Regional Processes and Geopolitics of India,Afghanistan,Tajikistan,and Uzbekistan (IATU)

Abstract

The article attempts to examine the nature of interaction that exists among India, Afghanistan, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan (IATU) and the need to give an institutional basis to such a relationship spanning across Central and South Asia. Using some of the existing theoretical frameworks of regional cooperation, the study argues that even though such an institutional relationship looks futuristic, it has much relevance in the present context due to its functional necessity. Some of the factors such as a ‘common geo-culture’, ‘geo-strategic compulsions’, and ‘economic necessities’ are providing the basis for the emergence of such kind of cooperation among these four states.

Keywords

Geo-culture geopolitics security community extended neighbors Mandala theory common economic zone

Introduction¹

Regional cooperation is the lynchpin of the global security order in the post-1991 phase. Some of the regional organizations that have come up in the recent years such as Brazil, Russia, India, China, South Africa (BRICS), Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC), and Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) are examples of this trend. Contemporary geopolitical dimensions of regional integration showcase an interesting aspect that in addition to the ‘structural processes’ (where physical proximity is the most important factor) the ‘functional’ processes of regionalization are also playing an equally important role (Godehart 2014: 12–13; Knight 1982: 518; Mittelman 1996; Passi 1986: 106–112; Thompson 1973).

India, Afghanistan, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan (IATU) can be argued to be such a futuristic proposition for the model of regional cooperation. The author argues that despite lack of geographical connectivity (with India only) and absence of any institutional multilateral forum, a certain degree of operationalization can give a new impetus to the process of regional cooperation among these states which would shape the broader geopolitical framework of South and Central Asia. India being an emerging global power has the responsibility to bring the other three states together to form a body which will counteract ‘proliferation of terrorism’, ‘ensure sustainable security’, ‘promote regional economic cooperation’, and ‘connect’ these landmasses (Kaushik 2010; MEA 2017). The edifice of the regional cooperation can also be based on ‘shared geo-cultural norms’² (Breslin and Higgott 2000; Johnston 1995; Lake and Morgan 1997: 10–12; Passi 1986; Rozov 2012: 17; Wallerstien 1991: 11). The present article will also analyze the viability of such a type of regional grouping as well its ramifications on the security situation of these states. Though such form of a regional cooperation looks quite unrealistic at present, a sense of optimism prevails upon evaluating similar organizations such as Economic Cooperation Organization (ECO), SCO, and Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO). These organizations are currently under operation and are encompassing some of these countries (Laruelle and Peyrouse 2012). A study of these organizations can anchor the argument that IATU can be a viable forum for interaction and integration in the longer run.

Theoretical Postulates

Recent experiences demonstrate that regional groupings, even though are not sharing a common border, could be quite successful in managing their problems and generating a shared ‘strategic culture’ (Breslin and Higgott 2000; Godehart 2014: 12–13; Lake and Morgan 1997: 10–12; Rozov 2012: 17; Wallerstein 1991: 11). Similarly, growing interactions among states over a period of time contributes to the evolvement of a sense of common belongingness based on ‘shared norms’. Apart from this, individual states in their interface with other states generate certain ‘norms’ which play an important role in shaping the feeling of a community among them (Barkin and Cronin 1994: 107–130). In this regard, it is worth to make a reference to Karl Deutsch’s concept of ‘Security Community’. Deutsch’s approach provides a theoretical framework for analyzing regional and subregional cooperation based on ‘cultural commonality’. In outlining his notion of ‘Security Community’, Deutsch emphasizes on ‘compatibility of major values’, ‘mutual responsiveness’, etc. (Deutsch 1957: 123–129). He further argues that ‘Security Community’ encompasses:

a matter of mutual sympathy and loyalties; of ‘we-feeling’, trust, and consideration; of at least partial identification in terms of self-images and interests; of ability to predict each other’s behaviour and ability to act in accordance with that prediction. In short, it was a matter of perpetual attention, communication, perception of needs, and responsiveness. (Ibid.: 6–7, 118–119)

Along with defining ‘Security Community’ from a cognitive as well as constructive perspective, Deutsch goes on to identify two forms of Security Communities—‘amalgamated Security Community’ and ‘pluralistic Security Community’. An ‘amalgamated Security Community’ talks about the ‘creation of a confederation where members shed their sovereignty and create a government’. On the other hand, a ‘pluralistic security community’ underlines that ‘nation states interact and integrate without shedding their sovereignty’ (Ibid.: 6–7, 118–119). The facilitating factors of a ‘pluralistic security community’ are that the multiple units ‘trust each other’ as well as there is a ‘communication process’ between the states who also ‘share core values’ (Ibid.: 6–7, 118–119). Development of such a ‘community’ helps in the flourishing of ‘communication’ among different ‘units’ within a region or subregion (Ibid.: 6–7, 118–119). In the longer run, this form of ‘interaction’ contributes to the formation of ‘security community structure’, as has been envisaged by Deutsch.

Besides Deutsch’s ‘Security Community’ approach, the other important perspective on regionalism which is assuming significance in recent years is French Philosopher and sociologist Pierre Bourdieu’s idea of ‘common habitués’. Bourdieu uses the structuralist as well as the constructivist approach in defining the notion of ‘habitués’. He further emphasizes that ‘perception’, ‘thought’, and ‘action’ are the three common factors that constitute a ‘symbolic system’ based on ‘language’ and ‘myth’ (Bourdieu 1989: 14–25). Bourdieu highlights that norms are the ‘product of the strength of the historical trajectories of an imminent set of actions incorporated into an ethos and a habitus’³ (Bigo 2011: 228).

The arguments forwarded by Karl Deutsch and Pierre Bourdieu help to a great extent in constructing a new ‘geopolitical space’⁴ among these four states. Studies by these two scholars give a normative perspective to the formation of regional integration processes where the focus is more on ‘symbols’, ‘identities’, ‘values’, ‘flow of pattern of interaction and communication’, and ‘norms’ among different sovereign units of social structure in a common ‘geo-cultural’ region. The same phenomenon was also aptly captured by William Thompson (1973: 93) where he highlights that one of the essential attributes of a regional system is ‘some degree of a shared ethnic, linguistic, cultural, social and historical bond which paves the way for construction of a subregional identity and facilitates greater integration’ (Ibid.: 93).

In addition to some of these Western theoretical frameworks, the traditional Indian approach of Mandala theory, as articulated by Kautilya, has also highlighted in contextualizing foreign policy in a regional milieu. This theory also emphasizes the policy of ‘encirclement’. Kautilya (1992), in his book Arthashastra, eloquently explains the nature of ‘alliance formation’ and the doctrine of ‘spheres of influence’. The ‘spheres of influence’ also known as ‘Mandala’ will help the king in maintaining ‘balance of power’ and ensuring ‘equilibrium’ in the state’s external relations (Sarkar 1919: 402).

He further outlines that ‘Every neighbouring state is an enemy and the enemy’s enemy is a friend’ (Kautilya 1992: VIII). Keeping this theoretical proposition in mind Kautilya further emphasizes the theory of circles or Mandala. To quote him further:

The conqueror shall think of the circle of states as a wheel—himself at the hub and his allies, drawn to him by the spokes though separated by intervening territory, as its rim. The enemy, however strong he may be, becomes vulnerable to harassment and destruction, when he is squeezed between the conqueror and his allies. In order to further his own interests, the conqueror shall establish, both in the front and in the rear, a circle of kings made up of excellent allies. (Ibid.: 541)

The basic conjecture that one can draw from Kautilya’s writings is that ‘encirclement’ is the best way of taming the enemy states while boosting one’s own prowess in a regional security structure at the same time. It may be recalled here that the concepts of ‘Balance of Power’ and ‘encirclement’, which gained immense popularity during the Cold War and post-Cold War period, drew its inspirations from this ancient Indian philosophy of Arthashastra (Boesche 2002: 17–18). Mandala theory is quite relevant in addressing the complex geopolitical problems associated with South and Central Asian region. By employing Mandala theory in the foreign policy plank, a state will be able to address ‘unholy alliances’ employed by an enemy state, referred by Kautilya as an ‘Ari’ (Kautilya 1992: 551–552).

The significance of Mandala theory in India’s foreign policy can be understood from the fact that two major books on Indian foreign policy published recently focuses on these two aspects. For instance, Shyam Saran highlights the merit of Mandala theory in strategizing India’s foreign policy. Saran throws light back on the Indian historical traditions rooted in an ancient culture which played a key role in shaping India’s global engagement. As Saran says, ‘Arthashastra has much to teach us’, in the context of foreign policy (Saran 2017: 14). Similarly, Aparna Pande brought out the discourses revolving around the relevance of Mandala theory in the context of foreign policymaking of India (Pande 2017: 1–8).

In the economic realm, the nature of economic interaction among these four states can also be the premised on the hegemonic stability theory as outlined by Charles Kindleberger. As Kindleberger advocates, the dominant actor has a role to play in economic integration and its responsibility will be of ‘stabilization’. To quote him: ‘stabilizing state has symbolic, economic, and military capabilities that can be used to entice or compel others to accept an open trading structure’ (Kindleberger 1981; Webb and Krasner 1989: 184). The logic given by Charles Kindleberger can be applicable while strategizing New Delhi’s relations with Kabul, Dushanbe, and Tashkent in the economic domain, although one may not agree with Kindleberger’s view of ‘enticing’ or ‘compelling’ the other states in bringing out a regional economic cooperation. In the case of these four states, it would rather be voluntary cooperation based on ‘mutual economic compulsions’⁵ (Baldwin 2006).

Some of these inferences as discussed earlier can be applicable if such type of regional cooperation is formed among these four states. To understand the feasibility of such a form of regional cooperation (IATU) in a theoretical context, one has to look at three geopolitical strands, namely historical basis, which generates ‘strategic norms’, the geopolitical development that contributes to the ‘strategic stability’ and the economic dimension which fosters the evolvement of an ‘interdependent character of regional economy’ (Baldwin 2006; Thompson 1973).

Historical and Normative Basis of IATU

Since ancient times, IATU constitute a common ‘geo-cultural milieu’. There used to be a lot of intermingling of people, cultures, food habits, and a common belief system which united all the four states together (Bagchi 1955; Gafurov 2005). In this regard, it is worth to quote Bal Gangadhar Tilak who dwelled at length in highlighting India’s relations with Tajikistan and Uzbekistan. Tilak argues that: ‘It was on these plains … that our oldest ancestors gazed upon the wonders of dawn or the rising sun with awe and astonishment, or reverentially watched the storm-clouds’ (Tilak 1903: 3, 400). The description given by Tilak demonstrates that there is a common ‘geo-cultural zone’ that existed in the Eurasian space often known as Aryavrata as well as Aryanama in the ancient Iranian text (Gafurov 2005: 43). Even few Central Asian nomads who strayed into India have aptly been captured by Indian religious texts and scholars. Atharvaveda for instance mentions about the country of Gandhari as ‘Artha takman and Bahlikas’. Kalidas in his work Raghuvasa mentions ‘Hunas settled on the bank of Amu River’ (Levin 1971: 218). Later on, they migrated to Badakshan and Bamiyan regions presently located in Tajikistan and Afghanistan. From there, they migrated to India and established a ‘Huna kingdom in Punjab’ (Bagchi 1955: 116–136). Indian mythology mentions about four holy rivers, namely, ‘Ganga, Sindhu, Vaksu (Amu river) and Sita (Yarkand river flowing in Xinjiang) originating from the same sources, i.e., Anavatata lake and called as Ganga’ (Ibid.: 122). Ancient Indian religious texts also draw attention to some of the Central Asian communities like the ‘Tusaras of Tokharistan, the Carmakhandikad population of Samarkand, Sulikas who were known as Sogdians and, Vokkana identified as a community located in Wakhan’ (Ibid.: 119). Incidentally, most of these places are located in Afghanistan, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan. The first thing a person will hear from the locals when one visits Bukhara (The city consisting mainly of Uzbek and Tajik population) is that the name is derived from Vihar (Buddhist monastery) closely synonymous with the Indian culture.⁶

Perhaps, the greatest bond between India and these three states was provided by Buddhism. This can be testified by some of the archeological excavations being carried out in different parts of this region such as Bactria, Sogd, and Khorezm. The relationship between these geo-cultural spaces attained pinnacle in terms of their unification during the Kushan period (Kaushik 1998: 231). It was the Kushans’ who gave a unifying administrative system to this vast stretch of landmass starting from the ‘Caspian Sea, Amu Darya to the Ganges’. Some of the regions which were under the Empire include ‘Bactria, Arachosia, Kaofu, Gandhara and the Northern part of India’. The most promising contribution of the Kushan period was the flourishing development of the Gandhara School of art (Kaushik 1997: 63; Kumar 1973: 79; Ibid.). The best exposition to IATU relations was given by Soviet archeologist and Historian B.A. Litvinsky. Litvinsky in his book Outline History of Buddhism in Central Asia argues that both: ‘science and culture were spreading along with Buddhism’ in this geo-cultural zone (Levin 1971: 205, 208). Some of the ancient Indian cities like Taxila and Purushapur emerged as the springboard for spreading cultural influences in the Central Asian region. In terms of linguistic and cultural developments, ‘Sanskrit, Gandhara, Prakrat, Kharosti and Bramhi scripts’ played an important role in giving a new identity to the ‘ethno-linguistic developments of this region’ (Kaushik 1997: 63–64, 1998: 231; Marshall 1972: 5, 33–36). The Kharoshti script used to act as a common lingua franca from India to Afghanistan. During the Kushan period, it used to be the court language as well (Hartmann 2004: 37; Kaushik 1997: 63–64). The strong cultural affinity between India and Afghanistan can be inferred from the fact that the name of the city Herat is derived from the Indian name Hari Rud which resonates with the Indian god Vishnu (Baily 1988: 154).

Even during the medieval period, one can witness the flourishing of such kinds of cooperation. The Mughal Empire in India hosted a number of scholars from the Central Asian origin in their court, notable among them were ‘Alisher Navoi, Abdurakhman Jami, and Gadoi, Durbek’ (Kaushik 1997: 65, 1998: 232; Khodjaeva 1998: 50–51).

The robust cultural ties in this common geo-cultural space of IATU came to an end when both the regions were under the influence of colonial powers. Both Tajikistan and Uzbekistan were under Russian occupation, and India remained under British Empire. Afghanistan became a buffer between both the imperial powers. Though the British Empire tried to control Afghanistan and for sometime influenced its external policy, it could not gain a decisive control or command over this landmass (Morrison 2006: 703–705). On the other hand, the Tsarist rulers pursued a cautious policy toward Afghanistan because of the suggestions given by Russian geostrategist Admiral Gorchakev. He warned that: ‘acquisition of new territories will have an impact on Russia’s penetration into colonial regions’ (Baker 1917: 92–93; Wyatt 2011: 6).

It may be mentioned here that India’s relations with Central Asia and Afghanistan during the colonial period did not remain hostage only to colonial confrontation. The Indian diaspora settled in Bukhara, Samarkand, and Kabul provided necessary thrust to the strategic relationship among IATU (Burnes 1854; Dale 2002: 1–18; Kaushik 1997; Moorcroft 1831; Stein 1918: 172–175; Vambery 1864). Hungarian traveler Arminius Vambery, in his book Travels in Central Asia, mentions that during his visit to Bukhara he found that ‘500 Hindoos (Indians) used to reside there and worship Vishnoo’ (Kaushik 1997: 66; Vambery 1864: 372). Similar mentions about Indian merchants can be found from the works of Alexander Burnes in his travel account titled Travels into Bokhara, where the British military agent tried to shed light on India’s relations with these three states (Burnes 1854). It has been estimated that in the seventeenth century, the bulk of cloth was exported to Turkestan. Merchants, mostly from Bengal and Northern part of India, used to have trade linkages with this region (Alam 1994: 205–206). Indians taking advantage of the country’s geo-strategic location used multiple routes to reach Bukhara, Samarkand, and other Central Asian cities. For instance, it opened a trade route across the Indian territory of Ladakh to reach out to these states by using Xinjiang as an ‘entry point’. Traders also used to pass through the Karakorum Mountains and the Chen Chenmao routes. William Moorcraft, the famous British travelogue, as well as Aurel Stein gave some interesting anecdotes about trade routes that used to connect Turkestan (Tajikistan and Uzbekistan) and Ladakh (Kaushik 1998; Moorcroft 1831; Rawlinson 1868–1869: 12–13; Stein 1918: 172–175; Wessels 1992).

India’s independence from British colonial empire in 1947 and the subsequent partition has had a deeper impact on the strategic environment not only of South Asia but also for the adjacent regions. The partition contributed to a strategic impasse which prevented active collaboration between India and Afghanistan as well as the two Soviet republics—Tajikistan and Uzbekistan (Kaushik 1998). It may be highlighted here that when the question of the creation of Pakistan came up it was Afghanistan which opposed first. In the post-1947 phase, India tried to maintain contacts with this part of the world through the then Soviet Union. Similarly, India was the only South Asian state to extend its cooperation to the Soviet-backed Najjibulah Government (Crossette 1989; Gartenstein-Ross and Vassefi 2012). Even after losing the geographical connectivity with this space, India still maintained cordial relations with Afghanistan and the two Soviet republics through cultural and political connections after its independence (Ibid.). Partly due to its close interactions, India took a neutral position when the Soviet Union intervened in Afghanistan by stating that ‘the Government of India’s earnestly hopes that no country or external power would take the steps which might aggravate the situation’ (Horn 1983: 235).

The growing nexus among the two Soviet republics—Uzbekistan and Tajikistan—along with Afghanistan has increased substantially after the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan. It has also brought out the old historical linkages into the forefront as most of the Soviet soldiers were from these two republics. The ethno-religious fermentation in these two republics, as well as the growing radicalization in Afghanistan, has had an impact on the strategic space of Soviet, Central, and South Asia. Toward the end of the 1980s, the chaotic geopolitical developments as well as internal disturbances in the Soviet Union contributed to its demise (Gartenstein-Ross and Vassefi 2012; Wimbush and Alexiev 1981: 16–17). The fragmentation of the Soviet structure and the emergence of independent states of Uzbekistan and Tajikistan along with the subsequent dethroning of Soviet-backed Najibullah regime in Afghanistan created a new regional structure in this part of the world. India took a cautious approach in dealing with the newly emerging states of Tajikistan, Uzbekistan as well as Afghanistan. Despite strategic turbulences, following the collapse of the Soviet Union, what one can witness is the development of a sense of regional cohesion among all the three states (through Afghanistan drifted apart under the Taliban rule) along with India in the post-1991 phase in this ‘geopolitical space’ (Kaushik 1998).

Geopolitical Structure and IATU

The withdrawal of Soviet forces from Afghanistan and the subsequent dissolution of Soviet Union along with the emergence of independent states in the vicinity of India’s ‘extended neighborhood’ propelled India to recast its foreign policy (Moskalenko and Shaumian 1999: 229–239). The emergence of Taliban as an alternative power base in Afghanistan, with the explicit support of Pakistan, provided twin advantages to the Pakistani foreign policy establishment. First, the Pakistani foreign policymakers thought that by propping up Taliban, they will achieve ‘strategic depth’ in the Central Asian states, and second, they (Taliban and Pakistani establishment) could also vitiate the regional security environment in both South and Central Asia by aiding radicals. In the long run, this strategy would have given the Pakistani establishment an upper hand in its fight against India (Naqshabandi 2008; Weinbaum and Harder 2008). Thus, to achieve their twin objectives, Pakistan started sponsoring terrorism in India and Afghanistan. Islamabad has also provided sanctuary to militants from Central Asia which includes Tajikistan and Uzbekistan (Bedi 2001). In recent years, Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU) has also developed a deeper network in South Waziristan region bordering Afghanistan by getting enough local support (Gul 2014).

In addition to the radicals who are posing a challenge to the security structure of four states which can be termed as a subregion of its own, the external geopolitical structure including the changing strategic realignment is also posing a strong challenge to IATU. External powers such as the USA, China, Russia, and ‘medium powers’ like Iran along with Pakistan are also trying to shape the strategic discourses of this part of the world. China which was once an isolated entity in the Eurasian geopolitics is now trying to ‘flex its muscles’ in recent years. In fact, Beijing shares its border with three countries of IATU (barring Uzbekistan) (Kirişci and Le Corre 2018).

The increasing presence of China is a ‘game changer’ in this region as it is interested in promoting both the strategic and geo-economic interests in a hegemonic manner. As Beijing is facing its own ethnic problem in the restive province of Xinjiang, it is trying to create a rift between militants and Talibans in order to checkmate the growing proliferation of radicalism in its own territory (Huasheng 2012: 2–6; Zhou 2017: 2–6). It is in this context that China wanted to have an access in Afghanistan and engage the Taliban. In the post-2001 phase, Beijing hosted the then President of Afghanistan, Hamid Karzai twice and wanted to have a greater say in the affairs of Kabul keeping three goals in mind. The Chinese objectives range from checkmating greater Western penetration to getting an upper hand in the mineral resources of the country as well as containing the proliferation of radicalism (Huasheng 2012: 2–6; Lintao 2014). Despite being not so rich in oil and gas, Tajikistan has of late become a focal point of Chinese foreign policy due to its location. Beijing is trying to woo this small state as a strategic asset in penetrating further into Central and South Asia. Tajikistan is also becoming a strategic corridor for Chinese energy as the Turkmenistan and China pipeline is being expanded (Lintao 2014). Like Tajikistan, Uzbekistan is also coming under the sway of China through energy pipeline diplomacy. The relationship between these two states can be understood in the context of the signing of strategic partnership agreement signed in July 2012. This agreement was strongly reinforced by Chinese investment in this region which accounts for US$6.5 billion (Tolipov 2013). As reported during the visit to China Uzbek President Shavkat Mirziyoyev in May 2017, both the sides signed an agreement to the tune of US$23 billion with a major focus on energy. This move on part of the Chinese can be viewed in the perspective of long-term strategic interests that the Chinese have in this space through building the One Belt One Road (OBOR) project (EurasiaNet 2017a; Pantucci 2017). By bringing both Tajikistan and Uzbekistan under its ‘sway’, China thinks it can able to checkmate Russia in the Eurasian region (EurasiaNet 2017a; Kirişci and Le Corre 2018).

In addition to China, Russia which claims to have an ‘organic’ link with this region is trying to strengthen its security interaction with this part of the world. Russian presence in Tajikistan, Uzbekistan and Afghanistan can be understood in a historical context. Both Tajikistan and Uzbekistan used to be the part of Soviet Union till 1991. On the other hand, Afghanistan was under the de facto control of Moscow from 1979 to 1991. After the disintegration of the Soviet Union, Russia stationed its troops in Tajikistan, in the form of 201 motorized divisions (Cooley 2002: 160–165). Russia also renewed its presence in this part of the world when it extended 201st motorized division’s presence in Tajikistan till 2042 (Abdurasulov 2015). Its concern with regard to security and stability in Central Asia can be understood in the context of the reemergence of Taliban in Afghanistan and Moscow’s desire to fight against Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) militants, which is showing its presence felt in this part of the world. As stated by a high official of Russian Defense Administration, 25 out of 34 provinces in Afghanistan, radical ISIS is making its presence felt. Moscow has recently reoriented its foreign policy toward the Taliban by engaging them to checkmate ISIS terror groups as Moscow perceives that the ISIS will pose a grave threat to its regional spaces (Strokan and Mikheev 2015; Washington Post 2016). This Russian approach of rapprochement with the Taliban what can be termed as a shift which was evident when Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov during his visit to New Delhi in December 2017 stated: ‘We have contacted the Taliban … to sit down and to negotiate’ (Lavrov 2017). Thus, Russia which has a deeper strategic interest in this part of the world is pragmatic of not giving up its sphere of influence (Strokan and Mikheev 2015; Washington Post 2016). One may add here that Russia’s engagement with the Taliban will also provide an impetus to the dormant radical forces like IMU and Hizbut Tehrir al Islami (HTI). It may be underlined here that both the bordering states, Uzbekistan and Tajikistan, have a long history of radicalism. To keep a tab on radicals, the Tajik government has banned the Islamic Renaissance Party in 2015. If the Taliban is equipped with Chinese and Russian support, it can contribute to the strategic catastrophe for these four states alongside gaining an upper hand in Afghan politics (Rashid 2016; The Guardian 2015). The Taliban, through twin terrorist attacks carried out in the capital city of Kabul within a week, has demonstrated the fact that it is still trying to be a dominant force in Afghan politics (The New York Times 2018).

Though Russia is engaging itself diplomatically with the Taliban, to checkmate the growing proliferation of radical ISIS groups and to create fissures within them, it implicitly never gave up on the threat from these radical groups. To ward off threats from these groups, Russia and Tajikistan conducted military exercises in July 2017 where more than 3,000 troops of both the countries participated. Similarly with Uzbekistan, Russia has conducted joint military exercises in the first week of October 2017 near Tashkent after a gap of 12 years (Tass 2017a, 2017b). Russia’s growing strategic engagement with these two states is a reflection of the fact that despite both Chinese and American penetration in this part of the world, it is interested in preserving its so-called ‘sphere of influence’, at a strategic level and at the same time checkmating the growth of radical forces in the region (Ibid.; Skalamera 2017).

The third external power which is interested in maintaining its stronghold in this part of the world is the USA. Tajikistan’s positioning as a ‘geopolitical pivot’ is propelling Washington to strategize its foreign policy options toward Dushanbe. In 2013, the USA mooted to provide financial assistance to boost up Tajikistan’s military forces to counter Moscow’s positioning for Dushanbe. Even it initiated a process to establish its military bases in Tajikistan (Voloshin 2012). Tajikistan’s efforts to reach out to the USA in particular and the West in general can be evident from the fact that since the operation against Taliban in Afghanistan (which started in the aftermath of 2001), it has signed an agreement with the NATO for clearing landmines (NATO 2017; RFE.RL 2016). One may recall here that both the countries are also rebuilding their strategic relations with the USA through the ambit of the C5+1 which covers all of Central Asia. Under this initiative, Washington is providing multifaceted assistance to these five states including Tajikistan and Uzbekistan (US–Central Asia 2016). The USA may rethink over its nature of strategic engagement with both Uzbekistan and Tajikistan after one Uzbek refugee was caught in Washington while carrying out subversive activities. It may be noted that the growing proliferation of radical ISIS forces in these two states is also worrying the USA (Dalton 2017). One may add here that since 2014, ISIS radicals are moving in at a faster pace in Afghanistan and has repeatedly carried out ghastly terrorist attacks in different parts of the country. The recent attack carried out by ISIS radicals in Kabul in the last week of December 2017 has killed 40 innocent lives (Abid, Faizi, and Mashal 2017). Recently, the Special Envoy of Russia for Afghanistan, Zamir Kabulov mentioned that there are around ‘10,000’ ISIS militants who are currently operating in Afghanistan. If the statement of Kabulov is true, then one can understand the repercussion of the proliferation of ISIS for Uzbekistan and Tajikistan (Sputnik News 2017a).

Uzbekistan, which has both hot and cold relations with these two external powers (Russia and America), is trying hard to get a strong footing in Eurasia in general and Central Asian in particular. In the Central Asian geopolitical space, it is facing a challenge from its old-time foe, Kazakhstan (Laumulin and Tolipov 2010). Getting marginalized in the Central Asian space, the Karimov regime eyed toward South Asia. This can be understood from Tashkent’s desire to forge a partnership with Kabul in taming the Taliban (IMU and Taliban nexus) or propping up its own Uzbek population in Afghanistan to get leverage in the Afghan power structure. What is worrisome is that the IMU and Taliban nexus is persisting despite International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) operation. The new leadership of IMU, Usmon Ghazi has also pledged its alliance to ISIS and is dreaming of ‘establishing a Khorashan state’ (KHAMMA 2015; EurasiaNet 2017b). Uzbekistan is also looking at the Afghan crisis from a broader perspective. Understanding the tenuous geopolitical situation, Uzbekistan in recent years is also mending fences with Afghanistan. The visit of Afghan President Ghani to Uzbekistan in the first week of December 2017 is an indicator of this trend. During the visit, both sides agreed to fight international terrorism as well as ensuring regional security. One may add here that in July 2017, Ghani undertook a similar visit to Tajikistan to adopt a cohesive stand against terrorism and religious extremist forces (EurasiaNet 2017a; TOLOnews 2017).

A pertinent question remains how India is looking at these geopolitical developments in the light of the recent strategic realignments in the Eurasian region? Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s visit to five Central Asian states and also to Afghanistan reflects the fact that India is deeply concerned about the development in this part of the world. The Joint Statement signed between India and Uzbekistan in July 2015 called for an interaction between two sides with regard to checkmating radicalism. It emphasized on the ‘framework of the Uzbekistan–India Joint Working Group on Counter-Terrorism’ (MEA 2015; PIB 2015). Similarly, during his visit to Tajikistan, India signed a Joint Working Group to fight radicalism and terrorism. India has signed such similar agreements with Afghanistan in 2011 to ‘fight against international terrorism, organized crime, illegal trafficking in narcotics, money laundering’ (MEA 2015, 2016; PIB 2015). The Agreement emphasized on the fact that ‘India agrees to assist, as mutually determined, in the training, equipping and capacity building programmes for Afghan National Security Forces’ (India and the Afghanistan 2011; India–Afghanistan Relations 2016). During the visit of the new Afghan President Ashraf Ghani in April 2015 followed by the reciprocal visit by Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi to Kabul resulted in intensifying the process of security dialogue between the two countries. It was hoped that India’s relations with Afghanistan will undergo a sharp turn after Hamid Karzai’s ouster. Analysts hoped that the internal political turmoil will have an impact upon the foreign policymaking processes. However, President Ghani rejuvenated the relations between the two countries. Similarly, Indian Prime Minister has also committed to give a new thrust to the relationship (India and the Afghanistan 2015). The visit of Tajik President Imomali Rahmon to New Delhi in the month of December 2016 can be considered as a step in the direction of forming a body for subregional cooperation. The visit also reinforced India’s strategic partnership with Tajikistan (The New Indian Express 2016). Similarly, interactions of Indian Prime Minister Modi at Astana in June 2017 with Presidents of Uzbekistan and Afghanistan at the SCO forum highlighted the common strategic concerns of all these states (Bloombergquint 2017).

India’s relations with these three states in recent years have been hindered by the nefarious objectives and ill intent of China in having a greater role in this fragile geopolitical zone. At the same time, it is also propping up Pakistan. As discussed earlier, Beijing is trying to create a strategic zone by involving Afghanistan, Tajikistan, and Pakistan. Similarly, growing Chinese engagement with Pakistan as well as its ‘OBOR policy’ will change the strategic alignment in this part of the world thus, impacting the security of both South and Central Asia (Outlook Afghanistan 2016). Russia, though a time-tested friend of India, has also initiated similar measures involving Pakistan, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan when President Dmitri Medvedev was at the helm of affairs in Moscow (Kremlin.ru 2011).

In addition to the obstructive role played by Pakistan and China in disrupting regional security, because of historical legacies as well as common histories, there are certain problems which these three states are facing over the years. For instance, border conflicts between Tajikistan and Uzbekistan and also between Afghanistan and Tajikistan are detrimental to the development of a subregional cooperation in this region. In addition to border issue, sharing of common water resources between Tajikistan and Uzbekistan is also accentuating the crisis between these two states (Forbes 2017; Stratfor, 2013).

These strategic developments require adoption of a pragmatic policy where India can strengthen its relations with regional powers such as Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, and Afghanistan. The complex geopolitical challenges faced by these three states are also providing an opportunity to India to re-strategize its policies toward this space. Mandala theory, as eulogized by Kautilya in the beginning, can be the best bait to contain Pakistan as well as China, as both of them are operating in tandem with each other in sponsoring cross-border terrorism in this region as well as patronizing Taliban forces (Raja Mohan 2015). India needs to enter into a policy of alliance formation as well as having its own ‘sphere of influence’. By forming a regional alliance with these three states, India can also to a greater extent contain the Ari states—Pakistan—and its chief mentor China (Kakar 2017). Resorting to the tactics of ‘alliance formation’ in an institutional format like the IATU, India can have a greater say in the regional geopolitical milieu.

However, the strategic interaction can be possible only through forming an institutional regional grouping where the focus will be both on geopolitical and on geo-economic dimensions. To make it a successful regional organization, IATU needs to focus more on sustained economic cooperation.

Evolving ‘Regional Economic Community’ and IATU

Though the aforementioned normative and strategic factors will provide the base for the evolvement of IATU, the geo-economic compulsions of these four states will add substance to the entire discourse. As has been observed, some of these states are rich in natural resources and precious minerals. Against this backdrop, India can play a positive role in bringing these states into the mainstream of international economic community by providing them with market. So far as regional economic development is concerned, no concrete efforts have been made till now which can give added impetus in this direction among these four states (Chaudhuri 2017). One common factor which brings the Tajik and Uzbek economy closer is that both are sharing the legacy of Soviet economy along with common resources like water (Bobokhanov, Pokrivcak, and Rajcaniova 2017). On the other hand, Afghanistan is yet to develop a stable economy due to poor infrastructure and incessant political instabilities, despite having rich natural resources. Because of resource constrains as well as perennial strife, these three states are lagging behind in economic development (Emadi 2011). The growing interaction among Afghanistan, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan in recent years has been providing a new way harnessing economic cooperation. The visit of Afghan President Ghani to both Tajikistan and Uzbekistan in 2017, as discussed earlier, has contributed to strengthening of bilateral economic cooperation among these three states. Most important of them is the early completion of CASA-1000 project which will facilitate uninterrupted electricity supply to Afghanistan from Tajikistan (EurasiaNet 2017b; TOLOnews 2017).

India is emerging as an important destination for these three states because of its economic development, technological competence, scientific achievement, and rich human resources. India is interested to tap the natural resources of these states. So the nature of economic collaboration is assuming an interdependent character. However, one major factor which is obstructing effective economic engagement with these states is lack of direct ‘land connectivity’ (Sputnik News 2017b). When Indian Prime Minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee visited Dushanbe in 2002, he signed an agreement relating to the India–Tajikistan Joint Commission on Trade, Economic, Scientific, and Technical Cooperation. Under the framework of Joint Commission, New Delhi provided all sorts of assistance to Dushanbe ranging from financial, technical as well as humanitarian assistance. Understanding the hydroelectricity potentiality of this part of the world, India, under the aforementioned framework provided technical support to the Varzob-1 hydroelectricity project (MEA 2016).

The bilateral economic relations between these two states received an impetus during the visit of Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi to Uzbekistan in July 2015. The Joint Statement between the two countries specifically mentioned that Uzbekistan will create a special economic zone for Indian companies which are interested in opening up their industries. Besides this, both the countries have agreed to step up their cooperation in information technology, health sector, community development, etc. (Joint Statement India–Uzbekistan 2015). India has also involved itself quite effectively to tap the hydro energy in Afghanistan. The economic relations between these two states got a new impetus when Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi visited Kabul in December 2015 and offered assistance for economic development (Ministry of Commerce India 2016; Joint Statement India–Afghanistan 2015). The preamble of the Agreement stressed on ‘free trade for strengthening intra-regional economic cooperation and the development of national economies’ (Ministry of Commerce India 2016). India’s best efforts in building a strategic trade corridor, in order to reach out to the Central Asian states and Afghanistan, have always been unsuccessful due to severe obstruction from Pakistan. In June 2017, both India and Afghanistan made efforts to overcome geographical barriers by using air corridor in order to boost their bilateral trade. Similar strategies have been used in the cases of Tajikistan and Uzbekistan (AOP Press 2017; India–Tajikistan MEA 2017). This move along with the International North South Transport Corridor Project (INSTC) which India is promoting will bring these two Central Asian states along with Afghanistan into much closer proximity. Under the INSTC project, India is also mulling of connecting Mazar-e-Sharif to Herat for facilitating greater connectivity with Uzbekistan and Tajikistan (Financial Express 2017). The opening of the first part of the Chabahar Port in December 2017 has led to two implications. First, it has to a substantial extent resolved India’s connectivity problem with the three states, and second, it will provide an impetus to the existing INSTC route. One may recall here that in October 2017, India delivered wheat to Afghanistan through Chabahar port and from there to Afghanistan by land route (The Hindu 2017). This Indian aid to Afghanistan can be considered as a symbolic step to bring these three states—Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, and Afghanistan—into a common trade network. The operationalization of the Chabahar Port added to the greater connectivity arrangements through INSTC defiantly adds new vistas to India’s economic diplomacy with these three states. One may add here that the plan to connect Central Asia and Afghanistan through Iran was originally mooted by former Indian Prime Minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee when Mohammad Khatami, the Iranian President, visited India in January 2003. Having connectivity with Central Asia and Afghanistan in mind, India outlined its policy of infrastructural development through Iran. As part of strategizing connectivity with these countries, Prime Minister Vajpayee outlined major infrastructural development projects, namely, Chahbahar port along with the Zaranj and Delaram road connectivity project (PIB 2015; Raja Mohan 2003).

Success of IATU, as a regional economic body will checkmate the ‘hegemonic policy’ of China, which by its own OBOR policy, is interested in subjugating these neighboring economies in the name of promoting open trade. Already there is a growing resentment in these countries against Chinese policy. The operationalization of INSTC trade route will also provide an opportunity to IATU countries for harnessing the natural resources for common benefits and greater engagement with the external market (Jaborov 2018; The Hindu 2017).

Conclusion

After going through the theoretical propositions as well as empirical narratives, the preliminary question that arises is whether IATU is a feasible proposition? The obvious answer will be, yes. Kautilya’s Mandala theory, Pierre Bourdieu’s logic of ‘common habitus’, Charles Kindleberger’s notion of ‘hegemonic stability theory’ and Deutsch’s ‘Pluralistic Security Community’ are some of the theoretical paradigms which provide the necessary substance to the development of a regional cooperation framework in this part of the world.

Factors like the existence of a common culture inherited from ‘millennium past’ along with strategic compulsions and ‘interdependent economies’ are providing the necessary edifice for fruition of such kind of cooperation. Though such cooperation is yet to be realized, however, the informal interactions among these countries are reflect their desires to move is in such a direction over the years. The lack of geographical connectivity is often cited as a stumbling block for cooperation among these countries (especially in the context of India’s interaction with these three states) but technological innovation and modern means of communication are certainly providing greater avenues for overcoming these barriers. The cargo diplomacy, which India started recently with Afghanistan, is a good example of this move. The INSTC project through Iran is one such initiative in this regard. As stated earlier, the economic cooperation among these states is ‘interdependent’ in nature because of their mutual necessities. For instance, India needs raw materials while Afghanistan, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan require financial and technological assistance. In this context, economic relations among these four countries are assuming vital significance. One may add here that the surge in terrorist activities in Afghanistan will also have a repercussion on these three states. The external geopolitical developments along with internal socioeconomic and political compulsions are providing the theoretical substance to the fruition of regional cooperation among these four states. However, successful operationalization of this theoretical framework depends upon how policymakers from the four states perceive the whole idea.

Footnotes

1.

The basic idea to write this article came when the present author visited Bukhara, Samarkand, and Tashkent in 2008 and 2009 to participate in International Conference organized by Institute of Civil Society, Tashkent. The initial idea to develop a ‘normative framework’ came up when the author interacted with the local population in the bazaars as well as academia. The author would like to thank Professor Devendra Kaushik (retd) Centre for Russian and aim Central Asian Studies, School of International Studies, Jawaharlal Nehru University for his constructive suggestions along with two anonymous reviewers.

2.

The word ‘geo-culture’ is being employed here to study relations among these four states in a ‘cultural framework’ (refer, for instance, Wallerstien 1991: 11). Russian Scholar N.S. Rozov, for instance, argues that geo-culture implies ‘the intersection of two or more social networks in these centers, with the corresponding cultural traditions; a fruitful combination of these that opens up new horizons of creative endeavor’ (: 17).

3.

Professor Tahir Ashghar, Associate Professor, Centre for Russian and Central Asian Studies, SIS, Jawaharlal Nehru University, New Delhi, suggested this point.

4.

David Harvey defined ‘geopolitical space’ in the context of ‘time and space intersection’. As Harvey says: ‘Objective conditions of space and time must change to accommodate new material practices of social reproduction’ (: 419).

5.

The present author would like to thank anonymous reviewers for highlighting this point.

6.

The present author during his visit to Bukhara in October 2008 to attend an International Conference hosted by one Uzbek government agency Institute of Civil Society, Tashkent, for the first time heard such view as Vihar (refer, for a similar view, : 22).

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Regional Processes and Geopolitics of India,Afghanistan,Tajikistan,and Uzbekistan (IATU)

Abstract

Keywords

Introduction 1

Theoretical Postulates

Historical and Normative Basis of IATU

Geopolitical Structure and IATU

Evolving ‘Regional Economic Community’ and IATU

Conclusion

Footnotes

1.

2.

3.

4.

5.

6.

References

Introduction¹