Moral Ambiguity in Narratives Decreases Creative Performance in Highly Creative People

Abstract

This article seeks to further our understanding of the effects of morality in the media on individual creativity. We present an experiment testing whether morally ambiguous (versus clear) narrative endings can enhance or diminish divergent thinking in a subsequent task. Recently proposed understandings of mass-media entertainment seem to imply moral ambiguity should diminish performance, whereas research on the ‘dark side of creativity’ seems to imply it should enhance performance for highly creative individuals. We elaborate on both views and show results indicating morally ambiguous stories actually decrease creativity (defined in terms of fluency in divergent thinking), at least in the short term, for individuals high on trait creativity. Discussion centres on the multidimensional relationships between media and creativity.

Keywords

Moral psychology divergent thinking media entertainment creativity innovation

Introduction

Moral ambiguity in mass entertainment, exemplified by television programmes such as Dexter, Breaking Bad or The Walking Dead, has become an increasing trend on US television and elsewhere. But does witnessing such moral ambiguity in media enhance or diminish creativity and innovation in society? Research on the ‘dark side of creativity’ has shown that moral ambiguity is associated with greater creativity. For example, creative minds primed with creative tasks are more likely to behave unethically (Mai, Ellis, & Welsh, 2015), and reciprocally, dishonest activity is associated with enhanced creativity (Gino & Wiltermuth, 2014) defined as divergent thinking.

Based on this logic, there is a connection between divergent thinking and moral ambiguity. It seems that witnessing moral ambiguity could enhance divergent thinking, as it primes individuals to perceive grey areas rather than hardened categories. However, whether moral ambiguity in media can influence divergent thinking is uncertain. Newer frameworks (e.g., Lewis et al., 2016; Tamborini, 2011, 2013) discuss the role of deliberation and mental exertion in response to narrative-based moral ambiguity. As such, there is equal reason to believe that witnessing moral ambiguity could decrease divergent thinking. The mental appraisals evoked by morally complex or ambiguous narratives may be mentally exerting and deplete cognitive resources necessary for divergent thinking to occur. We elaborate ahead on these competing logics and present a study testing them. First, though, we define moral ambiguity in a more detailed way.

Moral Clarity versus Ambiguity

Moral clarity and ambiguity are understood from a cognitive perspective in a manner consistent with dual-process models of moral judgement (Greene, Nystrom, Engell, Darley, & Cohen, 2004). This view sees moral judgements as resulting from either an intuitive or a deliberative appraisal process (e.g., Gibbs, 2013; Tamborini, 2011, 2013). Intuitive appraisals are heuristic or emotional in nature, wherein respondents rely on innate and universal moral intuitions posited by social-intuitionist understandings of moral judgement (Haidt, 2001). However, when respondents judge actions in which moral intuitions are internally conflicting, the judgements become slower and more deliberative (Greene et al., 2004; Lewis, Tamborini, & Weber, 2014). This occurs when an individual must violate one moral intuition to adhere to another. In fictional narratives, this can be brought about by an unresolved moral dilemma or anti-hero story (Lewis, Tamborini, & Weber, 2014).

For example, consider the film Taken, an action flick in which the protagonist saves his daughter from human traffickers. In the end, justice is restored and the traffickers receive their due punishment. Such a story is intuitively processed, because good prevails unambiguously (i.e., it is morally clear). By contrast, consider the film, Titanic, in which one of the main characters tragically dies while the antagonist lives and the movie ultimately ends with the audience contemplating life questions. This story is not as easily processed, because it is riddled with moral ambiguity (i.e., good does not prevail and injustices are unresolved). In this sense, moral ambiguity in narratives can be understood as those eliciting incongruities between various moral intuitions, such that a storyline prohibits the simultaneous satisfaction of all salient moral intuitions.

Creativity and Immorality

There are competing rationales suggesting divergent thinking could be enhanced or decreased after witnessing morally clear or ambiguous stimuli such as the films mentioned earlier. The rationale that witnessing moral ambiguity could actually increase performance is based on the notion that unethical behaviour and creativity both require breaking at least some rules within a given domain (Gino & Wiltermuth, 2014). In the case of unethicality, one must break social principles (e.g., dishonesty requires breaking the social principle that people should always tell the truth; Gino & Wiltermuth, 2014). In the case of creativity, one must engage in divergent thinking, which requires breaking rules in a particular domain in order to construct new associations between seemingly disparate elements (Bailin, 1987; Guilford, 1950). Past studies have shown that thinking ‘outside of the box’ (i.e., in a way that requires cognitive flexibility) can lead to more unethical behaviour (Cropley, Kaufman, & Cropley, 2003; Gino & Ariely, 2012). As mentioned earlier, there is also empirical research suggesting that behaving dishonestly can lead to an increase in creativity (Gino & Wiltermuth, 2014).

Gino and Wiltermuth (2014) conducted several experiments in which respondents were given the opportunity to over-report their performance in an activity and were then given creative tasks to complete. In experiment 1, Gino and Wiltermuth (2014) found that those who were dishonest scored higher in the subsequent creative tasks than those who did not cheat, even when accounting for creative personality differences. Their experiments 2 and 3 linked dishonest behaviour to creativity in subsequent creative tasks and their experiments 4 and 5 indicated that the connection between creativity and dishonest behaviour can be explained by an enhanced feeling of being unbound by rules.

Mai et al. (2015) expanded upon the current literature on the relationship of creative personality and unethical behaviour by integrating trait activation theory. Trait activation theory suggests that personality traits or ‘dispositional variables’ (e.g., creative personality) will more strongly predict trait-relevant outcomes such as behaviour in context with trait-relevant situational cues (Tett & Burnett, 2003; Tett & Guterman, 2000; Mai et al., 2015). In its original definition, cognitive flexibility is noted as a response to environmental stimuli (Scott, 1962). Since the expression of traits is dependent on external situational cues, this earlier definition lends cognitive flexibility to being appropriate for integrating with trait activation theory. Trait-relevant situations provide cues for expressing trait-relevant behaviour (Tett & Guterman, 2000; Mai et al., 2015). In fact, in order to elicit behavioural variance between creative and non-creative individuals, creative personality must be activated by using a creative task (Martindale, 1989). Mai et al. (2015) found that creative personality can encourage unethical behaviour, but that this effect is much stronger when activated by a creative task (Mai et al., 2015). Borrowing the logic from these studies, it seems moral ambiguity would act as an activator for creativity and thus lead to higher scores on a divergent thinking task.

By contrast, the rationale that witnessing moral ambiguity could decrease divergent thinking is based on the notion that ambiguity can be cognitively taxing and deplete mental resources. There is evidence that witnessing moral clarity is a more intuitive and enjoyable activity free from cognitive exertion (Lewis, Tamborini, & Weber, 2014), and some scholars even argue this type of enjoyment can be likened to a form of flow (Sherry, 2004). Such feelings of perceptual fluency are known to aid memory storage and retrieval processes in subsequent tasks (Marsh, Richardson, & Schmidt, 2009; Ravizza, 2003). This effect would be helpful in divergent thinking, where mental effort is used to realize alternative, unintended or novel applications of older elements. Additionally, moral ambiguity may drain the mental resources necessary for divergent thinking. Lewis et al. (2014) found that appraising morally ambiguous scenarios is a more deliberative task than appraising morally clear scenarios by comparing appraisal speeds for these two types of contents. The longer appraisal times for morally ambiguous stimuli suggests greater use of mental resources. There is also evidence that deliberative tasks exhaust mental resources from the ego-depletion literature (Baumeister, Bratslavsky, Muraven, & Tice, 1998).

Ego depletion is based on the theory that acts of volition (e.g., self-regulation, choice, active response, etc.) draw on a common, limited inner resource akin to energy or strength (Baumeister et al., 1998). For example, impulse control can deplete the supply of an inner limited resource and has detrimental effects on subsequent effortful acts of volition (Baumeister et al., 1998). Baumeister et al. (1998), through a series of four studies, have shown ego depletion occurs across wide gaps of irrelevance. For example, if a person actively limits his/her consumption of a particular food, he/she is more likely to give up on a complex puzzle more quickly than he/she otherwise would have had he/she not spent the day limiting his/her consumption of that particular food.

Assessments or judgements of complex stimuli are inherently rooted in choice, an act of volition, making them a source for ego depletion. By having respondents assess morally ambiguous scenarios, we will be requiring them to put forth more effort in an act of volition (i.e., a judgement that is more cognitively taxing due to moral ambiguity), making morally ambiguous assessments a potentially great source for ego depletion whereas moral clarity should not drain mental resources. As creativity is often thought of as the coming together of two seemingly disparate ideas to create something new or to solve a problem (Gino & Wiltermuth, 2014), it is understandable that creativity assessments often focus on divergent thinking abilities, where the majority of responses will be the result of these connections. Being creative in that way requires mental resources. If previously witnessing morally ambiguous scenarios has exhausted mental resources, it stands to reason performance on a divergent thinking task would be hampered.

Following this, it is reasonable to assume moral ambiguity would act as an activator for trait-level creativity regardless of whether moral ambiguity increases or decreases creative thinking. If moral ambiguity enhances divergent thinking, this would be most pronounced for individuals who rate themselves as highly creative. If moral ambiguity diminishes divergent thinking, this would again be most pronounced for individuals who rate themselves as highly creative. We thus pose two competing hypotheses:

H_{1alternative 1}: Moral ambiguity (versus clarity) will interact with trait creativity such that it leads to an increase in performance in a divergent thinking task for individuals scoring highly on trait creativity.

H_{1alternative 2}: Moral ambiguity (versus clarity) will interact with trait creativity such that it leads to a decrease in performance in a divergent thinking task for individuals scoring highly on trait creativity.

Method

Participants

Participants were recruited from a departmental participant pool in a large public university in the southwestern United States, N = 341. The convenience sample consisted of a female majority, n = 269, with a mean age of, M = 19.80 and SD = 1.55.

Design and Procedure

The experiment was conducted online. After anonymously giving consent, participants were first asked to complete the Gough creative-personality scale (described below). Subsequently, participants read and rated three stories, which consisted of moral dilemmas that were either resolved (morally clear) or not resolved (morally ambiguous) in the storyline resolution depending on an individual participant’s assigned condition (see Figure 1 for example). Participants were split into two conditions, with n = 187 in the morally ambiguous condition and n = 154 in the morally clear condition. Participants rated each scenario using Oliver and Bartsch’s (2010) narrative appraisal scales that measure narrative enjoyment as well as appreciation. After reading and rating the stories, participants completed the divergent thinking task described below. Demographics were collected on the final screen.

Stimuli

Stimuli were adopted from Lewis et al. (2014), and consisted of three short narrative scenarios each with two alternative endings. The scenarios were entitled Amelia’s Justice, Courtroom Drama and Saving Civilians. As in Figure 1, each scenario had one of two types of endings (labelled morally ambiguous and morally clear). Either the scenario ended in a morally clear way (morally clear condition), or the scenario ended in a morally ambiguous way (morally ambiguous condition).

Figure 1.

Source: Authors’ own.

Measures

Creative Personality Assessment. The Gough personality scale was used to assess participants’ self-report trait creativity, a method used in previous research on creativity and its relationship to unethical behaviour (Mai et al., 2015). The Gough personality scale was designed to determine a person’s creative potential (Gough, 1979). The measure uses a checklist of 30 adjectives respondents must select if applicable to their personalities. There are 18 positive adjectives and 12 negative adjectives. Some of the positive adjectives are clever, inventive, humorous, individualistic, insightful and unconventional. Some of the negative adjectives are artificial, commonplace, cautious, submissive, narrow interests and honest. To compute a composite score, participants received a point for each positive adjective selected and lost a point for each negative adjective they selected.

Appraisals. Participants rated each of the three scenarios they read on enjoyment and appreciation using two 3-item scales (see Oliver & Bartsch, 2010 for scale validation). Both measures use a 7-point Likert-type response scale ranging from Strongly Disagree to Strongly Agree. Reliabilities were computed for enjoyment and appreciation for each of the three narrative scenarios. They ranged from α = 0.84 to α = 0.89.

Creative Performance Task. As a measure of divergent thinking, respondents were asked to come up with as many uses for six random objects as possible (i.e., the alternative uses test; Christensen, Merrifield, Guilford, & Wilson, 1960). The objects were brick, tire, pencil, shoe and hanger. Participants completed them all in the same order, starting with brick and ending with hanger. Respondents were given two minutes to list as many uses as possible for each object. A timer was present in the corner of the screen. When the timer ran out, their browsers were redirected to a transition screen before beginning the next object. Divergent thinking was operationalized as fluency in the task. The number of uses listed by the participants was counted for each object and served as the outcome variable.

Results

To test the alternative hypotheses, we ran six separate ANCOVAs (analysis of covariance) each with a distinct dependent variable (represented as one of six objects in the divergent thinking task) with condition serving as a between-subjects factor, trait creativity as covariate, and an interaction term for condition by trait creativity (see Table 1). Table 2 contains descriptive statistics for each condition across all six items. Significant differences were not observed for condition on any object, but an interaction between trait creativity and condition was present for the first object on the list (i.e., brick). The interaction pattern suggests that whereas moral clarity was associated with greater fluency in the divergent thinking task than ambiguity, this difference was only present for those scoring higher on trait creativity. This is consistent with H_{1alternative 2}, lending support to the cognitive resources rationale. Those lower on creativity saw no detectable effect or even a small (non-significant), negative effect. Controlling for enjoyment and appreciation ratings in the ANCOVAs did not alter the results. Trait creativity was positively associated with performance on the task for the first five objects in the task.

Table 1.

ANCOVAs for Each Dependent Variable in the Alternative Uses Task

DV	IV	F	η² partial	p
Brick	Condition	0.30	0.00	0.59
	Gough	4.27	0.01	0.04
	Condition × Gough	4.78	0.01	0.03
Tire	Condition	1.73	0.01	0.19
	Gough	9.63	0.03	0.00
	Condition × Gough	1.23	0.00	0.27
Barrel	Condition	0.00	0.00	0.99
	Gough	5.77	0.02	0.02
	Condition × Gough	0.17	0.00	0.68
Pencil	Condition	0.23	0.00	0.63
	Gough	4.74	0.01	0.03
	Condition × Gough	0.00	0.00	0.98
Shoe	Condition	0.31	0.00	0.58
	Gough	9.80	0.03	0.00
	Condition × Gough	0.98	0.00	0.32
Hanger	Condition	3.33	0.01	.007
	Gough	2.07	0.01	0.15
	Condition × Gough	0.20	0.00	0.65

Source: Authors’ primary data analysis.

Note: Bold effect sizes and significance values represent p < 0.05

Table 2.

Descriptive Statistics for Each Dependent Variable

DV	Condition	M	SD
Brick	Ambiguous	6.36	3.62
	Clear	6.70	4.17
Tire	Ambiguous	5.22	2.81
	Clear	6.06	3.91
Barrel	Ambiguous	5.25	3.05
	Clear	5.36	3.60
Pencil	Ambiguous	5.14	2.96
	Clear	5.36	3.60
Shoe	Ambiguous	4.95	2.98
	Clear	5.42	3.62
Hanger	Ambiguous	4.09	2.69
	Clear	4.90	3.24

Source: Authors’ primary data analysis.

Discussion

This study was designed to assess how moral ambiguity (versus clarity) affects performance on a task that measures creativity in terms of divergent thinking. Results show that witnessing moral ambiguity leads to a decrease in performance in a divergent-thinking task for individuals high on trait creativity. This finding contradicts logic that witnessing moral ambiguity will aid in divergent thinking by priming individuals to perceive grey areas between categories. Rather, the finding lends support to the notion that moral ambiguity can decrease the cognitive resources necessary to perform fluently in a divergent-thinking task.

Although research has shown unethical behaviour can activate trait creativity (Gino & Wiltermuth, 2014) and that activating trait creativity can enhance unethicality (Mai et al., 2015), ours is the first to examine whether narrative-based morally ambiguous communications subsequently influences divergent thinking. Our study highlights a complex relationship between unethicality and creativity. Although recent research on the ‘dark side’ of creativity has shown positive associations in both directions (i.e., unethicality leading to enhanced creativity, and vice versa), ours shows that this is not always the case, especially if moral ambiguity is mentally taxing. Past research can be interpreted in this new light. For example, an alternative explanation to the Gino and Wiltermuth (2014) findings is that dishonesty led to greater creativity, because those who did not resist the temptation to cheat had greater mental resources left over to perform in the creative task. Put in this way, their results are consistent with ours. More research should be conducted to detect whether other aspects of creativity may have directionally different effects. For example, it may be the case that moral ambiguity decreases fluency in divergent thinking, but increases the uniqueness or originality in divergent thinking. We leave such questions to future research.

Limitations

No study is without its limitations. One limitation in our study regards the sample, which was a convenience sample of largely homogenous, mostly female university students. This is a common limitation. Although important because one cannot generalize these findings to, say, children, other cultures, or older adults, the fact that the mechanisms involved are basic cognitive processes (i.e., cognitive exertion and trait activation), one may have some confidence that these effects generalize at least more broadly than the sample used in this study.

A second limitation is that there is no offset control condition in the study. As such, it is impossible to tell whether (a) moral clarity is having a positive effect, (b) moral ambiguity is having a negative effect or (c) some combination of those two. However, it would be difficult to operationalize an offset control with such a design. Any conceptually similar task would, by definition, either contain perceptual incongruities or not, induce high or low amounts of deliberation, and subsequently be either cognitively taxing versus intuitive. Future research could, however, use multiple comparison conditions (e.g., low, medium and high ambiguity) to more accurately ascertain the effects of clarity and ambiguity on divergent thinking.

Conclusion

Much research has focused on the dark side of creativity (Beaussart, Andrews, & Kaufman, 2013; Cropley, Kaufman, & Cropley, 2008; Gino & Ariely, 2012; Gino & Wiltermuth, 2014; Mai et al., 2015). Creativity has been linked with unethical behaviour and dishonesty (Gino & Ariely, 2012; Gino & Wiltermuth, 2014; Mai et al., 2015), terrorism and crime (Cropley et al., 2008) and a lack of integrity (Beaussart et al., 2013). This existing research may lead people to believe that creative individuals are less likely to be ethical. However, the current study shows that moral clarity does enhance some aspects of creativity. It seems that moral clarity engages a system of thinking that is so intuitive to creative individuals that they enter a state of perceptual fluency and subsequently perform better on the divergent thinking task. By contrast, moral ambiguity can be cognitively taxing and depletes the mental resources necessary to engage in a creative task. While creativity lends individuals the ability to reasonably break the rules and this rule breaking enhances creativity, this study shows that not all activators for creativity are ‘dark’.

References

Bailin

(1987). Critical and creative thinking. Informal Logic, 9(1). Retrieved 21 April 2017, from http://137.207.184.83/ojs/leddy/index.php/informal_logic/article/viewFile/2656/2097

Baumeister

R. F.

Bratslavsky

Muraven

& Tice

D. M.

(1998). Ego depletion: Is the active self a limited resource? Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 74(5), 1252. doi: 10.1037/0022–3514.74.5.1252

Beaussart

M. L.

Andrews

C. J.

& Kaufman

J. C.

(2013). Creative liars: The relationship between creativity and integrity. Thinking Skills and Creativity, 9, 129–134. doi: 10.1016/j.tsc.2012.10.003

Christensen

P. R.

Guilford

J. P.

Merrifield

P. R.

& Wilson

R. C.

(1960). Alternate uses (form A). Beverly Hills, CA: Sheridan Supply.

Cropley

D. H.

Kaufman

J. C.

& Cropley

A. J.

(2003). Malevolent creativity: A functional model of creativity in terrorism and crime. Creativity Research Journal, 20(2), 105–115.

Cropley

D. H.

Kaufman

J. C.

& Cropley

A. J.

(2008). Malevolent creativity: A functional model of creativity in terrorism and crime. Creativity Research Journal, 20, 105–115. doi: 10.1080/10400410802059424

Gino

& Ariely

(2012). The dark side of creativity: Original thinkers can be more dishonest. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 102(3), 445. doi: 10.1037/a0026406

Gino

& Wiltermuth

S. S.

(2014). Evil genius? How dishonesty can lead to greater creativity. Psychological Science, 25(4), 973–981. doi: 10.1177/0956797614520714

Gough

H. G.

(1979). A creative personality scale for the adjective check list. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 37(8), 1398–1405.

10.

Greene

J. D.

Nystrom

L. E.

Engell

A. D.

Darley

J. M.

& Cohen

J. D.

(2004). The neural bases of cognitive conflict and control in moral judgment. Neuron, 44(2), 389–400. doi: 10.1016/j.neuron.2004.09.027

11.

Guilford

J. P.

(1950). Creativity. American Psychologist, 5(9), 444–454. doi: 10.1037/h0063487

12.

Haidt

(2001). The emotional dog and its rational tail: A social intuitionist approach to moral judgment. Psychological Review, 108(4), 814–834. doi: 10.1037/0033–295x.108.4.814

13.

Lewis

R. J.

Tamborini

& Weber

(2014). Testing a dual-process model of media enjoyment and appreciation. Journal of Communication, 64(3), 397–416. doi: 10.1016/j.jesp.2015.05.004

14.

Lewis

R. J.

Grizzard

M. N.

Mangus

J. M.

Rashidian

& Weber

(2016). Moral clarity in narratives elicits greater cooperation than moral ambiguity. Media Psychology. doi: 10.1080/15213269.2016.1212714. Retrieved from https://www-tandfonline-com.web.bisu.edu.cn/doi/abs/10.1080/15213269.2016.1212714

15.

Mai

K. M.

Ellis

A. P.

& Welsh

D. T.

(2015). The gray side of creativity: Exploring the role of activation in the link between creative personality and unethical behavior. Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 60, 76–85. doi: 10.1016/j.jesp.2015.05.004

16.

Marsh

K. L.

Richardson

M. J.

& Schmidt

R. C.

(2009). Social connection through joint action and interpersonal coordination. Topics in Cognitive Science, 1(2), 320–339. doi: 10.1111/j.1756–8765.2009.01022.x

17.

Martindale

(1989). Personality, situation, and creativity. In Glover

& Reynolds

(Eds), Handbook of creativity (pp. 211–232). Springer. doi: 10.1007/978–1-4757–5356–1_13

18.

Oliver

M. B.

& Bartsch

(2010). Appreciation as audience response: Exploring entertainment gratifications beyond hedonism. Human Communication Research, 36(1), 53–81. doi: 10.1111/j.1468–2958.2009.01368.x

19.

Ravizza

(2003). Movement and lexical access: Do noniconic gestures aid in retrieval? Psychonomic Bulletin & Review, 10(3), 610–615. doi: 10.3758/BF03196522

20.

Scott

W. A.

(1962). Cognitive complexity and cognitive flexibility. Sociometry, 25(4), 405–414. doi: 10.2307/2785779

21.

Sherry

J. L.

(2004). Flow and media enjoyment. Communication Theory, 14(4), 328–347. doi: 10.1111/j.1468–2885.2004.tb00318.x

22.

Tamborini

(2011). Moral intuition and media entertainment. Journal of Media Psychology, 23, 39–45. doi: 10.1027/1864–1105/a000031

23.

Tamborini

(2013). A model of intuitive morality and exemplars. In Tamborini

(Ed.), Media and the moral mind (pp. 43–74). New York, NY: Routledge.

24.

Tett

R. P.

& Burnett

D. D.

(2003). A personality trait-based interactionist model of job performance. Journal of Applied Psychology, 88(3), 500. doi: 10.1037/0021–9010.88.3.500

25.

Tett

R. P.

& Guterman

H. A.

(2000). Situation trait relevance, trait expression, and cross-situational consistency: Testing a principle of trait activation. Journal of Research in Personality, 34(4), 397–423. doi: 10.1006/jrpe.2000.2292