Abstract
In recent years, with India’s rise in the international system, study of its foreign policy has acquired attention across the world. Numerous volumes covering various issues ranging from high politics to low politics and bilateral relations to multilateral engagement have been published. However, the book under review is distinct in the sense that, in contrast to mainstream literature that takes material movers of India’s regional policy into account, it uses domestic ‘identity’ politics as an explanatory tool to study India’s South Asia policy and argues that ‘rival views of what it mean to be ‘India’ and contests between the proponents of these rival views affect the way in which Indian state interacts with other states in South Asia’ (p. 2). Continuity and change in India’s South Asian policy could be explained through a proper understanding of the India’s ruling elites’ perception of India’s identity. However, the author does not claim that every complexity of Indian relations vis-à-vis South Asian states can be explained through this approach but underlines that it helps in explaining some crucial linkages between the domestic politics and the formulation of the India’s South Asian policy.
Divided into six chapters plus an introduction and conclusion, the book devotes two chapters to each case: Nehru (1947–1964); Indira Gandhi (1966–1977 and 1980–1984); and Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) (1998–2004). In each case, the first chapter deals with ruling elites’ conception of India’s identity defined in terms of three analytical variables: discourses on secularism, democracy and anti-imperialism. The following chapters analyse implication of perceived identity for the regime’s foreign policy vis-à-vis South Asian neighbours. Meanwhile, the introductory chapter begins with a brief introduction of aforementioned discourses, followed by expounding of the main arguments, methodology and brief discussion of the structure of the book.
The first two chapters study Nehru’s understanding of India’s identity and its implications for his South Asia policy. He defined secularism in sharp contrast to communal or religious nationalism and the role of the state in religious affairs as an independent arbitrator or what, in other words, is called ‘equal protection to all religious groups’ (pp. 12–13). Nehru’s idea of democratic India was based on universal adult franchise, socialism (redistributive not revolutionary) and restructuring of the Indian society as per the socialist principles. He entrusted the Indian state with a powerful redistributive (however, free from communal biases) role; therefore, his idea of a democratic India was ‘synonymous with the idea of India as a secular nation state’ (p. 20). Nehru closely attached his idea of anti-imperialism with the idea that prevailed in pre-independence and attached it with territoriality. Consequently, the ‘defence of India’s territorial integrity was a symbol of India’s resistance to any form of imperialism’ (p. 26).
Since India’s regional policy is linked with ruling elite’s conception of India, consequently, Nehru’s notion of secular–communal binary, according to the author, has notable ramifications for his policy towards Kashmir. He was of the firm belief that, historically, Kashmiris were not ‘non-communal’ (p. 32) and therefore, by using force to integrate Kashmir in India, we should not confirm the Pakistan’s communal perception that Kashmiris will reject any union with Hindu-majority India. Being convinced with his understanding of democracy, despite knowing the fact that the majority of the population in the Kashmir was Muslim that might have supported Pakistan, Nehru was ‘prepared to allow popular, democratic choice to determine the status of Jammu and Kashmir’ (p. 33).
Third and fourth chapters deal with Mrs Gandhi’s conception of India’s domestic identity and its implications for her South Asian policy. According to the author, she ‘utilize[d] a specific type of identity politics for gaining electoral support, the type of identity-politics that Nehru had termed communal’ (p. 51). On democracy, she took a populist turn through the slogan of garibi hatao, nationalisation of banks and directly appealing to people instead of consulting with her cabinet. However, on anti-imperialism, she extended the Nehruvian idea by further adding that intervention by extra-regional powers in the internal affairs of any South Asian state would also qualified as an act of imperialism.
Convinced by her idea of populist democracy at home, Mrs Gandhi, as the author has noticed, sided with the people and criticised the Pakistani government for denial of democratic rights of the people in East Pakistan crisis. Though she was aware of anti-Indian stand of Bhutto, yet she decided against forcing him to ‘convert the ceasefire line (CFL) in Kashmir into a permanent international boundary’ (p. 72) because she was willing ‘to make a direct appeal to the Pakistani populace, to convince them that India had no ulterior motives, such as the annexation of Pakistan’s territorial space’ (p. 74). In Sri Lanka, she tried hard to prevent the extra-regional powers from exploiting the opportunity provided either by rebels or the government. To prevent extra-regional powers from intervening in this region, she spelled out that ‘if the Sri Lankan government needed troops for internal security, “it should ask for Indian help or invite others with Indian consent”’ (p. 81). Similarly, in Simla, though she did not insist for permanent settlement of the dispute, however, she insisted on ‘bilateralisation’ of the Kashmir issue to keep extra-regional powers at a distance.
The BJP’s secularism, according to the author, is based upon the rejection of the Nehru–Gandhi version of secularism because it was based upon minority, particularly the Muslim and Christian appeasement; hence ‘encouraging the climate of anti-Hinduism’ (p. 89). To the BJP, Hindutva signifies a different kind of secularism: a positive secularism. According to the author, to the BJP, the idea of India is ‘inseparable from their conception of secularism embodied in their discourse of Hindutva’ (p. 90). To the BJP, Nehruvian democracy was alien, not ‘linked to certain facets of India’s ancient Hindu heritage’ (p. 94). Therefore, instead of individual liberty and minority rights, the BJP grounded its discourse of democracy on ‘communal group rights and majoritarian interests’ (p. 96). It is a majoritarian democracy, also known as ‘Hindu/Bhartiya’ democracy. Since the British as well as Muslims had subjugated and humiliated the Hindus, therefore both are imperialists.
With Pakistan, BJP’s policy was based upon the assumption that Hindu India is facing twin challenges: posed by Muslim Pakistan and Western imperialists represented by the United States (US). Vis-à-vis Pakistan, India adopted a policy of ‘resolve and restraint’ (p. 108) and emphasised on bilateralism and non-involvement of extra-regional powers while solving the bilateral issues. The issue of illegal migration became the issue of paramount significance in India–Bangladesh relationship because the BJP government saw it as an act of dispossession, displacement and humiliation of the Hindus by Bangladeshi Muslims. Given its perception of Muslims as an imperialist, in order to prevent illegal migration and criminalise it, the BJP linked it with the broader issue of cross-border terrorism and accused Bangladesh for providing a safe haven to Indian terrorist outfits and helping in financing, recruitment and training.
Nevertheless, the book has three identifiable shortcomings. First, its limited success in explaining the events renders to question the usefulness of the book depending solely on normative approaches. Though it may be good enough to start with domestic identity politics, but must not remain limited to it. The author’s approach seems to be good while explaining ‘changes’; however, he fails to explain why despite differences in domestic elites’ perception of India’s identity, some policies ‘continues’? An approach of this kind that ignores the importance of material capabilities and the systemic variables while studying foreign policy is bound to fail or remain with limited explanatory power.
Second, some cases/events can be explained better than the author has offered. For instance, the Simla Agreement, where Mrs Gandhi’s decision to grant significant concessions can be explained more plausibly by arguing that rather than democratic populism, her decision was based upon the assumption that sustainable peace cannot rest upon an imposed treaty. Dixit (2004) has written that P.N. Haxar’s advice that imposition of ‘an agreement on a defeated Pakistan would be counterproductive and would only prolong Indo-Pakistan tension’ played an instrumental role in her decision. Third, on the basis of limited cases, Singh has drawn broader conclusions. He has evaluated the BJP’s Pakistan policy only on the basis of Lahore Summit and Kargil conflict. Amidst the idea of Pakistan as an existential Muslim threat, the question is: how to explain India’s cooperative behaviour vis-à-vis Pakistan, like Prime Minister Vajpayee’s decision to meet Nawaz Shariff in Lahore, agreement on the beginning of the bus service and participation in Agra Summit?
Despite several limitations, it is perhaps the first book-length study in recent years that studies the role of domestic identity politics in formulation of Indian foreign policy towards South Asia. It helps to understand the changing discourses of secularism, democracy and imperialism during different regimes. It will enable the students of Indian foreign policy to understand the current BJP government’s regional policy in a better way because like earlier BJP regime, Modi-led government also adheres to and is motivated by a similar set of ideology and value system.