BRICS: Advancing Cooperation and Strengthening Regionalism

Background

Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa (BRICS), ¹ is a political organisation of the emerging, industrialised, large, fast-growing economies. BRICS has a significant influence in regional and global matters. The most recent and fourth summit of BRICS took place in New Delhi, India, on 29 March 2012 (Ministry of External Affairs, 2012).

I pose certain questions at the outset. Do foreign policy issues matter among the BRICS countries in the days to come, which were dealt with elaborately in the Delhi Declaration? China, Russia and India are well-recognised nuclear weapons states. Do the BRICS countries represent a mere gathering of market democracies? Will China and Russia endorse the rest of the members of BRICS to play a more meaningful role in the UN? A reformed United Nations is not a pragmatic idea in the near future. This article is sceptical about the revision of the Charter of the UN and reforming the United Nations Security Council. Until and unless the reform process does not take place, there is no point in talking of a meaningful engagement of the non-P5 countries of BRICS.

The noticeable point at this juncture: China as a strong economic power can outgrow the United States by 2020. The group will not be dominated by China alone, since it retains the permanent seat in the United Nations Security Council. The role and behaviour of the Russian Federation are also worth mentioning in this context.

President of the People’s Republic of China, Hu Jintao, has described the BRICS countries as defenders and promoters of developing countries and a force for world peace (Business Day 2012). However, some analysts have highlighted potential divisions and weaknesses in the grouping, such as India and China’s disagreements over Tibetan and border issues (Asia Times 2012), the failure of the BRICS to establish a World Bank-analogue development agency, and disputes between the members over UN Security Council reform (International Monetary Fund, April 2012 data, 21 April 2012).

Theoretical Underpinnings

It is worthwhile exploring the International Relations (IR) theories in explaining the working and governance for the cooperation among the BRIC countries. IR theories can address the questions of ‘who governs’, ‘how governance occurs’ and with what effects, at different points in time. The four major theories of the IR are striking in this respect, which include liberalism, realism, constructivism and Marxism. The variants of these theories are crucial to understand the explanations of global changes that impinge on the working of the BRICS. Moreover, along with the explanations how the patterns of global governance have changed in the past and may be changing in the present and might change in the future pertaining to the BRICS countries focus on the post–Cold war time.

As far as the liberal theories are concerned, it holds that human nature is basically good and that people can improve the moral and material conditions of their existence. For liberals, individual human beings are primary international actors. States are the most important collective actors, but they are pluralistic, not unitary, actors. That is, moral and ethical principles, elections (in the case of democratic states), power relations and bargaining among domestic and transnational groups, and changing international conditions shape states’ interests and policies.

There is no single definition of states’ national interests, rather states vary in their goals and their interests change. Accordingly, as per liberal traditions, the dynamics of non-state actors and transnational and trans-governmental groups as well are well taken. Since the end of Cold War, these dynamics are the order of the international system and subsequently, the interests of the BRICS countries should be attuned to the circumstances.

Liberals believe that cooperation is possible and will grow over time for two reasons (see Karns and Mingst 2010): First, they view the international system as a context within which multiple interactions occur and where various actors ‘learn’ from their interactions, rather than a structure of relationships based on the distribution of power among states and affixed concept of state sovereignty.

Hedley Bull (1977) has pointed out the idea that the system is a society when actors adhere to common norms, consent to common rules and institutions, and recognise common interests (for a detailed analysis, see Bull 1977).^{Power matters, but it is exercised within this framework of rules and institutions, which also makes international cooperation possible. Second, liberals expect mutual interests to increase with greater interdependence, knowledge, communication and the spread of democratic values. This will promote greater cooperation and thereby peace, welfare and justice.}

Liberals are generally supportive of both International Organisations and International Law. In the latter case, while admitting that law in the international system is different than in a hierarchical domestic system, liberals see law as one of the major instruments for framing and maintaining order in the international system. Given the major international economic dislocations resulting from rising oil prices, the collapse of Bretton Woods arrangements for international monetary relations, increasing Third World debt, and the decline in the United States economic power relative to Europe and Japan, why did the post–World War II institutions for economic cooperation (such as the International Monetary Fund and General Agreements on Tariff and Trade) not collapse? Keohane’s influential book, After Hegemony (Keohane 1984), answered this question by emphasising the cooperation of states achieved through international institutions and the effects of institutions and practices of state behaviour.

Neoliberals tend to be optimists and see cooperation as generally positive; they recognise that not all efforts to cooperate will yield good results. Cooperation can and the few at the expense of the many accentuate or mitigate injustice. Some neoliberals have been more willing to address issues of power, participating in answering the question of how cooperation emerges initially.

Liberalism and neoliberalism provide additional dimensions for explaining international cooperative behaviour. These include functionalism, regime theory and collective goods theory.

Functionalists assert that international economic and social cooperation is a prerequisite for political cooperation and eliminating war, whose causes (in their view) lie in ignorance, poverty, hunger and disease. As articulated by David Mitrany (1946) in A Working Peace System, the task of functionalism is ‘how to keep the nations peacefully apart but how to bring them actively together’. He foresaw, ‘a spreading web of international activities and agencies, in which and through which the interests and life of all nations would be gradually integrated’ (Mitrany 1946). The form that specific functional organisations take is determined by the problem to be solved and shapes an organisation mandate as well as the scope of its membership. In short, form follows function.

Functionalism fails to address a number of key questions and problem areas. If the ultimate goal is elimination of war and war is not caused just by economic deprivation, illiteracy, hunger and diseases, then how can the other causes of war be alleviated? Another basic flaw is the assumption that political and non-political issues can easily be distinguished. A further problem is the assumption that habits of economic and social cooperation will transfer to political areas.

In the European integration process, functionalists underestimated the strength of state sovereignty and national loyalties. It has proven a useful theoretical approach for understanding the development of a key piece of global governance. Functionalism is based solely in the liberal tradition, and regime theory has shaped not only by liberalism and especially neoliberalism, but also realism and neo-realism. Some regime theorists focus on the role of power relations among states in shaping regimes, particularly the role of a hegemonic state such as the USA (or Great Britain in the nineteenth century).

Explaining how regimes are created and maintained, and how, why and when they change, are key tasks for regime theorists. Regime theorists have also used constructivist approaches to focus on social relations and the ways in which strong patterns of interaction often found in an international regime actually affect state interests. Regime theory has shown international organisations and governance by establishing more than just organisational structures. Public goods theory suggests that those confronted with a collective action problem could seek to restructure actors’ preferences through rewards and punishments. This theory focuses on facilitating cooperation and managing public goods. They believe that the United Nations has helped to check power politics create some degree of shared interests in place of national interests, provide a forum for international cooperation and promote human progress. Collective or public goods may be tangible or intangible. In the global context, they include the natural commons such as the high seas, atmosphere, ozone shield and Polar Regions. They also include what Kaul (2000, 300) call ‘human-made global commons such as universal norms and principles, knowledge, and the internet, as well as “global conditions” ranging from peace, health, and financial stability to free trade, environmental sustainability and freedom from poverty’ (Kaul 2000).

A product of a long philosophical and historical tradition, realism in its various forms is based on the assumption that individuals are generally power seeking and act in a rational way to protect their own interests. Within the international system, realists see states as the primary actors; entities that act in a unitary way in pursuit of their national interest, generally defined in terms of maximising power and security.

To most realists, in the absence of international authority, there are few rules and norms that restrain states. Hans J. Morgenthau, proponent of realism, included international morality, international law and international government in his path-breaking book Politics among Nations (1978). In it, he elaborates that ‘...the main function of these normative systems has been to keep aspirations for power within socially tolerable bounds…morality; mores and law intervene in order to protect society against disruption and the individual against enslavement and extinction’.

Contemporary realists like John Mearsheimer (1994–1995) have argued: ‘The most powerful states in the system create and shape institutions so that they can maintain their share of world power, or even increase it’ (Mearsheimer 1994/1995). Realists do not acknowledge the importance on strength of non-state actors such as Non-governmental Organisations (NGOs) and Multi-national Companies (MNCs) in international politics and governance, nor do they accept the idea of International Governmental Organisations (IGOs) and independent actors.

To most realists, deterrence and balance of power have proven more effective in maintaining peace than international institutions. When it comes to structural realism or neo-realism, the core difference between traditional realists and neo-realists lies in the emphasis placed on the structure of the international system for explaining world politics. The system’s structure is determined by ordering principle, namely, the absence of overarching authority (anarchy), and the distribution of capabilities (power) among states. What matters are states’ material capabilities; state identities and interests are largely given and fixed. Anarchy poses severe constraints on state behaviour.

The power distribution shapes state behaviour and provides order in international politics, either through the formation of balances of power or through a hierarchy of relations between states with unequal power which underscores that order is a product less of state actions, much less international institutions, than of system structure (see Waltz 1979). Realism fails to address most of the issues posed by contemporary challenges.

A relatively new approach to international relations, constructivism as an approach has become important for studying key pieces of global governance, particularly the role of norms. There are many variants of constructivism. In some way, all constructionists suggest that the behaviours of individuals, states and other actors are shaped by shared beliefs, socially constructed rules and cultural practices. The approach has strong roots in sociology. While some constructivists place themselves within the liberal tradition, others draw from realism. At the core of constructionist approaches is a concern with identity and interests and how these can change; a belief that ideas, values, norms and shared beliefs matter; how individuals talk about the world shapes practices; that humans are capable of changing the world by changing ideas; hence a determination to show how identities and interests of actors are ‘socially constructed’, that is, influenced by culture, norms, ideas and domestic and international interactions. Thus, Germany after World War II defined its identity in relation to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and European institutions, while Russia had to redefine its identity after the demise of the Soviet Union. As Peter J. Katzenstein (1996) points it, ‘state interests and strategies are shaped by a never ending political process that generates publicly understood standards for actions’.

Structural forces have only a minor influence. Alexander Wendt (1994, 386) has suggested that the state’s ability to cooperate depends in part on whether their identities generate self-interests or collective interests, noting that ‘the state itself is a testimony to the role of collective identity in human affairs’.

He also argues that political structure in anarchy or otherwise tells us little about state behaviour. Constructivists place a great deal of importance on institutions as embodied in norms, practices and formal organisations. The most important institution in international society is sovereignty since it determines the identity of states.

Constructivists criticise those who see sovereignty as unchanging and point to various transformations in understanding of sovereignty since Westphalia, influenced by both states, and non-state actors (Reus-Smit 1999–2000). To illustrate how sovereignty determines the identity of states, one needs to only consider how so-called failed states, such as Somalia, retain their statehood and continue to hold their memberships in IGOs. Among the key norms affecting state behaviour is multilateralism (Ruggie 1993).

He examines how the shared expectations surrounding this norm affect the behaviour of states. Several studies have examined the impact of norms and principle beliefs on international outcomes, including the evolution of the international human rights regime (Risse et al. 1999).

The end of apartheid in South Africa (Klotz 1995), the spread of weapons taboos (Price and Tannenwald 1996) and humanitarian intervention (Finnemore 1996), state leaders, global businessmen, non-governmental activists, even the occasional international relations scholar, as Craig Murphy (2000, 797) points out, ‘influence each other’s understanding of their own interests’ and of the moral and social world in which they live’. Although most constructivists have focused on the global outcomes such as decolonisation, human rights norms and poverty alleviation, international organisations may also be dysfunctional, more productive of conflict than cooperation and contrary to the interests of their constituents (Bamett and Finnemore 1999).

Two further aspects of the constructivist approach that have been important for understanding pieces of global governance concern the development of collective identities and the role of epistemic communities in transmitting ideas and beliefs. Functionalists had earlier raised the possibilities of creating new collective identities ‘beyond the nation-state’. For example, members of the Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN) have evolved a form of collective identity known as the ‘ASEAN way’. The question for further investigation is the extent to which such an identity is shared and shapes states’ behaviour. Research has shown how transnational networks of experts can shape understandings of environmental and other issues and as a result influence actors’ decisions and behaviour (Haas 1992).

Critical theories challenge conventional wisdom and provide alternative frameworks for understanding the world. Most prominent among critical theories are Marxist and neo-Marxist theories. Their derivations include dependency and world system theories as well as feminist theories and postmodernism. These theories challenge realism’s focus on the primacy of power and the existing order and liberalism’s optimism about the benefits for expanding markets for peace and stability. Here, the roles of the social forces are central in Marxian analysis.

The Marxist perspective is still important for describing the hierarchy in the international system and the role of economics in determining that hierarchy. Basically China is a socialist state. It is reiterated in their Constitution. At the same time, since 1978 China follows market economy without compromising on the ideal of socialism at least in theory.

Marxian ideas still influence the thinking of many in the developing world whose colonial past, present weakness, and experience with capitalism is one of poverty and economic disadvantage. Marxist and neo-Marxist perspectives help to understand international relations and global governance through the frameworks they provide for linking politics, economics, social forces and structures of order.

The set of core ideas unites variants of Marxist and they include grounding in historical analysis, the primacy of economic forces in explaining political and social phenomena, the central role of the production process, the particular character of capitalism as a global mode of production and the importance of social or economic class in defining actors. The evolution of the production process also is a basis for explaining how new patterns of social relations develop between those who control production and those who execute the tasks of production, therefore explaining the relationship between production, social relations and power. According to Karl Marx, a clash would inevitably occur between the capitalist class (bourgeoisie) and workers (the proletariat). Robert Cox (1986, 220) notes: ‘changes in the organ of production generate new social forces which, in turn, bring about changes in the structure of states and…alter the problematic of world order’ (also, see Gill 1994).

The Marxist view on the structure of the global system is rooted in (the above set of ideas) the relationships of class, the capitalist mode of production and power. The hierarchical structure is a by-product of the spread of global capitalism that privileges some states, organisations, groups and individuals and imposes significant constraints on others. Thus, developed countries have expanded economically (and in an earlier era politically, through imperialism) enabling them to sell goods and export surplus wealth that they could not absorb at home. Simultaneously, developing countries have become increasingly constrained and dependent on the actions of the developed.

Variants on Marxist theories emphasise the techniques of domination and suppression that arise from the uneven economic development inherent in the capitalist system. An Italian Marxist Antonio Gramsci (1891–1937) has had considerable influence on critical theorists and neoliberal institutionalists, with his particular interpretation of hegemony as a relationship of consent to political and ideological leadership, not domination by force.

Marxists and neo-Marxists view international law and international organisations as products of dominant group of states’ domestic ideas, and the interest of the capitalist class. Some view them as instruments of capitalist domination imposed on others. Cox (1986) and Gill (1994) have emphasised the importance of ‘globalzing elites’ in the restructuring of the global political economy and hence in global governance. These elite are found in the key financial institutions (International Monetary Fund [IMF], World Bank, World Trade Organization [WTO]), in the finance ministries of the Group-Seven (G-7) countries, in the headquarters of MNCs, in Private International Relations Councils (for example, The Council of Foreign Relations and the Trilateral Commission) and major business schools (Harvard, Wharton, Stanford and others).

To a classical Marxist, dialectal process, transnational social forces backing neoliberalism are increasingly challenged by those resisting globalisation, as well as by environmental, feminist and other social movements that in Murphy’s (2000) view constitute a new locus for class analysis and potential source of future change.

During the 1950s dependency theory has captured the imagination as well. Thinkers like Raul Prebisch, Enzo Faleto, Fernando Henrique Cardoso and Andre Gunder Frank sought to answer the questions why development was benefiting the rich Northern countries, rather than the poorer South, and why that gap was widening? They hypothesised that the basic terms of trade were unequal between the developing and developed world, partially as a consequence of the history of colonialism and neocolonialism and partly because MNCs and other forces based in developed countries hamstring dependent states.

The WTO perpetuates adverse terms of trade for developing courtiers in the periphery, to the benefit of core states. MNCs are instruments of capitalist exploitation and a mechanism of domination that perpetuates underdevelopment.

Critical theories have resurfaced in the debates over globalisation, particularly among opponents of globalisation, including those opposing corporate control over the economy and those trying to rewrite the rules of global economy to strengthen protection for workers, small farmers, poor people and women (Broad 2002).

Worsening economic and social conditions in Latin America and Africa and the widening gap between rich and poor have also fuelled renewed interest in the perspectives critical theories offer.

As of 2012, the five BRICS countries represent almost 3 billion people, with a combined nominal GDP of US$13.7 trillion (IMF, April 2012 data, 21 April 2012), and an estimated US$4 trillion in combined foreign reserves (Christian Science Monitor 2011).

Early efforts to analyse the political underpinnings of regionalism were heavily influenced by ‘neo-functionalism’. ² Joseph S. Nye pointed out that ‘what these studies had in common was a focus on the ways in which increased transactions and contacts changed attitudes and transnational coalition opportunities, and the ways in which institutions helped to foster such interaction’ (see Mansfield and Milner 2005). Of late, elements of neo-functionalism have been revived. The problem was that it was highly focused on the European integration. The European situation is entirely different in terms of integration. In the changed global context, it would be so unbecoming to compare the BRICS with the EU. As regards regionalism, it seems to have occurred in two waves during the post–World War II era. The first took place from the late 1950s through the 1970s and was marked by the establishment of the European Economic Community (EEC), European Free Trade Association (EFTA), the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (CMEA) in Europe, and a plethora of regional trade blocs formed developing countries. These arrangements were initiated against the backdrop of the Cold War, the rash of decolonisation following World War II, and a multilateral commercial framework, all of which coloured their economic and political effects. Various Least Developed Countries (LDCs) formed preferential arrangements to reduce their economic and political dependence on advanced industrial countries. Designed to discourage imports and encourage the development of indigenous industries, such arrangements fostered at least some trade diversion (for a detailed analysis, see Pomfret 1988). The CMEA had represented an attempt by the Soviet Union to promote economic integration among its political allies, foster the development of local industries, and limit economic dependence on the West. Here, the European context is altogether different—the regional arrangements concluded among developed countries—especially those in Western Europe are widely viewed as trade creating institutions that also contributed to political cooperation. ³

As mentioned earlier, functionalism cannot overlook most of the regional issues and it has its own inherent flaws as well. Whether it is strategic significance, future strategy and long-term interests, the role of China matters in the BRICS. Pertaining to the Human Rights, non-traditional security issues, democracy, China’s stand is not very much clear. Market economy and non-state actors are not sidelined in the era of globalisation in addressing ideological issues in China. China’s regional disparities, domestic problems should be taken into consideration as well.

Global Economic Situation

Jim O’Neill, chairman of Goldman Sachs Asset Management, coined the term ‘BRIC’. Now he is questioning whether Brazil, Russia, India and China can still be defined as emerging markets.

‘I don’t think of the BRIC as emerging markets. It is an insult and inopportune. And in any case, they are different markets’, O’Neill told China Daily in an exclusive interview. He said: ‘The BRIC economies are increasingly the major story for the world economy, they have lifted the world economy’s growth trend from 3.7 percent to 4.5 percent in my view’ (Chunyan 2011). O’Neill said that he preferred to use the old acronym BRIC even though South Africa has joined the group and it is now known as BRICS (Chunyan 2011).

At around $350 billion, South Africa’s economy is small relative to those of the four original BRIC members. Even the economies of India and Russia, the smallest of the original BRIC grouping, are five times bigger than South Africa. ‘I guess South African involvement may have something to do with Africa as a continent, but I doubt other big countries such as Nigeria see them as their representative’, he added.

Large corporations and wealthy businesspeople were minimally affected by the recession (broadly referred to as ‘a period of reduced economic activity’) in 2012. The 2008–2012 recessions have affected the world economy. In the US, for example, persistent high unemployment remains, along with low consumer confidence, a continuing decline in home values and increase in foreclosures and personal bankruptcies, an escalating federal debt crisis, inflation, and rising petroleum and food prices.

The 2007–2012 global financial crises, also known as the Global Financial Crisis (GFC), late-2000s financial crisis or the second ‘Great Recession’, is considered by many economists to be the worst financial crisis since the Great Depression of the 1930s. ⁴ It resulted in the collapse of large financial institutions, the bailout of banks by national governments and downturns in stock markets around the world. In many areas, the housing market also suffered, resulting in numerous evictions, foreclosures and prolonged unemployment. It contributed to the failure of key businesses, declines in consumer wealth estimated in trillions of US dollars, and a significant decline in economic activity, leading to a severe global economic recession in 2008. ⁵

After both the Asian financial crisis of 1997–1998 and the dot.com crisis of 2000 in particular, criticisms were voiced about the failure of the global economic governance system to provide adequate warnings by highlighting, in advance, key instabilities and crisis tendencies. In Asian crisis, the intervention by the IMF made the crisis more severe, not less severe. The USA and other developed countries benefit from reduction of trade barriers because it gives them access to large markets for their goods and they keep the price of raw materials and other imported goods low. The developing and underdeveloped countries are disadvantaged by being forced to serve the needs of the world economy. This would definitely lock them in producing food and raw materials which will ultimately lead to a situation of prevention from making further progress.

The main goals of the BRICS meetings are to counterbalance the US hegemony. And the BRICS should be portrayed as the guardian of the interests of the developing countries. The capacity of the BRICS to act as a single entity is severely restricted by political, ideological and economic differences amongst its members.

Reforming Financial Institutions

Reforming the Bretton Woods institutions are the need of the hour. The best-known international Financial Institutions (IFIs) were established after World War II to assist in the reconstruction of Europe and provide mechanisms for international cooperation in managing the global financial system (Bretton Woods system). They include the World Bank, the IMF, and the International Finance Corporation. And these institutions’ engagements within the developing and underdeveloped countries are not praiseworthy and non-efficacious to a larger extent.

The Geneva-based non-United Nations agency, the WTO, is the successor of the General Agreements and Tariffs and Trade (GATT). The WTO is also sidelining the interests and concerns of the developing and underdeveloped countries. In this respect, the BRICS countries can form a coalition and set an agenda in engaging with the one of the most powerful economic institutions in the world. Since China, India and Brazil share a large amount of agricultural services, it is extremely important to have a collective bargaining in the WTO by these countries.

In the Delhi Declaration, a more representative international financial architecture is called for, with an increase in the voice and representation of developing countries and the establishment and improvement of a just international monetary system that can serve the interests of all countries and support the development of emerging and developing economies. Moreover, these economies having experienced broad-based growth are now significant contributors to global recovery. This is true. The engagement of China worldwide is noteworthy in this respect.

Russia’s accession to the WTO is a welcome step which makes the WTO more representative and strengthens the rule-based multilateral trading system. The BRICS countries commit to working together to safeguard this system and urge other countries to resist all forms of trade protectionism and disguised restrictions on trade.

The Delhi Declaration has also reiterated that the Heads of IMF and World Bank be selected through an open and merit-based process. Furthermore, the new World Bank leadership must commit to transform the Bank into a multilateral institution that truly reflects the vision of all its members, including the governance structure that reflects current economic and political reality. Moreover, the nature of the Bank must shift from an institution that essentially mediates North–South cooperation to an institution that promotes equal partnership with all countries as a way to deal with development issues and to overcome an outdated donor–recipient dichotomy.

China, being the largest country entirely in Asia and the most populous country in the world, shares the largest unitary state in the world. Since the introduction of market-based economic reforms in 1978, China has become the world’s fastest-growing major economy (The Economist 2012). As of 2012, it is the world’s second-largest economy, after the United States, by both nominal GDP and purchasing power parity (PPP; Altucher 2010),^{and is also the world’s largest exporter and second-largest importer of goods. On per capita terms, China ranked 90th by nominal GDP and 91st by GDP (PPP) in 2011, according to the IMF. China is a recognised nuclear weapons state and has the world’s largest standing army, with the second-largest defence budget. In 2003, China became the third nation in the world, after the former Soviet Union and the United States, to independently launch a successful manned space mission. 6}

Russia is the largest country in the world covering more than one-eighth of the Earth’s inhabited land area. Russia is also the eighth most populous nation with 143 million people. It extends across the whole of northern Asia and 40 per cent of Europe, spanning nine time zones and incorporating a wide range of environments and landforms. Russia has the world’s largest reserves of mineral and energy resources (UNESCO 2010) and is the largest oil and natural gas producer globally (International Energy Agency—Oil Market Report, 18 January 2012; accessed on 20 February 2012.). Russia has the world’s largest forest reserves and its lakes contain approximately one-quarter of the world’s fresh water (Library of Congress 2007).

Russia has the world’s ninth-largest economy by nominal GDP or the sixth largest by purchasing power parity, with the third-largest nominal military budget. It is one of the five recognised nuclear weapons states and possesses the largest stockpile of weapons of mass destruction (Federation of American Scientists 2007). Russia is a great power and a permanent member of the United Nations Security Council, a member of the G8, G20, the Council of Europe, the Asia–Pacific Economic Cooperation, the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, the Eurasian Economic Community, the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), the WTO, and is the leading member of the Commonwealth of Independent States.

India, the largest country in South Asia and one of the largest democracies in the world, opened its economy to the world two decades ago. It is the seventh-largest country by geographical area, the second-most populous country with over 1.2 billion people. Bounded by the Indian Ocean on the south, the Arabian Sea on the south-west, and the Bay of Bengal on the south-east, it shares land borders with Pakistan to the west; China, Nepal and Bhutan to the north-east; and Burma and Bangladesh to the east. ⁷ One of the ancient civilisations of the world, India boasts a sheer size of continental diversity and climate and is abundant with natural resources and few ecological hotspots among the world. The Indian economy is the world’s eleventh-largest by nominal GDP and third-largest by purchasing power parity (PPP). Following market-based economic reforms in 1991, India became one of the fastest-growing major economies; it is considered a newly industrialised country. Brazil is the largest country in South America. It is the world’s fifth largest country, both by geographical area and by population with over 192 million people (Source: ‘Demographics’, Brazilian Government, 2011).

It is the only Portuguese-speaking country in the Americas and the largest lusophone country in the world. A Lusophone (or lusophone) is someone who speaks the Portuguese language, either as a native, as an additional language, or as a learner. As an adjective, it means ‘Portuguese-speaking’. It extends to people who are culturally and linguistically linked to Portugal, either historically or by choice. The term does not have an ethnic connotation, in that a Lusophone may not have any Portuguese ancestry at all. The Lusophone world is mainly a legacy of the Portuguese empire, although Portuguese diasporic communities have also played a role in spreading the Portuguese language and Portuguese culture.

The Brazilian economy is the world’s sixth-largest by nominal GDP and the seventh-largest by purchasing power parity (as of 2011, see, World Development Indicators database, World Bank, 7 October 2009). Brazil is also one of the 17 Mega diverse countries, home to diverse wildlife, natural environments and extensive natural resources in a variety of protected habitats.

South Africa is multi-ethnic and has diverse cultures and languages. Eleven official languages are recognised in the constitution. Today South Africa enjoys a relatively stable mixed economy that draws on its fertile agricultural lands, abundant mineral resources, tourist attractions and highly evolved intellectual capital. Greater political equality and economic stability, however, do not necessarily mean social tranquillity. South African society at the start of the twenty-first century continued to face steep challenges: high crime rates, ethnic tensions, great disparities in housing and educational opportunities, and the AIDS pandemic. It has the largest economy in Africa, and the 28th-largest in the world (data refers to the year 2010, World Development Indicators database, World Bank, accessed on 30 September 2011).

Brazil and India are democracies, while China and Russia are authoritarian and practice a form of state capitalism. While Brazil and Russia are commodity exporters, specialising, respectively, in agriculture and natural resources. As regards India, which specialises in services, and China that focuses on manufacturing, both are commodity importers.

Delhi Declaration

The stated goals of the 2012 Delhi summit include: Global Stability, Security and Prosperity. BRICs will have to move further in reinforcing and deepening economic ties. For the member countries having an unequal relationship with China does not matter in the era of economic interdependence and impact of technology. In respect to the Syria and Iran matters, the BRICS nations have taken a well-thought and principled stand which will impinge the security policies and doctrines within the BRICS countries. President Dilma Roussef of Brazil during Delhi summit stated that BRICS was one of the ‘most important engines of the world economy’, pointing out that countries of the grouping would be accounting for 56 per cent of the economic growth forecast by the IMF for 2012.

In his opening speech, Manmohan Singh advocated speedy reforms in global international financial and political institutions and urged the BRICS grouping to work together to overcome the challenges posed by the global economic downturn. During the Delhi summit, an initiative was taken to set up a BRICS Development Bank as the future step. The BRICS countries have agreed to strengthen intra-BRICS trade and investment linkages. India is committed to advance the cooperation intended to explore meaningful partnerships for common development, address global challenges together and contribute to furthering world peace, stability and security.

Non-traditional Security Challenges and Implications of Globalisation

Environment and energy security capture imagination of this century in the era of regional international relations. Most of the countries in the BRICS are large consumers of energy which share the historic responsibility in saving the planet Earth.

South Asia is facing a severe HIV epidemic in magnitude and scope, with an estimated 5.5 million to 6 million people infected. ⁸ At least 60 per cent of HIV-positive people in Asia live in India alone. The epidemic is not homogenous and requires well informed, prioritised and effective responses. This report attempts to provide the basis for rigorous, evidence-informed HIV policy and programming and to increase understanding of the diversity of the epidemic between and within the countries of the South Asia Region. The responsibilities of the BRICS countries are extremely pressing in this area in the years to come. A diverse range of structural factors amplify HIV vulnerability (Moses et al. 2006) and risk in the region, including widespread poverty and socio-economic inequality, illiteracy, low social status of women, trafficking of women into commercial sex and a large sex work industry. The region’s borders are porous, permitting widespread rural–urban, interstate and international migration. High rates of sexually transmitted infections and limited condom use prevail, and social stigma is an important impediment to delivering effective programmes.

The pace of globalisation is accelerating over time. The end of Cold War, the collapse of the Soviet Union, the September 11 terrorist attacks on the USA and the global financial crisis of 2007–2009 have changed the contours of the global politics, sometimes radically. The balance between continuity and change in the areas’ key aspects of world politics is relevant to the dynamics of globalisation concerned in the BRICS countries. These are as follows: power, security and justice (for a detailed analysis, see Heywood 2011, 17–21). All forms of politics are about power. The end of the Cold War has precipitated a major debate about power. However, the alternative views about the shifting configuration of global power suggest that it is becoming more fragmented and pluralised. One of the most abiding and the deepest issue, that is, security reveals that each state must have the capacity for self-defence. The problem is that ‘security’ is primarily understood in terms of ‘national’ security. The state-centric ideas of national security and an inescapable security dilemma have also been challenged. The ‘security regimes’ or ‘security communities’ have developed to manage disputes and help to avoid war, a trend often associated with growing economic interdependence (linked to globalisation) and advance of democratisation. As regards justice, a perception that strongly prevails is that it has become an irrelevant issue in international politics. But the growth of interconnectedness and interdependence has extended thinking about morality in world affairs and politics. The idea of global justice is rooted in a belief in universal moral values, values that apply to all people in the world regardless of nationality and citizenship. Similarly, ideas have been developed about global environmental justice. The commitment and preservation of environment has been the pressing need before the international community.

Transnational social movements called ‘new’ social movements, developed during the 1960s and 1970s against the backdrop of growing student radicalism, anti-Vietnam war protest and the rise of ‘counter-cultural’ attitudes and sensibilities (Heywood 2011, 152). Key examples included the women’s movement, the environmental or green movement and the peace movement. These movements attracted the young, the better-educated and the relatively affluent, and typically embraced a ‘post materialist’ ethic (which explains the nature of political concerns and attitudes in terms of levels of economic development). The democratic credentials of NGOs and social movements are entirely bogus in most of the cases. For instance, how can NGOs be in the forefront of democratisation when they are entirely non-elected and self-appointed bodies? Large memberships, committed activists and the ability to mobilise popular protests and demonstrations give social movements and NGOs political influence, but it does not give them democratic authority.

The increased attention devoted to civil society within international relations has followed its importance in other areas of politics. As with market liberalism has followed ideological fashion, with support coming from both the political right (anxious to scale back the role of the state) and the left (keen to stress the potential for solidarity and emancipation inherent in civil society and social movements; Hurrell 2007, 99). It is very closely tied to arguments about globalisation and the degree to which globalisation has created conditions for the development of global or transnational civil society as an increasingly important arena for political action. Still, there is difference of opinion that prevails among scholars and academicians about whether the globalisation has facilitated the diffusion of values, knowledge and ideas, and enhanced the ability of like-mined groups to organise across national boundaries.

The rapid growth of economic regionalism, regional economic institutions, free trade areas, customs unions should foster economic openness and bolster the multilateral system. The problem is that most of the economic studies give little emphasis on the political conditions which shape regionalism. Of late, many scholars acknowledged the drawbacks of such approaches and contributed immensely to a burgeoning literature which showed how political factors guide the formation of regional institutions and their economic effects. ⁹ Other studies focus on international politics, emphasising how power relations and multilateral institutions affect the formation of regional institutions, the particular states composing them, and their welfare implications. The contemporary spread of regional trade arrangements is not without historical precedent (see Mansfield and Milner 2005). Underlying many debates about regionalism is whether the current wave will have a benign cast, like the wave that arose during the nineteenth century, or a malign cast, like the one that emerged during the interwar period.

Certain NGOs and social movements distort national and global political agendas through their fixation on gaining media attention, both as the principal means of exerting pressure and in order to attract support and funding. This makes them exaggerated claims in order to ‘hype’ political issues, and to indulge in knee-jerk protest politics, aided and abetted by a mass media in an age of 24/7 news. The question is that how far can an organisation like BRICS take the confidence of the civil society which is a key element while taking into consideration the situation in the Asian context. It remains to be seen in the days to come.

Strategic Significance

To strengthen security architecture in Asia, nuclear and energy dimensions are key questions in strengthening regionalism. In this respect, the growing pressure to acquire nuclear weapons is one of the concerns of South Asian states. The BRICS countries will have to discourage Western powers from intervening in Iran, Syria and North Korea. Iran has legitimate power to produce nuclear energy for peaceful purposes. The regional tensions should be tackled within domestic mechanisms. Among the BRICS countries, China, Russia and India are acknowledged nuclear weapons countries.

Governance is often defined in terms of horizontal interaction. From one side, this pushes outwards from the state and towards the variety of ways in which states interact with a wide range of social actors—through policy networks, public–private partnerships and policy communities. From the other side, it pushes upwards from society and towards self-organisation and decentralised coordination through civil society groups (NGOs, social movements, non-profit and voluntary organisations) and through market-based allocation and various forms of economic governance that do not involve formal state-based rules. ¹⁰ Such ideas are structurally modern in that they place a heavy emphasis on the impact of new technologies, especially the degree to which revolutionary developments in transport, travel, communication, and the processing and transmission of information have both enabled and empowered new forms of transnational political organisation. Such ideas are modern and they reflect the power of global liberalism and the impact of liberal globalisation over the last few decades of the twentieth century. And there is the declining consensus on the value and viability of statist economic policies. The expansion of inter-state governance in terms of the numbers of institutions, the volume of global rule-making, and the increased complexity of the rule-making process which culminate or develop and deepen that makes their character harder to classify. But what goes in and around those bodies becomes increasingly hard to understand in terms of states, inter-state bargaining, the formal delegation of authority, and state-based and consent-based conceptions of international law.

While engaging with the deepening of interstate governance, another problem crops up in the form of vast increase in trans-governmental regulation and administration. For instance, within the European Union (EU), the European Council (made up of heads of government) and the Council of Ministers enact regular decisions but delegate detailed rule-making to committees made up of technical experts from member-states. In addition, a complex structure of advisory, regulatory and management committees (‘comitology’) has grown up, linking the Commission with national administrations. ¹¹

Governance in the twenty-first century has assumed a genuinely post-sovereign character. It is difficult to see how economic sovereignty (the absolute authority which the state exercises over economic life conducted within its borders, involving independent control of fiscal and monetary policies, and over trade and capital flows) can be reconciled with a globalised economy. As Susan Strange put it, ‘where states were once masters of markets, now it is the markets which, on many issues, are the masters over the governments of states’ (see Strange 1996). However, the rhetoric of a ‘borderless’ global economy can be taken too far. There is evidence to suggest that while globalisation may have changed the strategies that states adopt to ensure economic success, it has by no means rendered the state redundant as an economic actor. Finally, the power and significance of the state have undoubtedly been affected by the process of political globalisation (which refers to the growing importance of international organisations that are transnational in that they exert influence not within a single state, but within an international area comprising several states). And its impact has been complex and contradictory. Bodies such as the United Nations, the EU and the WTO have undermined the capacity of states to operate as self-governing units. Organisations like the BRICS can engage in regional as well as global affairs in contemporary times more meaningfully when world becomes closer.

Future Prospects

As pointed earlier, BRICS is a political organisation. Therefore, it has responsibility in reforming the United Nations, ensuring peace and international security. The relevance of diplomacy, negotiation and dialogue process are of paramount importance for ironing out key differences and in the working of the BRICS countries (Table 1).

OPEN IN VIEWER

Table 1.

BRICS Scenario

Member States	2011 GDP per capita (nominal PPP) $ USD*	2011 HDI**
China	5,413	8,382	0.687
South Africa	8,066	10,973	0.619
India	1,388	3,693	0.547
Brazil	12,788	11,769	0.718
Russia	12,933	16,736	0.755

Sources: *IMF data, April 2012.

**Human Development Report 2011—Human development statistical annex. HDRO (Human Development Report Office, United Nations Development Programme, pp. 127–130. Accessed on 2 November 2011).

The United Nations Charter attaches greater significance to regional organisations. It envisages the regional organisations as adjuncts to the United Nations. The Charter also authorises the United Nations to exercise control over the regional organisation. In this respect, Article 52 of the United Nations Charter (see the United Nations Charter, retrieved from http://www.un.org/en/documents/charter [accessed on 8 May 2012]) specifically provided that:

Nothing in the present Charter precludes the existence of regional arrangements or agencies for dealing with such matters relating to the maintenance of international peace and security as are appropriate for regional action provided that such arrangements or agencies and their activities are consistent with the Purposes and Principles of the United Nations.

The Members of the United Nations entering into such arrangements or constituting such agencies shall make every effort to achieve pacific settlement of local disputes through such regional arrangements or by such regional agencies before referring them to the Security Council.

The Security Council shall encourage the development of pacific settlement of local disputes through such regional arrangements or by such regional agencies either on the initiative of the states concerned or by reference from the Security Council.

This Article in no way impairs the application of Articles 34 and 35. ¹²

Thus, the United Nations specifically provides for the use of regional arrangements for peaceful settlement of disputes. Under the UN Charter, the regional organisations are obliged to keep the United National Security Council (UNSC) informed about their activities. Several of the regional organisations have been created not only for security purpose but also for the purpose of promoting cooperation among member states in the economic and other spheres. The former Secretary-General of the United Nations Kofi Annan noted in his July 2006 report (United Nations 2006) to the UNSC and General Assembly that cooperation between the United Nations and regional and sub-regional institutions have been accepted over time and they have been important partners in assisting the United Nations, and other international institutions, in combating threats to peace and security.

It is critical for advanced economies to adopt responsible macroeconomic and financial policies, avoid creating excessive global liquidity and undertake structural reforms to lift growth that create jobs. We draw attention to the risks of large and volatile cross-border capital flows being faced by the emerging economies. ¹³ The countries called for further international financial regulatory oversight and reform, strengthening policy coordination and financial regulation and supervision cooperation, and promoting the sound development of global financial markets and banking systems.

Realist and other state-centric commentators argue that the impact of globalisation in its economic, cultural and political forms has always been exaggerated. The states remain the decisive political actors and backbone of the system. There has been a growing recognition of the role of the state in promoting development. This is reflected in an increased emphasis on state-building ¹⁴ as a key aspect of the larger process of peace-building. One of the problems with state-building involves the imposition of an essentially Western model of political organisation unsuited to the needs of developing countries that are more accustomed to traditional tribal models of governance in which interdependent groups are united by a shared ethnic identity.

BRICS is a platform for dialogue and cooperation amongst countries that represent 43 per cent of the world’s population, for the promotion of peace, security and development in a multi-polar, inter-dependent and increasingly complex, globalising world. From Asia, Africa, Europe and Latin America, the transcontinental dimension of our interaction adds to its value and significance. ¹⁵ The Delhi Declaration called for a speedy resolution of the Palestine issue, implicitly calling on Israel not to use the ‘Arab Spring’ upheavals as a pretext for not engaging in meaningful talks with the Palestinians (Cherian 2012). The statement noted that the unresolved Palestinian issue was one of the main underlying causes for the instability in the Arab world. On Syria, the Declaration stated that the crisis should be solved through peaceful means that encourages national dialogues, which reflect the legitimate aspirations of all sections of Syrian society and respect the Syrian independence, territorial integrity and sovereignty. ‘A common position is needed on issues like Iran and Syria. The BRICS leaders should coordinate their positions at the summit’, said Alexander Kadakin, Russia’s Ambassador to India. As far as Iran is concerned, the BRICS declaration has recognised Iran’s right to peaceful uses of nuclear energy ‘consistent with its international obligations’.

A first line of criticism is that the five-member states of the BRICS have little in common. As a group formed by democracies and non-democracies hailing from four different continents, of very different size and economic performance (see Heine 2012, 12), of varying economic interests would not serve the purpose. This is the problem with Western academics and media pertaining to BRICS functioning. But there is no doubt that BRICS is going from strength to strength in deepening the economic cooperation. The argument which relates to Russia as a ‘declining power’—demographically, economically and politically—does not hold much water. Russia’s per capita income has quadrupled since the late 1990s. International politics is not reducible to similarities and differences in political economy, though intergroup trade has grown at 28 per cent a year since 200, reached $230 billion in 2010 and is planned to reach $500 billion in 2015 (ibid.).

Accelerating growth and sustainable development, along with food, and energy security, are amongst the most important challenges facing the world today, and central to addressing economic development, eradicating poverty, combating hunger and malnutrition in many developing countries. Creating jobs needed to improve people’s living standards worldwide is critical. Sustainable development is also a key element of our agenda for global recovery and investment for future growth. We owe this responsibility to our future generations. ¹⁶

New areas of cooperation to explore ¹⁷ :

Multilateral energy cooperation within BRICS framework.

A general academic evaluation and future long-term strategy for BRICS.

BRICS Youth Policy Dialogue.

Cooperation in population-related issues.

The decision to invest by BRICS nations in the United National Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) focuses on the real needs of developing countries. The UNCTAD is relatively the true representation of the developing countries. Other priorities are related to the WTO’s Doha Development Agenda and the Millennium Development Goals of the UN. The rise of Latin America and India could not be sidelined in this century. The BRICS is not a mere talk shop. The political cooperation and collective diplomacy is still alive among the BRICS countries. The United Nations Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) should be another priority area of the BRICS countries. Although the BRICS is a forum with highly unequal members, it hardly matters in achieving its goals in this era of regional international relations. The fact that China would remain as a dominant economic force reflects the common interests of the rest. The idea of the wider rise of the Global South assumes that example set by China, India, Brazil and the like can, and will, be followed by other Southern states and regions, and in particular Africa, especially sub-Saharan Africa, where much of the world’s deep poverty is concentrated, would start to match the economic progress made by Asia and Latin America.

The current wave of regionalism has arisen in a different context than earlier ones. Unlike the prior ones, the most influential state in the global system (the United States) is actively promoting the formation of Preferential Trade Areas/Arrangements (PTAs). Moreover, the current wave has occurred during the Cold War’s conclusion time. Besides that, there were accompanying changes in the international political system. So far, regional arrangements have seldom been used as instruments of power politics. Instead, it has been used to promote and consolidate domestic reforms that liberalise markets and foster democracy. And the pace of regionalism has accelerated during a period marked by substantial economic interdependence. Individual countries take initiative to mediate trade disputes. And a multilateral framework must facilitate such mediation. One cannot forget that a set of political conditions has contributed significantly to the relatively benign character of the current wave of regionalism. Further research should zero in on the current wave of regionalism which would fragment on global economy. If it happens, how regionalism get an upper hand and desirable tendencies to engage deeper. Any research on regionalism will have to be identified as the domestic and international political conditions are likely to affect the regional framework as well. Most contemporary PTAs have been established under the auspices of the World Trade Organization (WTO).