Russo-Iranian Relations in the Light of Putin’s Foreign Policy and the Iranian Nuclear Crisis

Introduction

Russia’s foreign policy under President Putin has undergone remarkable transformation yet certain continuities, from the late Yeltsin period, have continued to characterize its present foreign policy. This has been most starkly visible in Russia’s policy toward Iran, which is flexible and based on its pragmatic considerations. The genesis of this policy can be traced back to Russia’s Foreign Minister under Yeltsin, later the Prime Minister, Yevgeny Primakov, a visionary who directed Russia’s foreign policy away from the West. Iran, initially skeptical of New Russia’s pro-West policy reciprocated with cooperation when it realized that amidst its deteriorating relationship with the USA and the latter’s efforts toward internationally isolating it, Russia was the only viable option available to balance the USA in the region. Thus, the tactical relationship between Russia and Iran has been to a large extent shaped by their respective relationship with the USA. Though domestic developments have also played an important role in furthering cooperation between Russia and Iran, the external context manifested by US’ unilateralism has been the primary determinant shaping the present Russia–Iran bilateral relations.

The article is divided into three broad sections attempting to contextualize Russia–Iran relations. The first section attempts to comprehend the nature of Russia–Iran relations and takes into account whether Russia and Iran are natural allies, or it is a relationship based on tactical calculations. Though the primary focus of this article is to explore Russia–Iran relations in the geopolitical setting of the post-Cold War period, yet a cursory review of their historical ties going back to the Soviet period will prove beneficial to readers who are otherwise unfamiliar with the shifting contours of cooperation and conflict between Russia and Iran. The second section will explore the differing narratives and perceptions of the ‘West’ and Russia vis-à-vis the Iranian nuclear program. It proposes that Russia’s perception of Iran’s nuclear program and its active involvement in minimizing the impact of United Nations Security Council (UNSC) sanctions on Iran needs to be analyzed by moving beyond the trade and economic justification, placing the arguments within the broader framework of Russia–USA rivalry at the systemic level. From this perspective, it will be argued that Russia’s perception of Iran’s nuclear program is driven by Russia’s desire to thwart US unilateralism and its ‘policy of coercion’ (Mousavian 2014: 533) by projecting a set of alternative values of global governance that is critical of regime change, humanitarian interventions and Western standards of democracy and human rights. This is well reflected in Russia’s Foreign Policy Concept of 2013 in which it is stated that Russia continues to seek ‘political and diplomatic solutions’ to regional conflicts as it believes that modern conflicts cannot only be resolved through the use of force (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation [MFA Russia] 2013). In the context of the Iranian nuclear crisis, it clearly means that Russia favors a comprehensive political and diplomatic settlement of the situation through dialogue based on a mutual interest approach that is in compliance with nuclear non-proliferation requirements. The third section will briefly analyze how in the aftermath of US’ withdrawal, the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) is ‘one step forward, two steps back’ with regard to achieving a collective realistic solution to Iran’s nuclear crisis.

Contextualizing Russo-Iranian Relations

The changing contours of cooperation and conflict characterizing Russia–Iran relations have often prompted scholars to engage with the question of whether it is a tactical relationship or a strategic alliance. The multitude of literature dealing with Russia’s relationship with Iran has mostly portrayed this bilateral relationship as tactical. Such explanations and analyses have been determined by the complex historical exchanges and interactions between both nations. While, on one hand, Iranians harbored a bitter resentment toward Russia due to the humiliating loss it had to face at the hands of the Russians in the early nineteenth century that resulted in a loss of Persian territories to the latter (Tarock 2017). On the other hand, Russia pictured Iran as a ‘colonial oppressor’, an ‘imperialist rival’, and an ‘atheist adversary’. Russia’s interactions with Iran at various historical junctures have produced an attitude in the Russian mind toward Iran that is a mixture of ‘respect with apprehension’ and ‘fascination with revulsion’ (Trenin and Malashenko 2010: 2). It is these complex interactions and interchanges that have produced a sense of cautiousness, evident in their present bilateral dealings.

In the early twentieth century, Russia and Britain signed the Anglo-Russian Convention that divided the country into spheres of influence. This was followed by Russia’s support to the pro-loyalist forces against the Persian Constitutional Movement. Further resentment was caused when the Soviet Union along with Britain occupied Iran in 1941 and subsequently caused an international crisis in the country by aiding a group of communist insurgents, known as the Firqah that sought to separate Iranian Azerbaijan. The crisis was halted when the Iranian government with support from the USA approached the UN (Tarock 2017). Hussian (2015) writes that this event marked the beginning of the US’ security interest in Iran. Although US involvement in Iran can be traced back to 1883 yet the 1941 development was significant in many respects. US assistance to Iran both militarily and economically against the invasion established it as a natural ally of Iran. Subsequently, the USA helped Mohammad Reza Shah to replace his father and this marked active US involvement in Iran’s domestic politics. Such developments were deeply resented by the nationalists and the Islamic clergy that led to a coup in 1953 against the Shah by Mohammad Mosaddegh. However, a US-backed counter coup brought the Shah back to power. As Britain withdrew from the Gulf in 1969, Iran became the ‘policeman’ of the Gulf with unflinching support from its closest ally, the USA. Iran’s closeness to the USA inevitably distanced it from the Soviet Union.

The fall of the USA supported regime of Shah Reza Pahlavi in 1979 and the unfolding of the Iranian Revolution caused mingled anticipation and anxiety for Moscow. Rubinstein (1981) notes that initially, Khomeini’s triumph was in many ways a boost to Soviet diplomacy while at the same time undermining US credibility. Khomeini had virtually eliminated all the persistent source of conflict between Russia and the Shah by removing American bases from Iranian territory, by stopping the suppression of the communist Tudeh party while ceasing to play the role of a surrogate of the USA in the Persian Gulf. He also withdrew Iran from CENTO and embraced the anti-American establishment in the Arab world. These developments gave Russia new hope as Russian analysts came to describe the Iranian revolution as a ‘gain for progressive forces’. However, Russia–Iran relations soon entered troubled waters as Iran became suspicious of Moscow due to several reasons. USSR’s support to the communist Tudeh party in Iran, the former’s invasion and occupation of Afghanistan and its support to Iraq during the Iran–Iraq War of 1980–1988 caused resentment with USSR. The Soviets, on their part, feared the consolidation of the Islamic Republic in Iran as it would present an attractive revolutionary ideology to the Muslims not only in the Middle East but also in the Soviet Union (Katz 2012). Thus, the initial hopes pinned on Iran by the Soviet Union not only faded but also came to be replaced by tension as the geopolitical realities of the Cold War period played out in Asia.

In the initial period of the Gorbachev era, Russia–Iran relations gradually solidified. Several agreements were struck with Iran including a military agreement that permitted Iran to buy sophisticated weapons from Russia. Russia emerged as a suitable alternative partner for Iran in the light of the US refusal to sell spare parts to Iran (Freedman 2001). Furthermore, the visit of Soviet Foreign Minister, Eduard Shevardnadze to Tehran in February 1989 brought a sense of relief to the Iranian leadership with respect to its northern borders (Hunter 2003). This development was crucial as Iran was grappling with serious security issues in the aftermath of the Iraq–Iran War that resulted in a growing US military presence in the Persian Gulf. However, with Gorbachev’s ‘New Thinking’, a new orientation in Russia’s foreign policy was evident that marked a break from the past. Nizameddin (1999) writes that Gorbachev’s policy was driven by the notion that Soviet Russia needs to develop relations with some countries instead of dismissing them as Western allies. In the context of the Middle East, this meant improving USSR’s relations with the Arab countries while distancing itself from its radical allies. This new attitude was driven by the gradual improvement in USSR–America relations and by a growing apprehension of the potential spillover of radical Islamic ideas to the Soviet territories. This reassessment of USSR’s past relations with the countries of the Middle East mellowed down the gradually improving USSR–Iran relations.

As the newly established Russian Federation sought to reorient both its domestic and foreign policies in the changed international order, its foreign policy came to be heavily influenced by five broad underlying factors. These were—the change in the structure of the international system that was no longer characterized by bipolarity, the decline in Russia’s military capabilities, the transformation of Russia’s economy and its integration with the global economy, and lastly, the domestic politics manifested in the struggle for power between Yeltsin and the nationalists (Donaldson et al. 2014). These determinants led Russia to establish a different policy agenda toward its former ideological rival, the USA. The guiding principle of this policy agenda was to forge a strategic partnership with the USA as Russia now believed that both their national interest would complement each other in the international arena due to their shared commitment to the Western values of democracy and human rights (Petro 1997). Against this backdrop, Russia–Iran relations were marked with difficulties given Foreign Minister Andrei Kozyrev’s insistence that the Islamic threat emanating from Iran was real and threatening for Russia (Hunter 2003). However, as the high hopes pinned on the USA came crashing down with the USA reneging on its promises of aiding Russia and shifting the responsibility on the International Monetary Fund (IMF; Rutland 1999), Russia’s disillusionment with the West started growing that was further aggravated with the military conflicts in the region along with NATO’s eastward expansion. A growing sense of vulnerability crept in the Russian minds that eroded Russia’s support for the West. The biggest demonstration of declining support for these pro-West reforms came during the parliamentary elections of 1993 when the nationalist parties defeated their liberal counterparts (Tsygankov 2014). This defeat urged Yeltsin to reorient his foreign policy in a bid to win support from the warring factions at home. With respect to the Middle East, he realized that New Russia was faced with different geopolitical challenges in the Middle East that affected its priorities as compared to those of USSR. Thus, his previously held ideologically driven policy came to be replaced by a pragmatic approach (Freedman 2001). The replacement of Andrei Kozyrev by Yevgeny Primakov, an expert on the Middle East and the Muslim world helped remove Iran’s initial skepticism toward Russia’s excessive pro-West foreign policy (Tarock 1997).

Primakov, hailed to be the modern architect of Russia’s foreign policy, embarked on a very different path from that of his successor. Russia gradually began to pursue the ‘public perception of national interest’. He addressed the ‘new cultural fear of the West’ by proposing to build closer ties with countries of Asia (Tsygankov 2013: 27). Drawing on Alexander M. Gorchakov’s legacy, he believed that instead of withdrawing from the international arena, a weak Russia should engage actively by pursuing an active and multifaceted foreign policy. In his view, pursuance of ‘rational pragmatism devoid of romanticism and unaffordable sentimentality’ was the need of the hour and in order to achieve this, he called for forging ‘constructive partnerships’ with countries of Asia. He specifically mentioned China, India, Japan, Iran, Libya, and Iraq (Rubinstein 2000: 19). Iran, faced with domestic bottlenecks and security dilemmas in the region reciprocated to Russia’s call for cooperation. Iran’s importance as a buffer state had faded with the end of the Cold War and its delicate strategic position ended up as a liability rather than an asset. Most states including Pakistan and Turkey started competing with Iran for influence in the former Soviet Muslim states by presenting themselves as an attractive alternative to Iran’s Islamic revolutionary ideas. And as America started using these states as a bulwark against Islamic fundamentalism, Iran was left with no choice but to ally with Russia (Hunter 2003). Gradually, cooperation between Russia and Iran in the mid-1990s was manifested through the Russian President’s refusal to US’ request to abandon the sale of a light–water nuclear reactor to Iran on the basis of the former’s argument that the USA was providing a similar reactor to North Korea and selling arms to Pakistan. As Russian leadership’s rhetoric that Russia belongs neither to the West nor to the East began to reorient its foreign policy orientation away from the West, Iran became more comfortable with Russia as such a vision sat comfortably with Iran’s own motto of ‘neither the West nor the East’ (Tarock 1997). This new orientation in Russia’s foreign policy continued into the new millennium under the new leadership of President Vladimir Putin, who assumed office in 2000.

President Putin’s visit to Iran in March 2001 reaffirmed Russia’s desire to sell new arms to Iran while completing the construction of the Bushehr power plant. In November 2000, Putin had already stated that Russia intended to withdraw from the 1995 Agreement with the USA that had prohibited arms sales to Iran even though Russia had not adhered to the agreement strictly as it had sold weapons worth US$200 million between 1996 and 1999 to Iran. The signing of the treaty on the Foundations of Mutual Relations and the Principles of Cooperation in 2001 reflected both countries desire to further bilateral cooperation and trade (Boese 2001: 28). Subsequently, arms trade between Russia and Iran grew to US$1.7 billion between 2002 and 2005 from US$300 million between 1998 and 2001 (Beehner 2006). Recently, Russia and Iran have reached an agreement to increase bilateral trade by 30 per cent from 2019 to 2021 (Iran Daily 2018). Besides the growing cooperation in trade, Russia and Iran have shown interest in joint collaboration on issues of geopolitical significance, for instance, in supporting the Assad regime in Syria. Iran’s approval of Russian military personnel’s use of its air bases to bomb targets in Syria since August 2016 was a crucial development as for the first time since the Islamic Revolution; Iran had allowed a foreign military to operate from its territory (Ray 2018). Apart from Syria, Russia, and Iran share the common strategic interest in eliminating US presence from Iraq and Afghanistan (Kozak 2017). They are also cooperating with Turkey in order to arrive at a long-term solution to the crisis in Syria. The recently held trilateral summit in Sochi on February 14, 2019 reaffirmed Russia, Iran, and Turkey’s collective agreement on the US withdrawal from Syria as a positive step that would eventually help stabilize the situation in the region (Al Jazeera 2019). These bilateral developments need to be comprehended at the backdrop of both Russia and Iran’s growing resentment with the USA and the former’s attempt to bolster its image as a friendly country to Islam and one that is open to ‘a dialogue of civilizations’ (Trenin 2016). Such an approach fits into Kremlin’s larger objective of dismantling US hegemony and establishing a multipolar world order while at the same time projecting Russia as an indispensable global power capable of influencing global and regional developments.

Writing on the drivers of Russo-Iranian dialogue from 1991 to 2011, Kozhanov (2015) notes that the volatility in Russo-Iranian bilateral relations can be explained by Kremlin’s desire to use its ties with Iran as a means to influence the ‘geopolitical playing field’. He uses examples to illustrate how Russia’s relations with Iran have been determined by the dynamics between Russia and the USA. For instance, a rapprochement between Iran and Russia took place in 2006–2009 which was marked by energy cooperation in the backdrop of Russia’s increasingly difficult ties with the USA following the latter’s intention to deploy new defense missile systems in Eastern Europe and NATO’s support to Georgia and Ukraine for membership. However, the end of Russia–Iran rapprochement coincided with the start of the reset of Russia–USA relations at the behest of US President Barack Obama. He remarked that the reset paved the way for Russian support for 2010 UNSC resolution against Iran. Though it may be a possible explanation, yet there were other developments that can explain the turn in Russia’s attitude toward Iran, like the latter’s open defiance of the international community and its refusal to the Russian fuel swap proposal. On a similar note, Nixey (2010) remarks that for Russia the safest option has been to balance its policy vis-à-vis Iran. This balancing policy, according to some scholars has presented Russia with two different policy options: (a) to support Iran against the USA when relations with the USA reaches a low and (b) to side with the USA against Iran when relations with the USA improve. Russia has embraced either of these policies according to its changing equations with the USA as quoting Anna Borshchevskaya, Blank (2017) points out that President Putin’s anti-American dispositions have constantly impinged his policy on the Middle East.

Similarly, for Iran, its relationship with Russia has depended on the internal political scenario in Iran along with the external context manifested through Iran’s relationship with the USA. Tabrizi (2018) notes that while conservative governments have traditionally tended to build strategic alliances with Russia as both the countries share anti-American sentiments; reformist governments have prioritized improving ties with the West. But since presently a reformist government is in power and yet relations with the USA have reached an ultimate low especially due to USA’s growing hostility toward Iran’s nuclear program, it has become necessary for Iran to move strategically closer to Russia. For instance, through its appreciation of Russia’s efforts to block a resolution presented in UNSC to pressurize Iran over the illegal use of Iranian missiles by the Houthi insurgents in Yemen and by siding with Moscow in Syria, Iran has reflected the desire to strengthen its strategic ties with Moscow.

Therefore, Iran’s desire to strengthen strategic ties with Moscow has been majorly driven by two important factors. First, as Freedman (2001) notes that Russia has emerged as an alternative source of weapon procurement for Iran. This interest of Iran has coincided with Russia’s interest to diversify its markets for weapons and industrial equipments. Second, the US demonization of Iran on the face of its flourishing relationship with Saudi Arabia and Israel, Iran’s rivals in the region have necessitated it to maximize cooperation with Russia in a bid to balance the USA in the region. Russia’s growing estrangement with the USA following the crisis in Georgia (2008), Crimea (2014), and Syria (2015) and its economic and strategic interests in Iran coupled with a differing perception of Iran’s nuclear program have pushed Russia to collaborate with Iran. Although Iran and Russia have competing interest over access to the Caspian Sea’s enormous gas fields, both retain an interest is keeping foreign powers out of the region. And though Iran’s Islamic ideology makes it a natural ally to the former Soviet territories of Central Asia and South Caucasus, Iran’s attitude has been remarkably restrained and pragmatic in an effort to prevent ethnic unrest in the region (Reardon 2012). Thus, the developments on both sides clearly reveal that Russo-Iranian bilateral relationship has been shaped by their respective national interests and pragmatic considerations. US’ incessant labeling of both Iran and Russia as aggressor states has resulted in a shared resentment that has played a critical role in shaping the present Russia–Iran relations.

Iranian Nuclear Crisis: A Narrative on Differing Perceptions and Contesting Claims

Iran’s quest for acquiring nuclear capability can be traced back to 1957 when a civil nuclear cooperation agreement was signed with the USA. In the next decade, the Atomic Centre of Tehran University was established. Subsequently, Iran signed several agreements with the USA, France, and Germany to buy reactors and also for establishing the Bushehr plant, respectively (Bahgat 2006). Mousavian (2014) writes that during this period, Europe was competing fiercely with the USA to win lucrative deals in Iran. However, with the toppling of the Pahlavi regime and the establishment of the Islamic Republic of Iran, Iran’s nuclear program came to an end as Ayatollah Khomeini believed that nuclear weapons opposed Islamic teachings.

The Iranian leadership started to rethink about renewing its nuclear program in the late 1980s, but now the West seemed phlegmatic about Iran’s nuclear development that compelled the latter to look for assistance from other non-West countries like USSR and China (Karacasulu and Karakir 2008). In 1990, Iran signed several agreements with Moscow that was followed by the US$800 million deal to conclude the first reactor at Bushehr (Bahgat 2006). Over the course of the 1990s, Iran’s nuclear enrichment program grew rapidly and by the end of the decade, it had achieved the ability to enrich uranium by using a small centrifugal cascade at the Kalaye Electric Companies’ facilities outside Tehran. By 2000, Iran had already begun with the construction of the pilot fuel enrichment plant (PFEP) and the fuel enrichment plant (FEP) at Natanz (Reardon 2012: 14).

Iran’s nuclear program attracted the attention of the international community in 2002 with the discovery by the West that Iran had hidden its nuclear program for the last two decades. Reardon (2012) writes that in the aftermath of the discovery, the USA preferred an immediate referral of Iran to the Security Council while the EU opted for a negotiation strategy. The Iranian political leadership headed by President Mohammad Khatami agreed to intrusive international monitoring of its enrichment activities which resulted in the signing of the Additional Protocol to the Non Proliferation Treaty (NPT) with the E-3 (UK, Germany, and France) in 2003. This agreement was formalized into the Paris Agreement in the subsequent year. However, the agreement failed to achieve any favorable outcome as both the parties consistently contested on the nature of the nuclear program with Iran pestering that it was solely for peaceful purposes. In the background of its presidential elections in 2005, Iran resumed its enrichment activities with the new Iranian President, Mahmoud Ahmadinejad subsequently declaring that it will no longer implement the Additional Protocol. What followed from 2006 to 2010 was a series of United Nations Security Council Resolutions (UNSCR 1737 in 2006, 1747 in 2007, 1803 in 2008, and 1929 in 2010), but the impact of the sanctions contained in these resolutions was weaker than the USA had anticipated as Russia and China continued to reduce their impact on Iran.

Russia along with China has consistently taken a position on Iran’s nuclear program that has been contrary to the US position. Blank (2017) remarks that under Putin’s leadership, Russian thinking on Iran’s nuclear program evolved to the level where several of its foreign policymakers declared that Washington’s claim that Russia admitted to an Iranian threat was a misinterpretation. It has been reiterated that Russia does not share the West’s views on Iran’s nuclear program. Moreover, in contrast to the militaristic option floated by the USA, Russia has endorsed a policy favoring dialogues and negotiations with Iran. In order to understand the nuances of Russia’s stance on the Iranian nuclear crisis, it is important to move beyond the trade and economic justification and analyze US perception of the Iranian nuclear program within the broader framework of the latter’s geopolitical and economic interests in the region and its deteriorating relationship with Russia.

Tarock (1996) notes that historically, the Washington’s confrontation with Iran has been majorly directed to five areas and they are: (a) Iran’s efforts to acquire Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD); (b) the threat of these WMD on the Persian Gulf States; (c) Iran’s alleged support to international terrorism; (d) Iran’s opposition to peace agreements between PLO and Israel; and (e) Iran’s poor record of human rights.

With regard to the first argument, it may be noted that most Iranians strongly uphold Iran’s right to have access to peaceful nuclear technology (Afrasiabi and Kibaroglu 2005). This stems from their understanding of the nuclear program as a national project for technological progress rooted in a feeling of pride and grandeur (Guldimann 2008). Iran’s Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei had stated that ‘God would punish Iranians if they do not support the country’s disputed nuclear programme’ and remarked that the USA was trying to block Iran from achieving advanced technology (Karacasulu and Karakir 2008: 2). Trenin and Malashenko (2010) note that no Iranian government will ever negotiate away the country’s nuclear program, not even a hypothetical democratic government precisely because the quest to develop nuclear capabilities is closely linked to Iran’s tumultuous history as most Iranians perceive that their nation and civilization have been deprived of a great power status that they deserve and developing a successful nuclear capability will go a long way in restoring Iran’s sense of pride and glory. Bahgat (2006) presents a similar argument as he notes that Iran’s quest for acquiring nuclear capabilities started under the Shah and has been carried forward under the Islamic regime which reflects the fact that no matter which government is in power, it is most likely that the nuclear program will be pursued. Second, Iranians insist their nuclear program is for peaceful purposes and they attempt to justify this by remarking that Iran has not initiated any major war or confrontation in the last two and a half centuries. These arguments reveal how the predominant understanding in the Iranian society with regard to a potential nuclear program has been shaped which is in sharp contrast to the way in which the international community, most notably the USA have presented Iran’s nuclear program, as focused primarily on military intentions (Guldimann 2008). Bahgat (2006) writes that launching an attack on the USA or its allies is not a driving force for Iran’s nuclear program. The driving factor has been to deter any possible regime change powered by the USA. This means that it is regime survivability that acts as an important factor in driving Iran’s quest toward acquiring nuclear capability.

Remarking on the conceptual framework of America’s foreign policy, Sheikhneshin (2009) opines that the USA has been guided by the principle of promoting freedom and democracy in other regions of the world and has used this as a defensible moral ground upon which it has justified its military actions. But these moral concerns have more often than not been shaped by the USA’s geopolitical and economic interests that have led it to adopt a principle of selective engagement. Such policies have produced a deep cynicism in the Iranian mind about the USA whose actions are closely associated with Western imperialism. USA’s characterization of Iran as a ‘rogue state’ came after Iran refused to comply with the UNSC direction. However, Tehran’s position on the Security Council resolution was not groundless. The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) did not find that Iran had a military nuclear program yet it demanded Iran to stop uranium enrichment till additional inspections were completed which was later transformed into a full ban on enrichment. This demand exceeded the boundaries of International law as enrichment is not prohibited by the NPT and by asking Iran to stop enrichment it was asking Iran to do more than Iran was obligated to do under the NPT (Safranchuk 2008: 36). US high handedness with respect to Iran’s nuclear program was also reflected through the schism that developed between the USA and EU3 over the Paris Agreement in 2003. Iran had agreed to adhere to the protocol with the EU3 recognizing Iran’s right to peaceful technology under the NPT while the USA continuously called for complete suspension (Afrasiabi and Kibaroglu 2005). The EU3’s quest for a diplomatic resolution has been in some way similar to the Russian and Chinese way of dealing with the Iranian nuclear program.

With regard to the second argument that Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD), if acquired by Iran will constitute a threat to the states of the Persian Gulf, Tarock (1996) notes that the USA is highly exaggerating Iran’s military and political power in the region that is leading to its perceived threat from Iran to the states of the Persian Gulf. Sheikhneshin (2009) writes that US anticipation of a direct nuclear attack by Iran on its military bases in the Middle East or on Israel is unfounded as Iran is aware of the massive counter-retaliation it has to face. However, Iran may use its nuclear capability for bargaining purposes. Using examples of China, India, and Pakistan, he remarks that a nuclear Iran can alter the balance of power in the region but it will not make it less stable. For instance, the West was wary of Pakistan’s nuclear capabilities that the latter developed in a bid to alter the balance of power in the region vis-à-vis India yet far from engaging in any nuclear conflict, the public opinion in both India and Pakistan have been more prepared for peace negotiations than ever. This was well reflected in the aftermath of the recent Pulwana attacks.

The third argument that the USA has used to demonize and contain Iran have often lacked any concrete evidence. To cite an example, Warren Christopher had publicly accused Iran of responsibility for bombing the Argentina–Israel Mutual Association in Buenos Aires in 1995 but failed to produce evidence when asked by the Argentinean government (Tarock 1997). As far as the US argument on Iran’s record on human rights are concerned, the major criticism levied against the USA has been on its use of the notion of human rights and humanitarian interventions as a garb to further its own ambitions as manifested through regime change in various countries of the Middle East, Eastern Europe, and the Commonwealth of Independent States.

Like Iran, New Russia has faced similar challenges in the face of USA’s, psychological containment’ of Russia and its increasing intrusion in territories Russia considers its areas of ‘privileged interests’ (President of Russia 2008). US unilateralism manifested through NATO’s eastwards expansionism till the borders of Russia, US-sponsored color revolutions in Kyrgyzstan, Georgia, and Ukraine, laying of military defense missile system in post-Soviet space, USA’s unilateral abrogation of the Anti Ballistic Missile Treaty, US invasion of Iraq and the US commitment to build trans-Caspian shipment system to transport oil to Europe bypassing Russia (Kanet 2011) has convinced the Russian leadership that its national interests are at stake. Such developments along with the ‘psychological containment’ of Russia by treating it as a defeated power have eventually fueled the subsequent assertiveness in Russia’s foreign policy under President Putin. The reiteration of creating a multipolar world order that has found expression in all of Russia’s foreign policy concepts (2000, 2008, 2013, 2016) reflects the fact that the West’s triumphalism has failed to construct the post-Cold War peace structure precisely because it had considered Russia as a defeated power. Thus, Russia has become increasingly critical of US unilateralism that has driven the former to endorse a set of alternative beliefs, values, norms, and practices of global governance vis-à-vis the US model of global governance. For instance, Russia’s position on several significant global and regional developments including the Syrian crisis or the recent crisis in Venezuela has been in contrast to the US position. Such anti-West postures are not only driven by Russia’s economic and geopolitical interests but also simultaneously stems from Russia’s desire to thwart US unilateralism by projecting a set of alternative values and practices of global governance that is critical of regime change, humanitarian interventions, and Western standards of democracy and human rights. This has been reflected in Russia’s Foreign Policy Concept of 2008 where it has been stated that Russia will ‘… fully contribute to finding political and diplomatic ways of solving the situation regarding the nuclear programme of the Islamic Republic of Iran based on the recognition of the right of all state parties to the NPT to the peaceful use of nuclear energy’ (President of Russia 2008). Words like finding ‘political and diplomatic ways’ clearly hint at Russia’s opposition to USA’s ‘policy of coercion’ (Mousavian 2014: 533) and Russia’s eagerness to play an active role in deliberative processes on Iran’s nuclear program in an effort to be viewed as a great power capable of influencing both global and regional developments.

Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action: ‘One Step Forward, Two Steps Back?’

The JCPOA or the Iranian Nuclear Deal as it is famously known was a landmark agreement that was formally adopted in October 2015 after years of deliberations between Iran and the P5+1 (USA, UK, France, Russia, China + Germany). The deal marked a major breakthrough in the USA’s approach toward Iran’s nuclear program as Iran accepted to moderate its nuclear program in exchange of US waivers on the nuclear-related sanctions (Arms Control Association 2015). In conformity with the Agreement, Iran remained committed to restricting its nuclear program that the IAEA repeatedly confirmed in its quarterly reports; nevertheless, quitting the deal that President Trump persistently denounced as ‘the worst deal ever’ became one of his primary presidential campaign agendas that eventually culminated in USA’s withdrawal from the deal on May 8, 2018. USA’s withdrawal was termed as a ‘serious case of foreign policy malpractice’ by Thomas Countryman, the former US Assistant Secretary of State who had played a prominent role in negotiating the deal as a part of the Obama Administration (Al Jazeera 2018). Undoubtedly, the USA’s withdrawal from the deal has far-reaching implications not only for the international politics, but also for the regional developments in the Middle East along with Iran’s own domestic political developments.

At the global level, the US withdrawal from the deal not only jeopardizes international peace and security, but can also weaken the non-nuclear proliferation regime. USA’s withdrawal has terminated the negotiating window on Iran’s nuclear program that can eventually reduce US credibility to negotiate any future deals with Iran while presenting itself as an irresponsible and ‘rogue’ global power (Ahmadian 2018). Moreover, the US actions have also distanced it from the approach favored by its European Allies, who much like Russia and China have shown immense interest in safeguarding and implementing the deal. At the regional level, US engagements with Middle Eastern states that counter Iran’s rise in the region, especially Israel and Saudi Arabia, is eventually leading to regional groupings that can in the future aggravate instability in the region. While in terms of the implications of the withdrawal on Iran’s domestic politics, US actions can embolden the conservatives in Tehran while greatly weakening the moderates’ position which can harden Tehran’s attitude vis-à-vis Iran’s nuclearization (Taneja 2018).

Therefore, the USA’s withdrawal from the deal can be aptly termed as ‘one step forward, two steps back’ with regard to achieving any possible realistic collective solution to Iran’s nuclear program as the withdrawal not only reinforces US initial preference for militaristic options over peaceful negotiations, but also removes any further options open for credible negotiations in the future. Such an approach deepens both Russia and Iran’s misgivings about US unilateral tendencies and its principle of selective engagements to further its own geopolitical interests at the expense of international peace and security. This was well reflected in the statement that was issued by the MFA Russia that categorically criticized US policy as ‘aggressive’, ‘threatening’, and ‘… inconsistent with the modern norms of civilized communications between states’ (MFA Russia 2017). Russian policymakers have reaffirmed their commitment to upholding the JCPOA and have stated that Russia will continue to fulfill its obligations under it.

Conclusion

Russia and Iran have exhibited a willingness to cooperate even at the face of certain existing challenges. Such willingness has been determined by a host of factors, both at the internal and external levels, most pronouncedly manifested by their respective relationship with the USA. US characterization of both Russia and Iran as ‘aggressor states’ has strengthened their anti-American sentiments and has united them against US unilateralism. This shared resentment has not only brought Russia and Iran strategically closer but also strengthened their resoluteness to thwart US unilateralism at the ‘ideational’ level. Thus, Russia’s cooperation with Iran at the backdrop of US attempt to isolate it reflected from the former’s efforts to minimize the effect of US sanctions on Iran and its insistence on dialogue over sanctions is not only driven by Russia’s geopolitical and economic interests, but also by its desire to challenge the US at the ideational level by presenting a set of alternative values, norms, and practices of global governance that is opposed to US model of global governance characterized by an assertion of Western standards of human rights and democracy, humanitarian interventions, and regime change. This approach fits into the broader objective of Putin’s foreign policy to project Russia as an indispensable global power capable of influencing regional and global conflicts that the international community can no longer neglect or bypass.