Abstract
Russia became apprehensive after the outbreak of Colour Revolutions in three former Soviet republics. Post-revolution, Russia’s foreign policy in general and its outlook toward the West in particular transformed significantly. Russian response to Western democracy promotion became more pronounced. Against this backdrop, the concept of Sovereign Democracy has to be understood. It aims to not only defend the Russian regime from Western meddling but also undertake a vigorous international campaign to assert its great power status. This article deals with the meaning and rationale of Sovereign Democracy as a response to Western democracy promotion in a nuanced way. The study attempts to deal with the following research questions: How does Russia perceive and react to Colour Revolutions? How Sovereign Democracy enables Russia to restructure its foreign policy to challenge the Western democracy-promotion agenda in the post-Soviet space? How do the political institutions and historical narratives of anti-Westernism allow Russia to respond to Colour Revolutions? Lastly, whether Putin is able to reshape public opinion in Russia not only in favor of having an alternative model of democracy against the dominant Western one but also a favorable public opinion to justify Russian actions in Georgia, Ukraine, and Syria.
Keywords
Russia needs a strong state power and must have it. I am not calling for totalitarianism. History proves all dictatorships, all authoritarian forms of governments are transient. Only democratic states are intransient. Whatever the shortcomings, mankind has not devised anything superior. A strong power in Russia is a democratic, law-based, workable federative state.
After the negative fallout of the economic reforms in the aftermath of Soviet disintegration, the Russian perception of the democratic–capitalist system fizzled out. The above statement by Putin vividly illustrates the ascendancy of the Russian state under his presidency in the early twenty-first century, which led to the shaping of post-reform era politics. In the wake of the changing vicissitudes of Russian domestic politics and the concomitant transformations in international politics, a renewed importance for national sovereignty and territorial integrity gained traction in Russian policy circles. Russia asserts that Western liberal democracy does not correspond to Russian requirements to manage its hugely, diverse society characterized by unique civilizational underpinnings. Russia contends that liberal democracy is a smokescreen for Western meddling in its internal affairs. The revival of the Russian economy after Putin took over, which was in turmoil in the 1990s, and the Colour Revolutions in three former Soviet republics substantially contributed to the growing sense of Russian exceptionalism.
Russian Interpretations of Colour Revolutions
The outbreak of the Colour Revolutions in three former Soviet republics—the Rose Revolution in Georgia (2003), the Orange Revolution in Ukraine (2004), and the Tulip Revolution in Kyrgyzstan (2005)—had accentuated Russian skepticism manifold. In the aftermath of the Colour Revolutions, Russia’s relationship with the West transformed significantly. The Colour Revolutions propelled scholars and analysts to argue that a democratic wave was spreading in the post-Soviet space from the erstwhile Eastern Bloc (Avioutskii 2006: 213). As a consequence, the element of anti-Westernism became more evident not only rhetorically but also in policy action. Russia believes that without Western involvement, the Colour Revolutions would not have occurred. The way non-governmental organizations (NGOs) were propped up to undermine the regimes, the way anti-regime activists were aided by the West, and the launching of the youth movements clearly indicated Western support to foment unrest. For Russia, the Colour Revolutions were an act of Western intervention into the Russian sphere of influence. The Russian apprehension about the Colour Revolution has to be understood against the backdrop of the expansion of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) in 1999, when three former Soviet states, namely Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic, became members of it; the talks to include the Baltic states in the next round of expansion in 2006 were going on; and the willingness of some of the post-Soviet states to become members of the European Union (EU) (Smith, 2000). The invocation of Sovereign Democracy needs to be contextualized in the background of Russian skepticism to understand its response toward Western democracy promotion following the Colour Revolutions.
The Russian misgivings emerged from the fact that the Colour Revolutions have the potential to lay the groundwork for democratic contagion in the region by forming a pattern in themselves. Such a phenomenon can pose a threat to post-Soviet countries, including Russia. Although the initial momentum of these revolutions later took a backseat, the narratives of pro-democracy and pro-reform movements set by the Colour Revolution have had a profound impact on shaping Russian foreign policy.
The Russian response toward Western democracy promotion following the Colour Revolutions was guided by many considerations. First, to preclude any spillover of regime change within the Russian Federation, and second, to ensure at the same time that no such recurrence of democratic diffusion 1 takes place anywhere in the post-Soviet space. The Russian quest to remain impervious in its sphere of influence was of paramount importance. A Colour Revolution in such a scenario would invariably be understood as a threat to the stability of Russia itself (Delcour and Wolczuk 2015: 467). This feeling of skepticism has resulted in the Russian response to Western democracy promotion in an array of ways. The adoption of a raft of domestic and foreign policy measures is a pointer in that direction. The domestic ones are aimed at preserving the stability of the Russian government. Foreign policy measures tend to focus on two-pronged strategies. First, to challenge the reforms fostered by the Colour Revolutions in Ukraine and Georgia, and second, to strengthen the governments of those countries that are considered to be less democratic and anti-West but pro-Russia, such as Belarus under President Lukashenko.
The Background of Sovereign Democracy
The search for a post-Soviet ideology began soon after the collapse of the USSR. The first president of the Russian Federation, Boris Yeltsin, adopted an Atlanticist approach in an attempt to integrate Russia with the West by undertaking a market-oriented capitalist path of development agenda. He also wanted Russia to become a member of NATO and the EU. By 1995, it became apparent that the Atlanticist policies did not yield the fruitful results envisioned in the beginning. The chaotic fallout of democratic reforms in the 1990s made most Russians apprehensive about capitalism (Smith 2000).
In the wake of mounting electoral challenges in 1996, Yeltsin fired his Foreign Minister, Andrey Kozyrev, who mooted the Atlanticist approach, and appointed Yevgeny Primakov as the new Foreign Minister. Primakov articulated a foreign and security policy that came to be known as ‘Eurasianism’, whereby Russia accepted its limitations in becoming a global superpower. Russia began to consider itself as a regional hegemon whose foreign policy should be aimed at fulfilling regional interests. Eurasianism clearly spells out that Russia’s security interest lies in its ‘near abroad’, where many of the post-Soviet states with substantial ethnic Russians are located. After accomplishing its regional security interests, Russia would move toward ‘further abroad’—countries/regions that are situated not in the close vicinity of Russia’s border but are of considerable security interest to it. These countries are India, Japan, Pakistan, Iran, Afghanistan, Iraq, Syria, Serbia, Romania, Bulgaria, and Slovakia. The policy of Eurasianism was devoid of any philosophical or normative content as it simply articulated the immediate geopolitical priorities of the Yeltsin government by circumscribing Russia’s foreign and security policies to its neighboring countries/regions (ibid.).
The overhaul of Russia’s foreign and security policies began to take shape when Putin became president on January 1, 2000. Russia’s foreign and security policies were founded on new premises that alluded to the ideological and philosophical attributes of the Russian state. Such a Russia would pursue its interests beyond its immediate neighborhood and restore the greatness of the country as a global power in the twenty-first century. Putin wrote that Russia was facing ‘ideological, spiritual, and moral problems’ in his paper titled ‘Russia at the Turn of the Millennium’ (Putin 1999). Colour Revolutions played a pivotal role in laying the groundwork for the Russian version of democracy. Russia responded by employing a gamut of domestic and foreign policy measures in order to counter the domestic and external challenges emanating from Colour Revolutions. The Putin administration ramped up resistance to regional democratic trends by ensuring centralization of power. Measures were taken and policies were implemented to counter the spread of democracy by insulating Russia in order to maintain the existing status quo (Ambrosio 2007: 236).
Understanding Sovereign Democracy
The term ‘Sovereign Democracy’ was first coined by Vladislav Surkov in 2006. Surkov was the First Deputy Chief of the Russian Presidential Administration. According to Surkov, the term Sovereign Democracy implies that Russia is a democratic country, which must never be questioned; otherwise, Kremlin will view such an action as an unsolicited intervention into Russia’s domestic affairs. It subsequently became the official policy doctrine of the Putin administration. Its implementation was justified as Russia’s intellectual, moral, and ideological opposition to the Western democracy promotion agenda. The adoption of Sovereign Democracy was a part of the Russian strategy to rechristen its status as a global superpower in the twenty-first century, which is reminiscent of the Soviet era (Fisher 2014: 3). Russian actions in Georgia (2008), Ukraine (2014), and Syria (2015) have to be understood in this light.
The term Sovereign Democracy was proclaimed as Russia’s democratic ideology, in which both the notions of sovereignty and democracy are culturally embedded within its civilizational legacy. The Russian government viewed Colour Revolutions as Western attempts to influence the Russian population, which is a direct affront to the Russian institutions and their philosophical traits. However, the West continues to accuse Russia of thwarting the genuine democratic aspirations of people in the post-Soviet space by adopting undemocratic means (ibid.).
Although the concept of Sovereign Democracy is grounded in the democratization literature, many of its conceptual underpinnings are of typical Russian origin. Therefore, it is imperative to comprehend the terminology beyond the confines of democratization literature, especially in the Russian context, in order to grasp its distinctive character. It constitutes and continues to be the cardinal policy doctrine of successive Russian regimes toward Western democracy promotion. It defines the uniqueness of Russian democracy, even though many of its facets are considered undemocratic and unapologetic from a Western perspective. Nonetheless, the term was coined to preserve and advance Russian interests and priorities rather than anything else. When the doctrine became official, it was meant to give a politico-intellectual cover to Russian actions in the wake of growing international criticisms. The Russian articulations stem from the fact that to question Sovereign Democracy and the meanings it entails is to question the very foundation of Russian cultural and social history. Russian history, culture, and every bit of its civilizational component are intertwined with the meaning and nature of Sovereign Democracy (ibid.: 4).
Even though Sovereign Democracy provides an ideological firewall for the Kremlin against the dominant post-Cold War liberal international order, it was not the first of its kind that characterizes Russian resistance to democracy promotion. In fact, the solid pitch for national sovereignty and a strong state was first articulated in an article by Valery Zorkin (2004). Zorkin made a stark defense of the Westphalian notions of national sovereignty and territorial integrity. According to him, in the contemporary world, the Westphalian system has come under challenge from two quarters. First, the notions of state sovereignty and territorial integrity, which the Westphalian treaty of 1648 accords highest priority to, are being eroded in the wake of nations’ rights to self-determination and human rights. Second, nation-states are being pilloried for their ineptitude to ensure effective governance in the face of globalization.
Zorkin argues that the self-determination and human rights of the minorities living in Russia are a direct threat to Russian national security. He even rues the disintegration of the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia, which happened because primacy was given to human rights and nationalistic self-determination over the sovereignty of the state. In light of this, he highlights that the greatest threat to Russian sovereignty comes from movements for self-determination, like that of Chechnya. He says that ethnic movements have the potential to undermine the territorial integrity and national security of a multi-ethnic state like Russia, which will provide an opportunity for intervention by outside powers in Russia (Zorkin 2004).
In a clearly articulated message to Russian citizens, Zorkin warns by citing examples of ethnic violence in Bosnia and Kosovo. He argues that sovereignty is indivisible, and any attempt to divide it will inevitably lead to a gross violation of human rights. He was also of the opinion that the 9/11 incident enabled many states to invade foreign countries merely on the pretext of those countries’ alleged encouragement of terrorism by undermining their sovereignty. In an apparent allusion to the United States and the European powers, Zorkin pointed out the double standards of these countries. These countries advocate stern action against rulers who commit human rights violations, as in the case with NATO intervention in Kosovo, but blatantly violate human rights themselves by attacking other countries, like Afghanistan and Iraq, in the name of preserving their own security interests.
Zorkin’s arguments are poised to challenge the US’s and NATO’s claims of being defenders of human rights around the world. While referring to the Colour Revolutions, Zorkin clearly mentioned that national sovereignty should never be compromised for the sake of human rights and democratic self-determination of any group in a nation. The Russian skepticism apparently emanates from the fact that by constantly invoking the human rights of minorities, especially in Chechnya, Western organizations, like NATO and even the UN, seek to intervene by considering Russia as a violator of human rights. This will be a blow to Russian sovereignty, as NATO and the USA have committed such acts in past conflicts. Outside intervention could lead to the formation of semi-independent provinces/regions within the Russian Federation, which might result in complete independence by rejecting Russian sovereignty (ibid.).
Post-Soviet Russian Perspective of Democracy
The notion of democracy among the Russians blossomed much before the disintegration of the Soviet Union. For Russians, democracy embodies a sense of collectivism and collective well-being, in contrast to the Western understanding of democracy, which signifies individualism. This is because Russians lived under communist rule for more than seven decades. Democracy, for Russians is intrinsically associated with norms such as collective welfare, collective goods, and economic equality. Concepts, such as social justice and egalitarianism find more resonance among Russians than a competitive multi-party electoral system, a formal constitution, or the safeguarding of individual civil–political rights. This conceptualization of democracy among Russians continued until the collapse of the USSR (Sil and Chen 2004: 354–355). The collapse of the Soviet Union puts Russia in a fix. Uncertainties have prevailed regarding the future of its political system. The reason is not hard to comprehend. Both the Soviet model of socialism and the structure of the command economy became redundant. Hence, it can be said that the interplay of social variables is distinct in Russia’s case from that of the West. The probable logic behind the ambiguity about democracy among the Russians could be the perfunctory beginning of the Russian Federation as an independent country after the break-up of the USSR. Independent Russia’s first president, Boris Yeltsin, adopted an Atlanticist approach on the foreign policy front in an attempt to bring Russia closer to the West. On the economic front, Yeltsin introduced ‘shock therapy’ measures in sync with the neo-liberal market economy to revamp the Russian economy by tying it closely with Western capitalist institutional structures. Besides, the urge to imitate liberal democracy of the Western variety in order to create a pluralistic society and to become members of the NATO and EU has been unsuccessful. These factors have collectively increased ordinary Russians skepticism about democracy (Trenin 2007). Despite the Russian leadership’s allegiance to the West during the transition phase, it became quite clear that the economic and foreign policies resulted in no positive outcomes for the country. On the contrary, the reform initiatives created a space for Western intervention into Russian territory and market. These adverse feelings, in addition to economic vulnerabilities, extensive corruption in various state institutions, sharp inequalities in wealth and income, huge losses of jobs, debilitating education and health care system, clientelism and criminalization of the body politic, and the economic crisis of 1998, created an apprehensive or negative attitude among the Russians toward democracy (Karpowicz 2006: 3). This sense of uncertainty in all spheres of life made the average Russian strive for security and order rather than democracy (Sil and Chen 2004: 356). It can be argued that since the Russian people’s initial support for democratic reforms was designed to be in economic terms rather than political ones (Hatipoglu 1998: 3), when confronted with the negative outcomes of economic reforms, they equated liberal democracy with poverty and unemployment. The ordinary Russian’s perspective on capitalism and democracy underwent a massive transformation during the transition phase.
To a great extent, democracy in Russia is conterminously anticipated as the loss of Russia’s superpower status in global politics, which it enjoyed during the Cold War. More so, democracy provides an opportunity for Western countries to meddle in the domestic affairs of Russia and its surrounding countries. These developments have led most Russians to believe that democracy is not the perfect model for their country (Surkov 2009). Russia’s interface with democracy is also synonymous with the crisis of its state institutions and its dwindling international leverage, contrary to what it used to have during Soviet times. It is quite evident that most of the Russians prefer a strong state over democracy for a number of reasons: the state has always played a preponderant role in their country’s history, the negative fallout of democratic reforms, and the mismanagement of events by introducing reforms in the 1980s and 1990s, which led to the dissolution of the USSR (McFaul 2001). The Putin administration has also been able to convince the society that ‘Russia has a different kind of democracy’, than the standards and procedures set by the West. The uniqueness of Russian democracy accounts for its long tradition of social relations, complicated history, multi-ethnic state, and vast geographic territory (Levada Analytical Center 2011). It has also been argued that Russia is a ‘Sovereign Democracy’ or a ‘Controlled Democracy’ by pointing out the differences between Russian democracy and the Western one (Okara 2007).
Critique of Sovereign Democracy
Notwithstanding the pronouncement of Sovereign Democracy as a civilizational-cultural project to oppose Western democracy promotion, the term Sovereign Democracy is not above criticism. The criticism has come not only from Western writers, but many Russians too have expressed their dismay about it. A scathing critique of Sovereign Democracy by Vladimir Ryzhkov, a deputy of the State Duma, published in Russia in Global Affairs on November 21, 2005, merits an in-depth analysis. He voiced his concerns at the undue significance given to Russian sovereignty, as if the country’s security is in peril. He takes on the authority’s repetitive claims of Russia being exposed to outside forces, and that its internal security is at stake. He opines that excess campaigning for Sovereign Democracy is a smokescreen to bolster the power of the ruling authority by minimizing the space for democratic participation of the Russian citizens. He draws a clear distinction between state sovereignty and state power by saying that one cannot be confused with the other (Ryzhkov 2005).
Ryzhkov goes on to argue that promulgating the existence of a threat to Russian security to justify the invocation of Sovereign Democracy by limiting civil and political freedoms is in essence an aberration of the concept of sovereignty itself. According to him, Sovereign Democracy is an unconstitutional principle that seeks to alter the constitutional principle of popular sovereignty by curtailing political competition and shrinking the space for democratic dissent to ensure the consolidation of the regime. Ryzhkov (2005) says this is an attempt to bolster the power of the state by limiting the power of the sovereign people to bring in certain groups to dictate the terms. Sovereignty, Ryzhkov argues, is generally understood in terms of external sovereignty, which is to ensure the independence and integrity of Russia from possible external dangers. However, in reality, this external threat is excessively inflated to portray a picture of Russia that is under imminent threat and that its sovereignty is imperiled. This results in the imposition of restrictions. He also postulates that by imagining a non-existent threat and its continuous peddling, Russians believed that it was in the interest of the nation that they must live according to the dictums of wartime law at the expense of political and civil freedoms. Ryzhkov terms it unjustified on the grounds that people are entitled to certain rights that cannot be curtailed even in a war-like situation (ibid.).
Ryzhkov laments that Russia has had a long historical tradition of a strong state usurping power at different junctures of its history. He alludes to the Bolshevik seizure of state power following the Russian Revolution in 1917. The next seventy years witnessed the unbridled exercise of power by the Communist Party until the collapse of the USSR. He warns that any future attempt to usurp power will have similar results. Taking a swipe at the ruling elite, he derides them for having come to power by the hand of fate to protect Russia. They are now proven unable to retain their power and have also brought Russia on the brink of catastrophe. He concludes by arguing that Russia requires the wholesome implementation of the principle of popular sovereignty through honest and free elections, which will truly preserve the integrity and independence of Russia (ibid.).
The former Russian President Dmitri Medvedev put forward his anxieties about Sovereign Democracy by arguing that democracy looks better without any prefix being attached to it. That is why the term Sovereign Democracy did not find much resonance during his presidency (2008–2012). The resurfacing of the sovereignty debate in the political discourse of Russia began with the re-election of Putin in the 2012 presidential elections. In an array of articles in popular Russian newspapers, Putin strongly argued for a renewed emphasis on sovereignty by charting out a list of factors endangering Russia. In one such article, Putin (2012) delineates the chaos following the disintegration of the USSR. He pointed out the deep systemic crises of the Russian state on every front when he became first prime minister and subsequently president in 2000. The revival of the economy, the ending of the civil war, the tackling of terrorism, preserving territorial integrity, and restoring constitutional order were some of the achievements of his government mentioned in the article. He also warned of the challenges posed by the Western democracy promotion agenda, and the negative impact of the global economic meltdown of 2007–2008 on the Russian economy. These have been described as external challenges seeking to undermine Russian sovereignty. Putin also came down heavily on those countries seeking to promote democracy. He argues that promoting democracy through power and military means is a blatant transgression of state sovereignty and international law. At the end of the article, he advocates for a positive and assertive role for Russia, guided by its civilization model, great history, and cultural genome, in which fundamental bases of a western civilization and centuries-old experience of interaction are organically combined with the East, where new centers of economic power and political influence are actively developing (ibid.). Subsequently, Putin laid down his vision in a statement titled ‘Developmental Strategy for Russian Civilisation’ to stress on two points: first, to preserve and uphold the cultural and spiritual values of the Russian civilization, and second, to develop a novel educational concept for the Russian youth and children to ensure a safe information environment for them at school as well as at home.
The invocation of sovereignty in terms of civilizational identity was highlighted by Putin (2012) in an article where he listed certain factors such as the collapse of the USSR, the debasement of social, economic, and state institutions, and the steep gap in development trajectory among post-Soviet countries as the principal reasons for immigration and national problems. He claims that Russia refutes the process of integration through assimilation, and instead believes that ethnic Russians residing in other post-Soviet states do not necessarily form diasporas. They are an intrinsic component of a broader pan-Russian civilizational identity that was ripped apart with the disintegration of the USSR. He concludes by saying that the position of the Russian government on the issue of state sovereignty and the question of exercising force beyond its border have to be understood in this light. The annexation of Crimea in 2014 is probably the most vivid example of what Putin articulated in the article.
The Shifts in Russian Foreign Policy Post-Colour Revolution
The Colour Revolutions reignited the debate on Russian identity and values. The deliberations revolved around whether it was possible for Russia to have a strong state and democracy at the same time. The emergence of independent Russia from the rubble of the Soviet Union was complemented by democracy. However, historically, Russian identity was also closely tied to its status of a great power. Hence, the shifts in foreign policy after the Colour Revolutions were a reflection of both soft power (culture, economy, and diplomacy) as well as hard power (military, strong state, and coercion).
Bolstering Authoritarianism to Prevent Colour Revolution
Following the Colour Revolutions, the Russian policy toward neighboring countries became proactive, especially in likeminded countries. The aim was to ensure that they did not fall prey to the Western democracy-promotion agenda. The guiding principle was that if a country is able to withstand outside democratic pressures, it will act as a booster for other countries in the vicinity to thwart external democracy promotion. This gives Russia an opportunity to bolster cooperation with a number of friendly regimes. Such a policy is corroborated by active political and financial support for those countries, which was termed active resistance and counter promotion, as its aim is to ‘prevent, frustrate, oppose, or hollow out movements for democratic changes’ (Burnell 2006: 14). Russian help to the Belarusian government in the wake of its 2006 presidential election and the continuation of support to the presidency of Lukashenko on a whole range of issues, such as diplomatic, political, economic assistance, and military/strategic aid, till today amidst Western hostility against his regime is a case in point.
Diplomatic
Russia’s diplomatic relationship with Belarus stems from the latter’s isolation from the Western community of states. The administration of George Bush was very vocal against Belarus, and even termed it an ‘outpost of tyranny’ and the ‘last true dictatorship in the center of Europe’ (Dinmore 2005). The US government passed the Belarus Democracy Act in October 2004 to impose sanctions on Belarus and fund opposition groups to foment regime change (Ambrosio 2009: 109). The USA and the West kept denouncing the Lukashenko regime through public declarations in order to isolate the country. Various American officials of the Bush administration have met with the regime’s opponents to encourage them in their struggle against the regime. The EU is also not behind in its opposition toward the regime, although the EU’s approach toward Belarus has been one of engagement as opposed to the US’s confrontational approach. However, the EU too criticized the conduct of the Lukashenko regime and its policies, which are anathema to the country’s European identity and has sought to buttress the democratic opposition against the regime (Korosteleva 2002: 60–61).
On the other hand, Russia adopted a completely different approach toward Belarus’s pariah status in the Western hemisphere. Russia did not create any diplomatic pressure on the Lukashenko regime to democratize the country as per Western requirements. On the contrary, it sought to provide a diplomatic cover to respond to the West’s criticisms of Belarus’s flawed elections. The parliamentary elections of October 2000 and March 2001 strengthened Lukashenko’s grip on power at the cost of his regime’s international isolation. Although the West expected Russia to take a strident position in condemning the regime for its undemocratic actions, Russian President Putin instead congratulated the Belarusian president for his victory in the 2001 presidential election (Kremlin 2001). The Russia–West relationship reached a height of tension over Belarus’s 2004 parliamentary elections. The West questioned the legitimacy of the election, while Russia accorded legitimacy to the election by describing it as transparent.
In the aftermath of the Orange Revolution, Russian efforts to shield the Lukashenko regime became even more noticeable. This can be illustrated by the fact that the day Condoleezza Rice, then the US secretary of state, met the Belarusian opposition leaders in April 2005 and supported a change in the government, the very next day Putin met Lukashenko and expressed his support for the regime. Russian support for the Belarusian government in the wake of the 2006 presidential election is a clear manifestation of the Russian attempt to prevent a Colour Revolution in Belarus. The international observers raised doubts about transparency in the election, and the West threatened to impose sanctions on Belarus. Russia openly came out in support of the regime in thwarting such moves. At a time when Lukashenko firmly took hold of power following the 2006 election, Russia-backed Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) observers termed the voting ‘free and fair’ in a bid to deflect Western criticism of serious irregularities in basic electoral norms.
Political
The Lukashenko regime is also not beyond political pressure from the West, despite being diplomatically isolated. The West has attempted to pressurize the regime through democratic assistance programs for opposition groups/parties and a direct appeal to the people of Belarus. The Belarus Democracy Act, which was passed in 2004, appropriated US money for television and radio broadcasts into Belarus, and also provided assistance to pro-democracy political parties and exiled groups. In 2005, the USA alone spent around $11.8 million to fund anti-regime civil society groups in Belarus (Shepherd 2006: 76). The then-US president and the secretary of state met with regime opponents in order to boost their morale to fight the Lukashenko government. The USA even closely worked with Belarus’s neighboring countries, such as Poland and Lithuania, to promote democracy. The EU also played its part by appealing to the people of Belarus to augment support, provide assistance, and good ties once Belarus turns democratic (Ambrosio 2009: 114). At various EU–US summit meetings, Washington and Brussels have passed a host of resolutions condemning the Lukashenko regime by supporting democracy. However, these resolutions not only subscribed to Belarus’s isolation but also appealed to the people of Belarus to support a regime change.
The Kremlin, already wary of a regime change through Colour Revolutions, employed a positive interventionist approach. Such an approach was guided by more support for securing the durability of the regime than support for Lukashenko, with whom Putin has had personal animosity. Russia understands that its alliance with Belarus is important in order to resist the Western democracy-promotion agenda in the post-Soviet space.
Economic
Diplomatic and political isolation notwithstanding, Belarus is also isolated economically by the West. The EU and USA have imposed severe restrictions on Belarus, and the Belarus–EU trade is being hindered due to the lack of a Partnership and Cooperation Agreement. Although Belarus has never been subjected to any kind of comprehensive trade or economic sanctions by the West, the deliberations in the European capitals, however, mainly focus on making Belarus agree that its economic relations with the West will be determined by its acquiescence to Western values. The EU, on June 21, 2007, suspended Belarus from its Generalized System of Preferences trading program, which costs Belarus around £400 million each year (Rettman 2007), although this did not have much effect on the Belarus–West economic relations in recent times. Belarus and the West’s trade is comparatively less than what usual trade relations ought to be.
The dearth of hard currency hinders Belarus from importing products from the West. Moreover, in terms of trading partners, the economic fortune of Belarus is much more closely tied to Russia than the West. Belarus ranks third among Russian trading partners, and 50–60 percent of its trading takes place with Russia, as well as 90 percent of its energy supplies (Gupta 2020). However, in comparison, Belarus’s trade with the EU is almost half than that of Russia. The trade relationship between Belarus and Russia is favorable to Belarus, as it largely imports raw materials and fuel from Russia and exports prepared goods. Given this state of economic condition and Belarus–Russia’s close economic relations, the opportunities for the West to exert pressure on Belarus are limited (ibid.).
Apart from the trade relationship, Russia has been playing a pivotal role in ensuring the sustainability of the Lukashenko government through economic assistance. Belarus’s unreformed sector survived due to Russian assistance. Belarus’s economy has survived because of the supply of subsidized natural gas and oil from Russia, much below the market price. This, in turn, has ameliorated the standard of living of the average Belarusian. It also boosted the manufacturing sector, as Belarus’s exports to Russia were made competitive in terms of pricing (Ambrosio 2009: 117). Moreover, much of the debt of Belarus was waived off by Russia, which was largely collected from energy imports. In the case of Belarus’s gross domestic product (GDP), Russian subsidy accounts for around 20 percent (Aslund 2002: 182). Irrespective of the differences in terms of size and markets, the Russia–Belarus customs union, which was a product of the reunification, helped Belarus more than Russia. Belarus has also been granted to deal with Russian businesses through barter rather than hard currency, which enables it to export more products than it usually does in a fiercely competitive trading engagement. The close economic cooperation between Russia and Belarus and their economic dependence on Russia have enabled Belarus to stave off Western pressures. The regional integration process initiated by Russia with the CIS through the Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU) and the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO), where Belarus is a member country, is a testimony of the two countries’ close cooperation in creating a greater Eurasian order.
Military/Strategic Aid
The expansion of NATO toward the east has come to Belarus as a point of concern, which will ultimately isolate it in Europe. Moreover, NATO countries share borders with Belarus to the west and the north. The desire of then-Ukrainian President Viktor Yushchenko to seek NATO membership would have strategically contained Belarus from three sides. However, even if Belarus wishes to join NATO, it would not be allowed to do so, because, to join NATO, a country’s commitment to democracy is an essential criterion. In such a situation, Belarus feels left out of the European security arrangement. Russia is also concerned about the growing expansion of NATO in Eastern Europe. Against this backdrop, Belarus shares much of the concern with Russia, and finds military alliance with Russia a viable option in the wake of its strategic and military isolation in Europe (Ambrosio 2009: 119).
The close alliance with Russia fills the vacuum of Belarus’s strategic and military isolation in the West. The absence of bilateral disputes further deepened military ties between the two countries. It is believed that the bilateral military/strategic relationship between Russia and Belarus has even surpassed the political or economic reunification of the two countries (Martinsen 2002: 401). This has resulted in Belarus being a Russian military outpost. Many of the Russian government’s policy documents and military doctrines on security have highlighted the strategic importance of Belarus to Russia’s national security since the 1990s (Ambrosio 2009: 119). As a consequence, Belarus finds itself in a position of strategic comfort by being under the Russian security umbrella to deter any challenge emanating from the West, including regime change. Russia also considers Belarus as an effective buffer country between NATO and itself. The military alignment between the two countries has provided Lukashenko a propaganda narrative to highlight the importance of Belarus in balancing the Atlantic hegemony in Europe for a multipolar global order (Ambrosio 2005: 104–117). The Russia–Belarus security cooperation has to be understood in the context of their shared concern about the Western democracy promotion and the growing expansion of NATO.
Russian Attempts to Resist Democratic Trends in Post-Colour Revolution Georgia and Ukraine
According to Whitehead (2001), for any democratization to succeed, it is important that any major power in the region should not be opposed to democratic breakthroughs. In this regard, Russia can be seen as a counteracting power in the post-Soviet space, which is inimical to Western democracy promotion. Russian apprehension arises from the fact that the domestic consequences of the political dissimilarity between Russia and its neighboring countries will become more glaring than ever before. In such a situation, subversion becomes the only strategy in order to undermine democratization in neighboring countries. Against this backdrop, the Kremlin has adopted a slew of policy measures toward Georgia and Ukraine in the aftermath of the Colour Revolutions. It is also argued that the post-revolution countries’ level of cooperation with the Western organizations (EU and NATO),and their pro-Western orientation provoked Russian reactions to democratization in those countries. There are broadly two conditions under which Russia responds to Western democracy promotion. First, the impression of an imminent risk to the sustainability of the Russian regime because of what the democratization theorists postulate as the factors of contagion and diffusion being fostered by democracy promotion agenda, and second, to its geopolitical interests in the region. For Russia, these two conditions are entwined in historical sense, as Russia is a successor state to the empires of both Czarist and the Soviet Union, in which the geographical expansion and political regime were subtly linked (Delcour and Wolczuk 2015: 467).
Delcour and Wolczuk have identified an array of factors behind Russia’s response to Western democracy promotion. They argue that the Russian response is driven less by the feeling of insecurity of democratization and more by the Western meddling in the events of the countries in the region, which Russia feels is aimed at undermining Russian influence. Russia views the post-Soviet countries’ desire to get integrated into Western institutional structures with a great deal of suspicion. This provides one of the justifications for Russian actions in Georgia and Ukraine, as both the countries’ ruling elites have shown their pro-Western outlook following the Colour Revolution. Therefore, the Colour Revolutions have not only been considered as a threat to the survival of the Russian regime but also an attempt to jeopardize Russia’s pre-dominant position in the post-Soviet space (Delcour and Wolczuk 2015: 467).
The shift in Russian foreign policy is partly an outcome of Georgia and Ukraine’s pro-Western orientation after the Colour Revolution. The larger issue, however, to oppose Western democracy promotion agenda in the post-Soviet space continues to define the substantial shift. This can further be illustrated by the fact that the presidents of both Georgia and Ukraine have expressed their desire to become members of the EU and NATO. The expansion of NATO has been described in Russian defense circles purely from the geo-strategic point of view, which would have serious implications for Russia’s national security, state interests, and geopolitical standing. It is also important to understand that NATO expansion will have domestic consequences for Georgia and Ukraine. Once they become members of NATO, it will enable them to further consolidate democracy by legitimizing the symbolic values espoused by the Colour Revolutions (Ambrosio 2009: 132). For Russia, this would increase the possibility of domestic threats from regional democratic trends. Russia knows very well that joining any Atlantic alliance system will require the concerned country to be democratic; therefore, delegitimizing democratization in Kiev and Tbilisi would cater to the strategic interests of Russia. By doing this, not only can the democratic trends of Colour Revolution be reversed, as non-democratic states cannot join any such bloc, but also the expansion of NATO—which poses a challenge to Russia’s strategic interests—would be minimized. It is important to understand Russia’s foreign policy outlook toward Georgia and Ukraine to be able to gauge how Russia attempts to undermine democratic breakthroughs in these countries after the Colour Revolution in order to resist the Western democracy-promotion agenda.
Russia’s Relations with Georgia After the Rose Revolution
Russia’s relationship with Georgia has been strained since the independence of both countries (Chigorin 2003; Sammut 2003). After independence, Georgian President Zviad Gamsakhurdia sought to construct an exclusive Georgian identity to oppose the dominant Russian identity. This led to a strong anti-Russia feeling, which further aggravated the relationship. The genesis of the Russia–Georgia troubled relationship goes back to the time when Georgia emerged as one of the most anti-Russian countries among the former Soviet republics. Georgia even refused to join the CIS at the beginning and did not allow Russia to have a military base on its territory. After the overthrow of Gamsakhurdia, Georgia witnessed the arrival of former Soviet Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze as president in 1995. However, this did very little to ameliorate the relationship between the two countries.
The secessionist movement in the Georgian provinces of South Ossetia and Abkhazia and Russian support for anti-Georgian forces have been a festering sore between the two countries. Russia provided substantial weapons and support to the anti-Georgian forces in South Ossetia and Abkhazia (Lukic and Lynch 1996: 362). Russian military pressure forced Georgia to allow Russian peacemakers into South Ossetia and Abkhazia (Ambrosio 2009: 133). The peacemakers were given the task of ensuring a political compromise between the Georgian government and secessionists in order to help Georgia regain sovereignty over these two provinces. However, in practice, they allowed secessionists to declare independence from Georgia and precluded Georgian forces to claim sovereignty in the two regions. Both regions seek Russian support and protection, and Georgia believes that Russia will annex them. This apprehension is glaring, particularly in case of the Ossetians, who are divided between North Ossetia, which is in Russia, and South Ossetia.
In the case of the first Colour Revolution in Georgia in 2003, the Kremlin initially supported it in order to avoid any chaos in the region for the sake of stability. The new Georgian president, Mikhail Saakashvili, wished to improve ties with Russia. However, after the Orange Revolution in Ukraine, democratization in Georgia assumed a significantly different nature, much beyond the imagination of Russian policymakers. Russia started believing that a democratic contagion was taking shape in the region, which must be undermined to preserve Russian interests. As a result, the Russian position toward Georgia became hardened from 2005 onward. Following this, Russia launched a vicious rhetorical attack against Colour Revolution in general and the Rose Revolution of Georgia in particular. In the meantime, tensions between the two countries began to surface over the two contested regions of South Ossetia and Abkhazia. From the beginning of 2006, Russia attempted to hurt Georgia economically and sought to undermine its government (ibid.: 137).
In order to undermine the democratic trends in Georgia following the Colour Revolution, Russia adopted a slew of measures. Those include the misuse of energy supplies, banning of Georgian wine, mineral water, and other goods, as well as the tightening of the visa regime between the two countries. In the wake of simmering tensions over Abkhazia in the summer of 2006, Russia imposed an economic embargo on Georgia. The pro-Western attitude of the new president, Saakashvili and Georgia’s proximity to NATO, only aggravated the relationship, resulting in an array of stern actions by Russia. Moscow kept shoring up pressure on Tbilisi from 2004 to 2008 in order to prevent Georgia’s integration with the West. Russia even issued passports to citizens of two breakaway regions to undermine Georgia’s territorial integrity. When Georgia–Russia relations underwent a new low in 2006, trade and migration flows were hampered. In the aftermath of a spy controversy in 2006, Russian authorities tightened up control over the ethnic Georgians residing in Russia and deported many Georgians. Following NATO’s 2008 Bucharest summit, in which it was decided that Georgia would become a member of NATO, Russia intervened militarily, even though no actual mechanism to materialize this prospect was charted out (Delcour and Wolczuk 2015: 468). However, Russia claimed at the beginning that, being a peacekeeper, it is Russia’s prerogative under the Dagomys Agreement to intervene in South Ossetia. It was subsequently found that Russian troops went well beyond the breakaway regions into Georgian territory, probably to send a strong signal against Georgia’s intention to join NATO. The visit of the then-American President George Bush to Georgia in 2005 to attend an event to commemorate the victory of the Allied Powers during the Second World War in Russia was perceived by many as an American appreciation of the democratic reforms in Georgia and elsewhere in the post-Soviet space.
There is considerable debate over whether Russian action toward Georgia is a manifestation of geopolitical exigencies or a response to the democratic upsurge after the Colour Revolution, even though Georgia viewed Russian action both in terms of rhetoric and policy measures as a reaction to the Rose Revolution. The then-Georgian president said that the economic embargoes were part of the Russian pressure when Georgia made a choice for democracy (ibid.: 142). Furthermore, Russia’s continued support for South Ossetia and Abkhazia remains a flashpoint between the two countries’ relationship. The outbreak of war in 2008 led to the complete breakdown of the relationship.
Russia’s Relations with Ukraine After the Orange Revolution
The Russia–Ukraine relationship has also been historically troubled, like Georgia, albeit for different reasons. While Russia–Georgia relations have been marked by clashes of interests, Russia–Ukraine relations are being determined by issues of national identity of the people in the two countries and larger geopolitical issues as well. Many Russians have problems with the emergence of Ukraine as an independent country after the disintegration of the Soviet Union. The reason was the centrality of Ukraine as part of the Russian national identity shared by common cultural and historical factors. Therefore, many Russians believed that Ukraine, much like Belarus, constitutes a pan-Russian nation. That is why the emergence of Ukraine as an independent nation was not appreciated by many Russians, which prevented the Kremlin to formulate any coherent and consistent foreign policy outlook toward Ukraine.
However, it was only in 1995 that the two countries signed an interstate treaty, and therefore Russia recognized Kiev’s sovereignty. Nonetheless, Russia tried to influence Ukrainian politics by supporting pro-Russian candidates during elections and continues to view Kiev as anything less than an independent country (Kuzio 2003: 444–445). In response, Ukraine sought to emphasize its independence, sovereignty, and ‘European’ identity. The identification of Ukraine as a European entity seeks to drive the wedge deeper by representing Ukraine as a ‘Western’ country and Russia as belonging to the Asiatic ‘East’ (Ambrosio 2009: 134). Nonetheless, the Russia–Ukraine relationship continued to remain tense over the status of ethnic Russians living in the Crimea province of Ukraine, the disposition of the Black Sea Fleet, and third, the energy/debt crisis (ibid.: 134).
The alleged interference of Russia in the 2004 Ukrainian presidential election, which was reported to have been marred by fraud and massive corruption, led to tension between the two countries. The outbreak of the Colour Revolution in Ukraine and the downfall of the Kuchma regime altered the equation fundamentally, which sort of ruptured Russia’s foreign policy outlook toward Ukraine. The task before the new Ukrainian government was challenging in order to renegotiate the contours of the Russia–Ukraine relationship (Kuzio 2005: 509). Even though the new president, Yushchenko, paid a visit to Moscow after becoming president in a bid to improve relations with Moscow, he also made it amply clear that he wanted to consolidate democracy in Ukraine and work closely with the West. As a result, Russia adopted a confrontational attitude toward Ukraine, and consequently launched a barrage of rhetorical attacks against the new government. The aim of Russia was to delegitimize the Orange Revolution (Ambrosio 2009: 145).
In order to undermine the new regime in Ukraine, the Duma, dominated by the ruling United Russia party, asked its delegation of the Parliamentary Assembly to the Council of Europe to raise the matter of political repression in Ukraine by the new regime. This action was seen by Kiev as a desperate attempt by Russia to undermine democratic trends in Ukraine while remaining thoroughly silent about the abuse of power by the previous Kuchma regime (ibid.:146). The relationship between the two countries reached a nadir when Russia annexed Crimea after a referendum in 2014 in which ethnic Russians overwhelmingly voted in favor of Crimea’s integration into Russia, although the West and the Ukrainian government questioned the legitimacy of the referendum. According to them, this was a brazen attempt by Russia to undermine the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Ukraine. The West backed the Ukraine government for its sovereignty over Crimea, but it did not have any impact on Russia as it annexed Crimea militarily. The Russian invasion of Ukraine in February 2022 fundamentally altered the equation of the two countries’ relationship, complicating the geopolitical scenario in the region, the outcome of which will become clear as the war subsides. As of now, there is no sign of either side relenting.
Conclusion
The emergence of Russia as a rising power dispelled the status of its failing economy and weak state institutions. Russian foreign policy went through considerable changes following the Colour Revolutions. Russia became more assertive in its opposition toward Western democracy promotion. It also became proactive to ensure that no further repetition of Colour Revolution takes place in the post-Soviet space by adopting a slew of measures. At various international forums too, Russian policymakers have clearly articulated their independent position on a host of issues, from climate change to terrorism, education, energy security, and deadly diseases, in an attempt to usher in their great power status. While broadly accepting the principles of international relations, when it comes to its own political, economic, and social experiments, Russia does not entertain any outside interference. It rather treats any attempt to reshape Russian politics and society as a clear violation of its sovereignty and statehood.
Besides undergoing significant changes in domestic politics, Colour Revolutions also played an important role in reshaping the Russian foreign policy outlook. Russia has not only attempted to position itself as an international player by opposing Anglo-Saxon domination of global politics, but it has also tried to position itself as a regional power committed to preventing the spread of Western democracy promotion by playing a prominent role in various regional organizations such as the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) and the CSTO. Both organizations are poised to preserve order and sovereignty by providing substantial support to member countries to thwart Colour Revolutions by dissuading political uprisings. One of the recent examples is the deployment of CSTO peacekeeping troops in January 2022 under Russian aegis to control public disorder in Kazakhstan. These developments are clear indications of Russian apprehension about regime change in its sphere of influence. These regional organizations have come to balance the Western influence in the Eurasian region by acting as fulcrums in advancing the Russian narrative of sovereignty and the emphasis on a multipolar world order. The consensus with China in this regard is a validation of such articulations.
Apart from such measures, Russia also undertook an initiative to increase its military power to countervail America and the EU in the international realm. An attempt was made to revamp the military in 2008, which sought to modernize the failing Soviet-era defense equipment into an advanced modern one. Russian officials have described the act of military modernization as a means not only to safeguard Russia against Western interference but also to protect the sovereignty of other former Soviet states from undue Western intervention. Russian interventions in Georgia in 2008, Ukraine in 2014, and Syria in 2015 are a clear manifestation of the fact that an effective, modernized, and advanced military force is poised to influence events in countries beyond its territory.
From the Russian perspective, the response to the Colour Revolution has been largely successful. The initial progress made by the countries that witnessed Colour Revolutions was halted. These countries failed to produce lasting democratic reforms beyond a ‘partial reform equilibrium’. The relationship between Russia and those countries largely returned to the status quo. On the other hand, Russia used the Colour Revolution as a tool to advance its anti-Western narrative of Sovereign Democracy. It can be argued that the Colour Revolutions ultimately came to benefit Russia in many ways. While these revolutions were successful in attaining their immediate objectives, they failed to capitalize on the reforms promulgated at the beginning. On the contrary, corruption became a hallmark of the political systems in those countries. It is also evident from the developmental trajectories of many of the post-Soviet states that the change of leadership alone does not embolden democracy unless there are substantial transformations in all aspects of society, including political and social institutions. It would not be an exaggeration to claim that the foreign policy of Russia has been largely successful in ensuring that there is no reoccurrence of Colour Revolutions after 2005 until today anywhere in the post-Soviet space. It should also be borne in mind that the Russian response toward preventing Western democracy promotion in the post-Soviet space has come at the cost of curtailing the autonomy and freedom of its institutions and people.
Sovereign Democracy seems to serve as a calibrated politico-ideological instrument for Russia to not merely interpret the world as it is but to change it. It is used to challenge the Kremlin’s two ideological opponents, namely Western liberal democracy and populist democracy, which is praised by the rest. The victory of Putin in the 2018 presidential elections is a testimony to the fact that Russia will continue to resist the imposition of Western liberal ideas in the post-Soviet space in the foreseeable future.
Footnotes
Declaration of Conflicting Interests
The author declared no potential conflicts of interest with respect to the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article.
Funding
The author received no financial support for the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article.