Abstract
People in rural India routinely experience a vast difference between what is promised by the state and what is realised on the ground. Panchayati Raj Institutions (PRIs) enable a broad spectrum of actors to be involved in planning the activities of the local state and holding the bureaucracy accountable for their actions at this level. While literature shows that clientelism is pervasive and affects the performance of PRIs adversely, there are pockets of evidence where programmatic transactions regularly occur. I use programmatic and clientelistic transactions as ideal types of outcomes and exploring how these transactions are engendered through a comparative study of two Gram Panchayats with similar institutional settings using ethnographic materials. Together with institutional design and economic factors, differences in local political dynamics affect development outcomes. Individualistic and loyalty-driven leadership prompts symbiotic relationships with bureaucrats, whereas cadre-based leadership prefers control and scrutiny. The expectations of villagers from their panchayat are also shaped by these political traits. In the first scenario, bureaucracy uses procedural compliance to hide clientelist decisions from scrutiny, whereas in the second, it is used to demonstrate neutrality in decision making.
Introduction
Most people in India encounter the state, not necessarily as an abstract amalgamation of its constitutive elements of legislature, executive and the judiciary, but as a diverse set of “front-line bureaucrats” (FLBs) who provide a plethora of last-mile services and development functions, such as the supply of water, ration, electricity, sanitation, irrigation, education, health, employment, security and regulate the local economy. In such transactions, they routinely experience a vast difference between what is promised by the state and what is realised on the ground, since FLBs are found to be corrupt, inefficient and frequently absent (Banerjee et al., 2004; Beteille, 2009; Chaudhury et al., 2006; Wade, 1982). Literature has also documented other peculiarities by observing its quotidian practices to unpack issues, such as clientelism (Kitschelt & Wilkinson, 2007), contingency and randomness of bureaucratic action that leads to indifferent outcomes (Gupta, 2012) and how proceduralism often shields bureaucratic inaction (Mathur, 2015).
Thus, even with an expanding list of local state services, FLBs do not seem to conclusively influence policy outcomes like reduction of poverty. For example, even though the rate of poverty reduction accelerated after the liberalisation reforms in 1991, Dalits and Adivasis continue to remain in poverty or are at risk of slipping back into poverty (Narayan & Murgai, 2016). Further, rural–urban inequality has also increased, indicating the failure of the local governments to ensure redistributive growth (Datt et al., 2020). India continues to lag in the Human Development Index, ranking 129 out of 189 countries in 2019 (UNDP, 2019).
One institutional reform to improve the outcomes of FLB actions is through democratic decentralisation. In rural India, this is realised through Panchayat Raj Institutions (PRIs), a uniform three-tiered structure of governance below the state level, which has the mandate to plan, implement and oversee the delivery of services and developmental activities at the local levels. PRIs aim to achieve ambitious goals: deepening democratic processes (Fung & Wright, 2001), achieving “embedded autonomy” by overseeing local bureaucratic decisions through participation of a broad spectrum of participants (Evans, 1995) and providing horizontal accountability to villagers (Parthasarathy & Rao, 2017) resulting in “programmatic transactions”.
Within PRIs, its lowest tier, the Gram Panchayat (GP), is the institution where these concepts manifest into everyday interactions between FLBs, elected representatives and rural citizens. Here, representation is provided to all demographic groups through political reservations, and state-society interactions are enhanced through public open meetings (Grama Sabhas). Thus, together with “long route of accountability”, GPs enforce embeddedness and other social accountability mechanisms involving local communities to hold FLBs accountable for their services (Ahmad, 2005) and make them responsive to local needs.
Empirical studies of decentralisation offer mixed conclusions on its effects on developmental outcomes (Connerley et al., 2010; Hasan, 2004; Mansuri & Rao, 2012; Sujarwoto, 2017). Some studies document that educational levels, caste composition and competition among villages influence effective implementation of programmes and schemes (Besley et al., 2012). Others have also shown that PRIs are prone to clientelism (Anderson et al., 2015; Bardhan & Mookherjee, 2006a; Besley et al., 2005). However, there is also evidence of systematic targeting of poor and eligible households within the same PRI settings as well (Bardhan & Mookherjee, 2006b; Besley et al., 2004), hinting that even with similar institutional arrangements and structural patterns, other local factors influence FLB decisions to result in diverse development outcomes. In summary, while extant literature recognises the influence of structural factors (like education and caste) and asymmetry between voters and leaders on the effectiveness of decentralisation, we know significantly less about how institutional design and local political dynamics influence the everyday actions of FLBs, through which development outcomes are realised. Using qualitative research methods, I compare the everyday transactions of two GPs in Karnataka to explain ways through which these parameters influence FLB behaviour.
Everyday transactions in GPs span the welfare, development and regulatory functions of Gram Panchayats and are an arena where, despite similar institutional settings, FLBs produce diverse outcomes. Examples of such transactions include planning, construction and maintenance of public works like roads and drains, processing beneficiary applications for government schemes, provision of no-objection certificates, processing applications related to changes in property ownership and other activities routinely held in Gram Panchayats.
To explain the potential sources of such divergence in outcomes, I categorise these transactions into the ideal types of clientelistic and programmatic transactions and study how these transactions are enacted in the two GPs in Karnataka. Clientelistic transactions occur when the elected representatives use discretion to influence bureaucratic processes to channelise the benefits provided by the state towards their supporters rather than those who are targeted by such programmes. Programmatic transactions, follow the prescribed rules in the provision of state benefits. While political clientelism is considered useful in certain contexts (Pepinsky et al., 2017), it also results in ineffective targeting and inequitable access to government resources, leading to a loss of capacity and legitimacy of local governments (Bardhan & Mookherjee, 2012). Programmatic transactions, on the other hand, reflect higher levels of adherence to rules and regulations. Thus, the clientelistic-programmatic transactions typology serves as a useful tool for comparing FLB outcomes.
Using Migdal’s “state-in-society” approach (Migdal, 1988), I argue that in their politics of survival, GP-level FLBs are influenced by three distinct sets of issues: institutional constraints, local economic factors and local political dynamics. While institutional design provides normative constraints on what FLBs should do, local economic factors signal incentives for specific types of transactions. Political dynamics condition bureaucratic strategies and shape the expectations of villagers from FLBs. Depending on these conditions, I note that typical bureaucratic strategies like proceduralism can be used to deliver contrasting outcomes, in one case as a cover-up for clientelistic actions whereas in another, to ensure programmatic transactions. Mediators thrive in some cases, whereas they are seen as threats to political leadership in other cases. We can further contend that in areas where political competition is structured around procedural compliance, neutrality of bureaucratic behaviour is routinised among FLBs promoting programmatic actions. In areas where political support is based on transfer of resources to supporters, FLBs are expected to be conducive to the decisions of politicians in power, resulting in a lack of legitimacy and ineffective bureaucratic action.
The rest of the article is organised as follows. I briefly summarise the methodology adopted in this study, followed by descriptions of the institutional settings of PRIs in Karnataka and the field sites of the study. The next section summarises the field observations, followed by an analysis of the results of the study.
Methodology
Anthropological studies of the local state informed the field approaches of my study. I used a comparative approach to study two similarly positioned GPs (in terms of population, distance from district headquarters, personnel strength in the GP offices, etc.) of Karnataka to account for variations in local political dynamics and other contextual factors, while the institutional framework remained the same to explain for the variations in types of everyday transactions.
Fieldwork in the two GPs was conducted in 2017–2018, sequentially, over a period of 8 months in the first GP followed by 6 months in the second GP. I used qualitative research methods, such as participant observation, formal and informal interviews and shadowing elected representatives and bureaucrats. In both GPs, I observed day-to-day activities, visited worksites, attended monthly meetings, public hearings and social audits. I conducted in-depth interviews and informal discussions among GP personnel (four from each GP), elected representatives across the social categories (12 from the first GP and 6 from the second) and four women from each GP who were beneficiaries of government schemes. Further, I triangulated the data gathered from the two GPs with other online portals where administrative data was uploaded by the two GPs.
GPs provide a wide range of services to rural citizens, including the implementation of schemes such as the Mahatma Gandhi National Rural Employment Guarantee Act (MGNREGA), Swachh Bharath Abhiyan (SBA) and Pradhan Mantri Awas Yojana (PMAY). The scope and importance of these schemes vary across GPs. Thus, neither aggregating scheme outputs nor analysing a single scheme’s performance would suffice for the kind of comparative analysis attempted in this study. Other development indicators (such as literacy, health and income levels) are also not necessarily indicative of the differences in the functioning of the FLBs in the two GPs. Thus, I use the ideal types of clientelistic and programmatic transactions to delineate the differences in the functioning of the GPs. It has to be noted, however, that bureaucratic action at the local level cannot always be categorised into these binaries. Not all aspects of their work can be codified into rules and protocols. Quite often, their decisions are based on heuristics, selective invocation of rules and trust. Thus, the clientelistic-programmatic transaction markers in this context are relative rather than absolute.
Understanding the institutional design of GPs in Karnataka and how it shapes the appropriateness of FLB and elected representatives’ actions was another crucial aspect of analysis in this study. The sources for this analysis were: state government acts, rules and regulations and official descriptions of structure and functions of different government agencies, including PRIs.
Institutional Context
Karnataka is regarded as one of the few states that have a good track record in decentralisation reforms, together with Kerala and West Bengal (Manor, 1999; Parthasarathy & Rao, 2017). The state has carried out several reforms in decentralisation, including the transfer of 29 subjects mentioned in the 11th schedule of the Constitution to PRIs, 50% reservation of seats in PRIs for women, formal legitimacy to bottom-up planning activities, increased powers to Grama Sabhas, predictable rostering system for reservation of seats of elected members and increased adoption of technology to guarantee transparency and accountability.
FLBs at the GP level in Karnataka are a mix of formally appointed state government employees and locally appointed staff involved in the administration and provision of services at the GP. The state government employees are typically the Panchayat Development Officer (PDO), Secretary and Second Division Accounts Assistant (SDA), whereas the locally recruited personnel include the Bill Collector, Data Entry operator (DEO), Clerk and Peon. FLBs are assisted by pump operators and Safai Karmcharis (referred to in common parlance locally as sweepers or Group D staff). There are approximately 76,000 personnel (FLBs, Pump operators and Safai Karmacharis) 1 working in the GPs of Karnataka, with an average of about 13 personnel per GP. The PDO is the head of the GP bureaucracy and is either recruited directly through competitive exams or promoted from other positions like Bill Collectors and Secretaries. The President of the GP and the PDO are joint signatories of all bank accounts of the GP and its financial transactions. The decisions taken by the elected members of the GP have to be enacted by the PDO through the GP personnel. Thus, the elected representatives, headed by the GP President and the FLBs headed by the PDO are in a hierarchical relationship. These institutional settings, together with other bureaucratic norms, the schemes under implementation through GPs and accountability mechanisms, apply homogeneously across the two field sites.
Further, a few institutional design limitations homogenously influence the strategic decisions at the GP level across the state. Two such limitations are as follows. First, FLBs working at the panchayats are lower in cadre-seniority in comparison to bureaucrats working at higher levels, making it difficult for FLBs to assert the needs of the GP or demand bottom-up accountability to decisions taken by the Gram Sabha or the GP. Thus, the priorities for implementation of demand-based schemes like MGNREGA and target-based schemes like SBA are imposed from the top rather than emanating from local contexts. Thus, GPs tend to be implementation agencies of state and central rather than functioning as autonomous units of self-governance (Aziz, 2000). Second, the individually elected representatives of the higher tiers of PRIs control larger chunks of financial resources and have to comply with fewer procedural and accountability mechanisms in comparison to those at the GPs. Thus, ambitious politicians at the GP level are incentivised to get into patron–client relationships with politicians of other tiers and prioritise bringing funds from above rather than use their formal authority in planning and implementing GP level development works.
Field Sites
The field evidence for the study was generated using qualitative data from two comparable GPs, one in Mysore district (Somehundi) in southern Karnataka and one in Udupi district (Durga) on the west coast. Both GPs were comparable in bureaucratic setup, population size, distance to the nearest urban area, transport and connectivity facilities.
Socioeconomic Profile
Mysore district was ranked 9th (among 30 districts in Karnataka) in Human Development Index (HDI) in 2012 and has consistently ranked either on par with or lower than the state average HDI. Udupi has consistently ranked in the top six districts in the state in indicators of human development, including indicators of gender parity. Table 1 provides a brief profile of the two GPs
Brief Profile of the Two GPs.
While Somehundi had a higher proportion of STs, all of its ST population was concentrated in one village. In all other villages, Kurubas (categorised under Other Backward Classes) were the predominant caste. Thus, the influence of caste in electoral politics and provision of benefits was significantly nullified in Somehundi. In Durga, the ST population was negligible. SC population was spread across two villages of the GP. Bunts (General category), Billavas and Mogaveeras (Other Backward Classes) were the predominant castes in Durga. In contrast to Somehundi, Durga had a multi-caste configuration, and one would expect caste to play a role in the transfer of benefits to villagers. Literacy rate of Somehundi was considerably lower than Durga. Further, the per-capita income (calculated based on Gross district domestic products) in Durga was double that of Somehundi.
Somehundi was based on a traditional agrarian economy, in transition due to a booming real estate economy in at least four villages of the GP. These areas offered jobs for skilled and unskilled labour in construction and related sectors, street vending and dairy farming. In other villages, the availability of a variety of comparatively stable formal and informal job options (construction, transportation, employment in schools and hospitals, petty business, etc.) had reduced the residents’ dependence on agricultural labour as a source of livelihood. Durga was a coastal GP. It was only 2 km away from National Highway 66, which connects Kanyakumari and Mumbai. Livelihoods in the GP were based largely on fishing and non-agrarian commercial activities. Somehundi was ranked at 1,213 (80th percentile) in the Karnataka Gram Panchayat Human Development Index 2 , whereas Durga was ranked at 112 (98th percentile).
Public Sector Economy
Even though Somehundi was closer to Mysore city, the improvements in infrastructure through real estate boom in villages were limited to roads and services accessed by private layouts rather than those accessed by other villagers. While agriculture was not the primary economic activity here, the three tiers of the PRI and the line departments of the state government played vital roles in the investment in basic civic infrastructure, construction activities, health, education, housing and welfare facilities as well as the creation of individual economic assets. As Table 1 shows, public sector construction work in Somehundi was large. It amounted to about 12.15 crores which formed 14.3% of the overall village economy. The proportion of expenditure taken up by the GP was less in comparison to other agencies, and the average expenditure per work taken up by the GP was significantly smaller in comparison to that of other agencies. Somehundi GP’s annual expenditures increased from ₹80 lakhs in 2014 to ₹1.4 crores in 2019, owing mainly to increased devolution of funds from the 15th Finance Commission Grants and SBA.
In contrast, public sector expenditure (both by the GP and other agencies) was considerably less in Durga. The share of the rural development sector in the overall village economy in Durga was about 3%. Durga GP’s annual expenditures rose from ₹40 lakhs in 2014 to ₹60 lakhs in 2019, again, mainly due to increases in 15th Finance Commission Grants. Thus, the overall local public sector expenditure (in absolute and proportional terms) in Somehundi was much larger than Durga, which shows that higher financial resources were at stake for FLBs and elected representatives in Somehundi than Durga.
The implementation of MGNREGA was not prioritised in Mysore district during the period of the study (2017–2018) owing to pending payments to material suppliers in the previous years. Udupi being a coastal district with a large demand for non-agricultural labour, MGNREGA was not considered important by elected representatives and officials.
Political Profile
Political contestation in the Chamundeshwari MLA constituency of Mysore (Somehundi GP is under this constituency) was traditionally dominated by two political parties: Congress and Janata Dal Secular (JDS). Political mobilisation was generally aligned along caste lines and with individual leaders. Elections for various positions in PRIs, Cooperatives, Presidentship and membership in various standing committees were highly competitive, and patron–client relationships between influential political leaders and locally elected representatives and contractors, distribution of money for votes and caste polarisation are routinely used to win elections.
Political leaders had to find their own financial resources for funding their political careers, and hence, the most influential, elected representatives of the GP also had strong financial interests in the activities of the GP. Prospective candidates raised their own money for election campaigns (and hence, buying votes and other coercive tactics were common practices). These leaders resembled the Naya Netas noted by Krishna (2007). Regulating real estate development and contracting of public works were the most important activities of the GP that had direct implications on the professional interests of many elected members of Somehundi GP. For them, the strategy of using public office for private interests was a clear entry point to politics, and thus, the average political experience of elected representatives and overall information about government schemes and objectives were low in the GP. 3
Since the GP mostly had single-caste dominant villages, it diffused caste-based political conflicts. This also resulted in a straightforward division of resources across castes and villages. With no strong differentiating identities across parties, personal loyalty and patronage mattered more than other characteristics for political support in the GP. All GP members felt that elections cannot be won without money, alcohol and coalitions. Broadly, Somehundi’s elected representatives could be categorised into three types: (a) ambitious politicians who aimed to grow by networking with politicians in higher tiers, bringing funds to their constituencies and in turn mobilising political support and in the process seeking rent from the public sector economy, (b) contractors/real-estate developers who were clearly interested in the political office for professional gains and (c) tag-along members who were supported financially by the influential members, who had a limited perception of their own roles to recommending public works and individual beneficiaries from their ward for public benefits and in return expected commissions from their clients. Due to the need to accommodate these diverse interests across elected members of political parties, stronger GP members entered into informal agreements of power sharing to buy the support of other members, even if they were in the same party, either by providing material benefits or by promising rotation of presidentship. Thus, even with a Congress absolute majority, 4 competition between GP members for resources and political power (especially the post of president) existed, irrespective of party lines. For example, over a period of three terms of office (2005–2018), 10 elected members had served as Presidents. Further, during the last period of 2015–2020, even within Congress-supported elected members, three members from three different villages served as presidents.
The political dynamics in Udupi were characterised by party affiliation and religion-based political rivalry. Here, the Congress and Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) were at loggerheads. Due to the cadre-based political organisation of the region, many elected members of the GP had considerable political experience. Influential elected members were more strongly connected to their party networks and depended on a combination of reputation and their nearness to MLAs and other politicians. These members relied on participation in religious and other socio-cultural public activities to persuade party loyalists and middle-class voters. Vote buying was targeted towards poorer households. The non-influential elected members were party supporters, who fit the specific reservation categories in the election roster and who would go with the agenda set by influential political leaders from their own parties.
Elected members of Durga GP were politically more occupied than their Somehundi counterparts and did not have open professional conflicts with the work done by the GP since the opposition would pick on these conflicting interests. The combination of such an investment of time and effort in political mobilisation together with intense political rivalry meant that influential GP members had thorough knowledge about the functioning of PRIs, and they used this as a basis to scrutinise the decisions taken by the rival elected members. Since political affiliation was strong across political parties, support for presidential and vice-presidential candidates was stable, and Durga did not have frequent changes in these positions.
Every-day Transactions in Somehundi and Durga
The everyday experiences of FLBs in dealing with political representatives, villagers and other officials had shaped their understanding of PRIs, the heuristics of decision-making and behavioural strategies. In turn, the other stakeholders were also influenced by their actions. The PDO in Somehundi was a promoter and had seen “political interference” throughout his career as an FLB in GPs and distrusted politicians the most among the people he interacted with. On most days, he had to deal with some form of political interference in bureaucratic decisions, either in the form of political leaders pressurising him to process applications from their own clients favourably or asking him to regularise unbilled work. In Durga, even small actions by the PDO and other GP personnel were intensely scrutinised by elected representatives to discern foul play and ensure bureaucratic neutrality. Hence, even minute details like the dates on which letters were received and processed became important.
Somehundi GP
The large public sector economy and booming real estate sector in the GP meant that the stakes for political and personal gains through a selected set of construction and real estate transactions were much higher for GP members than other regular transactions and developmental activities of the GP. These members took a personal interest in getting funds from other departments and other “high-priority” cases, whereas the other transactions were fully handled by FLBs.
To maintain political control even on low-value transactions like provision of certificates and benefits like toilets and road repairs, politicians used ingenuous strategies (beyond making coalitions and sharing power with other elected representatives), like the inclusion of political agents as namesake pump operators. Further, key positions like Bill Collector and Data Entry Operator were politically motivated 5 . These political agents ensured that influential political leaders retained some control over the functions and distribution of benefits of the GP, irrespective of their presence in the GP. Due to the distinctive arrangements of power sharing across elected members (as explained in the previous section), collective decision-making on utilising fund schemes and resources available to the GP did not exist. Irrespective of their size and importance, resources were distributed evenly across GP members 6 , regardless of their political clout, and every GP member could benefit from clientelistic transactions. Consequentially, clientelistic transactions were ubiquitous.
Although some personnel were loyal to specific political leaders in Somehundi, the nature of their jobs (processing beneficiary lists, preparing documentation for important regulatory services related to land transactions and digital transactions) and their unique skills (deftly manipulating register entries and data entry in complex web portals) meant that other elected members found them indispensable, even if they were not politically supportive. This resulted in a symbiotic relationship between elected representatives and FLBs, even though, officially, their relationship was hierarchical.
The intricacies of rules and regulations of schemes were not important to the elected members as long as the PDO facilitated their expectations. The normative assumption in Mysore was that the GP personnel would be solely responsible for all procedural and financial irregularities in the GP, since elected representatives were generally beyond the reach of bureaucratic scrutiny. As the PDO explained, elected members functioned on the principle of work first, file last. Thus, carrying out clientelistic transactions while at the same time documenting them as rational/programmatic transactions had become a second nature for the PDO in Somehundi. Some strategies that he used in Somehundi were to tweak the documentation of works and activities in ways that were open for interpretation 7 and leaving blank spaces in meeting minutes of Grama Sabhas and monthly meetings to insert contingency decisions if needed. This required experience in understanding bureaucratic protocols, language conventions and ways of manipulation that avoid scrutiny. These skills were generally absent among directly recruited PDOs, and hence, elected officials of Somehundi preferred promoted PDOs over directly recruited PDOs. In his own words, he was “pucca in my paperwork”.
The risks of penalisation from higher officials, absolute dissatisfaction from villagers and animosity from political leaders were too high for the FLBs of the GP. Hence, the PDO strived hard to make the everyday transactions of the GP politically acceptable, defendable against bureaucratic scrutiny and retain goodwill among villagers. He was prompt in paying commissions and bribes, attending important meetings and addressing sensitive service delivery issues immediately (like provision of drinking water). Thus, FLB actions were motivated by a combination of self-interest, patronage, career growth and, to some extent, helping needy villagers to get state benefits.
In summary, FLBs and elected representatives in Somehundi had normalised dysfunctions such as fudging, withholding information, expecting commissions and selective prioritisation of beneficiaries. Villagers and clients who supported specifically elected representatives could be seen benefitting from such practices (like allotment of benefits, provision of streetlights near their houses, etc.) and would expect similar behaviour from the opposite camps when they come to power.
Personal loyalty-based support, the absence of caste-based conflicts and collective dependence of elected representatives on state resources meant that, although no single group of political leaders could dominate FLB actions, they could neither promote collective bargaining nor ensure programmatic transactions. The symbiotic relationship between FLBs and elected representatives engendered a weak local state in Somehundi, where villagers did not expect the GP to be impartial. They had little trust in collective action through Grama Sabha or social audits. The GP was limited in its ability to assert its autonomy or to take up programmatic tasks like tax mobilisation or behavioural change activities expected in schemes like SBA. Thus, tax collection rates in the GP were low (24.6% of the demand for the year 2018–2019), open defecation persisted and MGNREGA implementation was focused on individual benefits. Thus, local communities were routinised to accept that state benefits would predominantly flow to the supporters of elected representatives in power. Thus, even though clientelistic transactions were readily visible in the GP, neither elected representatives nor FLBs alone could be realistically held accountable for these unfair practices. Hence, it thrived within tolerable limits.
However, the political competitiveness, representative democracy and nearness of FLBs to villagers in Somehundi were successful in meeting the basic demands of local communities. Elected members and FLBs made it a priority to attend to drinking water problems, repair of dilapidated houses, upgradation of caste graveyards, etc.
Durga GP
Clientelistic practices were less visible in Durga. As discussed earlier, local political organisation was cadre-based and organised along political party and religious lines, and influential elected members of the GP were more experienced, ambitious and had better awareness of procedures to be followed in PRIs. Political leaders were financially supported by their parties rather than having to fend for themselves fully. They also had more media and public exposure because of which the political rivalry between elected representatives manifested itself in intense public scrutiny of political decisions and their implementation. Since electoral support depended on the reputation and networking of the leaders, ambitious leaders made sure that their own decision-making did not violate existing rules and procedures. Their goal was to “take decisions by taking all members into confidence”. Thus, caste and religion were not issues that significantly affected the daily transactions of the GP. Though political power rested with the president and vice president of the GP, they were expected to act programmatically and defend their decisions when scrutinised by opposition members.
Rules and regulations were tools used for political criticism, and thus, the PDO in Durga was extremely conscious of staying neutral and adhering to procedures. Her aim was to make sure that protocols were followed as much as possible (all her field visits were to be accompanied by elected members, all financial transactions to be first approved by the president, etc.). These protocols not only showed her penchant for procedures but also demonstrated her neutrality towards political actors. These strategies were also used to avoid bureaucratic penalisation from higher officials. While the PDO was not happy with this constant scrutiny, she was happy about the outcomes. She mentioned “there are many people who keep watching every action here, but there is zero corruption in our GP”. Thus, the elected representatives of Durga preferred directly recruited PDOs who would stick to the rulebook as much as possible and stay neutral on issues of political contention.
Though ambitious leaders needed to get more funds to their constituency from various departments and through other civil society organisations for their own political growth, they derived local recognition through procedural legitimacy. Thus, elected members were particular about retaining administrative control over FLBs and their day-to-day practices. The result of these political dynamics on the everyday transactions in Durga GP was that FLBs were under severe pressure to show that the everyday transactions were in fact programmatic in nature.
The personnel of Durga GP were appointed based on the criterion set by Udupi Zilla Panchayat. There were no fixers/agents in the GP since it could disturb the political power equilibrium in the GP. All personnel were expected to help the villagers in filling out forms and applications and accessing state benefits since it was a matter of electoral reputation for elected members. The GP had made considerable strides in achieving developmental outcomes, like maintaining open defecation-free status successfully for multiple years, achieving high tax collection rates (86% of total demand in 2018–2019), providing door-to-door solid waste collection services and establishing an environmentally friendly mortuary facility. However, intense political rivalry negated the possibility of consensus and collective action among the elected representatives of the GP. Hence, funds of the GP were equally split among members. For similar reasons, the GP was reluctant to frame its own rules for regulating local economic activities (and hence was seen ostensibly to support one category of citizens) and expected bureaucratic orders from above, which would negate the possibility of local bias. An example of this hesitation was the lack of consensus to enforce protocols for solid waste collection from commercial units, fearing backlash from supporters.
It was amply clear that the programmatic regime of Durga produced better developmental outcomes in comparison to the clientelistic regime in Somehundi. Repeated enactments of political competition leading to programmatic transactions seemed to have provided legitimacy to the procedural practices of the GP in Durga, whereas the bureaucratic practices in Somehundi were mainly to hide the pervasive clientelistic transactions of the GP. In both cases, even though the PDOs knew government priorities and the specific needs of the GP, they could only play a limited role in the distribution of funds across the wards of the GP and in the selection of beneficiaries and major public works.
Analysis and Discussion
The descriptions of the political profile and everyday transactions of Somehundi and Durga show that even when the institutional design of PRIs had similar effects on both GPs (not using their local autonomy, inability to set differing priorities for different schemes and pursuing funds from other tiers and departments), contrasting bureaucratic strategies were pursued by the GPs owing to the differences in the political dynamics. While PDOs in both cases were embedded in the local context through their bureaucratic actions, the nature of their relationship with the villagers and elected members differed in the two GPs. In Somehundi, the clientelistic political leadership resulted in unique coping strategies like manipulation of records to realign the objectives of government schemes with local leadership choices. Just like Naya Netas, who had to fend for themselves (Krishna, 2007), FLBs were also expected to develop their own strategies for mitigating the risk of being punished for intentional and unavoidable procedural irregularities. This weakened the overall capacity of the GP in bringing larger social change among local communities and progress across different schemes and interventions. The comparatively benevolent competitive political dynamics in Durga supported the programmatic implementation of GP activities that influenced the overall capacity and legitimacy of the GP.
In both GPs, risk-averse PDOs resorted to proceduralism. In the case of Somehundi, it was to hide the clientelistic transactions, whereas in Durga, it was to demonstrate to the local political leaders that FLBs had indeed been neutral in these transactions. While caste-based patronage was absent in Somehundi due to its unique single-caste dominant villages, clientelistic action did not allow effective targeting of beneficiaries. Political scrutiny in Durga deterred caste-based transfer of benefits, even though caste and religious identities mattered for political support. Thus, differing local political dynamics could be attributed as an influential factor in the differential outcomes of FLB actions.
A valid counter-explanation would be to contend that clientelistic and programmatic behaviours result from economic incentives for decision makers. 8 There is empirical evidence for this argument, and its rationale still holds. However, democratic decentralisation by design aims to counter predatory behaviour emanating from political power. As discussed in the previous sections, institutional design of PRIs and nature of political mobilisation do curb such tendencies in multiple ways. The evidence in Durga (the political thrust for being neutral and procedural) shows that programmatic behaviour is likely to be retained when the potential for political growth is contingent not only on financial gains but also on trust and political reputation (Granovetter, 1985). In Somehundi, though private interests motivated the political decisions of elected representatives, decentralisation brought them closer to public scrutiny and succeeded in ensuring the provision of basic amenities. Decentralisation acted as a deterrent against predatory behaviour and limited the effect of economic incentives on everyday transactions. Thus, although private interests mattered, I conclude that the production of clientelistic and programmatic transactions in these GPs was mainly a result of the local political dynamics.
Empirical evidence shows that the individual agency of FLBs had limited potential in determining bureaucratic decisions. Competing institutional and contextual factors had considerable influence on how these FLBs developed heuristics to handle the quotidian transactions in their GPs. Somehundi PDO believed that he should “help others as much as possible without getting into trouble”. Durga PDO believed that her role was to “stick to rules as much as possible and help the poor whenever possible”. Even though Somehundi and Durga PDOs were instinctively risk-averse, their strategies would probably backfire if their worksites were interchanged.
The findings of this study have other implications on how proceduralism and paperwork can be understood in the context of the effectiveness of the implementation of government schemes and programmes. While Mathur (2015) notes that transparency while making documents has hampered the implementation of programmes like MGNREGA, the current study posits that proclivity for procedural compliance and documentation can also serve as an important constituent of programmatic action. While this study notes that clientelistic transactions adversely affect the legitimacy and effectiveness of FLBs, decentralisation at the very least compels locally elected members and FLBs to respond to the provision of essential amenities and adhere to a minimalist set of programmatic actions.
Footnotes
Declaration of Conflicting Interests
The author declared no potential conflicts of interest with respect to the research, authorship and/or publication of this article.
Funding
The author received no financial support for the research, authorship and/or publication of this article.