Abstract
This article presents a critical commentary on the implementation of a graduation approach-based poverty alleviation scheme for transforming the lives of poor, marginalised communities (i.e., erstwhile toddy tappers and women-headed households). It draws from a qualitative study on the working of the Government of Bihar’s Satat Jeevikoparjan Yojana or the SJY scheme in the Madhubani district of Bihar, one of India’s poorest states. It primarily argues that there is a scope of improvement on four key fronts, namely (a) asymmetry between beneficiaries’ capabilities and livelihood opportunities provided (b) streamlining the different stages of ultra-poor graduation, (c) efficient cross-checking of developments on the field by project staff and (d) proper training of these beneficiaries to account for the unintended bureaucratic slippages by the beneficiaries. Thus in so doing, it avers, that given the socio-cultural and institutional limitations within which this project works, sealing these leaks could substantially improve the efficacy of this scheme.
Introduction
The Government of Bihar (GoB) banned liquor in 2016. It undoubtedly had a positive social impact in terms of decrease in the incidence of domestic violence and other crime rates. However, given the precarious employment situation in the state of Bihar, this step also impacted the critical mass of unskilled, labouring poor of the state, especially the livelihood opportunities of the toddy tapper families (i.e., those involved in the production and sale of country liquor). In other words, the people engaged in producing country liquor or toddy were extremely poor and vulnerable; therefore, developing sustainable livelihood options for them required a different and intensive strategy. Deploying the traditional self-help groups (SHG)—bank linkage model for ameliorating the condition of ‘ultra-poor’ women (widow, destitute etc.)—was not found to be a viable option in this context. 1
Keeping in view these concerns, the GoB initiated a programme named Satat Jeevikoparjan Yojana (SJY) or ‘Continuous livelihood scheme’ for the rehabilitation of ‘ultra-poor’ with the budget of ₹840 crores in August 2018. The SJY adopted the graduation approach (GA) to reach 10,000 household between 2018 and 2020 across the state.
The ultra-poor in this context, were defined as those women who hail from (a) Scheduled Castes (SC) and Scheduled Tribes (ST) social category, (b) female-headed households, (c) households of toddy tappers which have lost their livelihoods due to the liquor ban in 2016 and (d) households having a monthly income of less than ₹300.
But before we get into the specifics of this project, we herein provide a brief overview of the evolution of such an approach to poverty alleviation. The GA is a multifaceted livelihood programme that provides productive assets and employment opportunities to jump start economic activity, financial education, training, coaching, access to savings and consumption supply to the ultra-poor through which they graduate or come out of extreme poverty (Abdul Latif Jameel Poverty Action Lab [J-PAL], 2015). First, it was adopted by the BRAC (Bangladesh Rural Advancement Committee) in the project named Challenging the Frontiers of Poverty Reduction: Targeting the Ultra Poor (CFPR-TUP) in the year 2002, to fulfil the first SDG, that is, no poverty, and because of the greater impact of programme, it has been replicated by approximately 20 countries, including India. The J-PAL 2 evaluated the GA in 2007 in seven countries and found improvement in consumption, food security, asset holding, savings and psychological well-being. The findings indicated that it has enabled the poor women to run small business and increased their earnings by 38% after 4 years of asset transfer. Bandiera et al. (2013) assessed BRAC in Bangladesh, and two other studies done in Uganda on cash transfer programmes have also found their positive results in the lives of poor. Banerjee et. al (2015) in their research examined the ‘sufficiency-claim’ of the BRAC programme GA in Ethiopia, Ghana, Honduras, India, Pakistan and Peru, and found the major impacts of the programme on consumption, food security, productive and household assets, financial inclusion, physical and mental health, political involvement, and women’s empowerment. The findings showed that the impacts of programme were varied across several countries, but the general patterns of positive effects were common across all countries, with weaker impacts in Honduras and Peru.
Satat Jeevikoparjan Yojana or the Bihar Model of Graduation Approach
In the context of Bihar, the state government in 2018, flagged off the SJY, a phased GA, which aimed at turning ultra-poor women into self-sufficient entrepreneurs. The SJY was launched as a differential, intensive strategy for developing sustainable livelihoods among the ultra-poor 3 households on the same basis in the state of Bihar in 2018. The ultra-poor are incapable of fulfilling even their basic necessities and are typically food insecure, having very few or no assets. Therefore, a vast majority of women-headed families come under the category of ultra-poor households. Ultra-poor women suffer from a set of common challenges, namely food insecurity, lack of land ownership, poor health, unemployment, lack of education, skills and confidence, and hence they tend to be the victims of social exclusion. The poorest and most vulnerable sections of society need policy interventions and support to build their confidence and make them economically self-reliant and hence the GA is a step in that direction.
To implement the GA to poverty alleviation through the SJY, the GoB signed a Memorandum of Understanding with the Bihar Rural Livelihoods Promotion Society (BRLPS-JEEViKA) and approved it as the nodal implementation agency for SJY. The policy combined the transfer of productive assets, training, livelihood gap assistance and regular hand holding support to provide sustainable livelihood to the beneficiaries (refer Figure 1). It has made four main components of SJY on the basis of GA, which combines
Capacity building (staff, cadres, and community-based organisations [CBOs]), Livelihood financing (Special Investment Fund [SIF], Livelihood Gap Assistance Fund [LGAF] and Livelihood Investment Fund LIF]), Convergence and partnership (administrative department) and Project management (enterprise selection and transfer of productive assets).
The selection process of the beneficiaries is quite long. At first, the community resource persons (CRP) expert team comes from outside the village and the selection drive takes place there. They do participatory rural appraisals and prepare the list for the selection. After that, the CRP team present the list in the next village organisation (VO) 4 meeting then, and then on the basis of that endorsed list, the final list is prepared. After the beneficiaries are selected, they are provided ₹1,000 per month for next 7 months as LGAF through the VO. After this, the master resource persons (MRP) selection, training and baseline survey of the ultra-poor households go parallel. The MRPs play a very significant role in implementing this scheme, whose responsibility is to check and give proper guidance to the beneficiaries. One MRP is liable to take care of 35–40 beneficiaries. After their selection and training, livelihood mapping/enterprises selection is done through micro-planning, which helps to identify the most suitable livelihood investment as per the capacity of Household (HH) and available opportunities of the village. After this, enterprise development training is conducted and the productive asset like goats, goods for stationery shop and so on is transferred through LIF. The LIF tranches-based support or the livelihood financial interventions are spread over 2–3 tranches in different phases. Disbursement of each tranche to the household is based on completion of mandatory triggers. After a certain period, these households ‘graduate’ to a mainstream sustainable livelihood.
Research Question and Methodology
In a study commissioned by JEEViKA, Tiwari (2019) examined the impacts of SJY scheme in special reference to Purnia, Katihar and Khagaria districts of Bihar and found that the scheme has uplifted the social status of the beneficiaries and increased the economic and political status as well as the confidence level of targeted people. It also increased the decision-making powers of women. The author highlighted some limitations of the programme and suggested constructing basic infrastructure before starting the enterprises, compulsory and regular field visits of MRP and giving them proper training, fixing the amount of money to start any business for first tranches, keeping record books by the MRPs, allocating the LGF amount from the beginning of enterprises, and monitoring the village by CBOs (SHG, VO, cluster-level federation [CLF]). Building on this research, the central research question of this article is to examine the role of economic and cultural imperatives in impacting the outcomes of grant-based livelihood assistance schemes for ultra-poor women. In other words, this article, through a qualitative exploration, explores how such ‘grant-based ultra-poor graduation models of development’ need to focus on how both cultural and economic imperatives compel us to interrogate the key canons of this project.
The first phase of SJY began in 2018 with 14 districts (refer Figure 2) which are encircled in the map of Bihar. Among those 14 districts, Madhubani was one of the earliest in which it was started. Further, the Benipatti block of Madhubani was selected, since it is the largest block which comprises the largest number of villages. It was not possible to cover all 21 blocks of the district due to a shortage of time, a COVID-19-induced lockdown and a lack of resources. Hence, the Benipatti block was selected as it is the largest block of Madhubani which comprises the largest number of villages. The study was conducted in two rounds (i.e., from July 2020 to September 2020 and May 2022 to September 2022). Three CLFs are divided into one block, but Benipatti is the special case which has 6 CLFs. Further, the selection of CLFs and VOs has been decided as per the instructions of the Block Project Manager (BPM).
SJY Programme Distribution Across Districts in Bihar.
In this block, at the time of the first round of the field survey (i.e., July 2020), 812 households were selected by JEEViKA as ultra-poor households. Therefore, given the limitations of COVID-19 and funding, we randomly selected 150 households. The beneficiaries were selected on dual criteria for helping us draw a comparison among them:
Criterion 1: Selection in 75:25 ratio as per project timeline, that is, 100 households that had started work from the year 2018 and 50 households were taken under this programme from the year 2019. Criterion 2: Selection in 50:50 ratio as per the nature of livelihood that they were provided by the agency, that is, 75 livestock and 75 micro-enterprise based beneficiaries were selected.
Further, the study also conducted 20 in-depth interviews with policy actors/officials which included BPM, Young Professional, District Resource Person (DRP), Block Resource Person (BRP), MRP, Community Coordinator and Community Mobiliser.
Findings
The study found evidence how the SJY policy has indeed brought smiles on many faces and have created hope in their lives. However, it found that there are four ways in which the programme could be implemented
Asymmetry Between Beneficiaries’ Capability and Livelihood Options
The study found that 40% of the 150 respondents interviewed were not comfortable with their work because they did not understand calculations, but, and that due to others’ pressure, they had to do it. Many businesses were running in loss due to their lack of preparedness in book-keeping and maintenance of records. Interestingly, the policy intends to train the beneficiaries before starting the new enterprise, but on the ground, it is not so effective because they got this training late and that too of a low standard. It is true that the choice of enterprises are done by examining the market demand, but we argue that there is a need to pay attention to the capabilities of the beneficiaries who are allotted the same.
Figure 3 shows the reason behind the selection of the particular livelihood options by the beneficiaries. Only 20% respondents had selected their livelihood on their own choice, and 25% respondents had selected the choice as per their family members suggested it, and there are some cases when the beneficiaries have to do that work because of somebody has pressurised them for that. These respondents did not want that livelihood option which they were allotted, especially those who were allotted micro-enterprises such as kirana or stationary shops for they were illiterate. They instead wanted to opt for livestock.
Reason Behind Livelihood Choice.
Critical Links Between Enterprise Cycle and Funding Pattern (LGAF/SIF/LIF)
The LGAF is that amount of money, which is provided to the beneficiaries for 7 months after the selection. On paper, it is mentioned that the VO will provide ₹1,000 per month for 7 months just after the selection before starting the new work, but, on ground, the researchers got to know that this amount was being provided to them after the start of the new work. 5 Out of the total 100 beneficiaries of 2018, 87.50% have only received this grant. Out of a total of 50 respondents in 2019, 68.75% have received it. An SIF is a grant of ₹10,000 provided to the beneficiaries before starting the business for preparing a particular place for it to repair their house or any other infrastructural development work. Hence, very few of the 2018 beneficiaries had received this grant and none of them received the full SIF amount. Only 32 respondents had just got ₹2,000 as the lockdown relief from their SIF, and, for the rest, their SIFs were with the VO. Out of 50 beneficiaries of 2019, 25 had received the whole amount and some had not opted for it due to chequebook and other issues. 6
LIF is the grant for investing in a new livelihood source and is a fixed amount (i.e., ₹20,000 for livestock, ₹5,000 for poultry farms, ₹16,000 for goat-rearing and ₹50,000 for dairy), which is not given to the beneficiaries in hand but the VO and MRPs purchase the demanded assets for them. In our study, we found that 87.50% of the respondents had received the LIF grant and the rest were still waiting even after 3 years of the programme. 7 Only 62.50% had received this grant. But, most of the respondents had received only a certain percentage of their LIF amount and the rest amounts were in the VO. It was reported 8 that it has been done for the proper utilisation of funds, that is, if some respondents are not using the fund efficiently then, the rest part will be in the safe zone. If they would work harder, then their entitlements will be disbursed among them but, there are several cases where businesses are at a loss and, due to some confusion, these amounts are not being disbursed. Again, there were some special cases in the block wherein the beneficiaries have neither received the LGAF nor LIF 1 but, their name has come on the list for micro-planning of the second tranche LIF 2.
As interviews with field officials 9 reported and the same was ascertained from the SJY application (refer Figure 5), 80% of funds have been transferred to the VO from District Program Coordination Unit, but only 50% have been disbursed to the beneficiaries. Further, there were also many cases in the block wherein beneficiaries have not received any grant even after 2–3 years of selection (refer Figure 6) and hence, SJY has become another reason for their sorrow. For example, some respondents who had endorsed in the VO in 2018 and 2019 are continuously requesting for help but the officials have not provided them with any fund till now. On the contrary, as per the scheme guidelines, MRPs have to visit their homes every week for taking reports and photographs and for other formalities. These things have become a mere administrative botheration for the beneficiaries who are already grappling with the problem of regular and continuous funding. On being inquired about the same, the BPM gave the lame excuse that the fund had been received and that they would be allocated to the beneficiaries soon.
Funds Received by Beneficiaries.
Need to Explore More Innovative Livelihood Opportunities to Accommodate More Ultra-Poor (Scheduled Caste/Scheduled Tribe/Toddy tapper)
The study also found that the Scheduled Caste (SC), Scheduled Tribe (ST) and toddy tappers coverage of Madhubani district is just 48% which is in red zone (refer Figure 7). It means that either the authorities are not able to identify them or they are not able to convince them. The authors got to know through their interviews with the beneficiaries that the toddy tappers are not being convinced by them to leave their profession and start something new. So, it is required that some senior authorities would make them aware of this by organising some camp or any other means so that they would switch their livelihood sources. Further, in some of our interviews, it was also reported that the relatively, hostile, scattered manner in which these ultra-poor households were located and further the social stigma attached to their lives as destitute women or ex-toddy tapper did not provide them the optimal social capital or network to support their businesses. Alternative options like training these women with handicraft skills or developing some local, natural resource based enterprise could be explored rather than providing either goat-rearing farm or cosmetic stores as the sole option.
Acknowledging the Exigencies Affecting the Role Played by MRPs in Improving the Project Outcome
Even the HH and MRP ratio in the study area was 45, and, for the Madhubani district, it was 42. The MRPs also expressed their disappointment about the slow process in disbursal of their salaries since their work is like a field reporter hence, they have to give 8 hours on the field and the beneficiaries HH are quite distant; therefore, they face difficulties in managing their work. They said that they receive the payment in 3–4 months, and, till then, they could not save money for their travel and other things and hence, they had to arrange money from someone else. It also impacts their efficiency and indirectly the effectiveness of the policy. Therefore, there should be regular payment of such workers especially because they are the most responsible grassroots worker of this project. It was observed that the MRPs too are not well-trained, and, in many cases, they have started their work without any training and with the instructions only. These things led to confusion among them, which is hampering the project.
Discussion: Poverty Alleviation and Ultra-Poor Graduation Approach
There have been several studies all over the world on the impacts of different poverty alleviation programmes. Self-employment activities through the availability of micro-credit have been found to be a more viable alternative to resolve the problem of poverty. Chen et al. (2008) found in their research that China Southwest Poverty Reduction Project led to sustained income gains only for well-educated poor households, and it faded after the ending of project for the income gains of other less educated poor households. In the Indian context, Datta (2015) assessed the impacts of JEEViKA 10 (i.e., a large-scale SHG initiative that started in 2006 in Bihar) in the lives of beneficiary women. By using a retrospective survey, it was found that it has brought various changes in the socio-economic status of marginalised caste women in Bihar, as 95% beneficiary households now practice regular savings. Alternatively, scholars like Sanyal et al. (2015) have shown how poor women from JEEViKA SHGs were found to be more empowered when measured by mobility, decision-making and collective action or in terms of their engagement in problem solving at the community level.
Further there are studies done in other developing countries like Ethiopia (Tadesse & Zewdie, 2019) which have shown that livelihood grants are more productive than livelihood credits as grant recipients generated income and accumulated asset faster than credits recipients. But it also emphasised that those grants which were allocated to planned investments were more likely to perform better than credit-based schemes. Similarly, Pitt and Khandker (1998) examined the three group-based credit programmes by BRAC, Bangladesh Rural Development Board and Grameen Bank and found that credit routed through women increased labour supply across gender, schooling across gender, consumption expenses by the household and non-land assets held by women. Banerjee et al. (2015), in their research, reviewed six studies of micro-credit in six different countries and concluded that access to micro-credit loans for the average poor person does not generate the sustained consumption gains. Further, they noted that it may sometimes lead to an increase in business activity, but its effect on average business profits is negligible. Blattman et al. (2014) also found that a similar programme in Uganda that provided grant, training and support to youth had increased the business assets by 57%, work hours by 17% and earnings by 38% of beneficiaries. Livelihood grants created better capacity and incentives to reduce fungibility and it helped to reach the excluded groups as well as to improve the effectiveness and productivity of rural livelihood investments through higher rate of returns and faster capital growth rate.
However, in our study done on the SJY programme in the Indian context, we explored the different ways in which the sociological undercurrents played on the institutional outcomes of an ultra-poor GA to poverty alleviation. The programme is interesting in the sense that it is a novel programme that acknowledges the conditions of poverty accrued due to both historical disadvantages (SCs/STs) and those that has been the inadvertent outcomes of public policy legislations (i.e., the ban on liquor and the loss of livelihood opportunities among erstwhile toddy trappers). Our study among 150 households in the Madhubani district helps us identify four key limitations (discussed above) in this project that needs to be taken care of (a) the symmetry between beneficiaries’ capability and livelihood options, (b) critical links between enterprise cycle and funding pattern (LGAF/SIF/LIF), (c) need to explore more innovative livelihood opportunities to accommodate more ultra-poor (SC, ST & toddy tapper) and (d) the need to acknowledge the exigencies affecting the role played by MRPs in improving institutional opportunities.
Conclusion
Thus to conclude, we agree that the adoption of a graded-livelihood grants approach in place of a livelihood credits approach for the ultra-poor is definitely beneficial. Credits or loans are the money which a person can avail from banks, private lenders or any other microfinance institutions. But that money requires repayment, that is, the person who takes credit has to repay it with a certain interest in a specific period of time, and, in that sense, grants are the money which one can avail from government institutions or trusts, and are non-repayable. However, to ensure that these grants are better utilised, we find through our study of Bihar’s SJY scheme that it is intensive knowledge support to the beneficiaries and the provisioning of a more liberal graduation module that would prove to be critical in improving the outcomes of this novel ultra-poor development programme. In other words, we contend that there is a need to be vigilant about the interplay of cultural (i.e., people’s everyday life conditions) and economic (procedural) aspects of the development processes. Only then can we dispense social justice in terms of long-term development outcomes and not mere short-term targets. Poverty alleviation and economic empowerment is not only about creating conducive conditions to nullify the skewed economic arrangements in the given institutional set up. It is also equally important to acknowledge the precariousness of work conditions within which the poor and the marginalised are mired in.
Footnotes
Declaration of conflicting interests
The authors declared no potential conflicts of interest with respect to the research, authorship and/or publication of this article.
Funding
The authors received no financial support for the research, authorship and/or publication of this article.