Russo/Nigerian Relations in the Context of Counterinsurgency Operation in Nigeria

Introduction

The relations between Nigeria and predecessor, the defunct Soviet Union, tended to highlight the dilemmas of Nigeria in relating with Moscow and wider communist Eastern European states in the immediate years of Nigerian independence in 1960. Despite the establishment of diplomatic relations, however, the tense international climate of Cold War at the time ensured that relations with USSR were constrained. Even though Nigeria had subscribed to the Bandung framework of nonalignment, impartial relations with the East and West were never realized as the professed nonaligned position was largely superficial. This is because Nigerian successive leaders with a few exceptions displayed a strong proclivity toward Western world (Ogunbadejo 1978). Thus, the formal diplomatic exchange between the Soviet Union and Nigeria failed to translate into cordial and effective relations. A combination of Western ideological orientation of the national leaders, colonial legacy, and the nature of Nigerian political and economic systems ensured that the Soviet Union will not be welcomed in Nigeria with open arms. Therefore, Soviet Union and Nigerian relations could be described as ranging from cold to lukewarm (Onafowokan 2010).

As it is often said in diplomatic circle, ‘no permanent friend or enemy in international relations, but permanent interests,’ this maxim was to later shape Nigeria’s relations with Moscow. At different times when faced with existential threats, Moscow has proved more reliable than the USA and Britain in resolving internal crises in the country. As it happened during Nigerian Civil War (1967–1970), almost the same scenario has played out in Nigeria’s counterinsurgency operation. Like the Civil War’s incident, the West hinged its reluctance to sell arms to Nigeria on human rights abuses in the country. The voids created by Washington in the two scenarios were filled by Moscow. Its prompt interventions not only reversed the territorial gains made by Biafran separatist group but also Kremlin weapons were fundamental to the defeat of the rebels in the country. In more recent times, Moscow’s support for Nigeria’s counter terrorism operation was pivotal to the weakening of the terror group of Boko Haram. These interventions, without doubt have cast Russia as Nigeria’s most trusted security partner among great powers. It is in the light of this that this study interrogates the current involvement of Russia in Nigeria’s counterinsurgency operation arguing that an amalgam of forces provides a motivation for Russia’s actions in Nigeria. These factors range from geopolitical calculations to Russia’s anti-global jihadi movement which threatens its own national security and, finally, Russian economic issues. Russia’s counterinsurgency policy in Nigeria has once again raises the important questions about the continued pro-Western stance in Nigeria’s external relations.

Nigerian Civil War: From Pro-West Foreign Policy to Soviet’s Intervention

As a result of the East–West ideological rivalry, Nigeria was worried having effective relations with the Soviets. Nonalignment offered Nigeria at the time the ‘opportunity’ to remain rhetorically neutral in the superpowers’ hostility. The principle was a suitable alternative that would permit Nigeria to be friend to all and enemy to none. Such principled stance, it was reasoned, will enable the new nation and other members of the nonalignment movement to benefit from the development assistance being offered by the two blocs (Ojo and Sesay 1988). However, the Prime Minister, Sir Tafawa Balewa, who was the architect of the Nigeria’s nonaligned worldview, treated the principle with contempt. He did not only follow the dictates of the West but his regime was also rabidly pro-West, so much so that he demonstrated apparent abhorrence to USSR and other Eastern communist states (Anglin 1964). In line with the anti-communist policy of the government, the sale and circulation of any type of communist literature in Nigeria were banned in the 1960s and students were discouraged from taking Soviet’s scholarship that were offered yearly to Nigerians (Ajibola 1978).

The pro-West Nigerian foreign policy made the government to be circumspective of the Soviet incursion into Nigeria. For example, while Nigeria had concluded a defense pact with Britain on the eve of independence in 1960 and gave a £40,000 interest-free loan for the construction of the British High Commission in Lagos (Fawole 2003), not only the same regime limited the number of Soviet diplomats in the country but also restricted the issuance of diplomatic car numbers to the Soviet embassy (Ogunbadejo 1986). Indeed, the conservative government of Balewa never hid its bias against the Soviets. As pointed out by Epelle (1964), Balewa had solemnly assured the British government that he (Balewa) and his other cabinet colleagues were determined that

while we are responsible for the government of the Federation of Nigeria and for the welfare of its people, we shall use every means in our power to prevent the infiltration of communism and communist ideas into Nigeria. (Ibid.: 10)

Preventing the Soviets from gaining a foothold in the country was anchored on the alleged expansionist policy of the communists in Africa. Many Nigerian political elites and commentators shared Balewa’s worldview on international politics. It was generally believed that if the communists were encouraged to have a firm foothold in Nigeria, they might, among other things, harness the local revolutionary pressures to overthrow the pro-West Balewa’s government. Thus, from the onset, federal government wanted to be visibly seen as one of the key friends of the West. Therefore, the only viable option was to draw closer to the West and treat Soviet Union with contempt it deserved. In fact, at one point, the Soviets were implicated in a plot to subvert the Balewa’s administration (Thompson 1969). From the body language of the new nation, it would appear the diplomatic exchange between the Soviet Union and Nigeria was just to create a façade of commitment to nonaligned policy by Nigerian government.

The pro-West Nigerian foreign policy was to undergo a radical transformation following the outbreak of Nigerian Civil War (1967–1970). The war, initially dubbed ‘Police action’, meant to preserve the nation’s unity and maintain its integrity became an epoch-making in the nation’s external relations. The effective utility of propaganda by the Biafran secessionist movement had deleterious effects on Nigerian international image. Aluko (1981) argues that the Biafran propaganda succeeded in persuading many international humanitarian agencies and Western states as well as Catholic Pope that Nigeria was bent on genocide. Consequently, Nigerian Western allies especially the USA and Britain denied Nigeria’s requests for arms, alleging that the war was a genocide against the Igbo ethnic group in eastern Nigeria (Cronge 1972). While the Biafran secessionist movement was getting supports from France and Portugal in forms of arm shipments, mercenaries and more importantly, diplomatic support (Griffin 2014), Nigeria was left to its devices. Expectedly, the shocking Western disappointment convinced the Nigerian political leaders and defense planners that their previous attitude to the Eastern Bloc in general and Soviet Union in particular needed urgent review (Aluko 1981). Having learnt a bitter lesson that one-way traffic in external relations could be detrimental to the country’s well-being, government quickly made use of its tenuous link with the Soviet Union to facilitate arm deal for the war. The Biafran would have succeeded in balkanizing Nigeria had the Soviets refused arms delivery to Nigeria. The ultimate defeat of the Biafran rebels owed so much to the Soviet’s involvement on the side of Nigerian government. Speaking on the rationale behind Soviet Union’s intervention, Kudryavtsev (1968) argues that Moscow intervened in the war because of its intention to protect Nigeria from imperialist machinations. In other words, the military assistance to Nigeria was defined within Soviet Union’s external relations circle as a struggle against capitalism of the West. Obviously, the intervention was governed by the pursuit of Soviet’s national interest (Northedge 1968).

Nigeria was profusely grateful for USSR’s efforts. The state visit by the ex-Head of State, General Yakubu Gowon to USSR in 1974, the first by a Nigerian leader, was meant to convey the Nigeria’s gratitude to Moscow. The visit afforded Nigerian delegation to deliberate with its host on Soviet-Nigerian cooperation in economics, science, technology, trade, and culture. The most crucial area of this economic cooperation was the award of contract to the Soviet Union’s companies for the construction of Ajaokuta Iron and Steel complex and for the laying of the oil pipelines across Nigeria (Agubamah 2014). The Soviets were provided with a degree of foothold in the country. Thereafter, Moscow made several attempts to consolidate its presence in the country as the pro-communist groups and individuals became more vocal in the country.

However, while the Soviets were able to reap economic gains for their military efforts in the country, political and diplomatic benefits remained a mirage (Onafowokan 2010). Apparently, they had hoped to make Africa’s most populous country its important ally, such a yearning became a pipedream. All their efforts to ensure that Nigeria jettisons the Western system of economic development and embraces socialist model of development proved abortive. In fact, the Soviet’s relentless prodding to Nigeria for the collectivization of agriculture and bring the entire industrial sector under public enterprise was never heeded by the government (Ogunbadejo 1986). General Gowon did not succumb to the pressures to align more politically and economically with Soviet Union by maintaining the capitalist orientation of Nigerian economy. Hence, shortly after the war, Nigeria normalized relations with key Western nations and usual diplomatic engagements resumed.

The Resurgent Russia and Boko Haram Insurgency

The triumph of capitalism over communism following the unexpected collapse of the Soviet Union left Russia, the successor state to USSR, without ideological basis to continue with its hostility toward the West. The balkanization of the Soviet empire and dissolution of Warsaw Military alliance made Russia to look inward with a view to revamping its economy that had been badly devastated by arm race and decadent bureaucracy. The ambitious project to establish international communism that would cut across all the nooks and crannies of the world ended abruptly. Throughout the period Boris Yeltsin held sway as the first Russian President, internal issues preoccupied the Russian leadership. In fact, Yeltsin maintained that Russian foreign policy would be less confrontational and follow the ‘principle of real partnership in all directions’ (Adetokunbo 2007: 478). This partnership appeared to be focusing on economic recovery and not for geopolitics. ¹

However, the accession of Vladimir Putin into power in the country in 2000 began an arduous task of rebuilding Russian international engagements with a strong focus on geopolitics aimed at enhancing Russia’s influence and greatness in the world. Putin, the former Soviet’s KGB agent, had bemoaned the shocking collapse of the Soviet Union, calling it ‘the greatest geopolitical catastrophe of the twentieth century’ (BBC 2005). He had also remarked that he would like to reverse the collapse of the defunct Soviet Union if he had the opportunity (Reuters 2018). While regaining a modicum of control over the ‘New Abroad’ (the newly independent states of the defunct Soviet Union) was paramount to Putin’s policy, he was also determined to make Russia a highly powerful state with enough capability to resist Washington’s unilateralism.

After a long lull in Russo-Nigerian relations, the counterinsurgency measure against the seemingly invincible Boko Haram sect has once again reignited warm relations between the two powers. Russian involvement in the anti-Boko Haram campaign alongside regional military coalition was pivotal to the degrading and dislodgement of the terrorists.

Prior to the Russian involvement in the counterinsurgency operation in the country, Jamaa’tu Ahlis Sunna Lidawa’ti Wal Jihad popularly known as Boko Haram (Western Education is forbidden) was a potent existential threat to Nigerian state. Boko Haram, like other Sunni fundamentalist groups, is driven by the millenarian worldview derived from Salafi doctrine (Sampson 2015). In an interview, Dr Johnathan, a lecturer in the University of Maiduguri, Bornu State, stated that the primary goal of Boko Haram is to return the northern region into its purely Islamic past by recreating the dismantled famous Sokoto Caliphate. This ambitious project will, of course, translate into the destruction of the current Nigerian democratic system with its secular constitution through jihad. Its vicious campaign of terror in pursuit of this goal earned it the most brutal terrorist group in the world in the annual report of Global Terrorism Index (GTI 2015). These brutal attacks particularly since the sect’s transmutation into an insurgent group were primarily intended to intimidate the populace, weaken the security architecture of the state, and ultimately overthrow the government, as stated in an interview with Group Captain Sampson Eyekosi, ECOWAS Standby Force on May 5, 2017. The sect’s decision to carve out a caliphate in the Lake Chad region made the group a regional security challenge. Boko Haram’s seeming ‘invincibility’ and its excessive cruelty which had become widely spread by 2014 left no one in doubt of the Nigerian military’s inability to end the impunity of the sect. The poor performance of Nigerian military was primarily blamed on inadequate right arms (Bappah 2016). Apparently, the men and officers of Nigerian army were grossly ill-equipped and were therefore no match for the terrorists who were heavily armored with sophisticated and were well motivated. In his testimony, for instance, a court-marshaled soldier whose division failed to rout Boko Haram in Sambisa Forest claimed that the troops were given five bullets each as well as expired bombs manufactured in 1964, whereas the terrorists were armed with sophisticated weapons like anti-aircraft weapons with a range of over 1,000 meters (Vanguard 2015). However, internal crises within the nation, such as the politicization of the sect’s terrorism by politicians for partisan interests and gross indiscipline in the military manifesting in scandalous cases of corruption, heavily militated against counterinsurgency strategy in the country.

By the early 2014, it had become clear that inadequate hi-tech military hardware as well as high-level corruption among the top commanders was the bane of the military in defeating the group. With the abduction of the Chibok schoolgirls and 2015 general elections underway, government was under intense pressure to end Boko Haram carnage at all costs. Meanwhile, the sect had already annexed more than twenty local government areas in Yobe, Borno, and Adamawa states to its ‘caliphate’, making the area it controlled the size of Belgium (Alfred 2015). Efforts to procure lethal arms from the USA and Britain were met with the brick wall as the two nations were unwilling to sell weapons to Nigeria. The United Kingdom’s decision was blamed on activities of Boko Haram’s moles in Nigerian military. Former UK Minister of State for the Foreign and Commonwealth Office, Hugo Swire, told the British Parliament that London would not deploy military infrastructure to Nigeria to fight Boko Haran because ‘we have heard stories about people changing sides and equipment being seized’ (Igbonwelundu 2015: 7). Whereas appalling human rights abuses of the military in northeast Nigeria were cited by the USA as reasons for invoking Leahy Laws ²

The US Department of State and Defense review all potential arms transfers for their consistency with US policy and interests, as detailed in the US Conventional Arms Transfer policy. This includes any requests from a country that we have sold or donated weapons to resell or donate those same weapons to another country, such as Nigeria. We examine whether an arms transfer makes sense for the needs of the prospective country. Part of our review considers whether equipment may be used in a way that could adversely affect human rights. The United States believes that we bear a certain responsibility for how equipment is ultimately used. We take this responsibility very seriously and our laws require strict accountability for all sales. (Entwistle 2014: 53)

The American reluctance to deliver the weapons to Nigerian military was not unconnected to the alleged collusion between the military and the sect, as stated in an interview with Oluwafemi, Department of Political Affairs, Peace and Security, ECOWAS Commission on May 4, 2017. Thus, the USA was content to supply nonlethal defensive weapons, like anti-landmine vehicles to Nigeria and training Nigerian security personnel on counterterrorist tactics on US soil. In desperation, Nigeria reached agreements with Israel and Brazil for the procurement of the weapons (Soriwei 2016; The Nation 2015), but the deals were blocked by the USA (Ajayi 2014). The decision of the USA to imposed global arm embargo on the country made some Nigerians interviewed to accuse American government for undermining the country’s antiterrorist efforts. In fact, President Muhammadu Buhari declared that Washington arm denial was tantamount to aiding and abetting Boko Haram in Nigeria (BBC 2015).

In view of this disappointment, Nigeria opted for the controversial discreet purchase of weapons from fellow African country, South Africa. Unfortunately, the much-needed arms were never delivered neither was the seized US$15 million meant for the purchase returned to Nigeria as Abuja was accused of an act of illegality for its failure to follow the due process (Reuters 2014). Left without any option, Nigeria had to approach Russia for the equipment as a last resort. Russia, without any form of conditionality, responded positively to Nigeria’s demands (Daily Trust 2014). Russian response marked another milestone in Russo-Nigerian relations. The whole scenario appeared to suggest a reenactment of Nigerian Civil War debacle. While the Soviet Union decided to supply arms to Nigeria during its Civil War in order to have a foothold in the country in the context of Cold War politics, what then informed Russia to render military assistance to the country to combat the insurgents?

Russian Intervention: For Security or New World Order?

Despite being a leader in global war against terrorism, US counterterrorist policy in Nigeria has been worrisome. Its policy contrasts sharply with that of Russia which had been demonstrating willingness to equip Nigerian military with right arms. It is, therefore important to put into proper perspective the rationale behind Russian purposeful engagement with Nigeria. The study reveals that three factors were fundamental to Moscow’s decision. First, the convergence of interest between Nigeria and Russia in the fight against terrorism remains one of the salient reasons Kremlin did not hesitate to accede to Nigeria’s purchase of arms. Since the disintegration of USSR in 1991, Russia, its successor state, has had to contend with brutal rebellion of the largely Islamic separatist movement in Chechnya. The Chechen rebel group has been violently agitating for independence from Russian Federation having been denied statehood following the Gorbachev’s reform that railroaded the empire in 1991.

Twice Russia had carried out all-out wars with Chechnya, destroying Grozny, the capital of the semiautonomous state with its powerful fire power (Alade 2009). Unable to match Russian overwhelming military capability to attain independence, the group had had to resort to terrorism to achieve its goal. The Beslan siege crisis in which more than 1,000 Russians were taken hostage resulting in the killing of more than 300 persons mostly children was carried out by the rebels (Ibid.). Numerous terror attacks in the country were linked to the violent group in Chechnya. Consequently, Russia has had to prioritize fighting terrorism not only within the Russian Federation but also other terror groups outside Russia particularly in Syria. For instance, Vladimir Putin and other senior officials have repeatedly described Russian collaboration with Bashar al-Assad to fight terrorism in Syria as a war of survival for Russia itself (Walker 2016). Thousands of Russians mainly from Chechnya have fled to Middle East to fight in the defense of the ISIS’ caliphate. The triumph of the caliphate or the eventual return of the Russian fighters could pose grave security threat to Russia. In fact, Russian Foreign Affairs Minister, Sergey Lavrov, has acknowledged that ‘ISIS is our biggest enemy at the moment’ (Lavrov 2015). In view of its determined effort to fight terrorism, Russia is more willing in assisting countries battling terrorism. Hence, Iraq, Egypt, Libya, Nigeria, and Philippines among others have enjoyed Moscow’s military aid in varying degree in recent times. While justifying its decision using UN General Assembly platform, Putin asserts:

Russia has consistently opposed terrorism in all its forms. Today, we provide military-technical assistance to Syria, Iraq and other …countries fighting terrorist groups. We think it’s a big mistake to refuse to cooperate with the government forces who are valiantly fighting terrorists on the ground. (President Putin Text of address at 70th Session of the UN General Assembly 2015)

Nigeria is obviously among the ‘other countries’ Russia has been providing military-technical assistance to defeat Boko Haram. The arms supplied by Kremlin have been fundamental in putting the terrorists on the defensive not only in Syria but more importantly in Nigeria.

Second, geopolitical calculation was another crucial factor necessitating Russia’s readiness to agree to Nigeria’s purchase of arms. The Russian President, Putin, had lamented the loss of Russian super power status arising from the dissolution of Soviet Union. The former KGB agent calls the event ‘a geopolitical catastrophe of the twentieth century’. Since his emergence as president, he has charted a new course for Russian foreign policy with a view to reasserting Russian power and prestige as a counterweight to American power, influence, and unilateralism in international system.

While many states are disgusted with impunity inherent in unipolarity of international affairs in which American policies are viewed as arrogant whose increasing influence is largely deemed as undermining state sovereignty, Russia has cast itself as a major victim of the collapse of bipolarity. This is more so given the Washington’s hegemonic coalition’s (comprising the USA and its Western European allies) encroachment into Russian security interests in East and Central Europe, Balkans and Caucasus/Caspian axis. For example, NATO expansion into Russian traditional sphere of influence; American installation of missile shields in Poland and Romania; NATO bombardment of Yugoslavia; leading to the disintegration of the country and Washington penchant to gain leverage in former client states of the Soviet Union unavoidably generated hysteria in Russia (Fox News 2016; Kramer 2016). Concerns associated with Washington’s hegemony and unipolarity have been recognized by a broad cross-section of Russian elites as an extremely negative development which endangers Russian prestige, power, and position within the international system (Ambrosio 2001). This legitimate concerns are making Russian officials in defense and external affairs circles think more about a new world order based on multipolar system.

In 2007 Munich Security Conference Putin argues: ‘Unilateral, illegitimate actions of the United States and its allies are detrimental to global security because they produce new conflicts and wars, intensify the nuclear arm race and lead to a situation where no one feels secure’ (Putin 2007). Writing about Russia’s recent external relations, Stronki and Sokolsky (2017) contend that what is uppermost in Putin’s foreign policy is the undermining US international order so as to create a multipolar world in which Russia plays a more prominent role. Therefore, Russia’s desire for multipolar international system is primarily aimed at establishing an international environment in which Moscow can effectively counterbalance Washington’s military and geopolitical encroachment into its sphere of influence in Eastern Europe. Multipolarity, in the conception of Russia, would serve as an effective check on American unilateralist excesses in global affairs. Apparently, Russia’s inability to stop NATO assault on Yugoslavia and American hegemonic coalition’s victory symbolized the US goals of securing unipolarity and achieving hegemony within the international system (Bordachev 1999). The near consensus in Russia, as Ambrosio (2007) has emphasized, is that the proper response to encroaching US hegemony is the conscious and active construction of multipolarity. That is, establishing a multipolar world, in the thinking of many Russians, would meet the interests of global peace, stability, and development.

However, Russia’s inability to single-handedly resist US hegemony and unilateralism necessitates the aggressive search for allies outside of the American sphere of influence and hegemonic coalition. Thus, Russia has been building a credible pole of influence and power by establishing a network of friends with countries embittered by American policies such as China or countries hostile to Washington’s interests such as the so-called ‘Axis of evil’ (North Korea, Iran, and so on) and the ‘Rogue states’ (Syria, Cuba, Sudan, Venezuela, among others). The geopolitical aphorism of ‘the enemy of my enemy is my friend’ has greatly influenced Russia’s geopolitical calculation with a focus on strengthening the evolving new world multipolar order to effectively balance US unilateralism.

It is in the context of this geopolitical calculation that the Russo-Nigerian security agreement is better understood. Within Africa, Nigeria remains the biggest economy and influential in West African with enormous oil reserves, making it a crucial and major player in the global oil politics. By virtue of its economic potentials and population in Africa, Nigeria appears as a beautiful bride that should be courted by Moscow in its quest to balance the US influence in the continent. The restoration of democracy in Nigeria in 1999 fortuitously coincided with the new foreign policy focus of Kremlin to assert itself in global arena after the disintegration of Soviet Union. President Putin, the architect of the modern resurgent Russia, quickly prioritized Russian engagement with Nigeria. In fact, during the inauguration of the former President Olusegun Obasanjo in May 1999, Putin, as a Prime Minister, sent a personal representative to attend the ceremony and to deliver an invitation to the new President to visit Moscow (Agubamah 2014).

Therefore, the state visit of President Obasanjo to Russia in 2001 pioneered a new chapter in Russo-Nigerian diplomatic relations. As Agubamah has noted:

The signing in Moscow on March, 2001 of the Declaration on Principles of Friendly Relations and Partnership between Nigeria and Russia Federation and several other Agreements established a legal framework for Nigeria-Russian relations and the eventual establishment of the Intergovernmental Commission on Economic and Scientific-Technical Cooperation (ICESTC) between the two countries laid the foundation for forging mutually beneficial relations and helped deepen economic ties. (Ibid.: 197)

The meeting between the former President Yar’Adua and Putin on the sideline of G8 meeting, Germany in 2007 and the state visit to Nigeria by the former President of Russia, Dmitry Medvedev, in 2009 resulted in the strengthening of ties between the two countries. As part of the new level of partnership on Scientific and Technological Cooperation between Russia and Nigeria, in 2011, Nigeria, with the help of the Russian scientists, launched Nigerian SAT 2 and Nigerian SAT X spacecraft into orbit in Russia (The Nation 2011). Nigeria ranks today as the largest trading partner with Russia in Africa outside the BRICS framework.

Relations between the two states were already blossoming when Washington blocked Nigerian efforts at purchasing weapons in the USA, Israel, and Brazil. The resultant strained relations between the two states provided an auspicious environment for Russia to consolidate its budding relations with Nigeria by supplying the much-needed arms. Consequently, Russia was seen by most Nigerians as a national savior, while the USA was identified as ‘unfriendly friend’ in an interview with Permanent Secretary, Ministry of External Affairs Ambassador Enikanolaye Shola, Ministry of Foreign Affairs on May 2, 2017. Expectedly, Moscow’s decision was hailed by Nigerian government. Onyeama Geoffrey, Minister of Foreign Affairs, while commending the Russians agreed with the Putin’s worldview that what the international system needs is multipolarism saying:

You might likely have balance, because if you have one country that is totally dominant, it might not always necessarily make for a balanced approach towards issues. We believe in multilateralism, we believe that the big issues of the day, global issues, should be addressed on a multilateral framework. If you have a unipolar world, you are also most likely to have a process that does not really have the consensus of many other countries. …so we look for Russia’s support in terms of the reforms of the United Nations. (Enumah 2017)

This kind of commendation serves Russian global interest and geostrategic calculations. Its recent global activities suggest Russia is prepared to push back at the US unilateralism, attain leverage in its near abroad, and create a suitable environment for multipolar world.

The Russo-Georgian war of 2008 highlighted Russian preparedness to reassert Moscow’s influence and power in its backyard, sending a clear signal to the American government that it would no longer tolerate its meddlesomeness in Russian near abroad. Before the outbreak of the war, Georgia had intensified efforts to fully absorb the two breakaway territories of South Ossetia and Abkhazia. However, Russia was determined to make the two states technically parts of Russian Federation. Despite US security assurances to Tbilisi, Russia inflicted devastating damages on Georgia in the ensuing war. Being American closest ally in the region notwithstanding, Georgia was left to its own devices in its war with Russia. Russia has since occupied effectively the two semiautonomous entities in violation of French-negotiated agreement of August 2008. More importantly, the 2014 Russian annexation of Crimea in Ukraine in stark violation of Budapest Memorandum of 1994 portrays Russia as important power with enough leverage to push back at expansionism of American hegemonic coalition. The Russian activities in this region were meant to enhance its credibility within its traditional sphere of influence and put the USA on notice of Russia’s policy to challenge the unipolar status quo.

The war in Syria also clearly highlights the geopolitical struggle between the USA and the resurgent Russia. From the onset, Washington favored a regime change (Wilson and Warrick 2011), while Russia, for the reason of geopolitics, preferred a continuation of Assad’s dynasty in the country (Rahman-Jones 2017). The USA have had to suspend its vow of removing Assad as a result of Russian support. In fact, Kremlin has not only been targeting the al Nusra Front and IS but also other US-funded rebel groups opposed to Assad’s regime in Syria. Moscow has successfully blocked several UN resolutions on Syrian Civil War deemed too critical of Bashar al-Assad’s government. Russian policies in Georgia, Ukraine, Iran, and Syria are demonstrations of its public return to great power status with enough credibility to challenge American power and influence in the world. Russia is steadily returning to its geopolitical foundation. It has been an empire for centuries. The last twenty-six years or so were not the new reality, but an aberration which is being addressed now.

Evidently, the current international affairs appear to suggest a ‘polar shift’ in the context of the resurgent Russia. However, Russia is not unmindful of the fact that counterbalancing American power will require a decentralization of international system where four or five major powers such as the USA, Russia, China, and possibly European Union decide the cause of global system under the framework of UN. ‘It is not about Russia’s ambitions’, Putin had stated, ‘… but about the recognition of the fact that we can no longer tolerate the current state of affairs in the world, what we actually propose is to be guided by common values and common interest rather than ambitions’ (President Putin Text of address at 70th Session of the UN General Assembly 2015). Having Nigeria’s support in Africa for its quest for the ultimate end of unipolar international order is crucial for Moscow foreign policy of balancing American power in Africa. Already, Putin, through various forms of assistance, has expanded Russian global influence in a number of African countries such as Libya, Egypt, Zimbabwe, and South Africa.

Finally, the growing Russian economic problem appears to provide a rationale for Russia’s decision to let Nigerian military have the weapons. By late 2014, Russia economy experienced two major shocks, narrowly avoiding recession with moderate growth of 0.6 per cent (Focus Economics 2017). The first shock was the occasioned by the plummeting prices of petroleum in the third and fourth quarters of the year. Russia was among the worst-hit economies, exposing Moscow’s extreme dependence on crude oil. After fluctuating between US$125 and US$135 per barrel from 2011 to 2013, oil prices ended 2014 at less than US$60 per barrel. The second shock was induced by the multiple of Western economic sanctions slapped on Russia for annexing Crimea and supporting the secessionist group fighting Ukrainian government in eastern part of the country. The sanctions negatively affected investors’ appetite for Russian investments resulting in capital flights and high inflation which compounded Russia’s economic woes (BBC 2014). This gloomy economic climate made International Financial Institution (IMF) to declare that Russian economy is already in a recession (Ibid.). The combination of low oil prices and international sanctions had adverse impact on Russian financial system as the country’s currency, ruble, lost 46 per cent of its value against US dollar in the same year (Bowler 2015).

In the context of this economic quagmire, Russia was favorably disposed to the purchase of arms by Nigeria which cost hundreds of millions of US dollar. The Russia’s favorable response to Nigeria’s requests for arms has continued to have implications for Nigeria’s external relations. The discontinuation of training of Nigerian security personnel on counterterrorist operations in the USA in favor of Russia exemplified the direction of Nigerian security policy. Consequently, Nigerian security personnel were dispatched to Moscow for training on counterterrorism operation and how to operate the newly acquired Russian arms (Campbell 2014). This is necessary because Nigerian soldiers were trained on the Western weapons. Also, the impediment constituted to Nigeria’s efforts at getting weapons by the USA generated diplomatic row leading to the termination of the special military program between the two powers by Nigeria to protest the Washington’s actions. The defunct program afforded Nigerian security forces counterterrorism training on American soil.

Conclusion

The Russia’s latest constructive engagement with Nigeria on anti-insurgency measure has further reinforced Moscow’s unwavering commitment to Nigeria’s territorial integrity and national security. This commitment is laudable in view of Nigeria’s reluctance to prioritize relations with USSR after it helped subdued Biafran rebel group in 1970. Without Russia’s efforts, Boko Haram crisis would have been very difficult to manage effectively. To understand Russian prompt intervention by acceding to the Nigerian request for lethal weapons, I argue in this study that three interrelated factors were critical to Russian counterinsurgency policy. The convergence of interest in the fight against Islamist terrorism, the geopolitical calculations in the context of Moscow’s quest for multipolarity, as well as Russia’s economic doldrums were salient in understanding Moscow’s positive intervention in Nigeria’s counterterrorism campaign. It has demonstrated a lot of commitment to the anti-global Islamist jihadi movement within its own border and in a number of countries.

While the article suggests that Nigeria should maintain its neutral stance in the context of the ongoing geopolitical rivalry between the resurgent Russia and the USA, it strongly recommends that it should strengthen relations with Russia in all sectors. This is necessary to foreclose the repeat of post-civil war lukewarm relations. Apparently, Boko Haram has been degraded through the efforts of the regional military coalition, Multinational Joint Task Force (MNJTF), division within the sect as well as military-technical assistance from Russia in particular. However, despite these gains especially in liberating the territory hitherto controlled by the terrorists, the group, though, factionalized, still poses potent threat to human security in the northeast. Nigerian government therefore has to take the bull by the horns by looking inward to end the terrorism of the group. The politicization of the crisis by politicians for partisan interests, the ethnic tension in the country worsening security challenges, and general indiscipline in the military manifesting in huge corruption scandal and alleged collusion with the jihadists have to be meaningfully addressed for Boko Haram crisis to end.

Declaration of Conflicting Interests

The author declared no potential conflicts of interest with respect to the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article.

Funding

The author received no financial support for the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article.