Australia–India Strategic Relations: From Estrangement to Engagement

Abstract

India and Australia held a set of largely divergent strategic perspectives during the Cold War period, which prevented any significant strategic relationship from developing at that time. Since the end of the Cold War, however, strategic relations between the two countries, although still volatile, have steadily improved. This article argues that as the Indo-Pacific region is increasingly seen as an arena of strategic importance in both New Delhi and Canberra, there is increased scope for a further convergence of Indo-Australian strategic relations based on a series of shared core security concerns. However, in the context of a rising China and re-assertive US in the region, there is a danger that bilateral relations between each of the two countries and the US may serve to prevent a strengthening of independent Indo-Australian relations. First, the post-World War II security policies of both India and Australia are outlined, as are the places occupied by each country in the strategic perspectives of the other. Then, the post-Cold War convergence of security perspectives of both nations is examined in the context of the emerging importance of the Indo-Pacific region in terms of both non-state security challenges and traditional balance-of-power concerns. Finally, the pressures exacted on potential Indo-Australian strategic relations by a rising China and re-assertive US are considered. It is argued that although convergence has begun, India and Australia still have a long way to go before they can initiate a robust and independent bilateral security partnership.

Keywords

Australia China United States India security strategy

Introduction

Although physically sharing a pre-eminent position in the Indian Ocean, as well as a common British colonial legacy, subsequent Commonwealth membership, a Westminster parliamentary democratic system and to say nothing of a shared passion for cricket, Australia and India have never enjoyed a close political or strategic relationship. Certainly, the formal diplomatic relationship has remained at all times correct and cordial, but in terms of actual substance, the relationship has remained in large measure weak and shallow. That said, with the end of the Cold War and dawn of a new global order in which the Indo-Pacific region is gaining a new level of strategic pre-eminence, the potential for cooperation and a convergence of interests between the two nations has now broadened and gained momentum, largely in areas such as trade, security and strategic relations. However, the level of convergence will still depend in large measure on India’s and Australia’s bilateral relations with the region’s ‘Great Powers’, the United States (US) and China.

Currently, both countries consider the doctrine of self-defence as the cornerstone of their respective security policy and justify it, in part, on grounds of the challenges posed by global terrorism and the evolving power relations in the Indo-Pacific region, including the rise of China (Mohan, 2013, pp. 25–27). For example, India refers to the challenge of ‘cross-border terrorism’, whereas Australia uses the terminology, widely in vogue, of ‘international’ terrorism (Commonwealth of Australia [CoA], 2010). India, notwithstanding its growing trade ties with China, considers its sovereignty threatened by a number of border disputes and possible maritime encirclement by its powerful northern neighbour (Pant, 2007; Hedrick, 2009; Kapoor, 2012). More broadly, both India and Australia are concerned about the territorial disputes in the South China Sea and have significant economic stakes in ensuring freedom of navigation through the sea lines of communication (SLOCs).

It is against this background that an attempt is made in this article to: (a) undertake an analysis of the post-World War II security perspectives of Australia and India; (b) make an assessment of the opportunities that exist for bilateral strategic cooperation between the two states; and (c) examine the efficacy of the initiatives that both have taken towards a strategic convergence within the context of the rise of China and continuing US influence and strategic calculations.

India’s Security Policy

In the wake of independence, troubled and traumatised by the experience and violence of the Partition, India faced two immediate challenges: safeguarding itself from external threats; and playing an effective and constructive role in international affairs while balancing the influence of the two Cold War superpowers. In response, India unilaterally adopted the policy of panchsheel (five virtues) in order to maintain peaceful relations among nation-states. Panchsheel was an idealist and moralist approach to international relations based on the premise that no country would attack or interfere with an inward-looking and peace-loving state such as India (Singh, 2004, p. 171). Simultaneously, India championed non-alignment as a diplomatic principle, maintaining equidistance from the two superpowers and formulating foreign policy decisions on the basis of merit and within the ambit of the Charter Principles of the United Nations (UN) (Damodaran, 2000).

However, India’s steadfast adherence to the policy of non-alignment received a severe jolt in 1962 when China and India clashed over the border issue. India was caught unaware and, in turn, was compelled to undertake a serious rethink about its self-defence and security postures (Devereux, 2009). Under these circumstances, not only was India no longer averse to the idea of accepting military assistance from both the Soviet Union and the US, but even conceded to the latter’s condition that New Delhi must make every effort to resolve the dispute with Pakistan over Kashmir (Steele, 2002). In this way, India was drawn into a web of superpower relations which would ultimately lead to a series of border skirmishes with Pakistan, culminating finally in the Bangladesh liberation war of 1971. Taking a cue from the 1962 clash with China, 1965 war with Pakistan and witnessing increasing superpower presence in the Indian Ocean, Indian strategists, for the first time, were compelled to give credence to developing a naval defence strategy. This strategy proved highly effective during the 1971 war with Pakistan. Not only was India able to protect its waters at that time, but it was also able to successfully carve out the state of Bangladesh from Pakistan (Sisson and Rose, 1990, pp. 137–138; Singh & Bhatia, 2008, p. 171; Raghavan, 2013, pp. 10–11). In turn, and under the terms of the Mutual Assistance Agreement, the US dispatched the nuclear-armed USS Enterprise into the Bay of Bengal as a totemic show of support for Pakistan.

The dispatch of a US nuclear warship into the Bay of Bengal opened a new and disturbing chapter in security thinking for both India and Pakistan. Wary of the benefits of US support in the wake of its defeat in the Bangladesh war and while taking note of India’s enhanced defence capabilities, Pakistan, in order to strengthen its existing relations, entered into a strategic alliance with China in 1972 (Irshad Khan, 2013). Simultaneously, prelude to the Bangladesh liberation war, the increasing Sino-American ties and the US pressure as an alliance partner of Pakistan not only resulted in India justifying the momentous decision to sign a 20-year Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation with the Soviet Union in August 1971 but also further strengthening it in the wake of the liberation war in December 1971 (Kapur, 1972, p. 465).

Within this flurry of realignments, India began to think more vigorously and seriously on the issue of its national security. Instead of signing a defence treaty with the Soviet Union as a possible deterrence against the perceived US and China–Pakistan axis, India limited itself to a ‘friendship’ treaty, allowing it to maintain autonomy in foreign affairs (Donaldson, 1972, p. 477). India also increased its presence in the Indian Ocean and signalled to the outside world that it was prepared to meet any and all challenges to its national security. At the time, these risks were perceived to include the then-recent series of successful nuclear tests conducted by China, the increase in the US economic and military aid to Pakistan and the heightened and visible presence of the superpowers in the Indian Ocean (Damodaran, 2000, pp. 86–87). As part of its long-term security needs, India also opted to develop further its nuclear energy programme and expand its naval bases. Moreover, witnessing China’s clandestine support to the insurgency in its north-eastern region, possibility of Pakistan avenging against India’s role in liberation of Bangladesh and the US’s dispatch of the Enterprise, all accumulatively placed geostrategic pressure on India, to alleviate these challenges and develop credible deterrence, India successfully test fired a nuclear device at Pokhran in 1974 (Sreenivasan, 2008, p. 44).

To add to the woes of India, Soviet intervention in Afghanistan in 1979 further elevated tensions across the Indian subcontinent. The regular supply of sophisticated arms and weapons by the US to Pakistan for use in Afghanistan to stem expanding Soviet influence encouraged Pakistan to flex its muscles by using some of the same weapons against India (Dixit, 2002, p. 88). The simultaneous Chinese sale of weapons to Pakistan made India feel even more vulnerable (Stockholm International Peace Research Institute [SIPRI], 1982). Shoring up its initiatives to normalise relations with China proved futile, while Beijing’s acquisition of ballistic missiles and enhanced air force capacity, and the expansion of its naval power, raised further security concerns in New Delhi.

In the context of these ongoing regional considerations and indefinite extension of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) in 1995 and conclusion of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) in 1996, all accumulatively resulted in India conducting five nuclear tests in May 1998 (Pokhran II) (Keck, 2013, p. 2) in order to develop a full-fledged nuclear deterrence. As expected, these tests were sharply criticised by several countries, including Australia. India justified the tests on the basis that its nuclear weapons would not be used aggressively, that the country would not engage in an arms race and that a moratorium would be placed on any further tests (Evolution of India’s Nuclear Policy, 1998). In this way, India indicated not only its readiness to discuss a ‘no first use’ agreement with Pakistan and other countries, either bilaterally or multilaterally, but also indicated its willingness to take part in negotiations on the Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty. Officially, India announced that its nuclear doctrine was based on three main principles: minimum nuclear deterrence; no first use; and no use against non-nuclear states (Jayal, 1999). At the same time, India firmly opposed the proliferation of nuclear weapons and opposed the NPT and the CTBT on the grounds that they were seen to be discriminatory in nature and not aimed at total nuclear disarmament (Dhanda, 2009, p. 83; Perkovich, 2010, pp. 21–23).

Today, India, with its enhanced status as a nuclear power, is playing an increasingly significant role to help assist and cooperate in combating and containing non-state security challenges in the region such as piracy and terrorism, and providing great power balance in an increasingly strategically contentious Indo-Pacific region. To achieve these objectives, India is tentatively exploring further strategic cooperation with countries such as Australia and the US, who share India’s broad security and strategic perceptions.

Australia’s Security Policy

Like India, Australia formed an independent foreign policy in the wake of World War II and within the context of the Cold War. Unlike India, however, Australia on considering its geostrategic location and security imperatives chose to join the US-sponsored military alliance bloc via ANZUS (Australia, New Zealand and the US) and Southeast Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO). The alliance with the US, in part aimed at defending Australia from the perceived threat of Asian communism, became imperative for Australia’s forward defence within the Southeast Asian region.

A major shift in Australia’s defence and security policy occurred around 1969, however, when the US President, Richard Nixon, declared what came to be known as the Guam Doctrine (Lyon, 2013). Nixon pointed to the prospect of the US withdrawal from the Asia-Pacific region and suggested to allies a policy of sharing defence responsibilities in their respective regions. The new situation forced subsequent government’s strategists to amend their earlier policy of forward defence and consider appropriate alternatives. Thus, the 1976 Defence White Paper was the first to set out a self-reliant defence policy for Australia (Horner, 1992; Cheeseman, 1993a).

The new policy was made public in the so-called Dibb Review of 1986 and in the subsequent government’s defence white paper, The Defence of Australia, in 1987 (CoA, 1987). Under this policy framework, the government gave priority to the self-reliant defence of the Australian mainland and the arc of islands to Australia’s north and north-west that could be instrumental in any future security challenges (Frühling, 2013). In order to implement this strategy of ‘defence-in-depth’, the Labour government initiated Australia’s first-ever peacetime military modernisation programme by upgrading the armed force’s weapons and equipment to build capacity and capability to deter potential threats to Australia’s sovereignty. In addition, as a part of the government’s ‘second pillar’ of defence self-reliance, emphasis was also put on establishing an indigenous and internationally competitive defence industry (Cheeseman, 1993b).

To implement this plan, a provision of at least 3–5 per cent increase in defence expenditure was required for a minimum period of five years. However, subsequent governments did not honour this and the defence budget was in time reduced. This reduction in personnel and defence expenditure posed long-term repercussions for the Australian defence system (Cheeseman, 1993a).

In the post-Cold War era, and mainly due to the economic crisis in Southeast Asia and the US’s partial withdrawal of focus from this region, Australia has envisaged a shift in the balance of power. Australia’s security and strategic agenda needed to be tailored to meet not only military but also non-military threats. To meet the objectives, defence budget required a sufficient boost from the existing level of 2.3 per cent of the gross domestic product (GDP) (Smith & Kettle, 1992). Against this backdrop, considerations of independently ensured national self-defence and security gained further momentum, and thus paved the way for pragmatic strategic thinking in Canberra (see White, 2007).

In addition to the policy of self-defence, former Defence Minister Robert Hill, taking serious note of the 11 September 2001 terrorist attacks in the US, revealed another dramatic shift in Australia’s defence policy. While supporting President George W. Bush’s decision to ‘develop a new doctrine of pre-emptive action against states and terrorist groups trying to develop weapons of mass destruction’, Hill declared that ‘the determination of the US to act swiftly and firmly before threats become attacks, is a position which Australia shares in principle’ (Brown, 2002).

Since the coalition government’s 2000 Defence White Paper, Australia has followed a policy of defence self-reliance within an alliance framework. The 1999 Australia-led intervention into East Timor taught Australia a lesson in that the Clinton administration clearly signalled that the US had its own priorities quite different to those of Australia and, while supporting Australia diplomatically, would not become involved on the ground (Frühling, 2013). Since this time, Australia has maintained its remarkably close bilateral strategic alliance with the US, while continuing to play an independent role in responding to non-state security challenges in the Indo-Pacific region, most notably disaster and humanitarian relief, and counterterrorism operations in archipelagic Southeast Asia.

India in Australia’s Security Perspective

During the Cold War, Australia, in the main, evinced very little concern for India as a strategic influence, and when India was noted, it was not presented as being vital to Australia’s fundamental national security considerations. In the post-Cold War era, however, both countries have articulated genuine interest in building and strengthening ties, and also cooperating on issues related to bilateral and regional security that are core concerns for each country.

From the Australian perspective, this trend can be traced to the John Howard government’s release of a significant number of policies and initiatives that had a bearing on the Australia–India relationship. For example, the 1996 ‘New Horizons’ initiative, a multidimensional promotion of Australia–India relations, emphasised on strengthening of cultural linkages with India; 1997 was declared as the ‘Year of South Asia’; and in 1997, the Australia’s Foreign and Trade Policy White Paper (CoA, 1997b) emphasised on developing the relationship with India, predominantly in the areas of trade and investment. In addition, emphasis was put on the ‘considerable scope to broaden the bilateral relationship’ with India (CoA, 1997b, p. 67). The simultaneously published report, Australia’s Strategic Policy, produced by the Department of Defence (DoD) in 1997, made several references to India, and also specifically included South Asia as part of the Asia-Pacific region (CoA, 1997a). India was also given increased importance through the development of a bilateral strategic dialogue. In addition, India’s then joining of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) Regional Forum (ARF) was considered significant by Australian defence strategists, and India along with Pakistan was considered to ‘have a major impact on the East Asian security environment’ in the future (CoA, 1997a).

However, amidst the aforementioned positive developments came India’s May 1998 Pokhran II nuclear tests, which dealt a serious blow to the tentative acknowledgement of a convergence of shared regional security interests and thaw in bilateral relations. Australia reacted sharply and stridently, viewing India’s long-term expansion of military capabilities as ‘danger signs’ for itself as well as for greater South and East Asia (CoA, 1990, p. 84). In addition, at the same time, the Australian Defence Association expressed its major concern about the remarkable expansion of Indian naval capabilities over the preceding two decades, stating that ‘of more direct concern to Australia and to other Western maritime nations is the power projection capability displayed by India’s navy’ (Senate Standing Committee, 1990, p. 84). Further, on the basis of India’s increasing naval defence capability, Australia viewed the possibility of the use of the Andaman and Nicobar Islands by India as a base for the projection of military power in Southeast Asia. In addition, fears surfaced in Australian defence circles that India had the capability to occupy Cocos Island (CoA, 1990, p. 87). In hindsight, it may well be that these frenetic forebodings about India were deliberately pitched high by the Australian defence establishment in an effort to refurbish its own defence industries and seek further expansion of Australia’s defence capabilities at a time of shrinking post-Cold War budgets. However, damage was done to the Australia–India relationship and any possibility of a post-Cold War strategic convergence was lessened.

However, the acknowledgement in Australian government publications of the importance that India would have for Australia’s regional security continued, if couched in ambiguous terms. For example, the 2000 Defence White Paper added India in the nexus of relationships that it suggested would impinge on the security of the Asia-Pacific region, and declared that major powers in the region, including India, ‘are important to Australia’s security because they are the ones with the power—actual or potential—to influence events throughout the Asia-Pacific region’ (CoA, 2000, p. ix). The 2000 Defence White Paper, however, also highlighted the complexities of India’s emergence as a significant power, noting its nuclear capability, its strategic competition, possibility for conflict with China and, above all, the possibility of nuclear exchange between India and Pakistan. It declared, rather ambiguously, that ‘it is India’s growing role in the wider Asia-Pacific strategic system that will have more influence on Australia’s security’ (CoA, 2000, p. 19). But while underlining ‘India’s growing role’ and its ‘influence’ on Australia’s security, it was reticent in stating the nature of this influence and whether it would be positive or negative.

Australia in India’s Security Perspective

A divergence in Indo-Australian strategic perspectives became obvious early during the Cold War when Pakistan became an alliance partner of the US. By this logic, Pakistan, a hostile country to India, thus became a de facto co-ally of Australia. This resulted in Australia’s support of Pakistan vis-à-vis India on issues crucial to India’s basic security. One of these issues was that of Kashmir. Whether it was on the Sir Owen Dixon Report to the UN Security Council on Kashmir (Eggleston, 1951), or voting in the UN or other attempts at mediation, including the Goa liberation issue, Australia’s position was invariably at variance with India’s interests (for details, see Gurry, 2013). With their basic divergence in geostrategic positioning, India and Australia also took divergent positions on most events of global significance, such as the Korean War, the Suez Crisis, the Soviet invasion of Hungary and events in Cuba and Vietnam.

On specific issues such as the NPT, and later the CTBT, both countries also had differing views. India’s response was based on its perception of the discriminatory nature of both the treaties and the denial of scope for nuclear development in threshold countries like India, whereas Australia supported the global status quo. As mentioned, these differing viewpoints came to the forefront in May 1998 after Pokhran II. Australia not only strongly condemned the tests but also suspended all defence contacts with India, which included the withdrawal of the Australian defence attaché; the withdrawal of Australian defence force officers training in India and Indian officers training in Australia; and the cancellation of all proposed defence-related visits, including ship and aircraft visits (Joint Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade, 1998; Panda & Baruah, 2010, p. 208).

India reacted sharply to Australia’s reaction by describing it as impetuous and highly unjustified (Singh, 2004, p. 185). At the same time, India accused Australia of double standards by choosing to ignore China’s violation of the international disarmament regime in its missile and nuclear technology transfer to Pakistan and its stance on the National Defence Initiative of the US (Singh, 2004, p. 185). It lamented that Australia did not share India’s anxieties regarding China’s increasing presence in the Indian Ocean.

However, this acrimonious atmosphere, thick with accusations and counter-accusations, soon began to clear. Beginning in 2001, a thaw in bilateral relations could be perceived in a number of frequent high-level official exchanges. It was no coincidence that this coincided with rapidly improving levels of strategic cooperation between India and the US at this time. Australia appeared to remain largely peripheral to India’s core strategic interests, but as the twenty-first century unfolded, events in the Indo-Pacific region did begin to gently pull the two countries towards greater convergence.

A Convergence of Strategic Perspectives

Since the year 2001, a series of factors, including the 9/11 terrorist attacks in the US, the engagements in Iraq and Afghanistan, the continual rise of China and the evolving perceived imbalance of power in the Asia-Pacific region, have all contributed to many nations making strategic recalculations in the Indo-Pacific region. This has compelled Australia’s and India’s strategic perspectives to inch closer. Certainly, wider Indo-Australian relations have been strengthened over this time period, with bilateral trade increasing to AU$ 18.3 billion and two-way investment to over AU$ 15 billion (CoA, 2013). But equally impressive are the steps that both countries have made with respect to joint strategic initiatives. The first India–Australia Strategic Dialogue that started in August 2001 proved instrumental in widening bilateral security relations and raising a range of common regional security issues, including maritime security and counterterrorism. Since this time, discussions between the two countries are consistently reported within diplomatic circles as being constructive and wide-ranging, and demonstrating shared perspectives and common interests on a number of important issues in the Indo-Pacific region (India–Australia Strategic Dialogue, 2014).

As a follow up, a series of Security Round Tables have proved instrumental in promoting mutual understanding in areas key to strategic and defence planning. Moreover, development of a second-track dialogue framework has proved fruitful in deepening strategic dialogue and exchanges between civil society leaders from both the countries. To be specific, the areas identified include, among other things, shared interests in the Indian Ocean, ranging from the Indian Ocean Rim as a free trade area to protecting sea lanes, and controlling piracy, drug trafficking and illegal human cargo (Panda & Baruah, 2010, p. 208). India, as an expanding naval power with the largest navy and coastguard of any littoral state between Hormuz and Malacca Straits (the two most important commercial straits in the world), is an appealing strategic partner for Australia, the world’s largest island-state. Half of the world’s maritime trade passes through the Malacca and Lombok Straits, and the safety and security of these SLOCs is equally vital for both the nations. Further, there is ample scope for cooperation afield in the Indian and Pacific Oceans (Rumley, 2013).

Another effect of these dialogues has been to show how India’s and Australia’s interests converge in Indonesia. Australia considers Indonesia and the surrounding islands, by definition of their geography, of constant importance for its national security, while the Bali bombing terrorist incident and the establishment of organised crime groups engaged in people smuggling through Indonesia have illustrated how important Indonesia’s domestic security is to Australia. For India, Indonesia is a lynchpin in its ‘Look East’ policy (Deware, 2011, pp. 342–343). The presence of people of Indian origin in Indonesia, ongoing Islamic militancy and its geographic proximity (just 90 nautical miles) to the south of the Andaman and Nicobar islands are all vital concerns to India. Also, Australia’s and India’s security concerns converge in a particularly striking manner in the Indian Ocean region, which contains roughly 600 small islands, only about half of which are inhabited, with many claimed to be used as transit points by pirates, smugglers and other illegal arms dealers. In this case, agreements on joint information sharing are an encouraging first step in improving stability of the region (Rumley, 2013, p. 44).

In addition, the Australia–India defence and strategic relationship has taken a further significant step forward after the 2006 signing of a memorandum of understanding on defence cooperation. This was followed by a Joint Declaration on Security Cooperation by the two countries in 2009 (for details, see Brewster, 2010). Following this, the 2012 white paper, Australia in the Asian Century, highlighted India as one of the important countries that Australia considers as vital against the backdrop of the evolving strategic (im)balance in the Indo-Pacific region, raising the unstated but underlying issue of Australia’s perceived need for geopolitical ‘balancing’ in the face of a rising China (CoA, 2012, 2013).

Crucially, a joint statement was issued during former Prime Minister Julia Gillard’s visit to New Delhi in 2012 that emphasised the importance of reaching an understanding to sell uranium to India, an issue that had bedevilled the relationship since 1998. Gillard’s visit was followed by the first-ever visit of an Indian Defence Minister, A.K. Antony, to Australia in June 2013. These diplomatic overtures reinforced the two countries’ intent to forge closer understanding in the geostrategic field. The joint statement issued by the two ministers emphasised ‘practical measures that will further enhance bilateral defence co-operation between Australia and India’ (Smith, 2013). From these joint remarks, it appears that both countries aim to enhance cooperation and collaboration within the evolving regional architecture. Responding to a question, Minister Smith added that relations between the region’s three great powers, India, China and the US, ‘will be of roughly equal importance’ to Australia, and that enhanced practical cooperation between them would bring ‘nothing but positive developments’ (Barnes, 2013).

To further accelerate the unfolding relationship, Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s visit to Australia in November 2014 proved historic (visit of an Indian prime minister to Australia after 28 years) in the sense that both the countries decided to establish a Framework for Security Cooperation to deepen and expand security and defence engagement at bilateral level and close cooperation in regional and multilateral fora (Ministry of External Affairs, 2014a).

No doubt, in the regional and global strategic contours, China and the US factors attain the central focus in both the countries. The central role that the US and China play in Australia–India relations raises the issue of Australian and Indian responses to the rise of China, and the role that the US presence in the region may play in either facilitating or discouraging an Australia–India strategic convergence.

The China Factor

A robust geostrategic factor that acts as a common pressure for both India and Australia is the much discussed ‘rise’ of China. This ‘rise’ is, of course, complex and encompasses China becoming the second-largest global economy, its heavy investment in the defence sector, its acquisition of advanced military weapon systems and its transition to blue-water naval power (Phillips, 2013). For example, China’s pioneering of the strategy of anti-access/area denial (A2AD) to its littoral waters paves the way for regional power imbalances between it and other Asian nations, such as Japan and South Korea, and challenges the existing status quo in regards to the US’s role in the Asian region (Thayer, 2012). The rise of China not only raises security concerns within China’s immediate neighbourhood, but it transcends the Asian continent and also poses challenge to the US’s post-World War II geostrategic dominance in the region, in particular its naval dominance. As a result, India and Australia (as well as the US and most other Asia-Pacific nations) are reorienting their relationships in order to face this new and shifting strategic ambiance.

An increased Chinese military presence, including the replacement of an outdated missile system and upgraded People’s Liberation Army (PLA) capabilities along the Indian border, adds to India’s apprehensions. Fundamental issues that cloud relations between India and China are China’s ‘all-weather’ friendship with Pakistan and long-standing territorial disputes along the India–China border (Das, 2011). China continues to bolster Pakistan’s military capabilities and assist in building its nuclear reactors, in addition to supplying T-59, T-69 and T-85 tanks, heavy artillery and M-9 and M-11 missiles, presumably with the objective of Islamabad posing a credible challenge to New Delhi’s conventional military superiority (Reuters, 2013). China’s policy initiatives vis-à-vis the Indian Ocean have further exacerbated India’s apprehensions. China’s so-called ‘string of pearls’ strategy of developing sea ports in Pakistan, Sri Lanka, Myanmar and Bangladesh and entering into strategic relations with India’s neighbours in the Indian Ocean—traditionally thought of by New Delhi as ‘India’s pond’—are construed in New Delhi as deliberate and calculated moves (Brewster, 2010; Phillips, 2013).

China’s response to these propositions, however, is to argue that its ambition is for a peaceful rise and an assertion that the ‘string of pearls’ is mainly intended to facilitate further business and trade with India, which, in recent years, has exceeded a substantial US$ 74 billion. Notwithstanding the positive trend in bilateral trade, the increasing divergence between the size and success of the Chinese and Indian economies only increases the ‘barrier’ of mistrust, at least from India’s perspective. Overall, significant number of Indian analysts seem to suggest that China’s growing strategic, military and economic clout is aimed at ‘containing’ India, if not globally, at least within the Indo-Pacific region (Mohan, 2009, 2010; Subramanyam, 2010).

At the same time, India’s increased interest in the Asia-Pacific is welcomed by most of the countries in the region as a potential counter to growing Chinese influence. The ASEAN countries largely view India’s naval growth as a promising development. This situation makes India’s engagement with Southeast Asia in some ways easier than that experienced by China (Gordon, 2012, p. 19). As a result, India has recently entered into defence cooperation agreements with Vietnam, Singapore and Myanmar. In addition, Australia, Japan and the US have not only taken note of India’s growing influence in the region but also consider India an important actor in any regional ‘rebalancing’. This has been translated into increasing numbers of bilateral relationships between India and other Asian states, not only to address non-state security issues such as terrorism, piracy and safeguarding SLOCs but also to balance the shifting power disparity in the region (Lai, 2013).

Given the role of ‘regional balancer’ in which India increasingly finds itself (Gunnamani, 2010, p. 15), it is perhaps surprising that India has not moved closer to the US—the region’s traditional power and state with perhaps the most to lose from a continued Chinese rise. New Delhi appears wary of entering into any deeper strategic alliance with Washington but, nevertheless, aspires to continue to build an ever-closer relationship. As shown earlier, since independence in 1947, India has maintained autonomy in its foreign and defence policy, even from the Soviet Union, during the height of the Cold War and notwithstanding Pakistan entering into a defence alliance with the US during this time. It is thus likely that India will seek to retain this long-held autonomy in the near future (Ganguly, 2012, p. 1).

There is no doubt that, despite a small war-mongering lobby, New Delhi does not aspire to be a world power. Nor does it aspire to contain China, an impossible task at any rate. Rather, its main strategic goal appears to be to develop a credible deterrence capability. Moreover, against the backdrop of a China that perhaps suspects that India has the open option of entering into a full strategic alliance with the US at a time of its own choosing, India will perhaps choose to wait and assess its strategic options in the light of a range of shifting factors (The Economist, 2013, 11). These will include Chinese perceptions of India’s place in the Asian strategic game plan, China’s support to Pakistan, its strategic presence in the Indian Ocean and any moves towards the resolution of border disputes in the Aksai Chin and Arunachal Pradesh regions. The other important factor is Afghanistan. India’s long-term strategic policy posture will take shape after the withdrawal of the US and coalition troops from Afghanistan by the end of 2014 (see Maini, 2012). It is likely that India will then contemplate the position of Pakistani support and influence within Afghanistan, both overt and covert, and China’s current relations with Pakistan. In addition, the attitude of the new generation of leadership in China will be decisive in delineating the future of the ‘landmark bilateral relationship’ that China desires to develop with India in the twenty-first century (cited in Ahlawat, 2012).

As it does with India, China occupies a special place in Australia’s trade and economic policy. Currently, Beijing holds the position of the largest two-way trading partner in goods and services (valued at AU$ 127.8 billion in 2011–2012), the largest merchandise export destination (AU$ 76.8 billion in 2011–2012) and largest source of merchandise imports (AU$ 43.4 billion in 2011–2012) (CoA, 2013c; for details, see Yu & Xiong 2012, 581–582). Although this vibrant business and trade relationship provides a strong bond between the two countries, strategic issues raise serious concerns for Australian policymakers. For example, the Chinese modernisation of its military and strengthening of its outreach capabilities, growing challenges to free navigation in the South China Sea and security of the SLOCs, all pose challenges to Australia’s strategic calculus. Moreover, China’s continuous and sustained record of a significant increase in its defence budget, roughly 140 per cent annually since 2000, poses concerns (CoA, 2013a, p. 9). In order to address these concerns, Australia has the option of developing its own credible defence system, which appears to be unlikely considering the current defence expenditure of approximately 1.56 per cent of the GDP, ‘free-riding’ off the US bilateral relationship and/or developing other strategic relationships with ‘like-minded’ Indo-Pacific states such as India (Frühling, 2013).

An option to continuously rely on the alliance with the US poses a potential dilemma for Australia, in the sense that Australia naturally wishes to sustain a strong commodity-led trade relationship with China and at the same time, a secure strategic relationship with the US. At present, these appear to be two non-mutually exclusive positions. The 2013 Defence White Paper, for example, underlined that there is no reason why ‘Australia must choose between its longstanding Alliance with the United States and its expanding relationship with China’ (CoA, 2013a, p. 11). However, the longevity of this balancing position in the face of possible Sino-US tensions, particularly in regard to potential flashpoints such as maritime territorial disputes involving US allies or tensions on the Korean peninsula, has been severely questioned by some vocal, realist strategic thinkers in both Australia and the US (Mearsheimer, 2010; White, 2012).

This raises the question as to whether the pressures associated with the rise of China in the Indo-Pacific region will perhaps facilitate a further convergence of Australia and India as like-minded Indo-Pacific states, perhaps through their shared relationship with the US. Certainly, the US is Australia’s most long-standing and important defence ally and, at the same time, appears to be making overtures to India in this regard. The four-way ‘Quadrilateral Security Dialogue’ between the US, Japan, India and Australia, first initiated in 2007 through a Japanese initiative, is perhaps the most striking, if fragile, example of potential US attempts at using India to ‘balance’ a resurgent China (Brewster, 2010). But the Indo-US bilateral security partnership has also been solidified and expanded, as seen most recently at the July 2014 Fifth Strategic Indo-US Dialogue, which focused on regional security and defence issues (Ministry of External Affairs, 2014b).

As is well known, the US and Australia share a remarkably reliable alliance partnership. This relationship is currently being strengthened and reinvigorated as part of the US’ ‘re-pivot’ to the region, in particular through the rotation of 2,500 US Marines through Darwin (Medcalf, 2013b, p. 4). However, as important as Australia and other alliance partners such as Japan, South Korea and Singapore are as parts of the US ‘re-pivoting’, it is arguable that the US now considers a defence and strategic understanding with India as a linchpin in its unfolding defence strategy aimed at rebalancing its forces in the Asia-Pacific region (for details, see Medcalf, 2013b). Moreover, if the visits of the US presidents are a barometer to gauge the relationship between the two countries, Barack Obama’s second visit to India as the chief guest at the 2015 Republic Day carries sufficient weight that is aimed to ‘strengthen and expand the U.S.–India strategic partnership’ (The White House, 2014).

As noted earlier, during the Cold War, the US and India held differing and at times opposing security aims and objectives, both within South Asia and beyond. It was only in 1999, following the Kargil war, that the US, for the first time, recognised India’s security concerns and pressured Pakistan to unconditionally withdraw its forces from Kargil (Sreenivasan, 2008, p. 133). A closer Indo-US relationship did develop during the second Bush Administration, and was initially perceived as an inevitable convergence of interests between the two democracies (Mohan, 2011, p. 27). However, as it developed over subsequent years, the feeling grew that this rapprochement was also the outcome of common challenges faced by both countries in the wake of China’s emergence. At times, the Indo-US relationship was depicted as a common strategy to contain China (Gordon, 2012, p. 25). Renewed negotiations over the civil–nuclear agreement by the Bush administration, and its subsequent approval by the US Congress, were seen by some as being indicative of the broad contours of an evolving ‘containment’ strategy. In turn, India’s subsequent unconditional support for the US in its fight against international terrorism further evinced a discernible thaw in the relations between the two countries. Over a period of time, the US diluted its stand on Kashmir and held Pakistan responsible for harbouring terrorists and sponsoring terrorism in India (Mohan, 2006, p. 20). The election of Barack Obama gave further impetus to the bilateral relationship, which was eloquently couched in phrases such as India being an ‘indispensable power’ and a ‘leader in Asia’ (Mohan, 2011, p. 2). Though strategically somewhat turbulent mainly on the issues of relations with Iran, post-US withdrawal from Afghanistan and relations with Pakistan, but on vital strategic issues such as China’s role in South China Sea and evolving strategic equations in the Indo-Pacific region, India and the US appear to be heading towards a meaningful convergence.

Overall, Australia and India both seek the strongest possible economic ties with China but, at the same time, consider the rising power of China and its proportionate influence in the region as a geostrategic challenge. Considering this challenge, the concept of the Indo-Pacific as a shared strategic region does serve to bring Australia and India closer, in large measure through their relations with the US. Unlike during the Cold War however, when India was apprehensive about superpower use of the Indian Ocean, India now encourages joint naval exercises not only with the US but with several other countries in the region. In a similar vein, Australia’s suspicions over India’s intention to expand its naval power and reach have diluted (Brown, 2013). Today, India, Australia and the US look for cooperation in preventing piracy, ensuring the safety of SLOCs and the potential for joint operations to explore oceanic resources. The three countries share several common goals and aspirations in the Indo-Pacific region, such as maintaining peace and stability, sustaining a stable balance of power and harnessing economic opportunities. However, the dominant position played by the US in its bilateral relations between both Australia and India may be preventing them from becoming closer in terms of their strategic focus (Brown and Medcalf, 2013).

Conclusion

Australia and India share a set of common strategic perceptions, which over time could pave the way for deepening their security arrangements and possibly lead to a robust security partnership. Today, neither state continues to view the bilateral relationship through Cold War blinkers. However, although the evolving Indo-Australian strategic relationship has finally been decoupled from Cold War imperatives, the convergence of their shared strategic perceptions cannot simply be attributed to the collapse of the Cold War politics.

The Indo-Australian strategic convergence has largely been conditioned by the paramount ‘policing’ role adopted by both nations within the Indo-Pacific region within the context of the rise of China and the US response. Non-state regional security challenges, including terrorism, Indian Ocean maritime security, piracy, drug trafficking and the role of Indonesia, serve as core security interests for both countries, as is the continuing rise of Chinese strategic importance.

Seen in this perspective, the currently evolving strategic convergence between India and Australia, as well as the US, appears to be, in part, connected to China’s rise and the subsequent shifting balance of power in the Indo-Pacific region. In that sense, both India and Australia appear to be only too willing to maintain strong business and trade relations with China but at the same time engaging the US as a protective ‘fall-back’ shield in case of future strategic challenges.

Notwithstanding a sustained convergence of core security concerns centred on a mutual interest in Indian Ocean and Indo-Pacific regional peace and security, both India and Australia still predominantly fall back on their relationship with the US, rather than seriously explore scope for further bilateral cooperation. Unfortunately, although sharing a set of strategic perceptions that have rapidly converged since the end of the Cold War, both India and Australia still appear to share a limited understanding of each other’s core geostrategic interests and this prevents them from forming the depth of relationship possible in the increasingly important Indo-Pacific region.

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