PUK–KDP Conflict: Future Kurdish Status in Kirkuk

Introduction

The Kurdish referendum on independence resulted in over 92 percent of participants voting in favor of Kurdistan’s independence. This resulted in the immediate threat of a breakaway region, and on September 27, the Iraqi Prime Minister Haider al-Abbadi saw the need to reassert sovereignty over the disputed territories, including Kirkuk, based on the constitution stating that security management in disputed areas is the remit of the federal government. Baghdad moved swiftly to reassert control over the contested areas its troops abandoned in the face of the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) onslaught in July 2014—areas which the Kurds had subsequently controlled. The Iraqi government is expected to be in control of the disputed territories previously controlled by the Kurds in 2014. The pre-ISIS territorial status quo is being restored in this area, as it is everywhere else. The operation of Kirkuk, which is officially known as an ‘operation of the imposition of security in disputed territories’, is an operation launched by the Iraqi forces and the Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF) to regain control of the disputed territory and return the pre-2003 borders. However, the governor of Kirkuk refused to allow any forces entry. To support that decision the deputy of the former president of the Kurdistan region of Iraq (KRG) deployed tens of thousands of Peshmerga forces in the city to counter the potential threats from Iraqi forces ¹ but 3 days later, the Iraqi forces announced its control of the Kirkuk military airport, K1, which is the largest military base in the province, and of a number of oil fields to the north. However, the leadership of the Peshmerga forces accused a faction of the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK) of treason by assisting the Iraqi army in the Kirkuk operation. The PUK, conversely, accused the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP)’s insistence and Massoud Barzani’s intransigence of holding a referendum that prompted Baghdad to act. After these occurrences, the Kurds no longer have any administrative or military powers in Kirkuk. This article will discuss the political disputes between PUK and KDP and its implications for the Kurd’s role in Kirkuk, and future scenarios of the Kirkuk crisis.

PUK–KDP Conflict

The Iraqi Kurds were mostly defeated by their own political division—a recurring theme in the history of that troubled region. The relationship between the KDP and PUK has long been strained and, in some periods, has seen armed confrontations. From 1994 to 1998, the two parties entered into a bloody civil war, during which Massoud Barzani appealed to former Iraqi President Saddam Hussein to defeat forces loyal to Jalal Talabani, the former secretary of PUK (and the Iraqi president from 2005 to 2014). Saddam’s army took control of the capital from Talabani and handed it over to Barzani. This conflict ended in 1998 via American mediation, which eventually led to the establishment of two Kurdish administrations in Northern Iraq; one in Sulaymaniyah under the leadership of the PUK and the other in Erbil and Dahuk under the leadership of KDP. After the invasion of Iraq by the US-led coalition forces in 2003, the two parties agreed to form a unity government in 2005, which has at best, been an uneasy cohesion. ² Since that time, attempts have been made to unify the two Kurdish administrations under the umbrella of one government in Erbil. In 2006, the first unified government of the KRG was composed of ministers from the two Kurdish parties, but there were many indications that this unification was incomplete, while the Peshmarga and security forces of the two Kurdish parties remained unified. ³ The rivalry of the KDP and PUK is rooted in geographic, tribal affiliations and the conflicting personal ambitions and strategic interest priorities of its leaders. ⁴ Thus, the differences between both parties have intensified recently due to the authoritarian tendencies of Barzani, who refused to vacate his post until October 2017, ⁵ despite the end of his mandate in 2015. He also prevented the convening of the Parliament of the region for nearly 2 years (from October 2015 to September 2017) due to the efforts of the Kurdish parties to remove him from office after the completion of his presidential term, leading to the escalation of tension between the Change Movement (Gorran), PUK, and Barzani.

The Gorran and PUK agreement for joint action on May 17, 2016, led to escalating tensions between the latter and the KDP. The agreement has been a pivotal development in the region’s politics, as it has not ended 7 years of conflict between the two parties. However, it is also an attempt to balance the influence of KDP. Kurdish conflicts did not end on the Iraqi scene. The dispute between the two sides spread to Syria, when the KDP imposed a siege on the YPG-held territory ⁶ near the borders of the Kurdistan region.

Throughout history, Kurdish political parties have used nationalism to solve the Kurdish question with Baghdad. Kurds have fought for their right; mainly the PUK and KDP have used the sense of nationhood to achieve national interests, but the problem has been exaggeration and penetration in exploiting this common sense, which caused significant negative effects for the Kurdish question, particularly in Kirkuk. Before the referendum, the Kurdish-dominated Kirkuk Provincial Council decided to raise the Kurdish banner on all governmental buildings, which provoked different reactions, and Turkmen and Arabs expressed their rejection of this step, considering it to be ‘seditious’. The UN and Turkey expressed concern about it, too. Furthermore, holding referendum in Kirkuk without Iraqi permission, consenting non-Kurds minorities in the city, and consulting neighboring countries caused strong enmity toward Kurds and frustration over its rule in Kirkuk locally that allowed Abbadi to make his move with the support of the regional powers, and with the apparent green light from the USA. Externally, Iraqi neighbors (Turkey and Iran) support the territorial unity of Iraq and have consistently opposed unilateral attempts at settling the status of the disputed territories. ⁷

Many international players also oppose the secession of the Kurdish region from Iraq because it would strengthen the separatist conflicts of religious and ethnic minorities in a number of countries, especially related to the Kurds in Syria, Turkey, and Iran. Therefore, despite their political differences, in order to undermine the chances of political and economic independence of the region in the event of separation from Baghdad, neighboring countries threaten to take action, some even in the form of military intervention, against the KRG. Despite regional and international pressures and demands to postpone the independence referendum on September 25, ‘we do not mock our nation and will not delay the referendum’ as per Barzani. ⁸ Kurds held the referendum for some objectives, including increasing economic prosperity by (a) succeeding form Iraq and controlling the region’s natural wealth independently, (b) using the referendum as leverage in the KRG’s long-standing disputes with Baghdad to increase oil revenue sharing that has decreased by political conflict between Erbil and Baghdad, (c) sending a message to the international community that Kurds can attract foreign investment and capital to the region, particularly in the energy sector. The neighboring countries, however, have taken punitive measures involving borders and air space against KRG over the referendum. Turkey had decided to close off the oil flow, while hundreds of thousands of barrels of oil a day come through the pipeline in Turkey from northern Iraq. ⁹

The referendum on independence came at a time when the Kurds are divided on the timing; the first are those who reject it completely because the region lacks active institutions, an independent economy, and a unified army. They see independence as an alleged reason to overlook internal problems. The second faction sees the timing of the referendum as ideal because it comes after the victories achieved by the Peshmerga forces in their war against ISIS and the burgeoning international sympathy to the Kurdish question.

Barzani’s announcement of a referendum was not welcome in Sulaymaniyah, but it was outright opposed by certain officials, such as Ala Talabani, who is the head of the PUK bloc in the Iraqi parliament. Two days before the referendum, Bavel Talabani posted a message of the acceptance of the US initiative to delay the Kurdistan referendum via his Facebook page. He declared that the PUK and KDP decided to accept the American initiative to postpone the referendum on the independence of Kurdistan. Despite this, a few minutes later, Barzani rejected the declaration and insisted on the holding the referendum on the scheduled time. ¹⁰ The PUK issued a statement on September 24 announcing its support for the referendum. In a follow-up to the subject, it turns out that the atmosphere in the Kurdistan region, due to widespread propaganda, media speeches, and propaganda festivals organized by Barzani and his supporters, is no longer opposed to the referendum. However, some significant Kurdish leaders considered the referendum to be not in the region’s best interest. At a time when the Kurds are under the most intense pressure from Baghdad, they are more divided ¹¹ than ever—we intend to outline the different groups that oppose the referendum and post-referendum political developments.

Crisis of Kirkuk

The province of Kirkuk is one of the disputed areas between Baghdad and the KRG, which gave the Iraqi Article 140 the right to self-determination in a referendum that was to be conducted by the end of 2007. The Iraqi government was fragile in the post-2003 period and did not want to provoke separatist tendencies that would threaten its security situation. However, the situation changed dramatically in the last 3 years, as the influence of the Kurdish Peshmerga forces increased in Kirkuk and neighboring regions, coinciding with progress in the Northern provinces after the withdrawal of the Iraqi army. With the support of the international coalition forces, Kurdish forces took control of the city in June 2014. In parallel with the escalation of its military influence, the Kurdish parties controlled most of the city’s oil fields. For instance, the KDP controlled the Baie Hassan and Havana fields, which linked them to the Khurmala oilfield, all connected to the new pipeline that was launched at the end of 2013, eventually reaching the Turkish port of Ceyhan. The other fields have been under the control of the central government in Baghdad: Baba Gurgur, Khabaza and Jampur, all run by the northern Iraqi oil company under the authority of Baghdad. There were disputes over the management of oil fields in Kirkuk and oil exports from the province. The Kurdish parties accused Baghdad of failing to pay the region’s oil revenues of 17 percent, while the central government opposed unilateral oil deals concluded by the Kurds. Baghdad has not allowed Kurds to rule Kirkuk for many reasons, including: (a) Kirkuk is an economic engine of Iraq, and the government has no intention of abandoning the city, which is representing 10 percent of Iraq’s oil reserves; ¹² thus, Baghdad will never let Kurdistan secede with Kirkuk, as it too relies on oil revenue to fund its military and bureaucracy. (b) Kirkuk is vital to independence because without its oil, Kurdistan would not be an economically viable country, by controlling Kirkuk; Baghdad can prevent Iraqi division effortlessly. (c) Kirkuk is a multiethnic city which has been fought over by Kurds, Arabs, and Turkmen throughout the ages, yet no Iraqi government will ever willingly let Kurdistan secede with Kirkuk; the Arabization process had taken place in Kirkuk by former regimes to change the identity and keep the city under Iraqi Arab control. (d) Kirkuk is a ‘small Iraq’, and any efforts to succeed the city will lead to deterioration in social security and coexistence in other places, such as Mosul, Dyala, and Salahadin provinces.

On March 28, 2017, the Kirkuk Provincial Council voted to hoist the Kurdish banner next to the Iraqi flag in the province. This came about during the absence of members of the Council from the Arab and Turkmen components, culminating in twenty-six out of forty-one voting on the resolution. ¹³ Similarly, on April 4, 2017, the Council voted on a decision to include the province in the referendum on September 25, ¹⁴ but the Arab and Turkmen representatives considered the decision a ‘Kurdish occupation’ and the beginning of major divisions, while the Kurds defended their legitimate demand that would allow them self-determination. Neither the Iraqi Constitution nor KRG’s draft constitution provides for the possibility of legal secession. The legality of the referendum has been a controversial issue. Barzani said discussions with Baghdad had taken place regarding the referendum. However, an agreement was never reached (European Parliamentary Research Service). ¹⁵ The arguments range from its lack of legitimacy in a situation where the Kurdish Parliament never passed the proposed constitution establishing the legality of the referendum to its precarious acceptance by future governments and the lack of a viable blueprint for further negotiation and institutionalization. ¹⁶ What is more questionable is the territorial scope of the referendum. The poll took place not only in KRG provinces but also in the disputed territories, which are administered by the KRG but are not officially part of the region. The inhabitants of the disputed territories should have been consulted on whether they wished to be part of KRG or to be governed by a different entity. According to Article 140 of the Iraqi Constitution, this consultation should have occurred no later than 2007, but Baghdad failed to carry it out. Some opponents challenged the referendum, and they considered it was aimed at restoring Barzani’s contested legitimacy, even though he had pledged to step down once independence had been achieved. ¹⁷

Amid escalated tensions with the declaration of Kurdistan referendum of secession from Iraq in September 2017, the referendum was held despite the protest of the federal government and regional countries, who warned them of the seriousness of this action. The crisis began between the federal government and KRG and spread to areas controlled by the Peshmerga, which prompted Iraq to impose a blockade on Kurdistan.

It seems that the conflict over Kirkuk is getting more complicated. Both sides maintained their right to sovereignty over Kirkuk and its oil resources, while neither has ruled out the right to the use of force to preserve the city. The Iraqi parliament demanded on September 27 that the KRG give up control of the oil fields in Kirkuk and hand over control to the central government in Baghdad, giving Haider al-Abbadi the mandate to command Iraqi forces to enter the province to restore peace and sovereignty. This comes in light of evidence confirming that the Kurdish Peshmerga forces have strengthened their control over all the oil fields in Kirkuk.

A member of the Political Bureau of the PUK, ‘Mahmoud Sinakawi’, stated that the Iraqi forces will launch an attack on Kirkuk on the day of the referendum, while calling on the Kurdish political parties to pay attention to what he called ‘this danger’. ¹⁸ The Kurds ignored Iraqi demands, and the Kirkuk provincial council refused to hand over the oil fields to the Iraqi government. The former head of the Kirkuk Provincial Council, Ribwar Talabani, on September 2017, stated that ‘the governor of Kirkuk will not hand over the oil fields to any party and will be under the authority of the Kurdistan region’. Simultaneously, Massoud Barzani, who visited Kirkuk on October 2, 2017, asked the Peshmerga and other security services to protect Kirkuk and KRG from any potential threats. The Iraqi government saw this as a new challenge that emerged in the areas controlled by KRG who did not want to withdraw, and they regarded it as an annexation of the administrative borders of the region.

The failure of local, regional, and international mediation to persuade Baghdad and Erbil to resolve the crisis peacefully, with the end of the deadline for the Kurdish forces to hand over their positions, prompted Iraqi forces to enter Kirkuk and appoint a new governor in place of the Kurdish governor, who was previously ousted from the Federal Parliament in Baghdad.

In a few hours, Iraqi forces took control of many vital areas, such as the district of Tuzkurmato and the majority area of Kirkuk and its oil fields, accompanied by a large wave of displacement of Kurdish families from these areas toward the provinces of Erbil and Sulaymaniyah under the authority of KRG. This rapid progress is due to deep political differences with the PUK and the KDP, following the opposition of PUK to the referendum at that time, and the fear of Barzani’s monopoly in the region.

The War of Treason

The Iraqi army’s rapid success is based on politics rather than military strength because there has been little fighting, and the majority of their adversaries withdrew without major confrontations in the advance of the Iraqi forces. It was a relatively bloodless affair, where Kurdish Peshmerga affiliated with the PUK and KDP either withdrew or fled. ¹⁹ The first prominent signs of the crisis between the PUK and KDP in Kirkuk appeared when the governor of the city, in agreement with a part of the local council, decided to participate in the Kurdish referendum, which angered the central government, as they cut the city off from the administrative map of the Iraqi state, prompting Baghdad to expedite the liberation of Hawija, located on the line of direct contact with the city, and demanded the government of Kirkuk to hand over the city’s administration. The governor of the city rejected the request of the central government and vowed to resist any attempt by the Iraqi forces to enter the city.

The army, however, advanced toward the oil fields and the vital areas after the rapid withdrawal of Peshmarga from all the fronts of the city, which led to the smooth entry of Iraqi forces to the city and its administrative borders. So far, there has been no indication that Baghdad intends to go any further and occupy the constitutionally recognized Kurdistan region. Instead, the Iraqi government appears determined to isolate the KRG into submission by closing its border crossings with Turkey and Iran and stopping all flights except those coming from Baghdad. The city of Kirkuk and surrounding oil fields are back in the hands of the Iraqi government. ²⁰ The action was prompted by a referendum on Kurdish independence staged by the KRG on September 25 within its territory and in disputed areas with Baghdad. ²¹

In the wake of the Iraqi forces’ taking control of the city of Kirkuk and the expulsion of the Kurdish Peshmerga forces, on October 16, Massoud Barzani announced that a number of leaders of the PUK ordered the Peshmerga to withdraw from several positions to enable Iraqi forces to take control of the city, ²² but Hero Talabani, who is a member of the PUK’s Political Bureau, declared that neither she nor any of her other family members were behind the order to the PUK-aligned Peshmerga to stand down. ²³ Currently, these two parties are more divided than they have been in decades. The KDP accused the PUK of ‘treason’ for facilitating Iraqi forces’ entry into Kirkuk, but the PUK countered by reminding Barzani of his decision to invite Saddam’s forces into the Kurdish region in 1996. And thus another circle is completed. ²⁴ This tension reveals the existence of a deep divide that could threaten the unity of the KRG itself as a political, legal, and administrative entity. The control of Iraqi forces on Kirkuk revealed the weakness of the Kurdistan National Front, where it is clear that there are differences that emerged only at the moment of decisive confrontation, which could lead to conflicts within the region and possibly skirmishes between the wings of the two main parties: the PUK and KDP, repeating the civil war in the Kurdistan of Iraq that occurred in the mid-1990s.

Kurdish Status in Kirkuk

The Kirkuk Governorate Council was formed following the fall of the former regime in April 2003 and renewed only once since 2005. The Council is dominated by the Kurds’ Kirkuk Brotherhood List block, which holds 26 seats out of in 41 seats in the provincial council of Kirkuk. ²⁵ The Council held its first meeting on November 21, 2017, in the absence of a large number of members on the Brotherhood List after the events that took place in the province on October 16 to discuss the situation in Kirkuk and the appointment of a new governor. The state of tension and anxiety is currently prevailing among all its components.

The cause of this administrative crisis returned to unilateral steps by the Kurds in the city, including:

In view of the aforementioned political disputes between the PUK and KDP, the Kurds in Kirkuk are concerned that the Arabization ³¹ problem is back to square one a month after the Iraqi army and the PMF took control of the city. The following implications are the outcomes of the not Kurdish censuses to return to the city.

First, the lack of regular meeting of the Kirkuk Governorate Council: the last meeting of the Council was held for preventing the dissolution of the Council after being threatened to be dissolved by the Iraqi parliament by collecting 151 signatures. The PUK, in the last meeting of the Council, sent 14 members of the Kirkuk Brotherhood List block to the meeting, but none could choose a new governor nor schedule another meeting due to the lack of an absolute majority in the council because of the boycott KDP members, on the one hand, and the lack of mutual trust between the Kurds and the other communities Arabs and Turkmen on the other hand.

From the last 3 years, the Kurds in the Governorate Council of Kirkuk passed the draft laws by majority, such as raising the Kurdish banner in the city, taking part in the 25th Kurdish referendum, and ruling the provincial council. At this moment, the Kurds lost its controls over the city, and the PUK neither can persuade the Arabs or Turkmen to choose a new governor nor trust them to let them lead the Governorate Council. In order to end this crisis, the PUK suggested voting on a new governor from the Kurds and other officials from the Arab and Turkman communities as a single package in the Governorate Council and collect signatures from the members as a form of approval on the vote. ³²

The absence of Kurdish parties in ruling the city will lead to a negative fate for Kurds, which many believe would lead to the Arabization of the city all over again. The acting governor in Kirkuk did not need to issue and pass the laws against Kurds, but he can reactivate older laws passed by Saddam’s regime against the Kurds from 1969–2003. Currently, the acting governor (who is an Arab) used some of these laws; the following examples are efforts undertaken by the acting governor against the Kurds.

The Committee of Revolutionary Leadership of the Baath Party, via the Committee of Social Affairs, made nearly 460–470 decisions about Kirkuk. However, since the last 14 years, the Kurds could dissolve only 20 percent of these laws. For example, in February 2007, Decision 4 recommended the cancellation of ‘all agricultural contracts concluded within the policy of demographic change (Arabization) in Kirkuk’, ³³ while Article 140 committees worked for 6 years in the city and paid millions of dollars in compensation to the Arabs who Saddam Hussein had brought to take over ownership of hundreds of thousands of acres of Kurdish and Turkmen land in the province. The agricultural contracts that should have been canceled in the context of the implementation of Article 140 of the constitution provisioned for more than 1.2 million acres of land to be returned to their Kurd and Turkmen owners, but 10 percent of these cases remained unresolved. However, in coordination with the agricultural office of the city, the acting governor is currently working on these contracts and allowing Arab farmers to take back these lands and use them. He is also suspending the process of returning the lands to the indigenous landowner, the majority of them being Kurds, as stated by an independent member of Kirkuk Governorate Council Awat Hama Ameen. ³⁴ Similarly, a month after the attack on Kirkuk, the agricultural season began, and this year, the Arabs who have been receiving wheat and barley planted these crops in some of these lands after the expulsion of the Kurds, based on previous contracts. Baghdad is providing them with the facilities, especially in Daqouq, Dibs, and Yaichyi, as pointed out by Kirkuk’s director of agriculture, Mahdi Mubarak. ³⁵

In addition, the Deputy Head of the PUK headquarters in Tuz Khurmatu, Hassan Baram, expressed concern about the events that followed October 16, noting that many Arabs who had already left Kirkuk and Tuz Khurmatu are returning. He added that they were trying to expel the Kurds from their land after preparing the atmosphere for the practice of injustice against the Kurds; the Kurdish deputies in Baghdad are seeking to address the issue as soon as possible. To this, a member of the Kirkuk Provincial Council, Jwan Hassan, stated that an acting governor of Kirkuk is trying to ‘remove the Kurdish language from the educational syllabus books of the province, although this language is an official language according to the Iraqi constitution’. ³⁶

Similarly, the Arabs began returning to Kirkuk: Article (140) of Iraqi Constitution submitted to the federal government in Baghdad a road map to settle disputes over disputed territories in Iraq and determine their fate; one of these plans is related to the census in the city, but the Arabs and Turkmen asked for the population census to be postponed due to what they call ‘the Kurdish population offense’. During the Arabization process, thousands of Arabs were brought into Kirkuk to change the demographic balance in the city; but based on the pressure and insistence of the Kurds during the past decade, some of them went back to central and southern Iraq, being appropriately compensated for this. Currently, the acting governor is lifting restrictions on the ‘Arab Expatriates’ and allowing them to come back to Kirkuk. ³⁷ Moreover, according to the Electoral Law in Iraq, any citizen who lives for more than 10 years in any city and town will have voting rights in that specific city or town. During the last three elections in Iraq, the Kurds did not allow the application of that law in Kirkuk; however, the current governor is not hiding the fact that he intends to apply that law for the next election and allow tens of thousands of non-Kirkuki Arabs to vote, which will certainly change the balance of the city. The Kurds will lose their majority status in Kirkuk. ³⁸

Furthermore, Kirkuk Governorate Council members warned of the dangers of Arabization of Kirkuk after allowing the transfer of personal status records for citizens from central and southern Iraq to the province. The Ministry of the Interior has previously addressed the Kirkuk Provincial Council to allow the transfer of personal status register of citizens from the southern and central provinces to the province of Kirkuk, but the Council did not implement the decision. However, the acting governor of Kirkuk started the transfer of personal status records to citizens, said Clawiz Jabari, head of the Article 140 Committee of the Kirkuk Provincial Council. ³⁹ Likewise, the Kurdish member Ahmad al-Askari said in statement that the absence of the Kurdish governor, and the lack of consensus on the appointment of the alternative, caused a vacuum exploited by some parties to start again the policy of Arabization practiced by the former regime of Saddam Hussein on a large scale in the province. Al-Askari points to a decision that ‘Baghdad started the process of Arabization. The federal government issued a decree allowing the Shi’a Arabs to transfer their jobs to Kirkuk, Kurds to transfer their personal status records out of Kirkuk’. ⁴⁰ Additionally, the acting governor of Kirkuk sent a letter to the Department of Housing of the city for returning and redistributing the residential apartments in Al-Sayada and Benja Ali belonging to the Federal Ministry of Housing, which include 215 apartments and 600 apartments, respectively. ⁴¹ On the other hand, in 2014, the former governor of the city in the presence of Deputy Governor Rakan Said (who is currently acting governor of Kirkuk) distributed 150 residential apartments among the families of the Peshmerga martyrs in the war against Da’ash (ISIS), and the Deputy Governor of Kirkuk (current acting governor) confirmed that the residential apartments were distributed according to a draw in the Ministry of Housing. ⁴²

The Iraqi authorities are also resuming Arabization operations in the province in the absence of the Kurdish governor, who does not seem to have any signs of filling the vacuum in the near future, restoring the lost balance to the board of directors. The Iraqi Interior Ministry has replaced a number of Kurdish officers holding important security posts with Arab and Turkmen in the province of Kirkuk. ⁴³ Among those Kurds officials in Kirkuk who have removed by Iraqi Ministry of Interior Affairs since Iraqi forces took control of the province in mid-October 2017, were Kirkuk Police Chief and Director of Daquq Police who replaced by appointed Arabs officers instead. ⁴⁴

Another illegal step that is more dangerous than Arabization is a kind of ‘Shiism-Tashaiie’. In Islamic culture, the religious endowments control public opinion and build religious institutions, schools and influence politics. They also control properties, particularly lands. Similarly, Shiia Endowment Diwan require land ownership in Iraq; for this purpose, the Diwan issued a decision demanding that if there are any shrines, masjid or mosque that they to be attributed to the People of the House, or Family of the House ‘Ahl al-Bayt’. ⁴⁵ These religious institutions must therefore be owned by the Shiia Endowment Diwan. Thus, after controlling Kirkuk, a committee changed the ownership of nearly 370–400 acres lands and religious places to the Shiia Endowment Diwan, including Imam Qasim Mosque, which is a historical mosque in downtown of Kirkuk and located in Kurdish areas. The committee believed that because Imam Qasim is attributed to Imam Mohammed—son of Imam Qasim—son of Imam Ali Jauad–son of Imam Raza, it should be dedicated to the People of the House—and a part of Shiia Endowment properties, as per Awat Hama Ameen. ⁴⁶

The Future Scenarios

In the absence of a Kurdish power in Kirkuk, some upcoming scenarios are predicated on solving the crisis that might affect the future status of Kurds in the city:

Conclusion

The article explored the many layers of disagreements and conflicts in the very broad context of the political ties between the PUK and KDP. The historical tensions between the two main parties in Iraqi Kurdistan caused the huge loss for the Kurds in Iraq. The Program Director of Middle East and North Africa, in the International Crisis Groups, Joost Hiltermann, noted ‘while the Kurds’ common ethnic identity unites them, as a people, they are as divided as any other ethnic group—by dialect, political ideology, and the personalities and strategic priorities of their leaders’. ⁴⁸ In recent years, one of the main causes for the bitter ties between the PUK and KDP was caused by Barzani’s inclination to stay in power, paralyzing the National Assembly after attempting to amend the presidential law and kicking out the ministers of the Movement of Change (Gorran) in KRG cabinet. Taking some strategic and fateful decisions, including the decision to hold the referendum in September 2017, despite the objections of the majority of the leaders of the PUK and the Talabani’s family, unilaterally by Barzani caused a deepening of the crisis.

Another point is that the Kurdish leaders in PUK and KDP were utterly different in dealing with the security and policy developments that faced the region in post-referendum period, particularly, since the Iraqi government asked the KRG to withdraw the Peshmarga forces in the disputed territories. Both parties agreed to hold dialogue with Baghdad regarding the crisis. However, once the Iraqi forces and PMF attacked the disputed territories on October 16, 2017, after offering some resistance; the PUK and KDP forces were withdrawn, and both sides started blaming each other for losing Kirkuk and other disputed territories and deepening the mistrust between the PUK and KDP.

As a result of Iraqi attacks on the disputed territories, the Kurds lost their control on Kirkuk and most of the areas. The temporary acting governor in the city had taken some steps to start the Arabization of the city again, which caused anxieties for the Kurds and posed a threat to Kurdish status in the city. Unquestionably, some reasons are the driving force behind the new phase of Arabization in Kirkuk, including the lack of consensus between the Kurdish parties and deep mistrust and cleavage between the PUK and KDP.

As the final aforementioned scenario has displayed, the return of the Kurdish member of the Governorate Council to Kirkuk to choose a new governor and head of the council, the holding of regular meetings, and the sharing of powers with other communities in the city would guarantee both the prevention of a new phase of Arabization against the Kurds in the city and build the trust between the PUK and KDP, which is a necessary step to keep the region united and put pressure on Baghdad to stop them from violating the Kurds’ constitutional rights in the future.