A Knight in Sheep’s Clothing: Media Framing of the Alt-Right Can Alter the Image of Racist Groups

Abstract

The Alt-Right increased its national profile during the 2016 presidential election based on its support of Donald Trump. This research becomes more salient with the media continuing to face similar challenges in framing far-right groups. The Alt-Right, like other Far Right groups worldwide, has moderated their framing to hide racist ideology. Therefore, the challenge of this article is to learn if the media allow newer far-right conservative groups to self-frame even against the advice from the Associated Press. This study uses qualitative framing analysis through grounded theory to review the coverage of the Alt-Right as a manner of examining if the group was successful in advancing its desired frames into mainstream media coverage. The results of this study suggest overall the Alt-Right was successful in reducing a direct discussion about the racist beliefs of the group within press coverage. This study continues in the tradition of framing studies of the past yet moves the genre forward as journalists negotiate increasing polarised and fragmented political communication.

Keywords

Framing Alt-Right Self-framing Media

The election of Donald Trump brought a group known as the Alt-Right to the attention of many in the media. This heightened coverage provided those in the Alt-Right the opportunity to influence the 2016 presidential election and even the language used to talk about politics. This article defines the Alt-Right as a coalition of newer racist organisations and younger individuals that communicate mostly through online means often using memes and thinly coded racist and anti-Semitic language (Hartzell, 2018; Hawley, 2017). The notoriety of the Alt-Right is not a recent phenomenon; communication in the political far right within the United States has been changing since at least the 1980s as paleoconservatives changed their language as a manner of bringing themselves from the fringes and back into the mainstream of conservatism (Main, 2018; Swain, 2002). Paleoconservative groups, such as the contemporary Alt-Right, have four main pillars in their ideology: racialism, anti-Semitism, a rejection of liberal democracy and anything they deemed to be anti-American (Main, 2018). Their goal was to wrest the conservative movement back from the Libertarians and Neoconservatives who had dominated the Republican Party for decades (Lee, 2014; Main, 2018).

The Alt-Right, as part of this changing group of paleoconservatives, received media attention partially for its vocal support of Donald Trump, but also for its use of social media at conservative news sources such as Breitbart as both a platform for, and method of, potentially amplifying their role in political communication. This article does not simply follow coverage of the Alt-Right as it relates to the 2016 political campaign. The evaluation of press framing continues through the ‘Unite the Right’ rally in Charlottesville. This 2017 incident resulted in the death of a counter-protestor and the injury of 19 others in a car-ramming incident. Incidents of far-right violence add to this study’s relevance because one might assume the manner in which the media framed the Alt-Right would change following the political controversy that resulted from the rally. Studies of Alt-Right and far-right rhetoric are particularly salient as mainstream conservative personalities such as Laura Ingraham echo the voices of the Far and Alt-Right figures such as Paul Nehlen, Laura Loomer, Milo Yiannopoulos and Alex Jones and offer them mainstream conservative platforms (Brice-Saddler, 2019; Hartzell, 2018; Phillips, 2018; Sanchez, 2018).

The language used by far-right groups, such as the Alt-Right, which holds racist ideas but couches them using terms such as ‘white nationalist’ as opposed to ‘white supremacist’ and ‘replacement’ instead of ‘white genocide’ (Edwards, 2012; Hawley, 2017; Sanchez, 2018). The rhetoric shifted over the past decade, gaining more media attention and coverage, while maintaining the racist overtones of their rhetoric (Edwards, 2012; Hawley, 2017; Sanchez, 2018). There are conservative media that present the Alt-Right as a group occupying the ideological space between mainstream conservativism and far-right white supremacists (Hartzell, 2018; Mondon & Winter, 2020). The Alt-Right portray themselves as an alternative to mainstream conservativism, which allows them access to conservative media (Hartzell, 2018). The group cloaks its racial rhetoric behind pseudointellectualism, which is a hallmark of Richard Spencer (Hartzell, 2018; Speakman & Funk, 2020).

To some, the development of a group with positions like the Alt-Right might seem inevitable within the United States. The corroboration of free market supporters and social conservatives in the United States was unusual because the two are typically separate factions within the political right in other countries (Blee & Creasap, 2010; Lee, 2014). Additionally the racist ideology of the Alt-Right as a far-right socially conservative movement is expected since many social conservatives either exhibited or held racist beliefs (Blee & Creasap, 2010). Yet, in some ways, the media misunderstand the Alt-Right since those involved with the group tend to be younger and more educated than other more traditional white supremacist groups (Hawley, 2017). This misunderstanding may influence mainstream media framing of the Alt-Right. An understanding of the communication of the far right is becoming more important as communication throughout the right evolves to become more similar, but with layered meanings to different audiences (Hawley, 2017; Swain, 2002). Groups such as the Alt-Right continue to evolve into more mainstream conservative language by muting their language and engaging in hegemonic framing within the conservative counter-sphere (Speakman & Funk, 2020). Furthermore, studies of how the media frame these groups increase in importance as far-right rhetoric continues to evolve with groups such as QAnon who played a role in the 2020 general election.

Literature Review

The framing of the Alt-Right in mainstream press is important in communication research because of challenges facing the press in an increasingly partisan news environment and one in which far-right framing is quickly evolving (Speakman & Funk, 2020). The press shapes events and organisations based on what they report and how they report it (Entman, 2007; Goffman, 1974; Jamieson & Waldman, 2003). The media choose to use frames that are familiar to the public to offer context to information (Entman, 2007; Goffman, 1974). The choice of any particular frame inevitably will highlight some aspects of reality and downplay or remove others (Debatin, 2013; Entman & Rojecki, 1993; Goffman, 1974). These choices help the audience interpret an event and the characters involved (Iyengar & Simon, 1993). Media framing is essential because audiences typically do not have direct experiences with events or groups being covered and ordinarily depend on media accounts to stay informed, make rational decisions and understand the source’s intentions (Entman, 2010; Tversky & Kahneman, 1986). Yet, framing is not simply about the media pushing its collective will onto the populace, but is about convincing the public to think about important issues (Cohen, 1963). However, when an issue is polarised, the media do not bring people to a consensus (Warren, 1972). This polarisation and lack of consensus could influence coverage of the Alt-Right in the modern divided political situation.

Media Coverage of the Alt-Right

The press can help legitimise a movement or group but can also diminish the group in the eyes of the public based on its coverage (Entman & Rojecki, 1993), which matters in coverage related to far-right political groups such as the Alt-Right. To help aid in framing issues with covering the Alt-Right, the Associated Press in 2016 offered guidance for publications covering the group. The AP stated in its stylebook that the term ‘Alt-Right’ is the preferred term used by white supremacists and white nationalists as a way to describe their ideology, which combines some traditional conservative beliefs with racism, white nationalism and populism (Daniszewski, 2016). The AP guidance is important because with the ascension of groups such as the Alt-Right into the media consciousness, it is likely many journalists had little knowledge about the group. With this notation, the AP showed concern about the potential framing of the Alt-Right with the organisation going as far as to caution reporters to not allow groups such as the Alt-Right to define themselves within coverage (Daniszewski, 2016). The terms ‘Alt-Right’ and ‘white nationalist’ are the preferred descriptors for Richard Spencer and those in leadership of the Alt-Right movement (The National Policy Institute, 2017). This appears to be why the AP specifically cautioned reporters against using the term ‘Alt-Right’ generically without definition because the term was a public relations effort by the Alt-Right to make its supporters’ racist beliefs seem more palatable to a mainstream audience (Daniszewski, 2016; Hartzell, 2018; Munn, 2019). The AP advocated ‘whenever “Alt-Right” is used in a story, be sure to include a definition: “an offshoot of conservatism mixing “racism”, “white nationalism” and “populism’” or more simply, ‘a “white nationalist”’ movement (Daniszewski, 2016). The advice from the AP changed following the ‘Unite The Right’ rally in Charlottesville that resulted in the death of one counter-protestor (Daniszewski, 2017). The change included the AP suggesting reporters include ‘anti-Semitism’ to terms clarifying how to frame the term ‘Alt-Right’ if it must be used but stated in its stylebook that overall the term should be avoided by reporters because Alt-Right is a euphemism designed to hide racist aims (Daniszewski, 2017). Nearly all forms of media, including social and news, have struggled in dealing with a group as savvy in framing and using the web as the Alt-Right (Hawley, 2017; Munn, 2020). The media in some ways were hijacked during a three-year period from 2016 to 2018, using right-wing extremists as sources as part of increasing page views (Phillips, 2018). The AP was not the only source that attempted to provide guidance for journalists in dealing with these individuals (Phillips, 2018).

Adopting the label Alt-Right appears to be part of the far right’s efforts to increase its distribution of content to new audiences, which has resulted in Alt-Right leadership becoming adept at using commercial media sites for their own purposes (Ekman, 2014). Part of their goal is to change traditional frames, and therefore, public perception (Ekman, 2014), as it relates to far-right groups such as the Alt-Right. Additionally, one of the challenges for the media is differentiating Alt-Right talking points from some of those coming from conservative political figures. The importance of Trump to the Alt-Right in 2016 cannot be understated, and the language from Trump seems to embolden white supremacists (McHendry Jr., 2018; Xu, 2020) and has also changed the language of mainstream conservative pundits who fear alienating the Trump supporters that allowed him to remake the Republican and conservative movement (Sykes, 2017). Trump’s pathological unwillingness to criticise anyone who supports him helped to legitimise much of the American far right, at least in the eyes of conservatives (and conservative media), providing them an entrée into American politics (Heikkilä, 2017; Posner & Neiwert, 2016). The hiring of Steve Bannon was also considered a sign among the far right of Trump’s tacit support (Heikkilä, 2017; Posner & Neiwert, 2016). Trump promotes Alt-Right language and ideas by often tweeting false material from far-right and Alt-Right sources, giving it broader exposure (Heikkilä, 2017; Posner & Neiwert, 2016). The media would criticise Trump and move on with the next controversy, but the source gained greater credibility in the conservative counter-sphere (Posner & Neiwert, 2016). Trump and his Alt-Right supporters intermix racial language with terms such as ‘patriotism’, ‘heritage’ and ‘security’ to veil messages in a wink to white supremacists that is unnoticed by many others (Hartzell, 2018; Klein, 2012; Sanchez, 2018). This is due to the rhetorical versatility of much of the language used in current conservative framing that appeals to two separate audiences (Sanchez, 2018).

How the Media Frame Right-Wing Nationalist Groups

Groups of the far right throughout the world use multiple forms of media to help frame their message including websites, social media and partisan news sources to influence mainstream sources. Therefore, the US Alt-Right should be examined through its connection and similarities to other far-right groups as part of the evolution of the far right. The goal with these populist efforts is to use ‘simplistic messages with strong emotional appeal’ as a means of making the Alt-Right appealing to more people (Alvares & Dahlgren, 2016, p. 50). Furthermore, the goal is to use rhetoric that accentuates feelings of powerlessness that permeates some parts of society (Alvares & Dahlgren, 2016). The media have the potential to feed these efforts by allowing groups to define themselves and being attracted to sensationalism within politics (Alvares & Dahlgren, 2016). Therefore, journalism, with its focus on emotionally based messages, tends to work well for populist movements attempting to influence media frames (Alvares & Dahlgren, 2016; Ekman, 2014). Additionally, the Alt-Right often claim to simply be ‘shitposting’ by engaging in behaviour designed to shock and offend that does not portray any true belief (Woods & Hahner, 2019). This is a method of supplying members with a form of rhetorical cover for their actions.

Leaders of this movement cannot always control how the media frame their message or the language used by all connected to it. And this might explain Spencer’s loss of many Alt-Right supporters engaged in more directly violent rhetoric, framing those actions necessary (Klein, 2019). This connects to Spencer’s own claims that some people in the Alt-Right are meant to be leaders and others are meant to be soldiers and soldiers cannot always be controlled (Speakman & Funk, 2020). Those involved in the far right often use web-based communication to insert racist discourse into conversations that are not primarily about race (Hartzell, 2018; Hawley, 2017; Hughey & Daniels, 2013; Sanchez, 2018). Yet, overall, groups such as the Alt-Right typically present racist discourse in subtle, coded language designed not to offend, and use ‘common sense’ appeals that seek to appear race neutral while actually containing racist intent if not content (Goodman & Johnson, 2013; Hawley, 2017; Hughey & Daniels, 2013; Sanchez, 2018). These groups also seek to frame themselves as concerned about limited opportunity for natives in terms of opposition to immigration, a marked differentiation from the more direct racist appeals in past rhetoric from far-right groups (Goodman & Johnson, 2013; Hawley, 2017; Hughey & Daniels, 2013; Sanchez, 2018). Additionally, far-right groups tend to moderate positions publicly, while maintaining their more extreme positions and rhetoric in more private locations (Goodman & Johnson, 2013; Hartzell, 2018; Hawley, 2017), including social media such as Gab, private Facebook groups and more anonymous online locations.

Criticism of Media Coverage

There were members of the media and others who criticised the coverage of the Alt-Right, including how it was framed. In a conversation on National Public Radio, Holocaust Researcher Deborah Lipstadt, stated she saw connections between coverage of the Alt-Right, and Holocaust deniers, where the media have failed in their responsibilities, by providing both groups a platform to present misleading information as pseudoscience (NPR, 2016). The simple act of having the Alt-Right quoted by media sources and validated on social media (with followers and from Twitter checkmarks) provides them legitimacy and helps to normalise the group (Grove, 2016; NPR, 2016). At least one critic wrote the media have become fixated on this ‘small subculture’, providing it far more coverage than deserved (Lapowsky, 2017). ‘There’s no right approach to covering this growing movement, but one thing is certain: The press has erred on the side of overexposure’, (Lapowsky, 2017). However, the challenge is that if the media ignore the group, these gamble with missing a major danger, yet providing them too much coverage could amplify their cause (Lapowsky, 2017).

There have been those within the media who have struggled to understand what the Alt-Right is and the goals of those involved (Grove, 2016), which influences how the group is framed. The press often privileges political communication that transgresses mainstream rhetoric. The Alt-Right often use humour and irony to ridicule the political establishment (Greene, 2019; Munn, 2019; Poulos, 2017). The media offer front-page coverage to small groups as a way of exaggerating their importance with the goal of connecting racists to mainstream conservatism (Harsanyi, 2016). Other critics state that by publicising the Alt-Right, the media make them attractive based not on normalising them, but by promoting them as being outside of the mainstream, which is appealing to some (Poulos, 2017).

Partisan Media and the Web Have an Influence

One of the more important elements of this research is the apparent reconstitution of groups such as the Alt-Right into the respectable portion of the conservative counter-sphere (Main, 2018). There was a time when groups and individuals with views like the Alt-Right such as Ayn Rand, the John Birch Society, and groups like the Ku Klux Klan were ostracised from mainstream conservatism (Hawley, 2017; Lee, 2014; Main, 2018). Despite any criticism of mainstream coverage, the Alt-Right, much like other far-right groups worldwide, uses a multi-tiered approach of framing, using various forms of media for various messages. This seems to be an attempt by the group to frame itself based on the perceived audience. For example, when Alt-Right groups make overt references to racist or conspiracy-type beliefs, they tend to do so using alternative news sources (Starbird, 2017). These sites typically use phrasing to differentiate themselves from better-known press outlets and often belittle mainstream media sources (Starbird, 2017). However, these groups often attempt to use details from articles from well-known sites such as The Washington Post and New York Times to ‘prove’ their theories on these alternative sites (Starbird, 2017).

The partisan, conservative press has helped the Alt-Right to soften their language by even allowing the use of the term Alt-Right as opposed to white supremacist; this attempt to change the tone of the conversation is part of the extreme right’s semantic warfare (Lapowsky, 2017; Sanchez, 2018; Sykes, 2017). The Alt-Right attaches itself to some positions from conservative media, which often attack the Republican establishment for failing to meet economic or other goals (Sheffield, 2016b). Additionally, the Alt-Right uses conspiracy theories to influence many within mainstream conservatism using online sites and social media as well as press coverage (Sheffield, 2016b). Those mainstream conservatives, particularly those with elite status such as Ann Coulter, are referred to as ‘Alt-Light’, with these people helping to bring Alt-Right talking points to the mainstream (Hawley, 2017; Mondon & Winter, 2020). This idea of the alt-light is for leaders of this movement to work directly with conservative partisan outlets to soften the public perception of the Alt-Right (Hawley, 2017; Sheffield, 2016a).

The Alt-Right often relies upon certain conservative columnists who willingly frame the Alt-Right as being much less racist than it is as a manner of convincing racist trolls to boost their audience (Hawley, 2017; Sanchez, 2018; Sheffield, 2016b). Yet, those within the far right, such as the Alt-Right, often retreat to the Internet, claiming avoidance by the mainstream media (Siapera & Veikou, 2016). Furthermore, many far-right groups struggle to maintain a social media presence when their rhetoric eventually results in their removal; however, sites such as Facebook and Twitter in the past allowed freer reign, yet others have been able to successfully taper their language to avoid sanctions (Siapera & Veikou, 2016).

Changing Rhetoric for the Far-Right Worldwide

The American Alt-Right does at times reject mainstream conservatism but also softens its language about its beliefs to stay politically relevant (Anti Defamation League, n.d.). The far right worked within the conservative movement, particularly partisan media, worldwide for more than two decades to influence the terms used to define them, rejecting some and repeating others (Blee & Creasap, 2010; Hartzell, 2018; Major, 2020; Sanchez, 2018; Swain, 2002). For example, the groups used the term ‘white nationalist’ as opposed to ‘white supremacist’ or ‘replacement’ as opposed to ‘white genocide’; they also attempt to reframe old points about racism as being protection of culture, claiming to be populists (Hartzell, 2018; Sanchez, 2018; Speakman & Funk, 2020). These racist groups use the web and other means to offer socially acceptable messages with racist undertones to recruit, while not directly using racist imagery (Hartzell, 2018; Klein, 2012; Rajagopal, 2002).

The Alt-Right has sought to separate itself from better-known racist and neo-Nazi groups, yet the group espouses a form of American Identitarianism, an idea connected to white identity (Hawley, 2017; Southern Poverty Law Center, n.d.). In this way, they seem to mirror the actions of far-right parties in Europe during the 1990s that changed language and tone as a means to increase mainstream conservative acceptance and become more difficult to attack by opponents (Atton, 2002; Edwards III et al., 1995; Sanchez, 2018). This was part of concerted efforts to normalise the discourse of the far right (Atton, 2006; Edwards, 2012; Sanchez, 2018). In one example, the BNP in Great Britain, which embraces ‘an ideology founded on racism, hate, separatism and exclusion’, uses language similar to what appears in progressive publications to support its beliefs (Atton, 2006, p. 586). These international far-right groups also use victimhood discourse as a means of appealing to the disenfranchised and poor within white society (Edwards, 2012; Klein, 2019; Tanner & Campana, 2019). Additionally, the groups’ critics often consider the members with less extreme messages to actually be more dangerous (Singal, 2017). Despite the softer, less overtly racist language, the core beliefs of the Alt-Right are white separatism and an opposition to multiculturalism, the core of racist paleoconservatives (Anti Defamation League, n.d.; Daniels, 2018; Hawley, 2017; Sanchez, 2018).

Based on the literature review, the following research questions are offered. RQ1: How is the Alt-Right framed in the articles reviewed? RQ2: Do media outlets use the guidance from the Associated Press in defining the Alt-Right? RQ3: Will the Alt-Right experience similar success to other far-right groups in gaining media framing that makes their image appear more mainstream?

Method

This study utilises a qualitative case study time-based approach that incorporates framing theory and grounded theory. A ‘case study’ is best described as a study that allows deep and thorough analysis of specific individuals, participants or patients (Unicomb et al., 2015). Case studies like this one are typically descriptive in nature; they focus on unique features and have a diverse and international history (Morgan & Morgan, 2009; Osifelo, 2017; Smith, 2019; Unicomb et al., 2015).

This research seeks to discover patterns and themes using research techniques similar to those outlined by Strauss and Corbin (1997). Grounded theory involves the interplay of data throughout the analytical process that suits the often-unpredictable nature of qualitative research (Littlejohn & Foss, 2009; Strauss & Corbin, 1994). It is understood that findings are interpretative (Suddaby, 2006). This study in particular, through its framing elements, focuses on issues regarding temporal observation and description of language (Gerring, 2004; Gerring & McDermott, 2007).

This study conducts a framing analysis of media discourse as it relates to the coverage of the Alt-Right during the course of the 2016 presidential campaign and continues through the Charlottesville, VA, Unite the Right rally in 2017. Specifically, the aim is to investigate how the group’s most well-known leader at the time, Richard Spencer, and others using the Alt-Right mantle succeeded in attempts to frame media coverage. Using Lexis Nexis and limiting the search to newspapers, this research includes the collection of articles published between 26 August 2016 and 26 August 2017. This time period includes changes in the AP stylebook about how to define the Alt-Right from a definition to one that advised not using the term because of its euphemistic nature.

The Lexis Nexis search was set to eliminate duplication of articles, and the search terms used were Richard Spencer, Alt-Right and white nationalist and included them separately and in any form where they might appear together. As part of this framing analysis, a purposeful sample of 30 articles was randomly selected from samples that used Richard Spencer, white nationalism and Alt-Right and the combinations with seven groupings. The articles were then reviewed to see what terms were used and how Alt-Right, white nationalism and Richard Spencer were introduced, and if they used the AP definition, which connects to the AP’s role of creating a stylebook used by most journalism entities in the United States. With the seven potential variations, a total of 210 articles were reviewed. The timing of reviewing media framing both before and after the Charlottesville incident was intentional. The goal was to learn if media framing of the Alt-Right would change following such a high-profile and clearly racist show of force connected to the Alt-Right. The researcher also sought information on whether members of the Alt-Right might alter their self-framing after President Donald Trump’s comment of ‘very fine people on both sides’.

According to Entman (1991), for an analysis of the critical textual choices that the media make, it is important to understand the frames they use to construct meaning about an event for the readers. Framing analysis studies in the past examined issues related to media bias and politics looking at the success of conservative efforts in promoting their chosen position (Dreier & Martin, 2011; Parenti, 1995). Additionally, scholars such as Jamieson and Waldman (2003) suggested conservative spokespersons successfully framed media discourse and concluded that emergence of these frames as dominant relates to the strength of the rhetoric, which provides legitimacy to study how far that trend continues with the political right. Furthermore, framing studies in the past have suggested that media slant defines the frames that influence perceptions about facts (Entman, 2007; Nelson et al., 1997). The decision to represent a side is not just organisational but is also made at the individual journalist level. There are effectively three players in any attempt to frame an issue in favour of a position: those on either side of the issue and the media (Pan & Kosicki, 1993). The idea of this study is to provide some perspective regarding if the media allowed the Alt-Right to provide their own frames, permitted their opposition to define them, or if the media developed their own frames to describe the group.

Findings and Discussion

Before delving into the research questions, it is important to provide some scope of what the framing choices were descriptively. Of the 210 articles reviewed, 45 were opinion articles and 165 were news articles. This section first considers RQ1, which sought information about how articles that mention the Alt-Right, white nationalists and Richard Spencer were framed. The framing of the Alt-Right was inconsistent in the articles reviewed. However, despite the inconsistencies, there were some common elements within most of the articles. For instance, the news stories often included terms such as ‘neo-Nazi’ and ‘white supremacists’ that helped to provide context for the term Alt-Right. Yet, the challenge was the placement of these terms especially in relation to the primary search terms for this project. Alt-Right, Richard Spencer, or the group’s preferred term of ‘white nationalist’ were typically placed prominently in the article near the top. Inversely, phrases such as ‘neo-Nazi’ and ‘white supremacists’ were typically not within the same sentence or paragraph as the frames directly connected to the Alt-Right’s preferred terminology. At times the descriptive terms appeared several paragraphs after the reference to that of Alt-Right. In addition, there were 140 articles that did not mention the term ‘neo-Nazi’, ‘Nazi’, ‘racist’ or ‘white supremacist’ within the same paragraph as any reference to ‘Richard Spencer’, ‘Alt-Right’ or ‘white nationalist’.

Additionally, many of the journalists seemed hesitant to provide further definition when mentioning the Alt-Right. Instead, the much more common form of oppositional framing of the Alt-Right typically appeared much lower in the article corresponding to comments from someone opposed to the group. However, these subjects rarely referred to the group as the Alt-Right, nor did the journalists mention the term again. Instead those against the group would refer to members of the Alt-Right by calling them ‘anti-Semitic’, ‘neo-Nazis’, ‘racists’ and ‘white supremacists’. Journalistic framing choices left the reader to connect ideas despite a lack of a direct connection. This suggests poor framing by the media in describing the term Alt-Right as it relates to connecting them to their racist ideology.

This suggests those leading the Alt-Right have achieved some success in getting their chosen frames with moderated language about their beliefs published without serious challenges from the press (Anti Defamation League, n.d.). Additionally, the reliance upon sources to provide context to the self-definition offered by the Alt-Right spokespeople resulted in what seemed to be a lack of uniformity in contextualising the terms Alt-Right and white nationalist for readers, which could lead to confusion. Additionally, while the majority of articles offered some context to terms associated with the Alt-Right through other sources, there was a sizeable minority that provided no clarification to the terms and allowed the Alt-Right to self-frame and even create artificial separations between themselves and more traditional racist organisations. There were 116 articles that provided no clarification on terms used in the study anywhere within the article. This calculation was conservative because there were a number of articles that mentioned the above terms along with ‘Alt-Right’, ‘white nationalist’, or ‘Richard Spencer’, however, within the phraseology of the article framed them as being different and not necessarily connected groups to ‘neo-Nazi’, ‘white supremacist’ or even ‘Nazi’.

For example, one article stated, ‘the divide between the traditional neo-Nazi groups and the new, internet-savvy “Alt-Right” began to show’, a frame that seemingly created a non-existent divide between the groups (Beckett, 2017; Hartzell, 2018). It appears a number of publications simply expect the public understands what the Alt-Right is and stands for and what it means to be a white nationalist, which is unlikely because the media helped people understand meanings and aided the Alt-Right in mainstreaming (Mondon & Winter, 2020).

The Alt-Right leaders seem to have successfully self-framed using less directly racist rhetoric and emotional appeals to both attain media coverage and make emotional appeals to people who would not support a more overtly racist ideology (Alvares & Dahlgren, 2016; Ekman, 2014). The coded messages used by the Alt-Right (Hawley, 2017; Hughey & Daniels, 2013; Sanchez, 2018) were presented without immediate questioning within articles. To some degree, the tactics taken by journalists in coverage of the Alt-Right is expected because previous studies state that framing is often influenced by whether reporters covering the topic consider it more related to values or policy (Entman, 2010). Past research suggests journalists allow conservatives more leeway to self-frame their argument without journalistic interference if the issue is about values (Debatin, 2013; Entman, 2010). One article that allowed the group to self-frame without question wrote, ‘“Alt-Right,” shortened from the fuller form “alternative right” and defined as “an ideological grouping associated with extreme conservative or reactionary viewpoints, characterized by a rejection of mainstream politics and by the use of online media to disseminate deliberately controversial content”’ (Johnson, 2016).

It should be noted that a sizeable difference in framing the Alt-Right seemed to occur between opinion and news articles, and a sizeable portion of this sample was opinion articles. As noted previously, there were far more news articles than opinions in the sample. Opinion articles were much more explicit and effective in defining the Alt-Right using terms such as racist, anti-Semitic, Nazis, neo-Nazi, anti-feminist, ultra-conservative and more, including that the group seeks a white ethno state. So, while opinion articles offered a notable exception to the grand majority of articles, journalists did not provide clear frames to represent the Alt-Right, instead allowing the group to mostly describe themselves using their chosen rhetoric. This represented a typical frame used in opinion articles, ‘The thing is, there is no “Alt-Left.” But the Alt-Right exists: they are the white supremacists who also happen to be hardcore conservatives…the same mob which rejects any Republican who supports inclusion, by labeling them as “cuckservatives”’ (Wright, 2017). This seems to suggest that the sartorial and edgy tone allowed them to gain access through the media to the general public in a manner that likely is not possible for groups using more explicit rhetoric (Greene, 2019; Romano, 2016; Woods & Hahner, 2019).

RQ2 Adhering to AP Style

The second research question examined more specifically if media coverage of the Alt-Right followed the AP guidelines that existed both before and after the Charlottesville rally when the AP changed its style from offering a definition of the Alt-Right to a recommendation that reporters no longer use the term. However, they recommended if reporters used the term to be more specific about the Alt-Rights racist and anti-Semitic beliefs. The majority of articles reviewed did not follow the AP recommendations for clearly defining Alt-Right. However, there might be some reason for journalistic reticence to be more direct in framing the Alt-Right. It is possible that some journalists elected to cover the Alt-Right in the manner they did because the Alt-Right has a history of harassing and threatening reporters who cover their activities (Asher-Schapiro, 2018). The group informs journalists they know the reporter’s address or the addresses of their family members as a form of intimidation: additionally, many publications use young reporters or freelancers to cover the Alt-Right who have less experience with this level of harassment (Asher-Schapiro, 2018). ‘Part of the problem, reporters told CPJ, is that while many in the far right see the media as a necessary megaphone, a story or reporter’s style can incite a mob on Twitter or the right-wing site Gab, a chat network similar to Twitter’ (Asher-Schapiro, 2018). There were no specific articles within our sample that mentioned the reporter(s) being harassed by the Alt-Right; however, reporters such as David French from the National Review said he was harassed and his wife’s blog was spammed with images of African American men being murdered and committing suicide (Harassed On Twitter, 2016). Journalist Jonathan Wiseman after reporting on the group was bombarded with anti-Semitic messages and threats on social media (Gross, 2018). The Anti-Defamation League reported that at least 800 reporters received anti-Semitic and harassing social media contact from those representing the right (Anti-Semitic Targeting of Journalists During the 2016 Presidential Campaign, 2016).

Bethany Mandel, a freelance reporter who wrote critically about Trump, was also viciously harassed on Twitter. One user tweeted about her for 19 hours straight, and she received messages containing incendiary language about her family, and images with her face superimposed on photos of Nazi concentration camps. Mandel, like the other Jewish journalists interviewed by ADL, has been targeted by anti-Semitic language before, but these attacks stood out, she said, for their ‘volume and the imagery. It also seemed coordinated – they would come in waves and 50 percent of the time I couldn’t identify the source’ (Anti-Semitic Targeting of Journalists During the 2016 Presidential Campaign, 2016).

Furthermore, recent research suggests that certain reporters are more likely to be harassed than others and this includes women (Lewis et al., 2020), which fits into the misogynistic nature of the Alt-Right (Hawley, 2017).

Based on the results of this study, it appears the AP elected to suggest eliminating the term Alt-Right based upon the lack of consistency in framing the group and a lack of clear understanding from the public (Daniszewski, 2017; Hawley, 2017). The review of coverage for this article suggests that the Associated Press was correct in that assessment and that reporting likely did support confusion and potentially promote further Alt-Right acceptance into the mainstream. Fewer than five of the articles reviewed actually used the suggested AP language for describing the Alt-Right, and interestingly this study did include a number of articles published by the AP that did not meet the organisation’s own recommendation. Even after the AP’s recommendation of eliminating the term Alt-Right, the term continued to appear in articles from numerous sources. One of the closer articles to the AP style was provided by Chico Enterprise-Record which wrote the ‘“Alt-Right” – a loose collection of white nationalists, racists and anti-immigration populists’ (Galofaro, 2017). Yet, this example occurred after the recommendation to stop using Alt-Right altogether based on its euphemistic nature. However, another AP article provided no context for the term Alt-Right: ‘Cliff Erickson leaned against a fence and took in the scene. He said he thinks removing the statue amounts to erasing history and said the counter protesters are crazier than the Alt-Right’ (Press, 2017). Therefore, in this case, it seems the AP’s suggested frame had much less influence on the presentation of information about the Alt-Right than the group’s own chosen frames.

Alt-Right Success in Self-framing?

Finally, the last section of Findings and Discussion deals with RQ3, which asked if the Alt-Right would succeed in getting the media to use their chosen frames. The expectation of Alt-Right success is at least partially due to the strictness of its leadership in maintaining the message. However, it was also based on the achievement of other far-right groups internationally realising similar rhetorical goals of getting the media to frame their objectives in a more mainstream manner. There were a number of examples of this when talking about Sebastian Gorka or Steve Bannon and Breitbart’s connection to both the Alt-Right and Trump, where the term Alt-Right was not explained at all, yet the story was connected to mainstream presidential politics without differentiating it from more typical conservative views (Deng, 2017; Edelman, 2017). When much of conservative media engaged in rhetoric designed to separate the population and create fear, the Alt-Right might have more easily slipped into press coverage (Abrahamsen et al., 2020; Hartzell, 2018; Tanner & Campana, 2019).The first part of the assumption was based on past framing studies in which groups that succeeded in achieving rhetorical goals often did so through consistency in framing, which determines how influential a group is in advancing its frame through the media (Wagner & Gruszczynski, 2016). In addition, previous research suggests conservative groups are more effective than liberals in influencing media discourse (Dreier & Martin, 2011). In part, through weaving emotions in discourse, those in the Alt-Right were able to construct conflict frames that gained journalistic attention (Levasseur et al., 2011; Tanner & Campana, 2019). For example, an article referencing Spencer offers this description, ‘Spencer has changed the game by adeptly using social media and his venue choices to gin up controversy and to draw big crowds of both supporters and opponents, some of whom arrive itching to do battle’ (Schmidt, 2017). It was another eight paragraphs before any mention of Spencer’s beliefs were noted in the article and even that reference is not a direct connection (Schmidt, 2017). Examples of this self-framing occurred on multiple occasions. An example from the Lowell Sun that was part of this sample stated: ‘Until joining Trump’s campaign this summer, Bannon led a website that appealed to the so-called “Alt-Right” – a movement often associated with efforts on the far right to preserve “white identity,” oppose multiculturalism and defend “Western values.”’ The New York Times used this language when introducing the terms ‘Some of the counter-demonstrators brandished Confederate battle flags. Some exhibited Pepe the Frog insignia and other trappings of the so-called Alt-Right, a fringe movement that embraces white nationalism.’ The Lebanon Daily News introduced the terms in this paragraph, ‘But, when comparable numbers of white nationalist cretins and left-wing “Antifa” creeps faced off during a sickening shared-blame day of street brawls in Charlottesville, Virginia, the same media went into overdrive to link President Donald Trump to the white nationalists, implying that they were all Trump voters somehow motivated by his campaign and policies.’ However, one example of a strong frame came from The Herald (based in South Africa) writing, ‘In response, the “alt-right” (a whitewash term for neo-Nazis, white supremacists and members of the Ku Klux Klan).’

This study supports the hypothesis that the Alt-Right has been successful in getting the media to use its preferred frames. With the exception of opinion articles, most of the articles examined used, at least to some degree, the Alt-Right’s preferred frames without immediate challenge. Therefore, to answer RQ3, it does seem that the US-based Alt-Right duplicated the success of far-right movements in other countries in using rhetoric and framing in the media to aid in moderating their image to one that is more socially acceptable. However, the frequent use of opposition framing does offer some competition to Alt-Right self-framing, but journalists overall did not take an active role in framing the Alt-Right. An example of opposition framing occurred in a report about a radio station employee being suspended for posting what was called an ‘Alt-Right’ video. Several paragraphs later, the story commented on the signs held by the station’s protestors: ‘[A]bout a dozen protesters carrying signs reading “WHLM EMPLOYS NAZIS” and “TURN OFF RACIST SCUMWHLM”’ (Sylvester, 2017). An example of preferred framing was used in the State Journal-Register: ‘The faux nationalists of the “alt-right” and their fellow travellers like Stephen Bannon, although fixated on protecting America from imported goods, have imported the blood-and-soil ethno-tribalism that stains the continental European right.’ Another example comes from the Bismarck Tribune, which wrote: ‘During the Republican Convention, Bannon said Breitbart was “the platform for the alt-right,” a loose group espousing a provocative and reactionary strain of conservatism. Heavily influenced by the shock-based rhetoric of internet chat boards, the alt-right includes strains of white nationalism and aggressive anti-feminism.’

This form of framing continued even after events in Charlottesville, where members of the Alt-Right marched alongside those wearing the insignias of the racist, white supremacist groups of the past. An editorial posted after the fatal rally in Charlottesville mentions Spencer as an ‘intellectual’ and only later mentions he is part of a ‘hate-oriented’ group without offering further specificity (The Washington Post, 2017). Even articles that criticised President Trump’s response to the incident still separated terms like ‘Alt-Right’ and ‘white nationalist’ from more direct terms such as ‘white supremacist’, ‘racist’ or ‘neo-Nazi’. Criticism will continue regarding the framing of the Alt-Right until journalists truly understand the movement is not separate from but instead has placed itself right in the middle of traditionally racist ideology and alter their coverage accordingly (Hatewatch, 2016).

Conclusion

This study continues in the tradition of framing studies of the past, yet moves the genre forward as journalists negotiate increasing polarised and fragmented political communication. Framing choices remain important in media coverage because it is inevitable that news coverage will highlight some aspects of reality while ignoring or downplaying others (Debatin, 2013; Entman & Rojecki, 1993; Goffman, 1974). In this case, it seems likely that the media have helped to legitimise the Alt-Right movement in the United States by not directly challenging its beliefs and allowing the group primarily to self-frame much like more traditional conservatives. This article contributes to the canon of framing research by suggesting that even far right, extreme conservative groups are offered leeway from the media in political communication that relates to values if they moderate their tone. However, it is possible that this affordance to the Alt-Right was a sign of the aforementioned polarised politics of the time and constant attacks on the media made journalists less likely to take a more active framing stance. Additionally, it suggests that the US media did not learn from the experiences of journalists in other countries about the efforts of far-right groups using the mainstream media as a method to soften their image and gain wider appeal without any considerable change to ideology.

Despite any misgivings about how the Alt-Right is framed within media coverage, the press will continue to cover the group as long as many within the conservative movement acknowledge the group such as Laura Ingraham’s comments likening Alt-Right members to conservative thinkers. With the continued use of partisan media sources that provide an initial framing that mainstream sources must either reject or accept, framing issues pertaining to this group will continue to be challenging. The concern about the framing of the Alt-Right is that because of the results of such coverage, ‘readers find stories about extremists tantalizing, reporting can be done quickly online, and the coverage generates a lot of clicks’ (Asher-Schapiro, 2018). The Southern Poverty Law Center seems correct in its assertion that overall reporters have simply not been careful enough in combatting the rebranding of American racists, often ‘meeting them on their own terms’ (Hatewatch, 2016).

There are some limitations to the qualitative nature of this study and the period selected, being mostly prior to Charlottesville. The potential exists that framing towards the Alt-Right has become more accurate now that the group has become better known and more reporters cover the far right on a regular basis. Future studies on this topic could improve the potential connection between the rhetorical similarities between Alt-Right and traditional far-right groups in the United States and how those groups may connect rhetorically to mainstream conservative media in the nation. Additionally, future research may consider how rhetoric evolves within the right. Does partisan media help to moderate the far right when they adopt the language, or does the far right determine on their own how to moderate their language to connect with a larger potential audience?

While this study focuses on the Alt-Right, it has larger implications towards understanding the changing dynamics of media framing of the evolving conservative counter-sphere in the United States. This study suggests that the hegemonic language utilised by the Alt-Right to avoid making directly racist statements causes problems for journalists in covering them. The evolution of conservative self-framing has been developing for decades (Swain, 2002). This work, therefore, is another step in research that seeks to develop a body of work surrounding conservative framing, how it is changing, and how members of the media struggle to keep up in their coverage. This is particularly salient as the media struggle to focus on covering groups such as QAnon, which serve as the evolution of far-right communication (Sen & Zadrozny, 2020). Recent coverage suggests the media might have learned some lessons from covering the Alt-Right that are being used in QAnon coverage, but future researchers will help determine if the media truly learned from their failures in 2016 in informing the public.

Footnotes

Declaration of Conflicting Interests

The author declared no potential conflicts of interest with respect to the research, authorship and/or publication of this article.

Funding

The author received no financial support for the research, authorship and/or publication of this article.

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