Book Review: Samuel B. Griffith,The Art of War ~ Sun Tzu

The Art of War (TAW) is Griffith’s English translation of Sun Hsing-yen and Wu Jen-chi’s Chinese edition of TAW written during the Manchu period, along with his observations, interpretations and analysis of events leading to the creation of TAW. It is a timeless treatise on warfare (‘best short introduction to the study’) and treats war as the ‘ultimate instrument of statecraft’. It was first introduced outside China by Fr. J.J. Amiot, a French missionary, in 1772 and later re-published in 1782 in an anthology (p. 11). Sun Tzu’s views, through TAW, provided invaluable guidance to military strategists and rulers like Napoleon and Mao Tse-Tung. ‘The supreme art of war was to subdue the enemy without fighting’ (Foreword, p. 8, B. H. Liddell Hart) is the underlying theme for the book.

Reading the Introduction may be daunting because the discussion is unstructured, especially in its subsections, The Author and The Text. The Chinese names of people and places challenge the casual reader. But Griffith’s research is meticulous, and his narrative style is friendly. His array of narratives, facts and references on almost every page lend credibility to his analyses. Some quotations like ‘Weapons are ominous tools to be used only when there is no alternative’ (p. 63) are always memorable. TAW is peppered with references to combat, reconnaissance, flank patrolling, invasion, spies, deception, training, punishment, morale, weapons, control, suicides and assassinations in the Introduction (pp. 16–89) that will entice you to rush to the thirteen chapters (pp. 90–239).

TAW’s alleged author, Sun Tzu, appears to have been a mythical person. In The Author, Griffith sifts through considerable evidence about its origins to conclude that TAW may have been written by ‘a singularly imaginative individual who had considerable practical experience in war’, and declaring the issue as ‘Author Unsettled’ (p. 30). In The Text, he argues that TAW may have started with 82 chapters (p. 32) which were reduced to 13 chapters after the elimination of repetitive content.

The first TAW was probably written after the third century BC, with its contents built on the substantive experience of the many wars during 450 and 300 BC between at least six Chinese states. ‘The Warring States’ describes the War as a ‘fundamental occupation’ due to which countless rulers, generals and generations lost their lives. During this period, presented so well in ‘War in Sun Tzu’s Age’, new weapons like the crossbow were designed. Conventions that died included avoidance of battles during the cold winters, hot summers and agricultural seasons, and norms for ethical and righteous battles. Fighting and soldiers became professional, and brute fighting gave way to subtlety and planning.

‘Sun Tzu on War’ discusses the philosophy behind TAW. War is costly and a matter of grave concern for any nation even in those days. Therefore, it had to be avoided or won, quickly. TAW recommends planning, breaking alliances, espionage, isolation and other means to defeat the enemy without a physical battle by attacking the mind of the enemy. The ‘Biography of Sun Tzu’ is a misnomer because it contains no biography except some anecdotal evidence of the mythical Sun Tzu and of a real Sun Pin, who was probably the proxy for Sun Tzu.

‘Sun Tzu and Mao Tse-Tung’ describes how Chairman Mao adopted TAW guidelines to grow his control within mainland China and win his wars with the nationalists and in Korea. Mao was so impressed with TAW that it influenced his three books on military strategy, affected his agrarian policies and shaped his key principles for his Red Army

The thirteen chapters are replete with Chinese scripts (probably the original versions of the English translations), and paintings and pencil sketches of soldiers, weapons, troop formations and terracotta sculptures. They illustrate the reading materials, making it easier to imbibe the translated meaning. Griffith deserves all praise for his patient efforts in selecting images that most appropriately suited his English translations.

Estimates (Chapter I) could mean plans or calculations, but on reading the contents, suggests that it probably means preparations or setting for doing battle. War is ‘a province of life or death’, and therefore, must be understood in terms of moral influence, weather, terrain, command and doctrine as fundamental factors, which are seen to be battle conditions that prevailed during the fourth and fifth centuries BC. Statements that stand out and explain most of the others are ‘All warfare is based on deception’ (p. 96, para 17) and ‘Attack where he is unprepared; sally out when he does not expect you’ (26/100). In Waging War (II), the focus is on weapons, chariots and other resources, expenditures and operations. The statement, ‘Victory is the main object in war’ (3/106) sets the tone.

How to attack and win using troops and other means is covered in Offensive Strategy (III). ‘To subdue the enemy without fighting is the acme of skill’ (3/115) is a pointer to the chapter contents. The statement ‘He whose ranks are united in purpose will be victorious’ has implications for the effectiveness of every team and organization, whether in business, sports or otherwise. The Dispositions (IV) discusses the nature and preparedness of troops of both sides. War must consider these five elements, namely, measurement of space, estimation of quantities, calculations, comparisons and chances of victory (16/132) for a desirable end, because they are present in every strategic approach.

Force can be used in countless combinations to influence events, even with limited resources. ‘To control is […] a matter of formations and signals’ (2/136) is the theme of Energy (V). To organize and command the army is necessary because ‘A skilled commander seeks victory from the situation, and not from his subordinates’ (21/140). In Weaknesses and Strengths (VI), the focus is on subtlety, speed and situation. The first mover advantage is obvious in ‘He who occupies the field of battle first and awaits his enemy is at ease; he who comes later to the scene and rushes into the fight is weary’ (1/145). Martial arts expert Bruce Lee’s famous dictum, ‘Be like water’ is felt in ‘An army may be likened to water […] water shapes its flow’ (27–30/153). In Manoeuvre (VII), the emphasis is on troop management and enemy engagement through deception and appropriate signalling. ‘When he pretends to flee, do not pursue’ and ‘Do not attack his elite troops’ are prudent instructions for the army (27–28/161).

The Nine Variables (VIII) is a misnomer. Although tactical approaches of grounds and factors are discussed, there is neither reference to variables, nor anything nine in number. This may be one of the many translation problems faced by Griffith. ‘There are occasions where the commands of the sovereign need not be obeyed’ (8/172) asserts the universal truth that ground realities are best understood by those on the battlefield and not by their rulers (their organizational counterparts would be managers and business owners). If a general were to be reckless, cowardly, short-tempered, compassionate or have a wrong sense of honour, he may fail in military operations (17–22/176–179). In Marches (IX), you will find minute instructions for the movements and positions of the army and the enemy. ‘When the trees are seen to move, the enemy is advancing’ (20/184) and ‘When his troops lean on their weapons, they are famished’ (32/189).

The Terrain (X) discusses six different types of battlegrounds, namely, accessible, entrapping, indecisive, constricted, precipitous and distant, and the specific army actions to meet the conditions prevailing on those grounds. Also covered are detailed instructions for the general such as ‘When troops flee, or are insubordinate, distressed, collapse in disorder or are routed, it is the fault of the general’ (91/197). The Nine Varieties of Ground (XI) appears to be an extension of the previous chapter, with nine more types of grounds, namely, dispersive, frontier, key, communicating, focal, serious, difficult, encircled and death. The guidelines for the general’s behaviour include ‘Speed is the essence of war’ (29/213). Griffith observes that the chapter contents of the original Chinese text were disorganized.

There are five targets to Attack by Fire (XII), namely, soldiers, stores, equipment, arsenals and incendiary missiles. It also discusses other details such as the medium and equipment for such fire methods. A memorable statement is ‘Enlightened rulers deliberate upon the plans, and good generals execute them’ (16/229). The Employment of Secret Agents (XIII) contends that ‘an army without secret agents is exactly like a man without eyes or ears’ (23/239). It recommends that five types of secret agents be employed by the State, namely, native, inside, doubled, expendable and living. Their work is to collect information about the enemy, to spread false information with them, and assassination.

The contents of some chapters seem to be different from what is inferred by their respective titles. Another TAW authored by Wu Ch’i with six chapters titled ‘Planning Operations against Other States’ (six sections), ‘Estimating the Enemy’ (three), ‘The Control of Troops’ (three), ‘A Discussion on Generalship’ (three), ‘Responding to Changing Conditions’ (ten) and ‘Encouragement of Officers’ (one) mirrors TAW’s contents (pp. 241–255). Wu Ch’i was born in 430 BC and had died in 381 BC and, therefore, may have pre-dated Sun Tzu’s TAW. TAW ends with a bibliography of books in English; monographs and articles in English; books, monographs and articles in Western languages (other than English) and Chinese.

No strategic goal can be accomplished without control over others and the environment through logical and deliberate action. Although TAW’s latent objective may be to win battles without fighting them, it also offer guidance to seize control, to seek and retain power, and to apply political leverage. ‘To overthrow the State without bloodying swords’ (Griffith, p. 11) is one of TAW’s key tactics for engagements and interactions with the enemy for control and victory. Some of its commonsensical directives have pragmatic advice to individuals who wish to enlarge their sphere of influence. Despite its references to suicides and assassinations, it is not an evil text, and should not be judged from ethical or moral angles. TAW is not a text book, but is a simple guide for and must be read by marketing chiefs, military strategists, political leaders, and anyone else who wishes to protect or expand business territory or constituency.