The Concentric Circles of South Africa’s Foreign Policy under Jacob Zuma

Introduction

One way of looking at South Africa’s foreign policy is to view it as a set of concentric circles which define its priorities. Forging international relations with countries, regions and continental groups helps bring an element of coherence and predictability to a country’s foreign policy ¹ and may be viewed as an annulus with a common centre. If two concentric circles have the same area, they are congruent, and so bring a degree of coherence to policy and processes in general, and foreign policy in particular. Concentric circles could also be viewed as a hierarchy from the inside out, or from the bottom up. The idea behind concentric circles is that a country’s foreign policy has a common centre, with different, but inter-related and reinforcing foci. These different layers reinforce each other as they coexist in a symbiotic relationship. Concentric circles thus have different radiuses, but common epicentres; it speaks to different dimensions but all linked to the same core or centre. Concentric circles are about alignment and dialectic relationship between different layers and thrusts of an issue. While concentric circles exist in a complex political and institutional relationship, they seek to bring coherence and congruence to a country’s foreign policy. All circles speak to the inner-most or core circle.

As early as 1973, James Barber used the idea of the ‘concentric circle model’ to explain an external environment faced by the old South Africa foreign policy-makers (Barber 1973, 227). The inner circle represented southern Africa; the rest of Africa constituted the middle circle; and the wider international community formed the outer circle.

Does South Africa’s foreign policy have a common centre, a congruent area? As we have marked the five-year point of South Africa’s new Jacob Zuma-led government in May 2014, it is time to map some of its policy trajectories, and unpack the policy courses of this administration; we will do so by applying the idea of concentric circles, making an assessment of its emerging foreign policy agenda or dominant diplomatic priorities. Having previously applied this idea to the Thabo Mbeki administration, one question we are interested in is whether there are signs of significant change from the concentric circles drawn by the Mbeki government, or is there continuity—more of the same? (Landsberg 2006).

The Concentric Circles of the Zuma Government’s Foreign Policy

On paper at least, the emerging foreign policy of the Zuma government shows the idea of concentric circles underscoring both foreign and domestic policy, namely, domestic or national interests, an ‘African Agenda’, South–South cooperation, North–South dialogue, socio-economic and politico-security global governance and economic diplomacy (ibid.). The August 2009 Medium-term Strategic Framework to Guide Government’s Programme for the Electoral Mandate Period 2009–2014 reveals that it too is looking to champion the continent in its foreign policy, this time under the broad rubric of ‘Pursuing African Advancement and Enhanced Cooperation’ (MTSF 2009). Echoing the Mbeki rhetoric, this agenda was to be pursued under a series of sub-goals or sub-categories (see Figure 1).

After the articulation of the 2009 Mid-Term Strategic Framework (MTSF), these areas were spelled out by the president and senior government officials in state of the nation addresses, budget vote speeches and at conferences.

From Foreign Affairs to International Relations and Cooperation: A National Interest Doctrine

At the epicentre of South Africa’s foreign policy stands the idea of ‘the national interests’. All the different circles are thus supposed to reinforce the national interests. But do they? That is what we will seek to understand in this article. In one of the first moves announced by Minister Nkoana-Mashabane, in line with the resolution adopted by the ANC’s 52nd National Conference at Polokwane, the name of the department responsible for the management and coordination of the Republic’s diplomacy and foreign policy changed from the Department of Foreign Affairs (DFA) to that of Department of International Relations and Cooperation (DIRCO). The idea was to signal government’s intention to introduce a new style and approach to the conduct of foreign affairs, namely: (a) that domestic considerations, ‘the national interest’, would henceforth be the main priority of South Africa’s foreign policy and (b) there would be emphasis on issues of collaborative non-hegemonic soft-balancing as opposed to dominant, hegemonic intentions and power-seeking realist approaches to relations with other states and international entities. In her first public address as new Minister of International Relations and Cooperation, Nkoana-Mashabane confirmed the change in the name of the department, as well as spelling out the rationale behind it.

OPEN IN VIEWER

Figure 1.

Source: Author’s own graphic representation.

The first concentric circle to deal with here, the epicentre, is that of the ‘national interest’ as the new guide that would drive South Africa’s foreign policy. In a major policy speech by the Minister of International Relations and Cooperation on 10 April 2013, Miss Maite Nkoana-Mashabane claimed that ‘we have established a national interest link between our domestic priorities and foreign policy’. ² Elsewhere, the Minister in charge of DIRCO vowed in her address to the Heads of Mission conference, ‘our government desires to give more clarity and focus on the role of the Department in meeting our domestic priorities through international partnerships and cooperation’. ³ In 2009, DIRCO borrowed from the work of Joseph Frankel, who argued that the national interest of every country is ‘centred upon welfare of the nation and the preservation of the national way of life’ (DIRCO 29 September 2009, 6). In adapting this definition, DIRCO crafted their own conceptualisation, and asserted that ‘the national interest can be defined as those interests of the state, which can be categorised as core interests, which are inalienable, and whose attainment and protection is absolutely vital’ (29 September 2009, 6).

Slightly more promising was the statement announcing a new International Relations ‘Outreach Programme’ by the Minister in an address at the University of Limpopo in October 2009, in which she provided the clearest enunciation yet of a national interest doctrine. Challenging the realist notion of power and domination, it focused on ‘cooperation and partnership’, ⁴ but how would this materialise? According to the Minister, ‘national interests are by their very nature multi-faceted. In the main, national interests refer to a country’s goals and ambitions; they are about the state’s survival and security, extending to its pursuit of wealth, economic growth and power’. ⁵ According to Nkoana-Mashabane, DIRCO attached great importance to ‘soft-power’ and ‘soft balancing’ notions in its conceptualisation of the national interest, for as the Minister explained, ‘by their very nature, national interests find resonance in, and are informed, by our domestic agenda’. ⁶ Clear in her grasp of the concepts, she continued,

We do attach great importance to our national interests in our foreign policy. But unlike realists we do not believe that the international system is characterised by anarchy and that states have to hide behind the cover of their sovereignty and focus narrowly on the pursuit of their national interests. ⁷

In South Africa’s pursuit of the national interest, she proclaimed, will be a recognition that ‘states can work together around a common global agenda and shared values for a better world’ ⁸ —basing her analysis on formulations of general interests, not primary or permanent interests. While these statements provide some understanding of the rationale behind South Africa’s national interest conceptualisation, less clear was how the ideals would be put into operation.

The Minister had articulated a view of national interest which challenged the realist notion of power and domination, and instead spoke to cooperation and partnership. According to the Minister, ‘national interests are by their very nature multi-faceted. In the main, national interests refer to a country’s goals and ambitions; they are about the state’s survival, extending to its pursuit of wealth, economic growth and power’. ⁹ Elsewhere, the Minister argued that,

for us in the Department of International Relations and Cooperation we took on that promise by making sure that our mandate reflects all our domestic priorities of the creation of jobs, improvement of health, quality access and education to all, eradication of crime, and the upliftment of our rural communities. ¹⁰

These views highlight government’s struggle to come up with a robust conception of the national interest that would inform all other aspects of foreign policy.

DIRCO attached great currency to soft-power and soft-balancing notions in its conceptualisation of the national interest, and as the Minister explained, ‘by their very nature, national interests find resonance in, and are informed, by our domestic agenda. We do attach great importance to our national interests in our foreign policy.’ ¹¹ ‘But unlike realists’, asserted the Minister, ‘we do not believe that the international system is characterised by anarchy and that states have to hide behind the cover of their sovereignty and focus narrowly on the pursuit of their national interest.’ In South Africa’s scheme of the national interests, ‘states can work together around a common global agenda and shared values for a better world’. ¹² On this score, the South Africans attempted to make their unique contribution to the debate about national interests by making the case for a less power-obsessed notion of the concept, and to infuse into the debate the idea that non-hegemonic international relations could in fact help to advance the national interests of a country.

The Minister stated that, ‘the name of the Department has been changed from Foreign Affairs to International Relations and Cooperation. This has been done to help clarify the mandate of the Department. The name should reflect the new focus that our government wishes to place on partnerships and cooperation for development.’ ¹³ In an address to DIRCO Heads of Missions Conference in August 2009, she expanded on this motivation when she asserted that, ‘the renaming was largely motivated by international trends which require states to put emphasis on cooperation over competition, and collaboration over confrontation’. ¹⁴ In addition, ‘the globalised nature of the world necessitates that states continue to forge ways of cooperating better with each other’. ¹⁵ Thus, for the South African government, cooperation and non-hegemonism are vital ingredients in the promotion of a state’s national interests.

A further motivation behind the change in the name of the department was to help close the gap between domestic and foreign affairs and to assist in demystifying foreign policy by bringing it closer to the public. In the words of the Minister,

one of the important areas of our work will be to make South Africans aware of the work that the Department is doing. In this regard we plan to enhance our public diplomacy initiatives and increase the level of our engagement with South Africans on foreign policy matters. ¹⁶

The idea of national interests again figured prominently here. ‘For the department to get the support of the country’, she asserted, ‘our work needs to be known and understood by South Africans from all walks of life’. ¹⁷ It is important to stress here that, while this move was an important signal to the outside world about South Africa’s intentions, it did not represent a departure from the Mandela and Mbeki years or their approaches to foreign affairs. In fact, both these previous administrations had long de-emphasised hegemonic approaches to international affairs and placed emphasis on cooperation and partnership-building. In Africa in particular, South Africa has adopted a posture of partnership in a bid to reassure its neighbours about its good intentions, and announced that it sought to be a peaceful and reliable partner, not a bully bent on pursuing its own interest at their expense.

Pursuing African Advancement

Let us now zero in on the second layer of the concentric circle under the Zuma administration’s emerging foreign policy, that of ‘continued prioritisation of the African continent’. In that policy speech of the Minister of 10 April 2013, the Minister repeated what has now become a familiar refrain in South Africa’s foreign policy: ‘Africa is at the centre of what we do in the world through our African Agenda commitments and programmes’. ¹⁸ The ‘Africa prioritisation’ strategies are being pursued under two broad thematic areas: (a) Africa continental and (b) improving political and economic integration of SADC. Although the Zuma government has set out to pursue its Africa strategies under the label of ‘African advancement’, it is actually a policy that borrows heavily from the Mbeki government’s notion of the ‘African Agenda’ and in fact one that continued to use the very label ‘African Agenda’. ¹⁹ In this regard, Nkoana-Mashabane stated that, ‘the consolidation of the African Agenda remains central to our foreign policy objectives’ and that the new government ‘will continue to work towards achieving a vision of Africa which is united, peaceful and prosperous’. ²⁰

It came as clarifying news when the government recently started to state in the open that it remained committed to the New Partnership for Africa’s Development (NEPAD). For the first two years, and born out of sensitivities of the fraternal battles which played out during the battle at Polokwane, where Mbeki lost the African National Congress presidency in 2007 and was eventually ‘recalled from the Presidency’ in 2008, there was silence on this issue, and the government appeared ambivalent about NEPAD’s future. NEPAD was too closely associated with the persona of Mbeki. This was surprising because there was a real risk that the country, which was the lead state in the formation of NEPAD, was distancing itself from a plan for domestic political reasons, as opposed to sound foreign policy motivations.

Government has come out and committed itself to the implementation of NEPAD, and to improving the regional climate for growth and development, as well as placing the development requirements of the continent on the global agenda. This seems to signify that, as had the Mbeki government, the new administration will use NEPAD, and its vehicles, the G8-Africa Action Plan, and the African Partnership Forum. Policy states that NEPAD remains the main frame of reference for intra-African relations and Africa’s partnership with international partners, such as, the EU–Africa Strategic Partnership, Forum for Africa–China Partnership (FOCAC), the G8, New Africa–Asia Strategic Partnership (NAASP) and the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD). The socio-economic development plan devised by Mbeki and some of his African partners continued to feature as a pole in this important concentric circle of ‘African advancement’.

It is important to say something here about the future of the African Peer Review Mechanism (APRM), the implementation of which the government has come out in support. As Africa’s unique governance promotion tool, it was set up to advance democratic, corporate and economic governance of the continent. There are also questions around the future of the mechanism at home and the implementation of the action plan, creating challenges for this pole of the African concentric circle. During the Mbeki period, there were many tensions between government and civil society over the domestic APRM process and structures. As the new government committed itself to the future of the APRM, they persisted, with both civil society actors and government having to show some political maturity to restore the creditability of the instrument.

The Zuma government has committed itself to supporting this paradigm of building a Union of African states and to continuing to work for the strengthening of the AU and its institutions, another key aspect of the ‘African advancement’ posture. Zuma and his Minister of International Relations and Cooperation distanced themselves from Ghadaffi’s USAF push and instead vowed that ‘South Africa will continue to advocate for a gradual and incremental approach, focusing on the regional organisations, as building blocks towards the Union Government.’ ²¹ South Africa’s approach is premised on the understanding ‘that the African Union is a union of independent and sovereign states’, and that the actions of the AU Agency ‘are contingent on the mandate of member states’. ²²

Policy indicated that it would, through continental and regional issues, work towards the entrenchment of democracy and respect for human rights on the African continent. Suffice it to point out here that the balance between an approach of human rights and justice versus one of peace, security and development has been difficult for this country to achieve during the course of the past 15 years. There is already great build up and expectation in the local and international media that the Zuma government will pursue a pro-human rights foreign policy, whatever that may entail, but they will have to be carefully managed lest it also finds foreign policy becoming a hostage to shallow international human rights discourse.

The foreign policy strategies of the Zuma government continue to emphasise strengthening the AU and its institutions as an essential part of bolstering Africa’s unity and development. Government promised to continue to contribute towards putting into operation the organs of the AU, namely, financial institutions such as the African Central Bank, the African Monetary Fund and the African Investment Bank, the African Court of Justice and the African Court of Human and People’s Rights. ²³ As hosts of the Pan-African Parliament, South Africa deemed itself to have ‘a special responsibility to ensure that this organ of the AU enjoys legitimacy and effectively discharges its mandate’. Policies further stressed the need to ensure the necessary resources and political support to realise these goals. ²⁴

It is the view of listed policy that the government will work towards sustained and equitable economic growth on the African continent, which again suggests, as the Minister of International Relations has stated on numerous occasions, that South Africa would continue to emphasise a developmental approach to foreign policy similar to the one adopted by the Mbeki administration.

Another issue that has been on the agenda for some time is that of the role of South Africa’s corporate sector on the continent. Some local multinationals have been likened to imperialists and predators in Africa. Government has committed itself to developing a code of good business practices for South African companies doing business there, and to reinforce ethical practices to combat any negative business conduct. Where are we in the process, and would this be the route of regulatory legislation, or will it be left at the level of policy dictates?

The Zuma Government’s Approach to Conflict Resolution in Africa

Under the second concentric circle of ‘African advancement’, the issue of conflict resolution in Africa is being stressed. The new Zuma administration steered clear of using the evocative and controversial idea of ‘quiet diplomacy’ as a means to promote conflict resolution in Africa. Distancing itself from this controversial concept was an attempt to show a break between itself and the Mbeki administration. Yet, apart from being against the use of the term ‘quiet’, in practice the conflict resolution posture adopted by Zuma was similar to that adopted by the Mbeki administration. The first year of the Zuma presidency also displayed a preference for non-confrontational, accommodative and mediated solutions to conflict and deadly wars in Africa.

The new government has vowed to contribute to the promotion of peace, security and stability by, among others, sustaining involvement in peacekeeping operations in Africa. It went on to say that South Africa would assist in the reconstruction and development of the continent, especially in post-conflict situation countries such as the DRC, Sudan, Burundi, Western Sahara and Zimbabwe. Again, what would be the niche area here? Will the focus be on the DDR, on state-building or something else?

Let us start with the bilateral questions and in particular Zuma’s choice of first state visit to Angola in August 2009, accompanied by 11 Cabinet Ministers, senior government officials and the largest business delegation to accompany a head of state on a state visit since 1994. Not only was Zuma determined to restore solidarity with Angola, which during the Mbeki had seriously and very publically strained relations with South Africa. Angola did not take kindly to South Africa’s status in international quarters as a hegemon, and President Dos Santos did not respond positively to Mbeki’s overtures for closer relations; he was just as committed to elevate economic considerations to a higher strategic plane in the Republic’s foreign policy. As the President said on numerous occasions, ‘South Africa is open for business!’ This reinforces the centrality that economic considerations came to play in the Zuma emerging foreign policy and the spectre of the risk that regime (ANC) interest could become conflated with the Republic’s national interest. For almost a decade, Mbeki failed in his bid to secure a state visit to South Africa by his Angolan counterpart. In 2007, the so-called Browse Mole Intelligence Report was leaked by the Republic’s organised crime fighting agency, the Scorpions, making serious claims against the Angolan President and accusing him of having backed a plot to unseat Mbeki by providing financial and political backing for the campaign by the ANC Deputy-President Jacob Zuma (Mail & Guardian Online 2009). The report suggested that Angola was unhappy with the pre-eminent role Mbeki had come to play in African diplomacy and that the Angolans favoured a strategy in which his role would be curtailed.

Against the backdrop of these charges, and a generally frosty relationship between Luanda and Pretoria-Tshwana, it was not surprising that Zuma chose Angola as his first destination for a state visit after becoming head of state. One a positive note, the idea of elevating South African–Angolan ties to a more strategic plan sounds like a welcome move, and there are certainly bilateral economic benefits to be had. On a more curious level, the question arises as to whether the restoration of ties signalled a geo-continental shift in policy away from the likes of Nigeria, Algeria, Ethiopia, Tanzania, Ghana and others. If not, it is unclear how South Africa and Angola hope to achieve the stated goal which arose during the Summit of the two also playing a strategic sub-regional and continental role. If so, Angola is a curious choice, for while it harbours the desire to be recognised as a regional hegemon and seeks the status and prestige of the label, it is less clear whether it has a sub-regional and continental plan, let alone the will to execute it. Zuma’s open embrace of Angola did not go down well with Nigeria, and in the aftermath of the 2011 war in Libya, in part brought about by South Africa and Nigeria voting in favour of United Nations Resolution 1973 to threaten military action against Ghaddafi’s Libya, the relationship between Pretoria-Tshwane and Abuja went from bad to worst. This was a setback for South Africa and Africa more broadly, as the bilateral South Africa–Nigeria relationship is one of the most important in the continent.

Meanwhile, contrary to popular notions of a shift in policy vis-à-vis Zimbabwe, the Zuma government continued with the approach of the Mbeki administration. Apart from an explicit commitment to work towards a free and fair election in Zimbabwe at the earliest possible date, policy also suggests continuity with, not change from, the Mbeki posture of quiet diplomacy. South Africa said it would work with all parties in the Zimbabwe’s unity government to resolve their differences and so ensure that this government worked more effectively. The Zimbabwe Government of National Unity (GNU) is a fragile one and the three parties that are involved in the pact are reluctant participants. The GNU is likely to go through many fits and starts, and there is even a chance that there will be the occasional walkout by some of the parties, especially the two factions of the Movement for Democratic Change (MDC). South Africa is committed to working with the three principal parties, Zanu–Pf, MDC–Tsvangarai and MDC–Mutambara, to address ‘potential fault lines’ within the inclusive government (DIRCO 13 October 2009) and would work with these three protagonists over issues such as the Governor of the Central Bank and the Attorney General, and to ‘overcome those difficulties’ (ibid.). South Africa said that it would work with Western powers such as the EU and other cooperative partners to re-engage Zimbabwe. While it was suggested at some point that Zuma would adopt a much tougher stance vis-à-vis Mugabe, in the end he continued to work with all three parties of the GNU.

As far as the DRC is concerned, the Zuma government would continue to use the vehicle created by the Mbeki government to engage the DRC, namely the South African-DRC Bi-National Commission (BNC) (ibid.). In engaging the DRC, South Africa would focus on examining progress on the implementation of projects related to post-conflict reconstruction and development, in particular helping to build its capacity within the police, security forces and state institutions. The Mbeki government helped to broker a rapprochement between Rwanda and Burundi, and the Zuma government chose to take up this role and between them improve the tenuous security situation.

Sudan is another country and in which South Africa has invested much political capital to resolve political and security issues. While Mbeki took a personal interest in Sudan and regularly engaged in personal diplomacy, Zuma appears to favour a more backseat approach and delegated consultations around the issue to his Minister of International Relations and Cooperation. His government adopted a view that unity between North and South remained fragile, and the planned referendum over self-determination for South Sudan could unearth more tensions and divisions between rather than cementing unity and solidarity. The Minister for International Relations confirmed that South Africa has ‘an important contribution to finding a lasting peace in the Sudan as we chair the Ministerial Committee on post-conflict reconstruction in that country’. ²⁵ She confirmed that ‘South African troops are an important component of the AU–UN peace-keeping presence in Darfur’ and that ‘former President Thabo Mbeki is leading a High-level Panel of the AU whose work should help us to address the challenges of justice and reconciliation in that country’. ²⁶

Just as the Mbeki administration had a preference for negotiating inclusive governments on the continent, so Zuma’s showed early support for this stance. It supported the work of former Mozambique President Joachim Chissano as SADC appointed mediator to try and resolve the crisis in Madagascar, which has been dubbed by SADC and the AU as an example ‘unconstitutional change of government’. ²⁷ This is a practice that has been rejected by these continental institutions as unconstitutional, so to restore rule in Madagascar, Pretoria-Tshwane came out in support of Chissano’s push for an inclusive government that would see posted President Ravalomanana and the person who ousted him as President, Rajoelina, participate in such a government. Both were to be allowed to stand in a new presidential race after the transitional period.

The Zuma government’s stance towards conflict resolution in Africa is in line with the Mbeki administration’s preference for inclusive, negotiated solutions and therefore, shows a remarkable degree of continuity with the previous approach. All the talk here of change and a break with the Mbeki government’s approach to conflict resolution does not stand up to scrutiny, and in reality the new administration has opted to build on the approach of its predecessor government.

Improving Political and Economic Integration of the SADC

A sub-theme of the second circle is that of prioritising sub-regional organisations, and in particular the southern African region, and placing SADC at the centre of African diplomacy. Policy specifically set out to work towards ‘improving political and economic integration of the SADC’ (MTSF 2009). The new government’s prioritisation of SADC should be viewed within the context of South Africa regarding regional economic communities (RECs) as the pillar institutions of continental union. As the Minister of International Cooperation put it, policy is ‘informed by our commitment to contribute towards the transformation and realignment of SADC from a regional organization preoccupied in the main by a political agenda to a Regional Economic Community that will meet the challenges of globalization’. ²⁸

The new government promised to focus on making a contribution towards political cohesion and strengthening governance and capacity in SADC, including deploying personnel to strategic positions within the Secretariat. This has been a vexing question in post-apartheid foreign policy, namely, the issue of the gap between intentions and capacity. The lofty promise by government notwithstanding, South Africa remains one of the most underrepresented countries in African and international multilateral forums, with serious implications for the country’s core national interest and foreign policy goals. We know that there is a proposed international secondment policy on the table, but its status remains unclear. South Africa will promote regional integration, including through SADC protocols, aimed at improving security and stability, infrastructure, transport (surface, air and maritime, public administration and other sectors), as well as the coordination of multi-sectoral plans, and harmonisation of industrial policies.

The Zuma government will also move towards enhanced regional economic integration and address sources of disagreement among members of SACU on issues such as trade policy and revenue. The question begged here is whether the new administration plans to continue with the Mbeki government’s innovative policy paradigm, introduced towards the latter years of the previous administration, namely that of regional integration of development. What it does say is that the new government will be moving towards enhanced regional economic integration and addressing sources of disagreement among members of SACU on issues such as trade policy and revenue sharing.

The closest we have to an explicit developmental idea is to be found in government’s stated policy towards EPAs articulated in the 2009 MTSF, wherein the idea was mooted that South Africa would seek to ensure they had a development agenda and supported regional integration (MTSF 2009). However, there continues to be major differences amongst SADC states over how to respond to EPAs, with some being apprehensive about embracing this platform and others viewing it as an important trigger for development. Either way, there is need for SADC common positions over EPAs and other trade instruments. It was therefore understandable when the Minister for International Relations responded by stating that South Africa should ‘continue to reflect on challenges regarding our interaction with countries in SADC, particularly our varying positions on negotiations around the EPAs with the EU’. Said the Minister: ‘We need to assess the implications of the EPAs on SADC regional integration programme.’ Here is an example of South Africa not just challenging perceived European interests; it in fact portrayed itself as the spokesperson of Africa, there to look after Africa’s interests.

Also on the Zuma government’s policy radar screen is the issue of putting into operation the Project Preparation Development Fund (PPDF) as the first step towards a SADC Development Fund. This plan coincides with a global financial crisis and the chances of donors or for that matter SADC member states, honouring their commitments have been dealt a blow. Is the idea that South Africa will take it upon itself to engage the donor fraternity to ensure that they meet obligations and turn pledges into disbursements? What about the relationship between the SADC Fund and the planned SADPA, and what are South Africa’s own plans to bolster such a fund?

Establishing a South African Development Agency?

The name change of the department from Foreign Affairs to International Relations and Cooperation was not the only new initiative signalled by government. Another idea communicated by the new Zuma-led government was that it would build on the work of the Mbeki government in the area of development cooperation and proceed to establish a development agency for South Africa. Such an agency will be instrumental in achieving the goals as spelled out under the second concentric circle of ‘pursuing African advancement’. The government has publicly committed itself to establishing the South African Development Partnership Agency (SADPA), with the aim of promoting developmental partnerships. According to Minister Nkoana-Mashabane, the government intended to ‘streamline the work that is currently done by different departments on development cooperation into a coherent and systematic framework’. ²⁹ The view emanating from Pretoria-Tshwane was that, ‘for development cooperation initiatives to be effective, coordination and coherence are paramount’. In August 2009, the Minister confirmed that ‘work towards the establishment of SADPA is currently underway … This agency … will be tasked with the management of South Africa’s development assistance to contribute to capacity and institutional building, as well as support socio-economic and human resource development’. ³⁰ While the idea of SADPA was not novel, the new administration believed that, ‘once created, such an agency would give effect to much needed organizational and institutional systems and also enhance the effectiveness of development cooperation in general’. ³¹

The first concrete example of translating the vision into a programme of action was in South Africa’s move to become a virtual donor country, as the Mbeki government was willing to put resources at the disposal of its desire to turn the African Renaissance vision into a plan of action. During the Mbeki presidential era, South Africa had been prepared to put its money where its mouth was by making substantial financial contributions in its efforts to counter Western hegemony in Africa and the South. In 2000, just one year into his presidency, South Africa established the African Renaissance and International Cooperation Fund (ARF), and effectively became an African donor country. As, such, it was able to influence African politics in direct ways. The Fund was established in terms of Section 2(1) of the African Renaissance and International Co-operation Fund Act of 2000 (Act 51 of 2000), and replaced the former Economic Co-operation Loan Fund Act of 1968 (Act 68 of 1968), used by the apartheid state to lure reluctant African states into cooperating with it (DFA 2008).

In terms of structure, the African Renaissance Fund was under the control of the Director-General of Foreign Affairs. Funds for project were disbursed after the approval of the DG or the Minister of Foreign Affairs (DFA 2008). The DFA could also tap into its own resources and claim back such resources after approval had been sought from the Minister of Finance. Loans or other financial assistance were granted in accordance with an agreement entered into with the country in question and the South African Minister of Foreign Affairs. Assistance granted was subject to terms and conditions, as agreed upon by the country and the Minister, and in all cases in consultation with the Minister of Finance. An Advisory Committee was established to manage the Fund, and tasked with making recommendations to the Minister and the Minister of Finance on the disbursement of funds through loans and other financial assistance.

This African Renaissance Fund effectively propelled South Africa in the direction of challenging the hegemony of the established donors. Its aim with this fund was ‘to promote cooperation between the Republic of South Africa and other countries by granting loans and/or granting of other financial assistance in respect of development projects in other countries’ (DFA 2008). The fund set out to promote in a ‘proactive way’ (DFA 2008):

Cooperation between the Republic of South Africa and other countries, in particular African countries.

We also know that by 2007 the ARF had built up a strong track record in multilateral and bilateral funding in Africa. At this juncture, government recognised the need to develop a policy framework for development assistance for the Republic. The stage was set for it to venture into the area of becoming a full-fledged donor that would compete with, and challenge established donors in Africa. The DFA and Treasury had taken the lead by 2005 in working on a strategy of transforming the African Renaissance Fund into a more coherent Development Assistance Fund and Programme for South Africa. A detailed Cabinet memorandum was prepared which spelled out the principles for a policy framework for developmental assistance by South Africa, and they participated in the Paris Club process which focused attention on: increased attention to aid flow; critical reforms being addressed—to outdated and ineffective aid policies and management that favoured budget support as opposed to tied aid and a global assessment of progress made on issues such as achieving the indicators of the Paris Declaration.

Strengthening South–South Cooperation

The third foreign policy circle of the Zuma administration is that of ‘strengthening South–South relations’ (MTSF 2009). The 10 April 2013 speech by the Minister referred to earlier also highlighted the South–South dimensions of South Africa’s foreign policy. According to Minister Nkoana-Mashabe, ‘we have established dynamic relations with countries of the South on the basis of shared interests and common challenges; even positioning ourselves among the group of the emerging powers’. ³² The main rationale underscoring the strategies of the Zuma government would be to ‘ensure the creation of political, economic and social spheres necessary for the fight against poverty, underdevelopment and marginalization of the South’. Minister Nkoana-Mashabane stressed that,

South Africa will continue to build relations based on solidarity and cooperation with regional and sub-regional groups in the South such as the Non-aligned Movement (NAM), Forum for China–Africa Cooperation (FOCAC), Africa–India Forum, G77 plus China, the India–Brazil–South Africa Dialogue Forum, and the New Asia–Africa Strategic Partnership (NAASP) in pursuit of the consolidation of the African Agenda. ³³

The MTSF of 2009 stated that the focus of South–South cooperation strategies would be on (MTSF 2009):

Continued engagement with organisations of the South, such as the Non-aligned Movement (NAM), the G77 Plus China and others.

On the South–South cooperation score, there is a clear ethos of continuity between the emerging policy positions of the Zuma government and those adopted by the Mbeki administration. It should be remembered that the very Southern formations which the Zuma government chose to prioritise were the very ones which the Mbeki government played pivotal roles in revitalising and strengthening, including IBSA and NAASP, and NAM and the G77 Plus China formation, and mire recently the government joined the Brazil–Russia–India–China–South Africa (BRICS) formation. The new administration regarded the strong political and economic ties cultivated with India, Brazil and China as providing opportunities to diversify its international relations, especially in the political realm. BRICS is regarded as a counterweight to western political and economic hegemony in world affairs.

In reaction to widespread criticism about South Africa’s role in BRICS, Minister Nkoana-Mashabane is on record stating that ‘we joined BRICS with three objectives—to outline national interests, promote regional interests and partner with key economies of the South’ (The Diplomat 2012, 12). The Minister went further to state that ‘… our diplomacy and our BRICS membership remain linked to our national interest and that of the continent’ (The Diplomat 2012, 12). In spite of the articulation of this goal orientation, what remained unclear was what needed was a clear sense of its value adding to BRICS, and how exactly it planned to serve the national interests.

The foregoing suggests that South–South relations have emerged as a key priority of South Africa’s foreign policy; however, the link between South–South goals and stated national objectives is not clearly explained, and appears to be assumed as forming a symbiotic relationship. Instead of a presumption, this link has to be made.

Strategic Relations with Formations of the North

Even during the apartheid years, South Africa sought close association with Western powers. So, we turn now to the fourth concentric circle of the Zuma government’s foreign policy, viz., engaging the Northern industrialised powers and their associations. Interestingly, in terms of North–South relations, the Minister of International Relations did make a link between policies in this regard and domestic interests. According to the Minister, while addressing the April 2013 Heads of Missions Conference, ‘we have built a working partnership with countries of the North based on mutual respect on the one hand, and cooperation in areas that are critical to the development of our country on the other…’. ³⁴ Even though this domestic–northern link is stated, it is not elucidated. The rationale behind a strategy to engage the industrialised powers was advanced by the International Relations and Cooperation Minister when she stated that, ‘countries of the North are undeniably an economic power based of the world and remain essential to the economic well-being of the developing world’. Given these economic considerations, South Africa set out to ‘forge partnerships with these countries within the context of trade, development and cooperation’. ³⁵ Engaging the North, policy stated, would furthermore, ‘advance South Africa, the continent and the rest of the South’s developmental agenda’. In the medium term, policy towards the North would see the Zuma government continue to pursue a developmental and investment-oriented approach to engagements with the North, such as the OECD and the G8, as well as continuing to work for the consolidation of the African Agenda through the implementation of relevant NEPAD programmes in all such engagements.

The visit in August 2009 by US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton confirmed South Africa’s wish to cement close ties with Washington and strategic economic relations in particular. It wished to take ‘full advantage of the US Africa Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA)’. Contrary to widely held views that Washington was seeking to impose a an imperialist agenda on Africa through AGOA, South Africa was in fact pushing hard for AGOA and regarded it as in Africa’s interests. It should be remembered that during the Mbeki and George W. Bush presidential eras the bilateral relationship between the two countries cooled off significantly, because of differences over US unilateral conduct globally and the American-led invasion of Iraq in 2003. On the other hand, there was American irritation over South Africa’s quiet approaches to the crisis in Zimbabwe. The Zuma government was committed to strengthening this relationship and to seeking to extract maximum economic benefit from the world’s remaining superpower. Following the NATO-led invasion on Libya in 2011, in the wake of South Africa’s voting in favour of United Security Council Resolution 1973 in favour of imposing a ‘no fly zone’ over Libya and the regime in that country, relations between Washington and Pretoria soured to the point of antipathy between the two governments.

Reaching out to the EU was another example of South Africa’s determination to bolster its relations with the North. The EU is South Africa’s leading trading partner, and it wished to turn this reality into benefits for itself and for the African continent in the main. South Africa has committed itself to advancing AU–EU relations by taking the 1st Africa–EU Action Plan implementation process. The Zuma administration can take a leaf out of the book of its predecessor, which had learned some tough lessons from the TDCA negotiations with Europe, above all, how not to go it alone. So, as government takes up the EU–Africa mantel it has to listen to other Africans and their fears.

The Zuma government sought to advance the agendas of Africa and the boarder development community.

Participate in the Global System of Governance

The fifth foreign policy circle of the Zuma government is that of ‘participating in the global system of governance’.

What is interesting here is how considerations of prestige and recognition emerge as drivers. Thus, in the Heads of Missions Conference on 15 April, the Minister stated that,

we have found our place and are a recognized player in the multilateral system both in the United Nations, and the growing number of mini-lateral bodies like the G20, where we have joined forces with those working for the transformation and democratisation of system of global governance. ³⁶

Here too the domestic–foreign policy link is not explained; it is merely assumed as a given. Yet government faces the challenge of having to close this lacuna.

This stated assumption above is in line with the declaration by the Minister of International Relations and Cooperation declared soon after the April 2009 polls, when she stated that ‘we believe that the transformation of the international system will not only give Africa a bigger voice, but will put us in a better position to address the developmental plight of our continent’. ³⁷ ‘We will continue to work other nations and progressive non-state actors’, continued the Minister, ‘for the reform of the United Nations, including the Bretton Woods Institutions. We cannot achieve our objectives of a better world when the current configuration of the Security Council of the UN is informed by the geo-politics and security concerns of the 1950s when most of Africa was under colonial rule’. ³⁸ The transformational aspirations of government as articulated here targeted for reform and transformation both political and global financial institutions. In validating the idea of a developmental foreign policy, the 2009 MTSF stated that ‘strategic relations with the North’, the Zuma government’s ‘global system of governance’ strategies were geared towards ensuring ‘that the developmental objectives of the developing world are addressed’ (MTSF 2009). This objective would be met through a series of tactics:

Active participation in the global economic reform processes through continued engagement with the international and regional economic and financial institutions, such as multilateral development banks, the IMF and the G20.

According to the 2009 MTSF, South Africa will continue to champion the attainment of the MDGs in African countries. Here it has emphasised a linkage strategy which suggested that ‘democracy goes hand-in-hand with economic justice and prosperity’ and as such it was important to ‘ensure that Africa stays the course in its pursuit to meet the MDGs’. The tactic the new government set out to employ would be to ‘work with progressive forces in the world to implore the international community to play a constructive part in complementing our efforts’. While participating in his first G8 Africa session of the G8 Summit in 2009 in Aquila, Italy, President Zuma urged G8 countries to commit themselves ‘to supporting African efforts towards promoting development, good governance and achieving the MDGs’.

Strengthening Political and Economic Relations

The emerging foreign policy trajectories of the young Jacob Zuma administration not only focused on multilateral dimensions and institutions but, as the sixth concentric circle, also placed an emphasis on the need to strengthen bilateral political and economic relations. In her address to the Heads of Missions Conference in August 2009, the Minister of International Relations reminded heads of missions and diplomats that

among our main challenges in the pursuit of our foreign policy objectives is the alignment and coordination of South Africa’s economic diplomacy across all spheres of government; strengthening economic diplomatic capacity in our Missions; and improving efforts aimed at marketing the brand South Africa and Africa abroad. ³⁹

Specified policy held that South Africa’s economic strategy on diplomacy would continue to focus on strengthening economic relations with traditional and established economic partners; expanding trade relations with emerging markets in Asia, Latin America and Eastern Europe; and the promotion of intra-Africa trade so as to enhance economic development on the continent.

The foreign policy dimensions of the 2009 MTSF identified as vital the goal of ‘strengthening political and economic relations’, and in particular to strengthen ‘economic diplomacy’, with focus on:

Promoting and expanding bilateral partnerships that are aimed at advancing the economic interests of South Africa through structured mechanisms.

This emphasis on economic diplomacy came as no surprise as the new government set out from the onset of its new term to close the domestic–foreign policy divide and to introduce strategies that would make it better possible for DIRCO to make a more effective contribution to help meet the national strategic goals identified by government.

Conclusion

The idea of concentric circles is not widely applied to South Africa’s foreign policy. In 2006, I expressed the idea that it was possible to liken the Thabo Mbeki government’s foreign policy to a set of concentric circles. Given the similarities between, and high degree of continuity between the broad macro aspects of the Zuma government’s foreign policy to that of Mbeki, it is possible also to liken Zuma’s foreign policy to a set of concentric circles.

There is no gainsaying that, on paper, clearly discernible concentric circles are perceived in South Africa’s foreign policy. On paper, the Zuma government’s foreign policy could thus be said to be based on a set of thrusts or pillars, which forms a set of concentric circles, and at the heart of the new foreign policy, according to stated policy, is the pursuit of ‘the national interest’. In fact, it could be argued that ‘the national interest’, while still poorly developed and in need of some fleshing out, is the new glue that holds together the post-Mbeki government’s foreign policy. The question is whether government have a clear sense of the national interests, and whether the other international dimensions of foreign policy clearly speaks to, and reinforces the national interest. In the words of Gerrit Olivier, ‘what particularly needs careful orchestration and prudent diplomacy is the complex interplay between South Africa’s welfare, security and economic dependence vulnerability on the one hand, and on the other hand its ideological pursuits in the contexts of directions of change in the world’ (2013, 413).

Following the national interest is a set of wider circles that inform foreign policy, including African advancement, South–South cooperation, North–South dialogue, active participation in the global system of governance and strengthening political and economic relations. While these six circles are all clearly defined, how they all relate to the epicentre of the national interest and to one another is less obvious, and greater effort is needed on the part of government to redress this uncertainty.

The idea of coherence between the different circles should not be assumed, since coherence and consistency must exist between the different concentric circles and the stated annulus of the national interest. The very idea of South Africa’s national interest need some fleshing out and even turning into a full-fledged doctrine that would guide the Republic’s foreign policy. Also, while there is no gainsaying that there are five clearly identifiable concentric circles, alongside the idea of the national interest—viz., African advancement; strengthening South–South relations; strategic relations with strategic formations for the North; participating in the global system of governance and strengthening political and economic relations—the assumption that there is a neat correlation between these and the presumed national interests, remain just that: an assumption. The government has boasted about how it wished to extend Africa to form part of its foreign policy. In reality there exists a gap between the stated national interest and these other concentric circles, a lacuna that government should of course attempt to close. But the main point to make about the Zuma government’s foreign policy is not that it lacked the idea of concentric circles. On paper these exist. There is no doubt that South Africa does not only have a stated foreign policy on paper; but a clear one at that, and what that spells out broad contours or thrusts of policy. But that is not the real issue. The real issue is that it was often difficult to correlate the stated foreign policy on paper with the practices being followed in reality. Here we could even suggest that Zuma possessed a stated foreign policy on paper but struggled to pursue it through otherwise robust diplomacy. South Africa faces the challenge of ensuring that these different broad thrusts—national interests; African advancement; South–South cooperation; cooperation with northern industrialised powers; participating in the global system of governance and key bilateral political and economic relations—are coherent and aligned with each other; that they all in theory and practice speaks to the stated domestic sources or national interest imperatives. This raises the issue of the management of foreign policy, and the need for the DIRCO in particular, government in general to address the technical and organisational competencies to address the gap between the different pillars. The diplomats and foreign affairs cadres will have to become better at closing the domestic–foreign policy gap, and how to engage international partners more effectively so that tangible benefits derive for the Republic and Africa more broadly.

In short, there is no doubt that South Africa’s does not only boast a well-articulated foreign policy on paper, and in theory. That itemised foreign policy is clearly based on a set of identified concentric. The challenge for South Africa’s foreign policy and the idea of concentric circles lie in practice and with the operationalisation and implementation of foreign policy. Specific reference could be made about the need for the Republic’s 126 embassies, consulates and offices abroad to be coordinated more tightly, and interact with headquarters in Pretoria-Tshwane more closely. The quality of the Republic’s international representation, and enhancing the negotiation, lobbying and marketing skills of our diplomats in the areas of politics, peace and security and of course, the growingly important areas of economic and commercial diplomacy. Issues of specialisation and generalisation of members of the diplomatic corps needs addressing.