Abstract
The book under review presents a good account of the level of shock and human sufferings that followed the tsunami in December 2004. The book consists of six chapters and the content of the book can be broadly divided into three themes. At first, the book deals with the workings of the government, Non-Government Organisations (NGOs), Community-based Organisations (CBOs) and International NGO (INGOs) in post-disaster relief and rehabilitation, and the ‘Local–Global Interplay’ between these institutions; second, the research shows a comparative study between five tsunami-affected areas; and third, the authors draw on from this research a three- phase strategy moving from quick and effective relief to long-term social recovery work.
The chapters in the book broadly delineate the sociological consequences of the disaster relief and recovery and the impact of the tsunami in the local communities. The 2004 tsunami created havoc in Indonesia, Sri Lanka and India. Around 170,000 people died in Aceh, Indonesia; 36,000 people died in Sri Lanka and about 12,400 in southern India. Further around 380,000 people in India and around 400,000 people in Sri Lanka were rendered homeless. Though there has been a string of natural disasters since the 2004 tsunami, the unprecedented level and scale of its impact will ever remain in human minds and thus, the tsunami of 2004 is considered as the worst disaster in human history.
The responsibility for post-disaster relief, rehabilitation and rebuilding in these countries largely lay in the hands of the governments. The level of impact of the tsunami over the countries was so high that it evoked a global response. More than 500 international aid and humanitarian agencies were involved in the relief work in Sri Lanka. There was unprecedented generosity shown by the global community to participate in relief and recovery. For Sri Lanka, it was completely unprepared for such kind of disaster. In contrast, India had an experience of a Disaster Management Plan which helped to coordinate the relief and recovery operation in a better manner and later on India accepted aid funding from Asian Development Bank and World Bank.
The authors, Martin Mulligan and Yaso Nadarajah, have done an extensive study on the post-disaster community rebuilding, the success and the reasons of failure for post-tsunami relief and rebuilding and the lessons to be learnt from the disaster. They have engaged themselves in a study over a period of four years conducted across five Tsunami affected areas both in India and Sri Lanka, and gathered a considerable amount of empirical data and employed ‘community-engaged’ research methodology for the study.
The book argues that the massive engagement of international aid agencies and NGOs in the post-disaster relief mechanism has led to increase in competition, duplication of work and ultimately in the wastage of the distribution of aid. Post-disaster relief and recovery needs the collaboration and co-ordination with the local level bodies. Even many of the INGOs struggled to cope with the ground reality because of the shortage of skilled or experienced volunteers to be put on the field. Moreover, the arbitrary time frame adopted by the INGOs, which decided to withdraw after two years from the field and then handed over the work to local people and agencies, proved inadequate in a long-term social recovery. So, the international aid agencies must work in patience and in coordination with the local NGOs and CBOs so that long-term physical and social planning becomes possible, putting in place effective transition arrangements before leaving.
The book also reveals the politicisation of disaster management policies by the state with regard to the distribution of aid and relocation of families in the settlements. The lack in reasonable equity in the distribution of aid can cause local and regional tensions, undermine the sense of national unity and finally, cause disruptions in long-term deliberative planning. In Sri Lanka, the rebuilding of southern province of Hambantota was favoured compared to the Ampara district in South-east Sri Lanka because President Mahinda Rajapakse hailed from the former district. The Muslim communities of Sainthmaruthu in the South East Sri Lanka suffered the most in the tsunami but were neglected. By February 2009 more than 800 tsunami-affected families were still living in ‘temporary’ housing shelters with inadequate toilet and washing facilities, while people who had not been affected by the tsunami in Hambantota district, managed to acquire new houses built with tsunami aid money. So, the post-tsunami aid distribution within Ampara district worsened the fragmentation of society and exacerbated the inter-ethnic tensions between southern and eastern Sri Lanka.
With respect to the human suffering caused by the tsunami, it had its worst impact on poor communities living close to the sea. The tsunami made it difficult for people to find secure livelihoods especially in the case of women, children and young people with limited education. Women were deeply traumatised; there was a marked increase in domestic violence and even prostitution in the temporary settlements. Though there was relief aid extended to the tsunami victims, no psycho-social support was offered. Cases of child abuse, abduction of young girls, black marketing of human organs increased. Thus, communities with ‘pre-existing vulnerabilities’ were made worse by the impact of the disaster. Disaster relief needs to be supplemented with long-term poverty alleviation work. The urgent call was the need for a proper social planning with regard to relocation of traumatised people, long-term recovery and community development eventually. Moreover, the lack of coordination between the different levels of government in Sri Lanka with regard to resettlement planning made it difficult to work efficiently with the external aid agencies.
Post-disaster community development needs more people with knowledge of the locality, with relevant training and expertise. Taiwan’s Tzu Chi Foundation provided a professional approach to relief and recovery of the work. It recruited and trained local people to sustain the recovery effort and had long-term commitments to work for the communities. Contributions made by these local people and CBOs need to be acknowledged for future reference so that people learn from their past experiences. Research confirms that a large number of schools and religious centres also played an important role in rebuilding community life in post-tsunami–affected places. They continued to act as a refuge and fed homeless survivors. However, both India and Sri Lanka did not pay enough attention to the efficacy of both schools and religious centres to relocated communities.
The research also concludes that more emphasis was paid in setting up of ‘microenterprises’. Though these helped to generate individual household incomes, too many of them failed because of inadequate market assessment. There was wastage in regard to distribution of equipment and wrong kinds of equipment given. Aid should have flowed to small- and medium-level enterprises that might have helped to employ a large number of local people, deliver more benefits and be more sustainable. Research suggests that there should be a shift from individual enterprise to ‘community level’ enterprises (p. 198).
Finally, the book is a good combination of empirical data, maps, pictures and interviews with the tsunami-affected people, especially in southern India and Sri Lanka. Their keen research traces the roots of sociological problems of disaster relief and recovery and the impact of the tsunami on the lives of people. I think this book is one of the best reads to understand the fundamental politics involved in disaster management policies adopted in the region. It gives a good insight of the condition prevailing in the tsunami-affected areas, the reasons for immediate success and the possible lacunae to achieve long-term physical and social planning. The book also has a heavy bibliography which gives strength to the author’s narrative.