Migration and Its Impact on Security of Central Asia

Abstract

Migration is emerging as an important source of threat to the peace and security of Central Asia. This is happening, notwithstanding the fact that this region is receiving substantial amount of external remittance. Apart from lack of economic opportunities, existence of blurred boundaries, emergence of authoritarian regimes with a tilt towards strong ‘ethnic state’ as well as the alienation of substantial number of population are contributing to the process of flow of illegal migration. This results in loss of young population, growing ethno-nationalistic conflict, spurt in religious terrorism, proliferation of narco-trafficking as well as HIV/AIDS in this region. These above-mentioned threats are generating a lot of ‘insecurity’ in Central Asia. The best way to meet the challenges posed by migration is to ensure ‘sustainable security’ in this region by adopting a broader approach ranging from cooperation among the states of this region so also to ensure human security at the ground level.

Keywords

Migration securitisation contestant border non-traditional threats refugees insecurity ethnic conflict political institutionalisation remittance human security sustainable security

Introduction

The peaceful demise of the Soviet Union could not ensure peace and stability in the Central Asian region. New security threats are emanating from within the Central Asian states (often known as non-traditional threats) thus putting a strain on security of these nascent states (Buzan 1997, 5–7; Menon and Spruyt 1999, 87–89). Migration being an element of non-traditional threats is also threatening the peace and stability of Central Asia. One may recall here the fact that migration is contributing hugely to the national exchequer of these states in the form of remittance; on the other hand the Central Asian states are losing large reservoirs of talented and young human resources due to out-migration and large number of them are often falling in the trap of narco-traffickers as well as terrorist networks (Abramson 2010, 36–43; Danzer and Ivaschenko 2010, 191; Golunov 2007, 4; Kelly 2005, 42–43; Matveeva 2010, 4–6; Schatz 2000, 85; Umarov 2006, 91–92). It is in this background the present article will examine in a holistic perspective the threat to regional security from migration. These above-mentioned structural dichotomies regarding the implications of migration on Central Asian security can be studied from a non-traditional security framework.¹

Migration and Security: A Theoretical Paradigm

History of migration of population is as old as civilisation itself. Movement of population provided necessary vibrancy to the socio-political community over the years. Apart from the technological innovation, it was the cheap indentured labour force of Asia and Africa, who, played a key role in sustaining the momentum of industrial revolution (Bhagwati 2007, 208, 211–215; Page and Plaza 2006, 246–249; Ratha 2005, 26, 31; Truong and Gasper 2003, 5–8). As per a study by the International Organization of Migration (IOM), within a short span of eight years from 2000 to 2008 the migrant figures globally increased to 64 million. In 2000 the figure stood at 150 million. The cause of concern however is the growing number of refugees and internally displaced person across the world. This also reflects the chaotic situation which the global politics is undergoing. The total number of Internally Displaced Person stood at 27 million by the end of 2009. The World Refugees Survey mentions that the number of refugees went up to 14 million in 2008 (International Organisation of Migration 2010; World Refugees Survey 2008, 1).

Migration is an inevitable phenomenon because of industrialisation as well as globalisation but the question that needs to be addressed here is how the flow of refugees is putting a strain on state’s ‘capacity’ to govern? One should add the point that both sending and receiving countries are feeling the heat due to the flow of refugees. As in the longer-run immigrants put a strain on receiving countries by eating up latter’s scarce resources. This in fact generates ‘insecuritization’ both within the state as well as region’s security (Adamson 2006; Hobsbawm 2007; Miller 2001; Tuminez 2003; Weiner 1992/1993; Weiner 1996).

Some of the broader societal elements like the mobilisation of identity, emergence of secessionist movements and the nexus between migration and security got scant attention from the security analysts before the 1990s. On the other hand, in the aftermath of the Soviet disintegration analysts are increasingly looking at these phenomena as security threats. This is due to emergence of multi-ethnic state system as well as competition among different ethnic groups to share scarce resources. This in turn contributes to the hostile competitions which heighten violent ethnic conflict and accelerate the process of flow of refugees (Adamson 2006, 167–169; Ibrahim 2005, 164–166; Moscow Times 2010; Shils 1957, 13–17; Weiner 1992/1993, 105–108).

It has to be observed that migration being an essential component of social processes is also playing an important role in accentuating conflict.² It has got two implications for the domain of security study. One category is political refugees and the other one is migrants in search of economic livelihood. But in the eyes of common people, these distinctions are quite obscure. Instead, it has been argued that both these above categories of migrants will eat up economic resources. In the long run, they can pose a major threat to the cultural values by spreading alien culture (Stivachtis 2008, 5). Very often the existing government uses forced migration as a political weapon to deal with the dissent ethnic groups. This can be evident from Bangladesh crisis (Weiner 1996, 29).

Impacts of immigration on state security are felt asymmetrically in different states. While strong states with high degree of political institutionalisation and social integration are able to effectively handle the threats posed by the immigrants, on the other hand, states with weak political institutionalisation face the real challenge. A good instance in this regard is flow of refugees from Sri Lanka and Afghanistan to India, Pakistan and Central Asia (Adamson 2006, 177; Huntington 2009, 82–86; Weiner 1992/1993, 92, 105–106). It may be mentioned that sometimes migration proves beneficial both to the sending and receiving states. These are mostly associated with economic benefits only. Keeping both the benefits and lacunas associated with migration, there are three types of migration, namely, ‘pull’, ‘push’ and ‘network factors’.³

It is in this context, one has to study the nexus between migration–security in a broader framework. This is because it covers a whole gamut of issues ranging from cognitive factors of migrants like attitude norms, values, which contribute to the formation of identity, social processes and their political implications for nation state as well as conflict in the end. Thus, understanding the implications of these intricacies will help in knowing the structures and processes involved in the migration processes as well as outlining course of actions for ensuring ‘securitisation’ in a political system (Truong and Gasper 2003, 9–10; Wendt 1999, 92–93).

Implications for Central Asia

Like the theoretical paradigm as discussed in the beginning, Central Asia is also witnessing the above-mentioned three types of migration in the aftermath of the disintegration of the Soviet Union. Formation of ‘ethnic states’⁴ in this region led to massive emigration of ethnic Russian and other Slavic population. Apart from the formation of ‘ethnic state system’, the declining economic standard of these new states also forced many Central Asians to flee from their native land in search of greener pastures to Russia as well as in recent years to Kazakhstan (Beissinger 2002, 91; Tishkov 1997, 115–130; Umarov 2006, 91–92).

‘Ethnic State System’ and Emigration of Russians: The ‘Push Factor’

The dismantlement of the Soviet Union is one of the classic examples of collapse of a state system due to the mobilisation based on broader societal identity. The separatist tendencies started first in the Baltic republics, in the mid-1980s and afterward engulfed whole of the Soviet Union. This process culminated in the March 1991 referendum which demonstrated attitude of the Slavic elite to the question of the preservation of the Soviet Union (Kaushik 2001, 3–4; Roeder 1991, 213; Tuminez 2003, 81–82). To an utter surprise, majority of the population in the Slavic parts of the former Soviet Union in the referendum favoured break-up of the Union in contrast to the Central Asian region. Unfortunately, the Soviet Union collapsed and the emerging political elite of Central Asia (who changed their colour like a chameleon, from communist to nationalist overnight) tried to assuage the feeling of titular nationality in order to garner the necessary legitimacy to rule. Some of the policies of the new political elite like the language and citizenship law, rewriting of history provided the necessary leitmotif to the formation of ‘ethnic states’ in this part of the world. This in turn accentuated the flow of migration from Central Asia (Cummings 2002, 1–8; Dave 2007, 129–130; Kaushik 2001, 3–4; Roeder 1991, 213; Tuminez 2003, 81–82).

One may recall here the fact that the movement of population is not a new phenomenon in Central Asia. During the Second World War, Stalin ordered large-scale forced exile of Crimean Tatars to Soviet Central Asia as he suspected the allegiance of the Tatars to the Soviet Union’s war effort. This geographical space also experienced some form of reverse migration in the 1930s. It has been estimated that more than 15 to 20 per cent Kazakh migrated due to ‘forced collectivization’ policy of Stalin and later settled in Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan, Mongolia and China (Olcott 1981, 128). Though the Soviet policy-makers tried to follow a policy of assimilation among different nationalities but the discontent was very much manifested at the nature of inter-ethnic relations. This in turn generated psychological ‘insecurity’ among the Russian minorities in this part of the world. A good example in this regard was the clash that took place between Russians and ethnic Uzbeks during a football match in 1969 at Tashkent widely known as the Pakhtakor incident (Beissinger 2002, 61; Melvin 2000, 51). Some of the ethnic backlashes which took place (Kyrgyzstan, Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan) in Central Asia in the post-Glasnost phases demonstrate the nature of tenuous ethnic relations in this region. A closer look at some of these riots in this part of the world demonstrates ‘prejudice’⁵ among different nationality as the root cause of conflict (Anderson 1999, 43–44; Beissinger 2002, 61; Brown 1996, 1–9; Hiro 1994, 112; Ro’I 1991, 23–26).

The emergence of ‘ethnic state’ in Central Asia resulted in the systematic isolation of Slavic population from the mainstream socio-political processes in the post-1991 phase. The alienation among the Slavic population generated a climate of hostility which forced many of them to emigrate (King and Melvin 1999–2000, 120; Zaionchkovskaya and Florinskaya 2008, 3–6). Emigration of Russians to Russia was much higher from Kazakhstan than other Central Asian states. The existence of porous border as well as of a common culture facilitated such movement (Zaionchkovskaya and Florinskaya 2008, 3–6). At the same time, the rate of emigration of Russians was much higher in rural rather than from urban areas in this state. As per a statistical report, the net emigration rate has increased from 3.5 per thousand in 1991 to 25.2 per thousand in 1994 (Becker et al. 2005, 108). However, after 1994 the rate of emigration declined to a considerable extent due to the economic crisis in Russia. Similarly, the growth of Kazakh economy, thanks to the exploitation of hydrocarbon sector to a great extent, also stymied the flow. As migration figures demonstrate that in 2001 the net emigration rate was 29 per cent lower than in 1999 and 77 per cent below the figures of 1994 in Kazakhstan (ibid.). The impact of emigration pattern of Russians felt unevenly in Kazakhstan. While the Southern and Western parts of the country lost around 35 per cent of the Russian population, the figure is quite much more from the Northern and Eastern Altai parts. The emigration of Russian population put an adverse impact on the socio-political processes due to the strained inter-ethnic relations. It has also had an impact on the economic and industrial developments of the country. For example, the industrial cities like Karaganda and Pavlodar faced the heat due to the emigration of skilled Russian manpower (Peyrouse 2008, 4). The forced nativisation project initiated by Kazakh government in the form of closing of Russian language school as well as lack of employment opportunity for Russians in the administrative structures (‘ethnic state’ model) accentuated the flow of Russians from Kazakhstan. In 1991, as per a survey around 33 per cent of Russians felt that the status of the Russians worsened over the years in the state (Dunlop 1993, 618). Study conducted by Nurbulat Massanov and Igor Savin published in 1997 and quoted by Schatz found that during the period from 1985 to 1994 non-Kazakh representation in the high governmental job has declined from 50 to 25 per cent (Becker et al. 2005, 115–116; Schatz 2000, 85).

The growing alienation of Russians from the mainstream political processes resulted in the emergence of secessionist tendencies among them especially settled in the Eastern as well as Northern parts of the country. Emergence of Lad Movement and Federation of Independent Trade Union are some of the typical examples in this regard. These movements championed the causes of Russians like recognition of Russian as state language, demanding dual citizenship, continuation of Russian language school, etc. (Dave 2007, 129). In Kazakhstan also, the indigenous Cossack factions tried to establish linkages with radical Slavic groups of Russia and some of them took extreme steps to achieve their goal (Commercio 2004, 88–89). One may add further the fact that way back in 1999 the Kazakh authority had arrested 22 persons, out of which half of them are Russian citizen, for creating disturbances and trying to overthrow the local government in the capital city of East Kazakhstan. This rebellion was carried out under the leadership of Pugachev, the founder of an ultranationalist group known as ‘Rus’. It was formed to protect the interest of Russians in Kazakhstan during the post-Soviet era (ibid.). The Kazakh government has also responded to the fissure tendencies among the Russians in the northern part of the Kazakhstan, by shifting the capital city located in Almaty to Astana bordering Russia. Analysts highlight that this was done to showcase Kazakh assertiveness in the northern part (Schatz 2000, 79).

Like Kazakhstan, in Kyrgyzstan also large-scale emigration of Russians, Germans and other Slavonic population took place in the post-1991 phase (Table 1). The CIS data on Migration published by IOM in 1996 and as quoted by Abazov states that in 1991 the emigration figure was 71,315 and the same rose substantially in 1993 to 143,619 (Abazov 1999, 247). As a result of large-scale emigration, the position of Russians fell from second position to third after ethnic Uzbeks and stood at 10 to 11 per cent of the total population as per the Demographic Year Book of Kyrgyzstan published in 2002 (Ergeshbayev 2006, 46). Due to their technical expertise like in Kazakhstan, majority of them used to reside in the urban and industrial parts of the country which also played a significant role, what Uranbegk Ergeshbayev calls them as ‘stabilising forces in Central Asia’. The large-scale forced emigration of Russians also resulted in the structural imbalances in the socio-economic structure of Kyrgyzstan (ibid.). The tumultuous socio-political crisis in the aftermath of 2005 colour revolution forced large-scale emigration of Russians from this tiny state. As per a report provided by the Russian Embassy in Kyrgyzstan, around 60,000 Russians emigrated from Kyrgyzstan in 2006 alone, just one year after the change of regime through the Tulip revolution (Peyrouse 2008, 4). Russians generally cite the uncertain socio-economic and political situation of the country due to the change of Akaev regime as one of the primary reasons for emigration in the aftermath of 2005 (ibid.).

Table 1.

Number of Russians (and their percentage of the total population) in Each Central Asian Republics

Country	1959	1970	1979	1989	1999–2000	2007–estimate
Kazakhstan	3,974,000/ 42.7 per cent	5,521,000/ 42.4 per cent	5,991,000/ 40.8 per cent	6,227,000/ 37.0 per cent	4,479,000/ 30.0 per cent	Approx. 4,000,000
Kyrgyzstan	623,500/ 30.2 per cent	856,000/ 29.2 per cent	911,700/ 25.9 per cent	916,000/ 21.5 per cent	603,000/ 12.5 per cent	500,000
Tajikistan	262,600/ 13.3 per cent	344,000/ 11.8 per cent	395,000/ 10.04 per cent	388,500/ 7.6 per cent	68.000/ 1.1 per cent	Approx. 50,000
Uzbekistan	1,100,000/ 13.5 per cent	1,473,000/ 12.5 per cent	1,665,000/ 10.8 per cent	1,653,000/ 8.3 per cent	Approx 9,00,000	Approx. 800,000
Turkmenistan	262,700/ 17.3 per cent	313,000/ 14.5 per cent	349,600/ 12.6 per cent	334,000/ 9.5 per cent	Approx 1,20,000/ 2 per cent	Approx. Less than 1,50,000

Source: Sebastien Peyrouse (2008).

Turkmenistan’s record of protecting the Russians in the post-Independence phase is not much better. The administrative measures like cancellation of dual citizenship in December 2003 (just 10 years after its enactment) and adoption of language law by the late Saparmurat Niyazov forced many Russians to emigrate (Malynovska 2006, 105–106; Shaver 2003). As per an estimate provided by Russian Embassy in Ashgabat in 2003, till March 2004 the embassy received around 100,000 request from Russian citizens in Turkmenistan who wished to move to Russia, out of which only 27,000 got the permission by the Embassy (Malynovska 2006, 105–106). The share of ethnic Russians dropped considerably in the population census and by 2000 their share was below 5 per cent. As per a statistical figure published by IOM, around 47 per cent of the Russians emigrated from Turkmenistan (ibid.).

Tajikistan’s experience with regard to managing its Russian population is not much better. As per the report of 2002 State Statistical Committee of Tajikistan, it was estimated that at the time of the beginning of Civil War the percentage of Russian population stood at 7.6 per cent of the total population. In 2002 their percentage had declined to 1.1 per cent. The most surprising aspect of this form of emigration is that the presence of Russians has declined in the capital city from 32.4 per cent in 1989 to 5.1 per cent in 1989 (Olimova and Olimov 2005, 124). One surprising aspect of Tajik migration is that it is not only the Russians who were forced to migrate from this state due to Civil War, many ethnic Tajiks also forced to move out of their country. The study conducted by Saodat Olimova and Igor Bosc on pattern of indigenous Tajik migration demonstrates how the civil war forced many people to displace from their native land and move to neighbouring Afghanistan and other CIS states. The return of normalcy to the country after 1997 resulted in most of them returning to their native land (Olimova and Bosc 2003, 17–18; Olimova, Bosc and Olimov 2005, 124).

Uzbekistan’s case is not much different from other Central Asian states. In 1989 the percentage of Russians was around 8 per cent of the country’s total population. During Soviet period majority of them used to reside in Tashkent with 42 per cent (Moya 2007, 269; Peyrouse 2008, 4–5). During the transitional period, 1990–1997, it has been estimated that more than 500,000 Russians left Uzbekistan. The worsening socio-economic conditions provided an impetus to Russian migration (ibid.).

A closer look at the phenomenon of large-scale emigration of Russians demonstrates the state of affairs in the Central Asian states. Fear of ‘insecurity’ due to the emergence of ‘ethnic states’, declining economic standards of these states in the post-Soviet phase are some of the factors which contributed to the accentuation of this phenomenon. The development of ‘ethnic state’ has resulted in emergence of what one can observe as the phenomenon of clash of identity, that is, ‘we’ vs ‘them’ based on ‘primordial loyalty’ (Paley, Williams and Oliker 2003, 9–18; Shils 1960, 340–345).

The functioning of Central Asian political system for the last two decades demonstrates the fact that state has failed miserably in delivering public goods. Tajikistan is a good instance in this regard. Just after the disintegration of the Soviet Union, it faced civil war in which the whole country was divided into regional and ethnic lines. Taking advantage of hostile political situation, radical Islamist forces tried to capture political power. Government also took steps to mobilise the masses by using the cultural notion of common Tajik identity, which largely demonstrated the ‘ethnic’ character of the state (Gretsky 1995, 224–225). Kyrgyzstan offered some succour to the democratic character of Central Asia in the first decade of independence. But the democratic image of Kyrgyzstan gradually faded within five years, as this state witnessed two regime changes. Analysts think that the organised criminal networks are increasingly taking over the functioning of state system especially in the southern part. This is what is eroding the capability of Kyrgyz state to govern. It has been observed that the June 2010 crisis in southern Kyrgyzstan was largely orchestrated by rival Kyrgyz and Uzbek criminal networks. The rivalry between Uzbek and Kyrgyz gang took the character of inter-ethnic riot and forced many Uzbeks to leave Kyrgyzstan as highlighted earlier (Cummings 2002, 1–8; Eurasianet 2010; Fortin 2010, 656–658; Rotberg 2002, 85–87,17).

Both Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan have developed a strong state which provided less opportunity to ethnic minorities to participate in the political processes. Like Tajikistan, political elite of these states are using rich cultural tradition of the country and highlighting the ‘ethnic’ character of statehood to ensure legitimacy to the regime. In Uzbekistan, the regime is under challenge from the disgruntled forces who are trying to take over the political system by using religion as the means. Political institutionalisation has also not been so successful. The case of Kazakhstan is not much different from rest of the Central Asian political system, since the economy is growing up (due to oil price hike in the global market) and the present Nazarbaev regime is trying to ensure legitimacy to its government through offering goodies to the titular nationality, thus creating an ‘ethnic state’ (Marat 2009, 18–31; Menon and Spruyt 1999, 95; Olcott 2005, 168–170). Greater emphasis on political mobilisation on the basis of ethnic identity in Central Asia is weakening the state’s capacity to govern as it has alienated significant sections of minority communities like Russians and generated fear psychosis among them (Cummings 2002, 1–8; Olcott, 2005, 171–177; Rotberg 2003, 16–17). The alienation of Russians from the democratic political processes of Central Asia can be evident from the 1994 election to parliament which took place in Uzbekistan. In the1994 parliamentary election, more than 86 per cent of ethnic Uzbeks got representation in the parliamentary election. The situation is same in other Central Asian states (Mesamed 1996, 24; ibid.).

The large-scale forced migration had an adverse impact on Central Asian economy as Russians used to play an important role in the development of this region, and majority of them used to be skilled labourers. The exodus put the economic development of respective states on the back foot. Apart from industrial sector, the Russians are heavily dominated in the administrative structures but in the post-Soviet phase they lost their position due to systemic alienation of Russians. So also some of the Russians used to have an organic connection with this region as they have settled here prior to the formation of the Soviet Union. The large-scale emigration by them created a structural imbalance in the social structure (Dave 2007, 129–131; Dunlop 1993, 605–608; Johnson 2007, 84, 81; Menon and Spruyt 1999, 90–91). More recently, speaking at the sideline of the twentieth anniversary of Tajikistan’s independence in July 2009, President Rahmanov even advocated that Russian language which is acting as a language of communication will be abolished and the same will be given to the Tajik language. This he stated by saying that ‘The destiny of the nation depends on the destiny of its language’ (Parshin 2009).

The strong ethnic overtone in recent years are taking a religious colour; for instance, in Kyrgyzstan religious radical parties like Hizb-ut-Tahrir-al-Islami (HTI) are demanding that places of worship of Russians should be closed down (Johnson 2007, 75). Apart from large-scale forced migration of Russians certain ‘pull’ factor (in the form of economic necessity) is also playing a role as evident from the migration of native Central Asians to Russia as well to Kazakhstan.

Economic ‘Securitisation’ and Central Asian Migration: The ‘Pull Factor’

The irony of Central Asian migration pattern is that it is not only the Russians who are forced to emigrate due to emergence of ‘ethnic state’ but also the dwindling economy, lack of employment opportunity in their respective states as well as looking for a greener pasture abroad forced many Central Asians to leave their native land. It is widely believed that the ‘pull factor’ of migration is always good for a country as it will receive huge amount of money in terms of remittance through the workforce. However, the point that needs to be highlighted is that remittance in the short term is always good but over a longer-period of time it will have an adverse affect on economic development of a country (Danzer and Ivaschenko 2010, 191; Ivakhnyuk 2006, 1; Khakimov and Mahmadbekov 2009, 20–26; Olimova and Bosc 2003, 86; Umarov 2006, 91–92). This phenomenon might also have an effect on development of the other branches of the economy. This occurrence is also most commonly known as ‘remittance curse’ (Danzer and Ivaschenko 2010, 191). Immigration in the longer run also contributes to loss of precious human resources which can be used for country’s economic development. Fragmentation of family results in loosening of societal value and has a significant repercussion on ‘securitisation’ processes. In this context, one has to look at the phenomenon of ‘pull’ factor of migration vis-à-vis economic ‘securitisation’ in the Central Asian context from a historical perspective (Danzer and Ivaschenko 2010, 191; Ivakhnyuk 2006, 1; Khakimov and Mahmadbekov, 2009, 20–26; Olimova and Bosc 2003, 86; Umarov, 2006, 91–92). Since the Tsarist period, large-scale migration took place from Russia, particularly to Kazakhstan. In more recent times, large numbers of Slavic population are also settled in Kazakhstan due to the virgin land campaign initiated by Khrushchev. The movement of population from Slavic part of the then Soviet Union to Central Asia also changed the ethnic composition of this region (Schatz 2000, 75). On the other hand, in the post-Soviet phase the initiation of programmes in Russia by Yeltsin administration forced many Russians to move out of Central Asia. In this process, Russia emerged as a favoured destination point for them both on account of kith and kin relationship with Moscow as well as flexible policy measures undertaken by the Russian political elite in the initial years to accommodate them (King and Melvin 1995, 120; Zaionchkovskaya and Florinskaya 2008, 3–6); for instance, the then President of Russia, Boris Yeltsin’s decree, ‘On the Protection of the Rights and Interests of Russian Citizens outside the Russian Federation’, was adopted in November 1992 under which Moscow assured to grant citizenship to all who want to take the citizenship of Russia. The issue of decree provided an opportunity to the Russian population (acted as a ‘pull’ factor) who faced alienation in these Central Asian states to move to Russia (King and Melvin 1995, 120).

In the post-Soviet phase, Russians are not only migrating, even the native Central Asians are also going to Russia and Kazakhstan for better economic opportunities. This is due to, as Russian scholar Irina Ivakhnyuk thinks, ‘common geographical boundary as well as psychological and cultural feelings of oneness among the migrants, a reminiscence of the then Soviet Union’ (Ivakhnyuk 2006, 1). Similarly the Russian language also to a great extent facilitated the process of migration within the CIS states as the Central Asian emigrants did not face any problem in Russia while getting employment (Danzer and Ivaschenko 2010, 191; Ivakhnyuk 2006, 1; Khakimov and Mahmadbekov 2009, 20–26; Olimova and Bosc 2003, 86; Umarov 2006, 91–92).

With regard to motivation for migration, lack of employment opportunity is emerging as one of the major factors responsible for migration of native Central Asians. For instance, in Tajikistan’s case the mismatch between high rate of growth of population and low rate of economic development is one of the important factors contributing to the migration. As per the Statistical Year Book of Tajikistan published in 2007, approximately 36 per cent of the population is under the age of 15. From 1991–2005, the growth rate of population is increased to 27 per cent, while the GDP per capita decreased by 38.9 per cent (as quoted in Khakimov and Mahmadbekov 2009, 22–23 and 26). Both the high growth rate of population (young population) and low growth rate of economy have had an adverse impact on sustainability of country’s economy in terms of providing opportunity for livelihood. One surprising aspect about Tajik population growth is that, despite the country lost around 60,000 people because of the civil war, population figure is demonstrating a substantial higher rate of growth (ibid.). Tajik Economist Haji Umarov states: ‘the growing population is one of the major elements which had a deep impact on Tajik economy as well as the job sector’ (Umarov 2006, 91–92). Tajikistan Statistical Year Book published in 2005 as quoted by Umarov gives a detailed demographic picture of the country. The year book highlights that due to the growth of population the density of population has also increased to a significant extent. In 1991 the density per sq. kilometre was 38.5 and it rose to 47.4 in 2004 (ibid.). High dependence on land is also contributing to the migration process, since only 7 per cent land is cultivable and near about 90 per cent of population is depending upon the same. In 1960, 0.34 hectares cultivable land was available to per person and the same declined to 0.15 hectares per person in 1990 and it declined to 0.13 hectares in the post-Soviet phase (ibid.). This is what is creating a structural imbalance in Tajik society in terms of providing employment opportunity and fuelling large-scale migration in Tajikistan (ibid.). Apart from scarcity of cultivable land, environmental degradation like poor water quality, soil erosion, flood and drought are some factors responsible for large-scale migration of Tajiks. These problems are more acute in rural areas as around 74 per cent of Tajik populations are staying in rural areas. For instance, a recent study conducted by IOM in Sogd and Khatlon to examine the reasons behind migration of population observed that more than half of the country’s population agreed to the fact that due to environmental degradation people are moving out from their native place (Olimova and Olimov 2012, 8, 18, 30, 3).

The most-favoured destination for Tajik migrant is Russia because of high salary it offers to these immigrant labourers. As per Olimova and Bosc, the average monthly salary in Russia was much higher than Tajikistan in 1996 (Olimova and Bosc 2003, 22). The remittance sent by these migrant labourers is the key which is contributing to the growth of Tajik economy. As per the World Bank estimates based on IMF Statistical Year Book 2008, in 2002, Tajikistan earned around $79 million while the same figure stood at $1,691 million, and in 2008 the figure was $1,750 million which is around 45.5 per cent of Tajikistan’s GDP, and in 2009 the figure was 35.1 per cent of GDP (Human Development Report 2011, 164; Khakimov and Mahmadbekov 2009, 33). This figure has increased to 47 per cent of country’s GDP as per the World Bank data of 2011. Payment received by the families of the migrant labourers provides the necessary means to sustain their livelihood, as they do not have any alternative to earn the same in the country. This can be gauged from the IMF report which states that around 60 per cent of the country’s population survives on less than $1.40 a day (as quoted in International Crisis Group 2010, 4; The World Bank 2012, 2).

In the context of Kyrgyzstan, the closure of heavy industries like mining and hydro-electrical plant resulted in the massive emigration of Russians. Quoting various editions of Migration Yearbook of Kyrgyzstan, Rafis Abazov points out that in 1991, various branches of the economy lost 52,600 jobs and emigration figure was around 33,757 (Abazov 1999, 247–248). Another peculiar feature of Kyrgyzstan migration process in the 1990s is that due to the decline in the job sector there is a growing dependence on the agriculture sector which constitutes the backbone of rural economy (ibid., 248).

Like Tajikistan, in Kyrgyzstan also 90 per cent of land area is mountainous, as a result of which there is a huge concentration of population in relatively plain areas like the Chui and Ferghana valley, Osh, Jalalabad and Kyzylkia (Ergeshbayev 2006, 47–48; Schuler 2007, 84). The uneven distribution of agricultural land, heavy dependency on agriculture and lack of substantial economic opportunity because of less industrial development are some of the factors contributing to the process of migration in Kyrgyzstan. A study conducted in 2003 by Osh University on migratory behaviour of Kyrgyz population found that (around 60 per cent of the Kyrgyz population are residing in southern part) about 68.3 per cent are interested in going abroad and their favourite destination is Moscow for employment opportunity (ibid.).

Most of these migrant Kyrgyz labourers are able to remit $200–500 on an average to their homes from Kazakhstan and Russia, respectively. According to a World Bank study in 2002, Kyrgyzstan received $37 million as remittance and in 2005 it was $355 million, in 2006 it was $481million and it increased to $1.2 billion in 2008 (International Crisis Group 2010, 3; Khakimov and Mahmadbekov 2009, 33; Ruget and Usmanalieva 2010, 449). Like Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan is also receiving substantial amount of remittance. In 2009 the figure was 21.7 per cent and it rose to 29 per cent of country’s GDP in 2011 (Human Development Report 2011, 164; The World Bank 2012, 2).

Large-scale migration is also taking place from Uzbekistan. Like Tajikistan the dwindling economy and lack of employment opportunity in the post-Soviet phase are some of the prime reasons for migration of native population. This can be substantiated by the study conducted by Ijtimoiy Fikr, a research organisation of Uzbekistan in 2004 (Khadjimukhamedov 2005, 90). It interviewed 600 people all over the country to ascertain the reasons for migration. The study found that around 28.5 per cent expressed their desire to leave the country. Out of 600 respondents to the survey, 58.1 per cent desired to leave the country to earn a higher income. Majority of the respondents agreed to migrate to Russia as most of their relatives are based in Moscow, followed by Kazakhstan (ibid.). The Federal Migration Service of Russia stated that there are around 24,101 migrant Uzbek labourers in 2002 constituting around 5.24 percentage of total workforce. The presence of Uzbeks rose significantly to 49,043 with a percentage of 6.98 in 2005 and it rose to further high with 105,061 with 10.36 per cent of total workforce (as quoted in Chindea et al. 2009, 25, 43). Like Tajikistan, the remittance sent by Uzbek labour force is contributing immensely to the economic development of the country (Radnitz 2006, 656–657). This can be evident from the above figure given by Central Bank of Russia and the World Bank study (ibid., 657–658). The World Bank report on remittance states that in 2006 Uzbekistan received around $1.4 billion and it increased to $3.3 billion in 2008 and it constituted 13 per cent of GDP of the country (as quoted in International Crisis Group 2010, 3).

Though large-scale emigration took place from Kazakhstan after the Soviet disintegration (particularly by the Slavic population), surprisingly, it is receiving huge number of migrant labourers from other Central Asian states as highlighted above (Sadovskaya 2007, 150). Giving a broader picture about nature of emigration from Kazakhstan, Marlene Laruelle thinks that it is taking place in four ways. First, it is regularly taking place through the porous border between Uzbekistan and southern Kazakhstan. Secondly, as per an estimate more than 4,000 Uzbeks cross the Kazakh border post at Zhybek Zholy. Thirdly, emigration is taking place to Kazakhstan as the season labourers from other Central Asian states generally go to Kazakhstan in spring and summer. Finally, emigrant labourers want to stay on permanently (Laruelle 2008, 7). Kazakhstan in 2000 received 33,621 migrants, while in 2001 there was a slight increase in the number of refugees. According to the official data, the figure was 46,044 immigrants. Most of them are from Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan (ibid.; Marat 2009, 25; Yerekesheva 2005, 69).

Kazakhstan is also experiencing the network migration (as highlighted by Lee) with the return of Kazakh diasporic community (Oralman). Most of them left their homeland due to Stalin’s oppression during the 1930s. In recent years, the Kazakh political elite, with a nationalising drive as well as to fill the population deficit (that took place following large-scale migration of Slavic population), encouraged diasporic Kazakh to return to their native land. Since the Kazakh government promised to provide all forms of facilities, around 500,000 oralman returned to their historic landmass from countries like Mongolia, Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan (Diener 2005, 332). Most of these oralmans are settled in the Northern part of the countries. Though these oralmans were promised a bright future by the government once they return to their historical homeland but failure on part of the former to meet their promises resulted in resentment among them. This is due to the fact that the northern part of the country is heavily populated by Russians. The settlement of Oralmans in this part of Kazakhstan also created conflict between Russians and Oralman over access to land, housing and job, etc. (Barcus and Werner 2010, 219).

Another aspect of Central Asian migration is the movement of large section of rural population to the urban areas. This is because of lopsided regional development in these states. For instance, in Kyrgyzstan large-scale population movement is taking place from both the southern and northern parts of the country. While from South mostly young population moves to urban centres like Osh, Jalalabad, from North, young population generally moves to Bishkek. Overwhelming of them goes to get job opportunities (IRIN News 2005). The situation is not very different in Kazakhstan also. Uneven economic development, skewed resources distribution as well as lack of employment opportunity are pushing rural population of Kazakhstan, particularly in the southern parts of the country, to the oil and gas rich regions and the capital cities of Astana and Almaty. As per the 2011 data, around 54 per cent of the population is living in the urban areas. Large concentrations of population in the few urban centres also accentuate conflict over access to public goods (Dapper 2007; IOM Factsheet, Kazakhstan, 2012). Uzbekistan is also facing the problem of movement of population from countryside to the urban areas. To restrict the inflow of rural migrant to urban centres, the Uzbek authorities have introduced a law that prohibits rural population to migrate to Tashkent (UZ News 2011). The lack of economic development and low human development in Central Asia can be observed from the Central Asian Human Development Index (Table 2).

Table 2.

Human Development Index and Its Components, Population and Economy

Country	HDI Rank	HDI (Value)	Life Expectancy at Birth	Mean Year of Schooling	Expected Years of Schooling	GNI Per Capita Constant 2005, ppp$	GNI per Capita Rank Minus HDI Rank	Non Income HDI Value	Total Expenditure on Health as % of GDP 2009	Total Expenditure on Education as % of GDP (2006–2009)
Kazakhstan	68	0.745	67.0	10.4	15.1	10.585	30	0.829	4.5	4.5
Kyrgyzstan	126	0.615	67.7	9.3	12.5	2.036	19	0.734	6.8	6.8
Uzbekistan	115	0.641	68.3	10.0	11.4	2.656	23	0.756	5.2	5.2
Tajikistan	127	0.607	67.5	9.8	12.5	2.036	19	0.734	5.3	5.3
Turkmenistan	102	0.686	65.0	9.9	12.5	7.306	–7	0.724	2.3	2.3

Source: Human Development Report (2011), 13–134, 163–164.

Intricacies of ‘Push’ and ‘Pull’ Factors of Migration: The ‘Contesting’ Border

The ‘contesting’ border provides the necessary impetus to the growth of both the ‘push’ and ‘pull’ factors of migration. As migrants often move to another country by using soft border to escape from the persecution and also for securing greener pasture or for regular movement. It is a common trend that whenever there is a riot in southern Kyrgyzstan the ethnic Uzbeks move to Uzbekistan. In this regard, one may cite the example of 1989–1990 riots in this region (during the later part of 1980s) which manifest this trend (Ro’I 1991, 23; Slim 2003, 145–147). Similarly, the large-scale pogrom of Uzbeks in the aftermath in 2005 and recently in the post-Bakiev era demonstrates this trend. The clashes involving Uzbeks and Kyrgyz in the southern Kyrgyzstan in the month of June 2010 are a classic example of how porous border helps in flow of refugees. As per an estimate, nearly 400 persons were killed in the violent conflict involving Uzbek and Kyrgyz and more than 100,000 refugees fled from Kyrgyzstan to Uzbekistan (Matveeva 2010, 4–6; Moscow Times 2010; Petric 2010; RFE/RL 2010; RIA-Novosti 2010).

Since these borders are porous, it is very difficult to monitor the flow of refugees. It has been reported that general public often crosses one country to another country by using an overhead rope. The Kara-Suu village located in Uzbekistan bordering Kyrgyzstan is a classic example in this regard. By paying $20 people from Uzbekistan enter into Kyrgyzstan using a rope and a trolley. This way they avoid detection by border police force from either side (Baseline Research on Smuggling of Migrants 2008, 40). The porous border that exists between these two states can be evident from the study of Neil Megoran. In his study on Arosat village located between Uzbek–Kyrgyz border, Megoran has mentioned that while residents are getting water from Uzbekistan, they are using electricity supplied by Kyrgyzstan. He further observed that four alternative houses had different citizenship and both Uzbek and Kyrgyz students study in different schools. Uzbek citizens send their children to Uzbek school while Kyrgyz citizens send their ward to Kyrgyz school. As per Megoran, people in this village are multi-ethnic in character with 80 households out of which 20 are Kyrgyz families (Megoran 2006, 630–631).

Status of some of the bordering villages in Central Asia is also quite contestable. It is very difficult to determine their exact location as most of these lines were demarcated during the 1924 territorial delimitation. For instance, a village known as Bagys is located just closer to Tashkent. Though the village is located in Uzbekistan, it is dominated by Kazakh population. While one half of the population hold Kazakh passport, the rest of the population uses the Uzbek passports but are yet to get citizenship (International Crisis Group 2002, 8). The roots of the problem can be traced back to history as the 1941 map shows that it is located in Kazakhstan and on the other hand the 1963 map, which the Uzbek side is claiming to be genuine, says that Bagys is located in Uzbekistan (Dosybiev 2005). Similar experience can be observed in the Uzbek–Tajik bordering regions. The frequent incursion by the Uzbeks residing in Tajikistan is creating apprehension in the minds of Uzbek policy-makers that they might pose a security challenge to the existing regime. It considers that many of them are quite sympathetic to radical forces. To checkmate the refugee flow, Uzbek government laid land mines in its border with Tajikistan (ibid., 12; Slim 2003, 145–147).

Another example of blurred boundary that exists between Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan is the village of KokTash located in the territory of Kyrgyzstan. It has a village known as Shomonian, which is a part of Tajikistan’s Chorku district. There are two schools in the village separated by 300 metres apart. One is under the control of Tajikistan and the other is under Kyrgyzstan. The village people follow two time zones and celebrate different independence days. The structural contiguity of the Central Asian borders to a great extent fuels flow of refugees and migrants (Reeves 2009, 1285).

A closer look at some of the empirical survey concerning labour migration demonstrates the fact that the declining economic conditions (as evident from the Human Development index) as well as the ‘societal conflict’ within these states and the blurred boundaries are some of the root causes of migration. It has also been observed that these immigrant labourers are treated as mere slaves in their workplace and are at the receiving end as they are regularly facing racist attack and often treated as terrorists. These are some of the negative aspects of immigration which is accentuating the threat perception to state security in terms of identity conflict over sharing economic resources (International Crisis Group 2010, 15–21; Paley, Williams and Oliker, 2003, Chap. 2, 9–18). The above analyses also demonstrates the fact that the soft border as well as fluid socio-political identity is playing a critical role in determining the nature of migration and refugees in this part of the world. As studies demonstrate, mobilisation of identity has helped in putting strain on the political system (Huntington 2009, 85–86; International Crisis Group 2010, 15–21).

Migration and ‘Societal Insecurity’

The notion of migration has a wider repercussion on socio-political and economic processes of a country. As mentioned earlier, flow of refugees accentuates the cycle of violence in a political system as they try to exploit the scarce resources of the country and this often leads to competition between the immigrants and titular nationality. The conflict goes on finally engulfing wider social structure which in turn precipitates ‘societal insecurity’ (Adamson 2006, 167–169; Weiner 1992/1993, 105–108). The growing Central Asian migration is posing a strong challenge to both the security of Russia and Kazakhstan which can be studied in the framework of ‘Regional Security Complex theory’ (RSCT) developed by Barry Buzan and Olle Weaver.⁶ Russian political elite think that influx of large-scale immigrants from Central Asia pose a threat to Russia’s so-called Slavic identity itself, as these immigrants not only capture job market, but often indulge themselves in land-grabbing and other illegal economic activities (Golunov 2007, 3). The Levada Sociological Monitoring Centre, Moscow, in 2005, during the economic boom of the country, found in a survey that 31 per cent of those respondents felt that migrants play a catalytic role in upsurge of criminal activities in the country and even agreed to the question that migrants eat up the jobs of local population. The same centre in 2009 December survey, at the time of economic crisis, highlights that 61 per cent favoured restriction on immigrants (ibid., 73; International Crisis Group 2010, 12).

The growing indignation on the part of certain sections of Russian public towards these immigrant Central Asian labour forces can be evident from the sporadic racist attack carried out against them in Russia. The emergence of racist groups like Young Guard and Movement against Illegal Immigration (DPNI) are some of the examples. The Sova centre, an independent body working for the protection of immigrants of Russia, in its 2008 report highlights that 99 murders and 37 violent ethnic assaults against immigrants are carried out in Russia. In 2009 at least 49 deaths of Central Asian immigrants took place due to attack by neo-Nazi group (Fitzpatrick 2009; Newsweek 2009). Despite assurances from the top officials of Kremlin that all sorts of protection will be provided to the migrant labour force, the Russian government has so far done little to protect them. It has been reported that in 2011 around 10 migrants from Central Asia got killed due to racist attack in Moscow and St Petersburg. However, these are only the official records and most of the racist attack on migrants are not reported to the local enforcement agencies. The growing resentment towards the illegal migrants in Russia can be evident from the fact that even liberal politicians are also demanding strong measures against these illegal migrants. The protest against illegal migrants is becoming a routine affair in Moscow now and such protest movement is growing day by day (Kasymalieva and Marat 2012). In retaliation, these immigrants formed their own organisations and some times they seek assistance from religious groups. For instance, the Tajik immigrant labourers have also formed their own organisation known as Tajik Peoples League. The basic objective of this group is to provide legal counselling to immigrant labourers (Fitzpatrick 2009; Newsweek 2009).

It has been observed that taking advantage of isolation from their family, some of the hardliner religious organisations are trying to recruit them into their fold. These religious bodies try to meet their spiritual and social needs and provide much needed communitarian support system in the alien country. They also try to influence them in the name of religion which in the long run contributes to the growth of radicalism. It has also been reported that some of the Central Asian migrant labourers have also joined banned radical groups like Hizbat Tahrir al Islami (HTI). Way back in June 2003, the Russian internal security forces have also carried out crackdown on the HTI members and arrested 121 hardliners comprising mostly Kyrgyz and Tajik immigrants (CACI Analyst 2003; Olimov and Bosc 2005, 122). Similar clampdown was also reported in November 2009 when security forces of Russia and Tajikistan jointly conducted a raid in Moscow and arrested three persons connected with banned radical organisation Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan for carrying out subversive activities. The growing nexus between migrant Tajik labour force and hardliner Islamic activists has alarmed the Tajik officials to such an extent that they rejected the Saudi Arabia’s offer of recruiting Tajik labour force. The Tajik administration felt that these migrant labourers might be indoctrinated with radical ideology and may create problem for their own country upon their arrival (International Crisis Group 2010, 6). Studies have also demonstrated that most of these migrant labourers once they return from abroad observe strict religious practices and often try to spread radical ideas. This was also confirmed by local Imams. In recent years, some of the students of Tajikistan have also deported from Egypt, Pakistan, Iran and Saudi Arabia for involvement in unlawful activities (Abramson 2010, 36–43; De Cordier 2011).

The Russian government has also acknowledged the fact that migrants often indulge in anti-social activities and recently, the Interior Minister Vladimir Kolokoltsev even acknowledged that every ‘sixth crime in Moscow and every thirty crime in Russia’ are committed by migrants (Interfax 2012). Both policy-makers and officials from law enforcement agencies are repeatedly expressing apprehension regarding the growing nexus between narco-trafficking and migration of labour force in this Eurasian space. Way back in 2003, the then President Vladimir Putin during his visit to Dushanbe raised this matter with his Tajik counterpart President Rahmonov. Putin further stated, ‘Russia is badly affected by illegal drug trafficking, and this is as one of the main source of worry with regards to the illegal migration of Tajik citizens into Russia’ (Eurasianet 2003). Russian security analysts attribute the rising narco-trafficking in Russia to the growing immigration. It has also been reported that the Kazakh–Russian border is emerging as a major flashpoint in this regard. As per an estimate, around 2 per cent of ethnic Central Asian immigrants are engaged in drug trafficking (Golunov 2007, 4; Olimov and Bosc 2003, 88). The head of Russia’s drug control service (FSKN) Viktor Ivanov even admitted that porous border between Russia and Central Asia is one of the major factors responsible for flow of Afghan drug to Russia. Taking advantage of the blurred boundaries, the organised criminal groups thrive in Russia. In this regard, he cited that in 2010 the Russian law enforcement agency arrested 3,300 foreign nationals for their involvement in narco-trafficking (RT 2012). The nexus that exists between illegal drug trafficking and illegal migration in Central Asia can be evident from Table 3.

Table 3.

Number of Tajik Citizens Arrested for Drug-related Crimes

Place and Year of Arrest	1999	2000	2001	2002
Kazakhstan	135	166	75	8
Kyrgyzstan	11	23	–	4
Uzbekistan	384	572	188	106
Russian Federation	–	1,031	801	785
Total	530	1,792	1,064	903

Sources: Review of the Drugs Situation in the Republic of Tajikistan in 2002, Tajik Drug Control Agency, Dushanbe. Olimova and Bosc (2003, 35–36).

Migration and Human ‘Insecurity’

It has been observed that there exists a closer nexus between migration, spread of HIV/AIDS and its impact on gender as well as Human Security in the long run. In recent years, number of scholarly works have also come up highlighting the linkages between migration, internal displacement and human security (Anne Clark 2005, 87–88). It is a common phenomenon that often migrant labourers get infected with dreaded diseases like HIV/AIDS while working abroad and spread the same in their native country after returning (Sadik 2010, 4). The three states of Central Asia, namely, Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan are the worst victims of the spread of HIV/AIDS. As per a study of 2009 in Kyrgyzstan, around 20 per cent of HIV/AIDS patients are migrants. Among the worst victim of HIV/AIDS are women. As per a recent data published by Tajik government in 2011, near about 28.5 per cent of HIV/AIDS patients are women which was 8.5 per cent in 2005, though there is lack of precise data regarding how many of them are wives of infected migrant labourers (Qodir and Ergasheva 2012; Tokbaeva, Sadyrkulov and Manzarshoeva 2010). It has also been reported that immigrant women often fall to illegal trafficking within the country when they migrate from rural to urban areas and also abroad. Studies have also shown that refugee and migrant women in Central Asia are subjected to ‘sexual violence’ (Abdullaev 2007, 17; Sadik 2010, 5; Weine, Bahromov and Mirzoev 2008, 462). The Tajik government over the years argued that the Tajik women fell into the hands of pimps who took them to Russia and the Gulf region, employing them in immoral activities (Olimova and Bosc 2003, 86). The IOM in its publication succinctly brought out the nexus existing between trafficking of women from Central Asian states and their involvement in prostitution. The report quoting various sources highlights that the destination for these women in recent years is not confined to Russia or CIS states and some of them are heading towards South Korea. As per the IOM estimation, 2,000 immigrant Kazakh women in South Korea are engaged in the prostitution trade. The same source points out that around 4,000 Kyrgyz women are trafficked every year and the presence of Uzbek women in the Thai prostitution racket have increased considerably from 2,695 in 1999 to 5,017 in 2000 (Kelly 2005, 42).

The root causes of large-scale migration of women, as per the UNDP study, are that 45 per cent of the female migrants are single and another 22 per cent as per the report are divorced or widowed. The same report also notes that more than 24 per cent of women stated that they will never return to their native place as they will face social boycott, a common phenomenon in a traditional society. In the absence of societal support, these women face worst consequences (as quoted in Abdullaev 2007, 17). Thanks to the advancement of information technology, the phenomenon of ‘mobile divorce’ is taking place increasingly in Tajikistan (BBC 2012). Some of the migrant labourers who are currently working in Moscow are seeking divorce through phone and the women are facing problems at home. Though the State religious authority has banned this practice, it is still a common phenomenon in Tajikistan. As per the government statistics, the divorce rate has gone up by 14 per cent. After divorce the wife does not receive any financial assistance from the husband and is thrown out from her in-law’s house. This phenomenon is becoming a social menace now (BBC 2012). It has been observed that less developed economies coupled with weak societal system are some of the factors responsible for accentuation of migration of women from this region (Abdullaev 2007, 17; Kelly 2005, 42).

Apart from trafficking of women and growing broken families, Central Asian immigrant labourers are facing the lack of proper working condition both in Kazakhstan and Russia. Since most of these labour forces are illegal migrants and there is no legal law as a result of which they are facing the worst kind of human rights violation. In Kazakhstan and Russia, due to lack of access to proper health care system as well as inhuman working condition, a large chunk of them expire every year. It has also been observed that some of the Central Asian labour force is working in harsh working conditions of Siberia (Marat 2009, 31–32). These illegal migrants are not only facing problem in Russia but are also facing discrimination in their Central Asian space as well. Taking advantage of the lacuna in legal system, these illegal labourers are subjected to harsh treatment both from the local police as well from their employers. The simple truth is that both law enforcement agencies as well as employers favour illegal migrants. In the case of the former it helps them in minting money, while in the latter’s case they pay less and there is no legal obligation to maintain proper working conditions for them as stipulated by law (CACI Analyst 2003; Laruelle 2008, 7–8; Yermukanov 2003).

What is most glaring is that due to large-scale migration, the country is not able to use the potential of ‘human capital’⁷ in service to the country. The most glaring example is in the case of Tajikistan. According to Tajik Scholar Umarov, teachers, engineers, doctors are not doing their specialised job and most of them take up altogether different jobs. Quoting Tajikistan Statistical Year Book published in 2005, the Tajik scholar states that number of teachers in higher education decreased from 72,789 to 61,389 (as quoted in Umarov 2006, 96, 99).

From the foregoing discussion one can infer that implications of migration on ‘securitisation’ process requires adoption of a multidimensional prolonged approach to resolve the crisis ranging from bilateral to multilateral regional mechanisms. In this regard, the Central Asian states along with Russia have made some headway in resolving the crisis.

Migration and Regional Security Mechanism

Looking at the plethora of problems associated with migration in Central Asia, it is certain that no single Central Asian state is in a position to resolve the multifaceted problems. The best way to resolve the problem lies in strengthening the existing migration laws of each state. The problem of illegal migration of labour is partly arising out of this. Developing a coordinated framework for interpreting the legal rules would be helpful in resolving the disputes in a much peaceful manner. Secondly, some of the borders are too porous that it is difficult to check illegal migration. So the task lies with respective governments to arrive at a conclusion as to how far the security at borders can be strengthened to curb such menace (Allison 2004, 463–467; Marat 2009, 45–47).

Unfortunately, these states are yet to devise effective legislations to curb illegal migration, visa are given hastily without checking the records of person, and state-of-the-art technologies have not been implemented till now. Corruption is quite rampant in the Central Asian states. All these measures have obstructed the emergence of effective regional mechanisms (Baseline Research on Smuggling of Migrants in, from and through Central Asia 2008, 56). Since the last two decades of the disintegration of the Soviet Union, the existing regional mechanisms have not dealt with the problems adequately to evolve a common framework to arrive at a consensus in this regard (Ivakhnyuk 2006, 9; Marat 2009, 45–47).

Despite hindrances, the Central Asian states have initiated a number of programmes to resolve the issue. In July 1994 presidents of three states, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan, decided to mitigate the crisis arising out of the same. On the basis of the 1994 framework, two subsequent provisions came out. In March 1997 these three countries signed the ‘Agreement for Creation of Legal, Economic and Organizational Conditions for the Free Movement of Workforce’ (Labour Migration Regulation, n.d., 5, 8). Apart from these multilateral measures within the Central Asian states, these states have also signed some of the bilateral agreements among themselves. Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan Agreement on Labour Activity and Social Protection of Migrant Workers in May 1998, another agreement on protecting the irregular labourers employed in both Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan signed in July 2006 are some of the noteworthy measures (ibid., 8). As discussed above, majority of the Central Asians are migrating to Russia so this question of migration automatically involves Russia. Russia within the framework of CIS is trying to resolve this issue. For instance in 1998, ‘Agreement between the CIS states on cooperation in labor migration’ was signed. In 2005 through the Eurasian Economic Community, Russia and the Central Asian member countries signed the ‘Visa-free Agreement’ (Allison 2004, 463–467; Marat 2009, 45–47). Recently in his annual address to the Federal Assembly on 12 December 2012, President Putin advocated tougher measures to check the flow of migrant labour force from the CIS space. In this regard, he proposed that all those CIS citizens except those from the countries of the Custom Union should obtain necessary visas to make an entry to Russia. This, he stated, would significantly control the flow of workers from neighbouring states. He said that there should be a consensus on controlling the flow of migrant labour force (Voice of Russia 2012). Apart from the CIS body, the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO), which includes four Central Asian states and Russia apart from China, is also taking the issue of illegal migration seriously. The latest Summit of the August body, which took place in Beijing in June 2012, has also discussed the issue at length. One interesting aspect that needs to be mentioned here is that the SCO body considers illegal migration as part of wider non-traditional threats to this region like proliferation of narcotics and growing criminal activities (Shanghai Cooperation Organization 2012).

Conclusion

A critical evaluation of impact of migration processes on ‘securitisation’ process of Central Asia highlights the fact that ‘insecurity’ to this region to a great extent stems from the lack of societal cohesion and proliferation of social fault lines since the two decades of independence. These phenomena are manifested in the forms of inter- and intra-ethnic relations, formation of so-called ‘ethnic states’ in the region as well as strain on ‘capacity’ of the political system to deliver ‘public goods’ to the masses, which in turn accentuates migration. As the study shows that in the short-run, remittance contributes substantially to the economic development of some of the Central Asian states like Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan. However, this is not the best way to manage economy. As the present study demonstrates, migration in the longer-run proves to be harmful to the overall socio-economic development of the country, as the sending state will not be able to harness the ‘human capital’ properly. The Central Asian experience with regard to migration demonstrates that most of the migrants act as a conduit for illegal trafficking of drugs and are also prone to HIV/AIDS. A cursory glance at some of the previously mentioned empirical facts demonstrates that migration in the longer-run might have an effect on health security of this region. The best way through which the negative impact associated with migration can be checked is by ensuring ‘sustainable security’ in the region (Abbott, Chris, Rogers and Sloboda 2006, 28–33). The threat perception associated with migration can be smoothened if regional and international state, and non-state actors having interest in this region, can join together in devising an effective regional framework through which illegal migration can be curbed.

Footnotes

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