BIMSTEC at 17: An Assessment of its Potential

Abstract

Bay of Bengal Initiative for Multi-sectoral Technical and Economic Cooperation, the inter-regional mechanism which was initiated primarily as a combination of India’s Look East Policy and Thailand’s Look West Policy, need to be reviewed in terms of achievements and difficulties faced so far as it has already completed first 16 years of existence. This article aims to identify its shortfalls and positive aspects in order to understand its potential, if there are any.

Keywords

BIMSTEC sub-regionalism Inter-regionalism Look East Policy Look West Policy India

The inter-regional mechanism of Bay of Bengal Initiative for Multi-sectoral Technical and Economic Cooperation (BIMSTEC), initiated in 1997, claimed much commendation during its initial years. It was expected to be a linkage between South and Southeast Asia because of its overlapping memberships from SAARC and ASEAN. Unfortunately, gradually BIMSTEC has lost focus and only a handful people show any interest in reviving the initiative in a true sense. As the institution has completed 16 years of existence, an assessment of its potential needs to be drawn to understand why its success has been overdue. It would help to realise its exact potential and causes behind its slow progress. However, before that analysis, a brief backdrop to BIMSTEC is sketched first so that it can be contextualised within the framework of regionalism/sub-regionalism in Asia.

Backdrop to BIMSTEC

The importance of Bay of Bengal, along with its two adjuncts, namely, Malacca Straits and Andaman Sea, in terms of marine ecology, geography and maritime security, encouraged some Indian academicians and diplomats to think about a Bay of Bengal community comprising the littoral countries of the Bay. Suryanarayan (2000, 2013) mentioned that the primary objective of this thought was to establish a closer connection between the seafront countries of the Bay to enhance cooperation. However, the Indian Ministry of External Affairs showed interest in the project only when it was approached by the Thai ministry of foreign affairs to form a sub-regional grouping between India, Myanmar, Bangladesh, Sri Lanka and Thailand (Suryanarayan 2000, 2013). Interestingly, initially Myanmar was only an observer at the Bangladesh–India–Sri Lanka–Thailand Economic Cooperation (BISTEC). It was included in the grouping as a permanent member on 22 December 1997, six months after the formation of the same and caused a change in the name to Bangladesh India Myanmar Sri Lanka Thailand Economic Cooperation (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Thailand 1997). Later Nepal and Bhutan joined the grouping and the name Bay of Bengal Initiative for Multi-sectoral Technical and Economic Cooperation was adopted with the same acronym.

Primarily it has been accepted that BIMSTEC was an outcome of a combination of the Look East Policy of India and the Look West Policy of Thailand. Thai interest in BIST-EC/BIMSTEC could be understood in the light of three issues; Thailand’s regional aspirations, a desire to sustain economic growth as well as establish and maintain a cordial relationship with Myanmar. The Thai history of independence, which was duly maintained even during the period of colonisation, has given birth to a complex amongst the Thai elites about Thailand’s superiority in comparison to its neighbours. It was Thailand’s regional aspirations that encouraged it to place Bangkok as the essential address of a number of regional/sub-regional initiatives in order to be the central or nodal point of all regional affairs in the post-Cold War era in the Asia–Pacific (Pongphisoot 2012, 127–154). The successive governments of Chatichai Choonhavan, Anand Panyarachun, Chuan Leekpai and ChavalitYongchaiyudh followed more or less the same foreign policy regarding Thailand’s neighbours. Though the Thai policy makers were much more focused towards ASEAN, they were also interested in BIMSTEC as it offered a good opportunity to implement the Thai Look West Policy and a fair chance to be engaged with Myanmar. Thailand favoured the idea of constructive and flexible engagements with Myanmar as argued by Surin Pitswuan that peer pressure and friendly advice should be encouraged if a country’s domestic condition threatens to destabilise a region’s security and peace (Chalermpalanupap 2010, 150–165). At the economic front, Thailand was pursuing a policy shift from import substitution to export orientation and wanted to reduce the production cost. At that time, South Asia was trying to embark on the path of economic reform and predictions were already high about India’s potential to be one of the leading Asian economies. So, Thailand expressed its willingness to be engaged with South Asia to ensure economic integration and low-priced production bases. Thai Prime Minister Chatichai Choonhavan expressed his intentions as early as in 1989 when he was on a tour to India. However, the South Asian countries took some time to respond positively to the Thai call (Intrawityanunt 1997; Phongpaichit 1990). Intrawityanunt (1997) opined, because of BIMSTEC’s small size in comparison to ASEAN or APEC, it was expected that it would be more convenient and manageable and would link up two emerging markets of South and Southeast Asia. In the same tone, at the 13^th Ministerial Meeting of BIMSTEC, held in Nay Pyi Taw in 2011, the Foreign Minister of Thailand said that BIMSTEC’s strong commitments towards promotion and improvements of transport infrastructure and logistics can create modern silk routes, both on land and sea, where South and Southeast Asia grow and prosper together (Thailand PRD 2011).

Besides Thailand, India was another significant founder member of BIMSTEC. India’s enthusiasm to BIMSTEC was a natural outcome of the policy shifts in its foreign affairs and economic domain as well. India used to share sporadic bilateral relations with Southeast Asia during the Cold War era. However, as USSR disintegrated, India lost its closest ally in the international arena (Sharma 2012). India’s frustration increased because of its loneliness due to non-membership in any significant regional trading arrangements which had, by then, become a mantra of the world economy and failure of SAARC in raising intra-South Asian trade and cooperation. As the outer world was changing very swiftly, India decided to establish closer relations with Southeast Asia in order to get benefits from its integration with an economically booming region as well as to reduce its isolation. Besides ASEAN, BIMSTEC offered India a good platform to foster closer association with Myanmar, with which India’s Northeastern part shares a long porous border of around 1600 km. The security of Northeast India and a requirement to exploit its geographical position to elevate greater connectivity with Southeast Asia encouraged India to get membership in various regional mechanisms in its extended vicinity like Bangladesh China India Myanmar Initiative (BCIM), Mekong Ganga Cooperation (MGC), BIMSTEC, etc., (Rao 2005). Mr. Shiv Shankar Menon explained in 2007,

‘we will continue to work with our neighbours, through the innovative use of development partnership, our economic and technological capabilities, the development of cross-border infrastructure projects as well as our civilizational linkages, to achieve the goal of a peaceful periphery’. (Menon 2007, 389–391)

Myanmar’s participation has been an extra advantage offered to India by BIMSTEC. Even, Myanmar is aware of this fact as expressed by Colonel Khin Maung Lay, Director General of Directorate of Trade, Ministry of Commerce, that his country is willing to break the barrier between India and ASEAN (Financial Express 2005). Smaller South Asian countries like Bangladesh and Sri Lanka too were keen on joining hands with Southeast Asian countries. In 1975, India, Bangladesh and Sri Lanka signed Bangkok Agreement with Lao PDR and South Korea (Kalegama 2001, 105–121). Then, in 1981 again, Sri Lanka tried to join ASEAN which however did not produce any positive result at that time (Kalegama 2001, 105–121). So the idea of BIMSTEC was too eye-catching for the selected SAARC members to escape as it was expected to fulfil their long-standing ambition to connect with the dynamic ASEAN economy. They predicted that BIMSTEC would be hassle-free as the sub-region does not share any rival-like situations unlike SAARC. BIMSTEC was evolved with a potential to serve many interests of Myanmar too. Though regionalism was not a new word for Myanmar, it went under isolationism, bilateralism and neutrality during the time of Ne Win (Singh 2010; Myoe 2006). At the economic frontage, limited socialism and nationalism were followed (Myoe 2006). However, since late 1980s, Myanmar embraced several changes to incorporate limited marketisation and made some efforts to be included in some contemporary regional institutions including ASEAN. In an effort to liberalise the economy, the first foreign investment law was passed in 1988, the 1965 Law of Establishment of Socialist Economic System was withdrawn in 1989, private participation in trade law was enacted in 1989, 100 per cent retention of export earnings was allowed in 1990, tariff law was approved in 1992, foreign exchange certificates law was sanctioned in 1993, starting of foreign banks was permitted in 1994 and Myanmar Securities Exchange Center was set up (Fujita et al. 2009). At the foreign policy sphere too, the Myanmar government tried to construct positive relations with the neighbours in order to get recognition from them in the wake of its disapproval of the 1990 election result and other violation of democratic rights of the citizens. It was indeed a hard time for Myanmar as except China no outside power expressed support towards it (Singh 2010; Myoe 2006). In July 1998, few months after Myanmar joined ASEAN and BIMSTEC, Senior General Than Shwe said to his senior officers,

‘…. In the field of international relations, we cannot follow the policy of “no friend, no foe” as we used to do in the past. The world has changed. There is no more a balance of power. Thus, regional groupings have become important……. We must formulate and follow a new foreign policy of “all friends; no foe.”….’ (Myoe 2006)

It was expected that memberships in regional mechanisms like ASEAN and BIMSTEC would help Myanmar in getting financial aid and grant and create a balancing platform between China, India and ASEAN. On one hand, it would create a counter-balance for China’s overpowering influence on Myanmar and on the other, it would prevent India and ASEAN from harshly criticising the Junta government of Myanmar in the fear of the latter’s slipping into China’s dominance in a more evident way (Chachavalpongpun 2010b, 166–180).

Till date, three BIMSTEC summits have been held. Thailand hosted the first summit in July 2004, India hosted the second one in November 2008, and Myanmar hosted the third one in March 2014. By the end of the 2004 Summit, BIMSTEC members signed the Framework Agreement for a BIMSTEC Free Trade Area (BIMSTEC FTA), propelled the year-long Plan of Action on Tourism, set up the BIMSTEC Chamber of Commerce, arranged the first BIMSTEC Youth Football Tournament in Phuket, established the BIMSTEC Centre in Bangkok and scheduled a biomass gasifier plant in Myanmar (BIMSTEC 2004). By 2008, BIMSTEC started preparation for the establishment of BIMSTEC Energy Centre (BEC) in India, BIMSTEC Weather and Climate Centre in India, BIMSTEC Cultural Industries Commission and BIMSTEC Cultural Industries Observatory in Bhutan and completion of the BIMSTEC Convention on Combating International Terrorism, Transnational Organised Crime and Illicit Drug Trafficking (BIMSTEC 2008a). The flexibility of the BIMSTEC working structure can be seen from its sectoral expansion with time. Initially, BIMSTEC had identified only six priority areas at the second Ministerial Meeting, held at Dhaka, Bangladesh on 19 November 1998 and those were trade and investment, transport and communication, energy, tourism, technology and fisheries. After the eighth Ministerial Meeting at Dhaka on 18–19 December 2005, seven new priority areas of cooperation were identified and those were agriculture, public health, poverty alleviation, counter-terrorism and trans-national crime, protection of bio-diversity/environment or natural disaster management, culture and people-to-people contact. At the 11^th BIMSTEC Ministerial Meeting, held at New Delhi in November 2008, climate change was included as the 14th priority area of cooperation (BIMSTEC 2008b). Each sector has a respective leading country with the coordinating country responsible for the sub-sectors. Under the purview of BIMSTEC, several activities have been planned so far. For identification of the hitches in intra-regional transport and connectivity in BIMSTEC, a study was undertaken with technical assistance from Asian Development Bank called BIMSTEC Transport Infrastructure and Logistics Study which has recommended a concrete action plan for BIMSTEC for the period of 2008–2015 for the facilitation of intra-regional movement in BIMSTEC (Asian Development Bank 2008). The Framework Agreement on Free Trade Area (BIMSTEC FTA) was signed in 2004 and currently negotiations are going on for implementation of free trade in goods (Thailand PRD 2011). The BIMSTEC Framework Agreement has provisions for free trade in investment and services too. The Convention on Cooperation in Combating International Terrorism, Trans-National Organised Crime and Illicit Drug Trafficking was signed at the 12^th Ministerial Meeting of BIMSTEC, held at Nay Pyi Taw in December 2009 (Thaindian News 2010). For sharing experience in the energy sector, particularly for reforms, restructuring, regulation and best practices, BIMSTEC is also trying to establish a BIMSTEC Energy Center in New Delhi, India. This, however, is not the end of the list, but few of the activities taken by BIMSTEC.

There are certain features of BIMSTEC which need to be remembered. BIMSTEC, in a true sense, is a linkage between South and Southeast Asia. Panaspornprasit (2004, 257–266) said that BIMSTEC was considered an element of Asian Cooperation Dialogue that expands to include ASEAN, ASEAN+3, SAARC and Gulf Cooperation Council too, for commencing cooperation in areas like energy security, poverty alleviation, biotechnology, e-commerce, financial cooperation, human resource development and others. From the Indian perspective, it was expected that BIMSTEC would increase India’s engagement in Southeast Asia (Yahya 2005, 391–410). BIMSTEC is not a substitute for any existing regional/multilateral organisations. The founding members were very much aware of the fact that the new mechanism might be taken as a substitute for SAARC and in order to clear the confusion the 1997 BIST-EC Declaration defined it as a new organ for enhancing cooperation in the sub-region (Ministry of Foreign Affairs Thailand 2009). Albareda and Barba (2011, 6–11) mentioned that highly institutional arrangements are likely to have formal institutions, large volume of agreements, bodies, thematic organisations, rules and norms. On the contrary, for less formal regional groupings, these physical and visible structures matter less. In this sense, BIMSTEC can be defined as moderately formal/semi-institutional grouping which has endorsed several MoUs, MoAs, agreements and conventions, yet, till date, does not have any permanent secretariat. Only recently, Bangladesh has been selected as a venue for the BIMSTEC secretariat and a Memorandum of Association was signed at the third BIMSTEC Summit to complete the formalities. Another very important feature of BIMSTEC is its holistic approach towards development which could be seen from its gradual sectoral expansion. With the initial focus on economic cooperation and development in terms of economic benefits, BIMSTEC, with its all-inclusive nature, later incorporated other priority sectors like poverty alleviation and trans-national organised crime and cross-border terrorism. BIMSTEC members also share common ethnic, cultural and historical background to some extent, which, scholars like Rivano (2009, 91–100) believe, can enhance bonding within a grouping. Unfortunately, they are different in their approaches towards economy and political ideologies and disparities can be seen in the degree of their development too. For example, in terms of gross domestic product (GDP) per capita, a huge difference could be seen in BIMSTEC economies. Thailand recorded US$ 4972.04 GDP per capita in 2011, whereas the same was US$ 619.45 for Nepal in the same year (World Bank 2012). India and Thailand are two most powerful economies of BIMSTEC which, according to ADB’s forecasts, are amongst the seven engines of Asia’s comeback in the world economy (UNESCAP 2012). On one hand, the economy of Myanmar is still at a very preliminary stage followed by long years of western imposed sanctions and various domestic problems including corruption. 10.2% of the population in Bhutan was living below the poverty line (i.e. $ 1.25) in 2007; it was 43.3% in Bangladesh in 2010, 32.7% in India in 2010, 24.8% in Nepal in 2010, 4.1% in Sri Lanka in 2010 and less than 2% in Thailand (World Bank 2013). Agriculture’s contribution to GDP varied from 32% in Nepal to 12% in Sri Lanka and Thailand in 2011 (World Bank 2013). On the other hand, industry’s contribution to GDP varied from 15% in Nepal to 44% in Bhutan and 41% in Thailand in 2011 (World Bank 2013). Trade’s share to GDP too varied from a lowest of 42% in Nepal to 149% in Thailand in the year 2011 (World Bank 2013). In sum, it can be said that BIMSTEC is a mixture of success and failure characteristics, both of which enjoy similar leverage in the mechanism (See the flow chart 1 for the work structure of BIMSTEC).

Optimism Around BIMSTEC: Or, Not So Hope?

Geographical Proximity

Geographical proximity has the probability to play an important role in raising intra-bloc trade and other cooperation. According to Frankel et al. (1995, 61–95), an increase of 1% in distance can decrease trade by 0.5%. They also concluded that neighbouring members of a grouping, who share common land border, tend to have larger volume of trade in comparison to the countries that are identical but not geographically connected. Another study concludes that common border implies easier access to markets and lower transport cost which is likely to increase trade flows between the members of a regional grouping (Papazoglou, Pentecost, Marques 2006, 1077–1089). Therefore, geographical immediacy can be considered as an opportunity for BIMSTEC. However, one needs to remember that modern states often take differing attitude towards border (Murayama 2006, 1351–1359). For instance, sometimes, they want to follow an open border policy if it can give them returns in terms of free flow of trade with the neighbours. The same country can embrace a restraining border policy when they need to handle issues like illegal migration, trafficking of narcotics or arms, cross-border terrorism and so on (Banerjee 1998, 171–191). As all these issues are tenacious for BIMSTEC members, the governments need to be pragmatic on how they can yield benefits from their geographical proximity while at the same time can avoid issues and elements that create annoyances in the bilateral/multilateral relationships. Moreover, geographic proximity cannot be an independent variable favouring trade volume within a grouping (Banik 2005). It should be accompanied by efficient infrastructure, without which, even countries with huge common land border cannot raise their intra-bloc trade (Banik 2005). In fact, lack of infrastructure is one of the primary reasons responsible for low volume of intra-regional trade within BIMSTEC, despite their geographic contiguity (Asian Development Bank 2008).

Flow chart 1.

Source: BIMSTEC website, Retrieved 5 January 2011, from www.bimstec.org

Rich and Diversified Energy Resources

According to one report published by Asian Development Bank (2013), Asia is rich in energy and resources are diversified to a great extent. For instance, some Central, South and Southeast Asian countries (including Nepal, Bhutan and Myanmar) are rich in hydropower. Similarly, Central Asia (Azerbaijan, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan), South Asia (India, Sri Lanka, Bangladesh) and Southeast Asia (Vietnam and Lao PDR) are rich in hydrocarbon resources too. within BIMSTEC, the diversified energy resources give the smaller economies like Nepal, Bhutan, Myanmar and Bangladesh fair chance to contribute significantly to the goal of regional cooperation and integration as these countries have significant potential in hydropower and/or natural gas. The region wide Trans Power Exchange and Grid Interconnections and BEC as identified by BIMSTEC as two of its programmes under the Energy sector would be a breakthrough if implemented successfully. BIMSTEC members have been working on a MoU on grid interconnections and a MoA on the BEC has already been signed (BIMSTEC 2011, BIMSTEC Energy Center 2006a, BIMSTEC Energy Centre 2006b). However, despite having richness in energy resources, many of the countries in Asia have not been able to maximise utilisation of the existing resources (Asian Development Bank 2013). In the BIMSTEC region this is true for countries like Nepal, Bhutan and Myanmar (Asian Development Bank 2013). Even energy trade between them is much below the expected point. Within BIMSTEC, energy trade, for instance, is limited to bilateral level (India and Nepal, India and Bhutan, India and Bangladesh and Myanmar and Thailand) and no trilateral or multilateral trade or joint initiatives can be seen.

Scope for Sharing Knowledge

The existing differences and diversities between the BIMSTEC countries can be converted into an opportunity if they are ready to share knowledge and experience with each other. One instance can be cited here. If the four founding members of BIMSTEC are taken into consideration, it can be noticed that India and Thailand are ahead of Bangladesh and Sri Lanka in overall technological capabilities (Palit 2006). Differences can be seen even between India and Thailand and between Sri Lanka and Bangladesh. India enjoys advantage in technological innovation; on the other hand, Thailand is superior in technological readiness. Similarly, though both Bangladesh and Sri Lanka are lagging behind India and Thailand in overall technological capabilities, Bangladesh has successfully formed a legitimately large pool of scientists and engineers and Sri Lanka has been doing pretty well in using ICT infrastructure at different levels (Palit 2006). So, these diversities in knowledge, skill and experience offer good platform to share the same with each other and invite concrete togetherness.

Increasing Trade Can Enhance Growth

A growth is expected in the sub-region through increasing trade within BIMSTEC, like many other trade arrangements (Banik 2007). High growth rates in the per capita income in many of the ‘miracle’ economies were associated with growth in trade performance and in several cases, with trade liberalisation. On the other hand, low growth rate in the per capita income in the so-called stagnant countries were associated with waning trade performance (Bhagwati 2004, 34–40). Trade can enhance growth in three ways; first, trade facilitates flow of resources from a low productive zone to a high productive zone, which will eventually confirm proficient management, better forms of businesses, regular and efficient labour training, knowledge about technology and international market; second, trade implies an increase in export sales which again proliferates the production and reduces unemployment; and third, growing international trade ensures exposure to the advanced technologies available in the fast developed countries (Banik 2007; Chuang 1998, 697–721). Unfortunately, despite enormous forecasts and optimism, BIMSTEC has largely been unable to achieve whatever it had thought to have. The intra-BIMSTEC trade is only around 5% of the total export trade of BIMSTEC; and in case of imports, it’s even less than 5 per cent (Table 1). Even BIMSTEC is yet to benefit from the much discussed Framework Agreement on Free Trade Area (BIMSTEC FTA), signed in 2004.

Concerns within BIMSTEC

Top–Down Approach of BIMSTEC

BIMSTEC may be considered as a political project initiated by applying a top–down approach. A top–down approach in the literature of regionalism suggests that governments take the central role in materialisation of the grouping and the private sector has restricted role to play (Albareda and Barba 2011, 7–11). The formation of BIMSTEC testifies that it was a government-led initiative. The UNESCAP was approached to study the potential of such a grouping by the four founding members of BIST-EC and the former came out with the result in a form of a study titled ‘BIST-EC Development Programme: Overview and Sectoral Cooperation’, which eventually became the foundation stone for BIMSTEC (Kalegama 2001, 105–121). On the other hand, it has been argued that a bottom–up approach of sub-regionalism acknowledges different levels of requirements and development needs across the region and reaches to an agreement on the basis of that (Nag 2013). Pike et al. (2006, 3–20) mentioned, local and decentralised approach empowers the local populace so that they can participate in the economic, social and political development of their region, help the institutions to be translucent and accountable to the people to ensure sustainable development as it is based on the comparative advantages of the specific region and create participation from the people.

Table 1.

Share of Intra BIMSTEC Trade in BIMSTEC’s Total Trade (Export and Import) (Values in USD Million)

Year	Total Intra BIMSTEC Export	BIMSTEC’s Total Export	% Share	Total Intra BIMSTEC Import	BIMSTEC’s Total Import	% Share
2004	9401.23	188,833.30	4.98	10056.56	219,119	4.59
2005	11850.63	227,763.90	5.20	12338.17	286,393	4.31
2006	13825.19	274,961.60	5.03	14929.01	339,933	4.39
2007	17415.12	332,379.80	5.24	18226.89	414,832	4.39
2008	20647.11	380,556.60	5.43	23012.42	509,244	4.52
2009	17865.27	345,397.80	5.17	19007.05	434,994	4.37
2010	23694.9	448,784.70	5.28	25284.73	570,203	4.43

Source: Calculated from IMF Direction of Trade Statistics.

Note: Data Presented Lack Data on Bhutan.

Lack of Infrastructure in Transport and Energy

Lack of infrastructure is identified as one of the most significant difficulties faced by BIMSTEC. Sen and Asher (2006, 1–15) mentioned that lack of connectivity and infrastructure causes under-exploitation of the land border among the BIMSTEC members. Transport infrastructure in BIMSTEC cannot compete with the international standard (Asian Development Bank 2008, 6–28). Most roads are not ready for heavy vehicles; trans-shipment causes delays in movement and raises cost; documentation required at the borders makes trade more expensive and time consuming; modern fleet operating system is non-existent; rail networks do not connect all member countries; maintenance of the transport system suffers from lack of investment; air transport infrastructure is too weak within BIMSTEC and this list can go on (Asian Development Bank 2008; CSIRD and ICC 2008). According to estimates by UNESCAP, missing links in the Southern Corridor encompassing several countries in BIMSTEC has caused delays in the implementation of the Trans-Asian Railways project. The missing links include a stretch of 260 km between Thailand and Myanmar and another gap of 300 km between India and Myanmar (UNESCAP 1999, 51–61). Missing links do exist within Myanmar itself and those include a 100 km gap in Myitkyina–Kachang/Houqiao line, a 166 km gap in Thaton– Myawaddy line and a 195 km gap in Daluo–Tachilek line (UNESCAP 1996, 24). Besides inefficient transport infrastructure, BIMSTEC suffers from inefficient energy infrastructure too. Lack of investment, absence of region-wide institutions to stimulate regional energy cooperation, differences in national energy policies, variances in rules and regulations as practiced by different members, lack of cross-border energy links do not encourage regional energy cooperation within BIMSTEC (Rahman et al. 2011; UNESCAP 2012, 72–84).

Lack of Commonness and Cultural Identity

The European Union is known for its integration and that has become possible because of a sense of commonness amongst the members regarding political value, a desire for a common market, a common currency, open borders within the region, a single visa regime and collective security (Dutta 2011, 59–524). Besides common political and economic vision, a common cultural identity has been constructed in Europe through ages. Europe had shared many things very proudly including Dante, Cervantes, Shakespeare, Descartes, Goethe, Schiller, Victor Hugo, Stefan Zweig and many others (Frank 1999, 317–324). Frank (1999, 317–324) believed that the identical cultural root helped Europe in building a common political awareness. On the other hand, though BIMSTEC too shares many commonalities, the legacy of Indo-centric South Asian civilisation and history has added to the fear of Indian domination in the region. The role of Buddhism, early cultural and trade links involving the sub-continent and Southeast Asia (here Myanmar and Thailand in particular) have not been used effectively to revitalise the common cultural affinity in the region.

Lack of Soft Power Connectivity

Tourism which is often regarded as a tool to enhance people-to-people connectivity is not in a position to accomplish BIMSTEC’s vision of achieving regional cooperation as intra-regional tourism too represents a discouraging picture (UNESCAP 1997). Complicated visa and other documentation processes, lack of easy access to destination and transport infrastructure, lack of safety and security, lack of access to low-budget airlines, requirement of special permits to visit certain areas, lack of coordination between and amongst tour operators, governments and common people are some of the reasons which do not allow significant intra-regional tourism within BIMSTEC (Rasul and Manandhar 2009, 187–209; World Economic Forum 2013). Further, BIMSTEC has not been able to implement common visa for BIMSTEC professionals, common business card for BIMSTEC businessmen, Buddhist Circuit, open sky policy and other tools of greater people-to-people contacts which were undertaken as planned activities in various meetings and workshops. Low level of people-to-people contact is however a general phenomenon across South Asia. Despite SAARC attempts to improve it through initiatives like SAARC Audio-visual Exchange Programme, SAARC Documentation Center, Scheme for Promotion of Organised Tourism, A Chairs, Fellowships and Scholarships Scheme and Youth Volunteers Programme, people-to-people contacts in South Asia remain significantly low because of less publicity of the programmes, differences in the visa regimes of the countries, bureaucratic hassles in obtaining visa in certain cases due to obsession about illegal migration and trafficking of contraband etc. (Onta 2001). Behera et. al. (2000) argued that popular interactions in South Asia are largely shaped by the choices made by the states. In the ASEAN region, close interactions at the people’s level helped the grouping in many ways. In 1972, the ASEAN Chambers of Commerce and Industry was established and it played a significant role in formulating the ASEAN free trade agreement (Collins 2008). By late 1990s and early 2000s, ASEAN made it clear that civil society, business groups and people of ASEAN should have ownership in all matters regarding ASEAN (Collins 2008). People’s participation not only enhances solidarity and helps in creating a regional identity within a regional or sub-regional group, but also strengthens the cooperation initiative as experts with different kind of knowledge and skills can give their inputs. It helps a government-led initiative to be transformed as a people-led initiative (Collins 2008).

Lack of Permanent Secretariat, Leadership and Political Will

Lack of permanent secretariat is one of the basic problems of BIMSTEC. Though Bangladesh has been selected as the place for BIMSTEC Secretariat in January 2011, formalities were not completed till the third Summit of BIMSTEC held in early March 2014 (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Nepal 2013; The Sunday Times 2011). Though Thailand plays host to the meetings of BIMSTEC Working Group or Bangkok Working Group, absence of regular Summit and permanent secretariat causes delays in coordination and implementation of the planned activities. Another lacuna in BIMSTEC is related to the absence of political will. Asia, in general, suffers from lack of political will in case of regionalism (Gyohten 2009). Lack of strong political will and obligation towards regional cooperation, dominance of individual state interests and bureaucratic labyrinth cause delays in implementation of the planned activities and programmes within SAARC and BIMSTEC too.

Sporadic Bilateral Disputes within BIMSTEC

India’s bigger size and population and larger economic and military strength lead to lack of mutual trust with her immediate smaller neighbours, which are common both in SAARC and BIMSTEC. Geographically, India is the only country that has land border with most of its neighbours (except Afghanistan); economically, she enjoys a superior position in South Asia; historically, most of South Asia has civilisational links (either direct or indirect) with India (Sahadevan 2011, 102–176).

Though BIMSTEC does not have any rival-like conflicting situation, its members share intermittent bilateral and trilateral tensions at times. For instance, the issue of illegal migration from Bangladesh to India, particularly to Assam has long been an irritation in their bilateral relations (Das 2009, 451–456). Within BIMSTEC, India enjoys a positive trade balance with Bangladesh, Sri Lanka and Nepal (Das 2009, 5–34). Among these countries, Bangladesh particularly is not happy with its trade deficit with India. Bangladesh often views this trade deficit as an Indian hegemony which made it rigid against allowing her national territory as a transit to Northeast India from mainland India that can reduce the transport cost of India and help Bangladesh earn huge amount of transit fees. The ‘game of terror export’ is another annoyance in BIMSTEC (Barbhuiya 2009, 35–59). For instance, Bangladesh accused India of helping and protecting rebels of the Shanti Bahini from Chittagong Hill Tracts and India too keeps criticising Bangladesh of aiding various insurgent groups from Northeast India (Barbhuiya 2009). Nepal too shares a sensitive relationship with India because of factors like illegal movement of people, drugs and arms across the border (Das 2012, 7–52). Nepal’s geographic location between two giant neighbours, India and China, has added to it small-nation inferiority complex (Malla 2010, 212–220). Nepal is also not very happy with the way of sharing of common river system and alleges India of securing more benefits from the existing arrangements than Nepal (Jha 2013, 217–230).

Bilateral disputes within BIMSTEC are however not confined inside South Asia. Thailand and Myanmar too shared disputatious relations with each other in a number of issues (Chachavalpongpun 2010b, 117–137). Myanmar accuses Thailand of supporting Karen National Union and Shan State Army (south), two ethnic armed groups that are hostile to the Myanmar government. Myanmar stations troops and weaponry across the Thai border and it causes dissatisfaction within Thailand. Other issues are illegal fishing and logging within Myanmar’s territory, inflows of workers, refugees and other migrants from Myanmar to Thailand and flow of illegal drugs from Myanmar to Thailand (Chongkkittavorn 2001, 117–130). In November 1999, Myanmar imposed economic sanctions against Thailand as the later freed the political rebels who were held responsible for commandeered the Myanmar embassy in Thailand (Chachavalpongpun 2010a, 117–137; Ganesan 2006, 131–149). However, Thailand could not ignore the economic importance of Myanmar too. Timber, minerals, fish, gemstones and cheap labourers from Myanmar have always been in high demands in Thailand. It was this economic interest of Thailand that was crucial in declaring its policy of constructive engagement towards Myanmar and supporting latter’s candidature in ASEAN (Chachavalpongpun 2010a, 117–137; Ganesan 2006, 131–149). The military rulers of Myanmar too reciprocated positively to the Thai call as the country needed business from Thailand for sustenance and political support from ASEAN for its legitimacy (Chachavalpongpun 2010a, 117–137). Drug trafficking remains another major worrying issue in Thai–Myanmar relation. A report says that Thailand is the most affected country of Myanmar’s drug trade (ALTSEAN BURMA 2004). Tension also subsists between Myanmar and Bangladesh, mainly concentrated on the demarcation of maritime boundary and the Rohingya issue (Ahsanullah 2011, 139–161; Balaram 2012, 85–104). As Bangladesh is geographically disadvantaged, it wants to demarcate the maritime boundary with India and Myanmar on equitable principle so that it can enjoy equal rights with the other two over maritime resources such as gas and marine species. On the other hand, both India and Myanmar want to delineate the maritime boundary on equidistance principle (Ahsanullah 2011, 139–161). New issues evolved when huge amount of natural gas was discovered in the Bay of Bengal and both Bangladesh and Myanmar wanted to secure rights on maximum amount of reserves (Balaram 2012, 85–104). In 2008, Myanmar’s navy started drilling to extract natural gas with the help of a Korean company and that initiated fresh arguments between Myanmar and Bangladesh (Shah Alam and Faruque 2010, 405–423; Balaram 2012, 85–104). Bangladesh sought third-party mediation from the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) in 2009 to solve the issue. The UNCLOS gave the responsibility to the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea (ITLOS) and the judgement was declared in March 2012. As both Myanmar and Bangladesh claim to be the winner in the dispute, it seems that they have accepted the decision of the ITLOS at least for the time being (Balaram 2012, 85–104).

Concluding Remarks

Success of any regional/sub-regional initiative depends on four minimum issues—institutions, leadership, agenda and external factors (Albareda and Barba 2011, 6–11). From the above discussions, BIMSTEC may be identified as a semi-institutional inter-regionalism which is working towards establishing a permanent secretariat, tourism fund, energy centre and already has signed a number of documents in terms of MoUs, MoAs and established rules and norms to follow through Bangkok Working Group. Leadership is another important indicator for regionalism. Leadership denotes the capability and intentions of a member country to lead the group, mostly unofficially. Capability includes economic and political power of a country within the group/region vis-à-vis the international arena and intentions suggest to the willingness of a country to take the lead. Within BIMSTEC, both Thailand and India are two influential powers and so, the question remains, who has the intention to take the lead and to what extent, that would be able to gain others’ confidence? Would India’s leadership convert BIMSTEC into another SAARC? Or, would Thailand take the lead? Importance of selecting the right agenda for BIMSTEC is another important aspect on which depend the interests of the members. Maybe a little more bottom–up approach in selecting the agenda/programmes would ensure more participation from the private sectors and civil society at large. The fourth, but may not be the last important issue is the external factor. Largely, BIMSTEC members do not share any common threat perception from any external power. However, there are some measures that can be taken to stimulate the grouping. Transformation of Northeast India as a zone of convergence or cross-border region would help the grouping to initiate more interactions at the popular level (Shekhar 2008, 5–21, Chakraborty 2009, 197–211, Perkmann and Sum (2002), Scalapino 1991–92, 19–41). Hurrel (1995, 39–40) expressed that informal/soft-regionalism can involve

‘…increasing flows of people, the development of multiple channels and complex social networks by which ideas, political attitudes, and ways of thinking spread from one area to another, and the creation of transnational regional civil society’.

Besides, BIMSTEC needs to adopt a common stand against common issues concerning the region, such as, terrorism, insurgency and other cross-border trans-national crime (Rana 2010). It needs to remember that international and trans-national organised crime do not consider any border as barrier and terrorist groups have established networks with each other (Sunday Observer 2008). Mitigating intra- and inter-regional tensions and conflicting situations is another arena which needs attention from BIMSTEC. Many scholars have concluded that likelihoods of conflict between two countries may reduce trade as conflicts can raise costs of production, transportation and transaction (Blomberg and Hess 2006, Glick and Taylor 2005, Long 2009). However, to what extent the inter-regional tensions can affect trade and cooperation within BIMSTEC is yet to be explored through further research (Batra 2013). So, in brief, it can be concluded that the future of BIMSTEC is yet to be determined and it may take more time to evolve as a cohesive region.

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