Book Review: The Great Convergence: Asia,the West and the Logic of One World

The book under review is an anti-thesis of Western orthodoxy to paint a grim picture of world politics equally by academicians and political leaders. Academicians such as Robert D. Kaplan (2001), Gideon Rachman (2011), Ian Bremmers (2012) and Charles A. Kupchan (2012), and political leaders like George W. Bush, among others, are champions of this worldview, which claims that we are living in a dangerous world. In contrast, The Great Convergence aims to ‘spark a new kind of discourse about the (emerging) global condition’ (p. 7) and claims that massive focus unleashed by spread of technology and deepening and widening of globalisation have made the traditional division such as the ‘North–South’ and ‘Developed–Developing’ irrelevant. As a consequence of rapid growth in Asia, Africa and Latin America, author argues that is central argument of the book too, that human aspiration is progressing towards similar end: peace and security; economic growth and higher per capita income; rising life expectancy, education level and living standard; and above all strive for democratisation, rule of law and fixing governmental accountability that the West has enjoyed for a long time. In short, this book deals with implications of the rapid economic growth in the Rest, however, differently.

The introductory chapter figures out main arguments and sets a platform for detailed study in the subsequent chapters. The first chapter explicates the characteristics, norms and organising principles of converging society and argues that in recent years, there has been a sharp decline in number of wars and related deaths and absolute poverty on the one hand and noticeable growth in middle class and educated youth, on the other. On educational and other socio-economic indicators, despite economic recession, the author has noticed that the Rest’s performance has been satisfactory. Led by rapid growth of recent years, if trends continue, Asia-Pacific share in total middle-class population will bypass Europe–North America by 2020. (As per estimates, Europe–North America share will decline from 54 per cent in 2010 to 32 per cent in 2020, while Asia-Pacific share will rise from 28 to 53 in the same period.) The converging world, according to the author, would be organised around five principles: acceptance of framework of modern science, logical reasoning, embarrass of free market economy, transformation of relationship between rulers and ruled, and increasing focus on multilateralism (p. 33).

The rapidly converging world is facing various dilemmas. At theoretical level, among others, is how to explain it? In order to develop a theory of one world to adequately explain the changes taking place, in the second chapter, the author has identified four pillars namely environment, economy, technology and aspiration that are shaping this convergence. Amidst the environmental problems and increasing interdependence in the age of globalisation, states, irrespective of their power and reputation, would not be able to meet the challenges of converging world alone. Meanwhile, the irony of the day is that the world has changed substantially but, as noticed by the author, our ways to manage have not been changed so far that have been resulting in numerous challenges (such as civil strives and massacres, climate change and human rights violations) not only for policy-makers but also for common people. Given the complex nature of challenges, perhaps because of growing degree of convergence and resultant interdependence, we cannot solve them ‘as long as policymakers continue to believe that “sovereign national interest” is the key consideration in deciding what to do’ (p. 86).

The third and sixth chapters, in this way or another, however, more realistically explicate states’ preference for national interests rather than shared goals of humanity. According to the author, practice of Western liberal democracies shows contradictions in their domestic and international policies regarding liberal norms and values. At home, in accordance with the assumptions of liberalism, they promote civil society organisations and non-governmental actors, while at global level they have shown high degree of arrogance towards the global institutions like the United Nations (UN), World Health Organization (WHO) and International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). They preferred the World Bank (WB) and International Monetary Fund (IMF), where they have leverage in terms of decisive vote share and occupy top managerial posts, at the cost of UN, WHO and IAEA and forced later organisations to ensure zero-budget-growth and depend on voluntary instead of assessed contributions. Western donors have further tighten their control on these organisations through earmarked contributions. (Through earmarking donors decide the country to which and sectors like sanitation, food and health where they want their money to be spent.) More irrationally, according to the author, they went a step ahead in the case of IAEA and used it for spying in host states that resulted in sharp decline of the legitimacy and credential of the institution.

Nevertheless, the process of convergence is not as smooth as it seems to be but has created or sharpened the existing contradictions in international politics. Redistribution of the power and prestige of the West and the Rest has intensified the tension (for example, on the issues of tackling recession and climate change) and deadlock (such as reform of international institutions, mainly the UN Security Council). With the rise of the Rest, particularly China, the competition for raw materials and market among the rising powers on the one hand and rising and other states, on the other, is intensifying. With redistribution of power in international system, tensions between the global and national interests, on a few issues like reform of financial institutions, have become more manifest than ever before. Simultaneously, because of historical, religious and psychological reasons, in the last few years, the tensions between the West and Islam have deepened. In total sum, the process of convergence has led to a ‘complex trade-offs that policy makers will have to make between these contradictions’ (p. 118).

The fifth chapter evaluates the role of geopolitics in shaping the convergence and examines whether it would derail (actual or potential) the whole process of convergence by promoting competition. Elements of collaboration and competition are evident in bilateral relations of US-China and Sino-India. Similarly, tensions between Islam and the West have deepened. Despite prevailing confrontations, because of three reasons: the promotion of economic and cultural cooperation among ASEAN members; consistent engagement with the great powers; and going beyond government-to-government cooperation, according to author, the South-east Asia has been successful in conserving peace. On the basis of the analysis of four issues, the author concludes that ‘states have begun to cooperate more and more, as suggested by the liberal internationalists but despite the cooperation sometimes, aggressive competition continues as suggested by the realists’ (p. 146).

While dealing with the barriers of convergence in the sixth chapter, the author shows that the Western aid was never designed to serve the recipients but donors’ national interests. Wests’ lust for the promotion of the national interest in the name of aid and its strategy of earmarking has done more harm than benefit to the Rest. Aid disbursed through the institutions such as G-8, WB, IMF and Organisation of Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), which are donor funded and staffed, following the logic that no organisation bites the hand that feeds it, have so far functioned against recipients’ long-term interests. Therefore, either because of donors earmarking or institutions’ lending policies, a large chunk of aid, in this way or another, was spent to benefit multinationals and contractors based in the West. Moreover, aid, in practice, was conditioned to follow the line of donors in international multilateral forums like the UN; to spend a large extent of aid on purchase of goods and services provided by donors’ native firms; and were advised to open up their economic for the donors’ entrepreneurs. The author has found clear correlation between donors’ interests and recipients’ behaviour. In case of failing to follow the donors’ line, recipients were either threatened or faced actual cut in total aid. Thus foreign aid that, in theory, was meant to assist the poor, in practice, was used to serve the interests of donors.

The seventh chapter highlights the need to reform global governance. With declining share of population, economic and military, the best way for the West, as the author suggests, would be to strengthening the rule of law and institutions that promote it because nothing but rule of law in his opinion can serve the interests of minorities in better ways. Therefore, the West would have to abandon its policy to prefer institutions like G-8, IMF, WB, and OECD and revitalise the United Nations.

According to the author, principles of democracy, the recognition of power imbalance, and the rule of law (p. 227) should be guiding principles for the global governance reforms. The most contentious issue, however, is how to restructure the UN Security Council as per current distribution of power to meet the requirement of the new world. Moreover, the author has put forward a formula based on three-tire—permanent, semi-permanent and non-permanent members (7+7+7)—structure of the reformed Security Council, the most powerful institution of global security governance. His formula adequately considers the concerns of G-4 (India, Brazil, Germany and Japan) and their regional rivals (Pakistan, Argentina and Italy). Hopefully, it will provide new insights in smooth restructuring of the UN body.

While discussing the convergence unconventionally, the author has painted a brighter picture of the global condition which, however, undermined the tendency of states’ strive for national interests. At this point, the author seemed to miss the points raised by E.H. Carr’s critique of ‘harmony of interests’ (Carr 2001, 42–61) and later on reminded by John J. Mearsheimer in his ‘principles of realism’ (Mearsheimer 2001, 30–32) that states are primarily concerned with their national interests instead of shared goals of humanity. Even though the Rest has made significant progress in the last three decades, the degree of convergence has not reached a level that first, the states would willingly compromise their national interests for common interests as is evident in the South China Sea dispute and Syrian crises, among others, and second, formulate a theory of one world, as the author has assumed. In contrast to author’s few assumptions, national interests and Westphalian order prevail and enjoy widespread support particularly in diplomatic and policy-makers’ circles.

However, the book convincingly and in lucid manner elucidates the brighter side of the world condition that can be considered to be an important value addition. To prove arguments, ideas and references from different disciplines such as international political economy, globalisation, contemporary history, international politics and global governance have been employed and adequately supported by facts, tables and graphs in a congruent manner. Mahbubani has come up with three valuable suggestions to improve the human conditions in the converging world: the promotion and encouragement of conversation among states of the Rest and between the West and the Rest; abandoning the West’s present policy to marginalise the United Nations and the process of multilateralism; and development of global ethics, norms and principles to govern the converging world. In the age of globalisation and enhanced interdependence, where problems travel without passport, international community would not be able to tackle them separately but collectively through organisations like the United Nations and its agencies that have universal reach. If suggestions are followed in the next few decades, the author hopes that we would be able to realise that ‘our village is a world and not that our world is a village’ (p. 259).