Abstract
This study analyses state and civil society organizations’ (CSOs) perspectives on the contemporary situation of human rights defenders (HRD) in South Asia using submissions to the Universal Periodic Review (UPR), the United Nations five-yearly monitoring process. The governments’ UPR discourse shows how their engagement is characterized by performativity and legitimation. They appear to embrace the promotion of HRDs’ rights in a way that advances governments’ political legitimacy on the international stage. Instead, analysis of CSOs’ UPR discourse reveals that HRDs face a raft of rights violations, including threats, violence and murder. Their work is being curtailed by increasing state restrictions on freedom of association and expression. The malaise is compounded by impunity for offenders, corrupt practices and governments’ failure to respond to earlier UPR recommendations. The analysis shows a strong gendered dimension to HRD oppression with women HRDs particularly vulnerable to all types of violation. These findings underline the extension to South Asia of what international analysis elsewhere has dubbed a ‘counter-associational revolution’, or the rise, spread and contagion of restrictive legislation. This threat to democracy in the region shows that key reforms are urgently required, including measures to ensure the justiciability of the UN Declaration on HRD.
Introduction
This study explores state and civil society perspectives on the contemporary situation of human rights defenders (HRD) in South Asia. Its scholarly contribution lies in analysing new empirical data to address two aims: (i) to explore the applicability of the international phenomena of a ‘shrinking civil society space’ to South Asia as a region and (ii) to examine the stigmatization and criminalization of HRD, with reference to gender and intersectionality. There are manifold reasons why this is deserving of attention. Inter alia, from a global perspective, the United Nations has referred to a ‘shrinking civic space and imminent threats or other human rights violations experienced by human rights defenders’ (UN, 2018, p. 4). Second, the UN Special Rapporteur has stressed that, ‘Repressive laws can also restrict space for civil society actors to operate… Laws prohibiting non-governmental organizations and human rights defenders from working… have chilled the efforts to promote the rights of marginalized populations across the globe’ (UN, 2016, p. 12). Others have observed that in 2019–2020,
those working in defence of human rights in Asia faced unprecedented challenges, where existing risks were exacerbated, and new threats emerged… online harassment became widespread, and the COVID-19 pandemic led to a significant increase in violations against human rights defenders who spoke out against governments. (Forum Asia, 2021, p. 8).
For its part, the Asia Pacific Forum, concluded, ‘Many defenders fear that the pandemic has offered a convenient foundation for governments to silence dissent and galvanise popular support for disproportionate restrictions on freedoms of association and movement’ (Asia Pacific Forum (APF), 2021, p. 3). Focusing on developments across the eight countries of the region is also timely in addressing academic lacunae, for as Taylor and Kim (2021, p. 4) note, we need to know whether ‘South Asia [will] move further down the road of illiberal democracy in the years to come, or will the rich texture of civil society that has developed before and after independence provide the basis for new forms of political inclusion rather than exclusion?’
What constitutes a human rights defender is set out in the United Nations Declaration on HRD (United Nations, 1998). It notes: ‘everyone has the right, individually and in association with others, to promote and to strive for the protection and realization of human rights and fundamental freedoms at the national and international levels’ (UN General Assembly, 1998, Article 1). The UN summarizes the activities of HRDs as: ‘acting to address any human right on behalf of individuals or groups; the promotion, protection and realization of economic, social and cultural rights; collecting and disseminating information on violations’ (UNHR, 2021, p. 4). The UN Secretary-General (UN, 1998, p. 2) further explains, ‘“human rights defender” sometimes refers to civil society with the understanding that not all civil society actors are human rights defenders, but that human rights defenders generally are part of civil society.’ As the UN goes on to note, although the declaration on HRD is not a legally binding instrument, it contains rights that are already recognized in many legally binding international human rights instruments, including the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR). All South Asian counties have legally binding HRD obligations under the ICCPR and other instruments (Table 1).
South Asian Countries: International Human Rights Law—Obligation to Protect HRDs (Status/ Ratification of Relevant UN Treaties),a Socio-economic Characteristics,† Date of Last UPR and Current Global Rights Rankingb.
The data source for the present study is civil society organizations’ (CSO) submissions to the last cycle of the Universal Periodic Review (UPR). It is a unique process which involves cyclical monitoring of the human rights records of all 193 UN member states. It was established when the Human Rights Council was created on 15 March 2006 under UN General Assembly resolution 60/251. A subsequent revision to the UPR process was designed to broaden participation and enhance criticality in the wake of criticisms that, hitherto, it was an elite process. Accordingly, an amendment of 18 June 2007 provides that the UPR should ‘ensure the participation of all relevant stakeholders, including non-governmental organizations and national human rights institutions, in accordance with General Assembly resolution 60/251 of 15 March 2006 and Economic and Social Council resolution 1996/31 of 25 July 1996’. In consequence, non-governmental organizations (NGOs) are encouraged to register with the UN and submit their reports to the UPR of each country. As Schokman and Lynch (2015, p. 129) state: ‘The UPR has attracted a great deal of attention since it commenced in 2008. From an NGO perspective, this excitement flows from the new and high-profile opportunities for NGOs to advocate for the improved protection and promotion of human rights on the ground.’ A key strength of the process is that it is independent from national governments. The CSO submissions constitute a rich dataset that informs understanding of the role of civil society as a political space for resisting oppression and promoting rights.
In different ways, COVID-19 has compounded the precarious situation facing citizens across the region. As one contemporary source notes, ‘the pandemic is estimated to have caused 48 to 59 million people to become or remain poor in 2021 in South Asia’ (World Bank, 2021, p. 18). In a similar vein, Rasul et al.’s (2021, p. 629) account explains that:
South Asian countries in particular have had to deal with a more challenging situation due to their large population, weak health facilities, high poverty rates, low socio-economic conditions, poor social protection systems… This is likely to deepen poverty and increase unemployment and the risks of hunger and food insecurity. If not addressed properly, this may reinforce existing inequalities, break social harmony, and increase tension and turbulence.
As noted, this study’s aims are twofold: (i) to explore the applicability of the international phenomena of a ‘shrinking civil society space’ to South Asia as a region and (ii) to examine the stigmatization and criminalization of HRD, with reference to gender and intersectionality. The remainder of this paper is structured thus: following outlines of the research context and study methodology, the findings are presented in two parts. The first analyses HRD violations across the region. The second examines whether and how a gendered/intersectional dimension is evident in the UPR corpus in relation to each of the HRD violations as identified in the foregoing, region-wide analysis. The conclusion then discusses the implications of the study findings.
Research Context
South Asia is a diverse region consisting of Afghanistan, Bangladesh, Bhutan, India, Nepal, Pakistan, Sri Lanka and the Maldives. It covers 5.2 million km2 and is home to 1.8 billion people, making it the most populous and most densely populated geographical region in the world. It has a GDP equivalent to $USD 3.3 trillion. The region is beset with major inequalities and human rights challenges. For example, ‘millions of children [in South Asia] complete primary education without mastering the foundational skills of basic numeracy and literacy, let alone the 21st-century skills required for meaningful employment, personal well-being and active participation in society’ (UNICEF, 2021, p. 7).
Extant research reveals how such pronounced socio-economic inequalities (Table 1) combine with a number of factors to create a severely challenging human rights situation. These include widespread discrimination, including against women and girls, as well as LGBT+ and disabled people. Caste discrimination is also a key problem (Gorringe et al., 2017). Other challenging factors include few regional mechanisms supporting a common commitment to human rights, a rising tide of religious extremism and intercommunal tensions, social divisions exacerbated by neoliberalism, and ‘the crumbling state of public institutions… the decreasingly democratic nature of elected bodies, the corrupt and biased nature of the bureaucracy and an increasing reliance on the judiciary as an organ of governance’ (Rajagopal, 2013, p. 261).
Thus, over recent years state repression of HRDs has been an integral part of the rise of authoritarian governing practices. As Fisher (2010, p. 284) notes, ‘South Asian governments have often seen civil society groups as undermining state power and legitimacy and have attempted to bring these groups under control through government agencies set up to service them.’ In definitional terms civil society is a ‘non-legislative, extra-judicial, public space in which societal differences, social problems, public policy, government action, and matters of community and cultural identity are developed and debated’ (Keane, 1988, p. 45). NGOs—here synonymously referred to as CSO—are key actors in civil society and, as Taylor and Kim (2021, p. 4) observe, ‘Since independence every country… has seen a massive increase in the numbers of registered NGOs … [they] have been effective vehicles both of social mobilization and of service delivery… [and] have provided cogent critiques of government policies and initiatives.’ Civil society is integral to the UPR process across the region (see Methodology). As Table 1 reveals, past governments have ratified key UN treaties obligating them to protect and uphold the rights of HRD and guarantee civil society freedoms. Accordingly, the following analysis examines CSOs’ views and experiences of governments’ compliance with their treaty obligations, thereby proving key insights into the contemporary situation of HRD across the region. In doing this (in Part Two ‘The Stigmatization and Criminalization of HRD: Gender and Intersectionality’), we also examine the stigmatization and criminalization of HRD with reference to gender and intersectionality. Accordingly, at this juncture it is appropriate to consider gender relations across the region.
In their study of gender and capability discrimination Mehrotra and Kapoor (2009, p. 243) identify manifold forms of gender discrimination across Asia. They conclude, ‘in South Asia gender discrimination is most severe.’ A burgeoning literature attests to the diverse strands of this oppression. It includes—but is not limited to: public spending (Panday & Chowdhury, 2022), health (Fikree & Pasha, 2004), the labour market (Delavande & Zafar, 2019) and education (Yunus, 2021). The inequality is compounded by patriarchal cultures (Sechiyama, 2013), enduring violence against women (Bennett & Manderson, 2003), as well as the intersection of gender with other social characteristics such as faith (Ahmed-Ghosh, 2015), disability (Nakkeeran & Nakkeeran, 2018), sexual orientation (Roy, 2020) and indigeneity (Sigamany, 2017). The concept of intersectionality is one that addresses shortcomings in the first and second waves of feminism, which principally focused on the experiences of white, middle-class women. In contrast, intersectional analysis is cognizant of women’s different life experiences, identities and (dis)advantages based on the intersection of gender and other factors—including ethnicity, caste, sex, class, sexuality, religion and disability (cf. Crenshaw, 1989).
According to recent analysis by the UN ‘Women Human Rights Defenders (WHRDs) face additional and different risks and obstacles that are gendered, intersectional and shaped by entrenched gender stereotypes and norms’ (UN Women, 2022, p. 1). The extant literature underlines the need for the present study: ‘research on the nature of violations faced by women defenders will always be important in order for NGOs to grasp the reality that women defenders operate in’ (Amir, 2013, p. 476). Having outlined the research context, attention now turns to the study methodology.
Methodology
As noted, this study’s principal data source is made up of CSOs’ and governments’ reports submitted to the third cycle UN UPRs in each of the eight South Asian countries. The significance of the third cycle UPR is that it is a unique opportunity for CSOs to submit their views to the UN on the prevailing rights situation in a given country. This is important because authoritarian and oppressive state practices may prevent or limit CSOs’ opportunities to be critical of those in power. Thus, the UPR is a rare international platform where critical perspectives can be advanced. In epistemological terms the UPR is highly significant because the dataset of CSOs’ reports offers the situated knowledge of those working for human rights in a given territory. This provides direct insight into the situation of HRDs in a way that statistical analyses and records of jurisprudence cannot. As noted, the UPR data allow the first pan-regional analysis of the prevalence and framing of human rights violations from a civil society perspective. This tells us about phenomena of and debates concerning ‘shrinking civil society space’ from a South Asian perspective. Attention to framing in the CSO discourse (see below) informs us about CSOs’ use of language and the work, emotions, experiences and suffering of HRDs. In terms of periodicity, the third cycle allows comparison between South Asian countries (all have passed through three UPR cycles) and it covers the post-2017 period when there has been increasing concern about the international spread of state repression of civil society and HRDs (cf. Glasius et al., 2020; Swiney, 2019), thereby offering an up-to-date picture of the developing situation in the region.
The following analysis of the third cycle UN UPR data has two components: CSOs’ UPR submissions and South Asian Governments’ UPR submissions. Sampling is not used here. Instead, this study is an example of corpus analysis (Biber et al., 2007). In other words, it examines the entire set of CSO submissions to the UPR across the eight countries. The dataset (corpus) comprised 279 CSO reports submitted to the UN in 2017–2020 (see Table 4). They evidence generally strong engagement with the UPR, with dozens of submissions from each country. The exceptions are Afghanistan (seven submissions) where civil war, occupation and extremism has stifled civil society engagement—and Bhutan (nine submissions) with its under-developed civil society (a function of the country being shut off to the outside world for decades, its distinctive governance history and small population).
The total number of reports under-records the level of civil society input, for many of the UPR reports are joint submissions co-authored by several CSOs. For example, the joint submission by the Nepal National Coalition for UPR, National Women’s Coalition and Durban Review (2021) is authored by 440 CSOs. There are limited requirements regarding the format or specification of the CSO submissions. To a significant degree, they constitute ‘free text’. This preserves CSOs’ criticality. In addition, the discourse analysis includes attention to HRDs in the eight government submissions to the UPR. These gave limited attention to HRD rights and were characterized by high rhetoric. Repeatedly, they asserted that governments were keen to work with and uphold HRDs rights. Yet, as the following discussion reveals, such statements contradict CSOs’ submissions.
Methodologically the UPR corpus was contextually coded using abstraction (Thomas & Harden, 2008). Abstraction is a methodological tool used in qualitative content analysis (Dahlgren et al., 2019, p. 99–101). It allows the analysis to focus on a particular aspect or theme in the wider corpus. In the present case, this is a discourse on the situation of HRD (rather than CSOs’ views and recommendations on all aspects of state compliance with treaties such as the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the ICCPR). As Lindgren et al. (2020, p. 12) notes, with qualitative content analysis ‘All types of data, such as descriptions of physical things, values of things, and people’s experiences, perceptions, attitudes, and opinions can be abstracted.’ Moreover, as the qualitative content analysis literature explains, abstraction is part of reorganization and recontextualization of the text to be analysed. Accordingly, a subset of the wider UPR corpus was compiled consisting of all references concerned with agency and defending human rights. Consistent with the UN Declaration on HRDs, this defined anyone who acts to defend human rights as a human rights defender. This contextualized abstraction of the UPR corpus ensured the data focus was on HRDs. For example, discourse on journalists is only included if the discourse is about journalists’ defence of human rights (rather than some other aspect of journalistic practice). This ensures accuracy and addresses the fact that not all journalists are HRD. Similarly, discourse on CSOs is included if the context is concerned with the defence of human rights. Likewise, this addresses the fact that not all CSOs are HRD. Once the corpus of UPR discourse on HRDs was compiled, qualitative content analysis (cf. Schreier, 2019) was used to explore the level of attention to different types of rights violations and also different ways of framing (measured by the frequency or incidence of key terms, otherwise known as qualitative content analysis).
Qualitative content analysis is a type of critical discourse analysis. In other words, ‘a type of discourse analytical research that primarily studies the way social-power-abuse, dominance, and inequality are enacted, reproduced, and resisted by text and talk in the social and political context’ (Van Dijk, 2001, p. 352). There were two components to its use in this study, issue-salience and framing. ‘Issue-salience’ measures the frequency of key words, ideas or meanings in policy documents. It gives an index of the level of attention to (and thus indicator of prioritization of) key topics amongst competing issues and agendas. This was operationalized by using a technique from electoral studies. It subdivides the UPR reports into ‘quasi-sentences’ (or ‘an argument which is the verbal expression of one political idea or issue’, Volkens, 2001, p. 96). Dividing sentences in this manner controlled for long sentences that contained several policy ideas. This also deals with the problem of overlap when two or more issues are referred to in a sentence. It successfully produces a relational index of issue prioritization. Here is a worked example—the sentence:
‘In the Second Cycle UPR it was recommended that the Government of Bangladesh end all restrictions on freedom of expression. It has failed to do so. HRDs continue to be subject to threats.’ In the database this would be recorded under three issues: “freedom of expression”, ‘Failure to address past UPR recommendations on HRDs’ and ‘Threats, harassment and violence against HRDs’.
The coding of the corpus was done manually using marker pens to annotate hardcopy versions of the human rights defender corpus. Manual coding was used in preference to electronic analysis for, as a core strand of the research methods literature explains (Basit, 2003), this allows greater immersion and researcher proximity to the data than automated software packages (Blair, 2015). The coding frame of different human rights violations in relation to the work of HRDs based on deductive coding schemata. Finfgeld-Connett (2014, p. 342) explains the process:
using a deductive approach, the reviewer begins data analysis with a coding template in mind, and data are organised according to an existing, though alterable, structure. Alterability is important since one aim of qualitative systematic reviews is to test, adapt, expand, and in general, improve upon the relevance and validity of existing frameworks.
The initial codes were derived from a close reading of the relevant literature (see the Reference list). The resulting coding frame is reproduced in Table 3 (e.g. threats, harassment and violence against HRDs (inc. torture and murder), freedom of association, freedom of expression/censorship, etc.). The frequency of the different codes was logged into a basic spreadsheet (Microsoft Excel).
As noted, the second aspect of the discourse analysis centred on framing. It refers to the way that language is expressed. It is concerned with the inherent meanings, messages and criticality in relation to policy ideas (Druckman, 2001). As the following reveals, framing deepens the analysis for it moves beyond the level of attention to different rights issues to consider how policy actors seek to persuade others about the need for reform. Derived from the classic work of Erving Goffman (Goffman, 1974, p. 27), discursive framing refers to the language used by policy actors. It is concerned with the inherent meanings, sentiments, emotions, messages and criticality in relation to social and political communication (Heine & Narrog, 2015). It may explicitly or immanently advance a particular understanding of a problem. In the case of discursive framing, a key goal is to be critical and persuade other policy actors of the existence of social issues. In contrast, collective action framing comes from the literature on social movements and is concerned with advocacy of appropriate solutions to rights violations through activism to secure legal and policy change (Daviter, 2007) (e.g. boycott, mass demonstrations, civil disobedience, etc.).
Having outlined the study methodology, attention now turns to the study findings. These are organized in two parts. The first, aggregate-level, region-wide analysis has four subsections. (i) First, we examine the issue-salience on different types of rights violation reported in CSOs’ last-cycle UPR submissions. This is followed by (ii) analysis of South Asian governments’ references to HRDs in their national reports to the UPR, (iii) analysis of CSOs’ discursive framing—or use of language with reference to their evocations of meanings, sentiments and emotions in their UPR submissions and (iv) collective action framing. Part Two of the findings then explores the stigmatization and criminalization of HRD with reference to gender and intersectionality.
1. Region-wide Analysis
As noted, this section presents aggregate-level, region-wide analysis. It has three subsections. Initial attention centres on the level of attention to different types of rights violation against HRDs reported in CSOs’ last-cycle UPR submissions. This matters because it tells us which HRD rights violations CSOs deem to be the most important and deserving of attention. As noted above, all references to HRD violations in the UPR corpus were logged, aggregated across case study countries and then ranked. As Table 3 reveals, a total of 2,730 references (or quasi-sentences) were recorded in the corpus. The following discussion of CSOs’ discourse ranks each type of violations according to the level of attention (issue-salience) in the corpus (the number of references to each type of violation is given as a percentage of all 2,730 references). Before turning to the analysis of this study’s dataset on violations against HRDs, succinct reference is now made to the UN Human Rights Council’s summary reports following the UPR. This is provided in Table 2 and gives necessary context and reveals the major issues raised in the UPR submissions along with HRD issues. As Table 2 reveals, these span all areas of the ICCPR and include violence and discrimination against children, women, disabled people, LGBT+ people and different castes. In addition, significant failings in social welfare are highlighted, including adequate social security, education and healthcare.
Summary of Major Issues Raised in the United Nations Human Rights Council’s Third Cycle UPR Reports on South Asian Countries
Issue-salience of Different Human Rights Violations Against HRDs
The deteriorating rights situation across the region is confirmed by the fact that threats, harassment and violence against HRDs was the first-ranked violation in the UPR discourse, accounting for over a quarter (27.7%) of all references to rights violations in the UPR corpus (Table 2). For example, one CSO complained that in four years
at least 15 human rights defenders and activists were murdered in Bangladesh… These killings are part of an alarming trend of violent intolerance towards freedom of religion and freedom of speech, expression which not only silenced the victims but also sent a chilling message to all in Bangladesh who espouse independent views. (FLD, 2017, p. 8)
Issue Salience of Different Rights Violations in the Work of HRDs (Percentage of All References in the Previous Cycle UPR Discourse, N = 2,730)
Violations of freedom of association were second ranked (13.2% of references). For example, ‘under the 2003 Associations Act, the government shut down the Maldivian Democracy Network, a leading human rights organization… This attack on freedom of association directly infringes the rights of Maldivians… and the exercise of free expression’ (Access Now, 2020, p. 4). The third-ranked rights violation was freedom of expression (12.5% of all violation references). It is typified by the following example, ‘the year 2017 began with a crackdown on intellectuals and freedom of expression rights. Five human rights activists, who were staunch critics of state policies, disappeared within a week’ (Asian Legal Resource Centre et al., 2017, p. 7).
Generic references to repressive legislation are a further core trope (or reoccurring theme) in the UPR corpus (11.2% of quasi-sentences). For example, ‘attacks on these freedoms persist through violence against HRDs, restrictive legislation, lack of effective protections, and the hesitancy of the Bangladeshi government to publicly denounce attacks against HRDs’ (International Service for Human Rights & Sultana Kamal Center for Social Activism, 2017, p. 6). Impunity for offenders and the need for greater police investigation and protection was the fifth-ranked rights violation (accounting for 10.7% of references). For example, ‘The culture of impunity for killings of HRDs has emboldened hostile actors and fuelled further violence against them’ (HRD, 2017, p. 1).
As a burgeoning literature attests (Chaney, 2018; Van De Velde, 2018) in various parts of the world—including Russia, China, Israel and Cambodia—‘Foreign Agent’ laws variously require NGOs receiving overseas funding to register with state authorities and be subject to repressive government oversight. Failure to satisfy the authorities’ demands results in them being banned from operating. Measures undermining CSOs’ legal legitimacy or ability to receive funding was the sixth-ranked type of rights violation in the corpus (7.5% of references). For example, ‘We are further dismayed by the broad and discretionary powers granted to the NGO Affairs Bureau (NGOAB), which has restricted CSOs from receiving foreign funds’ (Civicus et al., (Bangladesh), 2017, p. 5). Government failure to address past UPR recommendations on HRDs’ rights constitutes Article 2 breaches of the UDHR and ICCPR. They are a further key trope. For example, ‘The Maldives government has partially implemented its UPR recommendations since the first and second UPR review cycles. Yet… the Anti-Terrorism Act [still] contains broad provisions to prosecute government critics and stifle dissent’ (Access Now, 2020, p. 3).
Amongst the remaining violations CSOs highlighted manifold failings in National Human Rights Institutions (NHRIs) across the region (5.4% of references). These centre on governments’ increasing control of NHRIs, undermining their independence and efficacy. For example, the ‘National Human Rights Institution remains ineffective [… it] suffers from a significant lack of resources and adequate training, particularly in its investigation department, which limits its ability to address human rights violations’ (International Federation for Human Rights & Maldivian Democracy Network, 2019, p. 3).
Underlining the applicability of notions of a shrinking civil space to the region, overall, when the case study countries are compared, there is a consistent trend across South Asia in CSOs’ level of attention to, or prioritization of, the different types of rights violation summarized in Table 3. Accordingly, Article 3 violations (threats, harassment and violence) are the first-ranked type of human rights breach against HRDs in each country (Table 4). Reflecting specific maladministration of justice issues, ‘impunity for offenders/need for greater police investigation and protection’ has greater salience in Pakistan, Bangladesh and Sri Lanka (cf. Jackson et al., 2014). The CSO discourse also places particular emphasis on freedom of association violations in the Maldives (cf. Robinson, 2016). This underlines what one referred to as the ‘chilling effect on free speech throughout the country’ (Access Now, 2020, p. 4) as a result of government’s use of the 2003 Associations Act to shut down NGOs. Reflecting the significant impact of the Foreign Contribution Regulation Act (FCRA) (2010), measures undermining CSOs’ ability to receive funding are a particular issue in India (cf. Sabharwal, 2020). Another notable local variation is that CSOs in Sri Lanka and Pakistan place greater emphasis than elsewhere on state surveillance of HRDs (cf. Ahmad & Mehmood, 2017).
Comparative Attention to Different Types of HRD Rights Violation (Percentage of all Violations) Across Case Study Countries (N = 2,730)
South Asian Governments’ Discourse on Civil Society, Rights and HRDs
As noted, a further component of the UN UPR is the national reports submitted by each government. These allow South Asian administrations to set out their accounts of how they are implementing UN international rights treaties. They are summarized here because they reveal a stark contrast between the claims of ruling elites and the foregoing discourse of CSOs. As the following reveals, two aspects of the national reports stand out: the scant attention that they give to HRDs and the positive rhetoric they adopt. The language employed is intended to convince the reader (including the United Nations Human Rights Council, 2016) that human rights, HRDs and supporting a vibrant civil society are government priorities. The significance of the contradiction between governments’ and CSOs’ discourse is discussed in the concluding section of this paper.
In its UPR submission the Afghan Government asserted that it ‘continues to foster genuine participation and meaningful involvement of civil society and human rights defenders in the promotion and protection of human rights’ (Government of Afghanistan, 2019, p. 22). In a similar vein, the Bangladesh government’s UPR asserted, ‘The GoB is vigilant to protect civil society, bloggers and thus create space for freedom of expression for all walks of life’ (GoB, 2018, para 5). For its part, the Indian Government said, ‘India is committed to ensuring a safe working environment for people engaged in promoting and the protection of human rights’ (GoI, 2017, para 56). In its UPR submission the Nepali government claimed, ‘The GoN is committed to removing any hindrance in the enjoyment of rights and freedom by human right defenders, and to take legal actions against perpetrators’ (GoN, 2020, para 7). In like manner, the Pakistan government asserted that it ‘considers civil society organizations and human rights defenders as partners in its endeavour to promote human rights and fundamental freedoms’ (GoP, 2017, para 76). In its UPR submission the Government of Sri Lanka claimed that it ‘is mindful of the challenges before it in the promotion and protection of human rights in Sri Lanka and reaffirms its commitment to the full realisation of human rights in the country’. Lastly, the government of the Maldives said that it, ‘recognizes the key role played by CSOs, journalists and human rights defenders. Their involvement was sought in the development of major policies including… the National Human Rights Action Plan.’ It continued to note, that ‘the Maldivian Police Service continues to actively engage in countering threats and harassment against individuals, both on online platforms and in person to ensure the protection of journalists and human rights defenders’ (GoM, 2020, paras 116–117).
CSOs’ Discursive Framing of the Rights Situation of HRDs
As noted, discursive framing refers to the language used by policy actors. In the case of discursive framing, a key goal is to be critical and persuade other policy actors of the existence of social issues. The corpus of CSO UPR discourse on HRDs was coded according to different frames. Again, this allowed a ranking of the frames, starting with those with the highest incidence (Table 5). As with the preceding section, the percentages below refer to the attention to individual frames as a percentage of all frames.
Discursive Frames on the Situation of HRDs: All References in the South Asian UPR Discourse Corpus (N = 569)
The first-ranked discursive frame in the CSO corpus is state defamation and smearing of HRDs. This accounted for over a third (36%) of all discursive frames. In order to undermine their wider support, governments variously portray HRDs as extremists, militants, terrorists, insurgents, blasphemers, Naxalites and Maoists. Second ranked are references to the fear and terror experienced by HRDs as a consequence of state oppression (29% of discursive frames). For example, ‘HRDs reported an increase in self-censorship and reduced activity for fear of physical attack. One indigenous woman HRD said she has limited her activism for fear of attack because she has worked with non-Muslim indigenous people’ (International Service for Human Rights & Sultana Kamal Center for Social Activism, Bangladesh, 2017, p. 6). State discrimination and targeting of HRDs are third-ranked in the corpus (22.8% of discursive frames). For example, ‘The FCRA has been used to disproportionately target and harass NGOs and activists critical of governmental priorities and policies’ (International Commission of Jurists, 2016, p. 6). As Levien (2020, p. 504) observes, ‘public discourse has for some decades registered the growing criminalization of politics and economy in South Asia’. This is reflected in the fact that state corruption in dealing with HRDs is a further key trope in the UPR discourse. For example,
HRDs and journalists investigating corruption continue to face threats and even physical attacks. On 2 June 2016 [… a HRD] was attacked after attending a meeting of the… Municipal Council. On the way to his car, he was beaten by two unidentified persons on motorbikes and sustained serious injuries to his head. (FLD, 2017, p. 5)
CSOs’ Collective Action Framing to Address the Contemporary Rights Situation of HRDs
Collective action framing comes from the literature on social movements and is concerned with advocacy of appropriate solutions to rights violations through activism to secure legal and policy change (e.g. boycott, mass demonstrations, civil disobedience, etc.). As with the preceding sections, the corpus was re-coded for different collective action frames (Table 6). In the following discussion the level of attention to each individual frame is given as a percentages of all collective frames in the corpus.
Civil Society Organizations’ Collective Action Frames on HRDs’ Rights Directed at South Asian Governments in the Last UPR Cycle: Region-wide Data (N = 1,821)
The first-ranked collective action frame is CSOs’ advocacy of government reforms to uphold HRDs’ rights. Specifically, imploring those in power to legislate, amend, repeal (law) and ratify (treaties) (29.7% of CAF frames). For example, ‘we hereby recommend to the State of Bhutan to urgently ratify the Enforced Disappearances Convention’ (Center for Global Non-killing, 2019, p. 7). This was followed by calls for the authorities to intervene to protect, support and represent the interests of HRDs (25% of CAF frames). For example, ‘India should also provide more effective protection for human rights defenders, by removing the legal obstacles and societal repression undermining their legitimate activities to promote and protect human rights’ (CSW, 2017, p. 6). Amongst the remaining frames were calls for civil protest and mobilization for HRD rights (16.4%). For example, ‘The Constitution of Bangladesh also includes the right to freedom of assembly, procession, gathering or demonstration, [… yet they are often] severely repressed as security forces brutally attack the peaceful demonstrators’ (Roopbaan, 2018, p. 8). The remaining CAF frames include calls to ensure the release of HRD detainees (4.4%). For example, ‘Unconditionally and immediately release all protesters, HRDs and journalists detained for exercising their right to the freedom of peaceful assembly and review their cases to prevent further harassment’ (Civicus, 2016, p. 11).
Having summarized CSOs’ UPR discourse at an aggregate, region-wide level, attention now turns to examine what the UPR discourse tells us about the stigmatization and criminalization of HRD with reference to gender and intersectionality South Asia.
2. The Stigmatization and Criminalization of HRD: Gender and Intersectionality
The aim of the following analysis is to examine whether and how a gendered dimension is evident in relation to each of the HRD violations identified in the foregoing region-wide analysis (Table 2), as well as whether intersectionality features in the discourse on violations of WHRDs.
Threats, Harassment and Violence Against WHRDs (inc. torture and murder)
The UPR discourse provides clear evidence of how, across the region, WHRD are more vulnerable than their male counterparts to threats and violence because of their work. As this CSO noted, we are ‘alarmed by the continuing levels of violence against women and the desperate situation faced by women HRDS in Afghanistan, who face a heightened level of persecution because of their gender and their human rights activism’ (Civicus et al., 2019, p. 7). The corpus shows how states employ diverse means to terrorize WHRDs. As this CSO explained
Threats and intimidation to human rights defenders. The military and State intelligence officers continue monitor and carry out inquiries of human rights activists…They have also formed informants amongst the public in order to obtain information on activities carried out by civil society activists. WHRDs who are working at civil society organizations are visited by the intelligence [service] and inquiries are taking place regarding their work. (Northeast Coordinating Committee [Sri Lanka] 2017, p. 3)
The threats and gender-based violence (GBV) are compounded by religious extremism and, in particular conservative, faith-based attitudes on the ‘appropriate’ role of women in society. For example, ‘security agencies, religious groups, militants, and armed gangs all target HRDs … [there is] Brutal sectarian violence. HRDs working to defend the rights of women in the tribal areas where extremist groups operate face the highest risks’ (FLD, 2017, p. 8). Moreover, as this CSO explained: ‘The pervasive nature of threats against WHRDs is largely due to the hostile atmosphere towards women in many parts of Afghanistan, most visibly demonstrated by attacks perpetrated by the Taliban and other armed groups against women who do not adhere to a strict religious code’ (Civicus et al., 2019, p. 8). CSOs’ UPR submissions include graphic accounts of the murder of WHRDs. For example:
On 25 April 2015, unidentified gunmen shot and killed woman human rights defender (WHRD) [name…] outside the arts venue she founded in Karachi. She was a prominent HRD in Pakistan. In 2007, she set up ‘The Second Floor’ as a forum to host public discussion around human rights, blasphemy, cultural diversity, extremism, and peacebuilding. (FLD [Pakistan], 2017, p. 4)
Freedom of Association
The UPR discourse reveals widespread Article 20 (freedom of association) violations against WHRDs. CSOs’ calls for reforms are typified by this entreaty to the government of Pakistan to undertake ‘Effective measures to ensure the full realization of assembly and of association and ensure that women HRDs and advocates around gendered issues are able to carry out their legitimate activities without fear of threat or reprisal’ (Digital Rights Foundation, 2017, p. 4). The corpus contains repeated examples of WHRDs being threatened whilst doing their work. For example, ‘Surveillance and intimidation related to freedom of assembly were also reported from Batticaloa and the East. Organizers, participants and supporters of protests against sexual violence against women and children were subjected to intimidation before, during and after the protests’ (FLD [Sri Lanka], 2017, p. 6).
Freedom of expression/censorship
A core strand of the UPR discourse centred on how WHRDs are subject to Article 19 violations, notably online harassment and clampdown. For example, in the case of Pakistan, the Prevention of Electronic Crimes Act [Majlis E Shoora (Parliament) Pakistan 2016] has been the subject of CSOs’ concerns regarding the broad powers it grants to the government. As this CSO notes
Women, especially human rights defenders… are denied access to spaces due to gender disparity, stereotypical and cultural expectations on how women should behave online, cyber harassment, sexualised threats and violence stemming from online activities-impeding women’s right to free speech online, political participation, information and association. (Digital Rights Foundation [Pakistan], 2017, p. 5)
Repressive Legislation
CSOs’ UPR submissions also make extensive reference to the stifling impact of repressive legislation on WHRDs. A number of them highlight governments’ use of blasphemy laws to target WHRDs. For example,
Women’s rights groups also risk blasphemy accusations for working to improve women’s and girls’ rights. In January 2016, the Council of Islamic Ideology (the constitutional body that advises the legislature whether a bill is repugnant with Islam) rejected a bill… to change the legal age of marriage from 16 to 18 years on grounds that it would constitute blasphemy. This decision has serious implications for civil society organisations and activists working to end child marriage, putting them at risk of prosecution under blasphemy charges… It can carry a maximum sentence of capital punishment. (Civicus et al., [Pakistan] 2017, p. 11)
Impunity for Offenders/Need for Greater Police Investigation and Protection
Impunity is a major issue facing WHRDs. In particular, the discourse reveals how the authorities persecute WHRDs who work on cases regarding GBV. The persecution is particularly acute when the perpetrators of GBV are state agents, police or otherwise influential individuals. The persecution takes a different form to that experienced by male HRDs because the authorities often seek to destroy the reputation of WHRDs. Moreover, WHRDs are often threated because they are the only ones who are willing to file and follow-up cases via first information reports at local police stations. As this CSO explained,
One common strategy to target women HRDs is to defame the defender in her local community… Attacks on the woman’s reputation can lead to non-acceptance and hostility against the woman by family and community members. Spouses and female family members of male HRDs are also subject to these attacks. (LSEW [Nepal], 2020, p. 12)
Measures Undermining CSOs’ Ability to Receive Funding
A number of CSOs highlight the gendered dimension to restrictive funding regulations. For example, this CSO explained how women’s CSOs were disproportionately affected by current use of the Social Welfare Act of 1992. This governs the provision of social welfare in Nepal. NGOs must obtain prior approval from the Social Welfare Council (SWC) to receive foreign funding and for implementing projects with support from foreign donors. As this CSO complained,
The process for approval of such applications is not transparent and is at the discretion of individuals within the SWC [… appointees of the Nepalese government]. This means that the government can exert control over which NGOs are allowed to work in Nepal, the activities they are able to carry out, and the funding they can receive.’ (LSEW, 2020, p. 9)
Failure to Address Past UPR Recommendations on (W)HRDs
This is a core violation in the UPR discourse. For example, as this CSO complained, we are
alarmed by the continuing levels of violence against women and the desperate situation faced by WHRDs in Afghanistan, who face a heightened level of persecution because of their gender and their human rights activism… Under Afghanistan’s previous UPR examination, the government received two recommendations on the protection of HRDs, journalists and civil society representatives. The government committed to… allowing ‘human rights defenders among all others to exercise the right to freedom of expression’ … However, conditions for HRDs in Afghanistan remain perilous.’ (Civicus et al., 2019, p. 7)
NHRIs
The failure of NHRIs to uphold rights of WHRDs is a repeated concern in the UPR discourse. As this CSO explained,
The Commission [NHRI] did not make any interventions or public statements regarding the suspension and cancellation of FCRA (Foreign Contributions Regulations Act) registrations of human rights defender Ms.[… named WHRD]’s organisation [concerned with…] the elimination of discrimination against women … civil society organisations appealed to the Commission to intervene in the Supreme Court using its powers under Section 12 of the Act but the Commission didn’t respond. (All India Network of NGOs and Individuals working with National and State Human Rights Institutions, 2016, p. 5)
Abduction/Enforced Disappearance
This strand of the UPR discourse underlines the acute danger often faced by WHRDs. For example,
Human rights defenders (HRDs) in Bangladesh faced killing, abduction, physical attack, judicial harassment, arbitrary arrest, fabricated charges and various other forms of intimidation and harassment. Local extremist groups pledging allegiance to Al Qaeda in the Indian Subcontinent often claimed responsibility for attacks targeting HRDs, especially those working on women’s rights… The government failed to properly investigate a majority of murders of HRDs and the level of impunity. (Bangladesh Front Line Defenders, 2018, p. 5)
State Surveillance
As part of increasingly authoritarian governing practices across the region, the CSO discourse shows how state surveillance of WHRDs is commonplace. For example, one CSO complained:
The National Database and Registration Authority maintains one of the world’s largest centralised citizen databases… Lack of transparency and accountability in maintenance and usage of this data raises concerns for digital and physical safety of women HRDs, activists from sexual minorities and female journalists who are critical of state policies and societal norms. Increased tracking technology is being decentralised and given to local police. Initiatives such as Safe Cities Projects have enhanced surveillance powers. (Digital Rights Foundation [Pakistan] 2017, p. 4)
Intersectionality
The UPR discourse also refers to intersectionality and WHRDs. In particular, it highlights how women’s multiple characteristics and identities can increase the threat that they face in their work. In particular, the discourse highlights the plight of indigenous women. For example, this CSO complained of the:
particular risks of human rights defenders working on the rights of indigenous peoples in India. Indigenous women human rights defenders such as [… named individuals] who are facing criminal charges, are confronted with additional challenges including sexual violence or risks thereof, including in custody, lack of legal support as well as access to justice and effective remedy. (Asia Indigenous Peoples’ Pact (AIPP) [India], 2016, p. 6)
Caste is a further dimension to the persecution of WHRDs, as the following CSO submission explains in the case of Nepal:
WHRDs still face multiple and intersecting forms of discrimination, exclusion and violence. Especially Dalit women suffer from multiple forms of discrimination, based partially on traditional ideas of impurity, patriarchal social norms, discrimination in education and access to water, land, health, housing and other necessities. (Nepal Dialogue Forum for Peace and Human Rights, 2020, p. 5)
The discourse also reveals how LGBT+ WHRDs face widespread persecution and rights violations. For example,
challenges to freedom of association, freedom of expression, and elementary human rights of LGBT individuals in Bangladesh. The status of LGBT communities at high risk of abuse, violence, and discrimination as well as the attacks on LGBT defenders… Lesbian communities are particularly vulnerable because of their status as women in a patriarchal society. There is greater likelihood of physical violence against lesbians. (Roopbaan, 2018, p. 4)
Conclusion
This study makes an original contribution by analysing civil society perspectives on the contemporary situation of HRD in South Asia. The analysis reveals a troubling number of commonalities in the situation of HRDs and confirms a region-wide trend of government repression of the civil space. This contributes new knowledge to diverse fields—including academia, UN treaty monitoring, CSOs’ modes of operation and government policy and practice. The rights breaches against HRDs identified in this study include violence, threats and murder and the negative rights impact of restrictive legislation (including enactments curtailing the right to freedom of expression and association). The reason for this is South Asian governments’ self-interest and concern to safeguard ruling elites’ grip on power. The universality of the phenomenon across the region suggests that the countries have learned from each other, borrowing ideas on how to repress activists, such that the events in one country legitimize (or create more favourable conditions for) repression in another. In this respect the present findings suggest that, albeit with local contingent effects of culture, politics, socio-economic factors and religion, South Asia is currently experiencing what many other countries have already undergone (inter alia, Hungary, the United States, Poland, Australia, Italy and Austria). From an international perspective, extant work (Cf Swiney 2019) has variously referred to this as a ‘counter-associational revolution’, ‘the rise, spread, and contagion of restrictive civil society laws’ or alternatively ‘the NGO Restriction Cascade’ (Glasius et al., 2020, p. 453). Allied to this, this study’s focus on the human rights situation of WHRDs reveals the main HRD violations in the region all have a strong gendered dimension. Analysis of CSOs’ UPR discourse shows that women generally face distinctive, often more severe, rights violations than their male counterparts. Whilst there are common trends in the oppression of WHRDs across South Asia, important local contingent factors shape the nature and extent of the violations, including androcentric cultural norms, historical patterns and processes of gender discrimination and the intersection of gender with factors such as religion, caste, sexual orientation and ethnicity/indigeneity. Thus, whilst there are commonalities, the oppression of women HRD also takes distinctive forms in parts of South Asia. This is due to religious extremism and cultural norms about the social role and position of women. This leads to the active targeting of WHRDs. In addition, a common strategy is to defame the defender in her local community. Attacks on the woman’s reputation can lead to non-acceptance and hostility against the woman by family and community members. This is particularly the case with WHRDs working on GBV, including rape.
At this point, it is germane to consider how the current findings relate to social theory and the literature on civil society’s role in upholding human rights. The present analysis supports earlier work highlighting civil society’s key function in advancing ‘declarations of public pressure against norm-violating countries’ (Fuchs, 2007, p. 408). It also tells us that HRDs’ rights advocacy is shaped by varied patterns and processes of governance, including post-conflict transitional justice issues (Holzscheiter, et al., 2019). In contrast to civil society views, analysis of the eight South Asian governments’ UPR discourse shows how they appear to embrace civil society engagement and the promotion of HRDs’ rights in a way that advances governments’ political legitimacy on the international stage, when in fact the CSO corpus tells us the opposite is true. In this respect, the region’s governments’ performativity resonates with what Emily Hafner-Burton et al. (2008, p. 141) identify as mechanisms that offer: ‘opportunities for rights-violating governments to display low-cost legitimating commitments to world norms, leading them to ratify human rights treaties without the capacity [or, political will] … to [subsequently] comply with the provisions’. As Chayes and Handler Chayes (1993, p. 178) observe, in truth, such regimes often sign international treaties without the intent to comply. Rather, they ratify treaties like the ICCPR in order ‘to appease a domestic or international constituency’.
This study’s findings suggest that amongst the key reforms needed to address contemporary rights breaches are measures to ensure the justiciability of the ICCPR and Declaration on HRD—both in domestic courts and at the international level, via the International Criminal Court (Cole, 2015). Furthermore, as Neumayer (2005, p. 921) explains, ‘improvement in human rights is typically more likely the more democratic the country… [And] ratification [of human rights treaties] is more beneficial the stronger a country’s civil society is’. This is why the increasing repression of civil society and HRDs across the region is such a threat. At this juncture, given the breadth and seriousness of the rights violations revealed in this study, it is difficult to foresee future improvements being recorded in the next round of the UPR.
Footnotes
Acknowledgements
Constructive feedback on an earlier draft of this paper by the editor and two anonymous reviewers is gratefully acknowledged.
Declaration of Conflicting Interests
The author declared no potential conflicts of interest with respect to the research, authorship and/or publication of this article.
Funding
The author disclosed receipt of the following financial support for the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article: Grant funding for this study by the Economic Research Council under Award No: ES/S012435/1 is acknowledged.
