Russia–China–Pakistan Engagement in the Changing Global Context: Scrutinizing the Realist Logic of a Trilateral ‘Axis’

Introduction

In the light of significant alteration to the strategic dimensions of the geopolitical world order, Russia, China, and Pakistan are gradually coming together. Most scholars and analysts of international relations are placing their arguments regarding a possible Russia–China–Pakistan ‘axis’ within the broader context of Russia’s desire to push for greater bipolarity in world affairs by searching for allies in the East in the light of its estranged relationship with the West. As Russian foreign policy has come to be characterized by an assertive fervor, as manifested in Georgia (2008), Crimea (2014), and Syria (2015), most analysts have attributed this assertiveness to the external developments that have characterized the international system at large (Gardner 2015; Lukin 2016; Mearsheimer 2014); for instance, Mearsheimer’s (2014) offensive structural realism holds that Russia’s actions in Ukraine should be seen as a reaction to the external context, that is, the West’s aggressive grand strategy, which exploits color revolutions in Russia’s neighborhood as one of the weapons in the struggle for power.

The construction of an ‘Atlantic Order’ by Washington has effectively treated Russia as an outsider and a second-rate power (Kupchan 2002). Russia became excluded not only from Europe, but efforts were also made to exclude Russia from Eurasia itself, a point manifested by NATO’s eastward expansionism and the West-sponsored colored revolutions in states that Russia considers to be the area of its ‘privileged interests’ (President of Russia 2008). The term ‘privileged interest’ remains unspecified, and the states falling under this classification remain unmentioned; yet, presumably, it points to those states which were a part of the erstwhile Soviet Union. This exclusion of Russia by the USA in the post-Soviet space has led the West to emerge as the significant ‘other’ for Russia vis-a-vis which New Russia’s identity and its interests has come to be defined (Mankoff 2009). Russia’s foreign policy-related documents have been explicit in its opposition to US actions, which have in Russia’s views threatened its national interests and have attempted to contain Russia by treating it as a defeated power (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation [MFA Russia] 2000, 2013, 2016; President of Russia 2008). Today, Russian policymakers are attempting to reaffirm a specificity of their country before the West by turning toward the East. It is within this broader context that the Russia–China–Pakistan engagement has been predominantly analyzed by scholars and practitioners of International Relations. In their opinion, China, a staunch supporter of a multipolar world order and Pakistan, in view of its present antagonizing relations with the USA over the suspension of security assistance, have joined the bandwagon to reap the possible benefits of Russia–USA rivalry to form a ‘counter alliance’ aimed at diminishing the USA and India’s supremacy in the region. However, this article will analyze the factors propelling Russia–China–Pakistan engagement with the aim to find support for the argument that a Russia–China–Pakistan counter-strategic ‘axis,’ as projected in realist literature, is untenable. While attempting to rationalize the shortcomings of the realist narrative, the article will further argue that Russia’s security interest in Afghanistan is the primary determinant leading Russia to recalibrate its ties with Pakistan. Hence, the coming together of Russia, China, and Pakistan should be viewed as a development primarily arising from their collective interest in tackling the menace of terrorism and bringing stability to the Afghan region.

Factors Promoting Russia–China–Pakistan Cooperation: Countering the Realist Narratives

Russia–China–Pakistan engagement has mostly come to be explained in realist terms, with the usage of terminologies like ‘axis’ or ‘counter strategic alliance’ by scholars and political analysts (Farwa 2019; Kakar 2018; Kumar 2016; Mitra 2015; Pant 2017; Talukdar 2016; Thoker and Singh 2017). In their explanations, the overriding factor shaping such an ‘alliance’ or ‘axis’ is Russia–China–Pakistan’s interest in pushing for a counter to the growing US–India ties in the region. Another line of realist thinking notes that the primary force behind such an alliance is not only Russia’s interest in dislodging the USA from the region but also to counter China’s growing status as a countervailing power in the region (Aziz 2017). This article seeks to rationalize that the above factors, as presented in the realist narratives, are inadequate to explain the nature of Russia–China–Pakistan cooperation in the light of (a) Russia’s invested relationship with India, (b) the former’s tactical relationship with Pakistan, (c) Russia’s comprehensive partnership with China, (d) the lack of any strategic agreement between the USA and India to counter Russia and China, and, most importantly, (e) Russia’s concern to institutionalize a regional mechanism to mitigate the menace of terrorism emanating from the Afghan territory in a bid to safeguard its own territorial integrity.

First, in view of Russia’s time-tested ties with India, it is difficult to sustain that Russia will cooperate with China and Pakistan to thwart India’s growing presence in the region. A comparative analysis of Russia’s political, economic, and defense ties with India, China, and Pakistan reveals that Russia’s relationship with India has been extremely invested cutting across several spheres, as both countries have assisted each other at crucial junctures of history ever since the Indo-Soviet Treaty of Peace, Friendship and Cooperation was signed in August 1971. The treaty laid down the desire of both the countries to expand and consolidate existing relations while upholding firm faith in peaceful coexistence between states having different sociopolitical systems (Ministry of External Affairs of the Government of India [MEA] 1971). Since the signing of the treaty, Russia–India ties have increasingly acquired a qualitatively new character in almost all areas of bilateral relations. Several institutionalized mechanisms have been established to ensure regular interaction between these two countries. Besides meeting in the annual summits, leaders of both the countries regularly meet at the sidelines of various summits of BRICS, Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO), and the Russia–India–China Forum (RIC) to discuss and exchange views on issues of regional and international significance. Additionally, Russia has been a long-standing supporter of India’s membership in the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) and an expanded United Nations Security Council (UNSC) notwithstanding opposition from other major powers, including China (Embassy of India 2019). Though Russia–China relations are presently being touted to be at ‘the best level in history’ (Putin 2018), Russia–India ties have historically stood the test of times unlike Russia–China relations that are characterized by a tumultuous past.

In terms of Russia’s defense ties with India, China, and Pakistan, 56% of India’s import of major arms and 76% of China’s import of major arms from 2015 to 2019 have been from Russia. Though the share of India’s import of arms from Russia has fallen by 16% compared to the period 2009–2014 due to India’s policy of supplier diversification, Russia remains the largest supplier of arms to India (Statista Research Department 2020). Moreover, amid India’s tense standoff over border issues with China, Russia has assured to accelerate the delivery of S-400 surface-to-air missile defense system to India following India’s Defense Minister, Rajnath Singh’s visit to Moscow for the Victory Day Parade in June 2020 (The Moscow Times 2020). While Russia remains the largest supplier of arms to India and China, the percentage of Pakistan’s import of arms from Russia in the same period stands at a mere 6.6% (Statista Research Department 2020). Russia has been warming up to Pakistan, as evident from the annually held ‘Friendship Exercises’ since 2016 coupled with other joint military exercises; yet, these are mostly counter-terrorism exercises performed within the ambit of the SCO . Taking cognizance of this fact, Russian Ambassador to India, Nikolay Kudashev stated that Russia’s military exercises with Pakistan are driven by the common denominator of fighting terrorism, and that its relations with Pakistan cannot be equalized with Russia’s relations with India (Gurung 2017). Moreover, the Pakistan military is handicapped by a lack of resources to invest in Russian origin military systems unlike India or China (Kaura 2018). Therefore, Russia’s defense cooperation with Pakistan faces severe institutional challenges unlike its defense ties with India and China.

A study of Russia’s trade statistics reveals that by the end of the first 7 months of 2019, trade figures with India and Pakistan stood at US$7.55 billion (Embassy of India 2019) and US$532 million (The Express Tribune 2019), respectively, while with China, it reached US$110.79 billion by the end of 2019 (Russia Briefing 2020). The figures reveal that Russia’s trade with Pakistan is extremely low and below potential. Though Russia’s trading figures with India also look unimpressive, a number of initiatives are being taken up to unleash the maximum potential of their economic ties. According to the figures provided by the Confederation of Indian Industries, the total trade in 2016–2017 between India and Russia went up to US$7.5 billion, registering a notable growth rate of 22% compared to the preceding year (Confederation of Indian Industries [CII] 2018). As the two-way investments succeeded in crossing the US$30 billion mark, both sides have enhanced the figure to US$50 billion to be achieved by 2025 (Zakharov 2018). Moreover, both India and Russia are also undertaking intensive efforts to identify projects that will enhance long-term economic cooperation between the countries. This was clearly evident from Prime Minister, Narendra Modi’s (2018) address at the India–Russia Business Summit in which he identified 23 projects for joint collaboration and also declared the creation of the ‘Russia-Plus’ system to provide support to Russian investors in India.

Compared to Russia–India trade statistics, Russia–China trade figures may seem impressive; yet, scholars have listed out the challenges that may thwart a long-term commitment between both the countries in the economic realm. First, Russia is not a promising partner to China when it comes to exporting advanced technology and importing low-cost manufacture (Malle 2017). Second, they are dependent on other countries more than on each other; for instance, Russia is dependent on the EU, while China on the USA and other Eastern Asian countries (Simola 2016). Third, Russia’s overt dependence on China, as illustrated from the differences that both these countries had over the construction of new pipelines and routes, is another challenge that thwarts a long-term commitment between Russia and China; for example, the compromise over the Power of Siberia route after years of arm wrestling displayed Russia’s weakness and China’s preeminence (Skalamera 2016). Furthermore, he remarks that if Russia’s economy continues to decline further, it can turn the Sino-Russian energy ties into an imbalanced relationship.

In terms of public perception and the dynamics of public attitude among the Russians toward India, China, and Pakistan, the Levada Centre which is the only non-governmental pollster in Russia in its survey identified India as one of their country’s top allies. Though it reassured of the ‘dzuzhbadosti’ relationship’s intactness, it also added that Russians’ perception of China was gradually becoming better, while Pakistan does not feature as one of the top five allies of Russia according to the survey (Bagchi 2018).

The above comparative analysis of Russia’s ties with India, China, and Pakistan at the political, defense, and economic level(s), and in terms of public perception, reveals that though Russia is gradually developing a robust relationship with China and recalibrating its ties with Pakistan, both these countries are yet to catch up with Russia–India ties that enjoy a mutually invested relationship and goodwill steeped in historical nostalgia. Therefore, it is highly unlikely for Russia to turn against India by forging a strategic alliance with China and Pakistan.

Second, Russia’s recalibration of ties with Pakistan, which is in sharp contrast to the Cold War period, is leading political analysts to remark that Islamabad is occupying an important position for Kremlin. The role of China in strengthening Russia–Pakistan relations is surfacing in many writings. China’s relations with Russia have reached a new level of comprehensive strategic partnership, while Pakistan has consistently occupied ‘a unique position in China’s foreign policy calculus’ (Pant 2012, 84). Many scholars argue that Pakistan is being drawn closer to Russia through some Chinese efforts, which is most notable in the case of Pakistan’s membership in SCO and the China–Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) in the Chinese-initiated One Belt One Road (OBOR) project (Purushottam 2015). CPEC serves a strategic purpose for China as it is held to be pivot to China’s economic and energy security (Ali 2016). Russia’s visible interest in this project for strategic and economic reasons has led analysts to opine that CPEC may eventually prove to be the launch pad for Russia–China–Pakistan ‘axis’ (Maqsood 2017).

A recalibration of Russia–Pakistan ties is clearly evident from their efforts to explore an array of avenues for engagement; yet, their bilateral relations face significant impediments. First, a scrutiny of Russia’s foreign policy concepts and other doctrinal documents reveals a fragmented policy toward Pakistan; for instance, Pakistan failed to find a mention in the Foreign Policy Concepts of the Russian Federation of 2000, 2013, and 2016. It was mentioned only once for the first time in the Foreign Policy Concept of the Russian Federation of 2008 (President of Russia 2008). Similarly, in Putin’s article entitled, Russia and the Changing World, published in Moscow News in 2012 along with the National Security Strategy and the Maritime Doctrine of the Russia Federation up to 2020, Pakistan was not mentioned unlike other Asian countries such as India, China, and Afghanistan (Moskalenko and Topychkanov 2014). Second, the analysis further shows that Russia’s growing closeness toward Pakistan is primarily driven by its security interest in Afghanistan; for example, the military cooperation agreement signed between Russia and Pakistan talks about ‘exchanging information on politico-military issues, strengthening collaboration in defense and counter-terrorism sectors (and) sharing similar views on developments in Afghanistan’ (Roy 2014). On a similar note, the Foreign Policy Concepts of the Russian Federation of 2013 and 2016 reiterate Russia’s commitments to implement comprehensive measures in the crisis-stricken Afghanistan along with ‘other interested states’ to mitigate the terrorist threat emanating from the region along with reducing the illicit production and trafficking of narcotic drugs (MFA Russia 2013, 2016). Third, a Russian President is yet to visit Pakistan, and the energy and military deals between Russia and Pakistan appear insignificant compared to Russia’s economic and strategic collaborations with India or China. Moreover, Russian officials including the Russian President have made it clear that Russia values India as a strategic partner, while its dealings with Pakistan are still at an incipient stage. Under such circumstances, it is too soon to talk of a Russia–China–Pakistan ‘axis’ as two of the component states of the so-called axis; Russia and Pakistan are yet to overcome their fragmented polices toward each other.

Third, scholars who opine that Russia desires to diminish China’s role in the region succumb to the rationalists’ narrative of conceiving Russia–China relations as either ‘confrontational’ or ‘cooperative.’ Most works pertaining to the analysis of Russia–China relations in the post-Soviet space have either described their bilateral relations as ‘rapprochement’ or ‘rivalry’ as if cooperation is not possible even when certain confrontational issues exist (Bin 2007). The adoption of these binaries to describe Russia–China strategic relations has proved to be inadequate and restrictive in explaining the changing dimensions of their ties in the new geopolitical setting of the post-Cold-War period. Moreover, the analyses and usage of certain terms such as ‘an axis of convenience’ (Lo 2008), ‘imbalanced relationship’ (Flikke 2016), and ‘status exchange’ (Flikke 2016) by scholars to describe the Russia–China relations lack the much needed interpretive approach.

Russia’s comprehensive cooperative engagement with China at the strategic level, as reflected from the multitude of Joint Declarations mainly opposing USA’s unilateral tendencies in international affairs, has ‘spilled over’ to other sectors like the economy and the military. As both countries have redefined their strategic partnership by upgrading it to the level of ‘comprehensive strategic partnership,’ their resoluteness to deepen cooperation has also resonated in the defense and trade sectors (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China [FMPRC] 2013). Therefore, any analysis of Russia–China strategic relations should adopt a more interpretive approach which should suggest that not all decisions and polices are governed by the systemic structure; rather, it results from an array of factors that include domestic political developments marked by the rise and fall of groups of political elites, economic conditions, internal threats emanating from separatism, cross-border terrorism, and so on. When analyzed from this perspective, the realist narrative that presents the primary force behind this trilateral alliance as Russia’s interest to counter China’s growing status as a countervailing power in the region stands invalidated.

Fourth, according to the realist narrative, India’s growing cooperation with the USA is driving Russia to prioritize its ties with India’s adversaries in the region, that is, China and Pakistan. India and the USA share a common commitment toward freedom and democratic principles and have recently attempted to deepen their bilateral cooperation through the 2+2 ministerial dialogues held in September 2018 and December 2019 along with the signing of the long awaited Communications Compatibility and Security Agreement (COMCASA). Besides the various bilateral dialogues and working groups such as the Cyber Dilaogue, Civil Space Working Group, Defense Policy Group, and so on, both the countries are also closely cooperating in enhancing their economic relations. At the end of 2019, the overall US–India bilateral trade stood at US$149 billion (U.S. Department of State 2020). Apart from enhancing their bilateral partnership and deepening their international cooperation at various multilateral organizations, India and the USA have come together in their declaration of commitment with regard to the Indo-Pacific region. They have also demonstrated their assessment of China as a regional disruptor in the region (Zakharov 2018). Yet, the chances of any formal strategic cooperation agreement between India and the USA to counter China appear bleak, given India’s realistic assessment of China which it knows is much like India itself, ‘…an incomplete power confronting significant developmental, diplomatic and political problems’ (Snedden 2016, 28). Though India and the USA are exhibiting deeper engagement in various areas of bilateral relations, India is apprehensive of the USA in the light of the latter’s America First policy promoted by the Trump administration, Countering America’s Adversaries Through Sanctions Act (CAATSA) and other anti-market policies that run counter to India’s national interest. Therefore, the ‘other’ (i.e., USA and India) vis-à-vis which the realists attempt to posit the Russia–China–Pakistan ‘axis’ as a counter strategic alliance is itself noninstitutionalized and fraught with many challenges.

Lastly and most importantly, the ‘Afghan problem’ has proven to be the primary factor shaping this trilateral engagement as all three states have high stakes in the stability of Afghanistan due to their geographical contiguity to the region.

Small (2014) notes that China shares a border of 76 km with Afghanistan, though the border lacks infrastructure to connect both the countries. The barren Wakhan corridor is maintained as a buffer zone. Historically seen, bilateral relations between China and Afghanistan have remained insignificant. Afghanistan has only featured in China’s political agenda when there has been sufficient anticipation of spillover of security threats from Afghanistan to the Chinese territory. During the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan in the late 1970s, China had assisted the Afghan mujahedeen against the Soviet forces, but once Soviet threat to Afghanistan receded so did China’s attention toward Afghanistan. During the civil strife in Afghanistan in the 1990s, China almost remained absent from Afghanistan and left its ally, Pakistan with a free hand to influence the political developments in the region. During this time, the Chinese secessionist group, the Uyghur militants demanding Xinjiang from China flourished in Afghanistan with help from the Taliban. To minimize their influence, Chinese diplomats negotiated with the Taliban leaders and promised to protect Taliban from international sanctions in exchange for Chinese security from the Uyghur separatists by not allowing them to launch any attack from Afghan territory. Though the fall of the Taliban following the 9/11 attacks brought respite to the Chinese, the presence of US military bases in Central Asia, Afghanistan, and Pakistan contributed to a feeling of ‘strategic encirclement’ (Small 2014). The feeling of ‘strategic encirclement,’ however, came to be replaced with the feeling of insecurity in the aftermath of USA’s decision to pull out its combat forces from Afghanistan. This invariably led China to replace its passive involvement with a more active involvement in Afghanistan (Ali 2016). China’s active involvement has come at the backdrop of its growing economic and energy interests in the Eurasian region. In December 2014, Sun Yuxi, China’s special envoy to Afghanistan remarked that China was ready to assist in a peace settlement in Afghanistan. However, instead of bilateral dealings with the Taliban, China undertook a regional mobilization, and the role of the SCO in this regard emerged as significant. Most of the member states of SCO including Russia, the Central Asian states, Pakistan, and China have ethnic groups in their territories who maintain links with their co-ethnic brethren in Afghanistan (Seerat 2015). Therefore, it is in the interest of all these states to mobilize their energies and work toward successfully implementing the recent peace deal in Afghanistan.

Similar to China, Pakistan shares a border with Afghanistan which means like China, Pakistan too is vulnerable to the threats of an unstable Afghanistan that can complicate the former’s competency to refurbish its weak polity and economy and annihilate internal militancy. Nevertheless, wary of a strong India–Afghanistan relation, Pakistan also retains an interest in not withdrawing its support from the Afghan Taliban and the Haqqani network (Brown 2015). As regional power dynamics between Pakistan and its adversary India may prevent the liquidation of Pakistan’s long-term relationship with the extremist groups in Afghanistan, it may eventually mar the peace process in Afghanistan.

Unlike China and Pakistan, Russia does not share any direct borders with Afghanistan; yet, the tremors of chaos and instability in Afghanistan can very well reverberate in Russian territory, given the geographical contiguity via the Central Asian states. This apprehension initially led Russia to work closely with the USA in bringing peace to Afghanistan. However, since 2014, a gap in the US and Russia’s approach toward Afghanistan became evident. The gap in their respective strategies emerged as a result of Russia’s growing mistrust of the West in the aftermath of the Crimean crisis and the USA’s decision to pull out its combat forces from the Afghan region, which was seen by Russia’s Special Representative to Afghanistan, Zamir Kabulov, as an abrupt withdrawal that could jeopardize peace and stability in the region (Gurganus 2018). Unlike the USA, Moscow became willing to engage with the various competing forces in Afghanistan that eventually led Russia to initiate several deliberative processes, which came to be known as the ‘Moscow Process’ (Ibrahimi 2018). The ‘Moscow Process’ not only presented a parallel opportunity to bring peace to Afghanistan by involving other major powers and interested stakeholders, but it also allied with Russia’s broader foreign policy objective of playing a proactive and assertive role in international affairs. However, in contrast to Russia’s previous criticism of the US withdrawal from Afghanistan, Russia welcomed the US–Taliban peace deal signed in Doha, Qatar in February 2020 that stipulates a phased withdrawal of NATO forces from the region in return for Taliban’s commitment of not using the Afghan soil for terrorism. A joint statement was also issued by the USA and Russia, which called on the Taliban to take concrete steps to ensure that terrorist groups like the Daesh (ISIS) or Al-Qaeda do not use the Afghan territory for terrorism (Gohel and Bailey 2020). Thus, as the USA gradually withdraws from Afghanistan according to the peace deal, it will give Russia the opportunity to step in and expand its strategic interests in the region for which it needs to recalibrate its ties with Pakistan, as the latter enjoys a leverage over the Taliban. Besides bilateral dealings, the role of the SCO in this regard may also prove beneficial.

Russia–China–Pakistan Engagement: Implications for India

The realist vision of the trilateral cooperation as a strategic counter alliance to the growing USA–India engagement in the region does not hold water in the light of the arguments provided in the earlier section. India’s ties with the USA have improved, but to reason that it is a major factor driving Russia’s growing relations with China and Pakistan is to succumb to the realist concept of a ‘power-centric’ and ‘relative gain’ approach (Powell 1991) that excludes other important factors from its explanation. One such factor is the need of the globalized world that demands cross-country cooperation even when some confrontational issues exist. The need for such cooperation cutting across state borders has become all the more significant in the light of new threats emanating across the globe and posing a challenge to states’ sovereignty and integrity. Recognizing these factors, Russian President Vladimir Putin (2017) stated that ‘it is ridiculous Delhi should be restricted in maintaining contacts with other partnering countries just because Russia has a ‘special relationship’ with India.’

As already reiterated, it is the situation in Afghanistan that is leading Russia to re-energize and prioritize its ties with Pakistan. Though Russia has engaged earlier with India, China, and Iran in peace consultations on Afghanistan, its rapprochement with Pakistan has been a relatively new development. Most scholars have anticipated that Moscow’s warming stance toward Islamabad will not go down well with New Delhi, but given Russian policymakers’ reassurance and prioritization of the ‘druzhbah-dosti’ by including India in its efforts toward instituting macro-regional multilateralism (Stepanova 2018), Russia has proven that India is an important ally for Russia in South Asia. The second round of discussions of the Moscow Process, held on February 15, 2017, was a testimony to this as for the first time ever, peace consultations on Afghanistan had both India and Pakistan on the same negotiating table.

In addition to including India in Russia’s effort toward mobilizing energies with regard to maintaining peace and stability in Afghanistan, Russia can also play a constructive role in persuading two of its closest allies, India and China to de-escalate the border tension. Kumar (2020) notes that though Russia believes that both India and China can resolve their issues bilaterally, back-channel diplomacy that was used to resolve the Doklam standoff in 2017 can be employed if the need arises.

Russia–China–Pakistan Cooperation: Challenges and Prospects

Most scholars and political analysts remark that Russia, China, and Pakistan are inching closer to the formalization of an ‘axis’; yet, the nature and objective of the ‘axis’ remain clouded by realist explanations and Cold War visions. In light of the previous arguments, it becomes difficult to sustain that an ‘axis’ in the sense of a counter mechanism to the USA and India will institutionalize, given Russia’s time-tested ties with India and its tacit policy toward Pakistan; yet, what the Russia–China–Pakistan alignment is capable of achieving is the role of a regional mechanism in maintaining stability in the heart of Eurasia.

Some challenges confronting the Russia–China–Pakistan engagement are as follows: 1.

An important impediment to this trilateral engagement is the fundamental reservation the Russian leadership has regarding the depth of Pakistan’s commitment to its relations with Russia. Examples from the past illustrate the general unpredictability of Pakistan’s foreign policy and how its relations with the USA have always impinged upon its relations with Russia. Today, Pakistan is warming toward Russia because of a setback in its relations with the USA, but if relations improve with the USA, then like the past, it will be quick to change sides. Under such circumstances, trust issues can dampen the closer cooperation between Russia and Pakistan.

Notwithstanding these challenges, if Russia, China, and Pakistan can come together to successfully uphold the peace deal and bring stability in Afghanistan, the menace of terrorism can be effectively tackled; peace and stability in the Eurasian region can be achieved; and the principles of multilateralism will be promoted.

Conclusion

A Russia–China–Pakistan ‘axis,’ as some scholars and political analysts have come to write about, is impregnated with the concepts of Cold War politics. Their analysis of the objective of such an ‘axis’ is to play a military role to counter the influence of the USA and India on the region in effect ushering bipolarity in world affairs. However, an analysis of the factors propelling these states to come together clearly reflects that the crisis in Afghanistan is the paramount factor shaping their engagement. Moreover, two of the constituent states of the so-called axis, Russia and Pakistan, are still struggling to overcome their tactical policy toward each other. Russia’s invested relationship with India steeped in historical nostalgia, and the reiteration of the importance of India and its markets to Russia makes it clear that Russia–Pakistan relations still have a long way to go before assuming the strategic significance that is assigned to Russia–India ties. Under such circumstances, it is too soon to remark of a Russia-–China–Pakistan ‘axis.’ Therefore, it is necessary for scholars to move beyond the Cold War concepts and embrace the changing realities of a globalized and interdependent world that is confronted with numerous nontraditional threats that necessitate interstate cooperation cutting across several cleavages.