Korea’s ‘New Southern Policy’ Towards India: An Analysis

Abstract

The Moon Jae-in administration in South Korea (hereafter Korea) initiated the ‘New Southern Policy’ in 2017 to foster closer relations with ASEAN and India and bring them at par with the four major powers—the United States of America (USA), China, Russia and Japan, which have traditionally played a dominant role in Korea’s foreign affairs. Korea’s strategy through this new policy has been to diversify its foreign relations and lessen dependence on these four major powers of the Northeast Asian region. In this policy shift India is projected as one of the key partners for Korea. However, there has not been much progress in Korea’s relations with India in the last 2 years. The New Southern Policy is also not compatible with US-led ‘Indo-Pacific strategy’ in which India is an integral component. This article argues that Seoul’s New Southern Policy toward New Delhi shall remain limited and would largely focus on developing economic relations rather than building security cooperation between the two countries.

Keywords

Korea India New Southern Policy Indo-Pacific strategy economic relations strategic relations

Introduction

The geographical and strategic location of the Korean Peninsula has made it an arena of contestation and rivalry between major powers in the Northeast Asian region since historical times. Therefore, Koreans have often referred to their country as ‘a shrimp surrounded by the whales’. After the end of World War II and liberation of Korean Peninsula from the brutal Japanese colonial rule (1910–1945), it again became a victim of rivalry between the two superpowers of the Cold War period as the country got divided along the 38th northern latitude or 38th parallel into ‘North’ and ‘South’ Korea. In 1948 the United Nations (UN) organized an election which led to the establishment of the Republic of Korea (South Korea or Korea) in the areas south of the 38th parallel as North Korea did not participate in this election. Korean War (1950–1953) was an effort by North Korea to reunify the Korean Peninsula forcibly, but it turned into an international conflict and was highly devastating to the Korean people. Since then Korea’s foreign policy has been largely shaped by the four major powers of the Northeast Asian region, which are the United States of America (USA), Japan, China, and Russia. Therefore, Seoul has been devising various policies from time to time to build economic and strategic partnerships with other influential and emerging regions of Asia and reduce dependence on these four major powers. In this context the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) has remained at the core for Korean policy makers. In the post-Cold War period India has also been gaining significance in Korea’s foreign affairs, mainly because of the rising economic power and regional influence of this South Asian country. As a result, the Moon Jae-in administration after coming to power in 2017 has initiated ‘New Southern Policy’ to diversify Korea’s foreign relations and develop closer economic and strategic relations with other powers and regions in southern Asia. In this policy shift India is projected as one of the key partners for Korea (Kumar 2018). However, contrary to the claims of several scholars, India’s relations with Korea remain limited and have not witnessed dramatic improvement under the Moon Jae-in administration in Seoul. This article argues that Seoul’s New Southern Policy toward New Delhi shall remain limited and would largely focus on strengthening economic relations rather than building security cooperation between the two countries.

Evolution of Korea’s ‘New Southern Policy’

Korea’s unique geographical position of having been surrounded by powerful neighbors has a huge impact on its foreign policy behavior since the historical period. This legacy continued in the twentieth century as in the post-World War II period major powers played an influential role in dividing the Korean Peninsula and shaping Seoul’s foreign affairs. Later the Korean War ended without a peace treaty keeping the two Korean states technically at war against each other and thousands of US troops are still stationed in south of the Demilitarized Zone (DMZ), which has kept the Korean Peninsula divided since 1953. However, Koreans also have deep resentment regarding the subordination of their country to the big powers and have strived for an independent foreign policy, so that Korea can be treated as an equal partner in its relations with other powerful countries (Ko 2006). The strong nationalistic ethos in Korea has often come in conflict with country’s subordinate status vis-à-vis the bigger powers in the region. Nevertheless, despite being a weak power, Korea was able to maintain its political independence and national identity for several centuries due to the strong determination of its people and pragmatic policies of its leaders. During the Cold War period Korea’s efforts for the acquisition of nuclear weapons and ballistic missile technology under the Park Chung-hee administration (1961–1979) was an effort to reduce dependence on the USA for security, and exercise more independence with regards to the foreign affairs (Kim 2001). According to Seung-Young Kim, ‘Faced with the prospect of complete withdrawal of US forces, he [Park Chung-hee] realized that the pursuit of self-reliance was the only way to defend South Korea, and to keep national dignity in the face of American meddling in Korea’s domestic affairs’ (Ibid.: 57). With the rising economic prosperity since the 1960s which transformed Korea into an ‘Asian Tiger economy’ and with democratic transition in the late 1980s Koreans developed an aspiration to lessen dependence on the USA, which had been a key partner of Korea since the Korean War and to diversify Seoul’s foreign relations with other important nations or regions of the world.

Another important aspect of Korea’s foreign policy has been with regards to Asian regionalism. The ideology of ‘Asianism’ gained popularity in Korea during the late nineteenth century to counter Western incursions and influence in this part of the world. Infact, some Koreans even supported Japanese imperialist expansionism in Asia as part of their solidarity with a rising Asian power (Shin 2005). However, Asianism lost support in Korea during the Japanese colonial period when Japan imposed brutal cultural assimilationist policies on the Koreans. The onset of the Cold War era ideological conflict further weakened Asianism in Korea as the country fought war against China during the Korean War and later participated in the Vietnam War despite condemnations from several countries of the world. In the post-Cold War period Korea’s policy toward Asian countries had its origins in the ‘Nordpolitik’ of President Roh Tae-woo (1988–1993), which strived to develop closer relations with the socialist countries of Asia, such as erstwhile Soviet Union and China. This strategy of the Korean government was to gain access to the new market and resources in these countries and also to strengthen Seoul’s international position vis-à-vis Pyongyang. As a result, Seoul was able to normalize relations with China in 1992, which had a huge impact on the economic development of Korea. China’s huge market and vast resources opened up new opportunities for the Korean chaebol groups.¹

Chaebol are the family-controlled huge business conglomerates of Korea such as LG, Samsung, Hyundai, etc.

Within a few years China emerged as the biggest trading partner of Korea and the bilateral trade has remained largely in the favor of Seoul. This normalization of relations between Seoul and Beijing has also brought about dramatic improvement in the people to people contacts and popularity of Korean cultural products, also known as the ‘Korean Wave’ or Hallyu in China. Beijing’s role has also become crucial on the issue of denuclearization of North Korea as China hosted the ‘Six Party Talks’²

Six Party Talks is a multilateral forum comprising China, the USA, Russia, Japan, North Korea, and South Korea and was established in 2003 to discuss the issue of denuclearization of North Korea.

and the possible reunification of the Korean Peninsula largely depends on the Chinese support. The Roh Moo-hyun administration (2003–2008) in Korea further promoted Northeast Asian regionalism. According to Gi-Wook Shin, ‘He [Roh Moo-hyun] defined the current period as an era of Northeast Asia (tongpuk a sidae), and unequivocally proclaimed that the Republic of Korea must actively participate in the new era by becoming a hub in the region’ (Shin 2005: 616).

Later, the ‘New Asia Initiative’ (NAI) started during the Lee Myung-bak administration (2008–2013) aimed at building stronger partnership with the countries of Asia. President Lee announced this new strategy during his visit to Indonesia in March 2009. ‘President Lee laid stress on diplomacy of attaching importance to Asian nations based on Korea’s diplomacy toward four major neighboring countries, the USA, China, Japan and Russia’ (Chung 2009). Through the NAI Korea desired to play a proactive role in the Asia-Pacific region by promoting free trade and representing the interests of the countries of Asia in the world (Ibid.). According to Balbina Y. Hwang, ‘At the core of the NAI is South Korea’s belief that it can play a “bridging” role between large and small powers, as well as between the developed and developing economies’ (Hwang 2012). The Park Geun-hye administration (2013–2017) also strived to diversify Korea’s foreign affairs by launching ‘Eurasia Initiative’ to explore new markets and alliances in Asia. According to Jae-Young Lee, ‘As South Korea relies heavily on international trade and investment, it needs to diversify its economic relations through enhancing partnerships with Eurasian states to pave the way for sustainable economic growth’ (Lee 2017: 108). The geographical barrier created by North Korea has virtually turned South Korea into an island which remains disconnected from the rest of mainland Asia. This has been a major disabling factor for Korea to gain access to Asian and European market and resources through land routes. The Eurasia Initiative of President Park was an effort to build roads, railways, pipelines, and economic zones across the vast Eurasian landmass and to get access to markets in landlocked Central Asian and East European regions. Further, to stimulate peace and cooperation in the East Asian region, Park Geun-hye administration launched ‘Northeast Asian Peace and Cooperation Initiative’ (Moon and Boo 2015: 225).

The ‘New Southern Policy’ of the current Moon Jae-in administration is an enhancement to the earlier policies of various administrations in Korea as it aims not only to look into the economic cooperation with the emerging nations and regions of southern Asia but also to build strategic partnerships with them, so as to combat terrorism and other emerging threats in the region. Seoul’s experience with the economic retaliation and coercive measures by China on the issue of installation of US-built antimissile system called Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) in Korea in 2017 has provided an important lesson to the Koreans against overdependence on the Chinese market. Similarly, the increasing economic protectionism in the USA under Donald Trump administration has been creating problems for the Korean exports. President Trump has been blaming Korea for pursuing unfair trade practices and has even accused Seoul as a free rider on the security issue. This is also evident from the fact that USA demanded a price of US$1 billion from Seoul for installing the THAAD system in Korea (Yi and Kim 2017). Korea’s relations with Japan under Moon Jae-in administration has reached a new low as his government cancelled several agreements with Tokyo, which were signed during the tenure of former President Park Geun-hye and more recently Japan has put trade restrictions on Korea. Under these circumstances the New Southern Policy of Moon Jae-in administration is a timely move to meet economic and strategic challenges and build new partnerships in Asia. This new policy of the ‘progressive’³

The administration of Moon Jae-in is regarded as ‘progressive’ because of his pro-North Korea policies and his efforts for strengthening the welfare state system in Korea.

administration of President Moon basically seeks to reduce dependence of Korea on the four major powers of the Northeast Asian region and enhance economic and strategic relations with ASEAN and India.

Korea’s Relations with India

Although Korea’s relations with India is centuries old, the geographical and cultural barriers kept them far away from each other. During the Cold War period Korea and India were in different ideological camps, which led to a mutual disinterest and mistrust between Seoul and New Delhi (Lee 2011: 185). Korea was a close ally of the USA, whereas India was one of the founding members of the Non-Aligned Movement. The interest between Korea and India got a boost with the changes in New Delhi’s economic and foreign policies in the post-Cold War period. India liberalized its economy and also initiated ‘Look East Policy’ to enhance foreign relations with the Southeast Asian and East Asian countries. Korea’s interests in India’s huge market became evident with the rapid expansion of the chaebol in this South Asian country. Within a short period, Korean companies like Hyundai, LG, Samsung, etc., became popular brands in India. In 2009 New Delhi and Seoul signed a Comprehensive Economic Partnership Agreement (CEPA) and later in 2010 signed a ‘Strategic Partnership Agreement’, which was elevated to ‘Special Strategic Partnership’ in 2015. In recent years bilateral trade between India and Korea has hovered around US$20 billion and has largely been in favor of Korea (Table 1).

There has also been an increase in the people to people contacts between India and Korea and leaders of the two countries have been meeting frequently. However, despite all these developments, the bilateral relations between New Delhi and Seoul have remained limited and have not witnessed significant progress in recent years. India’s trade with Korea has remained relatively small as compared to Korea’s trade with other bigger economies, such as China, the USA, Japan, and ASEAN.

To have better economic, strategic, and cultural relations with the countries of the Asia-Pacific region, India under Narendra Modi government (2014–2019 and since May 2019) launched the ‘Act East Policy’ to elevate the earlier ‘Look East Policy’ to the next level. However, India’s Act East Policy toward Korea has remained limited and has not witnessed substantial improvement under the Modi administration (Dhawan 2018). Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s another initiative of ‘Make in India’ also got adversely affected when Korea’s two companies cancelled their projects in India. Korean steel giant POSCO closed its US$12 billion steel plant project in the state of Odisha and Kangnam Corporation withdrew from the ₹326,400 million minesweeper construction deal in the state of Goa.

Table 1.

Trade Between India and Korea

Year	2014–2015	2015–2016	2016–2017	2017–2018	2018–2019
India’s export to Korea	4,602.95	3,523.43	4,241.42	4,460.98	4,705.07
India’s import from Korea	13,529.11	13,047.12	12,585.35	16,361.77	16,758.76
Total trade between India and Korea	18,132.06	16,570.56	16,826.78	20,822.75	21,463.83

Source: Ministry of Commerce and Industry (Govt. of India) (n.d.).

Note: Values in US$ million.

Impact of ‘New Southern Policy’ on Korea–India Relations

Prior to the presidential election in 2017 Moon Jae-in had pledged to enhance Korea’s relations with India. Soon after getting elected as the 19th President of Korea, Moon Jae-in sent a special envoy to New Delhi. This gesture of President Moon was unprecedented in the history of Korea–India bilateral relations and reflected Seoul’s seriousness to diversify its foreign relations. As has been mentioned by Soyen Park and Ramandeep Singh, ‘After years of close economic ties, the Moon [Jae-in] administration is now gearing up to expand its cooperation with India with equal, if not more, emphasis on strategic understanding, cultural appreciation, and people-to-people engagement’ (Park and Singh 2018). The visit of President Moon Jae-in to India in July 2018 was a major step with regards to Korea’s New Southern Policy toward India. The joint statement of the two countries during President Moon’s visit envisioned for a ‘shared vision for peace and prosperity for the people of the two countries’ (Ministry of External Affairs, India, Bilateral/Multilateral Documents 2018). President Moon Jae-in along with the Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi also inaugurated the so-called ‘world’s largest mobile phone factory’ in the Indian city of Noida (ENS Economic Bureau 2018). Since the initiation of the New Southern Policy there has also been a slight increase in the India–Korea bilateral trade as the total trade volume crossed US$20 billion during 2017–2018 and 2018–2019. To foster deeper understanding and engagement with ASEAN and India, the Korea National Diplomatic Academy (2018) established a Center for ASEAN-Indian Studies in February 2018. The Moon administration also established a presidential committee on the New Southern Policy on August 28, 2018 under the chairmanship of Kim Hyun-chul. According to Kim Hyun-chul, the presidential committee is coordinating between various ministries in Korea for devising strategies for enhancing cooperation with ASEAN and India (Jun 2018). To boost tourism and sports between the two countries India and Korea signed an agreement in November 2018 (The Korea Herald/Yonhap, 2018b). Also, the first lady of Korea Kim Jung-sook visited Ayodhya in India in November 2018 to lay the foundation for a park to commemorate Heo Hwang-ok, the legendary princess from Ayodhya who married the Korean King Kim Suro of Gaya kingdom in 48 AD. It was for the first time in almost 16 years that a Korean first lady visited abroad without accompanying the president (The Korea Herald/Yonhap, 2018a). In the year 2018 there was an upsurge in the public diplomacy efforts by the Korea Foundation—an organization which is associated with Korea’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs to increase interactions with Indian scholars, young leaders, journalists, etc., and organize academic and cultural events in India (Korea Foundation, 2018). Later in the year Korean Foreign Minister Kang Kyung-wha visited New Delhi and met the then Indian Minister of External Affairs Sushma Swaraj on December 19, 2018 to discuss sales of arms and enhance civilian cooperation between the countries (The Korea Times/Yonhap, 2018).

Apart from these few visible changes in the economic and cultural arena there has not been much progress on the security issues. Both countries have not yet been engaging in regular military or naval exercises. Also, Seoul and New Delhi have different views on the US-led ‘Indo-Pacific strategy’, which aims to counter China’s rising hegemony in this part of the world. While India has openly supported this new initiative of enhancing the geopolitical significance of the Indian Ocean, Korea has been reluctant to take any official position on this issue. Although the joint statement in July 2018 between Korea and India reaffirmed the ‘Special Strategic Partnership’ between the two countries, it referred to only Indian perspective for ‘inclusive and cooperative’ Indo-Pacific region (Ministry of External Affairs, India 2018). Korea’s reluctance to endorse Indo-Pacific strategy is testimony to the fact that Seoul does not share New Delhi’s concerns over China’s rising hegemony and Beijing’s contempt to support rules based system for international trade and resolution of territorial disputes in the South China Sea. Recently Korea’s plan to sell antiaircraft arms system worth around US$2.66 billion to the Indian military has also been objected by Russia, which has been a traditional supplier of arms to New Delhi and is also an influential power in the affairs of Korean Peninsula (Lee 2019).

The four major powers of Northeast Asia—the USA, China, Japan, and Russia are important stakeholders in North Korea’s denuclearization issue and on the issue of reunification of the Korean Peninsula. However, India’s active participation in these issues is still not recognized by the Koreans. India’s influence in the affairs of Northeast Asia and Korean Peninsula are limited, which prevents New Delhi from gaining parity with the other four major powers in this part of the world. As a result, Koreans are still dependent on the neighboring powers for the reunification of their own country (Dhawan 2017a). On the issue of proliferation of nuclear weapons and ballistic missile technology by North Korea in association with Pakistan, India has become more vocal under the Narendra Modi administration and has been raising it in various international forums and during bilateral summits with the countries of Northeast Asia. However, Korea has remained reluctant to openly blame Pakistan for the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. Seoul under the Moon Jae-in administration has even refrained from directly criticising Islamabad for its active support in the promotion of terrorist activities in India (Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Korea 2019).

US-led ‘Indo-Pacific Strategy’ and Korea’s ‘New Southern Policy’

The ‘Indo-Pacific strategy’ has emerged as an important vocabulary in the geopolitics in recent years. This strategy expands the geostrategic significance of Asia-Pacific region to the Indian Ocean region and highlights the rising role of India. The goal of this US-led strategy is to counter China’s hegemonic ambitions in this part of the world. According to William T. Tow, ‘Traditionally, non-aligned actors such as India and various member-states of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) are exploring advanced economic and security collaboration with other large and small powers within the increasingly fluid Indo-Pacific geopolitical environment’ (Tow 2018: 2). The term ‘Indo-Pacific’ as a geopolitical reference point was probably first mooted by the Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe. In his famous speech titled ‘Confluence of the Two Seas’ before the Indian parliament in 2007, Prime Minister Abe said,

The Pacific and the Indian Oceans are now bringing about a dynamic coupling as seas of freedom and of prosperity. A “broader Asia” that broke away geographical boundaries is now beginning to take on a distinct form. Our two countries [Japan and India] have the ability—and the responsibility—to ensure that it broadens yet further and to nurture and enrich these seas to become seas of clearest transparence. (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan 2007)

The strategy of Indo-Pacific has become ‘official’ for countries like the USA, Japan, India, and Australia. This new geopolitical alignment may still be at its preliminary stage, but it has been getting a lot of scholarly attention and has emerged as an issue of academic debate. China’s assertiveness and hegemonic ambitions in the Indo-Pacific region is threatening the balance of power and it appears that the Sino-US war is imminent. According to John J. Mearsheimer China’s military rise would not be peaceful and would come in conflict with the dominance of USA in Asia (Mearsheimer 2010: 382).

Being a country which is located at the juncture of continental and maritime divide in Asia (Lee 2011: 161), Korea’s participation will remain crucial for the success of ‘Indo-Pacific strategy’. However, Koreans are also fearful that their country may became an arena of conflict between the USA and China. As a country which is surrounded by major powers of the world Korea often becomes a victim of rivalry between these major powers. This is evident from the fact that to this day Korea remains the only divided country in the world. According to Danielle Chubb, ‘South Korea approaches great and rising powers with caution, wary of becoming caught up in their wider power struggles’ (Chubb 2015: 68). As a result, Korea’s response to any shift in the power dynamics in the region is very calculated. Korea’s economic interests with China may come in conflict with the US strategy to balance ‘China’s rise’. Korea does not have any major territorial conflict with any country of the Indo-Pacific region, except with Japan over the ownership of Dokdo/Takeshima Island. For Korea, China is also not a major adversary. This is evident from the fact that compared to Seoul’s reluctance to endorse Indo-Pacific strategy, Korea has openly supported Chinese ‘Belt and Road Initiative’ and also joined China-led Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB), which are opposed by the USA and Japan. Moreover, Koreans acknowledge the crucial role of China in the possible reunification of their country as Beijing has closer relations with both Seoul and Pyongyang. As a result, Korea’s current stand on the Indo-Pacific strategy could be regarded as a sign of pragmatism.

However, Korea considers itself as a ‘middle power’ nation and wants to be recognized as a regional power (Mo 2016). In this context Korea’s response to the disputes in the region should be more principled and Seoul should align with other middle power nations like Japan, India, Australia, and Indonesia to build a coalition for resolving regional disputes. But it has been observed that Korea shows more deference to China as compared to Japan. With regards to the foreign policy of the former President Park Geun-hye (2013–2017), Leif-Eric Easley and Kyuri Park have stated ‘However, against expectations for middle power diplomacy, Seoul applied a great power’s strategy of isolating and pressuring Tokyo, while behaving like a small power showing deference in relations with Beijing’ (Easley and Park 2017). This foreign policy of Park Geun-hye administration toward the two neighboring countries seems to be continuing under the current government in Korea. President Moon Jae-in has shown more assertiveness toward Japan, but has been submissive with regards to Korea’s relations with China (Park 2019: 28). In fact Seoul is more concerned about Japan becoming a ‘normal’ military power by abandoning its pacifist constitution and is lesser concerned about China’s military rise. As David C. Kang has also stated, ‘Indeed, South Korea appears more worried about potential Japanese militarization than about Chinese militarization’ (Kang 2007: 104).

To bring compatibility between Indo-Pacific strategy and New Southern Policy also remains a major challenge for Korea’s foreign policy establishment (Lee 2018). The administration of President Moon Jae-in has largely remained silent on the issue of Indo-Pacific strategy. The Indo-Pacific strategy is being promoted by a group of countries including the USA and Japan, which have been influential powers in the Korean affairs. But the rationale of New Southern Policy is to reduce dependence on the USA and Japan and diversify Korea’s relations with other Asian countries. However, Indo-Pacific strategy is also being supported by India and some ASEAN member countries which are key elements of Korea’s New Southern Policy. Most importantly, the reluctance of the Moon administration in Korea to endorse the Indo-Pacific strategy is in contrast to its support to China’s BRI, which aims to revive the ancient Silk Road and maritime connections between Asia, Europe, and Africa. While Korea is active participant to the BRI, it would be indeed interesting to observe whether Seoul supports Japan-led similar strategy in Asia or not? According to Michael J. Green, ‘In short, the New Southern Policy is an important new component of Korean foreign policy strategy but cannot yet be considered a unique or innovative middle power contribution to regional diplomacy’ (Green 2019: 12).

Why Is India Important for Korea?

Korea’s economic development is facing huge challenges due to the rise of competitors in Asia and other parts of the world. Several industries in Korea have been witnessing decline in terms of sales and profitability as labor cost has increased in the country. The advent of new technological paradigm such as the ‘Fourth Industrial Revolution’ which employs greater use of artificial intelligence, 3-D printing, internet of things, etc., have made the labor-intensive, low-cost manufacturing obsolete. Further the rising trade protectionism in the Western countries has also been problematic for the Korean industries. In recent years the slowing down of the Chinese economy and Beijing’s economic backlash against the installation of US-built THAAD system in Korea has raised serious concerns regarding Korea’s economic development. As a result, Korea has been looking for alternative economic partners, and India happens to be one of them. In the recent times some Koreans have even been promoting the idea of ‘replacing China with India’ (The Korea Times, 2017). According to Sukhee Han ‘With diminished interest in China, there has been soaring Korean interest in Vietnam and India’ (Han 2007: 18).

China’s rapid economic and military rise has increased the importance of all its neighboring countries to the Western Powers and Japan. In this context India has emerged as an important ally to the USA, Australia, and Japan. Despite India’s pathetic economic performance and massive corruption, its strategic significance has suddenly increased in the world as it shares huge land borders with China. According to Danielle Chubb, ‘South Korean policymakers are developing their perspectives on India in the broader context of a global power shift: the “Asian Century”’ (Chubb 2015: 72). Although regarded as a ‘balancer’ to China’s rising dominance in Asia, India is actually no match to China in terms of economic or military capabilities (Raja Mohan 2019). However, India’s 1.3 billion people which makes it the second most populous in the world after China provides huge consumer market to export-oriented countries like Korea. Seoul’s primary interest in India has been economic. For this purpose Korea has also been actively promoting the spread of Hallyu through its cultural diplomacy in India and to create new market opportunities for Korean products (Dhawan 2017b). India could also be a major source of foreign tourists to Korea. After China’s economic backlash against THAAD installation which effectively stopped Chinese tourists from coming to Korea, India has been regarded as a potential source of tourists to this ‘Land of Morning Calm’. As a result, the Moon Jae-in administration has signed an agreement with India in 2018 to provide group tourist visas to tourists from this South Asian nation.

Another importance of New Delhi for Korea is with regards to the huge arms bazaar in India. As an import-dependent country India is one of the biggest importers of arms in the world. Although security cooperation with India is not a priority for Koreans, selling defense equipment to India is certainly a lucrative business opportunity. Korea is an emerging arms exporter and India is a new target for Korean arms industries. Apart from exporting weapons, joint production of the weapons with India could also be on the agenda of Korea. Also, India is an emerging energy market which again provides huge opportunities to Korean companies. Korea has already supported India’s membership to the ‘Nuclear Suppliers Group’ and has been seeking access to investment in civilian nuclear energy sector in India. Several schemes of the Narendra Modi government in India, such as ‘Start-up India’, ‘Clean India’, ‘Make in India’, ‘Digital India’, ‘Skill India’, ‘Smart Cities’, etc., are also important for Korean business interests. Despite India being a tough market due to corruption and lack of infrastructure facilities, Koreans are trying to expand their business presence here (Joongang Ilbo/Korea Joongang Daily 2015: 30). On the eve of the visit of Prime Minister Narendra Modi to Korea in 2019 President Moon Jae-in reiterated the need for further improvement in relationship between the two countries (The Korea Times/Yonhap 2019). However, no document was signed between the two countries on defense cooperation during Modi’s 2-day state visit to Korea in February 2019 (Ministry of External Affairs, India 2019).

An Analysis

The changing geopolitical situation in the Indo-Pacific region has led to formation of new alliances between the countries in this part of the world. China’s rapid military rise and its increasing economic dominance over the countries of the region have raised concerns. The USA has also been gearing up to meet the challenges to its hegemony in the Indo-Pacific region. In this context, Korea’s New Southern Policy is a timely response to the changing security scenario in the region. Korea’s dependence on the four major powers of the region has made it more vulnerable to the conflicts between them. The chances of conflicts among the four major powers, such as China and Russia on the one hand and the USA and Japan on the other, have been increasing day by day. Under these circumstances Seoul wants to diversify its foreign relations by enhancing the status of ASEAN and India at par with the four major powers important for Korea. Korea has also remained reluctant to take any definite position on the US-led Indo-Pacific strategy. The reasons are quite obvious as Seoul wants to avoid being dragged into the conflicts of major powers in the region. Nevertheless, Korea also claims of itself as a ‘middle power’ nation and wants to be recognized as a regional power. But the response of Korea has been ambivalent on several territorial and historical disputes in the region. The foreign policy behavior of Korea is in contrast to a middle power.

Despite Korea’s new policy toward India under Moon Jae-in administration, there has not been much improvement in the bilateral relations between the two countries. This is also evident from the fact that Koreans are not seeking any significant role of India in the context of denuclearization of North Korea or on the issue of Korean reunification. The focus of Korea’s New Southern Policy toward India is primarily on improving economic relations and not to enhance security ties. Korea’s bitter experience of the Chinese economic backlash against the THAAD installation has pushed Seoul to seek new trade partners in the Asia-Pacific region. There has also been no compatibility between the New Southern Policy and the Indo-Pacific strategy. India has been supporting the new geostrategic alliance with like-minded countries like the USA, Japan, Australia, Indonesia, etc. However, Moon administration’s New Southern Policy is silent over the Indo-Pacific strategy. Despite claims of being a regional power, Korea has also been reluctant to take any stand on the territorial and maritime disputes in South China Sea. Any major military conflict in the region would not be in the interest of USA or China and Korea would probably be one of the worst sufferers. However, to some analysts Korea’s interest would be served if the conflict over the South China Sea issue remain protracted and that of low intensity (Lee 2016: 40). Therefore, taking sides with either the USA or China would be detrimental for Korea’s interests. As a result, Korea has maintained an ambivalent position over the Indo-Pacific strategy as Koreans regard it as a ‘containment of China strategy’ (Kim and Jung 2017).

Korea’s economic interests in India also remain limited as bilateral trade volume has remained low in comparison to Korea–China trade or Korea–ASEAN trade. The trade balance still remains in the favor of Korea as New Delhi still suffers from massive trade deficit with Seoul. While there was a slight improvement in India–Korea trade during the 2017–2019, Indian export to Korea has remained low. The bilateral trade between India and Korea is still not mutually beneficial and is mostly favoring the Korean companies. Despite the earlier vision of increasing the bilateral trade to US$40 billion by 2015, there has not been much success and now the target for enhancing to US$50 billion trade between India and Korea has been extended to 2030.

Moon Jae-in administration has also not shown much enthusiasm to elevate security relations with India. Korea does not participate with India in any major military or naval exercises. On the other hand, India is also cautious of not inviting more members in its naval exercises with the USA and Japan, so that they do not appear to be part of any anti-China strategy. But what is worth to be noted that Seoul rarely have bilateral military or naval exercises with India. The enhancement of strategic cooperation with Southeast and East Asian nations is one of the key pillars of Narendra Modi government’s ‘Act East Policy’ in India. However, there has not been any visible improvement on this issue between India and Korea. India’s naval influence beyond the Strait of Malacca is limited and any further increase of Indian naval influence in the Pacific Ocean would possibly be aggressively countered by China in the Indian Ocean region. As a result, Korea would certainly like to avoid of being trapped between these two Asian powers.

Conclusion

The rapidly changing geopolitical situation in the Indo-Pacific has triggered new alignments and strategies by the countries in the region. In this context, Korea’s ‘New Southern Policy’ seeks to reduce dependence on the four major powers in the Northeast Asian region. On the other hand, India’s ‘Act East Policy’ and its endorsement to ‘Indo-Pacific strategy’ are measures to cope up with the emerging challenges in the Indo-Pacific region. In this policy shift of Seoul and New Delhi there are certain similarities, but also major differences as have been discussed in this article. The new policies of Korean and Indian government have both economic as well as strategic dimensions and the goal is to enhance cooperation with the Asian nations in which ASEAN is the core element. But there are also major differences in the motivations of the new policies of Korea and India. While Korea’s New Southern Policy seeks to reduce dependence on the four major powers including the USA and Japan, India’s support to Indo-Pacific strategy aims to increase cooperation with the USA, Japan, Australia, and Southeast Asian nations. While India’s concern is ‘China’s rise’, Korea’s concern is possible remilitarization of Japan and conflicts between China and the USA. Under these circumstances both Korea and India have different positions on the ‘Indo-Pacific strategy’.

Korea’s ‘New Southern Policy’ toward India shall have limited impact and the focus would be to increase economic engagement between the two countries. However, India’s problems with poor infrastructure, corruption, nepotism, and bureaucratic inefficiency are not going to end in the near future. Till then Koreans would look for alternative market and destinations for investment in ASEAN and other countries in the world. Seoul’s strategic relations with New Delhi shall also be difficult to go beyond the current status. This also validates the fact that despite the rhetoric of ‘New Southern Policy’, India may not replace China for Korea in the coming times.

Footnotes

Declaration of Conflicting Interests

The author declared no potential conflicts of interest with respect to the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article.

Funding

The author received no financial support for the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article.

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