between mutual economic interdependence and oil security. However, to avoid calculating mutual economic interdependence based on trade of goods, which are not easily replaceable, and goods which can be easily supplemented, this research uses mutual crude oil import and export between United States and Iraq as a proxy variable for calculating economic interdependence. The reason for this assumption is based on the fact that majority of trade revenue generated by countries of Middle East (including Iraq) and North Africa (MENA) countries comes from oil exports which has influence on their economic security (Chatterjee, 2012a). Similarly, for an oil importing country like United States, oil is an important part of its energy mix. Moreover, trade between United States and Middle East countries is heavily dominated by crude oil. Therefore, it is assumed that oil trade between United States and Iraq is an important component for determining mutual economic interdependence.

Oil Security

US Department of Energy (US DOE) in 1956 defined energy security as a sufficient supply of energy at affordable price. Many of the energy security definitions are focussed on securing and maintaining supply of energy, particularly supply of oil (Clawson, 1997). Energy (including oil) security can be defined as a condition when a nation has access to sufficient energy resources at reasonable prices for foreseeable future (Barton, 2004). Barton (2004) stated that such an access or control of resources is imperative for mitigating risk from major oil supply disruption. An exact definition of energy security is hard to give as different people interpret it differently at different moments in time (Alhajji, 2007). Oil security per se means availability of uninterrupted supply of oil at all times; supply of oil between two countries is the simplest indicator of oil security. Accessibility of oil is also another important factor for oil security; however, it often carries geopolitical implications (Kruyt et al., 2009).

Passive and Active Strategies

Alhajji mentions four major principles underlining the energy policies of all major industrial countries for oil security. These are (a) diversity of energy supplies; (b) diversity of oil import source; (c) reduced dependence on Middle East oil and (d) low oil price volatility. The Asia Pacific Energy Research Centre (Quest for Energy Security, 2007) in a study also consolidated the fact that diversity is an important means to hedge against supply risks. Vlado (2009) argues against over emphasis on diversification of sources, stating that ‘though diversification is an important aspect, too much must not be read into it’. Diversification has been one of the oldest active strategies for mitigating oil supply risks; however, mutual economic interdependence can also be an important passive strategy mitigating oil supply risk (Kalicki and Goldwyn, 2005). National Council of State Legislatures (NCSL) United States in a report in 2006 on energy security strategies for United States described a resilient energy system as one, which is capable of withstanding threats through a combination of active (direct) or passive (indirect) measures. It is necessary to do further empirical research to explore the effect of passive strategies like mutual economic interdependence on oil supplies (Chatterjee, 2012b). Apart from passive strategies, active strategies such as military occupation are also used for oil security. Singer (2008), in policy analysis, briefly stated that oil is one of the resources, which still attracts military intervention for its access and control (Singer, 2008). The concept of energy security is generally offensive as it is closely related to economic well-being of its citizens; Western States prefer to use offensive or active strategies against economically and politically weak oil supplying states (Grafstein, 2002).

The research endeavours to empirically examine the use of ‘asymmetric economic interdependence’ between two countries as a passive strategic tool to influence international outcomes, such as oil supply. The article assumes that asymmetry in crude oil trade dependence between two countries has a causal relationship with crude oil supply quantity. It uses cointegration and Granger causality tests for testing causality between ‘passive strategy’ such as asymmetric economic interdependence and crude oil supplies quantity.

Data Description

Data of United States and Iraq crude oil exports and US imports from Iraq have been taken from United Nations Energy Statistics report 2011 (Table 1). This article examines 31 years of data starting from 1980 to 2010; however in Table 1, only figures from 1990 to 2010 are presented as an example. This period includes two wars between Iraq and United States, first in 1991 and second in 2003. The export and import data have been expressed in MMTPA. Further, it is assumed in the article that I_j is the total import from (j) supplying country (here Iraq) and IT_iis the total imports of crude oil by the oil importing country (i) (here United States). I_mD_i is the import dependence of the crude oil importing country (i) on the oil supplier (j).

The research assumes that interdependence (ID_i) between United States and Iraq is equal to export dependence on crude oil of Iraq (ED_i) minus import dependence on crude oil of United States (I_mD_i) as the passive strategy factor. Measures of import and export dependence are the most commonly used indicators for energy security. An example of such an indicator is the import of oil, often expressed relative to oil consumption (Alhajji and Williams, 2003). Here, export dependence (ED_i) is the quantity of exports from Iraq to United States divided by the total exports of crude oil by Iraq for that particular year. Similarly, import dependence (I_mD_i) is the ratio of crude oil imported by United States from Iraq and US total imports of crude oil for that particular year. For I_mD_i purposes, this article takes total import figures of crude oil instead of consumption as it may also include crude oil from indigenous source. Thus mathematically import dependence can be represented as I_mD_iI_jIT_i

Table 1.

The Level of Crude Trade Interdependence between United States and Iraq for the Period 1990–2010

Year	US Total Crude Oil Imports in MMTPA	Iraq Total Crude Exports in MMTPA	US Imports from Iraq (IT_i) in MMTPA	US Crude Oil Import Dependence on Iraq (I_mD_i)	Iraq Crude Oil Export Dependence on United States (ED_i)	Interdependence (ID_i) = (ED_i) – (I_mD_i)
1990	277.64	78.15	25.58	0.09	0.33	0.24
1991	273.36	2.12	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
1992	282.07	2.97	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
1993	337.82	2.89	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
1994	351.56	2.93	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
1995	359.87	3.11	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
1996	373.71	4.32	0.05	0.00	0.01	0.01
1997	409.40	36.86	4.43	0.01	0.12	0.11
1998	433.34	79.68	16.72	0.04	0.21	0.17
1999	434.59	100.63	36.09	0.08	0.36	0.28
2000	451.51	102.50	30.86	0.07	0.30	0.23
2001	464.30	90.18	39.57	0.09	0.44	0.35
2002	454.94	71.28	22.85	0.05	0.32	0.27
2003	481.08	49.12	23.94	0.05	0.49	0.44
2004	502.13	73.89	32.60	0.06	0.44	0.38
2005	504.02	68.77	26.23	0.05	0.38	0.33
2006	503.62	73.68	27.53	0.05	0.37	0.32
2007	499.29	80.56	24.09	0.05	0.30	0.25
2008	486.95	88.22	31.21	0.06	0.35	0.29
2009	448.62	86.12	22.35	0.05	0.26	0.21
2010	456.09	85.23	20.61	0.05	0.24	0.19

Source: UN Energy Statistics report 2011 (exports and imports data only).

Thus, if ID_i> 1.00 (where ID_i = export dependence‒import dependence), it implies that Iraq is more dependent on United States for its exports as compared to US dependence on Iraq for imports. Such relative interdependence ID_i (refer Figure 1) has been assumed as ‘asymmetric relation’ or mutual economic interdependence.

Figure 1.

Flow Chart Showing Assumed Relationship Between Oil Security and Asymmetric Economic Interdependence

The level of crude oil interdependence between United States and Iraq is highly unbalanced or asymmetric as shown in Table 1. US import dependence on Iraq has been within the range of 0–9 per cent, whereas Iraq export dependence on United States has been 0–49 per cent. Although the interdependence ratio is between 0 and 44 per cent, Iraq export dependence is very high as compared to US import dependence. This shows Iraq’s dependence on United States for majority of its oil revenues, which has a major influence on its economic well-being (Chatterjee, 2012a). The basic summary statistics of ID_i and IT_i series of United States and Iraq is given in Table 2.

Table 2.

Summary Statistics for Both ID_i and IT_i Series (United States–Iraq)

Variable	Description	Mean	Standard Deviation	Minimum	Maximum
IT_i	Crude oil supply from Iraq to United States (MMTPA)	13.579	13.885	0	39.570
ID_i	Crude oil trade interdependence between Iraq and United States	0.138	0.144	0	0.438
Observations	From 1980 to 2010	31	31	31	31

Econometric Methodology

Empirical studies of multivariate time series data have shown that in order to avoid spurious regression situation, the variables must be stationary or cointegrated (Engle and Granger, 1987). It is well known that most of the economic time series data might have a unit root and dominated by stochastic trend. Conventional regression techniques, based on non-stationary time series, produce spurious regression, and statistics may simply indicate only correlated trend rather than a true relationship. In this article, we have tested data of crude oil supply quantity and the calculated mutual economic interdependence for non-stationarity; subsequently, the series was tested for cointegration, and then a decision was taken on whether to model the variables as an unrestricted vector autoregression (VAR) or error correction model (ECM). Finally, variables were tested using Granger causality to establish or contradict the assumed hypotheses. The research examines whether dynamic reciprocal, unidirectional or no causality exits between interdependence and crude oil supply data of United States and Iraq.

Engle and Granger (1987) showed that if the series X and Y, for example, are individually I(1) (i.e. integrated of order one) and cointegrated, then there would be a causal relationship at least in one direction. However, the direction of causality can be detected through the vector ECM of long-run cointegrating vectors. Furthermore, Granger’s Representation Theorem demonstrates how to model a cointegrated I(1) series in a VAR format. VAR can be constructed either in terms of the level of the data or in terms of their first differences, that is, I(0) variables, with the addition of an error correction term to capture the short-run dynamics.

If the series are I(1) but not cointegrated, causality test may give misleading results unless the data are transformed to induce stationarity.

Three-stage procedures have been employed to test the existence of causality. The first step tests for the order of integration of the variables using augmented Dickey–Fuller (ADF) (1981) statistics. Conditional on the outcome of the tests, the second stage involves investigating cointegration relationship among the variables using VAR approach of Johansen and Juselius (1990) (Johansen, 1991).

The third stage (or second if bivariate cointegration is rejected) involves constructing standard Granger-type causality tests, augmented where appropriate with a lagged error correction term.

ADF test for stationarity

ADF test is conducted with the following model: X_t(1)₀k_tkX_t_–1_jX_t_–j_tjp

where X_t is the underlying variable at time t, ε_t is the error term and α₀, β, k and γ_j are the parameters to be estimated.

The lag terms are introduced in order to justify that errors are uncorrelated with lag terms. For the above-specified model, the hypothesis, which would be of our interest, is H₀k

Granger causality test

If the series X and Y are individually I(1) and cointegrated, then Granger causality tests may use the I(0) data with an error correction term, that is

\begin{matrix} Δ X_{t} =α+ \sum_{i =1}^{m} β_{i} Λ X_{t - i} + \\ \sum_{j =1}^{n} γ_{j} Δ Y_{t - j} +δ E C M_{t - 1} + u_{t} \end{matrix}

(2)

\begin{matrix} Δ Y_{t} = a + \sum_{i =1}^{q} b_{i} Δ Y_{t - i} + \\ \sum_{j =1}^{r} c_{j} Δ X_{t - j} + d E C M_{t - 1} + v_{t} \end{matrix}

(3)

where δ and d are error correction terms, u_tand v_t are zero-mean, serially uncorrelated, random disturbances.

If the data are I(1) but not cointegrated, valid Granger-type tests require transformation to make them I(0). So, in this case, the equations become

Δ X_{t} =α+ \sum_{i =1}^{m} β_{i} Δ X_{t - i} + \sum_{j =1}^{n} γ_{j} Δ X_{t - j} + u_{t}

(4)

Δ Y_{t} = a + \sum_{i =1}^{q} b_{i} Δ Y_{t - i} + \sum_{j =1}^{r} c_{j} Δ X_{t - j} + v_{t}

(5)

The optimum lag length of the VAR can be determined on the basis of Akaike’s (AIC) and/or Schwarz Bayesian (SBC) and/or log-likelihood ratio (LR) test criterion.

For Eqs. (2) and (3), the F-statistics on the lagged explanatory variables of the ECM indicates the significance of the short-run causal effects. The t-statistics on the coefficients of the lagged error-correction term indicates the significance of the long-run causal effect.

For Eqs. (4) and (5), ΔY GC ΔX if,

H₀: γ₁ = γ₂ = … = γ_n = 0 is rejected

Against H_A: = at least one γ_j ≠ 0, j = 1, …, n,

and ΔX GC ΔY if,

H₀: c₁ = c₂ = ….. = c_n = 0 is rejected

Against H_A: = at least one c_j ≠ 0, j = 1, …, r.

Empirical Results

In the first stage, the order of integrations of the variables is investigated. Table 3 presents the results of unit root tests based on ADF tests on the levels and the first differences of the variables ID_i and IT_i. The null hypothesis of a unit root cannot be rejected at 5 per cent level of significance. Stationarity is obtained by running the similar test on the first difference of the variables, indicating that both the series are I(1) in nature.

Table 3.

Unit Root Test of ID_i and IT_i Series (United States–Iraq)

Variables	ADF Test Statistic
Variables	Level	First Difference
IT_i	‒1.503	‒5.218
ID_i	‒1.354	‒7.060
1% Critical value	‒4.339	‒4.339
5% Critical value	‒3.587	‒3.587
10% Critical value	‒3.229	‒3.229

Table 4.

Johansen Cointegration Estimation Results of ID_i and IT_i Series (United States–Iraq)

Rank Test (trace)
Number of cointegration	Trace statistic	5% Critical value
None	14.609	15.494
Almost 1	1.069	3.841
Rank Test (max eigenvalue)
Number of cointegration	Max-Eigen statistic	5% Critical value
None	13.540	14.264
Almost 1	1.069	3.841

In the second stage, Johansen maximum likelihood procedure is used to detect cointegration. This provides a unified framework for estimation and testing of cointegrating relations in the context of a VAR ECM. The cointegration rank, r, of the time series is tested using two-test statistics. Denoting the number of cointegrating vectors by r_o, the maximum eigenvalue (l max) test is calculated under the null hypothesis that r_o = r, against the alternative of r_o > r. The trace test is calculated under the null hypothesis that r_o ≤ r, against r_o > r.

Referring to Table 4, both maximal eigenvalue test and trace test reveal that the null hypothesis r = 0 and r ≤ 1 between IT_i and ID_i cannot be accepted against the alternative r ≥ 1 and r = 2 at 5 per cent level of significance. These imply the absence of cointegration between IT_i and ID_i.

In the absence of cointegration between variables ID_iand IT_i, short-run causal effects can be tested with the first difference operator of the variables, that is, ΔID_i and ΔIT_iin an unrestricted VAR framework.

On the basis of SBC and adjusted LR test criteria, the optimal lag order of the VAR is chosen as 1. The absence of residual serial correlation of the individual equations has also confirmed the correct order of VAR selection.

Table 5 represents the results of the Granger causality tests. The null hypothesis of non-causality from ΔID to ΔIT, which is asymptotically distributed as a chi-square variate with one degree of freedom, cannot be rejected at 5 per cent level of significance. While testing the non-causality from ΔIT to ΔID, the null hypothesis cannot be rejected at 5 per cent level of significance. Thus, the Granger causality results show lack of causality in either direction.

Table 5.

Granger Causality Test of Series (United States–Iraq)

Granger Causality
	Source of Causation (short run)
Dependent variable	ΔIT_i	ΔID_i
ΔIT_i	–	0.310 (0.582)
ΔID_i	0.031 (0.861)	–

Notes: Here ‘Δ’ denotes the first difference operator of ID_i and IT_i series.

Figures in brackets are probability values.

Conclusion

US foreign policy towards Iraq has been aggressive since 1991, however it continued to source oil from Iraq for its energy security, excepting for the period from 1991 to 1995. The importance of oil security and the perceived threat to US national security from WMD manufactured by Iraq led to a highly complex scenario. On one hand, oil security was necessary for United States, and on the other hand, United States did not want to compromise on its National security, especially after the 26/11. Although, United States is one of the major importers of crude oil from Iraq, the US administration played a pivotal role in the UN Security Council to bring in resolution for immediate, unconditional and unrestricted access for inspection of any sites in Iraq for WMD by the UN Monitoring, Verification and Inspection Commission (UNMOVIC) and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) on November 2002, for its own national security. However, when Iraq did not comply with UN Security Councils pressure, United States attempted to push through a UN security resolution for invasion of Iraq. The efforts proved futile when other permanent members, including Germany, Russia and France, vetoed it. However, United States along with United Kingdom, invaded Iraq in 2003 and declared the occupying forces by the UN Security Council through its 1483 resolution on May 2003. This shows US zero tolerance for any threat to National security, after 26/11 even from countries from where it sources oil. Moreover, the issue of WMD could also be treated as a political passive strategy by United States to politically isolate Iraq, before invading it.

The article further reveals through the empirical research that evidences of unbalanced (asymmetric) oil trade interdependence exist between United States and Iraq. The economic Interdependence ratio is heavily skewed towards US favour, that is, Iraq export dependence on United States is greater than US import dependence on Iraq (refer Table 1). This asymmetrical economic interdependence is due to Iraq’s overt dependence on oil exports as a major source of revenue generation, indicating lack in the development of other sectors and shows Iraq’s vulnerable economic conditions.

Moreover, econometric analysis proves that there is no causality in any direction between the assumed proxy variables for Interdependence and oil security. Lack in causality between the economic interdependence proxy variable ID_i and oil security proxy variable IT_i consolidates that passive strategy in the form of economic interdependence is not in play between Iraq and United States. Therefore, one can comprehend that although asymmetric economic interdependence is considered to be an important passive strategy for oil security (Kalicki and Goldwyn, 2005), lack of causality between economic interdependence and oil security between United States and Iraq (as evident from the econometric results) could be one of the contributing factors for use of direct strategy.

Some of the reasons which contributed to the military invasion of Iraq are US suspicion on Iraq’s WMD, Iraq’s lack in economic development (from its dependence on oil exports as major source of revenues), its political isolation (from not allowing UN inspectors), US aggressive foreign (policy after 26/11) and US need for oil security in Middle East. Therefore, the research consolidates the fact that military intervention is still used by Western forces, where issues of energy security are concerned on countries which are politically and economically weak, especially where there is lack in established cause–effect relations between mutual economic interdependence and oil security.

US military occupation of Iraq was a strategic success, as it helped US oil companies to gain access to vast oil resources of Iraq and win major contracts for exploration and production. Statistical data and business evidences reveal that after US–Iraq second war, Iraq’s exports of crude oil to United States have increased, at present, United States is the major export destination of Iraqi crude oil. Juhasz (2008), in her book, mentions that after invasion of Iraq by United States in 2003, oil companies of United States have landed themselves lucrative contracts for exploration and supply of crude oil (prior of 2003, there were no US oil company operating in Iraq). Zalloum (2002), an international oil consultant and economist, stated that United States and its ally have ‘obtained concessions’ in major Iraqi oil fields after its occupation of Iraq.

Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) in a report has presented that no concrete evidences of chemical, biological or nuclear WMD were found in Iraq after US occupation (CIA-Report, 2004). One can therefore comprehend that US use of military force, as a direct strategy helped primarily to achieve oil security through access, presence and penetration of the source of oil in Iraq than anything else.

To further examine the evidences of economic interdependence as a passive strategy for oil, one could do a comparative analysis of United States and Kuwait. Historically, India has never engaged any kind military intervention as a direct strategy for security of oil; it adopts more passive or indirect strategies through political persuasiveness. Further, research on the passive strategies used by India for its oil security could be another area of interest, especially its strategy in Iran, given that it sources oil from Iran even with United States and Europe sanctions.

Footnotes

Note

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