Abstract
When the Western countries confronted backlash in their promotion of democracy, they wooed India to join them. India has shown reluctance to join them due to various factors. It starts with discussion of how it was inconceivable for India to promote democracy during the Cold War and then examine factors that made India reticent to commit itself to democracy promotion in the post-Cold War. The paper discusses the reasons as to why a nuanced shift towards supporting democracy promotion has taken place in the turn of the Century and how this shift is made with the intention of making a difference through participation rather than openly protesting and standing aloof on principle ground. The main focus of the paper is to highlight how India provides democracy assistance differently from that of the Western countries and what kind of tangible assistances India provided to those who sought. It highlights how, keeping in view the sensitivity of sovereignty among the developing countries, India uses term such as ‘democracy assistance’ or ‘democracy support’ instead of ‘democracy promotion’ and how it adopts policy of providing democracy assistance only when requested and it follows top-down approach, dealing mainly with the sovereign states and their institutions. It ends with an emphasis on the value addition of having diverse approaches to spreading democracy.
Keywords
Among all the regime types, it is generally agreed that democracy is most desirable form of government. In the post-Cold War since 1989 onwards, promotion of democracy has been one of the major international agenda. India should have been elated that one of its most cherished values, that is, democracy, is recognised as an international norm. Its soft power has been greatly augmented since the late 1990s with the acceptance of India by the Western major powers not only as the largest democracy but also as the most successful democracy among the post-colonial states. India has been wooed by them in their mission of democracy promotion. If India had band wagon on them, it could have gained the opportunity to be in the club of great powers, shaping the future international order. However, India has shown reluctance to join them enthusiastically.
The rationale for India’s reluctance can be traced to a variety of factors, such as its historical experience of being colonised by the West, its sensitivity to sovereignty, its commitment to the principles of non-intervention and non-interference that guide its foreign policy, the influence of the domestic and regional contexts and its apprehensions of alienating its traditional allies. The most immediate factor for India’s reservation is the manner in which the major powers went about promoting democracy. They adopted this as a mission in the context of the momentous event of collapse of the Soviet Union which they saw as triumph of their political and economic systems (Muni 2009, 1). Their missionary zeal raised apprehension among the developing countries. Like other developing countries, India too was apprehensive of interventionist strand of Western posture in the post-Cold War. However, no country could dare to stand up against the West in transformed international system. Only when the Western countries confronted major backlash and started facing criticism in the mid-1990s, they began to consider that the democratic rising countries could be of assistance in promoting democracy. The democratic rising powers are expected to ‘fill gaps left by Western actors and give democracy promotion new vigour’ (German Development Institute 2013).
This article analyses the nuanced shift towards democracy promotion in India’s post-Cold War foreign policy posture and then probe into why and how it supported democracy differently from that of the Western major powers. It starts with narrative of how it was inconceivable for India to promote democracy during the Cold War and looks into why a nuanced shift towards supporting democracy promotion has taken place in the turn of the Century. It then examines the factors that made India reticent to commit itself to the Western mission of democracy promotion. The main focus of the article is to highlight how India provides democracy assistance differently from that of the Western countries. It ends with an emphasis on the value addition of having diverse approaches to spreading democracy.
Democracy Promotion
Democracy is highly contested term. Most contemporary definitions of democracy have several common elements. First, democracies are countries in which there are institutional mechanisms that allow the people to choose their leaders. Second, prospective leaders must compete for public support and once elected, they are expected to represent the interest of the public. Third, the power of the government is restrained as it is accountable to the people (Lynn-Jones 1998, 1). Democracy had acquired Cold War connotation as the Western powers used it to challenge Communist system of rule. The collapse of the Soviet Union and disintegration of the Eastern bloc in the early 1990s has been touted as triumph for Western political and economic systems. In the transformed international system, enterprise of democracy promotion acquired international legitimacy. The proponent of this enterprise justifies by evoking democratic peace theory, which finds its origin in Immanuel Kant’s Perpetual Peace, written in 1795. Kant postulates that the liberal democratic state, due to internal structure of the division of power, would prevent leaders from launching wars without rationale based in terms of collective interests (Doyle 1983, 229). At the most general level, democratic leaders are expected to be constrained by the public, which is sometimes pacific and generally slow to mobilise for war. These constraints are expected to prevent democracies from launching wars without strong rationale. Further democratic states are expected to be more prone to cooperation and compromise compare to that of other regime types. Therefore, according to Kant, world of democracies will probably be more peaceful and better for international trade and finance, providing the basis for international peace and mutually beneficial cooperation (Doyle 1983, 230–232). He also postulated that liberal democratic states would form ‘pacific union’ that ‘maintains itself, prevents wars, and steadily expands’ (Doyle 1983, 226). The Western major powers found it convenient to evoke democratic peace theory as normative framework to justify their engagement in democracy promotion.
Although India highly cherished its democratic system of governance, it has never been the objective of India’s foreign policy to export its regime type. Apart from its adherence to the tenet of non-alignment and its commitment to principles of non-interference and non-intervention, Cold War connotation of democracy promotion made it improbable for India to export its regime type. Although the collapse of Soviet Union and the communist bloc were perceived by the Western countries as a victory of their political and economic systems and engaged in propagating their cherished values in the rest of the world, India was more apprehensive of US dominance in a unipolar world than enthusiastic for the triumph of democratic principles (Raja Mohan 2007, 102). India was not even regarded in the West as a model of democracy worth emulation throughout 1990s. Freedom House in early 1990s had labelled India as a ‘partially free’ country in its report (Diamond 1992, 27). According to Raja Mohan, ‘Many U.S. internationalists were quite happy to berate Indian democracy as an “illiberal one”’ (Raja Mohan 2007, 103).
It is only when their democracy promotion faced major hurdles did the Western major powers began to consider using the democratic rising powers like India in their scheme of democracy promotion. They faced backlash by mid-1990s as increasing number of countries perceived the democracy promotion an illegitimate meddling in their internal affairs and regarded it as a code word for ‘regime change’ to replace bothersome governments by military force or other means (Carothers 2006, 55, 64). The governments in developing countries started crack down on activities within their borders by expelling or harassing Western NGOS and prohibiting local groups from taking foreign funds. Further, President George W. Bush’s ‘repeatedly violating the rule of law at home and abroad has further weakened the legitimacy of the democracy-promotion cause’ (Carothers 2006, 56) and brought disrepute to the Western project.
Nuance Shift in Indian Position
By the turn of the century, a nuanced shift in India’s traditional stand on giving primacy to non-interference and non-intervention has been noticed when it started declaratory support to the Western democracy promotion. This shift had happened in the context of fundamental reorientation of the US perception of India’s democratic credential and India’s need for closer relationship with the United States. Towards the end of Clinton administration and through the George W. Bush administration, the US began to acknowledge the significance of Indian democracy and started exploring the possibility of working with it to promote democracy worldwide. During President Clinton’s visit to India in March 2000, the Indo-US Vision Statement stated, ‘We will share our experience in nurturing and strengthening democratic institutions the world over fighting the challenges to democratic order from forces such as terrorism’ (Indian Embassy 2000). In the transformed international system, it was not in India’s national interest to a take principled stand and rebuff American overture. On the contrary, there is much to be gained by building rapport with the world’s only hegemonic power to promote an array of India’s national interests and enhancing its international status (Cartwright 2009, 423; Mehta 2011, 111).
Indian leaders began to frequently express their support for democracy by the turn of the Century. In fact, India was of the opinion that promotion of democracy could be a deterrent against extremism and terrorism which has become a menace not only to India but also to the whole world as well. This way India could link its central concern of terrorism with that of the Western interest in promoting democracy. This linkage is reflected not only in Indo-US Vision Statement of March 2000 but also further elaborated by Prime Minister Atal Behari Vajpayee in a speech at Singapore on 9 April 2002, where he reiterated: ‘It is not surprising that terrorism is supported and sponsored only by undemocratic societies and totalitarian regimes. But because democracies represent the will and determination of their peoples, they have the internal strength and resilience to resist and overcome the scourge of terrorism …’ (Muni 2009, 11). This linkage of terrorism and democracy has been further emphasised by his successor Prime Minister Manmohan Singh. He said in 5 November 2004:
The world community has been actively engaged in recent years in dealing with the perceived threat of globalization and of political extremism in its various manifestations, ranging from ethnic cleansing to Jehadism. There are no military solutions to such challenges. There are no unilateral solutions either. Any meaningful solution must be based on the principles of democratic pluralism and inclusivism, the respect for law and of diversity of opinion and faith. (Singh 2004)
India joined hands with the US to establish ‘Community of Democracies’ in 1999 and became one of its 10 founding members. At the first meeting of ‘Community of Democracies’ in Warsaw in June 2000, India was given a prominent role and was chosen to lead one of the ministerial panels. On the basis of the suggestions made at the Warsaw conference, an attempt was made to create a caucus of ‘Community of Democracies’ at the United Nations, with the United States urging India to take up the leadership of this proposed grouping. India turned down the offer, while promising that it would continue to participate actively in the processes of the ‘Community of Democracies’ (Parthasarathy 2000). Although India agreed to take part in the US–India Global Democracy Initiative (GDI) in July 2005, nothing tangible came out of this initiative as well. These incidents manifest that despite Washington’s diplomatic enthusiasm for India’s participation in the new initiatives, New Delhi was cautious, weighing each step carefully.
However, India has been more consistent in its support of the UN Democracy Fund (UNDF). It was initiated as a result of a partnership between India and the United States and was launched jointly by India’s Prime Minister Manmohan Singh, US President George W. Bush and UN Secretary General Kofi Annan in September 2005. Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh observed that ‘as the world’s largest democracy, it is natural that India should have been among the first to welcome and support the concept of a UN Democracy Fund’. He expanded on the virtues of Indian democracy by stating, ‘For us, the democratic ideal is a common heritage of mankind. Those fortunate to enjoy its fruits have a responsibility to share its benefits with others’ (Singh 2005A). This is one of the few arenas in which India is not only the cofounder but has also consistently supported it. India is the second-largest contributor to the UNDF, having contributed $ 31.5 million by 2013 (Permanent Mission of India to the United Nations).
The earlier declaratory supports for the Western democracy promotion reflect a nuanced shift in India’s traditional stand of giving primacy to the principles of non-interference and non-intervention. However, it should be noted that despite its declaratory supports, India has avoided making any tangible commitment, except in the case of UNDF and has indeed made a conscious endeavour to retain its autonomy in taking concrete action. This policy of ‘cautious prudence’ (Mehta 2011, 112) can be interpreted as a policy of hedging its bets carefully (Mallavarapu 2010, 56).
Rationale for Cautious Prudence
India has no dispute of democracy becoming the most acceptable form of government. The Prime Minister, Manmohan Singh forthrightly stated ‘… Liberal democracy is the natural order of political organization in today’s world. All alternate systems, authoritarian and majoritarian in varying degrees, are an aberration’ (Singh 2005b). However, major contention of India and many of the developing countries is that the concept of ‘democracy promotion’ and the way it has been done by the West. It has overtone of a patronising campaign. Many developing countries view this concept as synonymous with ‘regime change’ and imposition of an alien system of governance on them. The implication of intrusiveness in the term has made it unacceptable to the developing countries which are still very sensitive to any encroachment on their sovereignty. Being familiar with their sensitivity, India does not want to be seen as a party to democracy promotion (Kugiel 2012, 3). India is firmly of the view that democracy related assistance should be offered only ‘when sought’ and cannot be imposed from outside (Muni 2009, 16). In its bilateral engagement, India has been very cautious and instead of using the term ‘democracy promotion’, it prefers phrases like ‘democratic assistance’ or ‘democratic support’.
There are a number of factors which have prompted India to adopt ‘cautious prudence’ when it comes to democracy promotion. One of the important factors behind India’s reticence in joining the Western countries in promoting democracy is its historical experience of colonisation which has been projected by the colonisers as a philanthropic mission of civilising society. The Western countries’ strategy of projecting their activities as noble mission has not altered sufficiently since Indian independence for it to erase that memory. Therefore, it is but natural that this deep-rooted experience makes India apprehensive of any value promotion engagement of the Western countries. In addition, post-colonial states, including India, have not yet reached the stage of post-modernism to get over with their sensitivity of sovereignty. In fact, the nonaligned movement further crystallised this sensitivity and even the turn of events since the end of bipolarisation did not facilitated the lowering of the guard on this front. Given the fact that the principle of sovereignty ‘was designed to protect weak powers against the strong’ (Mehta 2011, 99), their sensitivity to this issue is not likely to dissipate as long as there is a trust deficit between the developing countries and the major powers. Therefore, postcolonial states, including India, are likely to continue to place a high premium on their sovereign standing in the international system.
At least during the Cold War, developing countries could, without fear of retribution, openly express their apprehension of designs of the great powers. Indeed, India took on the role of a self-appointed spokesperson of the developing countries and became known for forceful and forthright articulation of its principled stand on many highly contested global issues. Its principled articulation on various issues on behalf of developing countries allowed it to become influential in global affairs, despite its lack of economic and military capabilities (Mehta 2011, 99). In the process, India could pose ideational challenge to the great powers. However, as the solidarity among the developing countries has been dissipated in the post-Cold War, India became increasingly conscious of the fact that it can no longer afford to articulate its principled stand without bearing direct cost to its national interests. ‘The Nehruvian style of public diplomacy with clearly articulated categorical stances on important global questions of the day is no longer part of the standard operating procedures of Indian foreign policy’ (Mallavarapu 2010, 60). Therefore, in the transformed international system, India has many a times adopted ambivalent posture on several issues, including democracy promotion, with the intention of making a difference through participation rather than openly protesting and standing aloof on principle ground.
Another factor which has made India reticent in joining the West in democracy promotion is its long tradition of steadfastly committing itself to the principle of non-intervention and non-interference in the internal matters of other countries. This principle was formally enshrined in the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence (Panchsheel) signed between India and China in 1954, (see Table 1) and continues to be the guiding force of India’s foreign policy, especially towards its neighbours, whose apprehension of India’s size and influence needed to be eased. It has been replaced by new version in the form of the Gujral doctrine in mid-1990s (see Table 2). Thus, India’s commitment to the principles of non-interference and non-intervention has made it cautious in encouraging or supporting the spread of the democracy and inhibited it from exporting its regime type. Keeping in view the long tradition of non-interference in its foreign policy, it is not easy for India to change its stand overnight even if it wants to.
Panchsheel (Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence)
Gujral Doctrine
Further, the weight of India’s influence in international relations rests on its leadership of the developing countries. The great powers are making an effort to woo India mainly because of diplomatic influence it exercises over the developing countries. India is aware of the fact that, while backing the Western agenda of democracy promotion would enable it to be seen as belonging to the club of great powers, it would involve a huge cost to its image among its traditional allies. These traditional allies might perceive that India is allowing itself to be used as US pawn and performing sub-contracted tasks for the West (Cartwright 2009, 422). Such a perception would result in India losing its traditional base of influence without being sure of firm acceptance in the club of great powers. In short, the concern of its traditional allies is another major factor which restrain India from joining the major powers in their mission of democracy promotion.
Another major factor for India’s reluctance in joining democracy promotion is the regional dimension. It is an established fact that the primary preoccupation of any country is to safeguard its national interests. It is too naïve to expect India to ‘put its own requirement second’ to build a reputation as a responsible stakeholder and become a major international player (Dormandy 2007, 127). India lives in the neighbourhood of unstable and authoritarian regimes be it China, Myanmar or Pakistan who could affect its strategic, social and economic interests. ‘India must balance any thoughts of democracy promotion against not merely its interests but also its own very real and concrete vulnerabilities—a task that calls for infinite finesse and threatens direct costs if mishandled’ (Mehta 2011, 104–105). The reality of India’s strategic and material interests makes it difficult to engage in democracy promotion. For example, sheer economic necessity requires that India be circumspect in its policy regarding the Middle East. Countries in this region not only supply a large share of India’s growing energy needs, but also host millions of Indian workers. Therefore, promotion of democracy in this region has to be tempered by consideration of its material interests (Mehta 2011, 99). Similarly, in the case of Myanmar, India had to change its earlier policy of pro-democracy movement to an engagement with the military ruler due to the geostrategic competition with China (Mallavarapu 2010, 60). Apart from India’s own vulnerability and existential cost, these neighbours could inflict damage to its reputation as the leader of NAM and developing countries. Therefore, the Indian leaders believe that it is in their national interest to maintain autonomy rather than piggyback on the Western project of democracy promotion.
Another reason for India’s adoption of cautious prudence in promoting democracy is to prevent searchlight being focus onto its own nature of democracy. There is no doubt of the fact that there is high appreciation of India’s stupendous achievement of sustained democratic system in a multicultural and diverse society and its unblemished record in this regard, except for the brief period of Emergency rule in 1975–1977. However, Indian leaders are equally aware of the shortcomings and challenges confronting the country’s democratic governance (Kugiel 2012, 6). If India is seen to be promoting democracy along with the West, it could trigger a debate on the quality of Indian democracy itself. India could be subjected to vociferous criticism for political violence, group violence, ethnic and religious animosity, corruption and nepotism in the society. As India is averse to taking such an unwarranted risk, India has adopted ‘cautious prudence’ in supporting the Western mission of democracy promotion.
Above all, despite immense challenges, the democratic tradition runs deep in Indian society. If the people of India see their government band wagon on the Western major powers without consultation and consensus, there could be the risk of a domestic backlash. Mehta is of the view that ‘The very intensity of democratic political contention within India makes for risk-averse rather than grandly ideological foreign policies’ (Mehta 2011, 98). Thus, compulsions of domestic coalition politics and the possibility of the Indian parliament dismissing the government serve as restraining factors on shifting the India’s policy without valid justification and consensus within the country.
From the above, it is amply clear that multiple factors contributed to India’s reluctance in joining the major powers in their mission of democracy promotion.
Mechanisms of Democracy Assistance
Democracy as an international norm in the post-Cold War period brought a windfall of gain for India. The way its democracy evolved and matured over considerable length of time enabled India to acquire a new global image as one of the most successful democracy among the post-colonial states. India tries to cash on it by citing its democracy credential as one of the factors to claim a permanent seat at the UN Security Council. Further, the elevation of democracy as international norm augmented India’s soft power as many of the developing countries turn to India, rather than Western powers, to seek assistance in establishing democracy within their respective countries. They are attracted by the Indian model of democracy and signed Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) with the Election Commission of India (ECI) to gain assistance and training. Many of them have invited officials from the ECI both to supervise and give suggestions to improve their electoral system or to act as observers of their election process.
Although India is averse to playing a high profile role in promoting democracy along with the Western countries, it has made a substantial contribution to spreading democracy in its own unique ways. The very success of democracy in India itself serves to promote the cause of democracy as it exhibits the possibility of how democracy can take roots in a highly complex and challenging post-colonial society. Further, India’s rapid economic growth in recent years also shatters another myth that development cannot take place in a democratic developing country. The Prime Minister of India, Manmohan Singh highlighted this point during the inauguration of the UN Democracy Fund:
Poverty, illiteracy or socio-economic backwardness do not hinder the exercise of democracy. Quite the contrary, our experience of more than 50 years of democratic rule demonstrates how democracy is a most powerful tool to successfully overcome the challenge of development. But most of all, democracy alone gives the assurance that the developmental aspirations of the poorest citizens of our society will be taken into consideration. (Singh 2005a)
Thus, the Indian experience provides a pertinent role model for the developing countries to emulate.
Another unique way, which contrasts with the Western style of democracy promotion, is that India provides assistance only when requested. In the statement at the inauguration of UN Democracy Fund, Prime Minister Singh emphasised that India would extend assistance when ‘requested’. This principle was further elaborated by Shyam Saran, the Foreign Secretary, when he stated in 2005,
As a functioning democracy ourselves naturally we feel very comfortable and enthused if there are more democracies emerging. Our policy is very clear … we don’t believe in the export of ideology. We don’t believe in the imposition of democracy or democratic values on any country. But if there is any interest in any country about our democratic institutions or in the institutions … which India built over a period of time or the strong judicial system or training programme for Parliamentarians, we are very ready to share these with any country. (Cartwright 2009, 423)
Even India’s National Security Advisor Shiv Shankar Menon is reported to have said ‘a people cannot be forced to be free or to practice democracy’ (Jaffrelot 2011).
The requests for assistance and support have come mostly from the government of states and the ECI is the nodal agency which addresses these requests. It has signed Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) with government agencies of other countries as well as multilateral organizations as shown in the Table 3. This demonstrates that India prefers a top-down approach, dealing with the sovereign states and their institutions whereas, the West prefers a ‘bottom-up’ approach that essentially concentrates on civil society and NGOs, and sometimes rebel groups, which have been the main channels and recipients of Western democratic aid (Jain 2009, 12). The government of states perceived the ‘bottom-up’ approach ‘as concerted campaigns to oust them, instigated or at least backed by powerful Western governments, especially the United States’ (Carothers 1996, 62). As India adopted ‘top-down’ approach, it carries out democratic assistance through cooperation and coordination with that of the state structures. This is the reason why India does not require its own army of democratic experts spread across the world, whereas Western civilian democratic experts are trotting all over in many of the developing countries.
International Cooperation
The ECI has to its credit sixty years of experience in the management of the largest and most complex elections in the world. It has earned global recognition for performing with a high degree of efficiency and credibility so much so that an increasing number of countries are approaching it to share its skills and knowledge in election management. The ECI has signed MOUs with 14 countries, see Table 3. Although Bangladesh, Kenya and Jordan did not have any MOU with India, they too have close interaction with the ECI, get their personnel trained in India and seek trainers from the commission to train their personnel in their respective countries. The ECI is also member of a number of multilateral organisations and has signed MOUs with eight such organisations, see Table 3. Its MOU with the United Nations in August 2004 also enabled the world organisation to use its resources for UN electoral support to other member states.
Although it is obvious that the other countries seek India’s assistance for democracy, the language used in the MOU is not patronising. In fact, the general template in all the MOU puts both the parties on an equal footing and gives a sense of both having something to learn from each other (ECI A). The template reflects India’s sensitivity to the issue of sovereignty in its dealing with other countries. However, at the signing ceremony of MOU the Indian counterparts are more forthright about the benefit they would acquire from the agreement. For instance, Chairperson of the Electoral Commission of South Africa, Dr Brigalia Bam, said that the partnership between the two Commissions would benefit the whole of Africa, besides further cementing the historic relations between the two countries (ECI B). It indicates that Indian democratic assistance to a signatory of MOU could have a cascading effect in the whole region. Through such bilateral and multilateral cooperation India is expected to extend assistance ‘to strengthen electoral systems and democratic institutions, training of personnel, development of human resources, production and dissemination of materials pertaining to electoral systems, voting technology, voter’s education and awareness, participation of weaker sections including women’ (ECI A).
Of the varieties of assistance India provides, three stand out in terms popularity and tangible benefits. One of them is the Electronic Voting Machine (EVM). Some of the countries which have signed a MOU with the ECI have expressed their desire to familiarise themselves with the EVM. The ECI officials give a detailed briefing and demonstration of EVM to the delegations visiting the ECI and also train officials from other countries in the use of the EVM. Some of the African countries like Namibia have imported in large number EVM from India (Business Standard 2013). Even the Russian evinced keen interest in EVM (Sify News 2010).
EVM is advantageous in a territorially vast country with huge and mostly illiterate populations. In countries like India, where illiteracy is still a factor, illiterate people find EVMs easier than ballot paper system. The bogus as well as invalid voting can be greatly reduced by use of EVMs. The EVM is also designed to discourage booth capturing by limiting the rate of vote casting to five per minute. Further, it is easier to transport the EVMs compared to ballot boxes as EVMs are lighter and portable. The vote-counting is very fast and the result can be declared within 2 to 3 hours as compared to 30–40 hours, on an average, under the ballot-paper system. It also has disadvantages. It could be subjected to viruses and hacking, as well physical tampering as pointed out a study (Wolchok et al. 2010). As no system can be error-free, EVM has remained as popular as before, despite these warnings.
The second kind of assistance which attracts other countries is the use of the Indian election ink. It is a semi-permanent ink that is applied on the forefinger of voters during elections in order to prevent the electoral fraud of double voting. It is an effective method for countries where citizens do not have identification documents or where such identity proof is not standardised. Some countries, as for instance Egypt, have asked the ECI for samples of the indelible ink (Hindustan Times 2011). Mysore Paints and Varnish Limited of India, a public sector company, have specialised in manufacturing this ink. The ink is not sold to the public. Hemanth Kumar, Managing Director of the company said ‘We do not market the ink …. We provide it to only those who have a legal and genuine need for it’ (Balasubramanyam 2013). The company regularly exports ink to several democratic states. Countries procure the ink either through a global tender, or through their embassies in India, or with the help of United Nations agencies. Government of India also donate ink to other countries. For instance, some 40,000 bottles of indelible ink was donated by the Indian government in 2013 to Cambodia’s National Election Committee for use in general elections (Deccan Herald 2013). This company also has been supplying indelible ink to various countries including Turkey, Nepal, Papua New Guinea, Nigeria, South Africa, Ghana, Singapore and others (Mysore Paints and Varnish Limited).
The third popular assistance the developing countries seek is the training facilities at India International Institute of Democracy and Election Management (IIIDEM) of the ECI. The Institute, set up in June 2011 at Delhi, is being developed in collaboration with the Government of India, the United Nations, the Commonwealth and inter-governmental organisations like the Sweden-based International Institute of Democracy and Electoral Assistance (IDEA). Its specific mandate includes ‘promoting inter-institutional and international collaboration and providing technical support to Election Management Bodies on Request’ (ECI D). IIIDEM has become the training arm of ECI’s institutionalised international cooperation, where it has been training personnel from various countries upon request. Recent international courses held are:
A capacity development course in election management for 30 trainees from 18 countries organised under Indian Technical and Economic Cooperation Programme (ITEC) in October, 2012; A special course in election management for 12 election officials from 6 countries of South Asia held in January 2013; A special course in election management, exclusively for 20 election officials from Afghanistan, held on 20 February 2013 (ECI A).
IIIDEM has already conducted more than 50 national courses and 11 training courses/workshops for international participants, including Commissioners and election officials from Kenya, Nigeria, Afghanistan, Maldives (twice) and Nepal, two courses for partner countries of Indian Technical and Economic Cooperation Programme and one course for South Asian Election Management Bodies (India Education Diary).
Apart from these mechanisms of assistance, the members of ECI are also engaged in election observation assignments in other countries on invitation. The ECI chooses carefully the host. The former chief election commissioner S.Y. Quraishi said, ‘We have been getting invitations from many countries in the past. But we send observers to countries only after looking at their bonafides and their ability to conduct credible polls’ (Business Standard 2013). The ECI also provides an opportunity to foreign officials to observe Indian democracy at work. For instance, ‘Delegates from Namibia, Sri Lanka and the Maldives visited Karnataka during the recent assembly polls,’ Rout said (Business Standard 2013). Another example of India’s assistance is in the case of Egypt. India assisted Egypt to elect its new President after the ouster of the President Hosni Mubarak and also provided indelible ink to mark voters to prevent multiple voting. It is reported that the United Nations expected the ECI to play a role in conducting polls in 12 Arab countries in 2013 (Hindustan Times 2011). In Afghanistan, for instance, India is involved not only in providing support for the construction of the new Afghan parliament building but also in assisting the conduct of the election under the aegis of UNDP, apart from training Afghan election officials, as mentioned earlier (ECI C). The ECI Director General Akshay Rout, in charge of international cooperation, said in an interview that poll observers in the past have been sent to countries like Egypt, Jordan, Ecuador, South Africa, Brazil, Venezuela, Mexico and Bhutan, besides conducting electoral consultancy programmes with around 18 countries (Business Standard 2013). More recently, a high-level Indian delegation consisting of former election commissioners was involved in the Maldives’ Presidential election of September 2013 (Radhakrishnan 2013). Despite the strained relationship between the two countries after the ouster of elected President Mohamed Nasheed, the involvement of the Indian delegation as election observers is an indication of how India can cautiously handle a very complex situation in its neighbourhood and engage in supporting democratic process.
Apart from such bilateral engagements, India prefers to carry out the assistance and support for democracy through the United Nations and its agencies. It is not only a signatory to MOUs with the United Nations and the UNDP but is also actively involved in their activities as a regular invitee as an expert to UN organised consultations, electoral support meets and activities. ECI contributes to the UN electoral assistance to the member states on their request (United Nations A). The ECI has also taken part in several UNDP organised international collaboration events on election management and its expertise has been harnessed by the UNDP to benefit several countries (ECI C). It is in the context of these kind of engagements that the Prime Minister Manmohan Singh said, ‘India has been sharing its rich experience, institutional capabilities and training infrastructure with nations that share our values and beliefs and request our assistance’ (Singh 2005a).
Another unique feature of India’s assistance and support for democracy is that, unlike the Western countries, it never imposes democracy or good governance as a condition for providing development aid. Over the years, India has transformed gradually from an aid recipient to a donor country, emerging on the world stage as a significant provider of development assistance (Chanana 2009, 11–14). Even in this new role, India’s development cooperation policy approach is clearly distinct from the Western approach as it adheres to the principles of non-interference and mutual respect for sovereignty which are its major features (German Development Institute 2009). It views aid as part of South–South cooperation, and therefore, avoids conditionalities that could be interpreted as interference in the internal affairs of the recipient countries (McCormick 2008, 85). This approach, along with its principle of providing democracy assistance only on request, has endeared India to the governments of recipient countries who are tired of Western conditionalities.
Conclusion
The Indian model of democracy assistance manifests that a state can promote international norms according to its own perspective and contextual situation. Rising powers, like India, have their own way of doing things depending on their historical experience, foreign policy objectives and traditions and regional and local contexts. The aforementioned analysis points out that India, in its own unique way, has made substantial contribution to the spread of democracy in the world.
Like any other country, India’s engagement in democratic assistance is also motivated by various factors. Initially India’s declaratory support for democracy promotion was more to do with instrumental value rather than for its intrinsic value. India responded to American desire for its participation in democracy promotion as India found it useful means to cement its relationship with the world’s only superpower (Cartwright 2009, 424; Mallavarapu 2010, 56). Democratic rhetoric has remained an important entity in Indo-US relations and it facilitates in transforming their relationship into deeper ‘engagement’ at the turn of the Century. India also found that the democracy assistance as useful means of expressing solidarity with the developing countries. Some of the training programmes for officials of developing countries in the ECI training institution (IIIDEM) are organised under by the Indian Technical and Economic Cooperation Programme (ECI E). Its willingness to share its experience and expertise in this field could be viewed as manifestation of South–South cooperation. Other motivational factors are that India expects that through democratic assistance, it could promote trade, facilitate investment opportunity, ensure steady energy supply and serve its strategic interests. Democracy assistance also serves as projection of India as rising great power and also to build up image of India as responsible international citizen. In the process, India can augment its soft power which has become significant currency to influence international relations in the globalised world.
However, there is striking difference in India’s style and strategy of supporting democracy compare to Western countries engaged in the same enterprise. It seems to be India’s deliberate policy not to be seen promoting democracy in a high profile manner with lots of publicity for short-term gains and also not to adopt questionable means. Cartwright aptly capture the essence of this by stating ‘… even when India is doing more, it prefers to be seen as doing less …’ (Cartwright 2009, 410). India seems to be taking various precautionary measures to ensure that it is not seen as pawn used by the Western powers in their strategic design in the developing countries. The Western major powers favour exporting democracy, whereas India is of the opinion that no ideology or form of governance can be imposed from the outside. The Western major powers goes about the task of democracy promotion with a missionary zeal with intrusive means and adopt bottom-up approach, whereas, India prefers to promote democracy by example and extend assistance for democracy when requested. As the requests for support entertained from the governments and MOU are signed with the governments of other countries, India adhered to top-down approach, which is also in tune with showing sensitivity to the sovereignty of recipient countries.
Instead of viewing India’s model of democratic assistance as sign of weakness or lack of enthusiasm, it seems to be appropriate to view it as a mark of maturity on the part of civilisational state. Rather than continually nudging India to ‘do their ways’, it would serve the common goal of spreading democracy if the promoters of democracy show democratic spirit and accept the reality that there are diverse approaches to democracy assistance. India’s enormous soft power, especially among the Global South, could be valuable asset not only for spreading democracy but also for managing other global governance issues, provided international system in general and great powers in particular respect and allow India to have its own space.