Media,Migration and Politics: The Coverage of the Little India Riot in The Straits Times in Singapore

The State and the Press in Singapore

Singapore is a small island-state in Southeast Asia with a multicultural, multilingual and multi-religious society made up of 5.4 million people, of which 74.3 per cent are Chinese, 13.3 per cent are Malay, 9.1 per cent are Indian and 3.3 per cent are of another race (Singapore Department of Statistics, 2014). In 1965, Singapore gained independence after being expelled from the Federation of Malaysia following a series of racially charged riots and political contestations between the Singapore political party, People’s Action Party (PAP), and the Malaysian political party, United Malays National Organization (UMNO). It is this historical trauma of ethnic tensions and political and economic uncertainty that underscores Singapore’s domestic and foreign policies and the current ruling party’s (the PAP) political ideology and model of governance till the present day. Since 1959, the PAP has managed to retain political power in each general election as the incumbent ruling party in Singapore’s dominant party system (Chong, 2012; Mauzy & Milne, 2002). The PAP is often credited with being responsible for Singapore’s rapid economic success and development, world-class education system, public housing system and public infrastructure as well as its political, economic and social stability (Edge, 2014; Tey, 2008a). However, critics have also commented on the PAP’s ‘soft authoritarianism’ form of governance, use of covert instruments of social control, use of the legal system to discipline and quell dissent, as well as exerting control over social institutions in Singapore to align political agendas and consolidate hegemonic power (Chua, 2003; George, 2007; Means, 1996; Tan, 2013). Hegemony refers to the dominion of the ruling class not through coercion or brute force, but through consensus using cultural systems and institutions that include mass media, civil society groups or educational institutions which participate in the organization of consent (Castells, 1988; Chua, 2003; Edge, 2014; George, 2012; Gramsci, 1971; Sim, 2007).

The media is one such institution in Singapore that has attracted international scrutiny and criticism for the perceived lack of press freedom. Reporters Without Borders ranked Singapore 153 out of 180 countries on its World Press Freedom Index in 2015 (Reporters Without Borders, 2015; The Straits Times, 2015). Despite this, the PAP maintains its stance on its conceptualization of the role of the press as a nation-building apparatus, not as a ‘fourth estate’ or a ‘watchdog’ to check and control the dominant party. The role of the press in Singapore therefore refutes Western notions and ideals of the role of the media (Bokhorst-Heng, 2002; Tey, 2008a, 2008b). The notion of press freedom, itself castigated as a form of Western cultural imperialism by PAP leaders, has never had a space in government rhetoric, which instead advocates for its own brand of politics that places the interests of society as a whole over individual rights, and is described as a ‘“pragmatic” or “communitarian” political ideology’ (Tan, Hao, & Chen, 1998; Tey, 2008a, p. 204; Tey, 2008b).

The mechanics of press control in Singapore are sophisticated and carefully thought out, skilfully achieved through a combination of legislation, retaining control over key appointments in the press, strategic use of market forces and consolidation of media outlets (Bokhorst-Heng, 2002; George, 2007, 2014; Lee, 2014). The media industry is regulated under the Newspaper and Printing Presses Act (NPPA), which has undergone carefully calibrated and deliberate amendments over the last few decades to produce a sophisticated piece of legislature that effectively aligns press values with state rhetoric (George, 2007, 2012; Tey, 2008a). Under the NPPA, a newspaper publisher is required to apply for a license to operate from the Minister (s 3(1)), which must be renewed annually and can be revoked at any time according to the Minister’s discretion (s 21). In addition, the NPPA requires the newspaper companies to be publicly listed and created two classes of shares—management and ordinary shares (s 10(1)(b)). Management shares, w (s 3(1)(c)), have 200 times the voting power of an ordinary shareholder (s 10(11)). No one person is allowed to hold 12 per cent or more of the shares in the newspaper company unless approved by the Minister (s 12(1)). Being publicly listed means that newspaper corporations are more likely to be motivated by profit margins and performance in the stock market, and therefore have a greater stake in safeguarding economic, political and social stability in the country. Spreading ownership also ensures that no one person could exert their political ideologies and influence decision-making. At the same time, the NPPA gives the government control over key appointments in the press, many of which have been high-level public servants such as S. R. Nathan, Tony Tan and Lee Boon Yang (George, 2014). Leadership in the newsrooms have mostly been experienced journalists, some of whom were recruited as midcareer civil servants from the administrative service (a fast-track career programme in the government service to groom elite officers for leadership positions) such as Patrick Daniel and Han Fook Kwang (George, 2014).

Two companies, Singapore Press Holdings (SPH) and MediaCorp, dominate the media industry in Singapore. This was preceded by several decades of mergers and closures of newspapers such as the merger of Singapore News and Publications Limited (SNPL) with Times Publishing Berhad and The Straits Times Press to form SPH in 1984. Both SPH and MediaCorp have financial ties with the government—SPH is publicly listed, while Temasek Holdings, a company owned by the state has the ownership of Mediacorp, an investment company owned by the government. The result of the consolidation of media outlets in Singapore has been a lack of alternative voices in mainstream media. As a result, the press in Singapore has gained a reputation for being pro-government and exhibiting political bias in its reporting (George, 2012; Tey, 2008a).

However, there has been little evidence of direct intervention by the government in the newsroom in the form of top-down instructions on what to report or strict rules to keep errant journalists in check. The PAP’s utilization of its tools of co-option and ideological power has allowed it to engineer a press system that is still able to operate freely as a profitable business while simultaneously balancing the public’s need for timely and factual information and the media’s role as a tool of propaganda in advancing the political interests of the PAP (George, 2007). The PAP’s self-restraint in its control of the press system and use of other avenues of control behind-the-scenes means that self-censorship is often practiced without any interference from the state, giving the impression of autonomy, credibility and professionalism (George, 2007). Therefore, despite its reputation, the mainstream media still enjoys relative success and is still widely used by the Singapore public as the main news source—The Straits Times alone is read by approximately 31 per cent of the population (The Straits Times, 2013). In contrast to simplistic readings of the press as a passive cog in the state apparatus, this newspaper complexifies the media’s dynamic relationship with the state and the public, negotiating the inconsistencies, contradictions and dilemmas that mainstream news media in Singapore inevitably face in attempting to balance their role in gatekeeping information with the expectations of their stakeholders. These tensions faced by the press give insight into their reporting of crucial events in Singapore such as the Little India riot.

Media Framing of Foreign Construction Workers in Singapore

The country sees significant numbers of low and semi-skilled construction workers from India, Bangladesh, China and Thailand (Aricat, 2013; HOME, 2011). Singapore is viewed by these workers as a country of opportunity because of the substantially higher wages promised to them compared to what they may earn back home. Such substantial increase in wages helps them financially to support their families adequately back home. However, after coming to Singapore, many realize that they have been exploited for various reasons. For example, workers experience a variety of workplace abuses such as health and safety breaches, illegal deductions from their salary, while others are not paid for extended periods of time. Wages that were agreed upon before workers arrive do not match their payment in Singapore, and employers deduct and charge workers for housing and food that are supposed to be basic provisions for these workers (Huang & Yeoh, 2003; TWC2, 2011). These workers also have no job security in the long term as the onus is left to the employer to terminate their work permits at any time, and this often happens during a recession. Moreover, FCWs are housed cheaply by employers to save cost, often in squalor conditions that violate fire safety regulations and land use laws (Bal, 2014; Rubdy & McKay, 2013). The construction sector in which they work is also extremely risky, dangerous and harsh environments, often characterized as the 3Ds: dirty, difficult and dangerous. They work in these conditions for very low wages and very long hours (HOME, 2011; Rubdy & McKay, 2013).

In contemporary public discourse in Singapore, the fact that there is a large community of FCWs has led to the feelings of resentment among some members of the public, depicting the broader context of discontent among a section of Singaporeans facing rising inequality, inadequate employment opportunities and the shifting culture of the nation-state (Lee, 2010; Rubdy & McKay, 2013). Migrant workers are depicted as the ‘Other’ in both mainstream and alternative media discourses, and the ‘day-to-day costs of their presence are felt in terms of crowded pavements, congested buses and trains, long queues and potentially threatening conduct, raising the ire of local citizens’ (Rubdy & McKay, 2013, p. 159). For instance, in 2008, residents of the Serangoon Gardens neighbourhood signed a petition to prevent the government from converting an old school property into a dormitory for foreign workers in that area, alleging that the presence of many FCWs in their neighbourhood would lead to more crime and would lower the value of their properties (Tay, 2009).

This article focuses on the framing of FCWs in mainstream news in Singapore in the wake of the Little India riot on 8 December 2013, drawing upon framing theory. According to Entman (1993, p. 52), ‘to frame is to select some aspects of a perceived reality and make them more salient in a communicating text, in such a way as to promote a particular problem definition, casual interpretation, moral evaluation, and/or treatment recommendation’. Therefore, framing involves not only the selection of particular facets of an event of an issue, but also the ‘generation of meaning’ through the way news reports are crafted or through the use of particular narratives or expressions with the goal of influencing public opinion (Lee & Basnyat, 2009; Reese, 2001, p. 10). Frames very often mimic structural patterns present in unequal societies where powerful actors are in a position to define and give meanings to frames that are circulated in the discursive space (Reese, 2001). Gramsci’s (1971) notion of hegemony emphasizes how spaces not through coercion, are controlled by the dominant elite by riddling frames with ideological undertones of power, safeguarding the systems of power in society that serve to imprint power norms on public opinion. Hence, understanding and identifying media frames also helps scholars reveal eclipsed power structures and imbalances in the outcomes of news delivery, as well as journalistic biases present in news stories (Weaver, 2007). In studying the way the Little India riot was reported using framing as a theoretical lens, we are able to cogitate about the kinds of labels about FCWs in the news and the policy solutions that are offered to manage them.

A study of 172 news articles published in mainstream newspapers during the period surrounding the announcement of the Singapore Budget in 2011 found that mainstream news media in Singapore was relatively even in its framing of migrant workers, reporting on both the positives and the negatives, and at times reinforcing or contradicting stereotypes (Tan, 2015). The reporting mirrored the contradictory sentiments towards migrant labour among the public. Although they acknowledged that it was in Singaporeans’ interest to employ cheap foreign labour and were willing to exploit that, there was a common feeling that the presence of too many foreigners would intrude on their physical space and way of life (Rubdy & McKay, 2013; Tan, 2015). Common themes among news articles included the need to increase productivity and to work towards a labour model that was less reliant on foreign labour that was in line with 2011 budget announcements, vulnerabilities of FCWs to workplace accidents, exploitation and abuse by employers and poor living conditions (Tan, 2015). Humanitarian Organisation for Migration Economics’ (HOME) report in 2011 also concurred that the Singapore media have played a role in bringing to light the many abuses faced by the FCW community (HOME, 2011). Typically, these exposés go hand-in-hand with news reports on the MOM’s efforts in enforcing labour laws and punishing errant employers (Tan, 2015). Negative portrayals of migrant workers, such as the ‘criminal’ FCW plotting with his employer to sidestep labour laws or ill-mannered Foreign Service staff, are balanced with positive accounts of the contributions of these workers to society. In such instances, the press in Singapore acts as a mediator in bringing attention to unethical behaviour by employers, abuse of workers, and in promoting policy changes to increase protection for workers while still advancing the state’s agenda. Noting the largest circulation of The Straits Times in Singapore, we seek to interrogate the frames circulated in The Straits Times in its coverage of the Little India riot. Our research question guiding the analysis is: How did The Straits Times frame FCWs in its coverage of the Little India riot?

Method

As the focus of the research was on understanding the way in which the news reported the riot, all articles were collected from The Straits Times. This article is Singapore’s largest mainstream daily newspaper run by the SPH with a circulation of 410,000 (The Straits Times, 2014, July 8). It is also this particular newspaper that has been critiqued for reifying and foregrounding news stories that evince state discourses (Lee, 2010). With only one competing media entity, MediaCorp, Singaporeans can only turn to social media or international news for alternative opinions on various issues with even fewer options on local issues.

All published articles pertaining to the riot were searched for using keywords ‘riot’, ‘Little India’, ‘foreign worker’, ‘Indian’, ‘Bangladeshi’ and ‘Little India riot’ to identify relevant articles that reported the confrontation. The timeframe was from the day the riot occurred (8 December 2013) till the latest reported article a year later in 2014 (24 September 2014). Factiva was the search engine used to collect all articles. There were a total of 205 articles published in The Straits Times relating to the riot, including articles from the print publication and its online edition. In addition, we included forum letters written by Singapore residents, opinion pieces and editorials, as these types of articles are carefully vetted before publication and add to the diversity of opinions represented in the news source.

The unit of analysis was each sentence in each news report. The coding process began with open coding of each sentence. Due to the unique nature of the conflict involving the FCWs and the police, and because of the absence of public dissent in Singapore in the backdrop of the stringent laws against acts of resistance, this article is an exploratory study using grounded theory to make sense of the themes identified. The first 10 per cent of the article was coded by two researchers to establish inter-coder reliability, with a Kappa agreement of 0.962. After the open coding stage of data coding, two researchers used axial coding to group the open codes into broader categories. For example, distinct concepts became apparent such as ‘voice of Minister’, ‘voice of Prime Minister’ and ‘official statements by the Committee of Inquiry (COI)’. These codes were then further grouped under the conceptual category of ‘voices of authority’. Subsequently, these axial codes started to reflect broader frames such as ‘voices of authority’. In the final step of selective coding, active discussion and reference to our original data points were done to come up with our four broad themes. As demonstrated in the following discussion, these four broad themes were studied in relation to each other to reflect the complexities and nuances of news reporting in Singapore and the tensions that exist between state and civil society.

Media, Migrant Work and Conflict

The sudden confrontation that took place in this highly regulated city-state emerged at the centre of public discourse for the period of a year. Dissent is almost non-existent in Singapore, and conflicts involving physical altercations are even rarer in Singapore society. The initial reports suggested that the conflict arose in Little India after a FCW came under a private bus. Private buses are hired to ferry FCWs from construction or dormitory sites that generally lie on the outskirts of the city to Little India, a place of leisure for FCWs on their days off. Little India is a space where one can find goods, food, and textiles from the South Asian diaspora. FCWs hailing from South Asia often visit Little India on Sundays to eat, shop, relax and meet up with other FCWs from their communities.

Ambiguity and contentions exist as to how the FCW came under the bus, but mass media reports concluded that the FCW, named Sakhthivel, had been drunk when he boarded the private bus. He then pulled his pants down in front of the female timekeeper, prompting her to throw him off the bus. Sakthivel then chased after the bus, running alongside it, falling under in the process, and was pinned under the wheel. Unfortunately, Sakthivel died at the scene. The accident incurred the wrath of other FCWs present at the scene of the accident, both on the bus and in the vicinity of the accident. The enraged workers set on the bus, tearing down the windscreens and shattering its windows. The bus driver and timekeeper hid in the bus, while the FCWs became even more confrontational in the process. FCWs seemed to have been targeting the bus driver and timekeeper for having caused the death of the worker.

The Singapore Civil Defence Force (SCDF) and police arrived to extricate Sakthivel from under the bus using a hydraulic press, while also assisting in safely evacuating the bus driver and the timekeeper from the bus. FCWs appeared to have seen the emergency personnel protecting the bus driver and the timekeeper, and therefore turned on them as well. FCWs began to throw heavy objects from along the road and hurled vulgarities at emergency personnel, including SCDF officers trying to rescue Sakthivel’s body from under the bus. As the confrontation intensified, other FCWs damaged emergency vehicles that arrived at the scene, including police cars and ambulances, turning them on their side and in some cases, setting them on fire. Approximately two hours later, riot police managed to disperse the crowd and bring the situation under control. Four key themes emerged from our data analysis: (a) alcohol and misbehaviour, (b) civilizing the ‘Other’, (c) surveillance and control as safety measures and (d) the voice of authority.

Alcohol, Misbehaviour and the ‘Other’

Descriptions of the worker who had come under the bus pointed to the worker ‘being so drunk, he could barely stand up straight’ (Sim, Lim, & Lee, 2013). From early on, alcohol was introduced as a reason for the accident and the death of the worker, and also for the actions of the rioters who were said to be drunk. The alcohol frame depicted the senselessness and irrationality of the mob and served as the preamble for the introduction of a ban on alcohol in the area:

Yesterday, Second Minister for Home Affairs S. Iswaran said that while it was too early to say definitively what caused the riot, it was ‘plausible that alcohol consumption was a contributory factor’. That is why the authorities are planning to enforce a complete ban on the sale and consumption of alcohol this coming weekend in the Race Course Road area ‘in order to stabilise the situation’. (Chan, 2013)

The reference to alcohol as the probable cause serves as the impetus for a policy solution. In tandem with reports on the drunkenness of workers, the overcrowding of Little India on Sundays was discussed as an issue that compounded and exacerbated the confrontation. Even before Sunday night’s riot in Little India, overcrowding and alcohol consumption in the area by foreign workers were in the authorities’ sights, two ministers have said (Heng, J., 2013).

References to alcohol were connected to the coverage of policy decisions such as the ban on alcohol:

Further measures include looking at how the transport flow can be made safer, Prime Minister Lee Hsien Loong said yesterday. Moves to curb the drinking problem in the area—which were already being discussed before the riot—will also be sped up, he added. These could include a prohibition on alcohol consumption in common areas such as void decks and pavements, as reported in The Straits Times on Monday. (Chan, 2013)

Aspects of the coverage focused on the cultural traits of the FCW as being different from ‘civilized’ Singaporeans. The South Asian FCW community was described as having a different ‘cultural psychology’, with social norms and standards of behaviour that were fundamentally ‘un-Singaporean’ (Chan, 2014; Heng, J., 2013). This cultural psychology refers to the ‘desire for “street justice” that is likely due to the rioters’ cultural background’ (Lim, 2014; ‘On India Street Culture’, 2014).

The rioter frame used the trope of culture to pinpoint cause and explanation on the part of the FCWs, attributing their violent behaviour during the confrontation to a cultural phenomenon. There was also a call for the need to highlight to FCWs that they ‘must obey and respect the laws of the host country, and not import norms and modes of behaviour to which they might be accustomed’ (‘Time for Self-reflection’, 2013). A solution to this is then to ‘civilize’ the worker by familiarising him with the social norms in Singapore so that he may understand how to behave (Chan, Mokhtar, & Yong, 2013).

Moreover, in allaying potential public backlash against FCWs amid growing public sentiments against foreigners, The Straits Times discourse simultaneously focused on dispelling myths about FCWs and dissociating them from the ‘criminal’ frame invoked in references to the rioters: Mr Lee pointed out that most of the over one million foreign workers in Singapore are law-abiding, and their crime rate is lower than that for Singaporeans on average (Chan, 2013c).

More importantly, there were numerous articles urging Singaporeans to hold back on speculation and stereotyping or discriminating against all FCWs based on the actions of a few (Chan, 2013). For example, some articles emphasized that ‘the general majority of workers here are peaceful, genuine and hard-working’ (Sim, 2014, June 29). At the same time, online vitriol, racism and xenophobia were widely denounced and heavily criticized by the state and civil society groups alike: If a majority of Singaporeans are reasonable fair-minded people, then I would urge every single one of us to rebuke, rebut or ignore the nasty xenophobes among us. This is the time to take a stand against ugly values that sow dissension (Heng, R., 2013).

Citing an academic sociologist, the newspaper continues to remind Singaporeans the need to be tolerant of the ‘different’ ways of the workers:

Sociologist Mathew Mathews said, ‘It will be important for us to continue to bring the message of tolerance, social cohesion, and good law and order to migrant workers who may come from societies where norms and values may be different from ours.’ (Zengkun, 2013)

By highlighting and castigating negative and prejudiced comments online, The Straits Times reiterated the value of tolerance. To achieve this objective, The Straits Times also made a concerted effort to humanize the FCW through the use of human interest stories (Chan et al., 2013) and by reiterating their right to good treatment. For example,

As for foreign workers, Mr Lee stressed that Singapore would not tolerate any ill or unfair treatment of them. ‘They are people, they are working, they have families to support and they are here to do a job,’ he said. ‘We have to make sure they are well treated, paid properly and on time, their safety is taken care of, their living conditions are also up to standard and that they are also given full protection of the law.’ (Chan et al., 2013)

The message of tolerance was accompanied by narratives highlighting the role of the FCW in building Singapore’s economy. Articles cited the fact that FCWs were responsible for building most of Singapore’s infrastructure such as roads, apartment flats ([Housing Development Board (HDBs)] and the transport network ([Mass Rapid Transit, (MRT)], positioning FCW labour as a valuable contribution to the economy (‘Deportation a Tough but Necessary Option’, 2013). In this economic backdrop, intolerance against FCW due to the riot is once again rebuked:

That is why the xenophobic and racist comments that have emerged on the Internet reveal a disturbing underside of Singapore life. There have been attempts to tar an entire ethnic community of foreign workers with supposed vices merely because the rioters were drawn from that community. Apparently, there are Singaporeans who would like to have Singapore without these workers. Their labour is welcome, but their presence is not—an argument that militates against reason and grates on morals. (‘Time for Self-reflection’, 2013)

Voices of migrant worker activists were also present in the articles, countering viewpoints about the lawlessness of workers and their antisocial behaviours. Transient Workers Count Too (TWC2), an NGO that advocates for migrant worker rights, argued against typecasting and labelling workers, even contending that Singaporeans would have been far more disruptive in difficult situations that FCWs go through during their employment stint in the country:

From the experience of TWC2 (migrant workers’ group Transient Workers Count Too), we do not find foreign workers any more prone to violent, criminal or anti-social behaviour than Singaporeans. Singapore crime statistics also bear this out. In fact I sometimes marvel at how stoic the foreign workers are in the face of a bullying employer or a rogue agent or an unresponsive bureaucrat. A Singaporean in that situation might have become far more confrontational. So I would appeal to Singaporeans not to jump to conclusions that foreign workers are an unruly lot. (Heng, J., 2013)

Moreover, The Straits Times published editorials written by migrant worker activists, such as an opinion piece titled ‘Little India Riot: Learning the Right Lessons from this Episode’ by TWC2 Vice President, Russell Heng.

In their reporting of the Little India riot, media frames were far from uniformly constructed in the support of state rhetoric, rather they were constructed within a myriad of tensions and dialectics. Although we see the news constructing culture of the ‘Other’ as a frame that is threatening, we also see the news simultaneously framing workers’ frustrations, welfare and labour rights as possible grievances the workers face in Singapore that added to the mounting tensions. Although majority of The Straits Times’ articles focused on reporting facts, the human rights frame was also present, albeit to a smaller degree.

Surveillance and Control as Safety Measures

Our findings suggested that The Straits Times played a role in lending credibility to the state’s decision to increase surveillance and control by (a) unilaterally repatriating 53 FCWs and (b) stepping up policing of the entire FCW community. These enactments of surveillance and control were framed under the ambit of safety of Singaporeans, safeguarding the interests and security of Singapore society. The news constructed this by reporting the setting up of the Committee of Inquiry (COI), an independent team investigating the cause of the riots with the goal of providing solutions and measures for prevention of future conflict. The setting up of the COI was reported just two days after the riot, already suggesting potential causes as described in this headline: ‘What Ministers Say; Crowding, Alcohol are Ongoing Issues Being Tackled’ (Heng, J., 2013). The outcomes of the COI investigations saw 28 workers being charged with rioting and in remand, 53 workers not charged but found to have either obstructed or failed to obey orders by authorities and therefore repatriated and 200 workers receiving advisories to obey the law but allowed to stay and work in Singapore (Lim, 2013). Looking back, there were, however, clear discrepancies in the way the news reported the initial conflict:

On Sunday, about 400 people rioted, overturning police cars and setting fire to them and an ambulance, after a foreign worker was run over by a bus at the junction of Race Course Road and Tekka Lane. The committee was first announced by Prime Minister Lee Hsien Loong on Monday. (Seow, 2013)

However, later reports indicated that 200 workers were found to have not been partaking in the riot. This included workers standing around, watching the fiasco. These workers were reported to have received advisories. In relation to the second group of 53 workers who were deported, The Straits Times was cautious in reporting alternative opinions regarding the unfair deportation of workers, mentioning an ongoing debate between civil society members and the state on the deportation charges. In such instances, we see The Straits Times’ role as far from monolithic—in contrast to views of the publication being a mere state mouthpiece—and its maturing role in articulating contentions by different groups regarding the deportation. Specifically, the newspaper reported that civil rights groups such as Workfair Singapore and Maruah came forward to criticize the ‘arbitrary deportation of workers who did not have the opportunity to defend themselves in court’ (Lai, 2013). The Straits Times therefore did not just merely reproduce the state narrative, but also reported voices that represented the unfairness in the way FCWs were being charged and repatriated.

However, there was a significant absence of voices from the FCW community and the public sphere in the reporting of the debate, leaving the state and civil society to debate the state of these workers. The voice of the state, including that of the Law and Foreign Minister K. Shanmugam and Senior Minister of State Indranee Rajah, refuted claims by civil society organizations, explaining that the Immigration Act allows for the repatriation of foreigners and the Minister for Home Affairs has the authority to make this executive decision if the individual is deemed to be a threat to the safety of Singaporeans (Lai, 2013). The Ministers also responded that civil rights groups have ‘confused the two issues’ as individuals that face a criminal charge have a right to due process in the court of law, whereas foreigners who are repatriated are not facing any criminal charge and therefore do not go through the same process as they are not allowed to challenge the repatriation order in the first place (Lai, 2013). As put by Ms Indranee Raja, ‘One allegation appears to be “Oh, no due process”, but the question is, due process for what?’ (Lai, 2013).

The Straits Times, in constructing issues of repatriation of workers for reasons of national safety, offered rich description with detailed quotes from state voices supporting repatriation. The newspaper also allowed for civil society voices to be represented, thus allowing for key debates, engaging the voices of specific actors such as the state and important NGOs. Although the arguments laid out by civil rights groups or voices of actors for the workers were articulated, they were given little room to fundamentally criticize the law. The Straits Times positioned Maruah’s claim as appealing to the United Nations (UN) without providing contextual emphasis on the reasons behind the claim and on what basis were these claims made to the UN. The report left the claim hanging without offering detailed explanation of the context of the appeal or the details of the claim.

The Straits Times article (Lai, 2013) presents both voices, but with important detailed arguments made by the state voice and not from any of the civil society groups or from the workers themselves. Opportunity for further discussion was foreclosed by the coverage of the state’s response that ‘every country has the right to determine its own laws and decide what works best, given its circumstances’ (Lai, 2013). Moreover, the safety frame is invoked to justify the state’s response. As Ms Indranee Rajah states, ‘I suppose Workfair and Maruah don’t approach it in the same way as the Government has approached it. The Government approaches it from the need to protect Singaporeans and to ensure that Singapore remains a place that is safe for everybody’ (as quoted in Lai, 2013).

The news stories recirculated the safety frame, frequently using official quotes from public servants. The media also framed surveillance and control of the FCW community at large as a safety measure, connecting to the paternalistic role of the state in protecting Singaporeans and in ensuring the safety of Singaporeans. Following the riot, the media announced that policing in Little India had been increased:

Meanwhile, patrols in Little India have been stepped up, as has police presence in areas where workers congregate, as a precautionary measure. Cameras will also be installed in the vicinity of Race Course Road in the coming week or so, in addition to existing ones. (Hoe, 2013)

The Straits Times’ coverage echoed official narratives about the stepping up of surveillance, such as Deputy Prime Minister Teo Chee Hean’s statement that ‘police presence has been stepped up in foreign worker dormitories and places where workers congregate “so that life can go on as normally as possible and everyone has a feeling of security”’ (Seow, 2013). Besides Little India, police presence had also been ramped up in areas where FCWs commonly congregate, such as Golden Mile Complex (Thai worker hangout), Geylang (Chinese worker hangout) and also in the vicinity of foreign worker dormitories (Sim, 2013). When discussing increases in police patrols and the alcohol ban, the stories portrayed the residents as supportive of and content with such measures, as reflected in this quote: ‘I know my residents will fully support this immediate measure,’ he [Minister Lui Tuck Yew] said, after touring the affected area with Mr Iswaran last night’ (Chan, 2013).

Typically, police officers were described as a necessary presence to help manage unruly drunk FCWs who caused public disturbances. Accounts from residents were offered, describing how ‘such intensified police presence has put Geylang residents like Mr Tan Xiang Li, 58, at ease’, as that was ‘a complicated area where people tend to drink and create trouble’ (Sim, 2013). As a whole, The Straits Times then framed surveillance and control not only as precautionary measures for the general public, but also as measures that were accepted by both Singaporeans and FCWs. However, we observed one instance where the frame was challenged: ‘Earlier, some MPs had been critical of the Government for seeming to have prematurely concluded that alcohol was a contributory factor, and one it used to justify giving more powers to the authorities patrolling Little India’ (Chan, 2014).

Again, we see the news pushing the boundaries, and not just publishing state rhetoric, but also bringing out the factions in underlying state discourses, laying out competing voices for the mediated public sphere to consume. It also allows room for arguments that challenge the alcohol frame and how it had been positioned to justify current post-riot measures, again suggesting that the press in Singapore do not operate in monolithic ways. Nonetheless, while this made the framing of the surveillance and control by the state appear more balanced, our findings did not show any critical line of discussion from The Straits Times itself.

The news stories reproduced quotes from alternative stakeholders without themselves interrogating and questioning the problems with surveillance critically. Take for instance, the following commentary by social activist and civil society actor, Jolovan Wham, which was quoted in a Straits Times article by Chan et al. (2013):

But social worker Jolovan Wham, a consultant to Humanitarian Organisation for Migration Economics (Home), says there is a risk that this heightened surveillance can go overboard. He has heard of cases where a foreign worker is merely talking loudly on the phone, and is told fiercely by the auxiliary police officer, ‘Hey, go away’. ‘When you bring in law enforcers who treat them harshly simply because of where they are standing, when they are not breaking any law, it creates some mistrust,’ he says.

This statement challenges the state-centred voice on the actions of law enforcers, and also engages with the possibility of law enforcers as being threatening towards law-abiding FCWs merely going about their business. In this instance, we again see the news not merely framing surveillance and control as safety measures, but also challenging the broader narrative through micro-representations of alternative voices that point to human rights issues. It is worth noting here that even in shaping discourse centred on a human rights agenda, the newspaper never represents these opinions as its own, always quoting external references in its reporting.

Voices of Authority

Throughout The Straits Times articles analyzed, authoritative voices (specifically the state) came through as the strongest. The Straits Times repeatedly used the voice of state authority who spoke for Singaporeans on various issues in support of government decisions. For instance, ministers were frequently quoted in The Straits Times in statements such as ‘the liquor curbs have been very welcomed by residents’ (Sim, 2014, June 29). Minister K. Shanmugam also said:

So you take no chances. So you do much more than is necessary and if you’re a resident in the area, you’ll welcome it, and if you’re outside, you’ll understand why, because this is really to protect the area, to protect the residents, so people will understand, I think. (Teng & Goy, 2013)

Similarly, the FCW community had also been spoken for by state authorities in multiple articles, particularly in debunking the argument that the underlying causes of the riot were extended periods of mistreatment and exploitation that came to a head following the accident in Little India. Consider the following excerpt:

In the aftermath of the riot, Law and Foreign Minister K. Shanmugam visited foreign workers at their dormitories and spoke with them in the presence of the media. There is no tension, there is no sense of grievance or hardship or injustice,’ Mr Lee said. (Chan, 2013b)

In addition, the other voice of authority, ‘the COI investigation team did not find any “deep-seated unhappiness” among foreign workers in Singapore that might have caused them to “take the opportunity…to vent their anger”, said Mr Adam [FasheHuddin, CNB Director of Investigations]’ (Sim, 2014, June 29). Note further:

There have been 3,700 employment-related complaints this year, as compared to the 1.1 million foreign workers here on work permits and S-passes, he said. ‘That’s a very small percentage of the workforce that have disputes and many of these disputes are settled within a month,’ Mr Tan said in an interview with local media. He also cited the findings of a 2011 survey of foreign workers by the Manpower Ministry, which found that nine in 10 were relatively content with their life here, and seven in 10 would recommend Singapore to their friends and family looking to work abroad. (‘Data Shows Worker Woes “Not an Issue”’, 2013)

However, discourses from alternative perspectives were present, and at times, robust debates on issues were reflected, reflecting the voices of the larger civil society. Sometimes, these voices were aligned with the state narrative, while at other times, they departed from the state narrative. Consider for instance, the voice of social worker Kenneth Soh from the civil society organization, TWC2, pointing out the importance of integrating workers into Singaporean society:

Those for integration suggest it is only the right and proper thing to do. TWC2 social worker Kenneth Soh says: ‘It is quite difficult for them to adapt because they don’t blend in with Singaporeans and Singaporeans don’t want to be in contact with these migrant workers. Over a period of time it has become two separate communities in the same society.’ (Chan et al., 2013)

Similarly, expert perspectives such as that of Cherian George, a media scholar in Singapore who has written extensively about censorship and mass media in Singapore, pointed out that ‘within our borders are separate Singapores for foreign workers’ (Chan et al., 2013). However, in articles that represented alternative perspectives, the voice of state actors emerged to counter these oppositional voices as utopian and unrealistic. In relation to Cherian George’s and Kenneth Soh’s argument on integration, Transport Minister Lui Tuck Yew, who is an MP for Moulmein-Kallang GRC, wonders how meaningful ‘integration’ can really be. ‘Most of these foreign workers are here on a transient basis. Our paths may cross once a week,’ he says (The Straits Times, 2015).

Similarly, in any suggestion by alternative voices regarding the underlying dissatisfaction of workers in Singapore such as poor working and living conditions, low wages and long working hours, the voices of authorities offered contesting accounts. However, apart from and beyond its reporting of the Little India riots, The Straits Times consistently reported concerns related to FCWs, such as poor living conditions of workers in a dormitory in Singapore:

MOM also encouraged the public to report such cases so that it can investigate and take action. There are 200,000 beds in purpose-built dorms with facilities like food courts. But many foreign workers continue to be housed in quarters with poor conditions. The Punggol dorm had broken urinals and choked toilet bowls. Workers also had to bathe using water that was meant to clean machinery, because of the poor shower facilities there. (Tan & Wei, 2014)

The media here played a role in reporting the violation of rights of these workers but also ensured that the authorities were seen as enforcers in preventing such violations and encouraging the public to report such incidents.

Discussion

The frames emerging from our content analysis of The Straits Times articles began with the construction of the ‘villain’ in the Little India riot, referring to the rioters who had caused destruction and threatened the safety of public servants and the general community. The use of this frame created an impetus for the use of surveillance and control as a way to once again achieve the safety and stability of Singapore that had been threatened by the rioters. By rationalizing their actions, using the moralistic frame of safety, the state was able to justify and generate support for various acts which infringed on the basic rights and freedom of FCWs, while quelling opposing voices that were then criticized as unconcerned with the protection of residents. The rioter was then contrasted with the image of the everyday FCW, a hardworking individual who had been wrongfully implicated in the incident. Significant attention was placed on reconciling the relationship between the FCW and Singaporeans, and dismissing any perspectives that pointed towards the feelings of anger or resentment among the FCWs.

These discourses were reinforced through the voices of the authority, and alternative voices on the ground were systematically erased in the media’s celebration of the state’s handling of the incident. The manner in which the discourse on FCWs was put forth in the mediated public sphere is an essential point of interrogation because their framing of social issues shapes public opinion and has a broader impact on how the marginalized community, in this case the FCW community, is constructed and constituted in this nation-state. A historical understanding of the mediated public sphere as a tool of public relations for nation-building, and the use of media instruments for co-option to mould consensus and acquiescence is rooted and brought out in our reading and analysis of the riot (George, 2014). In the recent years, media institutions in Singapore have evolved to become more empowered, and journalists have found openings for constructive discourse and critique of the state. However, George (2014) highlights that the practice of self-censorship is still deeply entrenched. Additionally, the paucity of independent news outlets reinforces how the mainstream media here play powerful roles in shaping perspectives of the ‘Other’ while silencing dissident views. These discursive frames must always be approached with a view to critically interrogate their role in the structural marginalization of the subaltern.

Our analysis points to multiple contested discourses emerging in The Straits Times coverage of the Little India riot. It is also important to note that these sites of contestations were very much present and evident in the articles about the riot. The fact that we see the issues of human rights being discussed by actors in contention with state voice in the mediated public sphere shows the evolution of Singapore’s press and the possibilities of the mainstream press in Singapore maturing beyond being a monolithic state apparatus for nation building. The news frames in the newspaper provide interesting insights on how the media in Singapore still play public relations roles for the state when replicating discourses meted out by the state on the one hand, and try to provide a space for alternative insights on selected issues pertaining to the riots, without subverting its role in obvious ways on the other hand. The Straits Times reporting is, therefore, far from being a monolithic mouthpiece of the state. In this rare case study, we see sites of contestations and the possibilities of press freedom in microsites of expression in mainstream news in Singapore.

This is in tandem with George’s (2014) critique of Singapore’s media, where he argues that oppositional perspectives are at times found in co-opted discourses through the points of consensus with the state. In these ways, hopes for social justice and social change can be found in the articulations of mainstream media outlets such as The Straits Times. To add to George’s (2014) critique, our analysis finds that The Straits Times, in this crisis also, found opportunities to introduce discourses grounded in alternative perspectives without co-opting the news into being a point of consensus, but merely representing state voice amidst alternative perspectives. Thus, the news, at times, did not use consensus in co-opted discourse but provided enough room for state discourses to be represented, and at the same time allowed for the flourishing of alternative criticisms of state representation and voice.