Abstract
India’s neighbourhood policy seems to be devoid of any strategy to integrate national interests with the concerns of border regions like Northeast India. India’s security-centric approach prevented a cooperative relationship from emerging with its neighbours, while a deeper and intense engagement with them would have benefitted India and helped solve many of the problems that Northeast India is facing today. However, the recent move by India under the Act East Policy to cultivate a much closer relationship with its eastern neighbours is full of possibilities to make India’s neighbourhood policy more accommodative and sensitive towards the needs of Northeast India. In the light of this, the proposed article intends to examine the nature of India’s neighbourhood policy, to assess its implications for the Northeast and finally, to examine whether the recent transnational engagements can initiate development of the Northeast by relieving it from its peripheral and landlocked status.
Introduction
The foreign policy of a state which is primarily motivated by its desire to promote national interest is never uniquely determined by any one factor or set of factors, but is the outcome of the complex interplay of a number of factors both internal and external. These include history, geography, politico-imperative, socio-cultural milieu, perceptions of the ruling elites of national interest and distribution of power in the regional and international level. While there has been recognition of the fact that different factors influence the shaping of the foreign policy of any state, the relation between the policy’s formulation and concerns of border regions of a state have so far received scant academic attention. The absence of any effort to explore the link between the two is clearly obvious in case of the existing scholarship on the foreign policy of India. This may be partly explained by the common assumption that national interest which is the goal of the foreign policy of any state already incorporates the interests and concerns of all the people and regions that fall within its borders.
However, there may be occasions when the overall national interest of a state may fail to address the needs and concerns of a specific border region within it because of the peculiar history, level of economic development and geo-strategic location of that region. Sometimes, the very definition of national interest shared by the ruling dispensation may have adverse bearings upon regional interests. In such circumstances, the interests of the border regions may necessitate the restructuring of the idea of national interest and foreign policy guided by it to make it more sensitive and accommodative towards the needs and aspirations of such regions. Such dissonance between national interests and foreign policy orientation of India and concerns of Northeast India can be seen with regard to its neighbourhood policy.
India’s policy towards neighbours is primarily dictated by security considerations and the northeast per se is found to be missing or at best figures as an appendix or footnote to such national security concerns in foreign policy calculations. Consequently, Northeast is viewed as a strategically sensitive region that needs to be protected to safeguard India’s national security vis-à-vis its neighbours. As security considerations overshadows all other aspects of India’s relations with its neighbours, the interests and concerns of the Northeast have taken a back seat. While close and cooperative relations with neighbours will help India achieve different political, economic and strategic objectives, such ties are crucial for the Northeast given its peripheral geographic, economic and cultural character, unique geo-strategic location, economic backwardness, problem of illegal migration and insurgency both bearing cross- border linkages. In fact, the logic of development and imperative of resolving numerous conflicts that besiege Northeast today call for a deeper and cooperative engagement between India and its neighbours. Besides, good neighbourly relations may also help India address internal challenges emanating from the Northeast region as it is commonly argued that the backwardness of the region and the role played by some of the neighbours has certainly abated, encouraged and sustained insurgency movements in Northeast.
Such integration of interest of its border regions like the Northeast within the overall national interest of India until recently seemed to be missing in the existing neighbourhood policy of India. Some welcome changes, however, can be observed in this regard in the recent policy orientation of India towards its neighbours. With the changing political, strategic and economic configurations of the emerging world order, there has been a growing realisation in the foreign policy establishment of India about the importance of its neighbours and it is in this changed circumstances that India started privileging its neighbours in its foreign policy scheme through policy postures like ‘Gujral doctrine’, ‘Look East Policy’ now rephrased as ‘Act East Policy’ and different regional and sub-regional initiatives. Significantly, in this restructuring of India’s neighbourhood policy, effort has also been made to accommodate the interests of Northeast, for instance, by trying to link Northeast with India’s Look East Policy. Such effort to integrate national interest and specific concern of Northeast in India’s neighbourhood policy has still remained at the stage of declaration of intent and actual materialisation of such goals will demand persistent and sincere pursuit of the goals, some imaginative out of the box thinking in foreign policy formulation as well as overcoming major hurdles present in the region.
India’s Neighbourhood Policy
Peaceful and cooperative ties with neighbouring countries are essential for any state to further its national interests. This is more so for the South Asian countries including India given their historical, cultural, economic and geographic continuity. As Shyam Saran (2008) has argued:
South Asia is today the politically correct way to refer to a region once better known as the Indian subcontinent. While political divisions may have made the “Indian” prefix somewhat presumptuous, the subcontinent remains a reality as a compact and easily identifiable geographical space occupied by a diverse people, who nevertheless share a common history and enjoy strong cultural affinity and kingship ties. (Saran, 2008, p. 1)
Despite such logic of sub-continental proximity, India’s policy towards its neighbours has remained one of the most poorly defined and less cultivated areas.
This is, however, not to suggest that India has not focused on its relations with the neighbours as is evident from the repeated references of its neighbours as the first circle of India’s foreign policy, prioritisation of it in the annual reports of MEA and the appointment of senior diplomats as ambassadors to neighbouring countries (Behuria, Patnnaik, & Gupta 2012, p. 231). What is striking in this regard is the lack of systematic and well thought out policy initiatives to deal with the neighbours. This perhaps also explain why India’s neighbourhood policy has received such scant attention in the scholarship on Indian foreign policy, while at the same time India’s bilateral relations with each of the neighbour has been extensively dealt with. In fact, ‘Indian political imagination and foreign policy has rarely demonstrated the needed knowledge about our near and extended neighbourhood, far less an ability to influence events in pursuance of national interests’ (The Problem, 2008). As a result ‘India has focussed more on managing its relationship with its neighbours rather than shaping it and giving direction to it with a long term objective and vision in mind’ (Association of Indian Diplomats, 2003, p. 19).
Traditionally, India’s policy towards its neighbours has been shaped by its security considerations. From the very beginning, India has been motivated primarily by the desire to ensure national security while dealing with its neighbours. The history of partition, question of Kashmir, border dispute with China and some other neighbours, armed conflict with China and Pakistan, deteriorating global and regional security environment manifested in intrusive Cold War politics and emerging Sino-American rapprochement and Sino-Pakistani nexus to a large extent explains this excessive reliance on security in India’s neighbourhood policy. Out of such security considerations, India adopted an intrusive and interfering foreign policy approach with regard to some of its smaller neighbours. For instance, in relation to Himalayan states of Nepal, Sikkim and Bhutan, Jawaharlal Nehru continued with the British colonial policy of ensuring tranquillity along the borders by signing treaties with neighbours to protect its security and commercial interests (Yasin, 1994). This was clear from the various treaties that India entered with these countries such as Indo-Nepal Friendship Treaty of 1950 and 1965, Indo-Bhutan Treaty of 1950, etc. Under these treaties, India provided security guarantees to these neighbours and in return secured commitment from these states to respect India’s security interests. Nehru did show some flexibility with regard to other neighbours including China, Pakistan, Sri Lanka, Myanmar, etc. However, subsequent deterioration in relation with China and Pakistan culminating in wars forced India to take equally tough stands in relation to them and India made it clear that national security interest would be paramount while dealing with Pakistan and China. India retained such policy framework with regard to her neighbours until recently barring few exceptions when non-Congress governments undertook some short lived initiatives to be more accommodative towards these neighbours. Among the Nehru followers, Indira Gandhi most vigorously and aggressively pursued the security interest of India in relation to her neighbours. Faced with the deteriorating security environment in the region along, with emerging Sino-American rapprochement and Sino-Pakistan strategic relations, she tried to ward off any external influence in the region. She even militarily intervened in East Pakistan to engineer liberation of Bangladesh despite great pressure from the West not to do so. Such policy posturing of Indira Gandhi was interpreted as the ‘Indira doctrine’; some even called it ‘India doctrine’ or ‘regional Monroe doctrine’ (Sengupta, 1983). Rajiv Gandhi took the ‘India doctrine’ forward towards the close of the Cold War era. He retaliated by refusing to renew the trade and transit treaties with Nepal in 1989 when it asserted its independence, militarily intervened in Sri Lanka in 1987 and forced Jayawardane to sign the Indo-Sri Lankan Accord to resolve the ethnic issue in Sri Lanka. Thus, for a greater part of the Cold War era, India’s actions towards its neighbours was ‘unilateralist and hegemonic’ (Burgess, 2009, p. 231). The post-Cold War phase, however, witnessed some welcome departure from the security- centric neighbourhood policy of India.
India’s obsession with security also led it to emphasise on bilateralism while dealing with its neighbours. The Indian National Congress, however, even prior to independence developed the idea of ‘Asiatic Federation’ and notion of Asianism as a part of its anti-colonial struggle. Such a notion was later articulated and set in motion by Nehru when he convened the first ever Asian Relations Conference, a few months before India achieved her independence and a second one about two years after independence and sought to make Asian solidarity one of the basic principles of Indian foreign policy (Behuria et al., 2012, p. 236). The subsequent growing rift between India and China as well as between India and Pakistan brought an early end to the idea of Asianism and with the crumbling of this dream, India turned to bilateralism. This preference for bilateralism pushed India to insist on a bilateral approach to resolve any dispute with them and to oppose the role of any outside force in such matters. It was this insistence for bilateralism that explains India’s initial reluctance to the idea of South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC). Such an approach of India, however, went against its neighbours’ natural preference for multilateralism while dealing with India. The neighbouring states of India, given the asymmetrical power balance between them and India, generally found it more comfortable to deal with India through multilateralism as it helps them to collectively offset any hegemonic imposition of India.
The result of such approaches was the gradual drifting away of its neighbours from India. Moreover, it helped in the formation of negative impressions among the neighbours about India as a selfish hegemon which wanted to maximise its power at the cost of its neighbours (Behuria et al., 2012, p. 231). The apprehensions among the neighbours concerning economic and political domination by India were to a large extent inherent in the asymmetry between them and India. However, such apprehensions were further reinforced and buttressed by India’s neglect towards the neighbours, over emphasis on security and insistence on bilateralism which allowed outside powers to exploit the anti-India feeling of the neighbours against India’s interests. As a consequence, the ties between India and its neighbours despite all the compulsions and potentialities remained poor and bereft of any cooperative and fruitful engagement.
However, with changing political, strategic and economic configurations of the post-Cold War period, India has moved to recast its foreign policy approach towards its neighbours. The end of East–West rivalry relieved India from much of its security anxiety. On the other hand, with the neo-liberal ascendency and liberalisation of Indian economy, economic issues became a priority for India in its relations with other states. Moreover, it is during this period that India began to pursue with more vigour its ambition for great power status. All these factors combined together to bring its neighbouring countries to the forefront of India’s foreign policy calculations. This was evident in the numerous statements both on the part of foreign policy establishment and academicians. For instance, Raja Mohan and S. D. Muni argued that for India, ‘achieving the objective of becoming one of the principal powers of Asia will depend entirely on India’s ability to manage its own immediate neighbourhood’ (Muni & Mohan, 2004, p. 318). Vajpayee, the former Prime Minister echoed the same when he declared that ‘[f]riends can change but not neighbours who have to live together’ (Malone, 2011, p. 102). Similarly, the Foreign Ministry couched the matter as follows ‘with the objective of a peaceful, stable and prosperous neighbourhood India continues to attach the highest priority to close and good neighbourly political, economic and cultural relations with its neighbours (ibid., p. 103). It is with such realisation that India has started privileging its neighbours in its foreign policy schemes by adopting more accommodative approaches towards them. Since then, the guiding principle of India’s neighbourhood policy seems to be ‘first establish yourself in your neighbourhood by privileging the neighbourhood in your foreign policy scheme and strengthening or winning trust and confidence in both areas of strength and areas of problematical, or even bad, relations’ (ibid., p. 4). Building on policy postures like ‘Gujral doctrine’ which emphasised on non-reciprocal accommodation, India has sought to engineer a marked improvement in its relation with its neighbours. Close economic cooperation among the South Asian countries has come to be considered as a precondition for ensuring and sustaining economic developments of India through globalisation of the Indian economy. The message from India towards its neighbours is a clear look upon India as an opportunity and not as a threat (Saran, 2008, p. 2). India has extended such effort to forge close economic cooperation even with regard to its extended neighbourhood through Look East Policy and various other sub-regional initiatives. Such revamping of India’s neighbourhood policy will not only help India to serve its different political, strategic and economic objectives but will also have far reaching consequences for the developmental prospect of Northeast India.
India’s Neighbourhood Policy and Concerns of Northeast
The failure of India to engage with the neighbours in a cooperative and constructive manner has contributed to India’s political instability and security anxiety and has also undermined the prospect of development by escalating the defence budget. The adverse impact of such poorly cultivated relation with the neighbours, however, is most pronounced in the case of Northeast India. The peculiar geo-strategic, political and economic situation has made the development of Northeast conditional upon the transnational regional cooperation involving India and its immediate and extended neighbours. India’s neighbourhood policy, devoid of any strategy to link national diplomacy and regional concerns, has failed to provide this much needed push to the Northeast so that it can overcome the existing predicaments of instability and underdevelopment.
India’s Northeast—The Making of a Hinterland
India’s Northeast, comprising the state of Assam, Meghalaya, Tripura, Mizoram, Manipur, Nagaland and Arunachal Pradesh, is spread over an area of 2.55 lakhs sq. km accounting for 7.8 per cent of the total land mass of India and 3.73 per cent of India’s population. The Northeast region shares less than 2 per cent of its borders with the rest of the country and 98 per cent with four Asian countries—China, Myanmar, Bhutan and Bangladesh. The defining features of India’s Northeast is its underdevelopment as well as its peripheral character—geographic, economic and cultural. However, creation of this region as a periphery was a construct of political cartography.
Prior to the partition, there was no concept of a separate Northeast region as it was closely linked with adjoining areas of East Bengal, Burma and Tibet (Bhaumik, 1998). For instance,
Many parts of Manipur (Kuki and Tangkhul Naga areas), Lushai and Naga Hills had direct links with Burma, where many of their ethnic kin live. The Khasi, Jaintia and Garo Hills maintained close relations with Sylhet, the Lushai Hills with Chittagong Hill Tracts and Tripura with Comilla, Noakhali and Sylhet. (Haokip, 2015, pp. 97–98)
For centuries, the region with its rich resources had attracted merchants from lands as far as Armernia, Afghan, Shan, China and Europe (Cederlof, 2014, p. 2). The Northeast was home to an ‘extraordinary mixing of different races, cultures, languages, and religious, leading to a diversity rarely seen elsewhere in India’ (Bhaumik, 2009, p. 1).
Its present peripheral condition, in fact, is the product of colonial and post-colonial geo-politics (Brahma, 2010, p. 18). The demarcation of borders in the region was at first attempted by the East India Company, from the late eighteenth century, and during this period ‘different and competing borders were claimed by officers, regional rulers, landlords and local lords’ (Cederlof, 2014, pp. 5–12). It has been ascertained that as the ‘British became firmly entrenched in Assam and their commercial interests expanded’ which ‘necessitated control over the frontier region’ (Bhaumik, 2009, p. 5). In the aftermath of the First Anglo-Burmese War, the Burmese were expelled from Assam and Manipur; and the British annexed lower Assam. Upper Assam was annexed in 1838. In 1873, the British implemented the Inner Line Regulations, which allowed the people to manage their own affairs while at the same time, marking the extent of revenue administration of the British in the region. In 1874,
the Bengali dominated Sylhet and Cachar districts, the Garo and the Khasi–Jaintia Hills, the Naga Hills and the district of Goalpara were all brought within Assam. Between 1895 and 1898, the north and south Lushai Hills and a portion of the Chittagong Hill Tracts were .. added to Assam. (Bhaumik, 2009, p. 7)
The kingdoms of Manipur and Tripura were not annexed but they had to pay tax to the British. Subsequently, the British imposed a unique set of administrative organisation in the region covering the hills and the plains such as ‘backward tract’, ‘excluded areas’ and ‘partially excluded areas’ which turned the region into a frontier.
The partition of India further severed the traditional arteries of communication of Northeast with the countries’ heartland, virtually reducing it to a landlocked region. The pre-independence inland water, road and railway communications through erstwhile East Bengal were disrupted. The region became isolated from the rest of the country except the tenuous connection through the Siliguri corridor (Haokip, 2015, p. 98). As B. G. Verghese puts it, ‘If imperial politics distanced the North East from its trans-border neighbourhood further east, partition in 1947 all but physically separated the Northeast from the Indian heartland’ (Verghese, 2004, p. 2). The region’s recent history as a remote, underdeveloped and troubled hinterland, therefore Sanjib Baruah argues, is neither inevitable nor unchangeable—it is a product of colonial and post-colonial construction (Baruah, 2004, p. 3). The Chinese takeover of Tibet and the virtual closure of the border with Myanmar further intensified the isolation of the region.
Moreover, British policies enabled the entry of people from outside the region. Labourers from West Bengal, Orissa, Jharkhand, Tamil Nadu, Kerala, etc. were brought to work in the tea gardens of Assam (Kalita, 2007, p. 11). Educated Bengalis migrated to man the colonial administrative functions and Nepalese, Marwaris and Biharis arrived to avail other economic avenues unleashed by the colonial administration. Bengali Muslim peasants from East Bengal came in search of land which created pressure on resources of Assam (Guha, 2006, p. 166). Such migration continued in the post-colonial period.
The geographical insularity of the region was further reinforced by the British who exploited the economy of the Northeast by extracting its resources. They removed local barriers to trade which allowed people from the rest of the country to acquire mineral rights, timber, lands and set up saw mills, coal business and other extractive enterprises in the region (Haokip, 2015, p. 99). Thus profit from tea plantation, mining, timber, oil exploration and refinement, etc. were appropriated by foreign and national capitalists without leaving anything for the region. In the post-independence period, there were no industries set up in the region whereas a number of industries were established outside the region to manufacture goods out of raw materials produced in Assam. The few industries set up in Assam in the post-independence period had no link with the local economy which led to the rise of extractive industries based on raw materials available in the region and developed by foreign capital. The region was thus converted from a frontier during British rule to an internal periphery in the post-independence period and the thesis of a ‘colonial hinterland’ was advanced to highlight the core–periphery relation between national economy and that of the region (Mishra, 2006, p. 51). Such economic underdevelopment was partly responsible for the insurgency problem in the Northeast. Insurgency is also sustained by the support of some of India’s neighbours. Thus, to tackle insurgency, there is a need for economic development of the region by overcoming its landlocked status; and a need to destroy safe havens across borders; both of which require transnational solutions.
Breaking the Territorial Trap of Northeast India: Role of India’s Neighbourhood Policy
Thus, in order to solve many of the problems that Northeast is facing today, it must exit the ‘territorial trap’ and connect with its transnational neighbourhood (Baruah, 2004, p. 3). However, India’s neighbourhood policy so far has largely failed to address this concern of Northeast. In fact, India’s over emphasis on security while dealing with its neighbours has effectively sealed the possibility of developing any cooperative and constructive ties with them. Moreover, such policy has also informed the other state-led developmental actions in this region as a state-centric traditional security perception tends to consider the border region as vulnerable to external threats (Das, 2012, p. 3). As Sanjib Baruah has observed:
In the post independence period the state of diplomatic relation between India and its neighbour turned Northeast into a “sensitive border region” requiring special attention based on national security concerns which has not been conducive to the region’s economic and political well being. (Baruah, 2005, p. 214)
The notion of ‘Asian solidarity’ which informed the initial foreign policy orientation of India towards its neighbours was fully compatible with the security and developmental concern of India in general and the Northeast in particular as the idea emphasised the need for close cooperation among the post-colonial societies for future progress (Das, 2012, p. 5). Asianism as an element of India’s foreign policy had a built in promise for the landlocked and isolated Northeast. However, this idea of ‘Asianism’ soon crumbled under the weight of sharpening of conflicting interests between India and Pakistan and China. India’s war with Pakistan and China put the last nail on the coffin of the Asian solidarity movement. With the end of Asianism and intensification of hostile relations with Pakistan and China, the Northeast’s traditional market in East Pakistan remained inaccessible and the internal security scenario of Northeast became extremely sensitive as they started sheltering and nourishing different insurgent groups of Northeast. This fast deteriorating security environment had a negative bearing on the developmental prospect of the region.
The liberation of Bangladesh on the one hand reduced some of India’s security concerns and on the other hand created prospects for the development of Northeast India by re-establishing some of northeast’s traditional markets and communication networks with Bangladesh. Moreover, with the emergence of a friendly Bangladesh, the prospect for resolution of the problem of influx of people from erstwhile East Pakistan to the Northeast and eliminating the external support base of insurgency groups operating in the region appeared bright. In fact, opening up of overland trade brought some relief to the Northeast. Mineral products and forest products from Meghalaya, Mizoram and Tripura found ready markets in Bangladesh which otherwise would not have been cost effective (Das, 2012, p. 10).
Similarly, India’s relations with Myanmar have serious implications for the Northeast as its people bear ethno-cultural affinity with Myanmar besides having traditional trade links. However, barring the initial warm phase, the relations between India and Myanmar largely remained cold. Instead of taking a proactive role, India remained a mute spectator to the emerging Sino-Myanmar economic and political collaborations. India’s disengagement in Myanmar and its failure to evolve any counter-strategy not only harmed India’s business interests in Myanmar, but also escalated the internal insecurity of Northeast and blocked its prospects for development (Das, 2012, p. 12). The creation of SAARC once again enhanced the prospect of addressing Northeast’s developmental concerns. SAARC has the potential to restore Northeast’s traditional market link and communication channels. The creation of SAARC Preferential Trade Arrangement (SAPTA) has tremendous potentiality in this regard. But due to India’s initial reluctance and lack of proactive initiatives and conflicting bilateral relations between its members, the potentiality of SAARC has remained underutilised.
Post-Cold War Changes in India’s Neighbourhood Policy: Implications for the Northeast
In response to the changing realities of the post-Cold War era, India has also moved to recast its foreign policy approach. Such reformulation of India’s foreign policy could also be seen in case of its neighbourhood policy having direct bearing on the security and development of the Northeast. Such changes have been both bilateral and transnational in nature. A result of India’s new foreign policy orientation towards its neighbours is the development of India’s Look East policy, now called the Act East Policy. The economic reforms, growing trends towards globalisation and regionalism, slow pace of integration within South Asia and concerns about a rising China and its growing influence have led India to initiate the Look East Policy to seek deeper bilateral and transnational strategic and economic engagement with the Southeast Asian and East Asian countries.
The Look East Policy of India reflects the pragmatism and priority of economic issues that have come to inform India’s new foreign policy both at the global level in general and towards its neighbours in particular. The Look East Policy of India is pregnant with the possibility of development of Northeast region. As Gurudas Das has argued:
Being completely land locked, positioned at the periphery of national geography, history and culture, far away from the market centres and surrounded by neighbouring countries of Bhutan, Bangladesh, China, and Myanmar, development interest of this region will be better served if she is positioned in a broader canvass of East and Southeast Asia rather than remaining completely blindfolded towards them. (Das, 2012, p. 29)
In fact, the geographical contiguity, civilisation and cultural link, existence of traditional trade relations and complementary nature of economic resources between Northeast India and Southeast Asian countries make it compelling for closer economic integration between them. The off repeated statement that ‘Southeast Asia begins where Northeast India ends’ reflects the continuities of social, cultural and psychological bonds between Northeast India and Southeast Asia (Gogoi, 2010, p.1).It is in this context that the Look East Policy has created the possibility of breaking the landlocked condition of Northeast by way of opening to the markets of neighbouring countries across the border.
India tried to engineer a rapprochement with China and they have succeeded in intensifying their political and economic relations. Despite these improvements, tensions still prevail in their mutual relations. In fact, the security and development of Northeast has been caught in the cross fire of Sino-Indian rivalry for regional power (Das, 2012, p. 18). As it is the case with China, India’s relation with Myanmar also improved in this period as India began to adopt a more pragmatic approach to Myanmar. A border trade agreement was signed in 1994 allowing trade to flow through selected customs post along Moreh (Manipur)–Tamu (Myanmar) sectors. India has already constructed the Tamu–Kalemayo road in 2001 which is expected to be a part of proposed Asian Highway Project and once it materialises, it will remove the communication bottleneck of the landlocked states of Manipur, Mizoram and Nagaland (Dhar, 2000). Moreover, such cooperation also improved the security environment of Northeast as collaborative efforts of security forces of India and Myanmar forced many of the insurgent groups of the Northeast to shift their bases from Myanmar. Similarly, Indo-Bangladesh relations also showed signs of improvement during this period. Already a series of irritants between them have been overcome and their trade and commerce relations including Northeast India–Bangladesh border trade have grown. However, the transit facilities through, being a major interest of land locked Northeast, have not yet materialised.
Besides these bilateral approaches, some multilateral initiatives have also been cultivated to realise the goals of cooperation among India and its eastern neighbours envisaged under the Look East Policy. For instance, multilateral initiatives like the Bay of Bengal initiative for Multi-Sectoral Technical and Economic Cooperation (BIMSTEC) was formed in 1997 and it consists of India, Bangladesh, Thailand, Sri Lanka, Myanmar, Nepal and Bhutan. All members of the BIMSTEC are to cooperate to promote the 14 priority areas identified by the organisation. India is the lead country for Transport and Communication, Tourism, Environment and Disaster Management and Counter Terrorism and Transnational Crime. The other areas include Cultural Cooperation (Bhutan), Energy (Myanmar), Trade and Investment (Bangladesh), Agriculture (Myanmar), Poverty Alleviation (Nepal), Technology (Sri Lanka), Fisheries (Thailand), Public Health (Thailand), People-to-People Contact (Thailand) and Climate Change (Bangladesh).
Another important sub-regional organisation is the Bangladesh-China-India-Myanmar Forum(BCIM) Forum which consists of geographically adjacent areas including the north-eastern states of India, southern provinces of China, Bangladesh and Myanmar. It aims to promote regional cooperation on the development of infrastructure, and thus stresses on transport connectivity for increased movement of people and goods and to realise the tourism potential of the area. Such regional organisations have the potential to increase the economic competence of the region and thus deliver manifold socio-economic goods to the area. The BCIM would be valuable for the Northeast due to the complementarities of the goals of ‘developing and opening up an economically backward and landlocked region’ of Northeast India and ‘engaging China in its own parallel effort to unlock the potential of its relatively backward western regions’ (Uberoi, 2016, p. 87). Such mutual interests would be well served and would act as a harbinger of greater overall cooperation between New Delhi and Beijing as well as with Dhaka and Yangon. Such cooperation would offset the ‘China Threat’ which has led to paranoia in India with regard to building new connectivity in the region (Rana, 2016, p. 115).
Opportunities and Challenges of Linking Northeast India via India’s Act East Policy
The strategy of developing Northeast India through the Look East Policy is ridden with a number of opportunities as well as challenges. With regard to the opportunities it may be argued that there can be several constructive outcomes apart from breaking the territorial trap for the northeast region and for India as a whole, if the Act East Policy which can be interpreted as a twenty-first century strategy for the development of the Northeastern region is pursued and transnational links and cooperation with India’s eastern neighbours are materialised. It would lead to laudable achievements for the Northeast as well as help in achieving goals of peace, security and cooperation with countries sharing India’s borders which underlies India’s overall policy towards it neighborhood. First, transnational solutions of linking the Northeast with Bangladesh and Southeast Asia would not only help develop the economy of the Northeast which in itself would be a response to the constant harking of insurgent groups of the exploitation and economic underdevelopment of the region, but would also help alleviate insurgency by tackling it in a more holistic manner. For instance, insurgents in Manipur, Assam and Nagaland have their tentacles in the neighbouring countries from where they receive training, financial and material support; a transnational solution which includes coordinated effort by India and its neighbours would be better equipped to dismantle such groups and such cooperative solutions would help generate a culture of trust and confidence between the governments of India and its neighbours.
Moreover, until now the Northeast of India ‘… is the only region in the country whose development is the specific mandate of a department of the national government. Enormous public resources are being spent in trying to bridge the region’s development incentives for investing in the region’ (Baruah, 2009, p. 1). Since such a national level arrangement has not been able to deliver the required development of the region and neither has it been able to provide stability and peace, a transnational arrangement wherein Myanmar, Bangladesh, southwest China and northeast India are united in effort and unified policies are made to cover these contiguous regions would perhaps be better positioned to engender development of the region as a whole.
With regard to the regulation, protection and use of resources of forests, rivers and other environment-related concerns which are cross-border in nature, transnational solutions and management is best suited under the rubric of sub-regional bodies like the Mekong Ganga Cooperation Initiative (MGC), launched in 2000, consisting of countries of the two river systems—Cambodia, India, Laos, Myanmar, Thailand and Vietnam. The MGC aims to promote cooperation among member states in the fields of tourism, education, culture, communication and transportation. China’s absence in this group is conspicuous given its role as the country where the headwaters of Mekong lie. Cooperation between India and China is essential for solving problems related to cross-border issues as well as bringing about amicable resolutions of more outstanding concerns which continue to plague the relationship of these two countries. A fusion of the Greater Mekong Sub-region project (which includes China) and the MGC could perhaps lead to arrangements which are more comprehensive in manner.
In addition, approaching the problems of the Northeast and the contiguous regions across the political borders in a transnational manner would enable India and her neighbours to cultivate cross-border cooperation by forging a web of links that would ‘deepen shared interests and raise mutual stakes in maintenance of that cooperation’ which would help in the overall improvement of ties between these countries which would strengthen stability and peace in this region (Rana, 2016, p. 116). Such transnational solutions would transform the meaning so far attributed to the borders of India especially the ones along the Northeast region as barriers and markers of isolation and instead turn them into ‘potential connectors, even bridges for an evolving, cooperative paradigm of cross-frontier relationships’ instead of continuing to act as (ibid., p. 116).
Yet another significant achievement which can be assured by including the Northeast as an integral part and component of India’s Look East Policy is that the issue of ‘us and them’, ‘Northeast and rest of India’ and accusations for exploitation, ignorance, indifference about faulty implementation of policies, and … all components of the neglect narrative’ could be addressed if the Northeast is given a stake and role in the Look East Policy which would lead to the rise of the role and significance of the region in the context of India’s foreign policy (Dutta, 2009, p. 134). By giving a prominent role to the Northeast in India’s Look East Policy on account of its distinctive geographical and cultural setting would imply that New Delhi was acquiescent of the Northeast’s uniqueness as well as would endow the Northeast with a major role in the overall foreign policy of India which could help allay fears of disregard and neglect which persists among the people of the region.
Despite these abovementioned possibilities, the Look East Policy so far has failed to bring any noticeable benefits to Northeast India. As far as positioning Northeast in India’s Look East Policy is concerned, the main challenge is how to move towards the East through Northeast. There are several impediments to the realisation of the projects associated with the Look East Policy underway in Northeast India, which need to be overcome for the transnational projects in the Northeast and Southeast Asia to benefit the Northeast region. For instance, historically, India’s relation with South East Asian countries has been maritime rather than continental with states like Orissa, Andhra Pradesh, Gujarat and Tamil Nadu having had economic and political connections with Southeast Asia via the sea since the remote past (Baru, 2000, p. 21). The continental route that passes through Northeast and links India with Southeast Asia because of security problems and hostile terrain is not considered safe and cost effective. There are also some arguments for the Look East Policy(LEP) to bypass the Northeast and instead aim to connect India with Vietnam across the Bay of Bengal through Thailand given the robust nature of India–Vietnam ties (Chatterjee, 2014, p. 4). In addition, paucity of industries in Myanmar as well as in Northeast India, unstable and tenuous border trade, corruption, abundance of checkpoints between Moreh and Imphal and poor banking sector in Moreh act as impediments to Moreh and other conceived border haats from benefitting from the trade envisaged under the LEP (Goswami, 2009, pp. 13–14). Furthermore, the construction of the infrastructural links which are underway in Northeast India are mostly transboundary in nature which makes it dependent on the pace of construction in Myanmar as well as Bangladesh which in turn is reliant on India’s relations with these countries as well as the political, economic and social stability of both these nations (Bhaumik, 2014, p. 27). India’s transboundary links with Bangladesh are at times hostage to bilateral issues between the two countries like the issue of illegal immigrants, river water sharing issues and the tumultuous equation between New Delhi and Dhaka especially when the BNP comes into power in Bangladesh (ibid., p. 21). Another major impediment of the routes envisaged under the LEP with regard to linking Northeast with Bangladesh and Southeast Asia pertain to issues of lack of infrastructure, lack of local support, absence of provisions for trade in agricultural goods as well as the fear that the traditional way of livelihood of the region and the ecosystem would not be protected (Karthikeyan, 2009, p. 13).
Moreover, the existence of various insurgencies and demands for statehood among several groups all along Northeast India, especially in the border areas, renders the region through which the lifelines of the LEP are being envisioned extremely volatile, unpredictable and unattractive for potential investors (Bhaumik, 2014). Other issues plaguing the realisation of the developmental projects in the region include the fears of opening up the Stilwell road which was a part of the ancient Southern Silk route which ‘followed the course of the ancient route that linked the Upper Irrawady and the Chindwin region to Assam’ and had been used by Singpho, Shan, Naga and other hill people prior to 1947 to traverse the region has now fallen into disuse (Phukan, 2003, pp. 38–39). The opening of the Stilwell could re-link these regions but it is feared that re-opening of the Stillwell road may help insurgencies instead of leading to benefits for the region (Gogoi, 2003).
Moreover, insurgent groups like National Socialist Council of Nagaland Isak-Muivah, United Liberation Front of Assam (NSCN) (IM) or the ULFA, the National Democratic Front of Bodoland (NDFB), the Harkat-ul- Jehadi-e-Islami (HuJI), the United Peoples’ Democratic Solidarity and the Dima Halam Daogah among others function all along the Northeast and have often levied taxes on business houses and extorted money from common people while the state has been unable to provide basic security to the people, thus it is also believed that transnational borders as envisaged under the LEP would further weaken the already tenuous grasp of the state on Northeastern territory which would compound the problems of small arms, free cash and luxury goods flowing in from East Asia (Goswami, 2009, p. 15).
Groups like the United National Liberation Front of Manipur (UNLF) and the Kuki National Liberation Front (KNLF) in Myanmar, bordering Moreh, often unleaded violence along the Indo-Myanmar border and extorted money from the local traders on NH-39 which would eventually become the Asian Highway which is being planned to connect India to Southeast Asia. Such notorious presence of these groups augurs poorly for the proposed Asian Highway as they could then hold hostage the goods and people using this Highway which would then lead to major economic and political calamities between nations (Goswami, 2009). It was also noted that such connective links would promote greater cooperation among insurgents who were sustained by havens across borders. However, others argued that sans such links underdevelopment would continue unfettered which would consequently lead to greater disillusionment which would ‘.. feed insurgency, the effects of which would be much greater than allowing few insurgents to pass through the highways’ (Baruah, 2004, p. 25).
Challenges related to the ethnic situation of the region were also raised by some scholars. They opined that since the ethnic insurgents of the region were against goods from rest of India, they would also be against international goods which would find markets in the region once the cross-border trade links materialised and it was also asserted that greater market access may lead to greater cheap labour flows from across the borders, which would not be welcome in the region already marred by conflicts over ‘foreigners’ issue (Das, n.d.). Furthermore, instead of improving the situation, the transborder links may ignite new kinds of chasms in the region. This include the provision for greater sharing of agonies of kin on either side of the border thereby igniting their distaste towards the state and the problems which may arise due to comparison of people on either side of the borders as they are not at the same level of development (ibid.). It was also mentioned that despite huge funding from the centre, the infrastructure and the overall level of development of the state was abysmal and thus it was claimed that it remained uncertain whether any possible transboundary trade as envisioned under the LEP could alleviate the dismal economic situation in the Northeast given its lack of physical and human infrastructure (Goswami, 2009, p. 19). It has also been stressed that plans under the LEP were couched in the language of development but in actuality signalled the coming together of elite corporate global actors and the state, who are using the idea of development and transnational border trade to erode ethnically protected, community owned cultural and natural resources (ibid., p. 13).
In order to face these challenges, the ethnic component of the region, the fragile ecosystem of the region, the scourge of insurgency, the lack of human and physical infrastructure, the need for modernisation of the land customs stations and creating more food testing laboratories need to be factored into any developmental work ensuing in and across the region. Restrictions like limited trading items ‘identified for formal border trade’, inner line permit and restricted area permits, should be carefully re-considered within the larger ambit of other security parameters of the region (Chakraborty & Ray, 2014, p. 307). Roads, rails, flight and water transport arrangements should be increased in sync with the environment in the Northeast region prior to engaging in cross-border developmental work. The report taken out by the Ministry of Development of North Eastern Region (DONER) Ministry which recommended setting up of special economic zones (SEZs) in the region to boost the sale of the unique products of Northeast India and the need in Northeast India for a scheme similar to the existing Towns of Export Excellence (TEE) wherein towns having export potential received support from the central government are useful suggestions towards developing the region in a holistic manner (Government of India, 2011, pp. 3–8).
Conclusion
For the Act East Policy to deliver constructive results, the Northeast region ought to be given the reigns of development of the area and some inspiration could be drawn from the manner in which Yunnan, which is a landlocked region of south-west China, was allowed to pursue foreign relations with its bordering countries to bring about economic prosperity to its region. Such sub-national diplomacy suits the Northeast given the fact that it has a shared historical past with its neighbouring countries, making the Northeast more uniquely poised than the centre to conduct transboundary issues with the neighbouring countries. Such avenues are explored by the Agartala Doctrine, recently released by the Government of Tripura, a state which has since before independence had a bearing on the conduct of India–Bangladesh relations (Bhaumik, 2016). Thus, India’s neighbourhood policy should seek to factor in the development of the Northeast region of India by insisting on connecting it to Bangladesh and Southeast Asia, albeit after ensuring that prevailing ethnic space of the locals is not diminished, the objects of development are the people and economy of the region and after ensuring that the local stakeholders are consulted on matters pertaining to policies affecting the region.