A Knight in Sheep’s Clothing: Media Framing of the Alt-Right Can Alter the Image of Racist Groups

Media Coverage of the Alt-Right

The press can help legitimise a movement or group but can also diminish the group in the eyes of the public based on its coverage (Entman & Rojecki, 1993), which matters in coverage related to far-right political groups such as the Alt-Right. To help aid in framing issues with covering the Alt-Right, the Associated Press in 2016 offered guidance for publications covering the group. The AP stated in its stylebook that the term ‘Alt-Right’ is the preferred term used by white supremacists and white nationalists as a way to describe their ideology, which combines some traditional conservative beliefs with racism, white nationalism and populism (Daniszewski, 2016). The AP guidance is important because with the ascension of groups such as the Alt-Right into the media consciousness, it is likely many journalists had little knowledge about the group. With this notation, the AP showed concern about the potential framing of the Alt-Right with the organisation going as far as to caution reporters to not allow groups such as the Alt-Right to define themselves within coverage (Daniszewski, 2016). The terms ‘Alt-Right’ and ‘white nationalist’ are the preferred descriptors for Richard Spencer and those in leadership of the Alt-Right movement (The National Policy Institute, 2017). This appears to be why the AP specifically cautioned reporters against using the term ‘Alt-Right’ generically without definition because the term was a public relations effort by the Alt-Right to make its supporters’ racist beliefs seem more palatable to a mainstream audience (Daniszewski, 2016; Hartzell, 2018; Munn, 2019). The AP advocated ‘whenever “Alt-Right” is used in a story, be sure to include a definition: “an offshoot of conservatism mixing “racism”, “white nationalism” and “populism’” or more simply, ‘a “white nationalist”’ movement (Daniszewski, 2016). The advice from the AP changed following the ‘Unite The Right’ rally in Charlottesville that resulted in the death of one counter-protestor (Daniszewski, 2017). The change included the AP suggesting reporters include ‘anti-Semitism’ to terms clarifying how to frame the term ‘Alt-Right’ if it must be used but stated in its stylebook that overall the term should be avoided by reporters because Alt-Right is a euphemism designed to hide racist aims (Daniszewski, 2017). Nearly all forms of media, including social and news, have struggled in dealing with a group as savvy in framing and using the web as the Alt-Right (Hawley, 2017; Munn, 2020). The media in some ways were hijacked during a three-year period from 2016 to 2018, using right-wing extremists as sources as part of increasing page views (Phillips, 2018). The AP was not the only source that attempted to provide guidance for journalists in dealing with these individuals (Phillips, 2018).

Adopting the label Alt-Right appears to be part of the far right’s efforts to increase its distribution of content to new audiences, which has resulted in Alt-Right leadership becoming adept at using commercial media sites for their own purposes (Ekman, 2014). Part of their goal is to change traditional frames, and therefore, public perception (Ekman, 2014), as it relates to far-right groups such as the Alt-Right. Additionally, one of the challenges for the media is differentiating Alt-Right talking points from some of those coming from conservative political figures. The importance of Trump to the Alt-Right in 2016 cannot be understated, and the language from Trump seems to embolden white supremacists (McHendry Jr., 2018; Xu, 2020) and has also changed the language of mainstream conservative pundits who fear alienating the Trump supporters that allowed him to remake the Republican and conservative movement (Sykes, 2017). Trump’s pathological unwillingness to criticise anyone who supports him helped to legitimise much of the American far right, at least in the eyes of conservatives (and conservative media), providing them an entrée into American politics (Heikkilä, 2017; Posner & Neiwert, 2016). The hiring of Steve Bannon was also considered a sign among the far right of Trump’s tacit support (Heikkilä, 2017; Posner & Neiwert, 2016). Trump promotes Alt-Right language and ideas by often tweeting false material from far-right and Alt-Right sources, giving it broader exposure (Heikkilä, 2017; Posner & Neiwert, 2016). The media would criticise Trump and move on with the next controversy, but the source gained greater credibility in the conservative counter-sphere (Posner & Neiwert, 2016). Trump and his Alt-Right supporters intermix racial language with terms such as ‘patriotism’, ‘heritage’ and ‘security’ to veil messages in a wink to white supremacists that is unnoticed by many others (Hartzell, 2018; Klein, 2012; Sanchez, 2018). This is due to the rhetorical versatility of much of the language used in current conservative framing that appeals to two separate audiences (Sanchez, 2018).

How the Media Frame Right-Wing Nationalist Groups

Groups of the far right throughout the world use multiple forms of media to help frame their message including websites, social media and partisan news sources to influence mainstream sources. Therefore, the US Alt-Right should be examined through its connection and similarities to other far-right groups as part of the evolution of the far right. The goal with these populist efforts is to use ‘simplistic messages with strong emotional appeal’ as a means of making the Alt-Right appealing to more people (Alvares & Dahlgren, 2016, p. 50). Furthermore, the goal is to use rhetoric that accentuates feelings of powerlessness that permeates some parts of society (Alvares & Dahlgren, 2016). The media have the potential to feed these efforts by allowing groups to define themselves and being attracted to sensationalism within politics (Alvares & Dahlgren, 2016). Therefore, journalism, with its focus on emotionally based messages, tends to work well for populist movements attempting to influence media frames (Alvares & Dahlgren, 2016; Ekman, 2014). Additionally, the Alt-Right often claim to simply be ‘shitposting’ by engaging in behaviour designed to shock and offend that does not portray any true belief (Woods & Hahner, 2019). This is a method of supplying members with a form of rhetorical cover for their actions.

Leaders of this movement cannot always control how the media frame their message or the language used by all connected to it. And this might explain Spencer’s loss of many Alt-Right supporters engaged in more directly violent rhetoric, framing those actions necessary (Klein, 2019). This connects to Spencer’s own claims that some people in the Alt-Right are meant to be leaders and others are meant to be soldiers and soldiers cannot always be controlled (Speakman & Funk, 2020). Those involved in the far right often use web-based communication to insert racist discourse into conversations that are not primarily about race (Hartzell, 2018; Hawley, 2017; Hughey & Daniels, 2013; Sanchez, 2018). Yet, overall, groups such as the Alt-Right typically present racist discourse in subtle, coded language designed not to offend, and use ‘common sense’ appeals that seek to appear race neutral while actually containing racist intent if not content (Goodman & Johnson, 2013; Hawley, 2017; Hughey & Daniels, 2013; Sanchez, 2018). These groups also seek to frame themselves as concerned about limited opportunity for natives in terms of opposition to immigration, a marked differentiation from the more direct racist appeals in past rhetoric from far-right groups (Goodman & Johnson, 2013; Hawley, 2017; Hughey & Daniels, 2013; Sanchez, 2018). Additionally, far-right groups tend to moderate positions publicly, while maintaining their more extreme positions and rhetoric in more private locations (Goodman & Johnson, 2013; Hartzell, 2018; Hawley, 2017), including social media such as Gab, private Facebook groups and more anonymous online locations.

Criticism of Media Coverage

There were members of the media and others who criticised the coverage of the Alt-Right, including how it was framed. In a conversation on National Public Radio, Holocaust Researcher Deborah Lipstadt, stated she saw connections between coverage of the Alt-Right, and Holocaust deniers, where the media have failed in their responsibilities, by providing both groups a platform to present misleading information as pseudoscience (NPR, 2016). The simple act of having the Alt-Right quoted by media sources and validated on social media (with followers and from Twitter checkmarks) provides them legitimacy and helps to normalise the group (Grove, 2016; NPR, 2016). At least one critic wrote the media have become fixated on this ‘small subculture’, providing it far more coverage than deserved (Lapowsky, 2017). ‘There’s no right approach to covering this growing movement, but one thing is certain: The press has erred on the side of overexposure’, (Lapowsky, 2017). However, the challenge is that if the media ignore the group, these gamble with missing a major danger, yet providing them too much coverage could amplify their cause (Lapowsky, 2017).

There have been those within the media who have struggled to understand what the Alt-Right is and the goals of those involved (Grove, 2016), which influences how the group is framed. The press often privileges political communication that transgresses mainstream rhetoric. The Alt-Right often use humour and irony to ridicule the political establishment (Greene, 2019; Munn, 2019; Poulos, 2017). The media offer front-page coverage to small groups as a way of exaggerating their importance with the goal of connecting racists to mainstream conservatism (Harsanyi, 2016). Other critics state that by publicising the Alt-Right, the media make them attractive based not on normalising them, but by promoting them as being outside of the mainstream, which is appealing to some (Poulos, 2017).

Partisan Media and the Web Have an Influence

One of the more important elements of this research is the apparent reconstitution of groups such as the Alt-Right into the respectable portion of the conservative counter-sphere (Main, 2018). There was a time when groups and individuals with views like the Alt-Right such as Ayn Rand, the John Birch Society, and groups like the Ku Klux Klan were ostracised from mainstream conservatism (Hawley, 2017; Lee, 2014; Main, 2018). Despite any criticism of mainstream coverage, the Alt-Right, much like other far-right groups worldwide, uses a multi-tiered approach of framing, using various forms of media for various messages. This seems to be an attempt by the group to frame itself based on the perceived audience. For example, when Alt-Right groups make overt references to racist or conspiracy-type beliefs, they tend to do so using alternative news sources (Starbird, 2017). These sites typically use phrasing to differentiate themselves from better-known press outlets and often belittle mainstream media sources (Starbird, 2017). However, these groups often attempt to use details from articles from well-known sites such as The Washington Post and New York Times to ‘prove’ their theories on these alternative sites (Starbird, 2017).

The partisan, conservative press has helped the Alt-Right to soften their language by even allowing the use of the term Alt-Right as opposed to white supremacist; this attempt to change the tone of the conversation is part of the extreme right’s semantic warfare (Lapowsky, 2017; Sanchez, 2018; Sykes, 2017). The Alt-Right attaches itself to some positions from conservative media, which often attack the Republican establishment for failing to meet economic or other goals (Sheffield, 2016b). Additionally, the Alt-Right uses conspiracy theories to influence many within mainstream conservatism using online sites and social media as well as press coverage (Sheffield, 2016b). Those mainstream conservatives, particularly those with elite status such as Ann Coulter, are referred to as ‘Alt-Light’, with these people helping to bring Alt-Right talking points to the mainstream (Hawley, 2017; Mondon & Winter, 2020). This idea of the alt-light is for leaders of this movement to work directly with conservative partisan outlets to soften the public perception of the Alt-Right (Hawley, 2017; Sheffield, 2016a).

The Alt-Right often relies upon certain conservative columnists who willingly frame the Alt-Right as being much less racist than it is as a manner of convincing racist trolls to boost their audience (Hawley, 2017; Sanchez, 2018; Sheffield, 2016b). Yet, those within the far right, such as the Alt-Right, often retreat to the Internet, claiming avoidance by the mainstream media (Siapera & Veikou, 2016). Furthermore, many far-right groups struggle to maintain a social media presence when their rhetoric eventually results in their removal; however, sites such as Facebook and Twitter in the past allowed freer reign, yet others have been able to successfully taper their language to avoid sanctions (Siapera & Veikou, 2016).

Changing Rhetoric for the Far-Right Worldwide

The American Alt-Right does at times reject mainstream conservatism but also softens its language about its beliefs to stay politically relevant (Anti Defamation League, n.d.). The far right worked within the conservative movement, particularly partisan media, worldwide for more than two decades to influence the terms used to define them, rejecting some and repeating others (Blee & Creasap, 2010; Hartzell, 2018; Major, 2020; Sanchez, 2018; Swain, 2002). For example, the groups used the term ‘white nationalist’ as opposed to ‘white supremacist’ or ‘replacement’ as opposed to ‘white genocide’; they also attempt to reframe old points about racism as being protection of culture, claiming to be populists (Hartzell, 2018; Sanchez, 2018; Speakman & Funk, 2020). These racist groups use the web and other means to offer socially acceptable messages with racist undertones to recruit, while not directly using racist imagery (Hartzell, 2018; Klein, 2012; Rajagopal, 2002).

The Alt-Right has sought to separate itself from better-known racist and neo-Nazi groups, yet the group espouses a form of American Identitarianism, an idea connected to white identity (Hawley, 2017; Southern Poverty Law Center, n.d.). In this way, they seem to mirror the actions of far-right parties in Europe during the 1990s that changed language and tone as a means to increase mainstream conservative acceptance and become more difficult to attack by opponents (Atton, 2002; Edwards III et al., 1995; Sanchez, 2018). This was part of concerted efforts to normalise the discourse of the far right (Atton, 2006; Edwards, 2012; Sanchez, 2018). In one example, the BNP in Great Britain, which embraces ‘an ideology founded on racism, hate, separatism and exclusion’, uses language similar to what appears in progressive publications to support its beliefs (Atton, 2006, p. 586). These international far-right groups also use victimhood discourse as a means of appealing to the disenfranchised and poor within white society (Edwards, 2012; Klein, 2019; Tanner & Campana, 2019). Additionally, the groups’ critics often consider the members with less extreme messages to actually be more dangerous (Singal, 2017). Despite the softer, less overtly racist language, the core beliefs of the Alt-Right are white separatism and an opposition to multiculturalism, the core of racist paleoconservatives (Anti Defamation League, n.d.; Daniels, 2018; Hawley, 2017; Sanchez, 2018).

Based on the literature review, the following research questions are offered. RQ1: How is the Alt-Right framed in the articles reviewed? RQ2: Do media outlets use the guidance from the Associated Press in defining the Alt-Right? RQ3: Will the Alt-Right experience similar success to other far-right groups in gaining media framing that makes their image appear more mainstream?

RQ2 Adhering to AP Style

The second research question examined more specifically if media coverage of the Alt-Right followed the AP guidelines that existed both before and after the Charlottesville rally when the AP changed its style from offering a definition of the Alt-Right to a recommendation that reporters no longer use the term. However, they recommended if reporters used the term to be more specific about the Alt-Rights racist and anti-Semitic beliefs. The majority of articles reviewed did not follow the AP recommendations for clearly defining Alt-Right. However, there might be some reason for journalistic reticence to be more direct in framing the Alt-Right. It is possible that some journalists elected to cover the Alt-Right in the manner they did because the Alt-Right has a history of harassing and threatening reporters who cover their activities (Asher-Schapiro, 2018). The group informs journalists they know the reporter’s address or the addresses of their family members as a form of intimidation: additionally, many publications use young reporters or freelancers to cover the Alt-Right who have less experience with this level of harassment (Asher-Schapiro, 2018). ‘Part of the problem, reporters told CPJ, is that while many in the far right see the media as a necessary megaphone, a story or reporter’s style can incite a mob on Twitter or the right-wing site Gab, a chat network similar to Twitter’ (Asher-Schapiro, 2018). There were no specific articles within our sample that mentioned the reporter(s) being harassed by the Alt-Right; however, reporters such as David French from the National Review said he was harassed and his wife’s blog was spammed with images of African American men being murdered and committing suicide (Harassed On Twitter, 2016). Journalist Jonathan Wiseman after reporting on the group was bombarded with anti-Semitic messages and threats on social media (Gross, 2018). The Anti-Defamation League reported that at least 800 reporters received anti-Semitic and harassing social media contact from those representing the right (Anti-Semitic Targeting of Journalists During the 2016 Presidential Campaign, 2016).

Bethany Mandel, a freelance reporter who wrote critically about Trump, was also viciously harassed on Twitter. One user tweeted about her for 19 hours straight, and she received messages containing incendiary language about her family, and images with her face superimposed on photos of Nazi concentration camps. Mandel, like the other Jewish journalists interviewed by ADL, has been targeted by anti-Semitic language before, but these attacks stood out, she said, for their ‘volume and the imagery. It also seemed coordinated – they would come in waves and 50 percent of the time I couldn’t identify the source’ (Anti-Semitic Targeting of Journalists During the 2016 Presidential Campaign, 2016).

Furthermore, recent research suggests that certain reporters are more likely to be harassed than others and this includes women (Lewis et al., 2020), which fits into the misogynistic nature of the Alt-Right (Hawley, 2017).

Based on the results of this study, it appears the AP elected to suggest eliminating the term Alt-Right based upon the lack of consistency in framing the group and a lack of clear understanding from the public (Daniszewski, 2017; Hawley, 2017). The review of coverage for this article suggests that the Associated Press was correct in that assessment and that reporting likely did support confusion and potentially promote further Alt-Right acceptance into the mainstream. Fewer than five of the articles reviewed actually used the suggested AP language for describing the Alt-Right, and interestingly this study did include a number of articles published by the AP that did not meet the organisation’s own recommendation. Even after the AP’s recommendation of eliminating the term Alt-Right, the term continued to appear in articles from numerous sources. One of the closer articles to the AP style was provided by Chico Enterprise-Record which wrote the ‘“Alt-Right” – a loose collection of white nationalists, racists and anti-immigration populists’ (Galofaro, 2017). Yet, this example occurred after the recommendation to stop using Alt-Right altogether based on its euphemistic nature. However, another AP article provided no context for the term Alt-Right: ‘Cliff Erickson leaned against a fence and took in the scene. He said he thinks removing the statue amounts to erasing history and said the counter protesters are crazier than the Alt-Right’ (Press, 2017). Therefore, in this case, it seems the AP’s suggested frame had much less influence on the presentation of information about the Alt-Right than the group’s own chosen frames.

Alt-Right Success in Self-framing?

Finally, the last section of Findings and Discussion deals with RQ3, which asked if the Alt-Right would succeed in getting the media to use their chosen frames. The expectation of Alt-Right success is at least partially due to the strictness of its leadership in maintaining the message. However, it was also based on the achievement of other far-right groups internationally realising similar rhetorical goals of getting the media to frame their objectives in a more mainstream manner. There were a number of examples of this when talking about Sebastian Gorka or Steve Bannon and Breitbart’s connection to both the Alt-Right and Trump, where the term Alt-Right was not explained at all, yet the story was connected to mainstream presidential politics without differentiating it from more typical conservative views (Deng, 2017; Edelman, 2017). When much of conservative media engaged in rhetoric designed to separate the population and create fear, the Alt-Right might have more easily slipped into press coverage (Abrahamsen et al., 2020; Hartzell, 2018; Tanner & Campana, 2019).The first part of the assumption was based on past framing studies in which groups that succeeded in achieving rhetorical goals often did so through consistency in framing, which determines how influential a group is in advancing its frame through the media (Wagner & Gruszczynski, 2016). In addition, previous research suggests conservative groups are more effective than liberals in influencing media discourse (Dreier & Martin, 2011). In part, through weaving emotions in discourse, those in the Alt-Right were able to construct conflict frames that gained journalistic attention (Levasseur et al., 2011; Tanner & Campana, 2019). For example, an article referencing Spencer offers this description, ‘Spencer has changed the game by adeptly using social media and his venue choices to gin up controversy and to draw big crowds of both supporters and opponents, some of whom arrive itching to do battle’ (Schmidt, 2017). It was another eight paragraphs before any mention of Spencer’s beliefs were noted in the article and even that reference is not a direct connection (Schmidt, 2017). Examples of this self-framing occurred on multiple occasions. An example from the Lowell Sun that was part of this sample stated: ‘Until joining Trump’s campaign this summer, Bannon led a website that appealed to the so-called “Alt-Right” – a movement often associated with efforts on the far right to preserve “white identity,” oppose multiculturalism and defend “Western values.”’ The New York Times used this language when introducing the terms ‘Some of the counter-demonstrators brandished Confederate battle flags. Some exhibited Pepe the Frog insignia and other trappings of the so-called Alt-Right, a fringe movement that embraces white nationalism.’ The Lebanon Daily News introduced the terms in this paragraph, ‘But, when comparable numbers of white nationalist cretins and left-wing “Antifa” creeps faced off during a sickening shared-blame day of street brawls in Charlottesville, Virginia, the same media went into overdrive to link President Donald Trump to the white nationalists, implying that they were all Trump voters somehow motivated by his campaign and policies.’ However, one example of a strong frame came from The Herald (based in South Africa) writing, ‘In response, the “alt-right” (a whitewash term for neo-Nazis, white supremacists and members of the Ku Klux Klan).’

This study supports the hypothesis that the Alt-Right has been successful in getting the media to use its preferred frames. With the exception of opinion articles, most of the articles examined used, at least to some degree, the Alt-Right’s preferred frames without immediate challenge. Therefore, to answer RQ3, it does seem that the US-based Alt-Right duplicated the success of far-right movements in other countries in using rhetoric and framing in the media to aid in moderating their image to one that is more socially acceptable. However, the frequent use of opposition framing does offer some competition to Alt-Right self-framing, but journalists overall did not take an active role in framing the Alt-Right. An example of opposition framing occurred in a report about a radio station employee being suspended for posting what was called an ‘Alt-Right’ video. Several paragraphs later, the story commented on the signs held by the station’s protestors: ‘[A]bout a dozen protesters carrying signs reading “WHLM EMPLOYS NAZIS” and “TURN OFF RACIST SCUMWHLM”’ (Sylvester, 2017). An example of preferred framing was used in the State Journal-Register: ‘The faux nationalists of the “alt-right” and their fellow travellers like Stephen Bannon, although fixated on protecting America from imported goods, have imported the blood-and-soil ethno-tribalism that stains the continental European right.’ Another example comes from the Bismarck Tribune, which wrote: ‘During the Republican Convention, Bannon said Breitbart was “the platform for the alt-right,” a loose group espousing a provocative and reactionary strain of conservatism. Heavily influenced by the shock-based rhetoric of internet chat boards, the alt-right includes strains of white nationalism and aggressive anti-feminism.’

This form of framing continued even after events in Charlottesville, where members of the Alt-Right marched alongside those wearing the insignias of the racist, white supremacist groups of the past. An editorial posted after the fatal rally in Charlottesville mentions Spencer as an ‘intellectual’ and only later mentions he is part of a ‘hate-oriented’ group without offering further specificity (The Washington Post, 2017). Even articles that criticised President Trump’s response to the incident still separated terms like ‘Alt-Right’ and ‘white nationalist’ from more direct terms such as ‘white supremacist’, ‘racist’ or ‘neo-Nazi’. Criticism will continue regarding the framing of the Alt-Right until journalists truly understand the movement is not separate from but instead has placed itself right in the middle of traditionally racist ideology and alter their coverage accordingly (Hatewatch, 2016).