Abstract
Iran’s nuclear programme has alarmed the international actors as it is seen as a pursuit for nuclear weapons and a nuclear deterrent. Since the last decade till the run up to the 2003 Iraq War, Iran has been engaged with the West’s leading powers in a sustained diplomatic clash and has seen escalation ever since. In his book Nuclear Iran: The Birth of an Atomic State, David Patrikarakos sets out with an engaging account of the comprehensive story of Iranian nuclear policy. The author does an admirable job on the debated question about the rapid expansion of the Iranian nuclear programme and its rising international concern. The book proceeds with a chronological description of the evolution of the Iranian nuclear programme from its shambolic beginnings under the Shah Mohammad Reza Pahlavi to the present, and its resumption later under the Islamic Republic. Unlike other existing work, Nuclear Iran addresses the factors behind the birth of the nuclear programme to the present day and what it means to Iran, and narrates the chronological history of the programme. The author has explored the political, economic, security, cultural and psychological significance of the nuclear programme for Iran. The nuclear debate has been referred to as a Manichean conflict dividing the developing and the developed world, and the Islamic and Western world, which in turn has created cultural and ideological assumptions on both sides.
The author uses Akbar Etemad―the founder of the Atomic Energy Agency (AEOI) and the father of Iran’s nuclear programme as the starting point of his narrative. His dreams of technologically advanced Iran powering to modernity, matched the revolutionary Shah’s personal ambitions for modernisation. Nuclear power is considered as the epitome of modern technology, the catalyst for economic growth and the future. The Shah fancied himself as an economist, and presented the pursuit of nuclear power as the reward of resource diversification, energy competition and technological advancement. The Iranian nuclear crisis has never been about just centrifuges, or producing weapons-grade uranium. A nuclear programme serves an important symbolic function; it reflects a country’s standing and its attempts to find a place within a perennially hostile and changing world order. They have a ‘normative’ value similar to ‘flags, airlines and Olympic teams: something some modern states believe they must have to be modern states’ (p. 34). Patrikarakos contends that the United States was the midwife of Iran’s nuclear programme, who was willing to transfer unlimited nuclear technology to pre-revolutionary Iran as well as increasing its number of advisors; however, it adopted an aggressive and oppositionist stance towards the Islamic Republic. Along with the growth in wealth and military power, the Shah intensified his pursuit of nuclear technology. Guided by the Shah’s conception of modernity and nuclear power as a symbol of Iran’s ancient glory, the funding for the programme was ceaseless. As a result, Western powers were encouraged and the French Foreign Ministry even created a Nuclear Attaché at their embassy in Tehran (p. 36) and signed the Framatome deal, which would supply nuclear-powered electricity to Iran. France and the USA even signed an agreement for training of Iranian engineers and technicians in their laboratories. Over 1,000 Iranians were sent abroad for training (p. 47).
However, the US was concerned about the ‘Snowball Effect’ and a possible proliferation chain across the modernising world. Although the Shah initially rejected nuclear weapons, he became more publicly aspirant after India’s 1974 nuclear test and showed dissatisfaction with the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) norms (p. 59) which he had signed to keep Washington happy (p. 56). Patrikarakos is convinced that the US, under Nixon, Ford and Carter made it tough for Tehran’s nuclear programme to take off. However, the Shah decided not to risk the relationship with Washington through the pursuit of its nascent nuclear programme. The US even demanded a ‘right of prior consent’ clause, which would compel the AEOI to run all nuclear activities past Washington, but could also get US approval on what Iran could do with the spent fuel of any reactor Iran purchased from Washington (pp. 76–77). In the late 1970s, Etemad was replaced and the Shah’s nuclear programme ended.
In Chapter 6, the author addresses the causes behind the Iranian Revolution of 1978–1979 and the transformation of the country from an autocratic, pro-Western kingdom to an isolationist, Islamic and populist republic under Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini. The nuclear programme was now ‘officially viewed as the continuation of colonialism by other means’ which Khomeini protested as ‘no Westoxification’ in Iran (p. 99). The collaboration with the foreign partners disintegrated after the revolution. The intensifying of the Iran–Iraq War in the mid-1980s saw Iraq bomb Bushehr; the Iranian officials’ complaint regarding Iraq’s violation of internationally accepted code of conduct did not get any reaction from the IAEA as well as the Western powers. Iran started to believe that the only way out was the development of indigenous nuclear technology. Working on the nuclear programme became a national service and the programme became an integral part of how the Islamic Republic defined itself in the modern world (p. 113). It, however, continued the Shah’s line and categorically rejected nuclear weapons. The programme was now a symbol of Iranian defiance in the face of a supposedly hostile world. The Islamic Republic learnt an important lesson from recent events. They witnessed the overthrow of Gaddafi in 2011 after his nuclear programme was dismantled in 2003, and the same year Iraq that never had a nuclear programme, was invaded. However, nuclear Pakistan is an ally of the US and supported its invasion of Afghanistan in 2001 in the so-called ‘war on terror’. The message is simple: nuclear weapons means security. Iranians now, more than ever, see nuclear energy as a symbol of their country’s independence and a totem of modernity and progress. The author accounted this value while discussing Ahmadinejad’s rebuff of the offer of negotiations by the Western powers, which led to it being referred to the Security Council and subsequent sanctions being imposed. Since then, Iranians have desperately tried to find a solution through negotiations. Patrikarakos has skilfully analysed the weakness of the hardliners, who have dominated Tehran from 2005 and how it has hurt Iran’s national interest. He points out that the programme may ‘derail … the regime’ (p. 278). Though Obama could not bring a détente on nuclear weapons, he has made Iran a diminished figure, under attack both nationally and internationally.
Patrikarakos has concluded that the Iranian nuclear crisis is not the cause, but the effect of a dysfunctional relationship, between Iran and the West and it’s underlying relationship that must be addressed ‘through wider political solutions that resolve Iran’s place in the world’ (p. 280). The clash between Iran and the West will never be resolved until Iran’s capability rises and becomes comparable with the West in various political, economic, scientific and technological fields. This will enable call for negotiations but it is hard to see a rapprochement needed to break the impasse. The irony of the nuclear crisis is that Iran’s nuclear programme is the ultimate expression of its desire for acceptance, which is being pursued through the one means that will ensure it remains a pariah. Iran continues to learn that in an unforgiving world, acceptance can only be achieved from a position of strength although there remains some doubt. Sanctions may force Iran to reach a compromise; a prospective military strike may delay the programme, but only for a short term. The author’s only solution to the crisis is engaging Iran in the regional affairs, involving Iran in multi-lateral discussions, allowing Iran to play its intended role in regional and world affairs.
Nuclear Iran ends up in the form of a journalistic writing rather than scholarly work. The primary sources for this study are very less. He was deeply relying on a few interviews, that too especially from the Shah’s period. Persian sources cited are very few and the language used in the book is quite conservative. While illustrating the chronological charts of the programme, he has totally neglected the domestic politics, especially the widespread factionalism between the clerics. While the power structure in Iran is shared between the Supreme Leader, the President and other Council members, the word of the Supreme Leader is regarded as the final law. The author has left the conclusion in uncertainty, as he himself is uncertain of the programme to build a nuclear bomb.
However, the book represents a well-told story, for those interested in Iranian affairs and those who wish to learn more about the place, given the nuclear crisis. It can be a valuable resource for researchers on the nuclear exegesis of modern Iran from its evolution in 1950s to the present day.