Abstract
Sustainable delivery of drinking water of adequate quantity/quality sits at the core of rural development paradigms worldwide. The overarching goal of this study was to assess operational performance of rural water supply services (RWSS) in India to help authorities understand challenges/shortfalls vis-à-vis opportunities. Data on habitation-level coverage, aggregated by states between 2013 and 2018, were obtained from the National Rural Drinking Water Programme (NRDWP) database, against two water supply norms, namely, 40 lpcd and 55 lpcd (litres per capita per day). Results indicate that certain states are faring better (providing full coverage to over 90% habitations) while others are lagging (e.g., the north-eastern region, and Kerala and Karnataka in the South, for both norms). Several states yet fail to provide 55 lpcd to over half of their rural habitations. Overall, RWSS is marked by high spatial heterogeneity, inequality and recurrent slip-backs (decline in year-to-year habitation coverage) that thwart the basic motto of NRDWP—Har Ghar Jal (Water for All). Ground-level experience reveals a mismatch between theoretical systems’ output (40 lpcd and 55 lpcd) and on-site delivery, and highly intermittent services. Moreover, frequent scheme failure/abandonment adds to systems’ uncertainties and water users’ plight. A multitude of operational/organisational flaws, associated with government waterworks bodies, at different levels of systems’ hierarchy, limit RWSS operational performance. To that end, the concluding section argues for a demand-driven RWSS model (bottom-up systems’ governance) and highlights the core tenets of the same that call for integration of environmental, social, cultural, ethical and political perspectives in RWSS systems’ thinking/design.
Keywords
Introduction
Over the past few decades, resolving issues with sustainable rural water supply services (RWSS) has emerged as a key agenda in many global development dialogues, in recognition of its contribution to rural development paradigms. The issue has come to the fore in many developing economies, including Ethiopia (Tadesse, Bosona, and Gebresenbet et al. 2013), Nigeria (Nwankwoala 2011), Tanzania (Jiménez and Perez-Foguet 2010), Ghana (Atipoka 2009), Uganda (Naiga, Penkar, and Hogl 2015), Mali (Gleitsmann, Kroma, and Steenhuis 2007), Nepal (Haapala and White 2018) and India (Gopakumar 2010; Hutchings 2018; Hutchings et al. 2017; Mali and Dwibedi 2013; Nayar and James 2010; Rout 2014), where RWSS holds the key to improved life quality, health and creation of newer livelihood opportunities.
Chronological Order of Key Rural Water Supply Services (RWSS) Policy Reforms Created as Part of Different Five-Year Plans
The benefits of a functional RWSS are acknowledged in rural development paradigms worldwide, with it potentially contributing to new livelihood creation and poverty eradication (Jiménez and Perez-Foguet 2010), improvement of livelihood qualities (Jonah, Maitho, and Omware 2015), food/nutritional security (Kabir et al. 2016), health security, etc. As an added incentive, it helps meeting several United nations (UN) Sustainable Development Goal (SDG) targets by 2030: No Poverty (SDG 1), Zero Hunger (SDG 2), Health and Wellbeing (SDG 3), Clean Water and Sanitation (SDG 6), etc. However, despite several reformative actions in the past decades, the operational performance of RWSS in India yet falls short of meeting users’ expectations (Chaudhuri and Roy 2016a; Hirsch 2006). For example, the efficacy of the Swajaldhara programme is limited by income inequalities, caste hierarchies, and rural power dynamics (Sampat 2007). Apparently, the marginalised populations (less endowed and/or socially less privileged) are yet to enjoy full benefits (Srivastava 2012). There appear three baffling concerns in RWSS systems’ operation (policy–practice gap): (a) lack of adequate quantity to meet domestic needs; (b) lack of continuous availability/accessibility; and (c) potential health risks (water quality) (Nwankwoala 2011).
With such realisations, the present study aims to offer an overview of the current operational performance of the RWSS in India, between 2013 and 2018, against two water supply norms—40 lpcd and 55 lpcd (litres per capita per day)—to highlight achievements vis-à-vis concerns. In the process, it integrates technical with policy/institutional aspects of the RWSS to evaluate the fundamental motto/vision of the NRDWP: Water for All (Har Ghar Jal). The study was divided into three sections:
Spatial–statistical–graphical appraisal of state-wise (a) heterogeneity, (b) inequality and (c) consistency in coverage details, and how these attributes ‘evolved’ over time (2013–2018). Computation/mapping for this part was based on state-wise percentages of habitations with full-coverage (FC) status year to year. FC indicates that 100% of the population is receiving 40 lpcd and/or 55 lpcd. Policy concerns associated with current RWSS systems’ architecture, focusing on the level of functionality of various waterworks committees, ranging from village to district to state level. Appraisal of current RWSS systems’ thinking, to be geared towards a holistic community-centric model for the future.
A prime motivation to conduct this study was that there is yet no nationwide spatial appraisal of RWSS operational performances that incorporates a temporal component. However, such an integrative effort, charting out the evolutionary trajectory of the RWSS over time, is sought after in policy circles for developing judicial/targeted resource-mobilisation protocols for regions with a legacy of system failure/malfunction. Moreover, as global authorities advocate adopting community-run RWSSs, this study highlights generic issues that need to be strategically incorporated in RWSS systems’ design to ensure a sustainable delivery system.
Materials and Methods
Study Area
There are 29 states in India and seven union territories (UTs). India occupies about 2.4 per cent of the global landmass, hosting 16 per cent of the global population, 9 per cent of the global arable land, with only about 4 per cent of the global freshwater reserves (Raj and Sanmugam 2014). Currently, 13 Indian states are under severe drought alerts (Mundetia and Sharma 2015) and food insecurity concerns (Mishra et al. 2019) that endanger lives and livelihoods of a vast population (Zhang et al. 2017). Rapidly depleting groundwater reserves (Srivastava et al. 2017), coupled with pervasive water quality degradation, accentuates the water crises further (Chaudhuri and Roy 2016b).
Growing water shortages have ramified impacts on rural societies. For example, water users are often forced to buy water (e.g., water markets), which raises costs of water production, which limits accessibility/affordability (especially for marginal/less endowed sections). It creates socio-economic inequity in rural societies. Water shortages have made the rural gender divide ever more apparent. Women are responsible for water/firewood collection. However, general observation about it is that women have to make multiple trips to water sources to fulfill daily need (household quota). Daily travel time (back and forth to water source and home) has negative impact on women’s educational, social, health, hygiene, and nutritional opportunities. Moreover, it keeps them from participating in rural administrative processes (meetings, workshops, training programmes etc.) (Chaudhuri et al. 2020a; Baker et al. 2018). Moreover, such strenuous chores affect women’s health (Geere, Hunter, and Jagals 2010), besides leading to a variety of psychological disorders (e.g., anxiety, helplessness, depression). Oftentimes, young girls are engaged in daily water collection routines. Besides health ramifications, it leads to school dropouts, which interferes with their cognitive development routines and thus limits future career opportunities. Lack of sustainable water supply services undermines the rural WaSH (Water–Sanitation–Hygiene) infrastructure to cause multiple social-health damages (Chaudhuri and Roy 2017).
With such realisations, the NRDWP was envisaged to facilitate a transformative change in the rural water sector (CAG 2018). The core ideas include: (a) enabling all households to have access to and use safe and adequate drinking water within a reasonable distance; (b) enabling communities to monitor their drinking water sources; (c) ensuring that potability, reliability, sustainability, convenience, equity and consumers’ preference are the guiding principles while planning for a community-based water supply system; (d) providing drinking water facility, especially piped water supply, to GPs that have achieved open-defecation-free status, on priority basis; (e) ensuring all government schools and anganwadis have access to safe drinking water; (f) providing support and an enabling environment for Panchayati Raj Institutions and local communities to manage their own drinking water sources and systems in their villages; and (g) providing access to information through online reporting mechanism, with information placed in the public domain to ensure transparency and informed decision-making.
Data Acquisition and Pre-processing
Data for the 2013–2018 period were obtained from the official geodatabase of the NRDWP—the Integrated Management Information System (IMIS), a portal hosted by the Ministry of Drinking Water and Sanitation (MoDWS), Government of India. Habitation-level data—aggregated by states—were obtained from the IMIS, against two water coverage norms, namely, 40 lpcd and 55 lpcd. The coverage details were collected only for the FC category—habitations receiving 100 per cent RWSS coverage. For each year between 2013 and 2018, state-wise percentages of the FC habitations, for both 40 lpcd and 55 lpcd, were computed and integrated within a robust Geographic Information System (GIS). Differences in coverage levels were assessed between (a) years and (b) coverage types (40 and 55 lpcd) by one-way analysis of variance (ANOVA), at the 0.01 < p < 0.05 significance level, using the PROC MIXED procedure using SAS 9.1.3.
Spatial Heterogeneity: Hierarchical Cluster Analysis
The extent of spatial heterogeneity in RWSS coverage was assessed by agglomerative hierarchical cluster analysis (HCA). Application of HCA is well documented in water resources assessment studies (Chaudhuri and Ale 2015; Chaudhuri and Roy 2017; Hadjisolomou et al. 2018; Shrivaastava, Tandon, and Kumar 2015). In the present context, the governing idea was to ‘generalise’ states based on similarity (or dissimilarity) in RWSS coverage (for both 40 lpcd and 55 lpcd) so as to identify underlying zones (of high/low coverage). An idea to use HCA was, elicit the regional differences in RWSS coverage, so as to identify a ‘zonal structure’, which could potentially be used by the authorities to spatially optimized interventions in days ahead. The HCA was performed by using Ward’s minimum variance algorithm (Chaudhuri and Ale 2015).
Inequality: Gini Coefficient
Gini coefficients (G) were computed at two spatial levels: (a) national—by aggregating state-level information annually between 2013 and 2018 and (b) intra-state—using district-level information for each state for 2018 only. G values were computed using the following equation:
where G = Gini coefficient;
n = sample size (number of spatial units);
u = value of the parameter j (state-wise % of rural habitations receiving 40 lpcd or 55 lpcd coverage); and
|Yj – Yi| = absolute value of the difference between spatial units.
The G values range between 0 (perfect equality) and 1 (perfect inequality) (Wagstaff et al. 1991), with the following categories for G: <0.20—good equality; 0.20–0.30—fair equality; 0.30–0.40—reasonable equality; 0.40–50—high inequality; and >0.50—stark inequality (Fang, Zhu, and Deng 2013; Chaudhuri and Roy 2017). State-wise G values were mapped within GIS and tallied with HCA results. The Gini coefficient has wide applications in economic analysis of income inequalities. However, the computational principle finds equal use in environmental studies as well, such as inequality in CO2 emission (Soares, Fernandes, and Toyoshima 2018), carbon taxes (Oladosu and Rose 2007), energy consumption (Jacobson, Milman, and Kammen 2005) and water use patterns in Africa (Cullis and van Koppen 2007) and China (Wang et al. 2012).
Slip-back: Bray–Curtis Dissimilarity Index
Consistency in RWSS coverage details over time was assessed by computing annual slip-backs, on state-by-state basis, using the Bray–Curtis dissimilarity index (BCDI) (Bray and Curtis 1957), using the following equation:
where
Xt+I = percentage habitation covered in year t + 1; and
Xt = percentage habitation coverage in immediate previous year.
The method essentially involved differences in habitation coverage between two consecutive years, normalised by the summation of the same. The BCDI is a non-metric (non-Euclidean) Manhattan index, which provides robust measures for a wide range of applications in ecology/environmental sciences (Chaudhuri and Roy 2017). It was computed between 2013 and 2018, by taking two years in a pair. Negative values indicate year-to-year slip-back (decline) in RWSS coverage.
Results
National: 2013–2018
Nationwide Descriptive Summary of RWSS for 40 lpcd and 55 lpcd Between 2013 and 2018. National Averages are Determined Using the Annual State-level Information for Percentages of Rural Habitations Receiving RWSS Coverage.
However, concerns around RWSS run deeper than what numbers reveal. For example, there is a mismatch between theoretical output capacity (40 lpcd/55 lpcd) and what is supplied on the ground, especially during summer months (World Bank 2008). Moreover, supply is highly intermittent and unpredictable, partly owing to erratic power supply (disruptions/voltage fluctuations). It is more common with complex water distribution networks (e.g., multiple pumping stations and storage tanks). In such systems, waterworks managers adopt shorter, more intensive pumping regimes to fill reservoir capacity. However, high physical losses cause pipelines and storage tanks to empty during lengthy periods of non-supply. Consequently, a proportion of each brief pumping session is spent refilling storage tanks in the bulk system. When power is available, multiple pumping phases lead to only a small amount of water reaching the end of the system. Erratic power supply reduces overall RWSS efficacy, even to the extent of scheme failure/abandonment, due to: (a) larger pumps and distribution systems being required to handle ‘peaky’ flows; (b) increased maintenance costs (pipe ruptures due to unpredictable pressure changes); (c) higher demand for personnel, etc.
Sub-national (State-wise): 40 lpcd
In 2013, four states, namely Gujarat (GJ, providing 98.2% rural habitations with 40 lpcd coverage), Uttar Pradesh (UP, 99.7%), Madhya Pradesh (MP, 91.2%) and Haryana (HR, 94.2%), were the forerunners of RWSS (Figure 1)—a trend apparent throughout the assessment period (2013–2018). Gujarat is already widely acknowledged nationwide for its expenditure on rural water affairs that translates into high RWSS delivery efficiency (Shah et al. 2009). However, coverage details apparently ‘claimed’ on the NRDWP portal are not without apprehensions, as in Maharashtra a recent evaluation by the Tata Institute of Social Sciences (TISS) observed ‘over-estimation’ of coverage details (Sakthivel et al. 2015). Over the years, several states joined the ‘elite’ list—Jharkhand (JH, providing FC to 96.9%) in 2014, Chhattisgarh (CG, 92.1%) in 2015, Tamil Nadu (TN, 90.6%) in 2016 and Orissa (OR, 93.1%) in 2018. In 2018, 17 states ensured 40 lpcd coverage to over half their habitations (as compared to 14 in 2013), which marked improvements in RWSS delivery level. The North Eastern Region (NER) has the most impoverished regions—Manipur (MN, 56.7% habitation receiving FC in 2013), Arunachal Pradesh (AR, 52.7%), Tripura (TR, 30.2%), Nagaland (NG, 26.1%), Sikkim (SK, 24.1%), Meghalaya (MG, 19.5%) and Assam (AS, 12.3%) (Figure 1). Apart from the NER, Karnataka (KA, 41.7%) and Kerala (KL, 29.6%) displayed similar traits. Such disparity might partly owe to apparent ‘bias’ in RWSS scheme allocation. For example, in 2017–2018, the high-FC states, such as GJ, MP, MH, JH, CG, OR and UP, enjoyed the lion’s share, owning about 43 per cent of RWSS schemes in the nation (Figure 2). On the other hand, the NER, KL and KA collectively receive <10 per cent of schemes.


Sub-national: 55 lpcd
The 55-lpcd norm came into effect only in 2013, in line with the World Health Organization recommendation (50 lpcd) deemed minimum for per capita water supply (Chaudhuri and Roy 2017). Presently, however, there is a wide gap between theoretical systems output (55 lpcd) and what is realised on the ground for most states (Figure 3). For example, in 2018, only eight states, namely, GJ (providing to 99.7% rural habitations), JH (98.5%), UP (89.9%), MP (85.7%), HR (80.5%), Goa (80.4%), Himachal Pradesh (HP, 65.6%) and CG (50.5%), provided FC (55 lpcd for 100% habitations) for only half their habitations. The NER appeared the worst in the nation, providing FC to only a fifth of its habitations, which brings the fundamental NRDWP motto—Har Ghar Jal—into question. On a year-by-year basis, the NER stood substantially below the corresponding annual national averages. Moreover, coverage has slipped back over time in Sikkim, KA and KL. In Kerala, poor operational performances owe to (a) source sustainability failure (e.g., sources drying out) and (b) lack of systems’ optimisation to befit demands vs. supply potentials (Chakrapani 2014). Moreover, the operation and maintenance (O&M) efficiency of large RWSS schemes is still poor (coordination among sub-systems), and they have little scope for improvement due to lack of corporate/political will and poor cost recovery. Additional concerns include: (a) technology selection (expensive and seldom fitted to regional conditions, mainly because of the ‘urge’ to comply with standard protocols); (b) failure to maintain/revive traditional water sources; and (c) lack of decentralised approach (mobilisation of local workforce, ensuring maximum stakeholder input in RWSS systems’ design).

…for All?

In the present context, G-value mapping across spatial units offers the authorities means to pre-empt future action, such as (a) support/bolster existing water schemes and (b) increase the amount of water made available to rural households, to attain equality (Cullis and van Koppen 2007). The motive is to minimise G values—more equality, less intra-state differences in coverage. Policymakers could run optimisation trials, by tweaking various operational parameters, to ideate future coverage conditions. However, this will demand more systematic and systemic research in selecting parameters most influential on RWSS operational performance. One way to approach this is through active consultation with local water users to include local/traditional knowledge. It is further substantiated by the congruity observed between HCA (spatial heterogeneity)- and G (inequality)-mapping results—states with ‘high’ to ‘fair’ degree of equality (Figure 4b) roughly correspond to cluster 1 in HCA (>90% habitations having full RWSS coverage for 40 lpcd/55 lpcd) (Figure 3, especially for 2018), while, on the other hand, states with ‘high’ to ‘stark’ inequality (Figure 4b), centre on cluster 3 and/or cluster 4 (Figure 3).

State-wise slip-back events between successive years for 40 and 55 lpcd coverage between 2013 and 2018 using the BCDI (different shades of grey represent slip backs with lighter and darker shades representing 40 and 55 lpcd, respectively; white represents no slip-back) (Source: Authors’ own analyses of RWSS coverage information)
Scheme Failure/Abandonment
An obvious cause for scheme failure/abandonment is economic constrains (30% of RWSS schemes currently experience it). By 2017–2018 estimates, a little over 10 per cent RWSS schemes were planned but never took off (In KL alone, over 60% schemes never saw daylight), 17% remained incomplete and 23% schemes lacked status report (e.g., physical progress, fund allocation and release, level of community engagement, etc.; Figure 6). However, certain other issues that demand urgent policy intervention span across science–technology and policy domains:
Insufficient source strength: Lack of coordinated source-strengthening initiatives to address source yield concerns, leading to low performance predictability. Often, the schemes are built at locations without appropriate impact assessment studies and/or future sustainability scenarios. Moreover, source yield tests are rare. RWSS site selection: RWSS project sites are often decided without assessing aerial photographs/satellite images (topographic characteristics, settlement patterns, land management history, etc.) and/or verifying state water boards’ recent hydrologic reports (groundwater levels, stream flow, precipitation trends) and/or active consultation with local communities (incorporating local/traditional knowledge of environmental processes). Poor hardware maintenance: Collapse of assemblies, pipe-clogging, low pressure at the tail end of villages, rusting in plumbing fixtures, etc. Lack of adequate piping networks and/or disputes around piping layout (internal conflicts among local water users). Vandalism of infrastructure (internal conflict among water users’ communities). Theft of plumbing fixtures

Electricity bill arrears: Supply-side (government) fallacies in ensuring efficient power supply to main RWSS projects in functional states have been discussed earlier (see section ‘National: 2013–2018’). Electricity supplies are often discontinued due to demand-side (water users’ communities) fallacies as well, for example, delayed payment of bills. However, it also occurs due to operational flaws on the supply side—field officials seldom pay regular visits to electric meters in the RWSS network; often it owes to inaccessibility of meters (e.g., remote locations and/or located inside a locked pump house). Additional threats include meter damage (due to natural hazards) or stealing of electronic gear. In the absence of ‘true reading’, either a long-term average, or flat rate, or a ‘0’ account bill is prepared. At some later date, however, when the actual (cumulative) meter is read, the bill comes with a large amount to ‘compensate’ for the earlier account. Water users are often unable to pay the large sum, and as a consequence, the RWSS goes defunct. Lack of buffer capital: Most RWSS schemes thrive on regular taxes, just enough to disburse immediate charges, which means there is a lack of any ‘buffer capital’ to meet unforeseen/emergency expenses (e.g., machine breakdown, voltage fluctuation, natural hazards, ‘sudden’ hiring of RWSS labourers, purchase of hardware). It is also a reason why paying off arrears on electricity bills is difficult. Exclusion of habitations: After completion, RWSS schemes are handed over to Village Water Supply and Sanitation Committee (VWSC), the governing body that ‘represents’ the water users’ community at the GP level. However, such official bodies often lack appropriate representations from all habitations/communities, which leads to exclusion of some from the final scheme. Water piracy: Illegal diversion of water supplies (unmetered connections). Such events affect the RWSS network at multiple levels of operation and maintenance, increasing demand within a supply network and affecting operations performances.
Policy Shortfalls: Institutional Mechanisms
Institutional Features/Functions of Various Public Water Bodies and States Which Completely Lack Them, or Have Organisational/Functional Concerns
State level: Annual Action Plan (AAP), State Activity Plan (SAP), State Technical Agency (STA), Water & Sanitation Support Organization (WSSO);
District level: District Water Sanitation Mission (DWSM);
Block level: Block Resource Center (BRC); and
Village level: VWSC.
Prime Concerns Regarding Various State-Level Plans
The NER includes eight states (AS, AR, SK, MN, MZ, NG, MG and TR).
Prime Concerns Associated with District Water and Sanitation Mission (DWSM)
Prime Concerns Associated with Village Water and Sanitation Committee (VWSC)
Current worldview of developing a robust RWSS systems’ governance is making provisions for systematic structural support from expert agencies (Haapala and White 2018; Jones 2013; Smits, Rojas and Tamayo 2013). In the current Indian system, however, such provisions are yet largely absent. Having a regular supporting agency has unique advantages in the areas of:
Daily RWSS O&M; Administration and organisational development (e.g., setting up a transparent and just tariff system, bill collection routines, auditing accounts, etc.) Capital maintenance and resource mobilisation (e.g., helping communities raise funds, cost-sharing); Water users’ training (e.g., updated manuals, guidelines, refresher courses, etc.); and Maintenance of liaisons with waterworks department and users’ communities.
In its present capacity, what the NRDWP has that is anything close to the above is monitoring cells and investigation units, responsible only for information collection and dissemination. Even so, AP, HP, KA, PN, TN, TS, UK and the NER lack such facilities. However, should the waterworks authorities deliberate on such matters, selection of support agencies should be based on a set of criteria such as the following:
Dedicated personnel willing to work in close contact with water users; Familiarity with regional priorities/demands and challenges (environmental, social, cultural, political); Diversity of skills among personnel; Awareness of nationally/internationally approved RWSS tools/techniques/protocols; Strong inter-institutional liaisons (bonds with other public works departments); Robust organisational structure; and Demonstrated experience of handling complex systems.
RWSS Community Engagement
A functional RWSS demands careful integration of institutional, social, technical, political and economic instruments, over a range of spatial and temporal scales, to ensure equity/accessibility in water distribution (especially for marginal and less endowed water users’ communities) to ensure water users’ satisfaction (Tadesse et al. 2013). The system should be located at the intersection of three prime institutional domains: (a) inter-agency partnerships; (b) technical innovation/upgrades; and (c) continuous/systematic/targeted capacity-building (e.g., IEC/HRD at the grassroots level) (Figure 7) (Carter 2010).

Current Worldview
A growing body of research emphasises the role the local water users’ communities are expected to play in developing a sustainable service delivery system (Ediriweera 2016; Harvey and Reed, 2007; Hutchings 2018; Hutchings et al. 2017; Naiga et al. 2015; Smits et al. 2013). In India, however, the prime thrust yet lies with infrastructural innovation—seeking purely engineering solutions (technocratic advancement) to improve the service delivery mechanisms. Extent of RWSS scheme transfer to the rural water users’ communities (i.e., level of community mobilisation) falls way below expected level. For example, during the 2017–2018 period, about 77 per cent RWSS schemes were handed over to rural communities (Figure 8), with about 14 states falling below this national average. States with lowest account of scheme transfer includes KL (2.33% schemes being transfered in 2017–18), MG (15.8%), RJ (21.8%) and OR (22.2%). Such accounts defy the fundamental vision/motto of the NRDWP of a demand-driven system for RWSS—state agencies acting only as facilitators, rather than as service providers, whilst local water users’ communities play the central role in deciding working policies. Under present conditions, however, such an aspirational RWSS model is faced with multiple challenges (Table 8). For example, social audit is a key component of a demand-driven system, necessary to ensure transparency, accountability and users’ satisfaction. However, in their present capacity, most states lack it, including AP, BR, CG, GA, GJ, HP, J&K, KA, MP, OR, PN, RJ, TN, TS, UP and whole of the NER.
Towards Demand-driven RWSS in India
The fundamental need is to understand water users’ willingness to participate in O&M as well as bear the costs thereof. The prime factors that influence users’ willingness include: (a) socio-economic and demographic circumstances; (b) characteristics of existing water sources, as compared to proposed benefits of a community-run system; and (c) users’ attitude towards government policies (Wedgwood 2005). In addition, for a functional, demand-driven RWSS operational system, the first step is to understand the likely variants (Hutchings et al. 2017) (Table 9):

Measures and Challenges of a Demand-Driven Community-Run RWSS Systems’ Framework in India (not considering the expenditure concerns)
Community Management Typologies in RWSS Systems’ Governance
Professionalised community-based management;
Community management with direct support; or
Direct provision with community involvement.
Each type comes with a unique set of advantages vis-à-vis challenges, and selection of one over the other should be based on active consultation with the local water users’ communities. Often, a hybrid approach is preferred. The central idea is to align RWSS schemes with water users’ capacities, across a demand–cost continuum of water supply services.

Highly patriarchal system of thinking—many government officials/field technicians do not feel comfortable dealing with women in official matters; Stereotypical assumptions about women’ abilities/experience; Lack of land rights and/or productive assets among women; Lower educational levels/awareness of women; Lack of official documents to apply for loans/subsidies among women; Time poverty—women are mostly kept busy in household chores, collection of firewood, water from distant sources, etc., which do not allow them time to participate in community meetings/workshops/training programmes. It lowers their knowledge of governmental programmes; and Prevalence of water markets (lack of women’s productive assets leading to inability to engage in water transactions).
Building a gender-responsive RWSS system requires behavioural changes, facilitated by context-specific policy measures to empower women. Certain interventions that might be considered include: (a) creating economic opportunities; (b) projecting successful women leaders as role models; (c) capturing stories of women in leadership roles; (d) ensuring passive participation in meetings/workshops that could gradually develop into more active participation; (e) ensuring women’s membership in social/economic groups to bolster their bargaining power; (f) using men in high-ranking positions who are concerned about women’s rights to influence transformative changes; (g) creating specific guidelines for women-led households/farms to receive loans/subsidies on a fast-track basis; etc.
However, a prerequisite to establishing a dynamic/functional institutional system is sound understanding of its main organisational/operational types: (a) community-based (more bottom-up approach facilitating more stakeholders’ inputs) and (b) local government–based (coordinated by the GP). In India, the latter variety predominates. Such systems come with multiple shortcomings (Hutchings 2018). First, they allow only limited stakeholder input, which means users’ expectations/priorities/aspirations are often overlooked in decision-making; elected officials who are often unaware of users’ demands make decisions. Second, such systems are prone to political entrenchment and aggravate ‘favouritism’. However, a redeeming quality is that such systems appear more effective when technology-intensive systems, such as piped water supply systems, are involved, which demand a more professional mode of operation.
Footnotes
Acknowledgements
We thankfully acknowledge the support stuff of the Center for Environment, Sustainability and Human Development (CESH), O.P. Jindal Global University, Sonipat, Haryana, India, to help conducting the present study.
Declaration of Conflicting Interests
The authors declared the following potential conflicts of interest with respect to the research, authorship and/or publication of this article: We hereby declare that there has been no conflict of interest.
Funding
The authors received no financial support for the research, authorship and/or publication of this article.
