Abstract
Indian strategic thinking is a product of its historical, cultural, geopolitical, socio-economic compulsions; it sought a preservation of India’s strategic autonomy with a revisionist perspective that was structured to tackle the status quo created by the great powers. Today, given India’s technological and economic capabilities, it is demanding space in the decision-making circles of the world. India-US security dialogue began sometime in the late 1980s. It was only after September 2001 that India-US security ties gained real momentum. The new key word in India-US defence relationship is ‘inter-operability’. It signifies the mutual desire of both the countries to work more closely in the area of military cooperation and also portrays a possibility of sharing strategic doctrines and operations in the future to tackle new challenges. There are several issues that are likely to dominate the security dialogue. They include issues of terrorism associated with Pakistan and Afghanistan and American policies in that area; the question of technology transfer; nuclear non-proliferation; and the overall political discourse on non-military aspects like Human Rights and the ethnic nationalism based right to political self-determination movements that appear to elicit American attention at times.
Introduction
Two themes have dominated the thinking on India’s relations with the United States over the years. One was a Cold War era descriptive framework that explained the bilateral relationship as ‘ups and downs’ in Indo-US relations (Palmer 1954, 113–123). The second sought to encapsulate the ethos of a revisionist Indian foreign policy in the context of the global order and place the debate in a ‘subject–object relationship’ (Nayar 1969, 276–279). While the former takes a broader historical perspective and suggests periods of bilateral goodwill and tensions that have characterised the relations, the latter roots itself in the governing image that India has sought to evolve over the years. India wanted to be treated as a ‘subject’ in international relations while it had been critical of the US, as it was perceived that India was treated as an ‘object’ of international relations. The ‘governing image’ that India has sought to project was based on this concept of being a ‘subject’ of international relations. India argued that in a status quoist world order dominated by the great powers, India had no voice in the global decision-making process. It is in that closed circle that India sought to demand space. A ‘governing image’ (Whitson 1976, 327) is essentially a perception held by a nation or a group of nations to establish a pattern of stability in their mutual relationships. It seeks to present the strategic vision of the nation-state, a vision that evolves through the search for and the eventual articulation of its national identity. Independence, internal security and territorial integrity have always been overriding priorities in India’s strategic perspectives. These, along with the approach to peace, constituted the ‘governing image’ of India’s policies during the early years of Indian Independence. These policies continued to remain valid through most of the Nehru years and beyond until the shift towards South Asian regionalism in the 1970s. Even then, the key tenets of the approach continued to dominate Indian thinking, whether it was policy towards the Superpowers, nuclear issues, neighbours, etc. Today, in an age that professes transnationalism, India continues to reassert the fundamentals of peace and independent understanding of world affairs as key to its worldview.
Indian Strategic Perspectives
The following issues have dominated the discourse on Indian security policy and strategic perspectives in the post independence era:
Use of force: The issue of the legitimacy of use of force in certain circumstances as against the traditional peace approach has been a matter of debate in India. At one level, India defines the international situation in the framework of a society of states and not anarchic, therefore arguing in favour of conflict resolution as against a status quoist balance of power to achieve order in international relations. The global position rejects the power approach and seeks international governance on the basis of a structure of peace grounded in development. At another level it accepts the utility of force at the regional level where it defines the Indian role in the regional state system and presumes that ‘order’ is a product of hierarchical power structures. Thus, in a regional state system of South Asia, India would be a hegemon, Pakistan a bargainer, the smaller powers would play the role of either legitimising the hegemony of the regional power or have ‘nuisance value’ (Paranjpe and Thomas 1991, 165). This dichotomy, however, is neither duplicity nor a state of confusion, for the regional dimension seeks to incorporate principles of economic and political development through such approaches as ‘panchsheel’. That the Nehru approach accepted the necessity of national defence but sought to under-play it is perceived in his query ‘Why shout it out? Why talk about it? Why threaten the other all the time?’ (Mende 1958, 142). Revisionism versus status quo: The roots of Indian approach to security lie in its development policies, an approach that came to be defined as defence through development (and diplomacy), and thus assumes and demands a possibility of change in the existing world order that is considered status quoist. Indian foreign policy has traditionally been revisionist in nature. This can be seen in various fields: in the economic field it was articulated as a demand for a new economic order, in the political field it found expression in support to national liberation struggles and eventually in non-alignment, in the social field it was reflected in the demand for social justice and in the security field it was demonstrated in the area of a defiant nuclear and space policy that rejected the non-proliferation and technology denial regimes to develop an indigenous nuclear and space expertise. There is, however, a growing realisation about the limitations of the classic revisionist position in an age when India is emerging as a major player in world affairs. Indian strategic thinking, as in most other countries, rests on the premise of the primacy of the political. Key decisions on security, in their last sequence of finalisation, are essentially political decisions and not based on military choice. Further, Indian security thinking has long been criticised for being abstract, not concrete. There has been a distinct reluctance on the part of India to present a clear-cut strategic doctrine and articulate the same in terms of policy. This stems from her belief in the realistic utilities of a deliberate ambiguity and not from a lack of strategic culture, as George Tanham (Tanham 1992, 28–111) would have us believe.
The post-Soviet era saw two transformative events in India’s national life that had far-reaching implications for its world view: First was the economic watershed of 1991 when India embarked on the economic liberalisation and reform process that ended decades of an inward-looking economic policy. The Indian economic reform programme led to a sustained average annual growth rate of 8 per cent, ending the old ‘Hindu rate of growth’ label that had been with the country through its socialist planned economic system. From a country dependent on the Aid India Consortium and food aid from the US, India is today giving financial and technical assistance to a large number of developing countries. The Indian position in the G-20 circles would indicate that economic diplomacy has now emerged as an important tool in Indian armoury vis-à-vis both the developed and the developing world.
The second watershed event was the declaration of a nuclear power status after the tests of 1998. What began as a demonstration of technological capability with the conduct of the first Peaceful Nuclear Test in 1974 and was carried through with the Integrated Missile Development Programme after 1983 and the Indian Space Research Organization’s successes in commercial launching of satellites was eventually confirmed with the nuclear tests of 1998. Over the years the issue of nuclear and related technologies like space and electronics had come to symbolise the core of the G-7/G-8 (Group of industrialised nations) status quoist agenda. The non-proliferation regime with its multifarious dimensions like the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty (NPT), Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG), Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR), Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty (FMCT), etc., had sought to place the G-7/G-8 in a monopolistic managerial framework. The problem was compounded by the restraints placed on ‘dual use’ technologies. The key threats to national security as articulated by the technologically advanced countries of the developing world came to focus on these restraints of the G-7/G-8 regime. The May 1998 nuclear tests represent this defiant independence and a demonstration of technological and political capabilities in an age where the nuclear regime had become more stringent over the years.
It is this reassertion of the ability to take independent decisions in face of anticipated sanctions that makes the nuclear test a symbol of a resurgent India. Further, the ability to ride over a global recession threat confirms the economic stability of this country. In an age when power status has come to be defined in terms of economic and technological capabilities, the Indian argument is that it now has a stake in the management of the world order. It is now demanding space in these decision-making circles of the world.
Indian foreign and security policies in the post-Soviet order when looked at from this backdrop have come to focus on the following issue areas:
India appears to have quietly (almost) abandoned the classical form of non-alignment that put India into the bracket of the Afro-Asian developing world. Today while India may still identify itself as a Third World developing country, it considers itself a prominent actor that seeks to lead the region in the global economic and other forums. The continuing utility of revisionism is now being quietly questioned. The old ideological rhetoric of non-alignment has come to be replaced with a far more realistic approach to foreign policy that is more concerned with national interest. Whether out of compulsions of reliability or difficulties faced due to dependence, India has now sought to diversify its defence procurements. The earlier compulsions of being tied to the Soviet Union have almost ended and while the Russian regime under Putin seeks a strategic partnership, India now avoids the ‘exclusivity’ that existed in those bilateral ties. Thus, while the Indo-Russian ties continue, India has sought to build a strategic dialogue with the US. In any case, if India has to pay in international currency for its defence procurements, it would not feel the need to seek ideological rationale for defence tie-ups. Ever since the formal launching of its ‘Look East Policy’ in the Prime Minister Narasimha Rao era (Pardesi 2010, 123), India has sought to broaden its role in areas of the Asia Pacific. The desire to look beyond its regional identity of South Asia and the obsession of the West Asian region has led India to establish a far more fruitful dialogue with the US, European Union and the Asia-Pacific region including the ASEAN and also Central Asia with participation in the Shanghai Cooperation Council.
It is against this backdrop of the changing Indian strategic perspectives and policies that one needs to ask a question: Is it possible to forge a strategic partnership between India and the US? The term strategic partnership indicates a kind of an understanding that the two countries have in the politico-security area minus a formal alliance relationship. While both the partners would gain from the partnership, it would not be a supplier–recipient or a client relationship of one vis-à-vis another. It spells out one’s ‘friends’ and ‘partners’ in the world without identifying ‘enemies’ and thus ensures a more positive world view. The approach provides flexibility in the security architecture of the post–Cold War era that the earlier formal alliances had denied. It gives either party the ability to manoeuvre its national interest in the anarchic world order along the road map that it has charted for itself and if need be alter or revise it mid course.
This article seeks to look at the question of a strategic dialogue or partnership from three perspectives: The problems or impediments in forging a strategic partnership; the opportunities that both the countries have to move in that direction and the issue areas that may be a matter of concern or contention (Ganguly and Scobell 2005).
Indo-US Relations: Problems
One can identify two possible problem issues to a bilateral dialogue between India and the US: the historical baggage that both the countries carry and the systemic obstacles in terms of roles played by the two countries.
Both, India and the US have inherited the cold war mindset that is likely to influence decision-making on both sides. While the earlier US concerns about India’s pro-Soviet stance may not be valid today, concerns about nuclear proliferation and technology transfer continue to be obstacles. Indian argument for self-reliance has led it to assert the need for a technology sharing/transfer agreement along with any purchase of new equipment. The debate is mostly on the dual-use technologies whose transfer agreements are tied down by several international regimes on the matter. The prolonged debates over the Civilian Nuclear deal between the two countries signed in 2008 are an indicator of the uncertainties of political pressures in the parliamentary democracy of India. The American Executive had to persuade the Congress to accept the deal in the interest of larger American national interests. These interests would include an active cooperation with India in the American war against terrorism as well as the role that India was likely to play as a significant power that would act as a check to the growing Chinese influence in the Asia-Pacific region. On the Indian side the need was to look beyond the ideological rhetoric of a ‘socialist world order’ and take a realist perspective of the changing world order. 1 India needed the US to open the locks that had been placed through various sanction regimes after the Indian nuclear test of 1974. For it is only due to the backing of the US that the Nuclear Supplies Group and the IAEA were willing to lift the technology transfer sanctions placed against India.
At the systemic level, there exists a dramatic asymmetry between the two powers. The US is a global power with global concerns, while India still remains a regional player. Consequently, American concerns in areas like Iran, Afghanistan or Pakistan, for example, would not necessarily coincide with Indian perceptions of its own national interest. The differences over the American Af-Pak policies and the consequent American need to retain close security ties with Pakistan and the Indian concern about American military aid to Pakistan are examples of this diverse viewpoints. Of equal concern are the implications of the eventual American withdrawal from Afghanistan and the role that the regional powers are likely to play in the future stability of the country. Similarly, the American and Indian positions on Iran are likely to diverge depending on the Indian regional considerations and American global concerns. From an Indian point of view, Iran would be an important source of oil and a link to Afghanistan; hence the interest in the development of the Chabahar port region and the link between Chabahar and Afghanistan through Zaranj and Delaram, which is located on the main Kandahar–Herat highway on the Afghanistan border.
Perhaps the real question that may be raised today is whether India as an emergent power would be willing to be proactive and take on the responsibility of playing an active role in global conflict situations? Would India send troops to areas like Afghanistan or Iraq as a power that has interest in the region or would it seek the protection of the United Nations resolution for any intervention? These are questions that India has not taken any positions on.
Indo-US Relations: Opportunities
India’s ‘exclusivity’ in Indo-Soviet relations started to end with Gorbachev’s ‘New Thinking’ on Soviet foreign policy (Sestanovich 1988, 4–5). The Gorbachev initiatives—opening up a dialogue with China, withdrawal from Afghanistan and steps towards disarmament—had an impact on India’s security perspectives. India fully realised the implications of the Gorbachev initiatives. It was the beginning of the end of the mutually exclusive relationship that the two countries had evolved since the Indo-Soviet Treaty of 1971. India responded by opening up a dialogue with China, Pakistan and also the US. The disintegration of the Soviet Union in 1991 did not create an abrupt end to the flow of relations between the two countries. However, the early efforts to consolidate the bilateral relations in the post-Soviet era did not indicate continuity in security relationships that the Cold War days had seen. Russian world view under President Yelstin took a pro-West tilt, partly out of economic compulsions and partly out of a mindset that sought to reject the earlier socialist line. This world view was reflected in the Russian stance on nuclear non-proliferation, on the Missile Technology Control Regime and in India specific terms on China and Pakistan, especially Kashmir (Conley 2000, 9).
Indo-US security dialogue began sometime in the late 1980s. This was ad hoc and open ended. There was some attempt to secure US aid in manufacturing the Light Combat Aircraft and in procuring the Airborne Early Warning System. It was only in the 1990s that a serious dialogue began. The first attempt to structure approaches to defence cooperation between the two countries was made in the 1990s by reciprocal exchange of information and personnel under what became known as the Kicklighter Proposals (Kumar 1997, 783). These proposals included Army chief of staff reciprocal visits; US and Indian army participation in the Indo-US strategic symposium which would provide an informal, unofficial forum for US and Indian analysts, officials, military officers and scholars to discuss the current state and future possibilities for US-Indian security relations; setting up of an Indian-US Army Executive Steering Council to ‘review, refine, and redefine the agreed upon goals and objectives put forth in the strategic plan to ensure greater future co-equal co-operation, consultation, collaboration, and interpretability between the two armies’; and reciprocal schooling and individual training of commanders, leaders and staff officials.
In 1995, the two countries signed the Agreed Minute on Defence Cooperation (Sboto, ‘Indo-US Military Cooperation’, 1–2) covering service-to-service and civilian-to-civilian cooperation, as well as cooperation in defence production and research. Five separate groups were established to foster more interaction and facilitate discussion: Defence Policy Group (DPG), for tackling issues of defence cooperation—this group was also to tackle sensitive issues like CTBT and Kashmir; a Joint Technical Group (JTG), for discussing issues related to defence research and a Joint Steering Committee (JSC), for discussing personnel and information exchange, as well as joint exercises.
The Indian nuclear tests of 1998 broke the early momentum of the bilateral relationship. The tests were followed by a prolonged dialogue between the Indian Foreign Minister Jaswant Singh and the American Under-Secretary of State Strobe Talbott. This dialogue sought to re-establish the broken links between the two countries. It was, from an Indian perspective, an attempt to get the US to understand the Indian compulsions for going in for nuclear weapons capability. The visit by President Clinton in 2000 and the subsequent visit by Indian Prime Minister Vajpayee in the latter part of 2000 and again in 2001 during the Bush administration paved the way for a more constructive dialogue.
It was only after September 2001 that Indo-US security ties gained real momentum. Both countries came to acknowledge a desire for greater bilateral interaction on security issues. The Defence Policy Group came to be revived. The new keyword in what the American Embassy publication described as the ever expanding lexicon of India-US defence relationship was ‘inter-operability’ (Embassy of the United States of America 2005, 28). It signified the mutual desire of both the countries to work more closely in the area of military cooperation and also portrayed a possibility of sharing strategic doctrines and operations in the future to tackle new challenges.
Indo-US joint exercises have been conducted on a regular basis since 2001 (Embassy of the United States of America 2005, 38–47). The USS Cowpens represented the US during India’s first international fleet review. Indian participation in the ‘Operation Enduring Freedom’ in Afghanistan included refuelling facilities, escorting of US ships through Malacca Straits. A naval exercise ‘Malabar’, an air mobility exercise, high altitude warfare exercises in Leh, joint training exercises in counter-insurgency warfare, are only some of the joint exercises conducted by the respective sides. Peacekeeping has also been an important area where the two sides have started extensive dialogue.
Bilateral interactions continued to gather momentum through the early part of the decade of 2000. In January of 2004, the two countries agreed to expand their cooperation in three specific areas: civilian nuclear activities, civilian space programmes and high-technology trade. In addition, the two countries agreed to expand their dialogue on missile defence. These areas of cooperation were designed to progress through a series of reciprocal steps that build on each other. This was the first phase of the Next Steps in Strategic Partnership (NSSP) between US and India (Embassy of India 2008). This, according to Prime Minister Vajpayee, was a follow-up to the November 2001 visit when the two countries had committed to a strategic partnership. This first phase of NSSP led to the removal of the Headquarters of Indian Space Research Organization (ISRO) from the US Department of Commerce Entity List and removal of licensing requirements for low level dual use items exported to ISRO subordinate entities. In July 2005 the US State Department announced the successful completion of the NSSP that provided for expanded bilateral commercial satellite cooperation and removal or revision of some US export licences for certain dual use technologies (Embassy of India 2008, 1–2). The July 2005 Joint Statement along with the June 2005 US India Defence Framework Agreement constituted a forward movement on all four issues of the NSSP. This was also the first step towards a far more ambitious agreement on the Civilian Nuclear Cooperation.
The July 2005 joint statement issued by President Bush and Prime Minister Manmohan Singh at Washington, DC, represents a major policy shift in American perceptions of India. President Bush vowed to work on achieving ‘full civilian nuclear energy cooperation with India’ (Kronstadt 2008, 28). This represented a reversal of a three-decade old US non-proliferation policy that was based on the commitment to the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty (of 1968) and the Nuclear Non-proliferation Act (NNPA) of 1978 that had been structured in the wake of the Indian test of 1974. In the year that followed, India achieved the successful completion of nuclear facility separation plan that created fire walls between military and civilian facilities in India. The separation plan would require India to place its civilian facilities under international safeguards to be eligible for nuclear trade with the US. What then followed was the India specific legislation in the US Congress 2 so as to waive the provisions of the US Atomic Energy Act of 1954 and facilitate trade with India. This process was eventually completed after India secured a clearance from the IAEA and the Nuclear Suppliers Group. The finalisation of the agreement ended the nuclear ‘apartheid’ for India and it became eligible to gain access to nuclear material and technology from the suppliers. The passage of the Nuclear Liabilities Act in the Indian Parliament in August 2010 was one of the last milestones in the process of the implementation of the Indo-US nuclear deal (The Times of India, 30 August 2010).
From the American perspective, the Administration argued that the nuclear deal would bring India into the non-proliferation mainstream. It would benefit US consumers by reducing the burden on carbon-based fuels and reduce carbon emissions; it would also be a boost to American business interests. At the geopolitical level, there appeared to be an expectation that the agreement would get India to make policy choices that are more in line with US interests (Kronstadt 2008, 28–29). This presumably may focus on the growing concerns about terrorism and the expanding Chinese influence in the Asia-Pacific. These would be common concerns for both the countries and there would be a base for a further dialogue on the matter.
In India, the nuclear factor had come to dominate the political agenda in the last years of the decade of twenties. While the criticism from the Left was understandable from the ideological perspectives that has dominated all the discourse of the Left political parties, the opposition from the other major party, the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP), appeared futile. Since it was the BJP government led by Vajpayee that had initiated the strategic partnership with the US and also the agreement on the NSSP that had the component of civilian nuclear cooperation inbuilt into it, the BJP appeared more intent to score political points rather than take a substantive position.
The second term of the Manmohan Singh government saw continuity in the efforts to build a closer understanding between the two countries. The Indian Prime Minister, during his visit in November 2009 as the first State Guest of President Obama, reaffirmed the global strategic partnership between India and the US (Embassy of India 2010). Secretary Clinton and the Indian External Affairs Minister established a ‘Strategic Dialogue’ during the former’s visit to India in July 2009 (Embassy of India 2010, 2). This was to be implemented through bilateral working groups in five areas: Strategic Cooperation on non-proliferation, counter-terrorism and military; Energy and Climate Change; Education and Development on education and women’s empowerment; Economics, Trade and Agriculture on business, trade and food security; and Science and Technology, Health and Innovation on major technologies and global health challenges which will lead to more focus on areas of common interest. The two sides also signed a Technology Safeguards Agreement that will allow India to launch satellites containing US parts on its satellite launch vehicles for non-commercial purposes.
Indo-US Relations: Issues
There are several issues that are likely to determine the extent of the ‘inter-operability’ that the two countries seek to establish. They include the impact of the situation in the South Asian region, especially issues of terrorism associated with Pakistan and Afghanistan and American policies in that area; the question of technology transfer that has implications for Indian efforts at modernisation of its armed forces; the American position on nuclear non-proliferation; and the overall political discourse on non-military aspects like Human Rights, the ethnic nationalism-based right to political self-determination movements that appear to elicit American attention at times. Essentially, it would appear to be a struggle between India’s portrayal of itself as a regional great power with the corresponding realist perception that it needs to be a party to the deliberations regarding the evolving regional order and the American ‘concern’ at the implications of a strong Indian domination in the sub-continental region and its implications to the overall global order.
Speaking in October 2005 at the Institute for Defence Studies and Analysis, New Delhi, on Nuclear Non-proliferation and International Security (Saran 2005), the then Indian Foreign Secretary presented India as a ‘responsible’ nuclear weapon state that is conscious of its obligations to the international community on the control of weapons of mass destruction. He reiterated Indian commitment to global nuclear disarmament and argued that India has always been critical of clandestine activities with respect to WMDs. India seeks to be a partner and not a target for the global non-proliferation regime. This Indian position on nuclear proliferation continues to stand today. However, it is this Indian position—a country that is a non-signatory to the NPT and CTBT, yet a recipient of a ‘special status’ through the NSG and the IAEA for the implementation of the Indo-US nuclear deal—that is a matter of critical concern for the current administration in the US. The US Nuclear Posture Review, 2010 (US Department of Defence 2010, 13), has stated its goals about pursuing the ratification and early entry into force of the CTBT and seeking a commencement of negotiations on the FMCT to halt production of fissile material for use in nuclear weapons. The US efforts to get India on board for the CTBT and FMCT were spelt out in the context of the NPT Review Conference of 2010. To a direct question on whether the US would urge India and Pakistan to sign the NPT, Susan Burk, the President’s Special Representative for Nuclear Non-proliferation, is reported to have said, ‘The US has had a longstanding policy of supporting the universal adherence to the NPT, and I am quite confident that that issue will be raised during the review conference and there will be a desire to recommit the parties’ support for that’ (The Hindu, 1 May 2010). Further, in a departure from tradition of not singling out countries by name, the United Nations asked India, Pakistan and Israel to join NPT and CTBT without further delay and pre-conditions. This UN call was made at the end of the month-long 2010 NPT review conference (The Hindu, 29 May 2010).
The difference over the issue of nuclear proliferation has a spillover effect on India’s position on Iran. Iranian President Khatami visited New Delhi in January 2003 (Fair 2010, 135). The wide-ranging agreements that came to be made during that visit included, among other things, India’s commitment to develop the Chabahar port and the Chabahar–Fahranj–Bam railway link. However, the progress on bilateral cooperation has been slow. The Indian effort to cooperate with Iran on a civilian nuclear programme had been abandoned due to American pressure. India also voted against Iran at the IAEA on the Iranian nuclear proliferation issue. India is unlikely to support the belligerent Iranian posture on nuclear weapons or its position on Israel. However, it is unlikely that India go along the approach that imposes sanctions on Iran, as it is likely to hurt the masses rather than the political establishment. Yet apart from nuclear issues, India and Iran are likely to cooperate on issues like Afghanistan and the prospect of using the Chabahar port as an access to Central Asia. Iran’s importance to India also lies in its geopolitical setting since it lies in what could be described as a security perimeter of India (Roy 2010).
The American Af-Pak policy has been a matter of concern in Indian strategic community. The initial criticism sprang from the realisation that India was not included in the crafting of the American policy on Afghanistan. The latter concern came from the opening up of American aid to Pakistan to fight the Taliban. Given the Pakistani track record of using American military aid to boost terrorist activates across the Indian border, the concern was about the implications to Kashmir and other instances of Pakistan-sponsored terror. Today, the American willingness to have a dialogue with the Taliban in Afghanistan has further raised the ante in India. Indian perceptions have been that the real focus of the Af-Pak policy should have been Pakistan rather than troop enhancement in Afghanistan since the source of the problems lie in Pakistan (Roul 2010). The real threat to Pakistani security, as General Musharraf once put it, is the Talibanisation of Pakistan (The News International, 1 November 2006). The spread of Taliban in Pakistan and the emergence of what is now described as Pakistani Taliban is the real threat that Pakistan is likely to face in the years to come. American strategy needs to focus on this threat as a long- term goal rather than ‘manage’ the conflict in Afghanistan.
Indo-US Relations: Strategic Partnership?
President Obama’s visit to India in November 2010 provided a further impetus to the strategic dialogue that the two countries have sought to achieve. Of crucial relevance to India was the decision to ease controls on exports of dual use items and technologies to India. These measures included the removing of Indian entities from its so-called Entity List, realignment of India in US export control regulations, as well as the intention of the US to support India’s full membership in the multilateral export control regimes. The two countries also decided to deepen the existing consultations on developments in East Asia and expand consultations to cover regional and global issues of mutual interest, including Central and West Asia and Afghanistan (Ministry of External Affairs 2010). The American expectations, as President Obama puts it, were that India should not only ‘look east’ but also ‘engage east’ to ensure a greater security in the region. The US President did express his expectation on the need for India to take a stand on the human rights violations in Myanmar and on the nuclear issues relating to Iran (IBN Live 2010). The American Secretary of State argued that over the next decade American statecraft would look for substantial diplomatic, economic and strategic involvement in the Asia Pacific. As regards India, she cited President Obama’s support to India’s Look East policy including a trilateral dialogue between the US, Japan and India (Clinton 2012).
Is there an Indian road-map on the direction of Indo-US strategic dialogue or a partnership? The answer would be in the negative. It would not be realistic to expect a charting out of such a road map. Some of the reasons may lie in the nature of Indian strategic thinking. Indian thinking continues to stress on independent understanding of world affairs and peace approach as foundations of its world view. Given the abstract nature of strategic thinking in India, there is a reluctance to present a clear-cut doctrine; India cherishes deliberate ambiguity rather than a clear-cut articulation of doctrines. Further, at the level of domestic politics, it would require a great deal of ‘marketing’ to make such a concept acceptable.
However, there are certain areas where both the countries share common concerns; they include problems of global terrorism, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and regional stability. These are areas on which there has been a dialogue between these countries and several agreements have been finalised. There is also a growing trend in Indian strategic thinking of moving away from the earlier ideology-driven positions to a more realist framework. India recognises the utility of American intervention in Pakistan and Afghanistan for the establishment of order in that region. Chinese aspirations in the Asia Pacific and the Indian Ocean are a matter of concern to both the US and India. Attempts to widen the scope of relationship beyond the traditional areas have meant a greater level of interaction with such countries like the US and Israel and also the European Union. In the long run, both India and the US would have to look beyond the Cold War mindset to evolve a more mutually beneficial partnership in the security area. Today, there appears to be an increasing stress on the Asia Pacific as an area of strategic cooperation. Speaking on the ‘US-India Partnership in the Asia-Pacific region’ the US Deputy Secretary of State made a clear reference to the fact that the US is a Pacific power, a matter that was spelt out during President Obama’s visit to Australia and the signing of a security agreement with Australia. He spelt out the need for the two countries to cooperate in this region in areas like maritime security, and to build a regional architecture of institutions and arrangements to promote openness, trade, rule of law, human rights, etc. (Burns 2011).
The logic that led India to formulate the non-aligned approach as an alternative world view to the then Cold War bipolarity does not exist today. The global situation has changed radically. The financial crisis of the Western banking infrastructure and the inability of the world to deal successfully with series of ‘disturbed turbulences’ or ‘one hundred pinpricks’ (Center for National Policy 2008) which have become the hallmark of global war on terror are the threats of the new global order. India’s traditional revisionist perspective was structured to tackle the status quo created by the great powers during the Cold War era. Today, given India’s own power status, it cannot afford to take a purely revisionist perspective; it needs to participate in the building up of a new order. India is now demanding space in the decision-making circles of the world. The earlier logic of the ‘subject–object’ relationship appears to fade away. The pressure on the Indian decision-makers to be proactive in the global order has pushed India in the direction of a closer interaction with the US. It is this growing realism that is likely to be the base for a closer strategic dialogue in the years to come.