Abstract
India and Central Asia have shared a geo-cultural affinity and a long tradition of historical contacts that dates back to antiquity. There is convergence of views and interests between the Central Asian Republics and India, on fundamental issues such as; (a) need to maintain social harmony and equilibrium by promoting inter-ethnic harmony and peaceful co-existence; (b) commitment to secularism and democracy and opposition to religious fundamentalism; (c) recognition of threat to regional security and stability from trans-border terrorism, arms and drug trafficking, religious extremism and ethnic-religious secessionism; (d) commitment to the principles of territorial integrity of nation states and inviolability of state borders; (e) promoting economic, scientific and cultural cooperation and (f) ensuring peaceful and tranquil neighbourhood in Afghanistan.
The Central Asian Republics, being cautious and wary of dominating influence of the powerful neighbours like Russia and China look towards India as a friend and partner, which does not have any political or territorial ambitions in the region. India is also expected to play a balancing role in the big power games in Central Asia.
Keywords
Stretching from the Caspian Sea in the west to the western frontiers of China in the east, Central Asia has played an important role in the history and politics of Eurasia. In its past history, Silk Route system provided a transcontinental bridge facilitating multilateral exchanges among Central Asia, Russia, China, West Asia and the Indian subcontinent. The disintegration of former USSR and the subsequent emergence of independent Central Asian Republics, all having predominantly Muslim population, changed the balance of power in this region. Due to its geographical proximity to China, Russia, West Asia and South Asia, this region has emerged as a distinct geopolitical entity stimulating global attention and interest. Neighbouring countries, such as Russia, China, Iran, Turkey, Pakistan and India, have been pursuing competing strategic, economic and cultural interests in the region. They have been in the forefront of building new linkages with the independent Central Asian Republics. On their part, the Central Asian Republics have moved into a multilateral network of international relations, by becoming members of United Nations (UN), Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), Economic Cooperation Organization (ECO), Organization of the Islamic Conference (OIC), Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO), Conference on Interaction and Confidence Building Measures in Asia (CICA), Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO), etc. These republics, keen to be self-reliant and independent, perceive the involvement of such international institutions in Central Asia as guarantee for their independence. The political regimes in Central Asia have played their cards well, balancing their security interests by establishing bilateral and multilateral relations with Russia, China, USA, European Union, SCO, OSCE, OIC, etc.
Central Asia’s geo-strategic importance is due to its rich energy reserves, existence of gas and oil pipelines connecting China, Russia, Europe, Caucasus and the Trans-Caspian region. Whereas the geo-strategic significance of Central Asia and big power interests in the region make it an area of great importance, there is the need to engage in genuine partnership in the region in a spirit of non-hegemonic intentions. Cross-border energy projects have two major problems—investments and vulnerability to supply interruptions. The challenges, such as sovereignty of the nations, political barriers, security of supplies, paucity of infrastructure, etc. need to be met in order to develop the security aspect of energy cooperation and gradually bring it into the socio-economic dynamics in Central and South Asia. Apart from dialogues, knowledge sharing mechanism and bilateral transport linkages, a comprehensive framework is required to facilitate energy transit and trade by providing a level playing field to all countries concerned. Afghanistan becomes important as it provides a land bridge between Central Asia in the north and South Asia in the south. Moreover, the Central Asian Republics have always been keen to extend their oil, gas and transportation linkages with South Asia to the south, through Afghanistan in order to reduce their dependence on the existing linkages with Russia. This will become possible only after Afghanistan becomes peaceful and stable.
Afghan crisis has influenced all the Central Asian Republics. Rise of the Taliban to power tremendously affected these countries, which sought to build secular democratic states. Though they followed different approaches to the Afghan conflict, there has been unanimity among the Central Asian Republics over the threats posed by Islamist extremism of Taliban, terrorism and drug trafficking. Security of Tajik–Afghan border remained the crucial issue. Tajikistan witnessed bloody civil war and conflict during the early and mid 1990s which fragmented the society and polity, besides causing severe economic damage to the country. In the late 1990s, the country moved forward towards reconciliation between opposition and the government. Afghan conflict, accompanied by trans-border terrorism, arms and drug trafficking, caused instability in the region. The crisis deepened during the Taliban period when Osama bin Laden and Al Qaeda turned Afghanistan into the hub of terrorism and narco-trafficking, adversely affecting security in the entire region. However, in the post-September 11 period, when Taliban were defeated and a new broad-based government was formed, the Central Asian Republics felt relieved. Though the ouster of the Taliban relaxed the security concerns of Central Asian countries, thereby bringing new hopes of building liberal and democratic polity in Afghanistan, the Central Asian Republics now fear the return of the Taliban after the US withdrawal from Afghanistan in 2014.
India and Central Asian Republics
India and Central Asia have shared a geo-cultural affinity and a long tradition of historical contacts that dates back to antiquity. Notwithstanding the physical barriers of high Himalayan and Hindu Kush mountain ranges, there existed close socio-economic and cultural ties between the people of India and Central Asia. These linkages were cemented by the ideological force of Zoroastrianism, Buddhism, Islam and Sufism; by the influx of Aryans, Sakas, Kushans, Turks, Mughals, etc.; by high mobility of statesmen, scholars, spiritualists, artists, craftsman, literati and traders. The movement of people, trade and ideas and the reciprocal cultural influences enriched the horizons of human development and left a deep imprint on the political, economic and social life in the entire region.
Indian art, culture and philosophy made a profound impact in pre-Islamic Central Asia. The archeological finds in northern India and Central Asia reveal remarkable parallels in stone and bone tools, pot forms and other artefacts, which suggest a rare intensity of communication across the Himalayas since prehistoric times. Several important places on the Silk Route system, such as Khotan, Kashgar, Balkh, Bamiyan, etc., developed into important centres of Buddhism when parts of Central Asia and northwestern India were integrated into a single kingdom under the Kushans.
The establishment of Islam in Central Asia and its spread to India in medieval times lent new dimension to the existing ties in the region. Influx of Muslim artisans, traders, Syeds and mercenaries from Central Asia reshaped the geopolitical history of India. The Mughal rule that lasted for over 300 years changed the societal composition in India and led to the growth of an Indo-Islamic culture.
The incorporation of Central Asia and India in the Russian and British empires, respectively and the subsequent Anglo-Russian rivalry in the region restricted the contacts between India and Central Asia. Tsarist Russia sought to use its strategic position in Central Asia to pressurise India, which was perceived to be a sensitive nerve of the British Empire and which when touched would put a brake on British interference with Russian affairs in Europe. This Russian policy of strategic diversion was countered by the British by adopting a sustained forward policy in the region. During the period of ‘Great Game’, the importance of Hindu Kush–Karakoram–Pamirs region had become clear to the British as it was the meeting point of the Kashmir frontiers in Gilgit, Hunza and Chitral, the Afghan provinces of Badakhshan and Wakhan, the Russian territory of Kokand and the Sarikol area of Chinese Turkestan (for further details, see Warikoo, 2009, pp. 14–35). It was seen as a gateway for any foreign invasion of India. The British strategy geared itself to the task of creating a barrier between Russian and British empires right on the Pamirs, simultaneously extending their effective control over the frontier areas in Gilgit, Hunza, Chitral and Yasin through the Maharaja of Kashmir. The British used Ladakh and adjoining areas in Gilgit, Skardo, Hunza and Chitral as ‘frontier listening posts’ to monitor the developments in Central Asia and Xinjiang throughout the Dogra period.
After the October Revolution (1917), the British sought to halt the progress of Bolshevism in Central Asia. In their vain attempt to create and buttress ‘tiny independent states in the Caucasus, Transcaspia, Central Asia, Persia and Afghanistan, near the borders of India—hostile to Bolshevik Russia and under the tutelage of Britain’ (for further details, see Warikoo, 1989, pp. 183–202), the British used Kashmir and its frontier territories as a forward base to attain their strategic objectives in Central Asia. The British visualised India’s north and northwest frontier as frontier listening posts and a staging ground for monitoring the developments in Central Asia and Xinjiang, and also for extending the British influence there, to stall the Russians. Curzon believed in the concept of India as a South and Central Asian power. He was convinced that protection of the British colonial state in India required dominance of the strategic Himalayan neighbourhood to stem any incursions by other interested regional state actors such as Russia and China. He sought to ‘extend the idea of “buffer zones”—whether notionally independent like Afghanistan or under British control like the North West Frontier Province—to India’s strategic Himalayan neighbourhood in a proactive but composite manner’ (Kapur, 2009). India maintained a consulate general in Kashgar till early 1950s. That Nehru had envisioned the need for India’s maintaining physical contact with Central Asia becomes clear from his letter of 20 August 1948 to Joseph Korbel, head of United Nations Commission for India and Pakistan (UNCIP) Mission urging him not to let Gilgit and Northern Areas (the frontier areas of Kashmir having common borders with Xinjiang) be part of Pakistani arrangements in Pak-occupied Kashmir so that the continuity of overland trade and traffic between India and Central Asia could be ensured through these high mountain passes/territory. Obviously, the idea behind this move was not followed up even by Nehru himself later on.
After India gained independence in 1947, its relations with Central Asia were renewed in the overall spirit of Indo-Soviet relations. When Central Asia had ceased to be an area of interest for the world, India was in constant touch with the people and developments there. During the Soviet period, India enjoyed an edge over its near and distant neighbours, in reaching out to Central Asia, due to friendly Indo-Soviet relations. Central Asia was accessible to Indian leaders/visitors, which was not the case with others. So much so, direct Indo-Central Asian contacts developed in diverse fields— trade, education and culture, science and technology, films, etc. in the heyday of friendly Indo-Soviet ties, thereby creating a greater mutual understanding among the two sides. Indian Airlines used to operate bi-weekly flights to Tashkent.
The movement of trade, ideas and reciprocal cultural influences have left deep imprint on the social life and cultural traditions of this region. Popular usage of Indian spices, tea, medicinal herbs, etc. and quest for Indian films and songs in Central Asia even today reflects the age-old Indian connection. A common cultural pattern embracing various forms of expression such as astronomy, philosophy, language, literature, folklore, architecture, arts and crafts, calligraphy, textiles, food and dress habits developed in the process of socio-economic interaction between India and Central Asia. It is this consciousness of historical and cultural association dating back to antiquity and permeating the psyche of the people of the two regions that provides a firm basis for constructive Indo-Central Asian cooperation in diverse sectors of socio-economic development.
On the diplomatic plane, India established state relations with all the Central Asian Republics soon after their independence and opened diplomatic missions. Exchange of high-level political, diplomatic, business and cultural delegations has been taking place between India and the Central Asian Republics regularly. India provided the line of credit for the Central Asian Republics. India views Central Asia as its extended neighbourhood and an area of vital strategic importance. There is convergence of views and interests between the Central Asian Republics and India on fundamental issues such as (i) the need to maintain social harmony and equilibrium by promoting inter-ethnic harmony and peaceful coexistence, (ii) commitment to secularism and democracy and opposition to religious fundamentalism, (iii) recognition of threat to regional security and stability from trans-border terrorism, arms and drug trafficking, religious extremism and ethnic-religious secessionism, (iv) commitment to the principles of territorial integrity of nation states and inviolability of state borders and (v) promoting economic, scientific and cultural cooperation. This mutual political understanding can and needs to be reinforced through synergy of thought and action between various Indian government agencies, universities and institutions so that the historical and cultural linkages between India and Central Asia are strengthened and developed into a fund of goodwill, love and harmony at the grassroots level.
Strengthening Cultural Ties
Soon after their independence, the Central Asian Republics have been experiencing the resurgence of indigenous culture and traditions. The Central Asian Republics are attaching great importance to the rediscovery of their past and are consolidating their national identity on the basis of their indigenous ethno-cultural heritage. This offers ample opportunity to India to reinvigorate the age-old historico-cultural ties with Central Asia.
The Government of India has taken several steps, such as establishing full-fledged Indian cultural centres in Tashkent, Almaty/Astana, Dushanbe besides setting up India chairs/study centres in Osh and Tashkent. India has also been facilitating the visit and study of a few hundred students from various Central Asian Republics at various Indian universities and institutes by providing scholarships under its Indian Technical & Economic Cooperation (ITEC) and Indian Council for Cultural Relations (ICCR) programmes. Time has come to review the efficacy of these cultural centres and cultural exchange programmes. Experience shows that but for fulfilling the targets and stated objectives in theory, little impact has been created on the ground such that Indian political and strategic objectives in Central Asia could be attained.
It is high time that all the antiquities, frescoes, manuscripts, inscriptions and artefacts that are lying scattered in various parts of Central Asia either at the sites or in local museums are documented. Indian specialists/archeologists need to work urgently in close collaboration with their Central Asian counterparts to undertake the hitherto neglected task of identification, location, documentation and dissemination of such a rich and common historico-cultural legacy. Similarly, there is a need for preparing a cumulative catalogue of the artefacts and Manuscripts (MSS) that were excavated by the Western archeologists such as Aurel Stein, Albert Grundwel, Albert Von le Coq, Paul Pelliot, Sven Hedin, L. Warner, Count Otani and also by the Soviet archeologists in various parts of Central Asia, which are presently scattered in different museums throughout the world. Steps also need to be taken to identify and preserve the literary, historical and artistic works. Old classics in Kharosthi, Turkic, Persian, Uyghur, Mongolian, etc. that have been found in various parts of Central Asia, can be microfilmed and published, possibly with English translations. Indira Gandhi National Centre for the Arts (IGNCA), International Institute of Central Asian Studies, Samarkand and United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) should co-opt various experts in the field and initiate a concrete programme of identification, documentation, video filming and preservation of these antiquities, which can otherwise be lost into oblivion.
The Archeological Survey of India needs to step in to help in excavating, conserving and restoring such ancient sites which are presently lying in dilapidated condition so that the testimony of historical and cultural relationship between India and Central Asia does not get destroyed through vagaries of nature, time and neglect. These sites and monuments (now in ruins) can easily be restored and developed into important cultural centres after doing the requisite renovations and providing all the facilities of a modern museum.
The process of academic and cultural exchanges between Indian and Central Asian centres of learning, universities, institutes, etc. needs to be streamlined and institutionalised so that Indian specialists on Central Asia are able to collaborate with their counterparts in their areas of study/specialisation. Another vital area of cultural cooperation is the joint production of films, television serials, publication of books, exchange of print and visual materials and regular exchange of artistes.
Enhancing Trade Relations
Though India’s trade with Central Asia goes back to the Silk Route days, Central Asian Republics form minuscule proportion of Indian export/import trade. After the collapse of USSR and emergence of independent Central Asian Republics, the situation changed drastically. There was a sharp decline in the Indo-Russian/CIS trade. During the year 1990–1991, Indian exports to USSR were of the order of 2,935.04 million dollars, whereas imports from USSR amounted to 1,422.14 million dollars. In 1992–1993, Indian exports to CIS dropped to 584.62 million, whereas Indian imports were worth 258.17 million dollars only. Indian trade with CIS started growing from 1996–1997 onwards. Indian exports to CIS reached 915 million dollars against imports from CIS worth 841.01 million dollars, during 2002–2003. Though trade between India and Central Asian Republics has started picking up from the year 2004–2005 onwards, it is far behind the actual potential. Total volume of this trade for the period 1996–1997 to 2011–2012 has only been over 4,000 million US dollars (for details, see Tables 1–5). As such, India’s potential in the traditional sector is yet to be realised.
India’s Trade with Kazakhstan (in US$ million)
India’s Trade with Uzbekistan (in US$ million)
India’s Trade with Tajikistan (in US$ million)
India’s Trade with Kyrgyzstan (in US$ million)
India’s Trade with Turkmenistan (in million US$)
The main obstacles in the trade are:
Lack of direct overland access Macroeconomic instability in Central Asia Inadequate banking facilities Strict visa regimes and language barriers Lack of trade dynamism and entrepreneurship among Indian businessmen. Failure of India to secure air connections, remove customs/tariffs bottlenecks to motivate Indian enterprises for joint ventures in Central Asian Republics.
India can substantially raise its level of exports of tea, pharmaceuticals and consumer goods to Central Asian Republics. India also needs to focus on trade and investment opportunities in the service sector including banking, insurance, health care, IT software, tourism and education (in English medium). The Indian concept of alternative medicine has also become very popular in Central Asian Republics.
India needs to become a construction sector player in the exploitation and distribution of Central Asian energy resources. Indian firms need to join international consortia for oil and gas exploration in Central Asia and the Caspian, thus securing energy security for India. India has sound technology for refineries at par with established international standards. Therefore, India can help in modernising refineries in Central Asian Republics. There is scope for India’s involvement in modernising refineries, laying pipelines, investment in retail outlets/infrastructure and marketing of petroleum products.
There is enough scope for cooperation with Kazakhstan for uranium processing, nuclear reactors, space stations, refining and processing of oil, laying of pipelines; with Tajikistan on setting up of joint ventures for exploration and processing of silver, aluminium and uranium; with Kyrgyzstan on joint ventures in various sectors such as IT and pharmaceuticals; with Uzbekistan joint ventures on textiles, food/fruit processing, oil and gas processing/refining, pharmaceuticals, production of transport planes, etc. India would do well in foraying into management and marketing of petroleum products rather than exploration. Swap deals is another option. India and Iran can enter into such swap deals. India had such an arrangement with Iraq and former USSR, which would supply oil to Iraq and India got the same from Iraq. There is the need for strengthening energy cooperation between India and Iran which has become all the more necessary due to new thaw in US–Iran relations and hopes of settlement of Iran’s nuclear issue. It becomes imperative to evolve a trilateral cooperative fuel swap arrangement between Iran, India and Central Asian Republics, under which Iran could export its energy to India from its terminals in return for an equal amount of oil tapped by Indian firms in Central Asia which can be delivered by them across the border to Iran.
Towards India–Central Asia Trade and Transit Corridor
Central Asian Republics view Afghanistan and Pakistan as the transit corridor for access to South Asia, as an alternative to existing routes to Russia in the north. Uzbekistan, Iran and Afghanistan are now developing trans-Afghanistan corridor. Iran has initiated work on building Kerman–Zahidan rail which will go directly to Pakistan. Iran has also constructed a railway to Herat, thus connecting western Afghanistan. Uzbekistan is connected through a 75 km Hairaton–Mazar-e-Sharif rail line, which is planned to be connected to Mashad–Zahidan and Pakistan. It is also proposed to link Afghanistan to Chinese railway network in Central Asia, Iran and Pakistan. The Chinese are working out plans of a railway from Tajikistan to Afghanistan’s Aynak copper mine and also from Sher Khan Bandar via Mazar-e-Sharif to Herat and onwards to Turkmenistan railway line at Tororaghondi. These rail links when completed will integrate Afghanistan with the regional railway network, thereby enabling the country to earn huge revenues from trade and transit (Norling, 2011).
Turkmenistan has invested in the development of regional infrastructure by initiating the construction of Turkmenistan–Afghanistan–Tajikistan railway, which can in future become the trade corridor linking Afghanistan with the railway network of Central Asia and beyond. This railway will enable Tajikistan to bypass Uzbekistan, which has been blocking supplies of goods to and from Tajikistan through the country due to lingering bilateral Tajik–Uzbek disputes. All the three presidents of Turkmenistan, Afghanistan and Tajikistan attended the opening ceremony of this railway in 2013 at Atamurat in southeastern Turkmenistan. Turkmenistan is financing the construction of 85 km rail link between Atamurat and Imamnazar on its Afghan border. Afghanistan has asked Turkmenistan to construct the next 35 km from the border to Andhoi within Afghanistan, from where the railway will be extended to Pyanj in south Tajikistan via Mazar-e-Sharif. This rail link, which will take several years for completion, will eliminate Tajikistan’s dependence on the use of Uzbek territory for import of energy supplies from Turkmenistan. Construction of the Turkmen segment of the railway line was started in June 2013 (Salimov, 2013). The project has the support of Asian Development Bank (ADB) and is part of the regional development strategy through a network of roads, railways and energy supply lines, envisioned by the US in its ‘New Silk Road Strategy’, which seeks to reduce Russian influence in Central Asia (ibid.). This project will reduce the economic isolation of the land-locked countries of Afghanistan and Tajikistan, resolve Tajikistan’s predicament of its dependence on Uzbekistan for transit, increase regional trade and energy supplies. However, Afghanistan’s instability and its inability to provide a secure transit after the withdrawal of International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) forces in 2014, besides Tajikistan’s lack of funds to finance its portion of the railway are the main challenges in the way of successful fruition of this project.
Foreign and transport ministers of Uzbekistan, Iran and Turkmenistan met in Tehran in November 2010 and agreed to build new transportation corridor between Persian Gulf and Central Asia through Iran. President Karimov had earlier visited Turkmenistan on 19–20 October 2010 and discussed with Turkmen President G. Berdemuhamedov the issue of opening of a transport corridor of Uzbekistan–Turkmenistan–Iran–Oman–Qatar in the region. Soon after, Karimov visited Qatar on 23–24 November 2010, and in April 2011, foreign ministers of Iran, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, Qatar and Oman met in the Turkmen capital Ashkabad to discuss trade and transit cooperation. The five countries signed the multilateral agreement on Central Asia—Persian Gulf corridor to boost economic and transit cooperation (Roy, 2012). So Indian efforts to reach Central Asia through Iran (via Bander Abbas and Chabahar) and through Afghanistan (via Delaram–Zaranj) are being sidestepped.
Implications for India
India needs to secure its interests in Central Asia by securing direct overland access to Afghanistan, Tajikistan and other Central Asian countries, and also to ensure that it has peaceful, tranquil and benign neighbourhood. Taking into account the concept of strategic frontiers, India needs to determine the area within which no hostile or potentially hostile focus is to be allowed to exist or develop, so that national security is not threatened.
India needs to explore viable and alternative oil/gas transit routes to Central Asia. Similarly, India can secure direct land access to Central Asian Republics via Ladakh–Xinjiang–Kyrgyzstan–Kazakhstan, thereby becoming part of the great Eurasian land bridge (which is in the making). Thus India will be physically there in Central Asia. Only one country—China is involved as a transit point between India and Central Asian Republics.
Here, it would be instructive to reflect upon Chinese experience in Xinjiang. Whereas this remote northwestern region has been brought closer to China’s mainland both by air, rail and road network, notwithstanding the enormous distance and inhospitable deserts intervening between the two regions. China has also extended Xinjiang’s overland transportation links through Kashgar and Yarkand to Central Asia—Kyrgyzstan via Osh, Turgart and Karamik passes; Tajikistan via Osh, Sary Tash and Murgab; Kazakhstan by building Alashanko, Khorgos and several other border ports. This road network is being linked to the Karakoram Highway running through Pak-occupied Jammu & Kashmir (POJK) so that these Central Asian countries secure access to the sea via Pakistan. Besides, cis-Pamir mountain territories of Karategin, Garm, Tajikabad, Jirghital, Darvaz and Tavildara in Tajikistan are being linked to Kyrgyzstan and Kashgar region of Xinjiang by the formation of a transport and economic corridor through Suhov and Kyzyl Su (in Kyrgyzstan), Sary Tash in Pamirs and via Irkeshtam to Kashgar in China. This 750 km route is reported to have no high passes or inaccessible sections and can be made operational throughout the year. There already exists road on some sections of this route and the whole section from Dushanbe to Kashgar (750–800 km) has asphalt or pebble stone cover. Only a few sections of this road are reported to be not metalled. This transport network known as the Euro-Asian highway will embrace Pamirs and connect the Central Asian countries of Tajikistan, Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan with Xinjiang and Pakistan through the Karakoram Highway.
The latest Chinese plans to build a special economic zone (SEZ) in Kashgar and connect it by a major rail with Pakistan through POJK along the Karakoram Highway pose serious security challenge to India in Kashmir and Ladakh. Pakistan’s president Asif Ali Zardari during his visit to China in early July 2010 urged China Northern Railways Corporation (CNR) to form a consortium with Pakistan Railways to concretise the planned rail link between Kashgar and Pakistan (The Times of India, 2010). Pakistan’s Ambassador to China, Masood Khan, in an interview given last year disclosed that the ‘pre-feasibility work on the proposed railway line has been completed’ (Krishnan, 2012). This railway line, which runs from Kashgar in Xinjiang through POJK and onwards, will join Pakistan’s railway network at Havelian. Work on the Chinese side is almost completed as train service is running up to Kashgar and Khotan. China is also providing 500 million dollars for repaving and widening the Karakoram Highway (Krishnan, 2012). China has also taken over the management of Gwadar port in Pakistan (Datta, 2013; Joshua, 2013). Chinese president Xi Jinping during his recent visit to Pakistan in April 2015 announced 46 billion US dollars package for the development of 3,000 km China–Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) which will host roads, railways, energy pipelines and industrial parks (Aneja, 2015). The Kashgar–Gwadar economic corridor is being developed in conjunction with the Eurasian Silk Road Economic Belt (SREB), as a part of president Xi’s ‘Belt and Road’ initiative (ibid.). As such China is implementing its plans to have direct access to the Arabian Sea from Xinjiang through the Karakoram Highway and Pakistan. China is thus not only securing access to markets in South Asia, West Asia and Africa but also is augmenting its airborne and naval capabilities and acquiring strategic access to the Indian Ocean region, thereby posing serious threat to the security of India.
India needs to have a long term and comprehensive strategy in Central Asia, with set objectives and commitment/motivation to achieve the same.
Pakistan–Afghanistan route has a question mark, as Pakistan holds the key to switch off gas/ oil supplies at their will, thus rendering the huge infrastructure set up in India for the purpose, as infructuous. The uncertain situation in Baluchistan and Afghanistan also act as inhibiting factors for successful operationalisation of this route.
The trilateral agreement between Iran, India and Turkmenistan signed in February 1997, providing for the movement of goods through Bandar Abbas–Mashed–Tajend route, in theory resolved the problem of access for Indian goods in Central Asian Republics. But in practice, this route is still beset with several problems. There are problems of loading, unloading, reloading, restrictive customs and tariffs, container availability, different railway gauges in Iranian and Turkmen territory, warehousing, etc. India has completed the construction of 218 km of the Zaranj (on Iran–Afghanistan border)–Delaram road in Afghanistan in 2009 at a cost of ₹6,000 millions, braving multiple attacks by the Taliban, with the objective of linking it to Chabahar port in Iran, for securing access to Central Asia. Though Chabahar port has a capacity of 12 million tons, only 2.5 million tons are being utilised. However, Indian plans for enlarging Chabahar to five times its current size and constructing a railway line to Bam on the Iran–Afghan border have been a matter of discussion for quite some time with Iran (Dikshit, 2010). Besides, the oldest venture of the Shipping Corporation of India (SCI) with the Islamic Republic with Iran Shipping Lines (IRISIL), known as the Irano Hind Shipping Company, has been targeted by US sanctions. As a result, seven Indian vessels are lying idle. There is also a lurking fear that the seven vessels may be confiscated on some pretext as the US is targeting the IRISIL. US under Secretary of Terrorism and Financial Intelligence Stuart Levey stated in December 2010, ‘IRISIL, which we designated in 2008, has renamed and even repainted ships, and changed the nominal ownership of vessels, all to hide their connection to the shipping company’ (Jacob, 2011a).
However, with the new Modi government in India deciding to invest 85.23 million dollars in developing the Chabahar port for use by India is a step in positive direction (Behuria, 2014). There is a need to activise the shipping line between Chabahar and Indian ports of Kandla and Mumbai. That Iran is developing Chabahar as the third major hub for petrochemical industries, building roads, railway lines and pipelines offers new opportunities for India to join this project by investing in this upcoming petrochemical complex in Chabahar (ibid.). China is reported to have already invested in the heavy oil refinery sector there and is keen to participate in the development of the port (ibid.). India needs to shed its lethargic approach and be an active participant in the development of refineries, pharmaceutical and textile industries, road and rail infrastructure in the upcoming Chabahar complex. With the growing understanding between Iran and USA on restraining Iran’s nuclear programme, the prospects of termination of sanctions imposed by the US and European Union on Iran have brightened. These sanctions have not only disrupted India’s energy trade with Iran but also adversely affected other sectors, such as shipping, transportation, etc. Expecting the removal of trade sanctions imposed by the western nations, Iran is reported to have recently proposed a preferential trading agreement with India to enhance its trade relations with India (Indian Express, 2015).
India has done well, fostering bilateral relations with individual Central Asian Republics. However, India has not been a part of any regional security, political or economic arrangement. India needs to have a comprehensive proactive policy and not a reactive one dominated by the Pakistan factor. For this, India needs to have access, besides being a part of regional institutional mechanisms. India remained indifferent and out of the Tajikistan peace process (though Russia wished it to be there), the 6+2 arrangement for dealing with the Afghanistan crisis, and has been out of SCO. Now is the time to join SCO as a full member in a dignified way. Indian diplomacy should ensure that India is invited to be a member of SCO. The SCO has evolved as an effective regional institutional mechanism of multilateral cooperation between Central Asian Republics, Russia and China.
Though several security arrangements are being worked out by the concerned states in the region, India is conspicuously absent in them. Russia, Afghanistan, Pakistan and Tajikistan have been engaged in Dushanbe 4 dialogue for several years now, India being totally out of this process. Whereas Tajikistan, Iran and Afghanistan have been engaged in a separate trilateral mechanism, Turkey, Iran, Afghanistan and Pakistan are also working out their mutual strategy to address the new challenge following the US withdrawal from Afghanistan. On its part, the US is promoting its ‘Greater Central Asia’ and ‘New Silkway’ projects to promote geopolitical pluralism in the Eurasian space in order to exclude Russia from the region. The ADB initiative–The Central Asia Regional Economic Cooperation (CAREC Program) is a partnership of 10 countries including Pakistan, Afghanistan, China, Azerbaijan, Mongolia and five Central Asian Republics, India again being out of this mechanism. Now that the Customs Union of Russia, Belarus and Kazakhstan has come into existence on 1 January 2010, it has opened huge Eurasian space as a free trade area. India needs to explore avenues of trading with this area by concluding a formal economic cooperation agreement with the Custom Union.
Though the ‘Indian strategic community never tires of repeating how crucial Iran is to US for its energy resources, for alternative access to Afghanistan and for the northern corridor to Central Asia’ (Garekhan, 2013), there is clear need for reality-check. A track II discussion on India–Iran ties at the Institute of Defence Studies and Analyses, New Delhi (in which this author had also participated) was an eye-opener. An Iranian expert associated with Iran’s official think tank was candidly critical of India’s tilt towards the US. Describing Washington as ‘Qibla’ of India, he wanted India to strike a balance in its foreign policy and reconsider its relations with Iran (ibid.). In his view, India lost its popularity with the Iranian people due to its anti-Iran vote in the International Atomic Energy Agency. He dismissed Indian concern over Iran placing obstacles for sale of Indian wheat in Iran and instead purchasing wheat from the US, as a ‘matter of business considerations’. Regarding Pakistan, the Iranian delegate stated that as a ‘neighbor and a friendly country’, Iran had to support it (ibid.).
With respect to the two pipeline projects—Iran–Pakistan–India (IPI) and Turkmenistan–Afghanistan–Pakistan–India (TAPI)—the US has been openly backing the TAPI project. Whereas in the case of IPI pipeline, India has been insisting on the delivery of gas at the India–Pakistan border, it has agreed to buy gas at the Turkmenistan–Afghanistan border in the case of the TAPI project, obviously under US pressure. US Deputy Secretary of State on South and Central Asian Affairs, while speaking at an energy conference in Turkmenistan in November 2010, described the TAPI route as ‘a stabilising corridor, linking neighbours together in economic growth and prosperity’. However, Pakistan—the beneficiary of US largesse—went ahead to sign an agreement on a pipeline with Iran in March 2010. Whichever pipeline project—TAPI or IPI, is joined by India, it should take into account the security concerns and see that the natural gas is delivered at India’s borders with guarantees of assured and unhindered supply. Of the 1,680 km long TAPI pipeline, 735 km pass through the tough terrains of Herat, Lashkar Gah and Kandahar. However, the route has too many impediments, including mines. Besides, Afghanistan has taken a strident position by asking India to link the transit fee to the gas fee, instead of a fixed fee as had been agreed by Pakistan and Iran for the IPI pipeline (Jayanth, 2011b). One wonders if Indian engagement with the Karzai government in Afghanistan including 2 billion US dollars aid for reconstruction and humanitarian assistance will yield any positive results. As such, both the security concerns and the commercial issues of transit fees to be charged by Afghanistan and Pakistan and the final price of gas are yet to be resolved. However, the US is promoting TAPI not only as an alternative to the IPI but also as a means to break Russian monopoly on the export of Central Asian gas to outside markets.
Pakistan has been consistent in its policy of blocking the overland Central Asia–Afghanistan– Pakistan corridor to India for import of energy resources and export of Indian goods. The experience shows that Pakistan has not granted India any transit access to send even its humanitarian assistance in the form of wheat and other commodities to Afghanistan. The Afghanistan–Pakistan Trade Transit Agreement, which was finalised on 19 July 2010 in the presence of US Secretary of State, Hillary Clinton, while allowing Afghan trucks to carry goods to the Wagah border for onward dispatch to India, does not allow these trucks to carry back Indian goods to Afghanistan. In return, Afghanistan has allowed Pakistani trucks to go through Afghanistan to Central Asia, Iran and Turkey. Earlier, Afghan trucks were allowed to carry goods only to the Pak-Afghan border at Torkham. Pakistan’s information minister Qamar Zaman Kaira clarified that ‘according to the agreement approved by Pakistan’s cabinet, Afghan goods will be allowed to transit through Pakistan in sealed containers having tracking devices’ (see The Times of India, 2011). Afghanistan’s president Ashraf Ghani during his maiden state visit to India in April 2015 urged Pakistan to allow Afghan trucks to cross over to the Indian checkpoint at Attari, less than a kilometer away from Wagah (Haidar, 2015). Ghani asked Pakistan to ‘accept the “national treatment” clause agreed to in the Afghanistan–Pakistan Transit Trade Agreement (APTTA) signed in 2011, which gives both countries equal access up to its national boundaries’ (ibid.). He went on to say that ‘if we are not given equal transit access, then we will not provide equal transit access to Central Asia” (ibid.). Needless to mention, India offers a huge traditional market for Afghan fresh and dry fruits and carpets, which remains untapped to the detriment of the Afghan economy, as the Afghan trucks have to return empty from Wagah due to a bar on them for carrying back Indian goods. Though India has recently allowed duty-free market access to Afghanistan (see The Hindu, 2011), it has been denied transit access through Pakistan to Afghanistan and onwards to Central Asia. Pakistan has linked this transit passage and other bilateral trade issues with India to the final resolution of the Kashmir issue.
The establishment of multipurpose Gwadar Port complex with direct express highways, pipelines and other infrastructure linking Pakistan to Xinjiang province of China through an upgraded Karakoram Highway and onwards to Central Asia, poses a major challenge to India. Pakistan recently approved 90 million US dollars for the restoration of Karakoram Highway (see The Hindustan Times, 2011). Indian policy planners need to review India’s policy towards the region and also to expedite the process of upgradation/construction of border roads and related infrastructure in order to ensure better connectivity with Indian frontier stations such as Ladakh. Therefore, India needs to revive its overland link with the Silk Route, and be part of the process, rather be out of it.
As such, the proposals to open up the traditional Leh–Demchok–Gartok–Lhasa and Leh–Demchok–Yarkand–Kashgar trade routes need to be considered actively on an urgent basis so that India is able to open up its direct channel of communication with China’s frontier province of Xinjiang and through it with the Central Asian Republics. The existing unresolved state of Sino-Indian border in Ladakh need not come in the way of pushing such proposal as Nathu pass in Sikkim has already been opened for trade purposes. Besides, the Srinagar–Muzaffarabad road has been opened, notwithstanding Pakistan’s intransigence and insistence on Kashmir being the core issue and dispute between India and Pakistan.
The US has been promoting the concept of Greater Central Asia, which seeks to interlink and integrate Central and South Asia. The US has already merged the South Asia and Central Asia Bureaus in the Department of State into one. Whereas the US goal remains to wear away Central Asian Republics from the Russian and Chinese influence, it is practically strengthening infrastructural linkages between the Central Asian Republics, Afghanistan and Pakistan. The US has assisted in the construction of a few bridges over the Pyanj river connecting Tajikistan and Afghanistan. Given its experience with Pakistan, India needs to tread with caution the concept of Greater Central Asia, which assigns a crucial role to Afghanistan and Pakistan. Whereas Afghanistan has direct borders with Central Asia, Pakistan has ensured its direct access to Central Asia via Karakoram Highway and now via the Gwadar Port.
The Central Asian Republics, being cautious and wary of dominating influence of the powerful neighbours such as Russia and China, and the current regimes in Central Asia getting irritated at times by US manoeuvres and initiatives in the name of promoting democracy and human rights, look towards India as a friend and partner, which does not have any political or territorial ambitions in the region. India is also expected to play a balancing role in the big power games in Central Asia.