What does the Data Tell Us About Dominatarian Theory of Regional Integration?

Introduction

World over countries with geographical and historical commonalities and diversities can decide to engage in the processes that would lead to a collective action across spheres of life-security, economy, culture, and politics. This collectivism leads to the establishment of a community. One aim of building a community is to treat market deficiencies such as economic size, fragmentation of national markets, and the disenchanted political systems (Tuluy 2016). In Africa, Pan-Africanists envisaged the regional economic integration as the gateway for African states to overcome not only the destructive politico-economic legacies of the Berlin Conference (1884–1885), but also as a tool to unite Africans across the globe (Tavares and Tang 2011). Examples of Pan-Africa groupings can be gleaned from the works of Kwame Nkrumah, W.E.B. Du Bois, Marcus Garvey, Martin Luther King, Leopold Senghor, and George Padmore. Since then, a number of frameworks have been developed to drive the integration process, including: The Lagos Action Plan and the Abuja Treaty established in 1980 and 1991, respectively; the New Partnership for Africa’s Development (NEPAD) established in July 2001; and the Free Trade Area (FTA)-created to facilitate fair trade among African states. The assumption underlying most of these frameworks is that, they would produce the same effect on trade benefits for all member countries. However, over the years, it has emerged that trade competitiveness and structural differences tend to produce economic imbalances, elevating some countries to be more powerful or dominant (Gibb 2009). In the East African Community (EAC), Kenya emerges as the largest trading partner in the trading bloc (Buigut 2012; Chingarande et al. 2017). The country’s economic and geopolitical influence in the region produces different forms of dominance.

What is dominance? In the international relation studies, the concept of dominance attracts diverse thinking. Legal scholars view dominance as a sign of power, justifying the exercise of authority in the regional governance structure (Von Staden 2016). Contrary to this, scholars in regional studies caution that domination of one country in a regional bloc may lead to coercive or benevolent leadership (Hulse 2016; Ikenberry 2005). Similarly, political institutionalists view dominance as a process of gaining control over the formal and informal integration structures, processes, rules, regulations, and compliance procedures (North 1981; Yarbrough and Yarbrough 1992).

Political scientists categorize dominance into four different balance of power structures: (1) divide and rule, (2) compensation, (3) armament, and (4) alliance building (Morgenthau 1985). These structures and processes are in fact designed by state bureaucrats to constrain and shape the human interaction. The predetermined fashion of influence is then applied to maximize the wealth of other actors in the integration ecosystem (Mattli 1999). Perhaps, this is the reason why political economy readers view regionalism as an endogenous mechanism designed to challenge the western-dominated world economic order (Draper 2012). However, it is important to note that these legal regimes, intergroup relations, and institutional (mal) functioning are the various means through which domination sustains itself in an ecosystem. It is not clear though, whether the manner in which dominance is constructed in the society shapes some of the outcomes of integration such as economic conflicts and power constellations (Weyland 2016), especially among those forming part of a regional community. The EAC regional bloc, like any other African Regional Economic Community (REC), is steeped with political contradictions, ethnic diversity, cultural identity issues, ideological differentiation, and economic disparities (Burrow 1976; Green 2013; Repkin 2014; Robinson 2017). In these economic and political diversities, one thing remains grey: does the Kenya’s progressive economic performance and institutional leverages present comparative advantage or pose threat to the regional integration order? Can the Onditi’s (2021), dominatarian theoretical framework explain this phenomenon?

To address this question, this paper draws on a case study of EAC from three substantial study reports: (1) EAC Development Strategy (2016/17–2020/21): Accelerating People-centered and Market-driven Integration; (2) EAC Trade Report 2011–2014; and (3) the 2016 report on African regional integration by the United Nations Economic Commission for Africa (ECA), African union (AU), and African Development Bank (AfDB). The EAC Trade reports facilitated detailed comparative analysis of how balance of trade among the six (Burundi, Kenya, United Republic of Tanzania, South Sudan, Rwanda, and Uganda) Partner States have been perceived. The article focused on the ECA/AU/AfDB reports because it provides both interstate and interregional comparisons of productive integration performance indicators, namely; preferential trade, liberation, trade creations, and diversion effects.

The paper proceeds as follows. The second section contextualizes the study by drawing linkages between dominance as a concept and the integration dynamics within the EAC’s geography and geopolitics. The next section reviews the critiques of the classical regional integration theories. The subsequent section frames the study within the three common models of dominance. The fifth section tests and evaluates the applicability of the dominatarian theory to the two main indicators of integration: economy and institutions. Finally, conclusion offers alternative thinking on how dominance as a trading dispute resolution mechanism ought to be reconstructed to take into account both the economic and the human factor (values, perception, and ideological orientation) when analyzing and planning for the regional integration in Africa.

Contextualizing Dominance in the Regional Integration Processes

The East African Community regional integration aspirations, like any other regional bloc on the continent are bound by the common history, geography and the quest for a collective security community. The original Partner States of the bloc, namely Kenya, Tanzania, and Uganda, forged a regional cooperation glued by language, culture, infrastructure, and the trans-boundary natural resources such as the waters of Lake Victoria. Owing to ideological differences between the founding fathers, mainly President Jomo Kenyatta and Mwalimu Julius Kabarage Nyerere, the Community collapsed in 1977. The revival of the bloc on 30 November 1999, and the subsequent enforcement of the Treaty on 7 July 2000, ushered in Rwanda and Burundi. The Republic of South Sudan joined the Community in April 2016 making it a six-member bloc. The ultimate goal of the EAC is to achieve a political federation through a common market and socio-cultural interdependence.

It is the hope of the Partner States that the universally acceptable principles of good governance would govern the management of benefits and liabilities emerging from the integration process. In the performance of their key functions of legislation, representation, and oversight parliaments can actively engage in the development and implementation of laws, policies, and practices that promote democracy and good governance. Article 6(d) of the Treaty for the establishment of the EAC provides for upholding the fundamental principles of good governance. These include adherence to the rule of law, accountability, transparency and respect for human rights, gender equality, and equal opportunities. As a general principle, neither economic nor political domination of one state over the others will lead the bloc to the desired political unity.

The economics of integration does not obviously guarantee equal opportunities for all member states (Kelly 2005). In fact, in some situation, regional economic imbalances breed hegemonic traits and geopolitical ‘powerism’ (Zongyou 2006). The concerns on lack of the equitability mechanism continue to emerge from the EAC bureaucrats:

The positive developments taking place within the region are indicative of the right path EAC is pursuing. For example, we have implemented diverse initiatives aimed at providing East Africans with adequate, reliable, and cost-effective access to means of production such as road, railway line, and energy. However, there is much to be done in resolving the perceived or real economic disparity at partner states level and lack of the equitability mechanism. (Interview with one of the bureaucrats at the EAC HQ, Arusha, Tanzania, 7 March 2018)

On this note, it will be remembered that disproportionate benefits to members of the Community was one of the concerns that led to the collapse of the Community in 1977 (Apuuli 2004). It is doubtful that the Community has risen above these traditional grievances. Recent studies have revealed that the Community’s Common External Tariff (CET) has disproportionate impacts on intra bloc trade for individual Partner States (Bunder 2018). Such outcomes continue to deepen interstate tensions, with most Partner States feeling unease with Kenya’s dominance traits. This influence poses both conceptual and policy dilemma as to whether the dominance by Kenya in the region could possibly threaten the regional integration order? The complexes associated with regional integration processes have elicited several trade dispute resolution mechanisms. Such mechanisms include the application of dominance as a response to problems of “collective good.”

In the regional integration context, dominance is expected to promote order, stability, and predictability in the manner in which members interact and function (Pratto et al. 2006). However, dominance as a trait comes with bitter taste. In social sciences, for example, in-group prejudices, confusion, and truculence are among some of the issues that policy makers and researchers have to deal with. Sociologists contend that even after centuries of human evolution; discrimination, oppression, brutality, and tyranny remain common features of a contemporary society. The problem of dominance is that, while one social (or economic) group enjoys special privileges, the others have limited powers and influence (Pratto and Andrew 2012). This results in trading and policy asymmetries:

Although the EAC Court of Justice has managed to institutionalize the fundamental principles of the Community (e.g., rule of law, good governance, upholding human, and peoples’ rights), lack of enforcement mechanisms, the ad hoc approaches to resolving issues including those related to trade insolvency, hinder progression of the community. (Interview with one of the bureaucrats at the EAC Headquarters, Arusha, 7 March 2018)

Resolving the above issues can sometimes go beyond economics or legal frameworks to personalities and individual perceptions. In short, the human factor, that defines dominance, remains a key in determining the future of the regional integration. In this paper, we define dominance from a social science perspective, referring to institutional discrimination sustained through disproportionate allocation of resources and information asymmetries. It is not possible to appreciate the linkages between dominance and regional integration processes before understanding the weaknesses and strength of the classical regional integration theories.

From Classics to Dominance

In several instances, regional integration scholars, such as Hettne (1991), have offered frameworks for explaining regional integration processes, globally. However, given Hettne’s focus on the European integration, what he offers as an “alternative” thinking approach lacks contextual fitability. He constructs the world by “mixing” geopolitical differentiation criteria and social constructivism. This approach presents an ontological complication. For instance, when countries undergo the various forms of the integration, they do not necessarily dissolve into homogenous communities. Hettne and other neofunctionists (Haas 1964; Mitrany 1948; Soderbaum and Shaw 2003) have, on different occasions, constructed the concept of interdependence of regional communities as the solution to the integration. However, claiming that integration leads to a solution of regions is a fallacy of non-causa pro causa (causal fallacy). Indeed, such a theory would imply that all partner states in a regional organization are equal in all aspects. In Africa, RECs are in fact admixtures, and not solutions. As such, both the functionalists and neofunctionalists’ thought of regionness presents yet another conceptual misfitability.

The Three Models of Dominance Framework

As discussed earlier in this paper, dominance traits are known to hutch power hierarchy system. Dominance, however, comes with costs of oppression and resentment by the so-called lower ranking members of the community. As a form of political maneuver, political elites or bureaucrats apply dominance to gain expediency. This power structure rewards responsive agencies or punishes recalcitrant ones (Abbott 2007). In some cases, a country may dominate trade without the ability to lead. However, this form of domination remains a major source of economic conflicts and trade wars. A case in point is China’s controversial role in the International trade relations (De Vault 2002). In the case of EAC, interstate tensions between Kenya and Tanzania continue to blight possibilities of achieving full economic and political integration (International Monetary Fund 2016). Kenya, in particular, has been accused of taking the role of “great power” in the region (Busse and Shams 2003). Although the dominance “superpowerism” could function to caution other “weak states” in the trading bloc, for decades, this has ended up creating “trade wars” and interstate tensions.

Dominance as a concept dominates the literature in the natural sciences (Charlesworth 1979), especially concerning its role in shaping “survival” of species or human population dynamics. Notwithstanding this, social scientists too, have attempted to theorize its application to intergroup relations, prejudice, and discrimination (Sidanius and Pratto 1999). On one hand, it is plausible to argue that dominance, as a human behavior, is responsible for entrenching individuals with “powerful” traits. On the other hand, “recessive” or “weak” individuals are reduced to less useful members of the ecosystem. High dominance feeling involves self-confidence, assurance, high evaluation of self, feelings of general capability or superiority, and lack of timidity (Maslow 1939). There are three models explaining dominance in the human social system.

First, the social dominance orientation (SDO) theory can be used to predict future intergroup attitude and political behavior (Ho et al., 2012). This theory, therefore, can provide insight for understanding how each state responds to dominant traits. In considering the complexes related to the regional integration, it is usual to hear frustrations emerging from the EAC boardroom meetings or regional border points.

“Kenya is too aggressive for us” or “Tanzania with its trade barriers is not going anywhere…” or “is Burundi a member of the EAC?” or “why did Uganda decide to redirect their oil pipeline project to Dar es Salaam away from Mombasa?”

Second, the cultural perspective of dominance presents an interesting relationship in the global system. It explains why powerful countries such as United States and China are able to dominate the global markets. Why? Some scholars have observed that this occurs because of the ability of these countries to evolve a distinct trading culture. Once a culture is established, what follows is how Preferential Trade Arrangements (PTA) could help to create global welfare and not domination (Anchan, 2012). However, it is still possible that the greatest beneficiary of a welfare culture is considered a “dominant actor.” It should be remembered that the PTA negotiating environment strongly favors powerful economic actors such as the US and the European Union. It is natural that dominating trading partners will cascade to become dictators in the international trading relations. This eventually creates the asymmetric relationship compelling the Less Developed Economies (LDCs) to bear the title, “recessive.” This raises more of moral philosophical questions than it does economics. Serrano et al. (2007), in their efforts to understand this phenomenon, concluded that the global trading system is yet to achieve “real” trade interdependence.

The third and final is the psychological model, it argues that, dominance, as a product of competition, is sustained into three humanistic factors: (a) personality dynamics; (b) individual basic values—anxieties and beliefs; and (c) individual information processing (Otto and Richter, 2018). Yet, others argue that the authoritarianism behavior commonly associated with dominance can post higher organizational productivity (Smither 1993). Both the positive and the negative outcomes of dominance as a human behavior fit well in this paper’s postulation of tensions emerging from the EAC regional integration. But also, the revolutionary work of Sigmund Freud (The Library of Congress 1939), on human behavior, is critical in understanding why, for instance, regional economic/political or security arrangements such as the EAC do not find it necessary to make rational decisions. Does this reflect the institutional preferences or the individuals’ attitude toward each other? Should there be mechanisms for ensuring that the decisions made in such entities are entirely guided by rational logic and reason, and not human affection? How possible is it to detach political feelings of political elites from the professional mandate of regional organizations?

Studies show that in any social or economic ecosystem, domination is perpetuated through social relationships, ethnic cleavages, racial discrimination, and national stereotyping (Thompson, 2013). Lovetta (2009) referred to this condition as “social power.” All these are manifestations of basic features of groups’ motivation, rather than as a rationally held economic or political ideology. Sociologists are in agreement with the view that people or systems that are prejudiced against certain ethnic groups tend to be prejudiced against other nationalities (Loftus, 2008). Similarly, in political arrangements such as the EAC, authoritarian tendencies with conservative views are most likely to construct asymmetric power game leading to domination by one state.

In an effort to understand how global trade networks interact, Hilpert (2014) offered a typology of a dominant state. A typical example in the 21st century is China’s domination in the international trade as the US did in 1970s. The positive aspect of this classification comes out strongly when Hilpert caution that although China’s domination in the world trade and the World Trade Organization (WTO) has led to economic tensions and trade wars, these fears are unfounded because the country portrays features of an established actor in the world trade system. This implies that while the original dominance thinking among social scientists posited a direct linkage between social group formation and evolution of inequalities, evolution of the concept continues to draw relevance in the field of International Relations, particularly in its application to regional economic and political integration of Africa.

The same concept of dominance is used to explain evolution of institutions. As a form of dominance states may decide to legitimize “myths”—cultural mores and ideologies being formalized to guide decisions and policy direction (Grossman and Helpman 1995). Myths legitimization may take various forms: (a) national security, (b) national trade interest, and (c) national liberation. The challenge with economic domination is that the other member of a group considered “weak” or less beneficial are usually excluded through stereotype imaging and eventually labeled as “a less member.” Such forms of imaging can give rise to the negative taste, justifying wars, or political jittery. If such imaging relates to the economic integration, it might lead to trade wars through the “domino effect.” Imaging, at times, can lead to the promotion of universal rights. In the regional integration framework, the equal treatment of members may pave way for reduced disparities, increased access to resources, power, and legitimacy.

Gazi (2014) observed that individuals high in SDO are more likely to support social policies promoting the social structures of groups. This thinking further claims that such personalities or institutions are linked to lowered tendency to cooperation and increased social distance. Although SDO is predominantly associated with psychologists, institutional aspect of the theory could provide constructs, effective in explaining the contemporary dynamics of the regional integration in Africa. As such, constructs such as “hegemony,” “isolation,” and “ideology” transcend disciplines—political science, sociology, and international relations. This paper intends to contribute to the field of international relations/studies by framing regional integration processes and outcome within the framework of “social dominance.” By doing so, the regional trade dominance framework is constructed to guide in explaining observed trade imbalances and institutional differentials in EAC. It is the hope of this paper that this theoretical anecdote will provide a holistic explanation to both economic and institutional (interest groups) externalities of regional trade relations in Africa and beyond. Table 1 outlines the differences between the various approaches to designing and analysis of the regional integration.

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Table 1.

Differences between RIT, Regionalism Approach, and Dominatarianism.

Integration Indicator	Classical Theories	Regionalism Approach	Dominatarianism
Economy	Economic materials are the main driver of integration Trade liberalization States device mechanisms to survive in the market	Symbolism Economy is an integral part of the socio-cultural systems Economic interdependence	Economics of things is inherent in the genes and behavior of individuals Economic aggression and superiority complex Powerful individuals create agonistic interaction as survival tactics
Institutions	The informal cooperation among statesmen Build strong institutions Processes are regulated through rules of the game	Regionalism and historical interaction of states Non-state actor’s role is key Regional complex interdependence and regional society Socio-cultural construction of ideas	Fosters intergroup attitude and social power Individual belief system, values, and social relationship Trust and benevolent leadership Discursive nature of ideas
Politics	Focus on state’s interest Geostrategic rationality of things Supranationalism and intergovernmentalism Hegemonic stability Power distribution and rationality in decision-making	The end is to achieve a globalized world system Territorial identity influences regionalism Voluntary cooperation Regional space and geography key in regional integration Interconnections between the national communities	Focus on the person as the main source of social power Personalities and individual identities shape the processes Love and assurance Adaptation and survival tactics Sense of equity

Source: Author’s construct based on the discursive ontology of regional integration conceptual development.

From Table 1, it is clear that the classical regional integration theories and regionalism approaches are insufficient to explain some of the emerging dynamics in African regional organizations. In the case of EAC, there have been unending trade-related frictions between Kenya and Tanzania. Despite the shared history and geography, members of the Community have pursued diverse dimensions of ethnic and ideological policies, which breeds the perception that Kenya dominates over the rest of the Partner States (Miguel 2004).

However, the personality issues arising from the interaction among states in the Community cannot be understood only in the conventional geo-economics frameworks. Worse still, the new regionalism approach to the regional integration has compounded this thinking by drawing in an assortment of pillars—culture, politics, and social. This logic seems “too high,” “too low.” It is like flying an aircraft in the stratosphere (~40,000 ft above the sea level) without provisions for oxygen masks—the pilots are bound to lose consciousness and the plane will crush. But at the same time, flying too low exposes the plane to higher air resistance. Therefore, a middle point is required in order to sustain the journey. Likewise, there seems to be a lacuna between the regional integration theories and regional approaches, as illustrated through the two integration indicators: economy and institutions.

What Does the Data Tell Us About Dominatarian Theory?

The dominatarian theory predicts that while all countries in a trading bloc have a comparative advantage in the integration processes relative to the other trading partners, there will be one with more advantage. Hence, integration processes will tend to favor the most powerful states, more often times degenerating into geopolitical tensions with diverse impacts on the integration process. The dilemma remains, is dominance a sign of comparative advantage or a threat to the regional integration order? We address in turn the aspect of the economic domination and of the relationship mediated by institutional capacity (interest groups).

Economic Domination

On the economic front, there is a reasonable evidence for the contention that the Kenya’s trade performance is higher than the rest in the EAC trading bloc. At the same time, some countries in the bloc have performed well. Still, Kenya enjoys the benefit of well-established institutions such as interest groups. However, the ways in which institutional capacity (interest groups) mediates the economic performance within the EAC Partner States trading regimes appears to be complex. The analysis of the six EAC Partner States suggests the following insights about how economic performance and institutional capacity (interest groups) affect the outcome of the regional integration process.

The implementation of Free Trade Area (FTA) does not necessarily produce the same effect on each partner state. Some countries may be capable of achieving higher performance than average increase from the free trade. Darku (2009) performed “‘gravity model” analysis establishing that during the period 1996–2009, Uganda dominated trade in the sub-region. Further meta-analysis by Buigut (2012) shows that Tanzania’s imports had increased substantially from around US$100 million in 2002 to over US$400 million in 2007. The same case applied to Rwanda, whose imports have increased from around US$60 million to over US$300 million. Buigut attributed this performance to the implementation of the Customs Union. However, during the same trading period, the implementation of the Customs Union did not have the significant concomitant effect on Kenya’s exports. Nevertheless, Kenya experienced an anticipatory increase in her exports to EAC bloc of about 86%. This was in spite of the fact that Kenya’s exports to the EAC Partner States were not granted immediate duty-free status. Overall, during this period, Kenya did not necessarily dominate trade; Tanzania had in fact seen a significant improvement in her intra-regional trading performance.

The second element driving economic performance in the region is trade flows. According to the EAC Second Development Strategy, 2001–2005, the large volume of exports from Kenya could have reflected increased demand from neighboring states catalyzed by an economic boom (UNECA 2006a, 2006b). Conversely, landlocked Partner States such as Uganda, historically dependent on Kenya mainly for industrial products, had caused the large disparity in the latter years. The lack of product complementarities among the Partner States makes them experience the low intra-trade (Hoekman et al. 2017). Yet, other studies reveal that the Africa’s relatively low level of trading can be attributed to its low productivity (Tavare and Tang 2011). According the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD), during 2005–2014, intra-African trade was only around 11–15% of total trade flows compared to 45%–50% in the European Union and 45–50% in the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) area (UNCTAD, 2016). The Asia free trade area trade flows were even higher (59–62%). It is expected that the most dominant nation in a trading FTA creates prospects for the favorable fiscal development. However, during the period 2011–2016, Kenya experienced the highest levels of budget deficits (see Table 2).

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Table 2.

Fiscal Developments and Prospects (percent of GDP), 2011–2016.

Partner State	General Government Total Revenue						General Government Expenditure
	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016
Burundi	38.7	33.8	31.4	28.1	21.9	15.0	42.2	37.5	33.2	31.8	27.2	21.2
Kenya	19.5	19.1	19.7	19.8	19.3	20.2	23.6	24.2	25.4	27.2	27.5	27.5
Rwanda	25.3	23.2	25.5	24.2	24.7	23.6	26.2	25.7	26.8	28.3	27.5	26.0
South Sudan	25.6	16.8	21.9	27.2	21.0	30.5	21.0	31.6	24.8	34.1	39.4	50.3
Tanzania	15.6	15.7	15.5	14.9	14.5	15.9	19.1	19.8	19.4	17.9	17.8	19.6
Uganda	14.5	13.4	12.5	13.2	14.9	14.4	17.2	16.4	16.5	16.5	17.6	18.0
EAC	19.0	17.6	18.1	18.3	18.0	18.4	21.5	22.3	22.4	23.5	24.2	23.8

Source: IMF WEO, April 2017.

Note: 2016 is estimate.

Tanzania has a relatively better position in the internal trade attributed to stable exports relative to the overall economy (see Table 3). According to the regional strategic plans, 2016/17–2020/21, during the period 2012–2016, Kenya and South Sudan posted the highest levels of budget deficits, −7.3 and −19.8, respectively. The overall deficit in the region, on average, has varied between 4.4% in 2013 and 6.2% in 2015.

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Table 3.

EAC External Trade Indicators, 2012–2016.

Exports of Goods and Services (% of GDP)							Imports of Goods and Service (% GDP)	Partner state	2012	2013	2014	2015
2016	Average (2012–2016)	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	Average (2012–2016)	Burundi	9.4	8.8	7.2	5.9
5.6	7.4	46.7	41.8	37.3	37.5	29.0	38.5	Tanzania	20.9	19.4	18.4	20.1
20.6	19.9	33.0	30.2	28.3	27.0	25.8	28.9	Uganda	19.9	20.4	16.6	19.3
18.2	18.9	31.3	29.6	27.4	30.4	27.7	29.3	Kenya	22.2	19.9	18.4	16.5
15.8	18.6	35.5	33.2	32.9	27.9	25.5	31.0	Rwanda	13.9	15.4	16.4	18.4
19.0	16.6	34.0	32.0	33.2	35.6	37.1	34.4	South Sudan	9.3	28.0	34.0	21.0
61.0	30.7	34.1	29.9	31.6	28.9	64.8	37.9	Average (regional)	15.9	18.7	18.5	16.9
23.4	18.7	35.8	32.8	31.8	31.2	35.0	33.3

Source: IMF Regional Economic Outlook 2017: Sub-Sahara Africa.

During the same period, Kenya had heavily invested in infrastructure (the Standard Gauge Railway, SGR), while the Republic of South Sudan was experiencing protracted political instability and humanitarian catastrophe. Hence, the two governments experienced the wide gap between revenue and expenditure. Challenges associated with political instability and nation building are not new to the EAC integration process. Nevertheless, these challenges were mild, as Kenya maintained a steady revenue flow reaching the high of US$11,514.7 (see Figure 1).

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Figure 1.

Source: Authors’ construction from the EAC Database, 2011–2014.

The other element is the access to and utilization of the transport infrastructure. The region has experienced the progressive annual growth rate of 5% in the infrastructural development since 2004. As a result, the number of international passengers increased from 3 million (2012) to 6.5 million (2017). However, of the 12 major international airports in the region, Kenya owns 4. During the period July 2016 to March 2017, Kenya handled 6,986,760 passengers compared to Tanzania (3,948,000), Burundi (86,449), Rwanda (237,692), and Uganda (769,000) (see Table 4). The high performance by the Kenya’s air transport is attributed to several structural and systemic milestones such as establishment and utilization of the EAC Unified Flight Information Region (UFIR), adoption of the EAC Regulation for Liberalization of Air Transport Services and a clear Road Map for Operationalization of the EAC Agreement on Aviation Search and Rescue. Moreover, Kenya seems to have created more borders that are common, for the broadband interconnections, compared to any other country in the region. The country was among the first in the region to beat the 17 June 2015 deadline for the completion of digital migration.

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Table 4.

Number of Air Passengers by EAC Partner States, July 2016 to March 2017.

International Airport	Total Number of Passengers	Aircraft Movements	Cargo (in Tons)
Bujumbura International Airport	86,449	2,114	1,050
Jomo Kenyatta International Airport (JKIA)	5,456,452	81,846	177,439,722
Moi International Airport	1,066,544	17,204	2,276,788
Eldoret International Airport	176,012	7,134	8,926,970
Kisumu International Airport	287,752	5,917	–
Kigali International Airport	237,692	7,490	2,233
Julius Nyerere International Airport	2,360,000	77,000	15,700
Kilimanjaro International Airport	630,000	20,750	2,700
Amani Karume International Airport	958,000	64,000	1,825
Entebbe International Airport	769,000	14,516	10,096

Source: Authors’ construction from the EAC Database (2017).

Tourism is also another crucial sector. The sector’s contribution to GDP is the highest in Tanzania (14%) and lowest in Burundi (4.3%). Tourists’ arrival in Kenya declined significantly from 1,823,000 in 2011 to 1,181,000 in 2015. During this period, Rwanda (1,300,000) and Uganda (1,303,000) dominated the tourism market in the region (see Figure 2). Kenya’s retrogression on this indicator was attributed to the changing country’s foreign policy that deployed the Kenya Defence Force (KDF) in Somalia in 2012. Consequently, the country became more vulnerable to the Al Shabaab terror group in retaliation attacks. The tourism sector staggered and the country lost economic dominance grip to Rwanda, Uganda, and Tanzania, who experienced steady growth in tourist arrivals (see Figure 2).

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Figure 2.

Source: Authors’ construction from the EAC Database (2011–2015).

The energy sector is also a key indicator. The energy sector is considered critical to transforming the region’s framework of what is commonly known as “power pool.” The region’s development strategy, 2016/17–2020/21, between 2011 and 2015, shows increased installation of capacity of hydroelectricity and geothermal for Kenya by 2.9% and 9.3%, respectively, while the other Partner States’ remained constant. Installed capacity for thermal electricity decreased by 63.9% in Tanzania while in Kenya it increased by 11%. However, Kenya, Uganda, and Tanzania registered decline in generation of thermal electricity in the margin of 45.4%, 21.1%, and 8.4%, respectively. Kenya, however, still led on geothermal power generation by 55%. The role of energy is essential to the economic performance of a country. On this front, Kenya is considered as the “lead” nation in the region.

The notion of “lead” nation is akin to the concept of RTD. This provides an alternative thinking to the theories that dominate regional integration studies, such as the theory of hegemonic stability (Gilpin, 2000). As right put by Joseph (2001), the theory of hegemonic stability is central in maintaining adherence to liberal international economic regimes, and by extension liberal peace, by underwriting the costs of maintaining the regime rather than coercion. In this article, the proposed RTD framework provides that ‘the most powerful state influences the rest of the Partner States through institutional strength and economic “muscles.” The RTD framework is premised on the understanding that the convergence between the domestic complex interactivities with national interests determines which state influences the others most in the regional integration ecosystem.

Finally, geopolitical dynamics is instrumental in shaping the regional integration processes. A country’s influence in the integration ecosystem is shaped by its capacity to fund such regional organizations. Kenya is one of the principal contributors to the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) contributing 27.7% in 2016 alongside Ethiopia and Sudan contributing 29% and 28.5%, respectively (UNECA, 2016a, 2016b). During the same year, Kenya’s contribution to the EAC wealth stood at 39% followed by Uganda’s 21%. Kenya’s relations and performance across the three regional organizations (COMESA, EAC, and IGAD) remains sterling, hence sustaining her dominance traits. Kenya profits most with shares of 95% and 93% of total trade creation and diversion, respectively. This asymmetric regional trade relation poses a real threat to the EAC trading bloc, which would collapse if the issue of trade imbalances between Kenya and the rest of the Partner States was not adequately addressed. On this issue, the International Monetary Fund Directorate of Trade reveals that Kenyan’s exports to Tanzania and Uganda were US$477 million and US$633 million, respectively (IMF 2016). Therefore, in terms of the economic performance, Kenya remains the dominant economy. As illustrated in the next section, the country enjoys powerful negotiation leverages put forward by fairly developed and diverse interest groups (Bizuneh et al., 2018).

Conclusion

In the proposed alternative thinking on how future discourses on regional integration ought to be framed, the definition of dominance needs to capture the systemic aspects of regional integration and behavior of states and influential individuals. Based on the findings and analysis in this paper, here are two possible ways of thinking about dominance as relates to the regional integration.

First, framing the administrative and policy interventions for resolving the regional trade imbalances and political tensions. The administrative mechanisms of dominance would include financing, infrastructure and policies, regulatory frameworks and policies. Second, dominance refers to state behavior, ideology, values, and regional networking assets. Focusing on the noun, dominance, rather than the verb, domination helps us to view processes and outcomes better. This alternative way of framing discourses on the regional integration would be better placed to identify both the administrative and behavioral measures to caution the less competitive Partner States without necessarily victimizing the dominant states as a hegemon. The current thinking, which equates dominant economies to hegemon, does not provide for sustainable mechanisms for weaker states. This thinking, instead, entrenches cynicism and mistrust among the Community.

In conclusion, intellectuals and bureaucrats working on Africa’s regional integration, must also employ the human factor when framing the regional integration debate and policy. Dominance as opposed to domination should be regarded as a positive externality emerging from state interaction. Within the RTD thinking framework, the economic and political balance of power in a regional ecosystem ought to be schemed without necessarily creating the notion of “hegemons” verses “underdogs.”