Making Sense of India–Bangladesh Relations

Introduction

In a world system that is marked by an unequal and hierarchical distribution of power, security strategies of small states are essentially geared to survival often afflicted by a fear complex. Since the ability to use power—military or economic—is limited, security is understood in a much broader sense. A matrix of state-centric territorial security is mixed up with people-centred human security aspiring for socio-economic development and political stability. This is further influenced by issues of identity and national values. As ruling regimes represent divergent approaches, almost an endless experiment on security continues which has a direct bearing on a country’s foreign policy. For Bangladesh, such small-country syndrome is reflected markedly on its relations with India.

On the one hand, within a geopolitical theatre where major actors are present, a small state can skilfully use the differences between the contending actors in order to protect and promote its interests. However, such tactics are useful only to an extent and can backfire if stretched to an extreme. On the other hand, nation-building based on a bogey of external threat forecloses the possibility of cooperative initiatives where the pervading fear of the big brother dominates national perception. As a result, irrespective of particular regimes in Bangladesh having mutually beneficial relations with India during a given period, there has not been a sustained effort at peace-building.

Despite the common cultural links, disunity among people persists over national identity and national priorities, and the concomitant trust deficiency disturbs bilateral relations between Bangladesh and India. From pressures and threats to concessions and soft persuasion instigating resistance and counter-pressure, India–Bangladesh relations have experienced it all. While both stand to gain from extensive economic interactions, security considerations and threat perception continue to dominate relations between the two. Security-related core goals are not similar, and while Bangladesh may remain mired in the small-country syndrome, India may have to decide whether it would strive to support a particular regime that commits itself to secular, democratic ideals or treat Bangladesh, irrespective of the ruling regimes, as a security concern.

The same flow of events can be discussed from different angles. A descriptive chronological interpretation can give us a sense of a common thread among apparently disparate flow of events. The depth of bilateral relations can be assessed on the basis of what one gets and gives in return. Even we can think of a regional system or a subsystem to ascertain how the system impacts upon bilateral relations. Like the different angles of analysis, we have different levels of analysis as well. For example, Pant (2007, 231–249) analyses India–Bangladesh relations at three levels: structural—where the idea of ‘balancing India’ takes predominance in an asymmetric power distribution, institutional—where domestic politics and party postures play the most significant role, and bilateral—where issues such as river water sharing and border disputes stand out. Thakar (2010, 62–82), on the other hand, follows a hierarchical order of the systemic level—discussing patterns of state response, interest and policy—followed by the state level—where national identity and domestic politics become the subject of analysis—and the individual level—that focuses on leadership chemistry or the relations between the leaders at personal levels.

Bangladesh became independent in 1971 and for a short period of a few succeeding years, both India and Bangladesh enjoyed friendly relations. India’s role in helping Bangladesh to break away from Pakistan and establish it as a sovereign state was evident and such a support was necessary for Bangladesh as well. During those years of warmth, India and Bangladesh concluded agreements to resolve certain outstanding issues, including water sharing and land boundary agreements in 1974. However, the nationalist freedom struggle of 1971 did not completely eradicate or convert the pro-Pakistan elements present in the state who openly opposed the formation of Bangladesh. Before the national struggle could metamorphose itself into a nation-state, Sheikh Mujibur Rahman, the face of the struggle and the head of the state, was assassinated in 1975 in a military coup and Bangladesh was thrown into a turmoil from which, despite occasional periods of calm, it never really recovered. As the search for a new national identity began, different elements vied for pre-eminence and the end result was greater instability that, instead of bringing the disparate bands of people together, divided them more. The developments in the late 1970s made India apprehensive of the future course Bangladesh might take and all arrangements were up for reappraisal. With time, the inclination and likelihood of implementing the arrangements petered out. Only years after, some of the arrangements were implemented after renegotiation and much dilly-dallying. A state of ‘cold peace’ exists in India–Bangladesh relations (Saha 2000, 204) despite occasional cordiality that is short-lived.

It may be assumed that the main source of irritation and conflict in the bilateral relations of these two neighbouring countries is a sense of insecurity and trust deficit. The article seeks to assess the impact of essential security concerns predominant in the bilateral relations between India and Bangladesh on their mutual perceptions and explores for the dimensions of a sustained pattern in the security competition. As perceptions vary, patterns of policies and relations too change accordingly. At three levels, this assumption is sought to be verified: these are the levels of geopolitics, attitudinal influence and functional exchanges.

Geopolitics

If geopolitics is defined as geography’s conditioning influence on policy formulation, India–Bangladesh relations amply justify such a definition. Bangladesh is often described as ‘India-locked’, that is, 90 per cent of its international border is shared with India, while Myanmar brings up the rest. Its maritime access is to the Bay of Bengal where India has a robust naval presence. However, the north-eastern region of India, likewise is ‘Bangladesh-locked’ prompting India to seek transit rights through Bangladesh in order to, inter alia, ‘open up the region to trade and economic activity, and in particular, to bring it closer both physically and psychologically to the rest of the country’ (Murshid 2011, 50). The transit right through Bangladesh to reduce the distance with India’s north-eastern part has unique geopolitical significance.

Considering the fact that slicing out this territory from the then British India was merely an act of political convenience while its geographical features kept itself integrated into the Indian subcontinent, it could very well be assumed that political barriers would come in clash with geographical harmony, especially when 54 common rivers flowed through India into Bangladesh (the then East Pakistan), leading to a perennial problem of water sharing. As India is the upstream state, flow of river water into Bangladesh is susceptible to Indian activities, including building of dams and barrages, linking or digging canals or abundant use of water. Bangladesh is situated at the lower side of these rivers, and it suspects that the absence of just river water-sharing agreements makes it vulnerable to Indian designs. States would hardly agree on each other’s explanations of legitimate requirements. River water sharing has become not only a bone of contention between India and Bangladesh but it has also become a sensitive issue in domestic politics of both the countries. The resultant case-building on each occasion is geopolitical.

In 1977, India agreed on the principle of equitable distribution of Ganges waters between both the countries, but the construction of the Farakka Barrage in India made Bangladesh apprehensive of getting the desired volume of downstream water during the dry season. However, it took time to implement the principle in practice as differing perceptions prevented the parties from reaching an agreement. India’s insistence on a strict bilateral negotiation was sought to be countered by Bangladesh’s attempts to internationalise the issue and in effect, the contending positions delayed the final agreement, while short-term arrangements continued to work during this time. It was in 1996 that an agreement was signed between India and Bangladesh over sharing of the Ganges water. This came just before the expiry of Indo-Bangladesh Friendship treaty of 1972, which the Hasina administration refused to renew in 1997, as the treaty was viewed as an icon of Indian domination in Bangladesh. The agreement on the sharing of Ganges water is regarded in Bangladesh as one of the most positive confidence-building measures between the two countries (Khan and Azad 1999, 131). The other perhaps is the assurance that India is not building the controversial Tipaimukh Dam on the Borak River.

Sharing of Tista river water is a different story. The prolonged negotiation was on the verge of a final settlement when the interests of the state of West Bengal came in the way. The coalition government at the centre could not override the opposition from the state and the agreement did not materialise. As the expansion of the irrigation projects in Bangladesh depends on Tista water, with the common belief that Tista water will lead to greater irrigation for sustaining increased food production, the inability on India’s part to deliver was construed, again, as yet another instance of India’s insensitivity. While in the first case, that is, the sharing of Ganges water, the then Chief Minister of West Bengal was actively involved in the process, in the second case, the Chief Minister of West Bengal was denied a role. As a sovereign country, Dhaka’s main line of communication is with New Delhi and there is some inhibition in terms of lobbying at the levels of Indian states. Nevertheless, taking into consideration the practicalities of political compulsions in India, it is worthwhile to consider opening parallel lines of communication with the Indian states that border Bangladesh. Any decision of New Delhi has a greater chance of support if the border states, which are most affected by such decisions, are taken into confidence not by New Delhi alone but also by Bangladesh. The solution to other persisting or potential complications related to upstream–downstream water sharing too can follow the same formula. However, such lobbying should avoid the usual patterns of accusations and counter-accusations as, reportedly, during former Foreign Minister of Bangladesh Dipu Moni’s visit to Kolkata, an altercation with the Chief Minister of West Bengal led to Ms Mamata Banerjee adopting a rigid stand on Tista River water sharing and the land boundary agreement (Anandabazar Patrika 2014, 8).

India has been instrumental in Bangladesh gaining independence and the role of the Indian Army was the determining factor. Bangladesh, as a small power, can be apprehensive that the very same Indian Army may act against its interests albeit under extreme circumstances. India often considers the ‘Siliguri Corridor’, a narrow stretch of land which at a point is less than 14 miles wide, as a vulnerable point as it connects India’s north-eastern region with the mainland. There is a general perception voiced in some quarters in India (and echoed in Bangladesh) that in case of an attack from China with the aim of cutting off the north-east, northern Bangladesh will be overrun by India (if a request for the right of passage is turned down) as India will be compelled to maintain communication lines with its north-eastern region. This may appear merely as a contingency plan and there is no official evidence that such a plan is in place, but the idea that Bangladesh will have very little option to exercise under such circumstances is not a comfortable notion for a sovereign state. More importantly, India is also concerned of pressures from Bangladesh itself over the narrow ‘Siliguri Corridor’. The vulnerabilities, in the absence of trust, merely give credence to imageries with no attempt whatsoever to remove suspicion and build confidence in relations.

The border demarcation line drawn by the British at the time of the Partition was hurriedly done and as a result, the international border has become an issue of inconvenience for both the parties leading to random disputes. The Radcliffe Line has created a situation where maps do not always tally with the ground realities and at places, where border is to be determined along the mid-stream of a river, the line shifts as the river changes its course. Char lands form due to river activities and are sought to be occupied as soon as they appear and as a result, intermittent areas along the border remain under adverse possession. Further, the unique problem of 111 Indian enclaves in Bangladesh and 51 Bangladeshi enclaves in India introduces yet another challenge. All these, as a ‘flawed inheritance’, worsen the process of a clear delineation of the border (Pattanaik 2011, 746–747). The 1974 Land Boundary Agreement though intended the transfer of these enclaves, the actual transfer is yet to take place. Meanwhile, makeshift arrangements have been made like the Tin Bigha Corridor that allows Bangladesh to use Indian territory on lease to establish contacts with its Dahagram–Angorpota enclaves, where a flyover or an underpass is to be built to allow round-the-clock access. However, the chars and islands will continue to form because of river activities and will pose fresh challenges of territorial possessions necessitating fresh bouts of contest. Further, the issue of the demarcation of the maritime boundary assumes greater significance with contested exclusive economic zones (EEZs) and the resultant possession over natural gas reserves in the Bay of Bengal. Whether these issues are solved bilaterally or through international arbitration, the potency of conflict even in the coming years cannot be ruled out.

Moreover, the line creates a porous border and it facilitates the easy movement of people across. The movement of people is prompted by either a fear of loss or the lure of gain. Turmoil and consequent displacement of people in Bangladesh and a possible greener pasture in India instigate illegal migration to India—many of the migrants are branded as infiltrators. The long land border presents with a number of makeshift gateways which makes India a natural choice. The pattern of illegal migration and infiltration coupled with the suspicion that such infiltration covers the surreptitious movements of smugglers and radical Islamist terrorists who sneak into India makes the Indian establishment worried. The problem of infiltration into India is often denied by Bangladesh but the issue figures prominently in India’s domestic politics. The idea that the demographic boundary of Bangladesh rests well inside the political boundary of India has gained currency in India. Though in some quarters it is felt that the connection between Bangladeshis in India and Islamic terrorism is a ‘conceptual formulation with very little substantive evidence’ and the formulation has much to do with the domestic politics in India where the Bharatiya Janata Party, for its ideological commitment, is the natural enemy of Bangladeshi Muslim migrants (Ghosh 2013, 84–85), it is clearly pointed out by scholars that the fear is perceived as real. Samaddar writes:

…there is the haunting fear regarding lebensraum—masses of migrants from Bangladesh demanding the right to find a lebensraum, a haven in India. Such a fear has strengthened the national security perspective in India and has been responsible among other factors for turning India into a national security state. (Samaddar 1999, 19)

The general resentment against Bangladeshi migration in the entire north-eastern region of India vitiates relations among communities and it can disturb the local political process like the ‘foreigner issue’ that frequently instigates political uproar in the region. Such migration rekindles the apprehension of a vicarious design and gives credibility to Maulana Bhasani’s idea of a sovereign state of Bangassam (Bangladesh plus Bengali-speaking areas of eastern India dominated by a Muslim majority) which would eat into India’s territorial integrity (Bhardwaj 2003, 268). The resolve to stop infiltration has resulted in trespassers being killed at the border in some cases, and the Border Security Force of India has been accused of imperiousness in this regard. The Border Guard Bangladesh, however, makes little effort to stop illegal migration into India on their part. Illegal migration has prompted India to erect a fence along the border. Since the Land Boundary Agreement of 1974 prevents the parties from erecting any defensive structure within 150 yards of the border, the fence has been erected well within the territory of India at varying distances from the actual border. The fence thereby leaves out a vast stretch of territory, a number of villages and a portion of Indian population who live between the fence and the actual border. Allowed to travel into this side of the fence only during daytime, people in these areas face many difficulties (Pattanaik 2011, 749). Depending on the state of relations prevailing at a particular point of time between the two countries in general, the security forces on both sides of the border have either engaged in serious clashes or resorted to joint border patrol at the unfenced or undemarcated areas. It is to be noted, however, that the worst border clash between the security forces of the two sides took place in 2001, in which 19 lives were lost, when Sheikh Hasina was in power.

Much to India’s concern, with growing anti-India sentiment in Bangladesh coupled with greater accommodation of orthodox Islamic forces by the turn of the present century, Machiavellian tactics came into play. Bangladesh increasingly became a safe haven for insurgent groups active in India, a transit route for Pakistani militants, a hub facilitating the Pakistani Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) network establishing terror links with Bangladeshi militants Harkatul Jihad al-Islami (HuJI) with an eye on committing terrorist acts in India, and for smuggling fake currency and small arms into India. The situation assumed a credible threat to India’s security and in many quarters, it was felt that Bangladesh was turning out to be South Asia’s second front of Islamic terror after Pakistan (Bhaumik 2003, 282). In the same fashion, Bangladesh found New Delhi to be actively supporting the insurgents of the Chittagong Hill Tracts in Bangladesh, allowing them to operate from bases in India (Kabir 1998, 20), thereby generating a potential threat to the national security of Bangladesh. It can be said that the confrontational tactics constitute provocation and counter-measures, while cooperation assuage hard feelings and create an environment of opportunities. As the Hasina administration took action against the top Indian insurgents, it made way for better relations between the two countries. In 2009, Sheikh Hasina was awarded the Indira Gandhi Prize for Peace, Disarmament and Development and India subsequently moved forward to offer economic benefits in terms of the removal of trade barriers on certain items, 1 billion dollar credit to Bangladesh, cooperation in power sector and sought to settle the vexed issues of land boundary and Tista water sharing.

The very big size of India, with its concomitant economic strength and military might, itself is a source of distrust as it appears to envelop Bangladesh. There is little that Bangladesh can do to alter the realities on its own, and sustained cooperation with India could be mutually beneficial for both. However, there is always this feeling in Bangladesh that by emphasising friendship with India as the cornerstone of Bangladeshi foreign policy, Bangladesh runs the risk of being a satellite of India and might not be able to avoid eventual Indian domination. Therefore, equal, if not more, attention is to be given to Pakistan, and especially to China, to balance India. It takes a great amount of skill to play off one against the other as relations constantly remain stressful and confrontational, but in effect, all the wariness leads to Indo-centrism in policy formulation of Bangladesh. In India too, the stance hardens and sharp reactions are heard which call for ‘…a political bi-partisan declaratory foreign policy towards Bangladesh drawing “red lines” which Bangladesh cannot cross in terms of sensitivity to India’s national security interests’ (Trivedi 2008, 100).

The environmental geopolitics introduces a new scenario that presents fresh challenges, as if a future threat is in the making. Kaplan (1994), in his work, has drawn attention to the impending anarchy that environmental changes might cause. He regards the environment as a ‘hostile power’ and ‘the national security issue of the early twenty-first century’. It is now largely established that global warming leading to rise of sea levels would submerge low-lying areas and displace a large number of people in a few decades from now. Kaplan feels that the impact of growing population, disease and environmental degradation, along with rising sea levels in critical overcrowded regions such as the Nile Delta and Bangladesh, will prompt mass migrations and incite group conflicts (Kaplan 1994). In fact, Bangladesh has become the most potent symbol of the ‘crisis narrative’ of destructive environmental change as cyclones and floods periodically wreak destruction on the country (Lewis 2012, 205). It appears then that new issues are emerging as core foreign policy challenges and while India herself will be in trouble to tackle such threats effectively, the added responsibility to set things right in the neighbourhood would further imperil the mission.

Attitudinal Effects

Attitude of a state is made of a number of elements, including perception or misperception about itself and the other(s), collective memory, ideas and values and experience. With time, Indian attitude has grown to view Bangladesh as ungracious and ungrateful that fails to recognise India’s instrumental role in achieving its independence and consequently, shows little inclination to accommodate India’s interests. India’s expectations and consequent frustrations are indeed inappropriate as the very spirit of secular Bengali nationalism of 1971 that secured India–Bangladesh ties was short-lived, and after 1975, could not revive its true essence. As the very identity of Bangladesh went through a re-formation process under the military rule of General Ziaur Rahman and General H.M. Ershad, India figured as the hegemon, and the bogey of Indian threat was used to rebuild the Islamic Bangladeshi identity. As a result, Bangladesh views India not as a liberator but as a hegemonic ‘big brother’ that attempts to view at least part of the South Asian region as its own backyard and is inconsiderate to Bangladesh’s legitimate demands. In short, the feeling of ingratitude was reciprocated from Bangladesh in its fear of Indian patronage and domination and military rules shattered a naïve expectation of India that Bangladesh would emulate India on all matters of domestic and foreign policy (Saha 2000, 202). A sense of reciprocity, therefore, works in refusing each other’s proposed policies. Those who do not condemn India outright suggest that India should be like an ‘elder brother who cares’ and not a selfish ‘big brother’. The contending attitudes make it difficult for both India and Bangladesh to move ahead and allow functional cooperation to succeed.

Linguistic nationalism tends to establish monopoly on the culture of language. The perception in Bangladesh is that in West Bengal, the Bengali culture and the language are not as pure as that which exist in Bangladesh. West Bengal has a mixed culture now as it integrates itself with mainstream Indian culture. The more the Bengalis of West Bengal become emotional and sensitive about similarities of culture and inherent bonds between the peoples on both sides of the border, the more they continue to view Bangladesh as East Bengal (almost as a complimentary part of West Bengal). It is an undeniable fact that Bangladesh and West Bengal in India had once been together within the undivided Bengal and hence, a shared history, geographical congruity and cultural and linguistic similarities would continue to be present. However, post-Partition politics took different directions in these two areas and despite people-to-people interactions harping on common cultural ties, the propensity to view Bangladesh on an equal footing with West Bengal, a constituent state of India, not only hurts the collective ego of Bangladesh as a sovereign independent state but also fuels apprehension in Bangladesh that India fails to treat the country with due respect.

Though the colour of flags changed at regular intervals, historically, this area, as East Pakistan, has been anti-Indian from the Partition days. It is argued that the narratives of Partition function as non-physical borders. These mental borders ‘…like geographical borders divide and unite people, tell them who they are and inform them if and where they belong’ (Sinha-Kerkhoff 2006, 24). Closeness during the early 1970s was a matter of convenience for both. It helped secular India to prove that two-nation theory that led to the partition of the subcontinent was a wrong thesis and strategically, to diminish the possible second front of Pakistan in armed conflicts. This closeness was also the result of a change in the orientation of East Pakistan as, for the time being, the spirit of 1947 became irrelevant and the spirit of 1971 held sway that viewed the forthcoming Indian support useful in order to achieve the goal of independence. However, the transitory convergence of interests did not guarantee a long-lasting friendship as the nation-building process in Bangladesh began.

Construction of identity in Bangladesh takes in two primary components: secular or moderate Islamic Bengali linguistic nationalism; and orthodox Islamic brotherhood; both contribute to Bangladeshi nationalism and both are anti-Indian in their orientation, albeit to different degrees. Often, it is portrayed as a struggle between the two, as if the two main political parties and personalities in contemporary Bangladesh personify the opposing forces (Awami League under Sheikh Hasina and the Bangladesh Nationalist Party [BNP] under Begum Khaleda Zia), but in effect, a blend of both constitutes the unique Bangladeshi identity. It combines the spirit of 1947 with the spirit of 1971. Politics plays on the minds of people, with one stream trying to dominate the other, generating contending distinctiveness, but in effect, oscillates between the two extremes. This, in part, explains convenient collaborations of parties of different strands and transfer of power from one Begum to the other and back during the 1990s, and also in the subsequent decade. It has been argued that:

the people at the bottom of the pyramid have little interest in the symbols of political ideology deployed by the competing parties, such as nationalism and religion, and instead are engaged in a battle of survival in which they make rational calculations about material outcomes. (Lewis 2012, 102)

The turmoil in Bangladesh in 2013–2014 is not so much a struggle between the spirit of 1947 and the spirit of 1971, as it is made out to be. Sheikh Hasina administration’s determined push to try and punish those individuals who had sided with Pakistan and committed atrocities in 1971, but were resettled in the mainstream political life during the military regimes of Zia and Ershad, has divided the people once again. As the unfinished business of 1971 is sought to be completed 40 years later, it creates serious disturbance in the existing political set-up, being regarded as vengeance unleashed, provoking a response from both the sides. The parties generate an environment of fear and suspicion to secure their own support base. While the contest is projected as an expression of contending principles, as is evident from the Shahbag Square movement, it is the compulsion of political survival that leads the main contestants to indulge in violence and sharp reactive responses. The 10th general elections were boycotted by the Khaleda Zia-led opposition as their demand of a poll-time caretaker government was not accepted by the ruling Awami League. The administration went ahead with the polls, charging the opposition with the ‘conspiracy’ of creating a constitutional void. Predictably, the Awami League won the elections but without the participation of the main opposition party; the botched January 2014 elections of Bangladesh hardly provide legitimacy to Sheikh Hasina’s administration, while Hasina’s continuation in power hardly justifies the opposition’s tactic of boycott of elections and unrestrained violence that sabotage the democratic process. This has also led the international community to adopt different stands. While India and Russia back the Hasina government, the United States (US) called for fresh elections with the participation of all parties and China hoped that political stability would be achieved through talks and negotiation (Habib 2014, 1).

Any worthwhile arrangement to survive in Bangladesh needs to accommodate both the spirits of 1947 and 1971, making way for power sharing and extraordinary coalitions. In fact, a simplistic binary analysis may lead to appealing but wrong suppositions. The main BNP charge has always been in terms of subservient foreign policy of Sheikh Hasina, ignoring national interests, which has nothing to do with a crisis of Bangladeshi identity. On the other hand, India is more comfortable in dealing with the Hasina administration for the reasons that it has secular inclinations and is not hostile to India. In many quarters, the Hasina administration, viewed as a friendly regime on the eastern border, is welcome as it brings down the alarmist tones of accusations and counter-accusations. However, it is not easy for the Hasina administration to make Indian friendship a foundation of Bangladeshi foreign policy and moreover, it cannot be expected that the goodwill that Sheikh Hasina enjoys in India will translate into tangible rewards for Bangladesh. Though relations between India and Bangladesh seem to improve whenever the Awami League is in power, the party has never given any special privileges to India against Bangladesh’s interests (Bhattacharjee 2011, 9). It is the interest of the country that matters and also the political survival of the leadership. Sanjay Bhardwaj (2003, 275) writes: ‘The assumption in India that the Awami League is pro-India and BNP is anti-India is fallacious…Their attitude towards India is governed by domestic compulsions and tactics to secure a modicum of regime security.’

Further, a great deal of prominence is bestowed upon the two top competing personalities in Bangladesh without much effort to understand and cultivate the hesitant second-rung leadership of the main parties. Indeed, the half-baked ‘Minus Two’ formula adopted by the caretaker government of 2006–2008, to marginalise the main two parties and undermine the position and powers of Hasina and Khaleda, did not work, which reveals the fact that the political space in Bangladesh is highly personalised and revolves around historical legacies represented by the leaders (Datta 2009, 28–29).

In this form of identity-building, minorities—the Hindus, the Buddhists and the tribal groups—do not find a place and hence cannot identify with the homogenous Muslim Bengalis. Rather they are viewed as people of India living in Bangladesh and thereby readily taken as pro-India and anti-Bangladesh in their attitude. ‘Partition rhetoric forbids them to identify with the “locals” or as “locals”, the majority: they have to pay the price of partition’ as the construction of a nation-state and Bangladeshi self excludes them (Sinha-Kerkhoff 2006, 245). While many of these people, who are Bangladeshi by birth and identify their existence and emotion with Bangladesh as their home, suffer during any turmoil in the country, India shows special concern for their protection thereby corroborating the image that they are outsiders in their own country. The Partition rhetoric determines the mindset and presents a dilemma in foreign policy formulation for India as well.

Democracy encourages individual conformity to the dominant political set-up but the process is never smooth and easy. In young democracies, a gap exists between what is desirable and what one gets in reality. Since the process of change in democracy is essentially evolutionary, democracies can coexist with and accommodate non-democratic elements till it is pressurised or jeopardised by the non-democratic elements to the extreme. There may be occasional interludes of authoritarian regimes that determine the pace of progression of democracy. In Bangladesh too, such interludes have taken place and democratic ideals are yet to take firm roots. Besides the periods of military rules in Bangladesh, there have been as many as 18 coup attempts between 1975 and 1990 (Datta 2009, 49). The mutiny of the Bangladesh Rifles in 2009 also fuelled the suspicion that the tendency has not quite abated. Under the circumstances, rights of individuals or groups are not treated as so absolute so as to prevent the dominant ‘other members’ of the state from adopting deliberate exclusionary policies.

It may be said that within the Indian democratic set-up, an overwhelming majority of persons are related to the state through ethnic, cultural and religious ties. The Indians have multiple identities, some inherited and some acquired, and they are prone to use one or the other in order to gain social, economic or political privileges based on pragmatic calculations. The evolving identities operating at different levels obfuscate state–individual relationships. Attempts at nation-building are viewed as designs of some to submerge the group identities and interests, while economic inequalities, regional imbalance and perceived unequal political privileges accentuate apprehensions. However, each fragment being too small (or too stratified) to appropriate and monopolise power remains under compulsion to uphold democratic principles to ensure representation at the highest level (Dahl 2001, 162–163). The Partition process and the decision to have a secular, democratic political set-up have generated two types of, not mutually exclusive, identities for an average Indian. One is essentially territorial that theoretically overrides other identities by harping on nationalist sentiments. The other is the band of sub-identities that contributes to the complexities of identity politics at the domestic level. As a result, a plethora of parties and groups often form uneasy coalitions at the centre and compulsions of coalition politics impact on foreign policy behaviour and consequently, on bilateral relations between India and other states. The complications over Tista water sharing and Land Boundary Agreement with Bangladesh are the outcome of such compulsions. While the compulsions of electoral politics in democracies shape the policies, it is interpreted as a reflection of attitude again, and of insensitivity and arrogance. This contributes to the stereotypes of India’s ‘big brother’ attitude in the region, while India grumbles at Bangladesh’s lack of understanding.

Functional State Interactions

The behavioural patterns shaped by the two variables mentioned earlier influence the functional aspects or relations between the two countries. The issue of economic development is crucial for the sustenance of Bangladesh as foreign aid flows decline and export earnings from ready-made garments remain susceptible to the fickle character of international market. Bangladesh lacks huge exportable natural resources, except natural gas reserves and coal deposits, and suffers from the dearth of capital and technological abilities. Despite a growth in gross domestic product (GDP) over the years and reduction of extreme poverty, and exacerbated by the absence of concrete development strategies in an environment of political volatility, Bangladesh remains a poor state.

Trade deficit has been an issue of constant irritation in India–Bangladesh relations, with the attached sentiment in Bangladesh that reduction of trade deficit will increase national income but India deliberately obstructs the same. ‘Bangladesh cannot easily export to India because there is little that Bangladesh produces that India does not produce more cheaply, but its domestic market is open to, and in many areas dominated by, Indian goods’ (Lewis 2012, 155). Widespread smuggling takes place through the porous border which, as scholars have observed, ‘…works in favour of India where most goods tend to be cheaper and undermines the potential of small business to grow in Bangladesh’ (Lewis 2012, 156). It has been suggested that ‘the complete dilution of trade barriers will be a force multiplier for a sound journey together. Given the asymmetry in the level of development, maintenance of a negative trade list simply conveys a myopic view of national interest’ (Datta 2010, 348). India can help but whether autonomy is the price for development remains a matter of controversy in Bangladesh. As a result, a mood of frustration develops that turns into a sense of deprivation and the blame game continues.

One billion dollar credit to Bangladesh to develop infrastructure was extended by India in 2010 and import restrictions on almost 50 items were removed, but political compulsions often influenced reasonable decisions on economic interests. The proposed investment plan by the Tata Group of India, at an estimated value of 3 billion dollars, to exploit the natural gas reserves in Bangladesh and establish a steel mill, fertiliser factory and power plant failed to materialise as a strong nationalist sentiment prevented sharing of natural resources with India (Lewis 2012, 156). It is not without reason that India may think that Bangladesh is resentful of India’s economic success and resists, at times, Indian projects and investments while it blames India ‘for ills of its own creation’. However, David Malone (2011, 114) observes, ‘Although one means of achieving greater harmony would be to hitch Bangladesh’s economic prospects more clearly to the rising economic star of India, this will not be an easy sell domestically’.

Track-II lines of people-to-people contacts generate goodwill and friendship alright, but its impact is often limited. Interactions take place predominantly at the cultural level among the private citizens, and individuals often find common beliefs and aspirations binding them in a bond of friendship. However, rarely such private interactions translate themselves into tangible change in the attitude of the state or its foreign policy calculations. While educational and cultural exchanges with the support of the ruling regime are facilitated by offering scholarships, allowing exchange of journals, books, films and personnel, these are regarded as safe measures hardly affecting the prevailing power relations. Absence of such relations is indicative of serious distress in bilateral relations; presence of such relations, signifying ‘low politics’, however does not guarantee a stable and solid foundation of relations between two countries as these are susceptible to the changes in the area of ‘high politics’. Essentially, non-military and mutually beneficial economic measures, like rail–road connectivity, are not simply viewed as measures that would build confidence but interpreted with strong political/strategic motivations, and connectivity too is vulnerable to the ups and downs in overall relations between the two parties.

Contemporary Options

While a state’s foreign policy ordinarily has an element of continuity, the warmth in relations between Bangladesh and India has been influenced by the change of regimes. Nevertheless, the continuity element is reflected in the attitude of both the countries towards each other which is further shaped by the geopolitical realities. The relations are generally marked by the ambitions of the big country to lead, and the resistance of the small country to follow, resulting in a tussle between the two over the details of policy formulation. Moreover, there is a high degree of divergence in terms of the goals of Bangladesh from the core objectives of India, writes Destradi (2012, 158–159): while Indian objectives are security-centric, Bangladesh harps on the autonomy in decision making and economic security. Though Destradi’s observations of India’s ‘failed hegemonic strategy’ are limited to the time span of 2001–2008, which excludes the upturns during the Hasina administration, nevertheless, it follows that in simple terms, India would have to buy its peace and security by extending economic benefits, aid and credits irrespective of the regimes in power in Bangladesh. At the same time, taking into consideration the overall international environment of terror activities and counter-measures, where Bangladesh is susceptible to such trends, India has to be on guard to protect itself by looking for opportunities of joint security operations.

A rational sentiment would emphasise on the relentless efforts to achieve workable solutions to the vexed problems without waiting for a change in attitude or mindsets and ruling regimes. Almost a decade ago, scholars had pointed out that from the ‘bitter experience’ with its water problem with India, ‘Bangladesh has learnt that any process of negotiation would be, at one stage or the other, marked by turbulence, misunderstanding, instability and latent conflict, but then the process as a whole cannot be stopped’ (Khan and Azad 1999, 130). The same scholars had further observed:

while as the most powerful and resourceful actor India is expected to show concessionary and flexible attitude towards its smaller neighbours, there has also been a growing realisation among the smaller countries that the costs of conflict with India would be higher than the costs of cooperation. (Khan and Azad 1999, 128)

While it is ordinary logic that India would be willing to, and it would have to, support friendly regimes, India also needs to establish communications with different factions in Bangladesh in a sustained manner and not as and when the situation demands. This includes cultivating the second-rung leadership of the main political parties in Bangladesh. At the same time, Bangladesh would do well to establish links with the main political parties in India. Interactions that do not require rigid and formal positioning might establish multifaceted modes of possible cooperation at the official level as well. In a way, people-to-people contact needs to be focused more at the levels of political and economic exchanges. Even in the days of social media, civil societies and peoples’ initiatives, the traditional lines of communication need to be rejuvenated.

Bangladesh, a state in the making, will be torn by the struggle between the spirit of 1947 and the spirit of 1971 till some kind of compromise is reached and the true Bangladeshi identity is evolved. The problem is worsened by electoral politics where political calculations of accommodation and coercion would prevent any one idea to emerge as the dominant stream. The foreign policy formulation under the circumstances will not be free from attitudinal baggage. Further, the fear of Indian domination would lead Bangladesh to pursue policies that derive benefits from extra-regional powers that would like to keep India in restraint in the name of autonomy in decision making. However, a careful cost–benefit analysis will be in order and miscalculations will impact on the stability in bilateral relations. The complexities of Indian political processes require that Bangladesh should also cultivate the border states of India to influence policy decisions of New Delhi. India too, on her part, has to resolve domestic political opposition to the policy it pursues by taking the border states into confidence.

It may appear that the pattern of relations between two neighbours, with asymmetric goals and capabilities on the one hand, and unique geopolitical links on the other, is fraught with uncertainties of conflict and cooperation. It may also appear to be a normal big power–small power syndrome in a realist’s world where self-help determines the main line of foreign policy in an anarchic world. As long as Bangladesh struggles in order to come to terms with its very own identity, India would indirectly figure either as a friend or foe but, nevertheless, as a force in galvanising that identity. As a result, stability in relations will continue to suffer. Under the circumstances, a common vision for regional development continues to be missing and differing perceptions on the efficacy of regional institutional platforms are quite apparent. Hence, both the parties may aim at incremental progress in mutually beneficial working relations rather than going through the trickeries of high hopes and consequent bouts of disenchantments.