The Iranian Nuclear Impasse: The Protracted Imbroglio

Abstract

The Iranian nuclear deadlock has been one of the most contentious issues confronting the international community till date. The following article seeks to trace the tussle between the evolution of the Iranian nuclear aspirations and the politics of non-proliferation. It is divided into four main sections. The first section attempts to give a brief description of the problematic of the discriminatory politics of nuclear non-proliferation regime that Iran has been put through by the West. Iran’s nuclear aspirations can be traced back to the 1950s. Its strategic relations with the USA and leading European nations brought Iran significant scientific and technological assistance to set up a nuclear infrastructure. The second segment of the article delves into Iran’s nuclear activities during the Shah regime and the Western response. The post-Shah years brought about notable changes in the Western approach to Iran’s nuclear pursuit, the denial of nuclear technology to Iran being the predominant stand of the West especially the USA. The third section addresses the changes in Iran’s stand on the nuclear issue and the consequent changes in its relations with the West especially the USA. The last section of the article, that is, the concluding part attempts a dispassionate take on the rationale behind its nuclear aspirations, the veracity of its arguments and the future of the Iranian nuclear impasse.

Keywords

Non-proliferation the nuclear non-proliferation treaty international atomic energy agency joint comprehensive plan of action P5+1

Introduction

The prolonged imbroglio over Iran’s alleged nuclear ambitions have been one of the most complex issues confronting international relations in recent times. As the results of the US elections were out, the world waited eagerly to see what stand Donald Trump, the new US president, takes on the much debated nuclear deal with Iran. In a speech, in March, 2017, to a Conference of the American Israeli Public Affairs Committee in Washington Trump clearly said that his number one priority is to dismantle the ‘disastrous’ deal with Iran. The predilections of President Donald Trump for renegotiation of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action have been very much evident in his election campaigns. In fact, Trump’s provocative statements have left Tehran rather disgruntled about the sudden change in the US stand on the Iranian nuclear deal. Ali Akbar Salehi, the Director of the Atomic Energy Organization of Iran said Iran will ‘act appropriately’ if US President Donald Trump ‘tear up’ the deal (Tehran Times 2017).¹ The then US secretary of state Rex Tillerson termed the Iran nuclear deal a failure and said that an unrestrained Iran could become another North Korea. He categorically asserted that Iran’s nuclear ambitions pose a serious threat to the international community. Tillerson even accused Iran of fomenting trouble in the region including the turmoil in Syria, undermining US interests in several countries, endorsing attacks against Israel and sponsoring cyber and terror attacks across the world (The Economic Times 2017).

The entire issue revolves mainly around the lack of trust between Iran and the West especially the USA with regard to the nature of Iran’s nuclear program. While Iran has repeatedly claimed its nuclear program to be entirely peaceful, the USA and the West have been clamoring about the malign intentions of Iran.² The surreptitious nature of its nuclear activities and its alleged links with the A.Q. Khan network have courted international vilification over the years (Wilber 2006).

The subsequent years have seen a protracted confrontation between Iran and the West (led by the USA). The world has seen the worst of the tussles between the two and relentless diplomatic endeavors continuing for almost a decade till the signing of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, that is, the nuclear deal signed between Iran and the P5+1 (USA, UK, France, Russia, China and Germany). There are a lot of speculations about the future of the nuclear deal as attitude of the current US administration is hardly a positive one. A part from the unenthusiastic acceptance of the deal on the part of the Trump administration, the new economic sanctions slapped against Iran for rolling back its ballistic missiles program and for countering its allegedly ‘malign activities’ in the Middle East is likely to affect any positive contribution of the 2015 nuclear accord. It is, however, important to mention here that the deal with Iran was limited to the nuclear issue owing to the insistence of the Bush administration to do so. Thus, it is improper to link the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action with its ballistic missile program or any other activity in the region. Although Trump has waived a raft of sanctions against Iran as required under the 2015 nuclear agreement with Iran, staying within the deal for the time being, the US President has warned European allies and the US Congress that it will be the last such waiver he signs if they fail to agree to radical changes. ‘Despite my strong inclination, I have not yet withdrawn the United States from the Iran nuclear deal,’ Trump said in a statement. ‘Instead, I have outlined two possible paths forward: either fix the deal’s disastrous flaws, or the United States will withdraw,’ he added. Recently, Yukia Amano, the International Atomic Energy Agency chief has categorically said that ‘the JCPOA represents a significant gain for verification’. ‘If the JCPOA were to fail, it would be a great loss for nuclear verification and for multilateralism’ (Murphy 2018).

Iran’s Nuclear Ordeal

The current phase of the Iranian nuclear crisis commenced in August 2002 with the shocking revelation of Iran’s nuclear research and enrichment facilities in Natanz and Arak, by the National Council of Resistance on Iran, an Iranian opposition group in exile in the USA.³ These revelations marked the beginning of a protracted nuclear imbroglio that spanned across a decade and half. Mohammed Elbaradei, the former Director General of the IAEA, considered Iran’s failure to report imports of nuclear material and the activities and facilities in which it was processed, a violation of its safeguards agreement (Giles 2015). Between 2003 and mid-2006, Tehran did not cease its uranium enrichment program, while continuing indolent negotiations with Britain, France and Germany (EU-3) and fending off the UN and the IAEA. The ensuing international condemnation for Iran’s alleged links with the A.Q. Khan networks and purchasing enrichment technology from black market has implicated Iran in proliferating activities (Vishwanathan and Nagappa 2013).

Despite its entitlement under Article IV of the NPT, to legitimate access to nuclear technology for peaceful usage, Iran’s nuclear program has raised concerns across the international community over the years due to its illicit procurement of technology, clandestine nuclear activities and its failure to come up with plausible evidence of the peaceful purpose of its nuclear program that it has been claiming for a long time. Iran’s response to the international pressure has also been rather fluctuating (Thakur and Evans 2013). Its frequent oscillation between an apparent willingness to engage in negotiations with the P5+1, its unenthusiastic concurrence to cooperate with the IAEA and a recurrent denial and a lapse into disinclination have been rather confusing for both the IAEA and the international community (Samuel 2012). Notwithstanding these inconsistencies in Iran’s behavior, the perception of the West especially the USA in the case of Iran, however, has been rather complex, disapproving and hypercritical at times (Abtahi 2014). The US paranoia in the post-9/11 phase unleashed an open-ended war on terror. The Bush administration, determined to recriminate the ‘recalcitrant’ states, that is, Iraq, Iran and North Korea, clubbed them as an ‘Axis of Evil’, and it justified its unilateral and hegemonic policies as an imperative to save the world from the malicious states, such as Iraq, Iran and North Korea. And the degree of international surveillance grew more and more intrusive over the years. While the United Nations Security Council has thrust upon the Islamic Republic successive resolutions—1696 (2006)⁴; 1737 (2006)⁵; 1747 (2007)⁶; 1803 (2008)⁷; 1929 (2010)⁸ without any concrete evidence of Iran’s hunt for nuclear weapons, Iran has been under the scanner of the IAEA for quite a long time now. The USA and Israel have also been contemplating possible pre-emptive strikes to extirpate Iran’s nuclear facilities.⁹ Despite being rather moderate in their approach to Iran initially the European ‘troika’ (Germany, France and Great Britain, also known as EU3) eventually joined the USA in censuring Iran’s alleged nuclear aspirations and threatened it with plausible economic sanctions after the referral of Iran’s case to the United Nations Security Council. Iran’s ordeal became harder as the USA, French and British leaders disclosed the Fordow Fuel enrichment Plant, in a tunnel in the mountains near Qom, near a military base with air defense systems (Heinonen 2014).

Iran, however, has been arguing that the demand for suspension of its uranium enrichment and reprocessing activities by the IAEA Board of Governors and the UN Security Council has only made the nuclear apartheid ingrained in the nuclear non-proliferation regime more conspicuous. Any such demand, Iran claimed, would contravene Article IV of the NPT, the UN Charter and the rights to development and education. It is important to maintain here that the Paris Agreement in which Iran pledged to suspend its activities is not after all, a binding treaty, and therefore according to Iran, divergence from it should not tantamount to non-compliance of its treaty obligations.

Iran, according to many Iranian officials, has confronted serious obstacles to its pursuit of nuclear technology: unilateral abrogation of contracts to build power plants by the Western contractors, refusal of the USA to supply the nuclear material for the US built medical research reactor in Tehran and the opposition to its membership of the Eurodif. But there is no denying the fact that Iran has sought to get leverage from its membership of the NPT since 2002 by shifting the debate toward the perennial question of its rights under the treaty. In attempting to establish its right to enrichment and full fuel cycle and therefore to legitimize its nuclear pursuit, Iran has claimed that the Western opposition to its nuclear activities is an infringement on its right to peaceful uses of nuclear technology as enumerated in the NPT (Bowen et al. 2016). Iran has also repeatedly questioned the legal validity of its referral to the UN Security Council in the absence of a perquisite inspector finding it in violation of its Safeguards agreement with the IAEA or the NPT.

In fact six former European Union (EU) ambassadors to Iran—from UK, Germany, Sweden, Belgium, France and Italy— have sought to bring out the profound difference between the ‘non-compliance based on the failure to report’ and a major violation of the NPT. But Iran’s insistence on having access to the entire fuel cycle that includes processes like enrichment and reprocessing may also suggest Iran’s desire to manufacture nuclear weapons in future as and when needed. That possibility cannot be entirely ruled out (Barzashka and Oelrich 2012). Several enrichment techniques have been used for this purpose—Electromagnetic isotope separation, one of the earliest techniques was used to produce the Hiroshima bomb. As far as Iran is concerned, it can be said that although some technical evidences have undermined Tehran’s claims of peaceful nuclear program, the absence of any incontrovertible evidence allows Iran to continue its peaceful nuclear pursuit argument (Hobbs and Moran 2012).

Progress seemed to be on the cards in October 2009, as Iran agreed in principle to accept the IAEA proposal of sending a significant portion of (1,200 kg) of Iran’s declared Low Enriched Uranium stocks to Russia and France for its conversion into fuel for the Tehran Research Reactor. Eventually, however, Iran’s refusal to accept the draft technical agreement invited fresh sanctions, from both the United Nations Security Council and the USA. The EU measures, especially the EC Council Regulation 961 of October 2010, focused on energy, shipping and other sectors severely affected Iranian economy. Several other countries including Australia, Canada, Japan, Norway and South Korea also imposed additional measures.

The negotiations between Iran and the P5+1 held in Istanbul, Baghdad and Moscow ended in a dead heat in 2012 as none of the parties relented. The Western demands for halting Iran’s production of 20 percent enriched uranium, Iran’s expectations of immediate relief from the economic sanctions and a reconsideration of an EU embargo on Iranian oil to take effect from July 1, 2012, made any tangible solution to the problem even more difficult (D’Angelo and Grisorio 2012).

Hassan Rouhani, the newly elected President in 2013, took a much more pragmatic approach to the nuclear issue. Unlike his predecessor, Rouhani, who previously worked as Iran’s chief nuclear negotiator under President Khatami, opted for diplomatic acumen to end the protracted nuclear stand-off with the West and end Iran’s diplomatic isolation.¹⁰ President Rouhani went for discussing the outstanding issues with the US President Barack Obama—the first ever communication between the USA and Iranian President. And eventually in July 2015, the negotiations aimed at preventing Iran from acquiring nuclear weapons resulted in the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action between Iran and the P5+1 countries (China, Russia, France, UK, USA and Germany).

The Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, signed on July 14, 2015, was indeed a major breakthrough in the Iranian nuclear imbroglio. It seeks to make deep cuts in Iran’s existing uranium enrichment capacity and the re-design of its planned plutonium-production reactor, which will tantamount to eliminating its fissile material production capability for at least 10–15 years. It also calls for more intrusive monitoring by the IAEA to come up with conclusive evidence of compliance. Iran in return would get the nuclear-related sanctions imposed by the USA and the EU suspended and eventually terminated. The deal is already headed for much trouble.

Since, the new US President Donald Trump took office, Europe and the USA have taken increasingly different approaches toward Iran, with Europe seeking new areas of economic engagement in Iran, and the US Stance alternating frequently between an unenthusiastic commitment to the deal and anti-Iran rhetoric (Tehran Times 2017). Although the UN Secretary General Antonio Guterres applauded Iran for its ‘full and effective’ compliance in his third biannual report on the implementation of the nuclear deal, Washington hardly seemed to be convinced about the efficacy of the Iran deal. It has been rather ‘unhappy’ with the ‘flawed’ deal that has allegedly overlooked some serious issues like Tehran’s human rights record, its alleged support for US-designated terror groups and its role in the regional military conflicts. With so much dissatisfaction coming from the USA, the prospects of the Iranian nuclear deal seemed to be rather uncertain right from the beginning.

The USA and Europe initiated talks after President Donald Trump imposed a deadline to revise the Iran nuclear deal. Americans and Europeans were engrossed in high-stakes talks to settle the outstanding issues tabled by the negotiators during the diplomatic endeavors meant for restraining Iran’s nuclear ambitions. The Europeans were insistent on seeking assurances that the Trump administration will not back out from any deal they strike. But the State Department had asked the US diplomats to categorically mention that any agreement must address Iran’s missile activities and extend the date when key provisions of the deal expire. Iran must also agree to international inspections of the military sites. The USA has also been fixated with the much debated ‘sunset clauses’ that deal with the expiration of the provisions that limit Iran’s access to nuclear material and advanced technology. Notwithstanding the chances of an explicit concurrence between the two parties, ‘Europe is not going to give Trump all he wants in making restrictions permanent’, said Cliff Kupchan, chairman of risk analysis firm, the Eurasia Group (Christopher 2018).

The Heyday of Iran’s Nuclear Pursuit: The Shah Years

Iran’s nuclear ambitions got a fillip during the Shah years. The key Iran’s development, the Shah firmly believed, lies in education, urbanization and technological advancement that can ‘only’ be achieved through close ties with the West. Iran, under the Shah, was intent on developing a complete nuclear fuel cycle and it negotiated for plutonium reprocessing technologies from West Germany and some hot cells for separation of Plutonium from the USA. While one 5 MW HEU research reactor known as the Tehran Research Reactor was set up with the US assistance, the latter also offered training in nuclear science and technology to a large number of scientists and engineers from Iran.

The cordial relationship of the USA with Shah helped Iran become a leading force in the region. Iran’s nuclear aspirations got a boost under the Atoms for Peace Program of the USA. The intensifying relations between the USA and Iran culminated in the Agreement for Cooperation Concerning the Civil Uses of Atoms in 1957 after negotiation of 2 years. (Kibaroglu 2007). Iran’s scientific and technological infrastructure got a boost in the 1960s with numerous Iranian students attending universities in Europe and the USA and technicians acquiring advanced training abroad. A remarkable leap in the USA–Iran relations came as Richard Nixon came to power. Nixon clearly admitted that the USA had strategic interests in both Iran and Saudi Arabia. Caught up as it was in the Vietnam War Washington needed Iran (Patrikarakos 2012). The USA envisaged an assertive role for Iran not only in securing the Persian Gulf but also forestalling Soviet designs.

However, despite its amiable relations with the USA, the latter was rather miffed with the outrageous statements of the Shah about his determination to acquire sophisticated weaponry to stave off the ‘external threats’ that the USA had considered to be an erroneous calculation if not exaggerated. And the scale of Shah’s arms purchase also left the US Department of Defense worried. But it is the strategic importance of Iran that eventually compelled the US to relent and help it build a nuclear infrastructure. The USA could not avert a tight rope walking between two extreme policy options vis-à-vis Iran—an uninhibited support for the Shah in a time of vigorous change and total withdrawal of the US support. It could neither afford to leave Iran unbridled nor could it risk losing its strategic assets in the Middle East (Kibaroglu 2007).

Iran in the Post-Shah Years: From a Trusted Friend to an Estranged ‘Dissident’

The toppling of the Shah caused a rift in the USA–Iran ties. Iran, the watchdog of the US interests, became an enemy following the Iranian Revolution of 1979 that displaced the Shah regime from power. There was a sudden cessation of the transfer of nuclear science and technology from the USA and Europe to Iran as the Islamic Revolution of 1979 sealed its fate. The Islamic Republic of Iran found itself in isolation following the Hostage Crisis that apparently tarnished all prospects of restoring ties with Washington any time soon. The world stood baffled as a group of students calling themselves followers of the Imam’s Line stormed the US Embassy on November 4, 1979, and took the diplomats in hostage for 444 days. This incident violated all norms of international diplomacy, enraged the USA, weakened the moderates and strengthened the Islamists who firmly believed that the hostage taking was a suitable response to the years of US planning against Iran (Krass et al. 1983).

After Ayatollah Khomeini came to power, he sought to reverse Iran’s nuclear pursuit. But the new Islamic Republic inherited decent-sized nuclear hardware, materials and technology. Although Khomeini ordered a freeze to the nuclear program, rudimentary training and experimentation continued at the Tehran Nuclear Research Center. And the ensuing incidents in the international arena reinvigorated Iran’s nuclear activities. First, while the revolution had unleashed a new state that looked wobbly and needed to be put in order, Iran got entangled in a war with Iraq almost in no time. And during this time the West not only abstained from condemning the atrocities of Saddam Hussein, it allegedly helped Iraq politically and militarily win the war. Second, severe energy crisis in post-Revolutionary years had compelled the top Iranian clergy to change their attitude to nuclear projects and to prioritize the construction of nuclear power plants. Third, eventually the blatant demonstrations of US hegemony right from its victory in the Gulf War of 1991, the invasion of Afghanistan to the occupation of Iraq in 2003 have made Iran even more jittery about external threats.

Iran already has had a tough time dealing with a sinister image it has across the international community, thanks to its constant demonization by the West especially the USA. Its nuclear ambitions have confronted serious resistance from successive US administrations following the Islamic Revolution of 1979. The Reagan administration managed to convince Europe to impose rigorous export controls on dual-use nuclear technologies and cajoled Germany to stop all kinds of assistance to the nascent nuclear program of Iran. By 1996, the US pressure compelled China to suspend assistance to the Iranian nuclear program. With the EU and China off board, Iran turned to Russia for nuclear assistance. Throughout the 1990s, the USA tried hard to dissuade Russia from assisting Iran through all possible means-warnings, threats of selective sanctions and promises of expanding economic ties.

The US Securitization of Iran was a demonstration of the propensity of the neoconservatives to demarcate the world into black and white. Their penchant for a vigorous US global leadership was clearly expressed in the open letter sent to President Clinton (Hayes 2009). The letter categorically urged for securitizing Iraq that may use or threaten to use its much debated weapons of mass destruction, as the diplomatic maneuvers floundered and taking military action to remove Saddam Hussein from power.

In the post-9/11 era, the US predilection for securitizing the ‘dissenters’ and using the war on terror as a pretext for implementing their agenda became more evident. The US invasion of Iraq was viewed as a prelude to many similar military interventions in the Middle East. The prolonged period of unrestrained exertion of force in Iraq by the US forces disquieted the Middle East to a great extent.¹¹ Iran has already experienced frequent bouts of US sanctions since the 1980s for its alleged support for international terrorism, violation of human rights and its refusal to cooperate with the IAEA. The Iranian economy has been reeling under stringent US sanctions proscribing almost all trade with Iran. With the election of the conservative-hardline president Ahmadinejad, there was a significant change of political milieu in Iran. The new hardliners consented to resuming enrichment immediately after the new President took office. His ultra-nationalist stand on the nuclear issue resented the West.

One has to understand that despite the end of the Cold War, nuclear weapons continue to be legitimized by treaties (like the NPT) that clearly seek to turn nuclear weapons into an exclusive right of the privileged few (Simpson 1994). The American, European and Russian doctrines unequivocally recognize the importance of nuclear weapons in national and collective defense strategies. The post-Cold War international system was characterized by American pre-eminence and unilateralism; and by the increased role of nuclear weapon as a means of political blackmail. These factors have fomented the nuclear arms race, lowered the threshold for resorting to nuclear weapons and dramatically increased the insecurity and vulnerability of non-nuclear weapons states over the years. The Islamic Republic of Iran for the USA and the West for that matter has been a dissident, a ‘rogue’ or ‘outlaw’ or a recalcitrant state that cannot be trusted with nuclear weapons.

Iran’s nuclear ambitions have been a cause of concern for the West since the overthrow of the Shah regime, while the West especially the USA has been inconsistent in its reactions to similar nuclear ambitions of other states such as Pakistan, Israel or India (Barzegar 2014). However, it is difficult to draw a direct parallel between Iran on the one hand and India, Pakistan and Israel on the other. Iran is a party to the NPT and therefore bound to comply with its obligations as mentioned in the treaty, while the other states are not so. But the latent element of hypocrisy of the overall US non-proliferation policy is very much evident in its inconsistent approach toward different states across a different time frame.

The US policy of selective proliferation is demonstrative of the way threats and dangers are identified by the USA. In 2005, the USA and India declared a global strategic partnership to counter China’s rise as an Asian hegemon. One remarkable element of this policy was the US pledge to end its moratorium on nuclear cooperation with India, a country that has refused to sign the NPT and continues to produce fissile materials for its nuclear program. While the Bush administration perceives India as ‘a responsible state with advanced nuclear technology’ in 2005 in the wake of the Indo-US nuclear deal, the Clinton administration sanctioned the same nation for conducting multiple underground nuclear tests in Pokhran in 1998. Former US National Security Adviser Zbignieu Brzenski observes:

The US decision to assist India’s nuclear programme, driven largely by the desire for India’s support for the war in Iraq and as a hedge against China has made the US look like a selective promoter of nuclear weapons proliferation. This double standard will complicate the quest for a constructive resolution of the Iranian nuclear problem. (Kinch 2016)

The US indifference to the nuclear ambiguities of Israel and the latter’s ability to avert international surveillance despite there being a broad agreement about Israel possessing a fairly bulging nuclear arsenal have irked Iran. Notwithstanding the leverage Israel continues to enjoy in the Middle East, by adopting a policy of ‘deterrence through uncertainty’, it can never be subjected to world policing as it is a non-NPT state. But these technical loopholes are likely to weaken the morale of many other states like Iran that have been put through stern surveillance procedures. Similarly, the fact that although the USA did not directly assist Pakistan’s nuclear weapons program, it simply looked the other way as Pakistan kept on building a nuclear arsenal makes US double standards more distinct. Pakistan has been a crucial buffer state and ally first against the Soviet Union and then in the War on Terror. The American Presidencies right from Jimmy Carter to George W. Bush had been conspicuously soft on Pakistan and had been refuting or tampering with the intelligence reports about Pakistan’s nuclear activities, misguiding the Congress and the American people about the malign intentions of Pakistan. Their insouciance vis-à-vis Pakistan’s nuclear weapons program is a sharp contrast to the way Iran has been vilified.

There is no denying the fact that Iran has had a long and continuing record of concealing sensitive nuclear activities and facilities from the IAEA and upon discovery, of cooperating with the IAEA in reluctant and inconsistent manner (Bowen and Brewer 2011). The actual difficulty lies in the dual nature of the nuclear technology and the lack of completely infallible procedure or instruments of monitoring. But Iran will hardly be an exception if it actually pursues nuclear weapons under the garb of an apparently ‘peaceful’ civilian nuclear program. Most states with nuclear weapons have developed then parallel with their civilian nuclear energy programs (Alam 2011).

Iran’s Arguments

Iran has always refuted the allegations of pursuing nuclear weapons. But it has been vigorously defending its right to pursue nuclear program for civilian purposes. It has been extremely assertive in defending its ‘legitimate’ rights to pursue nuclear technologies for peaceful purposes. The USA and its European allies have, however, argued that Iran’s nuclear pursuit exceeds the requirements of a peaceful nuclear energy program.

One can hardly deny that the incentives to acquire and sustain nuclear arsenal will be there after all, as long as a single country possesses nuclear weapons. The USA and other nuclear weapons states are heading for up-gradation of their nuclear arsenal, while paying a lip service to their commitment to work toward eventual elimination of nuclear weapons. Moreover, the West especially the USA has been arguing that Iran’s acquisition of nuclear weapons will lead to nuclear proliferation across the region. This is indeed a problematic proposition. While Israel’s nuclear pursuit did not result in a surge of proliferating activities across the Middle East, why would a nuclear Iran lead to an arms race in the region? And in any case Israel’s nuclear capabilities would keep the incentive for nuclear pursuit very much alive regardless of Iran’s drive for nuclear weapons. Nuclear capability in the present context can hardly be a matter to be worried about. It is the intentions of the states that can be a cause of concern. And it is almost impossible to gauge intentions of the states (Misztal 2011).

Moreover, there is a need to address the legitimate interests of Iran. Iran has a very strong economic rationale for its prolonged interest in nuclear power—the need to diversify an oil-dependent energy sector to deal with spiraling consumption of electricity and petroleum and eventual depletion of oil resources caused by a growing population. It is an undeniable fact that nuclear energy would help Iran earn more revenues from increased oil and gas exports. Although buying nuclear fuel would anytime be cheaper, nuclear fuel assurance agreements may anytime be violated as its experience clearly suggests. Thus, the fickleness of the political whims of the suppliers makes domestic fuel production an economically and strategically prudent option for Iran. And as far as the international debate over Iran’s rights to pursue uranium enrichment is concerned, one can clearly discern that Iran is hardly an exception. There are many non-nuclear weapon state parties to the NPT such as Argentina, Brazil, Germany, Japan and the Netherlands—who have uranium enrichment facilities, as do the five nuclear weapons state parties—UK, USA, China, France and Russia.

Iran’s nuclear aspirations have not been shaped by only economic interests. The political arguments are probably stronger. The political symbolism associated with acquiring an expensive and technically demanding technology, such as uranium enrichment or the development of nuclear weapons must be taken into account while delving into the motivations behind Iran’s nuclear aspirations (Bowen and Brewer 2011). Iran has always sought complete autonomy in nuclear decision-making. Iran’s assertive gestures have been an outcome of both its ambitions and fears. Iran’s aversions to a second-class status and insistence on acquiring self-sufficiency by mastering the entire nuclear fuel cycle have been evident for a long time now. The hostilities between Iran and the USA in fact go far beyond the nuclear issue.

The conflict between the USA and Iran is that of identity. It is a conflict between an intolerant hegemon that is averse to any kind of dissidence and an unyielding state with an old but glorious civilization that could challenge the hegemon in a region where the latter seeks complete submission. Its ambitions to become a great power and a dominant player in the Persian Gulf region and acquire a significant position in international politics have been a lineage that runs from the Shah and his innovative modernization endeavors of the 1960s and the 1970s. The means of achieving ascendancy in the region have varied over the years but the fundamental aim of rising to prominence has, however, remained constant (Sherrill 2012). And Iran’s pursuit for supremacy has raised eyebrows in the West especially the USA in the post-Shah years. The US interest in seeking and maintaining a friendly regime in Tehran probably emanates from its desire to control Iran’s vast energy reserves. And the US intolerance of Iran’s dissidence is an attempt to ensure that it does not provoke similar instances of ‘disobedience’ across the region.

The deep-seated fear of being vulnerable to attack by the ‘enemies’ has also shaped Iran’s nuclear ambitions. The dreadful experience of the Iraq–Iran war of the 1980s had compelled Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini, the founding father of the Islamic Revolution, to reluctantly concede that Iran needed to take all necessary actions including the development of nuclear weapons if the need be to stave off the hostile Arab states. With the fall of Saddam Hussein’s regime, Iraq may not be a cause of concern for Iran, but there are many Arab states like Saudi Arabia who may seek an end to the supremacy of Ayatollah. The relations between Tehran and Riyadh have grown bitter over the years mainly because owing to the reservations of the Ayatollahs about accepting the Saudi royal family as the suitable guardians of the holy Islamic shrines at Mecca and Medina. Iran’s security concerns cannot be undermined at all. The USA which has been its principal strategic threat since the days of the Islamic Revolution of 1979 has had considerable military presence on Iran’s land borders since 2001. The USA has also maintained a continuous and visible naval presence in the Gulf. Apart from occupying Iraq to Iran’s west and Afghanistan to its east, the USA has been maintaining cordial relations with other neighbors such as Pakistan, Turkey, Saudi Arabia, Israel and India. Iran considers the US presence in the Middle East as a serious hurdle to the realization of its international objectives. Then, there is Israel that according to the Federation of American Scientists has had nuclear capable missiles since 1966—one of the main driving forces behind Iran’s nuclear aspirations. Israel is believed to possess at least 100 bunker-busting bombs or as they are called mini nukes, which are not only laser-guided but also capable of striking underground nuclear labs or storage facilities (Beehner 2006). But for Iran, is it Israel’s nuclear capability or its status of the only nuclear state in the region, that actually acted as a driving force behind its nuclear aspirations is difficult to be discerned.

Conclusion

One has to understand that a nuclear armed Iran is hardly foregone conclusion. There is no evidence to suggest that a political decision has already been taken by the Iranian authorities to acquire nuclear weapons. The Iranian President, Hasan Rouhani, in the wake of his second term in office stated that ‘transition from the most difficult sanctions was achieved through a combination of the power of diplomacy and deterrent defensive power’. He clearly insisted on the need for sustaining the constructive engagement in the coming years. But the recent sanctions imposed by the USA against Iran’s ballistic missile program smacks off US desire to change its stand on the Iranian issue.

President Donald Trump never looked happy with JCPOA as it stands and expressed his desire to renegotiate the deal. In fact his picks for the Cabinet include people who have been against the Iran deal. Trump’s pick to replace John Brennan, the chief of the Central Intelligence Agency, Mike Pompeo posted on Twitter that he was looking forward to ‘rolling back’ the nuclear deal with Iran, calling it ‘disastrous’ and labelling Iran as ‘the world’s largest state sponsor of terrorism’ (Taneja 2016). Tillerson speaking at the State Department said the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action ‘dealt with a very small slice’ of Iran’s actions and ‘ignored all of their other detrimental activities in the region’, unequivocally hinting at Iran’s contentious ballistic missiles program and its activities in Iraq, Syria, Yemen and other places. Iran according to Tillerson has been violating the ‘spirit’ of the Iran deal if not its actual provisions. President Donald Trump’s refusal to recertify the Iranian nuclear deal has raised eyebrows across the strategic circles. Calling Iran the world’s ‘leading state sponsor of terrorism’, President Trump has accused Iran violating the terms of the agreement. The other parties to the deal however refrained from sharing this view. Trump’s perception about the efficacy of JCPOA is clearly a pessimistic one: ‘In just a few years, as key restrictions disappear, Iran can sprint towards a rapid nuclear weapons’ breakout.’ In his recent speeches at the White House, the US President has been clearly blaming and shaming Iran for its alleged links with terrorist outfits like Al-Qaeda, Hamas and Hezbollah and its role in the civil wars in the Middle East. Trump intends to link the Iranian nuclear deal with its allegedly malign behavior in other areas of the Middle East.

Trump’s recent announcement on Tuesday afternoon (May 8, 2018) expressing US intent to exit the Iran nuclear deal and restore sanctions against Iran has landed the USA and the Middle East into a new maze of uncertainties. However, Britain, France and Germany remain committed to the deal. In exiting the JCPOA, Trump has not only estranged the US allies in Europe but also potentially triggered a new crisis in the gulf. He has justified his decision to withdraw from the deal by claiming that Iran is pursuing nuclear weapons without providing any evidence to substantiate his claims. ‘At the heart of the deal was a giant fiction,’ Trump said (The Guardian 2018). The US pull-out may also alienate Russia and China as its terms with both the countries have already deteriorated. Russia and China have rejected any renegotiation of the Iran nuclear deal and are unlikely to roll back their expanding economic and commercial ties with Iran. The USA attempts to extend sanctions to penalize countries or companies doing business with Iran are in fact likely to irk Russia, China and the European countries that have serious economic and commercial stakes involved (Saran 2018). The US withdrawal, however, does not render the deal redundant. Technically, it is an agreement between Iran and the P5+1 (USA, UK, France, Russia, China and Germany), which means USA leaving the deal does not end it. If the other members of the P5+1 manage to stave off the sanctions, Iran may continue to abide by the terms of the deal. But it is too early to predict the course of action Iran would take. After all, the Iran deal is a quid pro quo. Iran agreed to roll back its nuclear program as the signatories lifted sanctions offering Iran several economic opportunities. If the European powers now fail to deliver real economic benefits as they had promised, Iran may chip away from the deal and resume uranium enrichment. It is an undeniable fact that a nuclear Iran may be dangerous but only as much as a nuclear Israel or any other state. It may or may not have a domino effect in the region. But the chances of other states following the suit are there, like in any other region in the world. Saudi Arabia has clearly threatened to acquire nuclear weapons if Iran goes nuclear. And if Saudi Arabia at all trades the nuclear path, Turkey may also consider nuclear option. In short, Trump has jarred a new crisis in the Middle East, a region already mired in several interwoven conflicts.

Footnotes

Declaration of Conflicting Interests

The author(s) declared no potential conflicts of interest with respect to the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article.

Funding

The author(s) received no financial support for the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article.

1

US President Donald Trump claimed that Iran was formally ‘on notice’ following its recent missile test. ‘Iran has been formally put on notice for firing a ballistic missile. Should have been thankful for the terrible deal the US made with them!’ Trump tweeted. Details available at

2

The Bush administration categorically stated that nuclear weapons in the hands of the Ahmadinejad regime would be a grave threat to people everywhere. It even urged the Congress for endorsing a seven-fold increase in funding to launch the biggest ever propaganda campaign against the Tehran government with the worsening terms between the USA and Iran.

3

‘As the Middle East is among the most strategic areas of the globe, the world community has been witness to Iran’s call in 1974, for the first time, to establish a nuclear weapon free zone in the Middle East. Israel, however, the only non-adherent party has so far not been cooperative in this regard. It has consistently shrugged off this essential international call for safety and peace by turning its back on world public opinion and by refusing to even allow the Agency to inspect its nuclear installations. Such an arrogant attitude is certainly not conducive and will most probably lead to an apprehensive paradigm with unexpected consequences in the region. It, therefore, goes without saying that adherence to NPT by all the regional member states is an essential preliminary step towards the establishment of Nuclear Weapon Free Zone in the Middle East.

(Statement by H.E. Reza Aghazadeh, Vice President of the Islamic Republic of Iran and the President of the Atomic Energy Organization of Iran at the 46th General Conference of the IAEA, Vienna, September 16, 2002).

4

The UN Security Council adopted Resolution 1696 () by a vote of 14 in favour to 1 against (Qatar) demanding suspension of uranium enrichment by Iran within August 31, 2006, failing which it will face possible economic sanctions.

5

Resolution 1737, adopted by the United Nations Security Council (2006) established a Security Council Sanctions Committee, and imposed sanctions on Iran for failing to comply with the earlier resolution (1696) seeking complete suspension of its enrichment activities. It also imposed a ban on the supply of nuclear technology and materials and called for freezing assets of the key individuals and companies related to the enrichment programme. Available at

6

Security Council, determined to constrain Iran’s pursuit of sensitive technologies required for nuclear and missile programmes, unanimously adopted resolution 1747 (2007) urging Iran to immediately suspend all enrichment-related and reprocessing activities including research and development. Available at

7

The UN Security Council Resolution 1803 adopted in 2008 requires Iran to desist from any and all uranium enrichment and to freeze any research and development associated with centrifuges and uranium enrichment. Available at

8

UN Security Council Resolution 1929 urges Iran not to undertake any activity related to ballistic missiles capable of delivering nuclear weapons, including using ballistic missile technology. It categorically states that the state shall take all necessary measures to prevent the transfer of technology or technical assistance to Iran related to such activities. Available at

9

Avigdor Liberman, the current Defence Minister compared the Iran nuclear deal to the 1938 Munich Agreement, labelling the deal with Iran as ‘total capitulation to unrestrained terrorism and violence in the international arena’. For further details refer to , August 5).

10

Iranian President Hassan Rouhani, lashing out at Donald Trump’s threats to scrap the 2015 nuclear deal with Iran, defended the latter at the United Nations, saying it was an internationally endorsed accord that should not be destroyed by ‘rougue newcomers to the world of politics’. For details refer

11

‘No target could have seemed more worthy of being crushed than Iraq’s brutal dictator, Saddam Hussein. Sadly, however, the elimination of this tyrant was perhaps the only positive result of the war. The war aimed to eliminate weapons of mass destruction, but there weren’t any,’ said Hans Blix, the former UN Weapons inspector who headed the United Nations monitoring, verification and inspection commission from March 2000 to June 2003. For further details refer to .

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