Russia’s Changing Relations with Pakistan and Taliban: Implications for India

Abstract

Historically, India–Russia cooperation has largely been dictated by geopolitical factors. During the Cold War era, their relationship was defined by their similar strategic perceptions of the world. However, post-Cold War global politics has seen several transformations in geopolitical and geostrategic configurations, influencing the strategic worldview of both New Delhi and Moscow. Recent political trends demonstrate the growing divergence between the strategic approaches of the two states toward various global issues, including Pakistan and the Taliban. The article discusses the implications of the shift in Russia’s South Asia policy as well as India’s counterterrorism efforts.

Keywords

India–Russia relations China–Pakistan Economic Corridor Taliban Vladimir Putin terrorism military exercise

Introduction

India and Russia are time-tested partners, a commitment which is unfailingly emphasized in every joint statement made by the Indian and Russian leaders, particularly during their annual summits. However, the mutual trust between them seems to have been undermined by the imperatives of contemporary shifts in global geopolitics. The recent tensions in the US–Russia relations, an issue which has always influenced Indo-Russian ties since the Cold War, has further aggravated the problems between Moscow and New Delhi. Moscow’s worldview is churning under the leadership of President Vladimir Putin. In its renewed world-view, Russia is keen to attain the status of an indispensable power across multiple theatres of the world to maintain its geopolitical relevance. Therefore, Russia is making attempts to fill up the power vacuum across regions where it perceives that there is a tactical indecision on the part of the USA. This has led to profound consequences for Russia’s South Asia policy, especially in its relations with New Delhi.

Proximity with Pakistan

During the Cold War years, Indo-Russian cooperation on political and strategic issues was reflective of the positions that the two countries took on most of the global issues. Moscow backed New Delhi’s position on the issue of Kashmir, putting its weight behind India’s confidence in the international arena. The Indo-Soviet Treaty of 1971 gave India the psychological strength to respond to the Pakistani misadventure that ultimately led to the division of Pakistan and the creation of Bangladesh. Policy differences were often expressed in private. At the same time, Moscow–Islamabad relations had been poisoned by Pakistan’s alliance with the USA in the Cold War against the Soviet Union.

In 1947, Pakistan inherited the Durand Line from British colonial India as its northwestern border with Afghanistan. The 2,250 km border which was created under very controversial circumstances, arbitrarily divided the traditional Pashtun lands between Afghanistan and Pakistan. Many nationalist Afghans regarded ‘Pashtunistan’ as their historic homeland. For Afghan governments, support for largely ill-defined Pashtunistan has been a way to minimize Pakistan’s interference in their country as well as to rally behind the Pashtun majority in Afghanistan. For Islamabad, the issue represents a territorial claim against Pakistan (Bezhan 2014; Kaura 2017; Mihalka 2008; Schetter 2013). Soviet support for Afghanistan on the Pashtunistan issue ensured that the Pakistani leadership entertained deep apprehensions for Moscow’s intentions. Later, Pakistan army provided training and US-supplied weapons to various Mujahideen groups against the Soviet forces in Afghanistan. As a result, even after Russia overcame its past bitterness, relations with Islamabad remained a low-key affair. Russia–Pakistan relations continued to be defined by Moscow’s traditionally sound ties with New Delhi. However, Pakistan is the new elephant in the room when it comes to India–Russia relations in the recent times. Over the past decade, Russia and Pakistan have been building a relationship which was in the cold storage during the Cold War. The growing closeness between Moscow and Islamabad is reflected in several significant initiatives taken by Moscow in recent years. During the official visit of Russian Prime Minister Mikhail Fradkov to Pakistan in 2007, the two sides discussed possibilities of economic cooperation (Radyuhin 2007). The 2010 Quadripartite Summit among Russia, Afghanistan, Pakistan, and Tajikistan at Sochi in Russia was a significant step which provided an opportunity for Moscow to turn a page on its relations with Islamabad. What made Russia bring about a shift in its South Asia policy was the realization that viewing Islamabad as part of regional problems would not help in advancing Russia’s goal of playing a bigger role (Radyuhin 2010). Next year, Vladimir Putin, the then incumbent prime minister of Russia, publicly endorsed Pakistan’s bid to join the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) in 2011 (Dawn 2011). In 2012, Pakistan’s chief of army staff, General Ashfaq Parvez Kayani, became the first military chief from Pakistan to visit Moscow. Clearly, Russia was overcoming its reluctance to develop full-fledged relations with Pakistan.

While Moscow’s relations with New Delhi are an outcome of a long evolution, its ties with Islamabad mark a sea change. As described earlier, the two countries did not have much depth in their ties, barring some exceptions. However, Russia’s decision in 2014 to lift its arms embargo against Pakistan had changed this. It was explicitly done to sell military helicopters to Pakistan, followed by other systems. But the relationship has evolved beyond merely commercial aspects. During the first visit of a Russian defense minister to Pakistan in November 2014, both the countries signed a military cooperation agreement, termed as a ‘milestone’ by Pakistanis (Dawn 2014). This was the first military deal of its kind between them. In June 2015, Pakistan army chief, General Raheel Sharif, who succeeded Kayani, visited Russia and met top Russian civil and military leadership (Tanzeem 2015). A move considered as a breakthrough between the two countries, Russia and Pakistan signed a deal for the purchase of Mi-35M assault helicopters in August 2015. Produced by Rostvertol, a subsidiary of Russian Helicopters, Mi-35 is an export variant of the Mi-24 (Osman 2015). Pakistan finally received all four helicopters in August 2017 (Dominguez 2017). This is a historic first, given Pakistani reliance on American military equipment for six decades. The two countries also signed an inter-governmental agreement in October 2015 to jointly construct the 1,100 km Karachi–Lahore gas pipeline. Russia’s Energy Minister, Alexander Novak, who signed the agreement on behalf of Russia, said that the project would take Moscow–Islamabad relations ‘to a new level’ (PTI 2015).

The first Russia–Pakistan counter-narcotics exercise was held in October 2014 followed by a second exercise in December 2015. The first-ever Russia–Pakistan joint military exercise, dubbed as the ‘Friendship-2016’, was held in the Pakistani province of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa in September 2016 (Dawn 2016). The military exercise demonstrated the shifting regional alliances and the resurgence of Russian influence in the region. Pakistan is interested in improving its ties with Russia to diversify its options in the event of a stalemate or further deterioration of its ties with the USA. Russia’s opening up to Pakistan was also believed to be a subset of Russia’s evolving relationship with China (Bagchi 2016a). India’s uneasiness over Russia–Pakistan military exercises was evident given that Indian troops were also participating in military exercises with Russia. However, Moscow went ahead with Islamabad, raising serious doubts in New Delhi about the future trajectory of Russian policy in South Asia. Strategic affairs analyst, C. Raja Mohan, expressed astonishment over Russia’s joint military exercise when he stated,

[A]t a moment when India was trying to isolate Pakistan after the Uri attacks, coping with fresh political violence inside Kashmir … That Russia was unwilling to postpone these exercises in deference to Indian sensitivities at this critical juncture suggests something fundamental is at work in Moscow’s approach to the Subcontinent. (Mohan 2016)

Although Russia was sensitive enough to avoid conducting exercises in PoK due to India’s strong reservations (IANS 2016).

Indian apprehensions were played down by Russians who maintained that they held similar drills with other countries of the region as well. But India’s Ambassador to Moscow, Pankaj Saran, said in an interview that Russia’s ‘military cooperation with Pakistan which is a State that sponsors and practices terrorism as a matter of State policy is a wrong approach and it will only create further problems’ (PTI 2016b). These remarks came ahead of the bilateral meeting in Goa between Prime Minister Modi and President Putin on October 14, 2016. Moscow’s decision to carry out joint military exercise with Pakistan surprised not only Indians but many Russians as well. In an interview, Russia’s former ambassador to India, Vyacheslav Trubnikov, expressed his disapproval of the manner in which Russian government handled the issue. He said that ‘the timing for military drills with Pakistan, however, was chosen badly … [T]here are many other ways to improve military cooperation with this country [Pakistan] without damaging our relations with India’ (Zubacheva 2016).

Shortly before the BRICS summit in Goa, Prime Minister Modi and President Putin held a meeting. Appreciating Russia’s ‘unequivocal condemnation’ of the cross-border terror attack on Uri Army base, Modi said that ‘Russia’s clear stand on the need to combat terrorism mirrors our own’ (Indian Express 2016). The Goa summit of BRICS was concluded with a joint declaration which underscored ‘the need for close coordination on tracking the sources of terrorist financing and targetting the hardware of terrorism, including weapons’ supplies, ammunition, equipment and training’ (Kumaraswami 2016). However, Russia did not come to India’s support on the issue of Pakistan-sponsored terrorism. Chinese diplomats were able to convince their Russian counterparts to keep the Indian concerns regarding terrorism in abeyance while the declaration reflected Moscow’s own concerns regarding ISIS. Russia’s agreement with China on such an important issue sought to challenge India’s conviction that Moscow would come to its help whenever required (Pant 2016).

India organized the sixth Ministerial Meeting of the ‘Heart of Asia’ (Istanbul Process) conference on Afghanistan, at Amritsar in December 2016. The issue of terrorism assumed center stage, and it was mostly directed against Pakistan. Afghan President Ashraf Ghani launched a frontal attack on terrorism emanating from Pakistan and praised India for its role in Afghanistan’s transition since New Delhi’s ‘assistance is transparent and with no strings attached’ (PTI 2016a). Asserting that no amount of money can assist Afghanistan if there is simultaneous support to terrorists by Pakistan, Ghani even turned down a Pakistani offer of US$500 million for Afghanistan’s reconstruction. He said that this amount ‘could very well be used for containing extremism because without peace any amount of assistance will not meet the needs of our people’ (Ibid.). However, Russia expressed its disapproval of the manner in which Ghani attacked Aziz. Zamir Kabulov, who represented Russia, articulated Moscow’s position on Afghanistan’s transition. He said that Russia believes that the Heart of Asia is not ‘the right place for settling scores between member states … We believe that Heart of Asia is a dialogue platform which can complement but can’t supplement the existing well-known regional relations’. Kabulov showed understanding of India’s security concerns but at the same time emphasized the importance of Pakistan in winning the war against jihadist terror (Chaudhury 2016).

Asserting that Russia’s ‘trust-based’ relations with India would not be diluted by Moscow’s growing ties with Islamabad and other countries, President Putin told in an interview in June 2017 that there is no other country in the world, other than India, with which Russia has such ‘deep cooperation’ in delicate areas including missile technology. But Putin sidestepped a question on Kashmir, saying ‘it is upto you’ to assess whether Pakistan is fueling terrorism in the Indian state. However, he also said that ‘no matter where the threat comes from, it is unacceptable, and we will always support India in its fight against terrorism’ (PTI 2017a). When asked whether Russia would use its influence to get Pakistan to stop terror attacks, Putin asserted that Russians ‘always support India in its fight against terrorism’. But he also praised Pakistan by asserting that ‘I believe Pakistan is taking immense steps to stabilize the situation in the country’ (Ibid.). Anyone familiar with the evolution of Indo-Russian ties would understand the importance of the Kashmir issue in the bilateral relationship. During the Cold War, it was Moscow that often-bailed New Delhi out of tricky situations by vetoing UN resolutions amid the Anglo-American maneuvers. But Putin’s refusal to endorse India’s position on cross-border terrorism in Kashmir indicates a fundamental shift in Moscow’s approach, though public statements by Indian and Russian leaders continue to emphasize the importance of combating terrorism.

The special forces of Russia and Pakistan conducted a 2-week joint counter-terrorism exercise in September–October 2017. Second in the Druzhba series, the exercise focused on counter-terrorism operations, hostage rescue, and cordon and search operation (Hindustan Times 2017). But Russia also conducted the first joint tri-services exercise ‘INDRA-2017’ with India from October 19 to 29 at Vladivostok. This was also the first time that Russia hosted a Tri-Services Exercise on its soil (ANI 2017). Aimed at deepening security and counter-terrorism cooperation, the exercise involving armies, navies, and air forces of both sides was an attempt to address the drift in their relations.

As things stand now, military cooperation between Russia and Pakistan is going to widen. Pakistanis are optimistic of increasing the volume of Russia–Pakistan defense trade as they have pointed out mutual economic benefits for both sides. China plays the role of ‘middle man’ in Pakistan’s dealings with Russia for acquisition of military equipment, particularly heavy aircraft engines. One Pakistani analyst writes that Pakistani markets, which still remain ‘untapped’ for Russian arms industry, can be utilized by Russia for economic benefits. And similarly, by eliminating ‘China as a middle man, Pakistan can gain huge economic benefits’ (Bhatti 2017).

At present, the amount of Russian military equipment supplied to Pakistan is still very small and Pakistan does not have the financial wherewithal either to make big-ticket purchases from Russia (Mason 2016). Pakistan’s bloated military not only is unsustainable but also presently lacks the resources to invest financially for purchase of highly advanced military systems for future. But given an obsessive anti-India strand in Pakistan’s strategic culture, Pakistan’s security establishment can be expected to indulge in any economic adventurism. It is therefore important to make sure that bigger Russian weapons in future do not land in Pakistan’s arsenal which will invariably be a threat for India.

The China–Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) has also become a factor in Indo-Russian ties. After initial hesitation, President Putin has decided to link his ambitious connectivity project—Eurasian Economic Union (EEU)—with President Xi Jinping’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), creating nervousness in New Delhi. During Russian foreign minister Sergey Lavrov’s India visit in December 2017, Russia asked India to join the BRI and hoped that New Delhi would find a way out to benefit from the Beijing-led mega connectivity project without sacrificing its principled position (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation 2017a). India’s external affairs ministry replied by repeating India’s stand that New Delhi is ready to look at any suggestion if its ‘sensitivities’ are taken into account (PTI 2017b).

Attitude toward Afghanistan and Taliban

Since its emergence as an independent state in 1947, Pakistan has been involved in an antagonistic relationship with Afghanistan. It must be noted that Afghanistan was the only country to vote against Pakistan’s membership in the United Nations (UN). Pakistan felt, and still feels, challenged by Afghanistan’s ill-defined territorial claims to Pashtun areas that are now located in Pakistan alongside Afghanistan’s close relations with India. The appearance of an armed Islamist movement in Afghanistan since 1973 gave Islamabad an opportunity to shape Afghan politics. This movement later evolved into the anti-Soviet conflict in Afghanistan when the then US President Ronald Reagan promoted jihad against the Soviets forces, with the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) arming thousands of Afghan mujahideen. The emergence of Al-Qaeda and Taliban was the corollary of the CIA-armed mujahideen, who were nurtured by Pakistan’s Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI).

After the Soviet withdrawal, the USA and its allies lost interest in Afghanistan. Once the Soviet forces left, chaos and anarchy dominated the post-Soviet Afghanistan. Pakistan made use of this instability in establishing a Pakistan-controlled regime in Kabul. The Taliban wrecked havoc in Afghanistan during their five-year rule which was recognized only by Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, and the UAE. India, Iran, and Russia stepped in to limit Pakistan-supported Taliban’s influence through the Northern Alliance, the predominantly Uzbek and Tajik force of former mujahideen, fearing a Taliban-led radicalization of their respective regions. However, it was only after 9/11 terror attacks that Washington felt the urgency to engineer a reconfiguration of external forces toward a common purpose of overthrowing the Taliban from power and install a broadly acceptable new regime in Kabul. Although immediately before the Taliban was overthrown and even after it, Moscow had rendered crucial assistance to the USA. However, Russia was cautious about getting involved again in Afghanistan beyond materially supporting its anti-Taliban allies and cooperating with American forces through intelligence sharing. Russian help was crucial in the sense that it included detailed intelligence sharing on part of both civilian and military intelligence agencies along with an acquiescence to President Bush’s request to station the US troops in Central Asia, particularly in Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan (Mankoff 2009: 112).

Primarily concerned with promotion of its strategic interests in Central Asia, Russia left Afghanistan to the US-led coalition since Russia’s potential enemies were already being targeted by the USA (Trenin and Malashenko 2010: 8). It must be mentioned that the rapprochement between Moscow and Washington that followed after the 9/11 incident and subsequent overthrowing of the Taliban regime in Afghanistan stemmed from the convergence of interests between the two countries, both of which had suffered a great deal from Islamist terrorism and hoped to rid themselves of this menace which was playing an increasingly dangerous role in aiding and training Chechen rebels and spreading Islamist radicalism throughout Central Asia (Mankoff 2009: 111). But this delicate strategic coordination proved short-lived as Moscow’s anxieties about encroachment on Russia’s sphere of influence by NATO upset the prospects of lasting US–Russia rapprochement. Iran was also marginalized soon.

As the USA shifted its focus on Iraq, Rawalpindi provided sanctuary to the Taliban leadership and allowed it to recruit and train its fighters in the notorious tribal areas of Pakistan. For years, the USA turned a blind eye to Islamabad’s treacherous behavior, focusing only on securing Pakistan army’s cooperation in hunting down the remaining Al-Qaeda leadership. Pakistan continues to allow the Afghan Taliban almost unhindered access to its border areas while Islamabad demands exclusive veto over India’s involvement in Afghanistan. Pakistan army knows that Taliban is its Trojan horse that can come back to power once all foreign forces eventually leave Afghanistan. India has long considered Taliban as financed and supported by Pakistan’s security establishment. New Delhi has always been critical of any distinction between ‘good’ and ‘bad’ Taliban as it is fraught with serious security consequences for the region. Russia has historically supported India’s position on the issue of the Taliban as they had worked together in the 1990s to prop up the Northern Alliance as a counter to the Taliban. However, Russia’s attitude toward Taliban has been undergoing a decisive shift, much to India’s discomfiture. Almost three decades after Russia ended its own catastrophic Afghan war whose economic burden finally led to the disintegration of the Soviet Union, Moscow has been seeking to reemerge as a key player in Afghan politics by embracing the Taliban. On the other hand, despite the recent defeat of ISIS in Syria and Iraq, Moscow is not showing any complacency in the fight against ISIS. Moscow continues to express serious concerns over the growing activities of the Afghan ‘branch’ of ISIS, which can help it in securing a foothold in Afghanistan’s northern areas bordering Central Asian republics. According to an official briefing of Russia’s foreign ministry in December 2017, ISIS militants have launched a massive recruiting campaign in the Jowzjan province, where teenagers are reported to have joined the jihadist organization (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation 2017b).

Russia has no desire to see the Taliban control Afghanistan. However, Moscow at the same time recognizes Taliban’s territorial gains and prefers the group to ISIS. In fact, an influential section of Russian policy makers has come to view Taliban as a useful partner in its fight against the ISIS. President Putin has long worried about radical jihadists from former Soviet republics going to fight with ISIS in Syria or elsewhere. Now, the danger of ISIS militants returning to post-Soviet Central Asian states and Russia has come to haunt Moscow. With their movement being facilitated by a broad, ethnic, and linguistic network, Russian-speaking Islamist fighters are able to travel with relative ease across a geographically contiguous terrain. Although less than 1,000 of the approximate 8,500 Russian-speaking Salafi-jihadist fighters have returned to Russia or Central Asian states, they do so as ‘force multipliers’, as they have acquired fearsome battlefield skills (Sanderson 2018). For these reasons, Russia sees ISIS as a particular threat in a way that the Taliban is not.

In December 2015, Russian Foreign Ministry spokesperson, Maria Zakharova, said that Moscow was engaged with Afghan Taliban for intelligence sharing and information exchange regarding the fight against ISIS in Afghanistan (Todd and Almasy 2015). Speaking in January 2016, President Putin’s special representative to Afghanistan, Zamir Kabulov, candidly acknowledged that the ‘Taliban interests objectively coincide with ours. Both the Afghan and the Pakistani Taliban have said they don’t recognize ISIS and they don’t recognize the ISIS leader al-Baghdadi as the caliph; that is very important. We have communication channels with the Taliban to exchange information’ (Sengupta 2016).

Russia’s permanent representative to the UN, in his address at the UN Security Council in September 2016, stressed that the USA and NATO were responsible for the deteriorating situation in Afghanistan and added that the killing of Mullah Akhtar Mansoor paved the way for extremist groups such as ISIS to become stronger in Afghanistan. In December 2016, Russia’s ambassador to Afghanistan, Alexander Mantyskiy, conceded that Moscow maintained relations with the Taliban, while insisting that Russia’s contacts with the Taliban were not ‘intensive’ and aimed only at ensuring the safety of Russian citizens. Kabulov had also stated that the ISIS—not the Taliban—is a bigger threat in the region, while describing the Taliban as ‘local, Afghanistan-based’ and ‘predominantly a national military-political movement’ (Shalizi and Smith 2016). At the end of March 2017, the Russian Ambassador to NATO Alexander Gruschko conceded Russia’s ‘contact with the Taliban’, while adding that the purpose for such communication centered on safety of Russian citizens and Taliban’s participation in peace negotiations (Deutsche Welle 2017).

The Russians are being pragmatic as they believe that if any settlement in Afghanistan is to happen, it cannot happen without the Taliban at the table. A Russian analyst, Alexei Malashenko, has been recently quoted as saying that there are Talibans ‘who are fighting ISIS, so why shouldn’t we speak to them? Without the Taliban, the Afghan state is not viable’ (Rasmussen 2017).

The first-ever Russia–Pakistan consultation on regional issues was held in December 2016 in Islamabad. Russia began to move toward greater acceptance of Pakistan’s role in Afghanistan. At a high-level trilateral meeting held at Moscow in the last week of December 2016, the representatives from Russia, China, and Pakistan discussed the security situation in Afghanistan. According to a statement issued at the end of the meeting: ‘The Russian Federation and the People’s Republic of China as the UN Security Council permanent members confirmed their flexible approach in delisting Afghan individuals from the UN sanctions lists as their contribution to the efforts aimed at launching peaceful dialogue between Kabul and Taliban’ (Bagchi 2016b). Taliban obviously welcomed the move by pointing ‘that the regional countries have also understood that the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan is a political and military force’ (Khan 2016). But Afghanistan expressed its annoyance over the suggestion from Pakistan, China, and Russia that Taliban should be accommodated in the fight against the ISIS or Daesh. Asserting that ‘delisting of Taliban leaders is the right of only the Afghan people’, the Afghan interior ministry spokesman, Sediq Sediqqi, said that Daesh ‘are all ex-members of the Pakistani Taliban, they have just changed names … The biggest threat are the Taliban, Haqqani Network and Al-Qaeda—that’s the core of the issue. We can’t differentiate and say that some Talibans are better’ (Laskar 2016). Afghan stand was in conformity with that of India which has maintained that Taliban’s ties with Pakistan’s security establishment constitute the biggest threat to peace in Afghanistan.

The absence of Afghan representatives from the meeting created a lot of controversy as well. Kabul firmly objected to being left out of the trilateral meeting. As an Afghan spokesperson remarked: ‘Even if such talks are organized with good will, it cannot yield any substantial results because no one from the Afghan side is there to brief the participants about the latest ground realities’ (Shams 2016). The USA also questioned Russia’s real intentions for organizing the talks. Neither the USA nor NATO was part of these talks, which eventually went nowhere. After facing criticism for not inviting Afghanistan to the December conference, Moscow broadened its outreach by inviting India, Iran, and Afghanistan for the February 2017 meeting. In April 2017, Moscow hosted the fifth round of Afghan peace conference which was attended by eleven countries, including Russia, China, Pakistan, Iran, India, Afghanistan, and a number of Central Asian states while the USA chose not to attend again (Deutsche Welle 2017). The Russian Foreign Ministry ruled out inviting Taliban representatives to the conference and stressed that the event was only for governments so as to help Kabul establish direct peace talks with the Taliban. Following a massive terror attack in late April on a military base in northern Afghanistan that killed more than 100 people, Kabulov once again offered to provide a platform for negotiations between Afghanistan and the Taliban, saying that ‘dialogue is a need and that terror attack showed its need. In order to prevent such terror attacks, it is necessary to come to the negotiating table’ (Sputniknews 2017). India continues to oppose the integration of the armed Taliban insurgency into the Afghan government. India believes that the Taliban ‘should follow all internationally accepted red lines, and give up all violence and terrorism’ (Economic Times 2016). Russia’s growing engagements with the Taliban and the military cooperation with Pakistan have the potential to harm India’s strategic interests in the region. That is why, in January 2017, India’s minister of state for external affairs, M.J. Akbar, hoped that Russia would not cause any harm to the bilateral ties and strategic partnership notwithstanding Moscow’s recent overtures to Pakistan (Economic Times 2017). India continues to feel the heat generated by Russia’s approach to Afghanistan. After Trump administration’s new Afghan strategy announcement in August 2017, which vehemently criticized Pakistan for offering safe haven to terrorists, China’s support for Pakistan did not come as a surprise. However, Russia also came out in support of Pakistan. Kabulov insisted that Islamabad is ‘a key regional player to negotiate with’ and ‘putting pressure [on Pakistan] may seriously destabilize the region-wide security situation and result in negative consequences for Afghanistan’ (Express Tribune 2017). Echoing Pakistan’s oft-repeated position of finding a political settlement of the Afghan conflict, Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov also termed the American emphasis on force as ‘a dead-end approach’ (Reuters 2017).

From Russian perspective, the growing threat from the ISIS justifies its outreach to the Taliban, which also happens to be the enemy of the ISIS. However, Afghanistan finds this argument untenable. During his September 2017 India visit, the Afghan Chief Executive Abdullah Abdullah argued that ISIS can take root in Afghanistan only because of instability and constant fighting by Taliban. He further said:

I must emphatically deny the Russian perception that NATO in collusion with the Afghan government is helping Daesh. We are targeting Daesh … There is another line in the Russian argument that the Taliban are not ‘international’. If there are groups fighting in Chechnya or Uighurs or in Central Asian countries where they want to take Daesh-like ideologies, they are only able to do so because Taliban are fighting. Taliban are providing that infrastructure for them. (Bagchi 2017)

There can be many arguments and counterarguments about New Delhi’s objections to Moscow’s new Taliban policy. But this is clearly a policy departure on part of Moscow. With Russia giving up its hostility for the Taliban, India is at the risk of being regionally isolated. Since the Ashraf Ghani government in Kabul is not in a position to assert itself due to inherent institutional weaknesses, the Taliban and Pakistan are the real beneficiaries of Moscow’s policy shift. Indian policymakers are advised by some observers not to spend sleepless nights over Russia’s change in attitude toward Islamabad. However, the problem arises when Russia’s tactical aims adversely affect India’s strategic objectives vis-à-vis Pakistan. By cosying up to Pakistan, Moscow might be cautioning India against drawing too close to America, but it also has the unintended consequence of pushing India closer into the arms of the USA.

A noted Russian analyst has argued that ‘it is widely believed that the Russian leadership is stronger at tactics, short-term planning, than at strategy and long-term foreign policy. If that is the case, the Russian strategic partnership with India may become a victim of this’. He has also advised Russian leadership ‘to produce a long-term strategy towards India and the region of South Asia, and to stop thinking about India and Pakistan tactically and separately’ (Topychkanov 2016). Russia rubbing shoulders with Taliban and arming Pakistan is the most obvious expression of tactical thinking taking precedence over the strategic long-term planning. Officially, Russia continues to maintain the position of denial of any hobnobbing with the Taliban. Whenever the top USA and NATO military commanders have accused Moscow of providing both overt and covert support to Taliban insurgents, Russia has responded by terming these allegations as the West-sponsored propaganda.

President Ghani, during his trip to the Paktia province in late October 2017, leveled allegations about Moscow’s support to the Taliban. Russia’s foreign ministry immediately termed the allegations as ungrounded and urged ‘the Afghan leaders not to pander to the anti-Russian hysteria’ (TASS 2017). In his address at the Vivekananda International Foundation in New Delhi in December 2017, Russia’s foreign minister, Sergey Lavrov, repeated Russia’s stand vis-à-vis Taliban. Replying to a question regarding Russia’s ‘softness’ toward the Taliban, Lavrov said that there was no proof whatsoever that Russia has armed the Taliban. While conceding to have opened the channels of communication with Taliban for saving the citizens of Russia and other friendly countries and to convince the Taliban to negotiate with Kabul, he said that Russia has always insisted that the Taliban ‘must join the negotiations provided they respect the criteria established by the Security Council: renounce terrorism’ and also ‘severe any links to terrorist organisations and respect the Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan’ (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation 2017a). How to interpret Russia’s official statements pertaining to communication between Moscow and Taliban? The first way is to interpret it through the context of tensions between Washington and Moscow. If the relations between Russia and the USA show signs of improvement, Moscow may keep the channel of communication with Taliban open, but it will try to underplay their common interests regarding the ISIS at the same time. But if the US–Russian relations deteriorate further, Moscow will not leave any opportunity to engage in a bitter contest with the US policy toward Afghanistan. The second interpretation centers around Moscow’s signal to the Taliban to demonstrate positive attitude toward Russian concerns in the fields of terrorism and narcotics. But if the Taliban does not show long-term commitment in controlling its involvement in jihadist terror and drug trafficking, Moscow will maintain negligible contact (Topychkanov 2017).

According to Brahma Chellaney, by coming closer to Taliban, Moscow may like to ‘ensure that America needs its help to extricate itself from the war there. This strategy aligns seamlessly with Putin’s approach in Syria, where Russia has already made itself a vital partner in any effort to root out the Islamic State’ (Chellaney 2017a). Chellaney further writes that ‘Russia’s new coziness with the Taliban, of course, does not mean that the enemy of its enemy is necessarily a permanent friend. Putin is opportunistically seeking to use the Taliban as a tool to weigh down the US military in Afghanistan’ (Chellaney 2017b). This is correct to a certain extent. But despite occasional statements asking for American withdrawal from Afghanistan, there is broader consensus in Moscow that the US presence is not without its advantages to Russia. It keeps the USA occupied and the Taliban weak besides helping to keep the conflict broadly confined to Afghanistan. There are genuine concerns in Russia that full American withdrawal could lead to escalation in conflict, which would ultimately spillover to Russia’s immediate neighborhood (Oliker 2017). C. Raja Mohan also believes that while Russia takes great pleasure ‘in tweaking America’s nose, a permanent fight with the US and Europe is not Putin’s end-goal’ as he is only trying to manage an ‘honourable accommodation with the West’ (Mohan 2018). But the US–Russia tensions are serving as a strategic boon for Taliban as they spoil regional security.

Implications for India

Moscow’s rapprochement with Islamabad has emerged as their relations with the USA are deteriorating. If the US policies in Afghanistan have created both opportunities and challenges for Russia, the growing animosity between America and Pakistan has presented a new area for cautious exploration. Pakistan’s relations with Russia have moved past the Cold War rivalry and the chill in US–Pakistan ties. Islamabad has been further pushed toward Moscow after US President Donald Trump warned Pakistan for providing safe havens to terrorists. Pakistan has reason to fear that its main military partner is becoming not only unreliable but also hostile.

While Russia seems eager to sell some weapons to Pakistan, it also sees a golden opportunity to make inroads with a traditional US ally in South Asia. A closer Moscow–Islamabad relationship lines up perfectly with Beijing’s ‘Iron-clad’ friendship with Islamabad. Although Moscow and Beijing are far short of alignment on all important issues, the two are increasingly cooperating wherever possible. If Moscow succeeds in improving its ties further with Islamabad, there will be an even broader area of congruence between Russia and China.

When it comes to Afghanistan, Moscow, and Islamabad may have their own long-term priorities, but the closer ties have provided opportunities to coordinate for some short-term policies that they might have in common. How far and serious this newfound bonhomie can develop depends significantly on how far the falling-out between Islamabad and Washington goes. Although India has unwillingly and anxiously tolerated a relatively limited nature of improvement in Russia’s ties with Pakistan, considerable advancement is likely to throw a spanner in India’s willingness to maintain a ‘special relationship’ with Russia.

Unless Moscow fine-tunes its diplomatic strategy in Asia, Russia, and India are likely to continue to drift in different directions. However, the positive aspect of Russia’s foreign policy balancing is that Moscow’s diplomatic efforts convinced Beijing to include Pakistan-based terrorist groups in the recent BRICS declaration at Xiamen in China (Parashar 2017). So there is a room for hope that the quality of Russian policymaking in South Asia can be raised significantly from the Indian perspective. But India should remain nuanced in its immediate hope that Moscow will come to New Delhi’s help in convincing Beijing to give up its opposition to the ban on Maulana Masood Azhar.

Conclusion

The Pakistan–China nexus has been in existence for more than five decades. Beginning in 1963, the contours of the nexus have undergone tremendous transformation with the launch of the CPEC. China’s brazen support to Pakistan in its anti-India activities is something that Indian policymakers seem to have become accustomed to. What India needs to be particularly mindful of is the gradual shift in Russia’s strategic behavior in South Asia. Moscow’s ‘mission Islamabad’ marks a significant shift in Russia’s South Asia policy, as it is likely to create an opportunity for Pakistan to exercise greater influence in the region’s geopolitical context. The real impact of Russia’s growing convergence with Pakistan and China would be on the New Delhi–Moscow strategic partnership which may lose its traditional foundation. Russia’s recent military exercise with Pakistan and its sale of helicopters to Pakistan have not gone down well with policymakers in New Delhi.

As explained, Russia’s primary objective with regard to Afghanistan is to ensure security and stability in its periphery. Given the unexpected emergence of ISIS, Moscow is particularly concerned about the possibility of a further deterioration in Afghanistan’s internal situation triggered by increase in terrorism and drug trafficking. It has consequently been taking various measures to strengthen the security of its Central Asian neighbors through a variety of means, including through a diplomatic outreach to Taliban.

While Russia and India both see themselves as victims of jihadist terrorism, their perception of threats differ vastly. New Delhi is actively engaged in strengthening the hands of the regime in Kabul, viewing Taliban as the major threat to regional peace. On the other hand, Moscow sees ISIS as a greater threat than Taliban. Moscow even entertains the notion of making Taliban a partner against ISIS. Here, Russian and Pakistani views converge as Taliban is viewed as part of the solution. Unmindful of the impact it will have on its long-standing ties with India, Russia’s accommodation of Pakistan and Taliban is a counterproductive move, as seen from the perspective of New Delhi’s security interests. It also brings Pakistan back to the center stage of the peace process in Afghanistan. But the irony is that Pakistan is more a part of the problem than the solution. At present, it is caught up in its own political, security, and economic problems. Pakistan’s geopolitical tensions with the USA continue to multiply as it has not shown any inclination to scale back its ambitions of expanding its influence in Afghanistan while countering Indian presence there. Pakistan’s civilian-led government has confronted growing tensions with the all-powerful military which has sharply constrained the effectiveness of an already enfeebled governing structure. Although the Pakistani military claims to concentrate on Islamic terrorists and guerillas instead of India as the primary security threat, continuing hostility with Afghanistan and India jeopardize the significance of this so-called shift.

India and Russia have completed 70 years of their bilateral ties. But as India has gravitated toward the West, Russia has found new partners in China and Pakistan to serve its strategic interests. Strong defense ties do not seem to provide sufficient ground to sustain the dynamism in the bilateral relationship between India and Russia. At a moment of massive turbulence in great power relations, it is high time that differences in the understanding between India and Russia on Pakistan and Taliban are soon sorted out. India needs to focus on reconstituting the partnership with a country that will remain a dominant power in Eurasia.

References

ANI. 2017. ‘Joint Indo-Russia Tri-Services Exercise Indra-2017 Successfully Conducted’, November 1. Available at https://www.aninews.in/news/world/asia/joint-indo-russia-tri-services-exercise-indra-2017-successfully-conducted201711012012410003/ (accessed on December 17, 2017).

Bagchi, I.

2016a. ‘Will Russia–Pakistan Joint Drill Alter Moscow–Delhi Ties?’ Times of India, September 25. Available at https://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/india/Will-Russia-Pakistan-joint-drill-alter-Moscow-Delhi-ties/articleshow/54503220.cms (accessed on February 27, 2018).

Bagchi, I.

2016b. ‘Russia, China and Pakistan for Flexible Ties with Taliban, India Ignored’, Times of India, December 29. Available at https://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/world/rest-of-world/russia-china-and-pakistan-for-flexible-ties-with-taliban-india-ignored/articleshow/56228907.cms (accessed on February 27, 2018).

Bagchi, I.

2017. ‘Want to See End of Terror Sanctuaries in Pak that Target Afghanistan, Says Abdullah’, Times of India, September 29. Available at https://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/india/want-to-see-end-of-terror-sanctirues-in-pak-that-target-afghanistan-says-abdullah/articleshow/60884308.cms

Bezhan, F.

2014. ‘The Pashtunistan Issue and Politics in Afghanistan, 1947–1952’, The Middle East Journal, vol. 68, no. 2, pp. 197–209.

Bhatti, B.A.

2017. ‘The Army Chief’s Significant Visit to Russia’, The Daily Times, October 7. Available at https://dailytimes.com.pk/113622/the-army-chiefs-significant-visit-to-russia/

Chaudhury, N.R.

2016. ‘Terrorism, Connectivity Focus of “Heart of Asia”’, Russia Beyond, December 5. Available at https://www.rbth.com/world/2016/12/05/terrorism-connectivity-focus-of-heart-of-asia_653547 (accessed on October 10, 2017).

Chellaney, B.

2017a. ‘Putin’s Dance with the Taliban’, The Japan Times, March 8. Available at https://www.japantimes.co.jp/opinion/2017/03/08/commentary/world-commentary/putins-dance-taliban/ (accessed on February 26, 2018).

Chellaney, B.

2017b. ‘Revitalising India–Russia Ties a Challenge for Modi’, The Hindustan Times, June 1. Available at https://www.hindustantimes.com/analysis/revitalising-india-russia-ties-a-challenge-for-modi/story-N7MoezZkITwF9u4thIrxgL.html (accessed on February 26, 2018).

10.

Dawn . 2011. ‘Russia Endorses Full SCO Membership for Pakistan’, November 7. Available at https://www.dawn.com/news/671932 (accessed on February 26, 2018).

11.

Dawn . 2014. ‘Milestone’ Military Cooperation Pact Signed with Russia’, November 20. Available at https://www.dawn.com/news/1145786 (accessed on February 26, 2018).

12.

Dawn . 2016. ‘Joint Exercise with Russia Progressing Well: ISPR’, September 28. Available at https://www.dawn.com/news/1286616 (accessed on February 26, 2018).

13.

Deutsche Welle. 2017. ‘US Skips Out on Afghanistan–Taliban Conference in Moscow’, April 14. Available at http://www.dw.com/en/us-skips-out-on-afghanistan-taliban-conference-in-moscow/a-38426486 (accessed on December 11, 2017).

14.

Dominguez, G.

2017. ‘Russia Delivers Four Mi-35M Helos to Pakistan’, Janes, August 30. Available at http://www.janes.com/article/73439/russia-delivers-four-mi-35m-helos-to-pakistan-says-report (accessed on October 9, 2017).

15.

Economic Times . 2016. ‘India Hopeful of UN Designating Masood Azhar a Global Terrorist’, December 17. Available at https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/defence/india-hopeful-of-un-designating-azhar-a-global-terrorist/articleshow/56006306.cms (accessed on February 28, 2018).

16.

Economic Times . 2017. ‘Russia Will Not Cause Any Injury to Bilateral Ties with India: MJ Akbar’, January 5. Available at https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/politics-and-nation/russia-will-not-cause-any-injury-to-bilateral-ties-with-india-mj-akbar/articleshow/56347352.cms (accessed on February 28, 2018).

17.

Express Tribune . 2017. ‘Russia Warns Trump Against Piling Up Pressure on Pakistan’, August 24. Available at https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/politics-and-nation/russia-will-not-cause-any-injury-to-bilateral-ties-with-india-mj-akbar/articleshow/56347352.cms (accessed on February 28, 2018).

18.

Hindustan Times . 2017. ‘Pakistani, Russian Armies Begin Second Joint Exercise’, September 25. Available at https://www.hindustantimes.com/world-news/pakistani-russian-armies-begin-second-joint-exercise/story-voynrHcKFkpiBvedBNC9bM.html

19.

IANS. 2016. ‘Russia–Pakistan Joint Military Drill Not Held in Problematic Areas, Says Moscow’, Business Standard, September 23. Available at http://www.business-standard.com/article/news-ians/russia-pakistan-joint-military-drill-not-held-in-problematic-areas-says-moscow-116092301174_1.html (accessed on December 28, 2016).

20.

Indian Express . 2016. ‘Russia’s Stand on Combating Terrorism Mirrors Our Own, Says PM Modi on Sidelines of BRICS Meet’, October 15. Available at http://indianexpress.com/article/india/india-news-india/brics-russia-india-meeting-narendra-modi-putin-3084406/ (accessed on February 27, 2018).

21.

Kaura, V.

2017. The Durand Line: A British Legacy Plaguing Afghan–Pakistani Relations. Middle East Institute, June 27. Available at http://www.mei.edu/content/article/durand-line-british-legacy-plaguing-afghan-pakistani-relations (accessed on February 27, 2018).

22.

Khan, T.

2016. ‘Afghan Taliban Upbeat at Trilateral Talks’, Express Tribune, December 29. Available at https://tribune.com.pk/story/1278733/afghan-taliban-upbeat-trilateral-talks/ (accessed on February 27, 2018).

23.

Kumaraswami, S.

2016. ‘Pak Mother-Ship of Terror: PM Modi’, Asian Age, October 17. Available at http://www.asianage.com/india/pak-mother-ship-terror-pm-modi-925 (accessed on February 28, 2018).

24.

Laskar, R.H.

2016. ‘Afghanistan Rejects Move by Russia, China and Pak to Rope in Taliban for Talks’, Hindustan Times, December 29. Available at https://www.hindustantimes.com/world-news/afghanistan-rejects-move-by-russia-china-and-pak-to-rope-in-taliban-for-talks/story-7M5XbI8RLaOex5EeXC48LP.html (accessed on February 28, 2018).

25.

Mankoff, J.

2009. Russian Foreign Policy the Return of Great Power Politics. New York, NY: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc.

26.

Mason, S.

2016. Military Budgets in India and Pakistan: Trajectories, Priorities, and Risks. Washington, DC: Stimson Center.

27.

Mihalka, M.

2008. ‘Pashtunistan, NATO and the Global War on Terror: “If You Don’t Fight, You Cannot Have Peace in Afghanistan”’, China & Eurasia Forum Quarterly, vol. 6, no.1, pp. 51–78.

28.

Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation. 2017a. ‘Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov’s Remarks at the Vivekananda International Foundation New Delhi’, December 11. Available at http://www.mid.ru/en/web/guest/meropriyatiya_s_uchastiem_ministra/-/asset_publisher/xK1BhB2bUjd3/content/id/2984577 (accessed on February 27, 2018).

29.

Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation. 2017b. ‘Briefing by Foreign Ministry Spokesperson Maria Zakharova, Moscow’, December 28. Available at http://www.mid.ru/en/web/guest/foreign_policy/news/-/asset_publisher/cKNonkJE02Bw/content/id/3012378 (accessed on February 27, 2018).

30.

Mohan, C.R.

2016. ‘Get Real on Russia’, Indian Express, September 27, p. 15.

31.

Mohan, C.R.

2018. ‘Unsentimental Ties’, Indian Express, January 6, p. 15.

32.

Oliker, O.

2017 ‘Be Careful What You Wish for: Legacies, Realignments, and Russia’s Evolving Role in South Asia’, War on the Rocks, December 27. Available at https://warontherocks.com/2017/12/careful-wish-legacies-realignments-russias-evolving-role-south-asia/ (accessed on February 27, 2018).

33.

Osman, A.

2015. ‘Pakistan’s Tool of War: Why the Mi-35 Hind-E Is an Excellent Choice’, Dawn, September 29. Available at https://www.dawn.com/news/1209539 (accessed on February 27, 2018).

34.

Pant, H.

2016. ‘Troubled Partnership’, The Telegraph, October 29, p. 12.

35.

Parashar, S.

2017. ‘Brics Declaration to Lead to More Action Against Pak-based Terror Groups: Russia’, Times of India, September 12. Available at https://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/india/brics-declaration-to-lead-to-more-action-against-pak-based-terror-groups-russia/articleshow/60471111.cms

36.

PTI. 2015. ‘Pakistan, Russia Sign 1,100-km Gas Pipeline Agreement’, The Hindu, October 16. Available at http://www.thehindu.com/news/international/pakistan-russia-sign-1100km-gas-pipeline-agreement/article7770269.ece (accessed on February 28, 2018).

37.

PTI. 2016a. ‘Ashraf Ghani Slams Pakistan on Terror, Tells It to End “Undeclared War”’, The Indian Express, December 4. Available at http://indianexpress.com/article/india/ashraf-ghani-slams-pakistan-on-terror-tells-it-to-end-undeclared-war-4409979/ (accessed on February 28, 2018).

38.

PTI. 2016b. ‘India Conveys to Moscow Its Opposition to Russia–Pakistan Military Exercise’, Indian Express, October 11. Available at http://indianexpress.com/article/india/india-news-india/india-conveys-to-moscow-its-opposition-to-russia-pakistan-military-exercise-3077204/ (accessed on February 27, 2018).

39.

PTI. 2017a. ‘Indo-Russia Ties Can’t Be Diluted, No “Tight” Military Relations with Pak: Putin’, Hindustan Times, June 2. Available at https://www.hindustantimes.com/india-news/putin-says-russia-s-ties-with-india-will-not-be-diluted-no-tight-military-relation-with-pakistan/story-tY4YWkLFHyKCv8i1WWnN7J.html (accessed on February 27, 2018).

40.

PTI. 2017b. ‘Open to Look at Any Suggestion on OBOR If Sensitivities Taken into Account: India’, The Economic Times, December 14. Available at https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/politics-and-nation/open-to-look-at-any-suggestion-on-obor-if-sensitivities-taken-into-account-india/articleshow/62074480.cms (accessed on February 27, 2018).

41.

Radyuhin, V.

2007. ‘Fradkov Visiting Pakistan’, The Hindu, April 12. Available at http://www.thehindu.com/todays-paper/tp-international/Fradkov-visiting-Pakistan/article14748193.ece (accessed on February 27, 2018).

42.

Radyuhin, V.

2010. ‘Changing Face of Russia–Pakistan Ties’, The Hindu, September 9. Available at http://www.thehindu.com/opinion/lead/Changing-face-of-Russia-Pakistan-ties/article15907578.ece (accessed on February 28, 2018).

43.

Rasmussen, S.E.

2017. ‘Russia Accused of Supplying Taliban as Power Shifts Create Strange Bedfellows’, The Guardian, October 22. Available at https://www.theguardian.com/world/2017/oct/22/russia-supplying-taliban-afghanistan

44.

Reuters . 2017. ‘Russia Says Trump’s New Strategy for Afghanistan Is “Dead End”’, August 24. Available at https://in.reuters.com/article/usa-trump-afghanistan-russia/russia-says-trumps-new-strategy-for-afghanistan-is-dead-end-idINKCN1B41JS (accessed on February 27, 2018).

45.

Sanderson, T.M.

2018. From the Ferghana Valley to Syria and Beyond: A Brief History of Central Asian Foreign Fighters. Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies, January 5. Available at https://www.csis.org/analysis/ferghana-valley-syria-and-beyond-brief-history-central-asian-foreign-fighters (accessed on February 27, 2018).

46.

Schetter, C.

2013. ‘The Durand Line: The Afghan–Pakistani Border Region between Pashtunistan, Tribalistan and Talibanistan’, Internationales Asien Forum, vol. 44, no. 1/2, pp. 47–70.

47.

Sengupta, K.

2016. ‘World Powers Seek Unlikely Alliance with Taliban as “Interests Coincide” in Battle Against Shared Enemy ISIS’, The Independent, January 8. Available at http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/asia/world-powers-seek-unlikely-alliance-with-taliban-as-interests-coincide-in-battle-against-common-a6801516.html (accessed on February 28, 2018).

48.

Shalizi, H. and

Smith . 2016. ‘Ties Between Russia and the Taliban Worry Afghan, U.S. Officials’, Reuters, December 8. Available at http://in.reuters.com/article/afghanistan-russia-idINKBN13W2XX (accessed on October 7, 2017).

49.

Shams, S.

2016 ‘An Afghanistan Without Afghanistan’, DW, December 27. Available at http://www.dw.com/en/an-afghanistan-conference-without-afghanistan/a-36922029 (accessed on October 4, 2017).

50.

Sputniknews. 2017. ‘Moscow Ready to Provide Platform for Talks Between Afghanistan, Taliban’, April 26. Available at https://sputniknews.com/world/201704261053031273-russia-afghanistan-taliban-talks/ (accessed on December 21, 2017).

51.

Tanzeem, A.

2015. ‘Pakistan Army Chief Visits Russia to Forge New Ties’, Voice of America. June 17. Available at https://www.voanews.com/a/pakistan-army-chief-visits-russia-to-forge-new-ties/2825903.html (accessed on October 10, 2017).

52.

TASS. 2017. ‘Moscow Calls Afghan President’s Allegations About Russia’s Support to Taliban Unacceptable’, October 23. Available at http://tass.com/politics/972153 (accessed on December 28, 2017).

53.

Todd, B. and

Almasy . 2015. ‘Russia, Taliban Share Intelligence in Fight Against ISIS’, CNN, December 24. Available at http://edition.cnn.com/2015/12/24/europe/putin-taliban-isis/index.html (accessed on October 4, 2017).

54.

Topychkanov, P.

2016. ‘What Is Russia’s Plan with India?’ Newsweek, October 22. Available at http://www.newsweek.com/india-russia-vladimir-putin-pranab-mukherjee-global-politics-goa-summit-brics-511339 (accessed on February 26, 2018).

55.

Topychkanov, P.

2017. ‘Trilateral Initiatives Focusing on Afghanistan: US–China–Pakistan and Russia–China–Pakistan’, Triangular Formations in Asia: Genesis, Strategies, Value Added and Limitations, 11th Berlin Conference on Asian Security (BCAS), Berlin, September 7–8. Available at https://www.swp-berlin.org/fileadmin/contents/products/arbeitspapiere/BCAS2017_Paper_Petr_Topychkanov.pdf (accessed on December 17, 2017).

56.

Trenin, D. and

Malashenko . 2010. Afghanistan: A View from Moscow. Washington, DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.

57.

Zubacheva, K.

2016. ‘No Need to Worry About Russia–India Relations’, Russia Direct, October 21. Available at http://www.russia-direct.org/qa/no-need-worry-about-russia-india-relations (accessed on October 3, 2017).