India and ASEM: The Quest for Membership

Abstract

Indian membership of the Asia–Europe Meeting (ASEM) represents an interesting case study of identity and exclusion of a major Asian country from a key interregional forum. Examining the vicissitudes of India’s decade-long quest for membership of ASEM since its inception, this article highlights how the exclusionary definition of Asia in Western and Asian discourses kept India out of regional entities. It discusses the arguments of Asian and Western critics of Indian membership in ASEM and concludes that India’s purposeful and constructive Look East Policy since the early 1990s and membership of the East Asian Summit facilitated Indian membership of ASEM.

Keywords

Indian foreign policy European Union India-EU relations ASEM interregionalism

Introduction

India’s multilateral journey in the Asia-Pacific region began in the 1990s and has to a great extent been the result of its Look East Policy, which reversed decades of neglect of Southeast Asia and gradually led to the forging of closer institutional links with the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN).¹ It was not easy to overcome entrenched perceptions of South Asia as being ‘outside’ of Asia. It took a decade and six summits for India to become a member of the Asia–Europe Meeting (ASEM).

In contrast to other regional organisations, Indian scholars have paid scant attention to ASEM.² This article seeks to redress this lacunae by examining the travails of the decade-long Indian quest for membership of ASEM since its inaugural summit at Bangkok (1996) until its eventual admission in the interregional organisation at the sixth ASEM summit in 2006.

The Birth of ASEM

A few months after the launch of the European Union’s ‘New Asia Strategy’ (1994), Singapore’s Prime Minister Goh Chok Tong proposed the idea of an Asia–Europe Meeting in October 1994 as a necessary third axis in a world where Asia and America and America and Europe were well linked. Five months later, the ASEAN Senior Officials Meeting (SOM) (17–19 March 1995), adopted a position paper drafted by the Singapore Ministry of Foreign Affairs which identified three major regions of economic power in the world—North America, Europe and East Asia. Participation, it stated, would be based on the principle that the EU would select the European participants and that ASEAN would choose the Asian ones. The inaugural ASEM meeting, the position paper added, should be ‘a small and manageable group of countries’ though the door would be kept open for new participants (Serradell 1996, 190, footnote 9). India had, in fact, been mentioned in the Singaporean Prime Minister’s proposal for ASEM (Robles 2008, 27) in keeping with the island nation’s efforts to gradually enhance India’s engagement with Asian regional organisations.

ASEAN’s views about India’s inclusion in ASEM subsequently changed. The choice of participants, according to the Singapore concept paper, would now be based on the consideration of including only ‘dynamic economies which have contributed to the region’s prosperity and growth’ (cited in Hwee 2003, 24). Evaluated against the score of economic growth and trade openness, India lay in ‘the penumbra of Asia’. For the worshippers of the market, India had been ‘priced out of Asia’ (Baru 2010, 220–221; Devare 2006, 152).

Two months later, at the Senior Officials’ Meeting in Singapore (2–4 May 1995), the EU’s concept paper entitled ‘Meeting between Europe and Asia’ concurred with ASEAN’s views regarding the potential membership of the interregional organisation. Since ASEM’s inaugural meeting, it stated, would be ‘experimental and open to change and as pragmatism would be required in its presentation, it would seem advisable to keep the number of participants small’. Brussels agreed that it would be up to ASEAN to determine which ASEAN countries would participate while the EU-15 would decide the European participation (Serradell 1996, 191, footnote 10). At the SOM meeting, ASEAN clarified that it had extended official invitations only to China, Japan and South Korea. Thus, in the three preparatory SOM meetings held to decide the format, participation and agenda for the first ASEM summit, ASEAN apparently did not seriously consider India’s candidature.

In its first Communication (16 January 1996) on ASEM, the European Commission acknowledged that the first ASEM meeting would have ‘a limited participation’, though both sides agreed that it should be ‘evolutionary in character’ and the first of a series of meetings. The EU left the choice of the Asian participants to the ASEAN side (European Commission 1996). The increasing weight of Asia in the world economy, the Communication noted, would contribute to a multipolar world, in which one should not ‘forget’ South Asia (European Commission 1996, 5).

In the Europe–Asia Forum on Culture, Values and Technology (Venice, 18–19 January 1996), organised as a ‘lead-up’ to the inaugural ASEM summit in Bangkok, the European Union was ‘generous’ in its invitations. Without whining about India’s exclusion from the ASEM summit, India’s High Commissioner in London, L.M. Singhvi, underlined the need for a better understanding of Asia’s geography (Sharma 1996).

The question of future membership, the Council felt, would be dealt with at a later stage and reiterated the Union’s intention to strengthen relations with India (Monfils 1996, cited in Gaens 2008, 151, footnote 1). In the third week of February 1996, British Foreign Secretary Malcolm Rifkind suggested that India, Pakistan, Australia and New Zealand join the second summit to be held in London. This was quickly rejected by Malaysian Prime Minister Mahathir Mohamad who dubbed it as ‘too big, with too many conflicting interests’ (The Hindu 1996d).

Among the ‘fiercest critics’ of India’s admission in ASEM were Thailand and Malaysia. Prime Minister Mahathir opposed any enlargement since it would hinder ‘constructive dialogue’, dilute the East Asian/Pacific orientation and make it more difficult and unwieldy for the Asian side to take initiatives within ASEM (‘India and ASEM’ 1996). ‘If it becomes too big and confusing’, he added, ‘there will be many conflicting interests and we cannot have a real dialogue. It will become confused and nothing can be achieved.’ He felt that ‘at the moment, we have to see whether it [ASEM] will work or not before admitting new members’ (Sunday Star 1996; The Hindu 1996d). The Malaysian Prime Minister did not want Australia and New Zealand to come in. He clubbed India and Pakistan and maintained that both of them ought to come in together while arguing against the expansion of ASEM. Japan had advocated the inclusion of Australia and New Zealand, but also eventually envisaged India and Pakistan as future members.³ The Indian media was critical of the ‘churlish’ stance of China, Japan and ASEAN, especially Malaysia, towards Indian membership of ASEM (The Times of India 1996).

The Inaugural Summit (Bangkok, March 1996)

The inaugural summit (Bangkok, 1–2 March 1996) was attended by 25 heads of state or government in East Asia and Europe—the Asian side consisted of seven ASEAN countries along with China, Japan and South Korea and the EU-15. India—Asia’s and the world’s second most populous nation—had been kept out on the pretext that some ASEAN countries wanted it to be restricted to a ‘dynamic’ Asia in which India did not belong. Perhaps the ‘most valid explanation’ for India’s omission from the summit, according to a journalist, was that the EU’s trade with India was less than the Union’s trade with Singapore (Sharma 1996). Although the Indian application did get support from nations like Singapore, ASEAN’s consensus formula saw it being kept out of the summit. Indian ‘soundings on membership’ had led nowhere (Rana 2009, 67) and ASEM had not ‘felt it necessary to make room’ for it (Haider 2012, 59).

Since ASEAN had chosen to confine itself to ‘East Asia’, India objected to this ‘artificial division’ (‘Asia-Euro Summit’ 1996) and had reportedly demanded that ASEM change its name to the ‘East Asia–Europe meeting’, but it did not succeed (European Report 1996, 1; The Hindu 1996a). The membership agreed to at the Bangkok summit was essentially a ‘minimalist solution’. The ASEM process, the summit urged, needed to be open and evolutionary (Chairman’s Statement of the Asia–Europe Meeting: Bangkok, 2 March 1996, para 18) with the Asian side insisting that they alone had the prerogative to decide on Asian participation. Italy, which held the EU Presidency at the time, clarified that there was no EU position on this and that the matter should be left open; a position with which the Asian side acquiesced (Serradel 1996, 208).

At the inaugural summit, the Europeans advocated the admission of other states that would have joined the Asian side, such as India, Pakistan, Australia and New Zealand—all of which had strong ties with Europe. For some Member States of ASEAN, the Commission’s continuous endorsement of their inclusion was a matter of ‘concern’ (Robles 2008, 28; The Hindu 1996e) since they were not too keen on expanding it just yet. Nevertheless, there was broad agreement that new candidates might be approved through ‘a ‘two-step’ consensus or ‘double-key’ approach’ (with an initial consensus within a candidate’s own region, followed by an overall consensus among all partners) (European Commission 1997, 7).

India was ‘distressed’ and justifiably peeved and disappointed at being left out of the inaugural ASEM summit (Kelegama 1999; Sridharan 2005, 123). India’s official reaction was not one of disappointment at being excluded from the inaugural summit. ‘It is not the end of the world. India is too large a country to be disappointed’, remarked Finance Minister Manmohan Singh. In fact, he argued that India could be a bridge between East Asia and Europe as it had a ‘better understanding of the Western mindset’ as many Indians had studied or been trained in Europe (Singh 1995). The Times of India described the Bangkok summit as ‘only a meeting of East Asian and West European nations. Neither is all of Asia represented, nor is all of Europe. It is not population but purchasing power that has defined the parameters of the proposed partnership. Even so, the Bangkok Summit ought to be called EAWEM (East Asia and West Europe Meeting), not ASEM’ (The Times of India [editorial] 1996).

Immediately after the Bangkok meeting, Manuel Marin, Vice-President of the European Commission and Commissioner-in-Charge of EU-Asia relations, spent two days in Delhi (3–4 March), along with the EU Troika, for the ninth round of political dialogue with India. Marin used the occasion to smoothen ‘the sub-continent’s ruffled feathers’ (European Report 1996, 1; Subhan 1996). European Commission President Jacques Santer was expected to provide a first-hand account of the summit to India on his way home from Bangkok, but he cancelled his visit at the last minute. The EU troika led by Italian Foreign Minister Susanana Agnelli conveyed the message that the ‘comprehensive Asia–Europe partnership’ forged at the Bangkok summit (ASEM, Chairman’s statement at Bangkok summit, 2 March 1996, para 3) would apply to ‘all of Asia, not just to those present at the summit’, and that the ASEM summit seemed incomplete without the participation of India (European Voice 1996, 1, cited in Gaens 2008, 151; Shukla 1996). It was indicated to Indian officials that the EU would be ‘pleased’ to see India take part in future ASEM summits (Serradell 1996, 208).

‘ASEM Asia’ and the Politics of Exclusion

The initiative to establish the ASEM process necessitated Asia deciding ‘where it was, and who was in it’. The absence of South Asian states resulted in ‘an exclusionary definition’ of Asia (Breslin 2007, 41) since in Western strategic discourses and in high business circles the definition of Asia basically referred to East and Southeast Asia and did not normally include India. Several Asian countries used this definition ‘to seek to keep India out of regional affairs and entities’ and succeeded, for example, in the case of APEC and ASEM (Gupta 2007, 353). Soon after the Bangkok summit, Malaysia stressed that ASEAN would face ‘the risk of losing its identity’ if non-Southeast Asian states were admitted. While expressing his commitment to open regionalism, Malaysian Foreign Minister Badawi argued that engagement with non-ASEAN countries could be fostered through other means such as bilateral relations and dialogue. He asserted: ‘Obviously, we must draw the line somewhere, I suggest we hold the line in South-East Asia’ (Badawi 1996, cited in Charles 1996).

Asian participants in ASEM were trying ‘to monopolize the metaphor [Asia] for themselves, just like the EU has monopolized the term Europe for itself’. At the same time, they implied that Indians are either ‘something other than Asians, or Asians only in a secondary sense’ (Korhonen 1997, 360). Highly anomalous as it may sound, but in the lexicon of the Asia-Pacific, India did not seem to find a place (Devare 2006, 151). The Union also termed the Asian participation in the new interregional arrangement as ‘Asian ASEM’—a term which Brussels used in its statistics (Gilson 2004, 73; McMahon 1998, 233).

As a consistent advocate that the emerging regional architecture in Asia should be open and inclusive, India strongly criticised the narrow definition of Asia supported by the East Asian countries, which reduced Asia’s vast landmass to its ‘Confucian fringe’ or ‘Chopsticks Asia’ (Datta-Ray 1998, cited in Gaens 2008, 151). At the time of the first ASEM summit, Foreign Minister Pranab Mukherjee rightly complained that Asia without India was like Hamlet without the Prince of Denmark (cited in Datta-Ray 2007, 412). Any summit between Europe and Asia, he pointed out, would be meaningless without India’s presence, given its size, its status as a regional power and its economic strength ((The Hindu 1996f). In fact, the ‘Asia’ that was represented at the Bangkok summit was in fact, if not in name, the East Asia Economic Caucus of Malaysian Prime Minister Mahathir. The ‘Asia’ encountered in Bangkok was not only ‘geographically circumscribed’, it was also limited in a socio-political sense (Bouissou and Camroux 1996).

India Lobbies Hard

After becoming a full dialogue partner of ASEAN in December 1995, which gave it ‘the privilege and opportunity of wide ranging and all inclusive cooperation’ with it, Foreign Minister Inder Kumar Gujral stated that he looked to it as ‘a window of our progressive participation in other ASEAN-related fora such as APEC and ASEM since it was ‘an inalienable part of the Asia-Pacific economic and strategic zone’. He expressed the hope that India would be involved in the ‘processes’ leading up to the second biennial ASEM Summit to be held in London in 1998 (Gujral 1996, in Gujral 1998, 227, 232).

Gujral sought to reassure Southeast Asian countries that unresolved issues between India and China would not be brought into Asian organisations. The ‘consistent and declared policy of India’, he reiterated, has been ‘not to raise bilateral and contentious issues in international or multilateral forums’ ((Bangkok Post, 1996, 23 July). Given India’s size, its geostrategic location and the weight of its economy, he added, ‘we are convinced that any forum claiming to represent Asia cannot be complete without India’. He expressed confidence that in view of its ‘excellent relations’ with all ASEAN countries and other Asian members of ASEM as well as all the EU Member States, including the UK, the host of the next ASEM summit, India would be invited to participate in ASEM (Ibid.).

At the time of the Bangkok summit, New Delhi was apparently given assurances by several ASEAN members that it would not be left out of the London ASEM summit. However, at the Senior Officials’ Meeting in Dublin (20 December 1996), it was agreed that neither Asia nor Europe would interfere in each other’s choice of participants. That effectively ruled out Britain or any other EU Member State being able to speak up for an Indian presence at the summit (Velloor 1996). Again, the ‘spoiler’ at the SOM was Malaysia. At the SOM meeting, Kuala Lumpur and Bonn insisted that ASEM should first be consolidated and strengthened before being expanded (ibid.). Mahathir’s opposition was similar to his approach towards India’s inclusion in other fora as well. For instance, during the third week of December 1996 when the Malaysian Prime Minister was in Delhi to receive the Nehru Award for International Understanding, he ‘hummed and hawed’ when asked if Malaysia would support India’s application to enter APEC (Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation) (ibid.).

ASEM enlargement, Brussels noted, was ‘inevitable, but not immediately possible’ by the London ASEM summit since the Asian side was unable to reach a consensus on either the procedure or which countries among the ‘frontrunners’ (India, Pakistan, Australia and New Zealand) should be actually considered. One had to be ‘very mindful’, a senior EU official even cautioned, of how one proceeded because that could ‘easily almost double the size of ASEM. And the, even look more like the UN General Assembly’, which would be very difficult to work (Westerland in Kim and Park 1997, 175–176). The European Parliament continued to be supportive of Indian membership of ASEM. It regarded the case for including countries like India, Australia and New Zealand to be strong and urged the Union ‘to see what it could do to facilitate such an enlargement in the future’ (European Parliament 1997). The European Commission urged that the numerical imbalance in ASEM (fifteen EU and ten Asian countries) needed to be redressed by increasing the Asian participation. There was widespread recognition that any decision on enlargement was ultimately ‘a political decision’ (European Commission 1997, 8). In the absence of a consensus among Asian participants on the inclusion of more Asian countries, the issue was postponed for the second ASEM summit.

India lobbied hard both within ASEAN and the EU for inclusion in ASEM 2. It would be difficult, Britain pointed out, to conceive of an Asian organisation without India. New Delhi’s inclusion could be finalised only by consensus among member nations, but it was not a matter which needed to be ‘resolved immediately’ (Business World, 1996, 16 April; The Statesman 1997, 14 February).

At the first ASEM Foreign Ministers’ Meeting in Singapore (15 February 1997), it was agreed that no one had an automatic claim to membership and that the founding fathers of ASEM would have to adopt rules to justify their choices for future membership (Fatchett 1999, 15; Godement 2000, 204). After the conference, Malaysian Foreign Minister Abdullah Ahmad Badawi again urged patience: ‘It is not that we are against the admission of more countries into ASEM. It is simply a question of time…let us firm up first before expanding’ (New Straits Times 1997, 15 February). Japan and several Southeast Asian countries advocated the inclusion of Australia and New Zealand in the next summit for geographic and economic considerations, but were reticent about India. Other Asian members of ASEM also preferred that the original composition of the interregional organisation be maintained, especially as it was ‘a very new forum’ which need time to develop and strengthen (Business Times 1977, 1 May, 4). Even amongst the Europeans, there were some who wanted to see India take part in the London summit in light of its political and economic importance in Asia and in order to redress the numerical balance in favour of the Europeans. Since opinion was divided on the issue of new members, it was decided to postpone a decision on expanding membership after the London ASEM summit.

Enlargement became an extremely controversial issue over the admission of Myanmar (which became a member of ASEAN in July 1997) owing to the EU’s boycott of its inclusion because of the military junta. Since its own members (Laos, Cambodia and Myanmar) were not being accepted in ASEM, ASEAN countered that it would oppose the admission of new EU members in view of the impending enlargement. This resulted in a de facto moratorium on new membership until 2004 as successive Foreign Ministers’ meetings failed to resolve the deadlock.

ASEM 2 (London, April 1998)

The second ASEM summit (London, 3–4 April 1998) failed to come up with a consensus on either the timing, criteria or modalities regarding enlargement. A decision was deferred until ASEM 3 probably because the question of increasing the Asian side was probably too contentious (Holland 2002, 73). The Chairman’s statement of ASEM 2 stated that ‘enlargement should be conducted on the basis of consensus by the Heads of State and Government’.⁴

The Asia–Europe Cooperation Framework endorsed at ASEM 2 mentioned enlargement in passing and failed to define any criteria for membership. It merely reiterated that ASEM should be an open and evolutionary process and that enlargement should take place on the basis of consensus. At the end of the summit, Prime Minister Mahathir stood steadfast in his opposition to admitting Australia and New Zealand into ASEM, saying priority should be given to India and Pakistan. However, in the same breath he stressed that the two-year old, 25-nation grouping ‘must first produce results before considering expansion’ (AFX News 1998, 6 April, 1). Many Southeast Asian countries apparently came to the conclusion that Indian interest in joining either APEC or ASEM had waned somewhat given the sharp differences over the admission of Myanmar and because New Delhi was preoccupied with its nuclear security doctrine and a related dialogue with Washington (The Hindu 1999b , 15 February, 1). Moreover, between ASEM 1 and ASEM 2, support for Australia and New Zealand declined perceptibly and the issue of admission of India and Pakistan ‘receded into the background’ (Robles 2008, 22). With a growing sense of ASEM’s unimportance, according to one perceptive observer, India’s ‘lobbying fervor diminished significantly’ (Camroux 2006, 12).

ASEM 3 (Seoul, October 2000)

In March 1999, the European Parliament again urged both the Council and the Commission to ‘help’ India join the ASEM process, which could only benefit from the weight of Asia’s largest democracy and its economic potential. However, the following month, the Committee on Foreign Affairs, Security and Defense Policy of the European Parliament concluded that it would be ‘premature’ to admit new members given the major differences among the existing ASEM participants, that the case for including countries like India, Australia and New Zealand was strong and urged the EU to see what it could do to facilitate such an enlargement in the future (European Parliament 1999, 14).

Senior European bureaucrats in DG1B, which was headed by Commissioner Manuel Marin and dealt with South and Southeast Asia, seemed to have had difficulty in integrating its agenda in the ASEM process. For instance, DG1B generously financed two major meetings, such as the Europe–Asia Forum on Culture, Values and Technology (Venice, 18–19 January 1996) and the Europe–Asia Forum in Manila (1998) as a cultural dialogue between Asia and Europe. Both these meetings had a significant input from Indian specialists but the conclusions were largely ignored in the ASEM process because of the inclusion of non-ASEM members (Camroux 2002, 147; 2006, 7).

The continuing ‘numerical imbalance’, a Working Document of the Commission on ASEM (April 2000) argued, suggested that the priority for ASEM enlargement should rest with ‘major candidates on the Asian side’ (European Commission 2000). Three months later, Commissioner for External Relations Chris Patten expressed the hope that ASEM 3 would tackle the issue of enlarging its membership to include other Asian partners, including those outside East and Southeast Asia (Patten 2000a). Two days before the Seoul summit, Patten again argued that the ASEM was not ‘the sum total’ of Europe’s relationship with Asia and there were ‘important Asian countries, with thriving democracies and economies—and I think above all of India—who are not a part of it’ (Patten 2000b). Endorsing this, the European Parliament urged that India, ‘one of the most important democracies in the world’, ought to participate in the ASEM process, within ‘a reasonable time-frame’ (European Parliament 2000; emphasis added).

At ASEM 3, no progress was made on extending membership beyond the existing principle of each side determining its own composition. Thus, the EU’s wish to see India included was thwarted and Asia’s (specifically Malaysia) response to incorporating Australia or New Zealand was that ‘membership would have to be through the EU half of ASEM!’ The only concession was that ASEM non-members were allowed to participate in common ASEM projects (Holland 2002, 74). Even Singapore’s efforts to bring India into the Asia Europe Foundation were being blocked (Koh 1998). East Asian states, The Hindu editorially noted, were ‘dragging their feet’ over enlargement in order not to dilute attention at this stage and because of the Pakistan factor. It was up to India, it added, to convince its eastern neighbours that it could ‘add value and substance’ to ASEM (The Hindu 2000, 28 October).

ASEM 3 approved the ‘Asia–Europe Cooperation Framework 2000’ which enumerated the principles governing future participation. It stated that the ASEM was an ‘open and evolutionary’ process and enlargement should be conducted in ‘progressive stages’. Each candidacy, it said, should

be examined on the basis of its own merits and in the light of its potential contribution to the ASEM process. It adopted a two-key approach: a final decision on new participants would be made by consensus among all partners only after a candidate has first the support of its partners within its region. Thereafter, any decision regarding the admission of new participants would be taken by the Heads of State and Government on a consensus basis. (‘VI. ASEM Participation’, Asia–Europe Cooperation Framework 2000, para 28)

Thus, a candidate’s application had to first receive the ‘blessings’ of the ASEM members in the geographical group to which it belonged, before it could be considered by all the ASEM heads of state and government.

A European Commission Vademecum (July 2001) noted that since no decision on enlargement could be taken before ASEM 4 in Copenhagen (September 2002), there was no need to take a discussion on substance until nearer the summit (European Commission 2001a, point 7). In its revised Asia strategy—‘Europe and Asia: A Strategic Framework for Enhanced Partnerships’ (4 September 2001)—the Commission urged ‘a stronger integration of South Asia within the broader Asian regional (for example through a broadening of Asian participation in ASEM)’ (European Commission 2001b, 20–21). Thus, an agreement on the pace and procedures for enlargement continued to be elusive. Even in 2002, former Commission President Jacques Santer had expressed his frustration over the refusal of China, Thailand and Vietnam to let India and Pakistan to join ASEM (European Voice 6 June 2002, cited in Gaens, 151).

ASEM 5 (Hanoi, October 2004)

The deadlock over the admission of Myanmar persisted until ASEM 5 in Hanoi in 2004. Brussels sought to include the 10 new Member States, which had joined the Union in May 2004, at the summit. However, ASEAN refused to allow this unless the Union agreed to the inclusion of its three new members (Cambodia, Laos and Myanmar). A month before the Hanoi summit (September 2004), EU Foreign Ministers agreed that Myanmar could attend the summit, but they also imposed additional sanctions on it. Thus, at the fifth summit, ASEM had admitted 13 new members—10 EU and three ASEAN states, but even now India was not invited to join even though annual India-ASEAN summits had been held since 2002. All that Brussels could do was to note India’s ‘aspiration to become as early as possible a member of ASEM to complement its ASEAN Summit level dialogue status’.⁵

ASEM 6: Membership at Last

With the impending accession of Romania and Bulgaria on 1 January 2007, the Finnish Presidency started negotiations on ASEM enlargement at an early stage, but the Asian members of ASEM only reached a decision on ‘Asian ASEM’ enlargement during the ASEAN Plus Three Foreign Ministers Meeting in Kuala Lumpur on 26 July 2006. The Meeting agreed to the inclusion of three Asian countries, such as India, Pakistan and Mongolia, provided the new members became part of the Northeast Asian coordinating mechanism and that the ASEAN Secretariat was allowed to join as a partner (Gaens 2008, 150). Several observers maintain that this seems to have been almost a ‘last minute decision’ (Pereira 2007, 17) and was largely ‘unexpected’ (Camroux 2006, 31). However, the consensus is that after the admission of 13 countries (three Asian and ten European) in 2004, the decision of ASEM 6 to admit India, Pakistan, Mongolia and the ASEAN Secretariat, ‘no longer’ allowed controversies (Robles 2008, 29).

After the EU’s positive reaction, the Senior Officials Meeting on the eve of the Helsinki Summit agreed on the inclusion of the European and Asian candidates. The leaders officially endorsed the candidates during the ‘Future of ASEM’ session at the summit, and the new partners were officially invited to join the process during the summit’s closing ceremony (Gaens 2008, 150). On receiving a formal invitation from the Asian-ASEM Coordinators (China and Brunei), India accepted membership of the 45-member group of ASEM.

Asian members of ASEM consist of 10 ASEAN members and a sub-group called North, East and South Asia (NESA) comprising six countries (China, India, Japan, Mongolia, Pakistan and South Korea). When it joined, India became the coordinator of NESA, which rotates on a two-year term whereas the other one (ASEAN) was rotated on a three-year term. The admission of Pakistan was ‘a logical or unavoidable extension’ of India’s participation in ASEM (Godement 2000, 205; Gaens 2008, 150).

The admission of six new countries (India, Mongolia, Pakistan, Bulgaria and Romania) and the ASEAN Secretariat at ASEM 7 in Beijing (October 2008) brought the membership up to 45 partners, together representing half of the world’s GDP, almost 60 per cent of the world’s population and over 60 per cent of global trade. ASEM enlargement at the ASEM 6 provided ‘greater dynamism, enhances dialogue and cooperation’ and made the ‘partnership better equipped to tackle present and future global challenges’ (Helsinki Declaration on the Future of ASEM, 2006) India’s participation was expected to further increase the ‘representative, dynamism and innovative character of the ASEM process’.⁶ It was recognition of the fact that the EU’s engagement with Asia would be ‘incomplete’ without India.⁷ Kishore Mahbubani characterised ASEM enlargement at the Helsinki summit as an ‘effort to revive the ASEM process’ (Mahbubani and Jayme 2008, 30–31).

Critics of Indian Membership

Since the establishment of ASEM, there has been a debate over India’s admission in ASEM amongst European and Southeast Asian scholars with most of them being critical of New Delhi’s admission in the interregional organisation.

The official, formal reason for excluding India, according to a former Indian Foreign Secretary, was that if it joined ‘the skullduggeries’ of Indo-Pak relations would come in (Dixit 2000, 87). It was feared that admission of India and Pakistan would lead to a spill-over of South Asia’s conflicts and rivalries and ‘burden’ ASEM with their bilateral problems (Rueland 2001, 68; Rueland 2008, 27–28). Till the late 1990s, there were stated to be ‘strong fears’ in the Asian camp that their admission would ‘paralyse’ ASEM as both might be tempted to use the grouping as a stage for their protracted conflict over Kashmir (Rueland 1999, 129).

Several ASEAN Member States and scholars argued that any further expansion of ASEM would make it truly unwieldy and incapable of producing any meaningful results (Rueland 1999, 127–128). ‘A premature extension’ was to be avoided (Rueland 1997, 128) since ASEM had not yet consolidated as an institution and had been weakened by the Asian financial crisis. ‘Bringing in new members at this point—especially from South Asia—is the last thing an already highly fragile forum can shoulder. It would only burden ASEM with an additional set of tricky problems, thus further eroding the forum’s weak cohesion’ (Rueland 1999, 129; Rueland 2001, 68). Many scholars asserted that priority ought to be given to consolidation of ASEM rather than an early enlargement, which would make it prone to inertia and inefficiencies (Godement 2000, 204; Hwee 2003, 170; Rueland 1999, 127–128; Rueland 2001, 68).

Criticism of Indian admission increased in the wake of the nuclear tests by India and Pakistan (1998) (Rueland 1999, 129; Rueland 2001, 68). One scholar even suggested that admission of South Asian nations to ASEM ought to be linked to a prior accession to the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (Nutall 2000, cited in Rueland 2000, 192).

Some even feared that due to its size, India might take the centre-stage in ASEM’s dialogues and that Indian membership could lead to ASEAN losing its centrality in ASEM (Holland 2002, 73; Reiterer 2001, 26). Medium-sized and small Asian members were apprehensive that the inclusion of another 1.4 billion people from India and Pakistan would ‘drown their voices and living about a shift in balance of power’ (Hwee 2002). One EU official even advocated a ‘separate arrangement’ between South Asia and the EU (Reiterer 2001, 26).

Gilson highlighted the differences between East and South Asia, which the European Asia Strategy (2001) itself noted was ‘distinct from the rest of Asia’ (European Commission 2001b, 9). She argued that the EU pursued ‘a donor-recipient format’ for South Asia given its level of development and a graduated status for Southeast Asia as part of a wider regional grouping of East Asia. In this way, she added, the explicit nature of the region as part of an interregional framework might serve to reinforce further differences between East and South Asia (Gilson 2005, 319). For an EU official, the 2006 ASEM enlargement tended to confirm the dialogue character of ASEM and South and Central Asia, which remained ‘two distinct regions only loosely connected to East Asia’ (Reiterer 2009, 187–188).

Since the 1990s as India began to woo its Asian neighbours and stepped up its diplomacy to become a member of regional organisations, Beijing has sought the strategic exclusion of external players like India (Kavalski 2009, 89). When India was invited to join the ASEAN Regional Forum in 1996, China was ‘non-committal and its support, at best was lukewarm parity driven by a desire not to be isolated’ (Ram 2012, 71). Chinese objections to Indian membership of regional organisations like ASEM and the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO) have been largely political and strategic in nature. Even Members of the European Parliament felt that China was ‘not what one would call hospitable’ on the question of Indian membership of ASEM (Belder 2001).

On the other hand, some academics argued that ASEM could help in integrating ‘great powers’ like India and Russia into regional communities so that they could be ‘more actively engaged in their respective regions. While their involvement may have drawbacks as well (their presence may constrain the scope of discussions and co-operation), on balance the positive aspects of involvement’ seemed more important (Maull 1997, 25). In the wake of the 11 September 2001 events, a veteran observer of ASEM urged that the protracted campaign against terrorism should make one ‘re-examine seriously’ the idea of especially including India and Pakistan into the ASEM framework (Hwee 2002, 7–15).

Conclusion

After being at the periphery for decades, India’s constructive, proactive, and purposeful engagement with East and Southeast Asia since the 1990s has gradually transformed it into an active participant in Asian regional organisations and multilateral processes (Jain 2011). The Look East Policy, which was premised on emerging and shared strategic, defence, economic, cultural and socio-economic convergences between India and Southeast Asia, reversed decades of neglect of the region. It undeniably played a transformative role in enhancing India’s profile in Asia and opened the doors for Indian membership of regional organisations like the East Asian Summit (EAS) and ASEM. (Sikri 2012, 168) Membership of the EAS accorded India the status of ‘a legitimate player’ that could help shape the dialogue and political landscape of East Asia and the Pacific (Yong and Mun 2009, 39).

The diverse level, intensity and interests of Southeast Asian members in the ASEM process conditioned their practical scope and conceptual input. Singapore, Thailand, the Philippines and Vietnam were more interested in ASEM than Malaysia, Indonesia or Brunei Darussalam (Bersick 2002). Despite active support of several member states like Singapore, the inability to arrive at a consensual position within ASEAN delayed India’s inclusion in ASEM. The exclusion of India from the ASEM process was, for long, the result of ‘the growing dominance of the exclusionist position’ which Malaysia was able to enforce amidst the consensus-seeking diplomacy of East Asia (cf. Wesley 1997, 530). While Indian lobbying did apparently succeed in whittling down opposition to India’s inclusion in ASEM in several ASEAN member states, but even New Delhi’s more ardent supporters were not willing to break East Asian solidarity for India’s cause. Thus, enlargement of ASEM was made contingent on the emergence of a deeper consensus on broadening of membership.

Apprehensions that India might take centre-stage in ASEM proved unwarranted as New Delhi has historically preferred ASEAN to be in the driver’s seat and deferred to it as the leading architect of the institution-building in the region. India’s enhanced integration with the Asia-Pacific region has, in fact, been facilitated by a closer understanding with ASEAN, the crucial support of countries like Singapore and Japan, and concerns about China’s growing assertiveness. Indian membership has also not burdened the interregional organisation with contentious South Asian issues as New Delhi has assiduously striven to keep them out of international fora. Moreover, that ASEM continues to remain a forum for broad dialogue rather than problem-solving has nothing to do with Indian membership as many critics contended, but with what the interregional forum has become over time.

India has been an active participant in ASEM since its admission in 2007. New Delhi increasingly perceives ASEM to be a valuable forum since twelve ASEM countries figure among its top 25 trading partners. ASEM has also proven of great value in enhancing India’s bilateral and multilateral cooperation as well as being a platform for informal dialogue on topical issues. For India, ASEM offers an additional channel of communication with the added value of high-level participation, informality and multi-dimensional activities.

Footnotes

Notes

References

Asia Europe Meeting (1996, 2 March). Chairman’s statement, Bangkok, para 3. Retrieved 20 September 2012, from http://www.aseminfoboard.org/content/documents/chairmans_statement_asem_1.pdf

AFX News (1998, 6 April). Asia–Europe meeting: Malaysia maintains opposition to Australian entry to ASEM.

Badawi

A A.

(1996, 4 March). Remarks by Malaysian Foreign Minister at the Seventh Southeast Asian Forum.

Bangkok Post (1996, 23 July). Gujral’s interview, 19 July 1996.

Baru

(2007). ‘How Asian is India?’, in Baru

, Strategic consequences of India’s economic performance: Essays & columns (pp. 220–227). Oxon: Routledge.

Belder

(2001). Debates in the European Parliament, Strasbourg, 12 June 2001. Retrieved 20 September 2012, from http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?type=CRE&reference=20010612&secondRef=ITEM-009&format=XML&language-EN)

Bersick

(2002). The ASEM regime and its participants’ interests. Asia Europe crosspoints. Retrieved 16 August 2010, from http://www.tni.org/archives/reports_asia_crosspoints4

Breslin

(2007). ‘Theorising East Asian regionalism(s): New regionalism and Asia’s future(s)’, in Curley

M.G.

Thomas

(Eds), Advancing East Asian regionalism (pp. 26–51). Oxon: Routledge.

Business Times (1977, 1 May). Building a harmonious ASEM. Kuala Lumpur edition.

10.

Business World (1996, 16 April). ASEM membership needs further study. Manila edition: 2.

11.

Camroux

(2002). ‘Contemporary EU-East Asian relations: An assessment of the ASEM process’, in Jain

R.K.

(Ed.), The European Union in a changing world (pp. 139–161). New Delhi: Radiant.

12.

Camroux

(2006). The rise and decline of the Asia–Europe Meeting: Asymmetric bilateralism and the limitations of interregionalism. Cahiers Europeens 3. Retrieved 9 September 2013, from www.cee.sciences_po.fr/fr/publications/les-cahiers-europeens/doc/16/raw

13.

Charles

(1996). ASEM only a wake-up call to Europe, no quick deals seen. Economic Times, 5 March.

14.

Datta-Ray

S.K

(1998). Chopsticks and Victorian values. What exactly is Asia, and why do the Confucians try to keep India out? Time Magazine, 30 March.

15.

Datta-Ray

S.K

(2007). ‘Rediscovering Suvarnabhumi: India and Southeast Asia’, in Sinha

Mohta

(Eds), Indian foreign policy: Challenges and opportunities (pp. 407–426). New Delhi: Foreign Service Institute/Academic Foundation.

16.

Devare

(2006). India and Southeast Asia: Towards security convergence. Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies.

17.

Dixit

J N.

(2000). ‘India and Europe: Perceptions and misperceptions’, in Jain

R.K.

(Ed.), India and Europe in the new millennium (pp. 73-88). New Delhi: Radiant.

18.

European Commission (1996). Communication from the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament, regarding the Asia–Europe Meeting (ASEM) to be held in Bangkok on 1–2 March 1996, Brussels, 16 January 1996, COM(96) 4 final, p. 4.

19.

European Commission (1997). Perspectives and priorities for the ASEM process (Working Document). SEC(97) 1239 final, 26 June 1997, p. 7.

20.

European Commission (2000). Perspectives and priorities for the ASEM process (Asia Europe Meeting) into the new decade (Working Document). COM/2000/0241 final, 18 April 2000, p. 11. Retrieved 20 September 2012, from http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=COM:2000:0241:FIN:EN:PDF; European Parliament resolution on the third Asia–Europe Meeting (ASEM 3) in Seoul, 20–21 October.

21.

European Commission (2001a). Directorate H, Horizontal Matters—ASEM Counsellor Vademecum, Modalities for future dialogue taking the process forward, 18 July. Retrieved 16 August 2010, from http://www.aseminfoboard.org/content/documents/Vade.pdf, point 7.

22.

European Commission (2001b). Europe and Asia: A strategic framework for enhanced partnerships (Communication from the Commission). COM(2001) 469 final, 4 September.

23.

European Parliament (1997). Resolution on the Communication from the Commission to the Council, the European Parliament, and the Economic and Social Committee. Creating a New Dynamic in EU-ASEAN Relations. Official Journal C325, 27 October.

24.

European Parliament (1999). Committee on Foreign Affairs, Security and Defence Policy, Report on the Commission Working Document on Perspectives and Priorities for the ASEM Process SEC(97), 1239, PE 229.876/fin., 29 April.

25.

European Parliament (1999). Resolution A4-0197/1999. Official Journal 279, 1 October.

26.

European Parliament (2000). Resolution on the third Asia–Europe Meeting (ASEM 3) in Seoul, 20–21 October 2000, Minutes of 4 October 2000—Final Edition; European Parliament, Resolution on ASEM, 16 November 2000—Final Edition.

27.

European Report (1996, 4 March). EU Troika and Commissioner in Delhi to reassure India.

28.

Fatchett

(1999). ‘Setting the agenda for ASEM 2: From Bangkok to London via Singapore’, in Stokhof

van der Velde

(Eds), ASEM: The Asia–Europe meeting, a window of opportunity (pp. 13–17). London: Kegan Paul International.

29.

Gaens

(2008). ‘The outcomes of the ASEM6 summit in Helsinki’, in Gaens

(Ed.), Europe-Asia interregionalism: A decade of ASEM (pp. 149–168). Aldershot: Ashgate.

30.

Gilson

(2004). ‘Weaving a new silk road: Europe meets Asia’, in Aggarwal

V.K.

Fogarty

E.A.

(Eds), EU trade strategies: Between regionalism and globalism (pp. 64–92). Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan.

31.

Gilson

(2005). New interregionalism? The EU and East Asia. Journal of European Integration, 27(3), September, 307–326.

32.

Godement

(2000). ‘Europe and Asia: Is ASEM a model for the future?’, in Tien

H.-m.

Cheng

T.-j.

(Eds), The security environment in the Asia-Pacific (pp. 202–215). Armonk, NY: M.E. Sharpe.

33.

Gujral

I K.

(1996). Speech by Foreign Minister Gujral at the Post-Ministerial Conference of ASEAN, Jakarta, 21 July.

34.

Gujral

I K.

(1998). A foreign policy for India. New Delhi: External Publicity Division, Ministry of External Affairs.

35.

Gupta

(2007). ‘India’s “Look East” Policy’, in Sinha

Mohta

(Eds), Indian foreign policy: Challenges and opportunities (pp. 351–381). New Delhi: Foreign Service Institute/Academic Foundation.

36.

Haider

(2012). ‘Look East’, in Ram

A.N.

(Ed.), Two decades of India’s Look East Policy: Partnership for peace, progress and prosperity (pp. 53–62). New Delhi: Manohar.

37.

Helsinki Declaration on the Future of ASEM (2006, 10–11 September). Helsinki. Retrieved 20 November 2012, from http://www.asem6.fi/NEWS_AND_DOCUMENTS/EN_GB/1157981074064/INDEX.HTM

38.

Holland

(2002). The European Union and the Third World. Basingstoke: Palgrave.

39.

Hwee

Y L.

(2002). The Asia–Europe Meeting (ASEM): From selective engagement to comprehensive partnership. Suedostasien aktuell, Special Issue, 7–15.

40.

Hwee

Y L.

(2003). Asia and Europe: The development and different dimensions of ASEM. London: Routledge.

41.

Hwee

Y L.

(2007). ‘The inter-regional dimension of EU-Asia relations: EU-ASEAN and the Asia–Europe meeting (ASEM) process’, in Anderson

Wiessala

(Eds), The European Union and Asia: Reflections and re-orientations (pp. 173–192). Amsterdam: Rodopi.

42.

Hwee

Y L.

Vidal

L.L.

i. (2008). Regionalism and interregionalism in the ASEM context: Current dynamics and theoretical approaches. Documentos CIDOB Asia 23, December. Barcelona: Fundacio CIDOB.

43.

Hindustan Times (1996, 5 March). India and ASEM [Editorial].

44.

Jain

R K.

(2011). India and Asian regional integration. Japanese Journal of Political Science, 12(2), 213–231.

45.

Kavalski

(2009). China and the global politics of globalization. Aldershot: Ashgate.

46.

Kelegama

(1999, December). South Asia and other regional economic groupings. Paper presented at the conference on South Asia 2010: Challenges and Opportunities, Kathmandu. Retrieved 20 September 2012,: Challenges and Opportunities, Kathmandu. Retrieved 20 September 2012,, from http:\\www.casaconline.com\southasia_2010\

47.

Kim

C.-O.

Park

S.-H.

(Eds). (1998). The Asia–Europe Meeting (ASEM): A new framework for Korea-EU relations in the 21st century, August 1998. Seoul: The European Union Studies Association of Korea.

48.

Koh

(1998, 2 December). The prophet of boom. Interview in The Times of India.

49.

Korhonen

(1997). Monopolizing Asia: The politics of a metaphor. The Pacific Review, 10(3), 347–365.

50.

Mahbubani

Jayme

(2008). ‘ASEAN: A diplomatic superpower’, in Sisodia

N.S.

Datta

(Eds), Changing security dynamics in Southeast Asia (pp. 27–36). New Delhi: Magnum Books.

51.

Maull

H W.

Tanaka

. (1997). ‘The geopolitical dimension’, in Council for Asia–Europe Cooperation, The Rationale and Common Agenda for Asia–Europe Cooperation: CAEC Task Force Reports. Tokyo: Council for Asia–Europe Cooperation.

52.

McMahon

J D.

(1998). ASEAN and the Asia–Europe meeting: Strengthening the European Union’s relationship with southeast Asia? European Foreign Affairs Review, 3(2), 233–251.

53.

Monfils

(1996), Reply by Council in response to Written Question no. E-086/96 by Monfils (ELDR), 30 January 1996, on the future membership of ASEM.

54.

Naidu

G.V.C.

(1998). India and ASEM. Strategic Analysis (New Delhi), 22(3), June, 485–487.

55.

New Straits Times (1997, 15 February). Groundwork laid for stronger ties.

56.

Nutall

(2000, July). ASEM and political dialogue. Paper presented for the conference ‘The 2000 Seoul Summit: The Way Ahead for the Asia–Europe Partnership’, organised by the Korean Institute for International Economics and the Asia–Europe Foundation, Seoul.

57.

Patten

(2000a, 20 July). Europe and Asia: A closer partnership in the new millennium. Speech at Sejong Institute, Seoul. Retrieved from europa.eu/rapid/press-release_SPEECH-00-278_en.htm

58.

Patten

(2000b, 18 October). The EU and Asia in the new millennium. Speech to European Chamber of Commerce, Hong Kong. Retrieved 20 September 2012, from europa.eu/rapid/press-release_SPEECH-00-383_en.htm

59.

Pereira

(2007). The Helsinki summit and the future course of Asia–Europe meeting. Asia Europe Journal, 5(1), 17–21.

60.

Ram

A N.

(2012). ‘The first decade of India’s Look East Policy: An insider’s account’, in Ram

A.N.

(Ed.), Two decades of India’s Look East Policy: Partnership for peace, progress and prosperity (pp. 63–82). New Delhi: Manohar.

61.

Rana

K S.

(2000). Inside diplomacy. New Delhi: Manas.

62.

Rana

K S.

(2009). Asian diplomacy: The foreign ministries of China, India, Japan, Singapore, and Thailand. Washington, DC: Woodrow Wilson Center Press.

63.

Reddy

V L.

(2010). Briefing by Secretary East, Ministry of External Affairs, on Vice-President Ansari’s visit for the Brussels ASEM Summit, 1 October 2010. Retrieved 20 November 2012, from www.meaindia.nic.in

64.

Reiterer

(2001). ASEM—The third summit in Seoul 2000: A roadmap to consolidate the partnership between Asia and Europe. European Foreign Affairs Review, 6, 1–30.

65.

Reiterer

(2009). Asia–Europe Meeting (ASEM): Fostering a multipolar world order through inter-regional cooperation. Asia Europe Journal, 7(1), 179–196.

66.

Robles, Jr

A.C

(2008). The Asia–Europe meeting: The theory and practice of interregionalism. London: Routledge.

67.

Rueland

(1999). ‘The future of the ASEM Process: Who, how, why, and what’, in Stokhof

van der Velde

(Eds), ASEM: The Asia–Europe Meeting, a window of opportunity (pp. 126–51). London: Kegan Paul International.

68.

Rueland

(2000). ‘Asia–Europe cooperation—The ASEM process: A European view’, in Jerneck

Wiemann

(Eds), Asia and Europe: Regional cooperation in a globalising world (pp. 183–197). Singapore: Asia Europe Foundation.

69.

Rueland

(2001). ‘ASEM—Transregional forum at the crossroads’, in Stockhof

van der Velde

(Eds), Asian-European perspectives: Developing the ASEM process (pp. 60–76). Richmond, Surrey: Curzon Press.

70.

Serradell

V P.

(1996). The Asia–Europe Meeting (ASEM): A historical turning point in relations between the two regions. European Foreign Affairs Review, 1(2), 185–210.

71.

Sharma

L K.

(1996). India will not attend EU-Asia conference. The Times of India, 23 January.

72.

Shukla

H C.

(1996, 8 March). Economic, trade ties with EU. All India Radio General Overseas Service.

73.

Sikri

(2012). ‘A personal perspective on India’s Look East policy,’ in Ram

A.N.

(Ed.), Two decades of India’s Look East Policy: Partnership for peace, progress and prosperity (pp. 159–168). New Delhi: Manohar.

74.

Singh

(1995). Remarks at a press conference in Singapore, 22 September, in ‘India has no regrets at exclusion from ASEM’. The Times of India, 26 September.

75.

Sridharan

(2005). ‘The ASEAN region in India’s “Look East” Policy’, in Reddy

K.R.

(Ed.), India and ASEAN: Foreign policy dimensions for the 21st century. New Delhi: New Century Publications.

76.

Subhan

(1996). Thin representation at major Europe-Asia meets. Economic Times, New Delhi, 17 January.

77.

Sunday Star (1996, 25 February). Mahathir opposes expansion of ASEM ‘for the moment’. Kuala Lumpur edition.

78.

The Hindu (1996a, 26 January). Europe Asia Summit a misnomer, feels India.

79.

The Hindu (1996b, 15 February). ASEM doors not closed to India.

80.

The Hindu (1996c, 19 February). Asia-Euro Summit.

81.

The Hindu (1996d, 28 February). Bangkok getting ready for Asia Europe meet.

82.

The Hindu (1996e, 4 March). EU interests hamper ASEM consensus.

83.

The Hindu (1996f, 6 March). Entry into ARF will boost India’s regional ties.

84.

The Hindu (2000, 28 October). Lack of focus in ASEM.

85.

The Statesman (1997, 14 February). Britain on ASEM. New Delhi edition.

86.

The Times of India (1996, 2 March). Flag follows trade [Editorial].

87.

Velloor

(1996). India has long wait to get into Asia–Europe meet. Economic Times, 28 December.

88.

Wesley

(1997), The politics of exclusion: Australia, Turkey and definitions of regionalism. The Pacific Review, 10(4), 523–555.

89.

Westerland

(1997). Director, DG I, European Commission, Statement at an international conference, Seoul, 14–15 November.

90.

Yong

T T.

Mun

S.C.

(2009). The evolution of India-ASEAN relations. India Review, 8(1), January–March, 20–42.