‘Funny’ Politics: Stand-up Political Comedy,Public Engagement,Critical Thinking,and Opinion Sharing in India

Abstract

This study hypothesised that (a) exposure to online comedy about political issues promotes public engagement, critical thinking, and opinion sharing; (b) the relationship between exposure to online comedy and the dependent variables is mediated by self-perception of critical thinking on religious freedom (as an example of social justice issues); and (c) the relationship between online comedy and dependent variables (perception of public engagement and opinion leadership) is moderated by individuals’ self-reported political leaning. A post-test-only between-subject experimental design with a control group was conducted using a sample drawn from an online panel (N = 576). The treatment group was shown a video of political stand-up comedy and asked about their perceptions of public engagement, critical thinking, and opinion sharing. The control group did not view any videos before answering the questionnaire. It was observed that viewing online political comedy is associated with lower self-reported public engagement and opinion leadership on digital platforms. The results of this study in a non-Western developing country context indicate a positive relationship between exposure to online political comedy and public engagement, critical thinking, and opinion sharing.

Keywords

Comedy critical thinking India opinion sharing public engagement

Introduction

Is online political stand-up comedy associated with viewers’ ability to critically re-think their ideas around the issues of discrimination, social inequalities, and how marginalised communities are treated? What is the link between political humour and how viewers engage in such political matters? With the 2014 arrival of a right-wing government in India and its re-election in 2019, there has been an emphasis on the forceful imposition of a Hindu, majoritarian point of view on its electorate, systematic discrimination towards minority religions, and a strong resistance towards critique (Poonam, 2019). Disregarding the trend of stifling dissent, killings of intellectuals, and a rise in hate crimes, most of the Indian media has toed the line of the government’s ideology and has failed to provide constructive criticism for its decisions, schemes, and measures (Ganguly, 2020). Revelations within newsrooms found that the government has employed 200 staff members who direct and guide media editors on how to report on government activities (Ganguly, 2020). Not surprisingly, India ranks 161 out of 180 countries for press freedom, lagging behind South Sudan and Afghanistan (Reporters Without Borders, 2023).

While the mainstream media has been unsuccessful in being a watchdog of the political establishment, alternative spaces and platforms have emerged for communicating different and often dissenting opinions, with stand-up comedy being one of them (Paul, 2018). Political comedy does not have the same gatekeeping or information indexing norms and expectations as conventional news media (McKain, 2005). Since political comedy has an underlying spirit of questioning the status quo and prompting people to view issues from different perspectives (Chattoo, 2018), political stand-up comedy in India shows promise to facilitate critical conversations about issues that would otherwise not find space in the mainstream media.

Extant research supports the persuasive effects of humour in communicating critical issues. The results of a meta-analysis by Walter et al. (2018) showed that humour has a moderate-level influence on knowledge but a significant, weak effect on persuasion and behavioural intention. Others (e.g., Blanc & Brigaud, 2014) suggest that humour encourages prolonged attention, is more convincing, and has better message recognition. Furthermore, it can effectively initiate public discourse and engagement in struggles towards social justice (Cameron, 2015). Hence, this study seeks to understand if stand-up comedy in India is associated with individuals’ perceptions of public engagement, critical thinking, and opinion leadership on digital platforms on religious freedom as an example of social justice issues.

While a myriad of studies have researched comedy in India from different perspectives (James, 2020; Miller, 2020; Paul, 2018; Shivaprasad, 2023), there are limited studies that examine political stand-up comedy and its implications on public engagement, critical thinking, and opinion sharing from an empirical approach. This study provides a non-Western perspective on the implications of stand-up comedy on audiences whose media habits, motivations, and perceptions may differ from Western audiences. The remainder of this article develops as follows: It lays out the literature on public engagement, critical thinking, and opinion sharing around political comedy, followed by the theoretical framework, method, results, discussions, and implications.

Literature

Critical Conversations around ‘Funny’ Politics

Political humour can be categorised into four types based on its relationship to authority-holders: supportive, benign, undermining, and subversive humour (Paletz, 1990). The kind of humour pertinent to this study is subversive humour, which usually directs aggression and scorn towards authority figures and institutions, long-cherished systems, and entities by using expressions (i.e., humour) that would not be readily acceptable if presented in a serious format.

As individuals increasingly turn towards non-conventional tools of news, political comedy such as late-night shows and YouTube channels attract many individuals using an initial ‘hook’ of entertainment before delving deeper into serious political discussions (Baym, 2006). In the Indian context, the rise of YouTube comedy channels amidst the government’s increased censorship of TV news has provided less moderated avenues, thus more conducive for commentary on ‘playful politics’ (Paul, 2018). Along with prompting initial interest and sparking critical thinking and public engagement, humour can invoke a sense of ‘hope’ in ways that are lacking in non-humourous news approaches (Cameron, 2015). Though conventional political comedy primarily critiques the status quo, it can also evoke hope of improving things, inviting audiences to interact with other sociopolitical alternatives (Waisanen, 2014, 2018). Comedy may use counterfactuals (i.e., methods of comedic rhetoric that compare certain events against alternative realities) to invite audiences to critically re-think the status quo and construct alternative worlds of possibilities (Waisanen, 2018). In context of India, political comedy about marginalisation of religious minorities (Gettleman et al., 2019; Poonam, 2019) prompts the audiences to re-examine the existing status quo. The emergence of digital media in the country has increased the popularity of stand-up comedy as a genre and created a favourable environment for it to serve as a critical lens to analyse political realities (Ahmad et al., 2022). This is significant because traditional news media outlets have primarily adopted the dominant narrative of the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) government and its policies due—in part—to the BJP using its power to threaten the opposition and critics alike (Ganguly, 2020).

In this study, critical thinking is defined in relation to social change and inequality, that is, questioning the status quo (Christensen, 1992; Warner, 2004). The researchers use critical thinking to mean individuals’ democratic learning process that assesses power relations and social inequities (Cummins, 1989). Because political comedy shows often provide critical views of government policies and measures, these discussions can prompt viewers to think about and evaluate political choices and decisions (Chattoo & Barber, 2018). There are indications of a possible relationship between normativity and comic optimism in explicating how humour can be beneficial via promoting critical thinking (Morreall, 2009)—a view that aligns with the notion of counterfactuals. Though there are various definitions of critical thinking, this research uses the term within a social change framework to describe individuals’ thinking that focuses on social inequities and probes the disparities between democratic principles and undemocratic realities (Christensen, 1992).

Bridging Democratic Principles and Undemocratic Realities: Stand-up Comedy for Civic Participation

Paletz (1990) asks, ‘Does not humour sometimes enable people to confront authority, to diminish it, reduce its distance and majesty, thereby revealing authority-holders as imperfect mortals, error-prone humans, ordinary people unworthy of special respect, deference, or perpetuation in office?’ (Paletz, 1990, p. 484). While questioning the status quo and thinking critically about social institutions, structures, and government, comedy can inspire thought and incite curiosity to provoke questions (Warner, 2004). To delineate these effects, Anderson and Kincaid (2013) coined the term ‘democomedicratic’, a combination of democratic and comedic, referring to the counter-propagandistic and democracy-promoting traits of mass-mediated satire. This research’s central focus is the effect of this type of pro-equality, pro-democracy, anti-discrimination political comedy.

Stand-up comedy in India is set to have formally begun in 2003, when Vir Das returned from the US and brought this new genre of comedy (Nuske, 2018). Even today, he continues to be a prominent stand-up comedian who makes social commentary about sociopolitical issues in India. In November 2023, his standup special ‘Vir Das: Landing’ on Netflix won an Emmy in the best comedy category and shared the award with the British teen sitcom Derry Girls (Srinivasan, 2023). Being the first Indian comedian to win the award illustrates the significance of the sharp and thriving stand-up scene in India that compelled the Western jury and audiences to sit up and notice. The critical acclaim that Vir Das’ comedy has garnered on a global platform also speaks to the democracy-promoting traits of his work, especially in contemporary Indian politics. He faces an onslaught of police complaints over a comedy monologue that he performed on his US tour in 2021 that talked about religious extremism, COVID, women’s safety, and politics in India. During his performance, he said, ‘I come from an India where we worship women during the day and gang rape them at night’. After the video went viral, a spokesperson of the ruling BJP said, ‘The derogatory statements against women and India are inflammatory. They were made in the US and malign the image of our country internationally. I want police to conduct an investigation’ (Ellis-Peterson, 2023).

Indian comics such as Saurav Mehta, Rahul Dua, and Kunal Kamra have articulated their views about inequities between democratic principles and undemocratic realities in their works. For example, talking about pro-government media outlets during Amazon Prime’s comedy reality show dubbed Comicstaan, Dua questioned the BJP-funded propaganda machine and the ‘official narratives’ produced by those news channels that ‘hegemonize the critical thinking of people’ (Ahmad et al., 2022, p. 7). Similarly, the popular Kunal Kamra, whose work integrates counter-propagandistic and democracy-promoting elements, frequently discusses issues like increased communal hatred, crony capitalism, and fake news. He emphasises the weaponisation of Islamophobia to instill fear and intolerance in the country through fake news and hyper-nationalistic jingoism (Ahmad et al., 2022).

Although people may learn about political topics by watching political comedies (Hardy et al., 2014), research shows that people consume political comedy shows primarily to be entertained, not to be informed (Baum, 2003). However, the entertainment and civic functions of political humour are not unrelated. There is a positive connection between exposure to political comedy, message recall, and recognition (Hollander, 2005) and engagement in various forms of political participation, higher levels of political knowledge, and learning, especially for the politically inattentive (Becker, 2011; Chattoo, 2018). Thus, comedic formats allow for the presentation of political issues in an entertaining format that encourages increased interest and participation in public discourse (Cao & Brewer, 2008).

In addition to humour’s effects on audiences, comics’ rhetoric, language, and word choices explicitly provide a peek into comedians’ worldviews and politics, thus providing insight into their frameworks, themes, theories, and communicative practices (Waisanen, 2011, 2014). For instance, in their study of the 10 richest comedians in the U.S., Waisanen (2014) found that these comics tackle political issues less, and their language choices were less reformist and more optimistic. Although the current study focuses on the effects of political comedy on Indian audiences and not the politics of comedy, Waisanen’s (2011, 2014) research provides a context for conceptualising and making sense of this study. In line with the literature reviewed, we pose the following hypotheses:

H_1a: Viewing online comedy about political issues is associated with higher self-perception of critical thinking on social justice (i.e., religious freedom) issues.

Digital Platforms Re-defining Public Engagement and Opinion Sharing

Declining political trust negatively affects political participation and increases general mistrust towards news media and the government (Moy et al., 2005). A founding normative tenet of journalism is that the public should be enabled to actively engage in social, cultural, political, and economic discourses (Chattoo & Barber, 2018). With an evolving new media landscape, the meaning of public engagement is also shifting from letters to news editors to more participatory online comments and forums. As scholars continue to discuss the underlying principles of public engagement that cut across media, this study draws on the three dimensions of public engagement—width, depth, and height. Width refers to capturing the initial interest of a vast number of people; depth refers to intensely engaging a small number of people to critically re-think their ideas; and height describes the number of initiatives deployed to increase the impact of ongoing efforts (Cameron, 2015). All these dimensions of engagement require a deep sense of interest in and involvement with issues of concern. Thus, the width dimension of public engagement is foundational to its two other dimensions. Studies that operationalise political engagement as gauging the ‘extent to which respondents follow societal issues and politics’ (Neundorf et al., 2016, p. 928) align with this view. In line with the foregoing discussion, this study addresses the question: What is the potential of online political comedy for sparking public interest and increasing the depth and height of critical thinking and active engagement around religious freedom as a social justice issue in India? We hypothesised that:

H_1b: Viewing online comedy about political issues is associated with individuals’ higher self-perception of engagement.

Further, social media platforms such as Facebook, YouTube, and Twitter have brought different ways of seeking, sharing, and engaging with news and political information (Weeks et al., 2017). Online opinion leadership (i.e., espousing and shaping online conversations) has become integral to users’ engagement with contemporary news and entertainment. It also shapes people’s involvement with the news, diffuses the information beyond immediate audiences, and affects how information is interpreted (Weeks et al., 2017). This study defines opinion leadership as expressions that include making contact, posting, or recommending news or information (about politics and public affairs), providing others within one’s social network access to such information, and ultimately influencing them (Kümpel et al., 2015; Weeks et al., 2017). We hypothesised that:

H_1c: Viewing online comedy about political issues is associated with individuals’ higher opinion leadership on digital platforms.

H₂: The relationships between online comedy viewing vs. public engagement (H_2a) and comedy vs. information sharing (H_2b) are mediated by self-reported critical thinking about religious freedom.

H₃: There is a positive association between viewing online comedy about political issues, self-perception of critical thinking on religious freedom issues, engagement, opinion leadership on digital platforms, and individuals’ information-sharing intentions.

Processing Humourous Messages: Elaboration Likelihood Model

Extant research suggests that political humour that categorically includes critiquing the government or its schemes will likely be challenged less than the same message presented seriously (Young, 2004). One theory that explains the persuasive effects of political humour is the elaboration likelihood model (ELM), which was developed by Richard E. Petty and John Cacioppo. According to the ELM, individuals process persuasive messages through either a central route where the message is systematically considered or peripheral routes characterised by factors other than the substance of the message, such as the source credibility, attractive presentation, humour, and more (Cacioppo & Petty, 1982; Petty et al., 1983). Thus, the model posits that individuals’ likelihood to process information systematically (i.e., via a central route) or not depends on message elements such as the absence or presence of peripheral cues like expertise, source credibility, celebrity status of messenger, humour, and fit between the message source’s values and the audience’s values (Nabi et al., 2007; Petty et al., 1983). The theory posits that peripheral cues such as expertise or celebrity status are more effective under low involvement (i.e., low motivation) than high involvement conditions. Low-involvement messages are generally less personally relevant or important to recipients and therefore may not induce a high motivation to apply cognitive resources to process them.

To apply this theoretical model to comedy, the researchers observe that political comedy represents a low-elaboration condition. Hence, owing to low elaboration, messages delivered through humour may be associated with recipients’ decreased motivation to process arguments cognitively (LaMarre et al., 2014). The decreased motivation, thus, increases the probability of accepting the implicit attitudinal message (Nabi et al., 2007). As a peripheral cue, humour, thus reduces audiences’ willingness to argue against the message (Baumgartner & Morris, 2008), at least temporarily (Mendiburo-Seguel et al., 2017). However, the violence and censorship that Indian stand-up comics such as Kunal Kamra, Munawar Faruqui, Agrima Joshua, and Sanjay Rajoura have faced in recent years by the incumbent government call attention to the importance of digital archiving on social media, especially YouTube, where their videos could be repeatedly watched, processed, and interpreted (Dhar, 2020; Ellis-Peterson, 2023; Mogul, 2022). As opposed to a stand-up performance where the audiences get to watch the comics just once on stage, the increasing prevalence of uploading their stand-up routines on their personal YouTube channels has implications for public engagement with such content.

Additionally, empirical tests of the ELM indicate that involvement as a motivational state (e.g., based on personal relevance) is associated with increased persuasive outcomes. This motivational state can explain or modify the effect of peripheral cues on information outcomes (Eisend, 2011; Petty et al., 1983; Zhang & Zinkhan, 2006). An ‘involvement as personal relevance’ explanation of humour effects aligns with the view that when understanding humour, audiences engage in ‘frame-shifting’, which requires ‘interpreting new information in light of old information to create “coherence”’ (Young, 2008, p. 121). In their study on the persuasive effects of humour on individuals who have varying cognitive involvement, Geuens and De Pelsmacker (2002) found that humour affects high-involvement individuals (e.g., people to whom a message is personally relevant) indirectly through biased cognitions (e.g., underpinned by pre-existing political attitudes and beliefs). This view aligns with Eisend’s (2011) meta-analysis on cognitive and affective models for explaining humour effects, which found that while there is an interplay between message-congruent affect and cognition, humour exerts its strongest impact along affective paths. From the above discussion on the ELM, involvement/personal relevance, and biased cognition, one would expect that individuals who are more politically aligned with the comedic message (in this case, liberal and therefore high in personal relevance) would be more persuaded than more conservative-leaning individuals exposed to the same message. Hence, we posed a fourth hypothesis:

H₄: The relationship between online comedy viewing and three dependent variables is moderated by individuals’ self-reported political leaning on a five-point leftist–rightist scale. The hypothesised moderation effect is that ‘leftists’ who are exposed to political humour are associated with more self-perception of critical thinking on social justice, public engagement, and information sharing than ‘rightists’ exposed to the same message. Thus, it is hypothesised that message alignment with individuals’ political leaning is associated with more critical thinking, self-perception, public engagement, and online opinion leadership.

Method

Participants, Procedure, and Measure

This study focused on the relationship between exposure to online comedy about political issues, public engagement, critical thinking, and opinion sharing on digital platforms in India. A simple experiment was administered to 576 Amazon Mechanical Turk (MTurk) participants in India of varying backgrounds: 70.1% male, 29.9% female; 74.8% identified as Hindus, 17.5% identified as Christians, and 6.3% identified as Muslims. A majority (51.7%) were between 27 and 33 years old. Since signing onto MTurk is a self-selective process, using MTurk samples raises external validity concerns (Chandler et al., 2014). However, extant research suggests that MTurk samples are more representative of characteristics such as party identification, geographical categories, education, marital status, religion, and employment (Clifford et al., 2015; Huff & Tingley, 2015). These population characteristics are suited for this study’s public policy issue of interest. Each participant who completed a survey received a small monetary compensation for their time (US$1).

The study participants were randomly assigned to two conditions. The experimental group was shown a stand-up comedy video about political issues and asked about their perceptions of public engagement, critical thinking, and opinion sharing. The control group did not view any such videos. The 12-minute-long video titled Kunal Kamra: Stand Up Comedy 2019, used for the treatment group, was performed by a popular political comedian, Kunal Kamra. Performed in front of live audiences and uploaded online, the YouTube video has garnered over 20 million views since it was uploaded in 2019. The comedy clip criticises the nexus of government and corporations by dwelling on the close relationship between Prime Minister Narendra Modi and the richest Indian industrialist, Mukesh Ambani, and how it dictates Indian elections, shrinking religious freedom and imposing a majoritarian point of view. It also argued that the aggressive propagation of right-wing Hinduism has sidelined India’s performance on social indicators of health, sanitation, education, and corruption. Kunal Kamra’s video clip was chosen as a stimulus in the experiment because of his established credentials as a stand-up comic who is critical of the government and someone who has faced intense backlash for it. Because of his jokes, he has attracted death threats, been evicted by his landlady in Mumbai, and been banned from flying domestically. His jokes are usually targeted at Modi, Arnab Goswami, and the general right-wing mentality (Kelkar, 2018). Arnab Goswami is an Indian TV anchor known for his passionate and hyper-nationalistic comments on air. In an excerpt from this video clip, Kamra said:

I really think that corporations should fight elections. Like Ratan Tata and Mukesh Ambani should be competing with each other in the 2019 elections. It’ll be such a good election. What will they talk about? They will talk about only development…vikas [development in Hindi] they don’t know anything else…like Ratan Tata wont go to Uttar Pradesh (UP) to talk to a room full of people and say…Mandir Yahin banega [The temple will be built here] It will be so out of character..noo?? This top corporate honcho, Ratan Tata, dressed up in a suit and yelling in a rally, “Mandir Yahin banega!” [The temple will be built here!] I’d be like, “Uncle, you are a Parsi, not even a Hindu, please sit down!! We’ll look into it, but just sit down, for god’s sake! Whenever you go to UP, there will always be a person who will be yelling, “Mandir Yahin banega!” [The temple will be built here!] … Not a single person is equally excited about constructing a metro train … This enthusiasm is not there for upgrading hospitals … but … Mandir Yahin …

Thus, discussing the nexus between corporations and the government, Kamra humourously opined that the government should remove itself from the equation and let people vote for corporations instead. Talking about prominent industrialists Mukesh Ambani and Ratan Tata, he noted that they might work better for the country’s development as opposed to the BJP’s political agenda to build a Hindu temple at a disputed site, Ayodhya, in the North Indian state of Uttar Pradesh. Ayodhya has been deemed controversial because it is regarded as the birthplace of the Hindu deity Lord Ram and the location of the Babri Masjid (mosque), where Muslims have worshipped since the sixteenth century. The mosque was demolished by Hindu mobs in 1992, resulting in the killing of about 2000 people. Some Hindu factions think that the mosque was built on the ruins of a temple that the Muslim invaders demolished. However, some Muslims say that they offered prayers till 1949, when some people placed an idol of Ram in the mosque and started to worship them. Over the years, both religious groups have gone to court to decide the matter until the Supreme Court finally ruled that the land be given to Hindus to build a temple in 2019 (BBC, 2019).

To ensure that participants spent enough time on the stimulus, we required individuals in the experiment group to spend at least 10 minutes on the video before they could advance the survey to the next question. Our manipulation check found that those in the experimental group spent significantly more time completing the survey (M = 1,203.49) than those in the control group (M = 435.20), t(580) = 19.33, p < .001. We also asked questions that assessed the participants’ self-perception of public engagement, critical thinking on social justice issues, opinion sharing on digital platforms, and basic demographics such as age, gender, religion, and political worldviews.

Online Comedy Viewing

In addition to the experimental treatment, participants self-reported how many hours of online comedy they had consumed within the past 7 days. The values range from 0 to 26, mean = 10.9, median = 8.0, and mode = 6.0.

Self-perception of Public Engagement

This variable was measured using a five-item strongly disagree to strongly agree measure (α = 0.78; M = 3.92). Similar to Neundorf et al.’s (2016) political engagement index and in line with the width dimension of public engagement, which focuses on individuals’ interest in societal issues and politics (Cameron, 2015), this scale assessed the extent to which the participants perceive themselves as engaged citizens on issues of equity and social justice. Higher scores indicate a higher self-perception of public engagement, and vice versa. The scale items asked, ‘I feel that I am more likely to have a pretty good understanding of the important political issues, like religious freedom, facing our country’, ‘I think that I am better informed about politics and issues of religious freedom in India than most people’, ‘I feel that I am more likely to do as good a job in public office as most other people’, and ‘I consider myself to be well qualified to participate in politics’. This measure also included: ‘Generally speaking, how interested are you in what is going on in the Indian government and public affairs?’ (not at all interested =1, very interested = 5).

Critical Thinking (on Religious Justice Issues)

We measured self-perception of critical thinking on social justice issues using a five-item measure adapted from Becker and Anderson (2019) (α = 0.78; M = 3.93). In line with a conception of critical thinking within a framework of social justice that focuses on social inequities and probes disparities between democratic principles and undemocratic realities (Christensen, 1992), this scale was adapted to focus specifically on critical thinking surrounding religious liberties within the Indian context. Higher agreement scores indicate greater self-perception of critical thinking about the issues, and vice versa. The question asked the respondents about the extent to which they agreed (on a five-point scale) to the following statements: ‘I think critically while exposed to issues of religious freedom in India’, ‘I judge the value of new information or evidence presented to me about issues related to religious freedom in India’, ‘I can detect the use of inappropriate emotional language in arguments about religious freedom in India’, ‘I approach the complex issues of religious freedom in India in a variety of ways’, and ‘I have a focused and systematic way of thinking about religious freedom in India’.

Online Opinion Leadership

We measured this variable using a four-item strongly disagree-strongly agree measure adapted from the literature (Chu, 2009; Flynn et al., 1996) (α = 0.78; M = 3.85). A higher score on this measure indicates a higher and stronger online opinion leadership. The questions asked the respondents the extent to which they agreed (on a five-point scale) to the following statements: ‘The stories I share seem to influence other people’, ‘I am in close contact with the people in my online social network’, ‘Other people would like to visit my profile to access information’, and ‘People with whom I connect on this social media platform share information based on what I have contributed and shared’.

Information Sharing Behavioural Intention

We also assessed participants’ intention to share political information online (α = 0.75; M = 3.87). The questions asked the respondents how likely they are to share information online about critical political issues facing their country in the near future and how regularly they intend to share online information about such matters.

Political Leaning

Using a five-point scale, this was assessed as the extent to which participants self-identified as having ‘leftist’ versus ‘rightist’ political views. The sample skews conservative, with 10.8% self-identifying as rightist, 30.4 identified as right-leaning, 44.4% = centrists, 8.3% = left-leaning, and 6.1% identified as leftist.

Results

Our test of H1a was not supported. The analysis did not find a significant relationship between online political comedy viewing and self-perception of critical thinking about religious justice issues (β = −0.03, p = .44). For H_1b and H_1c, the analysis returned a negative association between exposure to online political comedy and individuals’ self-reported public engagement [F(1,574) = 5.71, β = −0.10, R² = 0.10, p = .017], and opinion leadership [F(1,574) = 8.00, β = −.12, R² = 0.12, p = .005].

For H_2a, the overall model containing self-perception of critical thinking and online political comedy viewing explained 48% of the variance in perception of public engagement [F(2, 573) = 267.53, R²=.48, p < .001]. Thus, self-perception of critical thinking on religious justice issues and participants’ online political comedy viewing explained nearly half of the variation in their self-perception of public engagement. Critical thinking on social justice had a significant positive relationship with public engagement (β = .77, p < .001), and online comedy was associated with less self-perception of public engagement (β = −0.08, p = .011). However, the hypothesis that critical thinking will mediate the relationship (i.e., watching online comedy → critical thinking → public engagement path) was not supported (β = −0.002, CI = −0.008, 0.004). Thus, the association between online comedy viewing and self-reported public engagement was not mediated by individuals’ self-perceptions of critical thinking on social justice issues. The results here make sense considering that H_1a (which predicted an association between online comedy viewing and higher critical thinking on religious freedom issues) was not supported.

Like H_2a, the hypothesis that self-perception of critical thinking on social justice mediates humour effects on online opinion leadership (H_2b) was not supported (β = −0.002, CI = −0.073, 0.003). However, the overall model containing self-perception of critical thinking and humour explained 48% of the variance in online opinion leadership [F(2, 573) =180.83, R² = 0.39, p < .001]. Critical thinking on religious freedom (as a social justice issue) had a small but significant negative relationship with self-reported online opinion leadership (β = −0.002, p = .001), and online comedy viewing was associated with less self-reported online opinion leadership (β = −0.10, p = .003).

Third, we tested the hypothesis (H₃) that there is a positive association between viewing online comedy about political issues, self-perception of critical thinking on social justice issues, engagement and opinion leadership on digital platforms, and individuals’ information-sharing behavioural intentions. Controlling for participants’ religion, age, and self-reported political orientation, the overall model predicting individuals’ online information-sharing behavioural intentions explained 22% of participants’ information-sharing behaviour intentions [F(8, 567) = 19.63, R² = 0.22, p < .001]. As shown in Table 1, controlling for all other seven factors, age, sex, political orientation, being a Hindu or not, and self-reported critical thinking were not significantly associated (p > .05) with online information-sharing intent. Online comedy viewing was associated with less behavioural intent (β = −0.08, p = .038). Self-reported public engagement (β = 0.14, p = .016) and online opinion leadership (β = 0.39, p < .001) were, however, associated with a higher intention to share information about religious freedom online.

Table 1.

Online Comedy Viewing, Engagement, and Opinion Leadership Predict Intention to Share Information on Religious Justice Issues.

Model		Unstandardised Coefficients		Standardised Coefficients	t	Sig.
Model		B	Standard Error	Beta	t	Sig.
1	(Constant)	3.607	0.197		18.306	<0.001
	Age	−0.067	0.037	−0.076	−1.829	0.068
	Gender	0.034	0.071	0.020	0.483	0.629
	Religion (Hindu)	0.113	0.075	0.063	1.509	0.132
	Political orientation	0.083	0.033	0.103	2.486	0.013
2	(Constant)	2.069	0.250		8.266	<0.001
	Age	−0.040	0.034	−0.045	−1.198	0.232
	Gender	0.068	0.065	0.040	1.054	0.293
	Religion (Hindu)	0.121	0.068	0.067	1.790	0.074
	Political orientation	−0.001	0.031	−0.001	−0.030	0.976
	Online comedy viewing	−0.008	0.004	−0.079	−2.078	0.038
	Self-reported public engagement	0.139	0.058	0.135	2.406	0.016
	Self-reported critical thinking	−0.096	0.063	−0.084	−1.532	0.126
	Self-reported online opinion leadership	0.420	0.056	0.393	7.467	<.001

Finally, for H₄, the pattern of relationship found H1_a–c was true irrespective of individuals’ self-reported political (i.e., leftist–rightist) leaning. Thus, no significant moderation effect was realised between online comedy viewing and self-perception of critical thinking on social justice (β = 0.001, p = .84), public engagement (β = 0.001, p = .79), and online opinion leadership (β = –0.002, p = .63).

Discussion

Our study found that online political comedy viewing and critical thinking self-perception explain nearly half of the variance in individuals’ perceptions of public engagement and self-reported opinion leadership. However, contrary to the hypothesised direction of association, the results suggested that increased viewing of online political comedy is associated with decreased public engagement and opinion sharing on digital platforms. Thus, while humour may be associated with individuals’ interest in an issue, critical thinking on social justice issues, and public engagement (Becker, 2011; Cameron, 2015; Warner, 2004), this is not always the case. As previous studies in Western contexts suggest (Baym, 2006), blurring the lines between news and entertainment, as seen in political comedy, may invoke a sense of ‘hope’ to counteract the effects of stressful topics and news—in ways that non-humourous approaches cannot undertake. Thus, we argue that contrary to the hypothesised positive relationship between political comedy and public engagement, critical thinking, and opinion leadership, the Indian viewers studied in this work may be consuming online political comedy as light-hearted entertainment or for escapism. Such gratification may discourage their ability to participate in public affairs and share political comedy on digital platforms. This view comports with Baum’s (2003) observation that people consume political comedy shows primarily to be entertained and not informed. Our research results indicate the need to examine further the boundary conditions for a positive relationship between political comedy, public engagement (self-perception), and opinion leadership/information sharing. In addition, the findings indicate some of the different issues that surround the current trend of political comedy in India, including the limited research on contemporary political issues produced by comedians, the nascent stage of political comedy as a format, and a still heavy reliance on mainstream media for news consumption, such as TV and newspapers.

Implications

Theoretical Implications

The results can be examined within the theoretical framework of the elaboration likelihood model (Cacioppo & Petty, 1982). Our argument that the participants seem to be consuming political comedy as a form of escape or entertainment rather than information is bolstered by the fact that the political orientation (right or left) of participants did not moderate political comedy’s effect on the Indian citizens studied. The content of the comedy video used for the experiment favoured a left-leaning stance on the political issues discussed. Hence, as evidence about the moderating role of involvement on elaboration likelihood (Petty et al., 1983) suggests, one would expect left-leaning individuals to be more cognitively engaged than their right-leaning counterparts. If this were true (and since humour also increases the probability of accepting an implicit attitudinal message; Nabi et al., 2007), people with a leftist political worldview would have shown greater critical thinking, public engagement, and opinion leadership. Thus, it is plausible that, irrespective of their politics, all citizens exhibited low elaboration.

Ordinarily, one would expect right-leaning individuals to be more critical of media content that criticises their political sensibilities. However, our findings that right-leaning political orientation did not significantly modify the association between political comedy exposure and self-reported critical thinking, public engagement, and opinion leadership align with some research that observes that political humour that categorically critiques the government is likely to be challenged less—in this case, by right-leaning individuals—than a message presented seriously (Young, 2004). This presents fertile ground for further empirical testing and theory development. Besides, owing to low elaboration, messages delivered through humour tend to decrease recipients’ motivation to cognitively elaborate on arguments (LaMarre et al., 2014; Nabi et al., 2007). This mechanism might explain the lack of engagement of left-leaning individuals, whom one would expect to be cognitively involved (Cacioppo & Petty, 1982; Petty et al., 1983). Hence, elaboration likelihood is a plausible explanation for why political comedy had no differential effects on left-leaning versus right-leaning citizens. This hypothesis is a fertile ground for future empirical testing.

The results of this study in a non-Western developing country context support the existing literature on the positive relationship between exposure to online political comedy and public engagement, critical thinking, and opinion sharing. The overall results notwithstanding, this study was only conducted in one non-Western context. Future research should conduct a comparative analysis and examine how and why audiences in India and other countries in Asia, Latin America, and Africa perceive political comedy vis-à-vis countries in Europe and North America. Moreover, it would be interesting to compare the effects of stand-up comedy on political issues within different regions.

Practical Implications

Stand-up comedians may have yet to establish their standing as an alternative source that could provide a well-researched commentary and information on contemporary issues. Additionally, comedians who record their political satire and upload it on YouTube are essentially seen as airing personal opinions without an organisation’s credibility. Urban audiences with access to digital media seek political comedy on YouTube that aligns with their political leanings. This could also be attributed to the working logistics of search algorithms showing videos that align with the viewers’ political leanings, thus making it difficult to observe any measurable difference in critical thinking, public engagement, or online sharing.

Limitations of the Research

First, the comedy video chosen for the experiment was in Hinglish (Hindi and English). India is a diverse country with several languages that often construct local ways of questioning and talking about the government. Thus, this research leaves out a major chunk of other languages, forms of political satire, and people’s perceptions of it. Second, the study’s focus on a non-Western context is critical to this work. However, since there are few studies from a Global South perspective, this study was supplemented by literature based on studies conducted in the West. Third, the video chosen for the experiment group was around 12 minutes long. To make the respondent watch the full video, the ‘next’ button on the survey appeared 11 minutes into the comedy video. Still, there could have been cases where the complete video was not seen. Also, some parts of the results rely on cross-sectional analysis and thus may have weaker internal validity than the purely experimental parts of the analysis.

Future Direction

As the mainstream news media is increasingly acting as the mouthpiece of governments around the world, political stand-up comedy is seen as a medium that can (a) re-imagine narratives, (b) present issues that are not being covered by the conventional news, and (c) ask relevant questions of governments. Studying it from a critical cultural point of view may provide additional insights into the relationship of intersectional identity markers of comedians, such as gender, caste, religion, language, and class, and their comedy. What are the issues that female comedians curate their content around, compared to male comedians? How does it further push the envelope when they perform in Hindi, English, or different regional languages? Second, it would be interesting to see the differential effects of different comedians on their audiences. Do those identity markers of comics influence and dictate the politics of their audiences, who may or may not relate to those identity markers? Third, the comments, likes, subscriptions, and other online engagement around comedy videos can also be studied to gain a more holistic picture of how audiences think and discuss the content and various issues emanating from political comedy.

Lastly, this research studies only the effects of stand-up comedy on the audiences. To gain a more comprehensive picture of the studied phenomenon currently underway in India, it is crucial to also study the backlash these stand-up comics face from the BJP government. The retaliation has included arrests, cancellation of shows, banning from domestic airlines, refusal of rental properties, police complaints, interrogation by government agencies, extensive online trolling, and death threats. Though this is beyond the scope of this research, future studies focusing on stand-up comics will be insightful to provide nuance in the role of stand-up comedy and political engagement.

Footnotes

Declaration of Conflicting Interests

The authors declared no potential conflicts of interest with respect to the research, authorship and/or publication of this article.

Funding

The authors received no financial support for the research, authorship and/or publication of this article.

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