Low Carbon Technologies for Our Cities of Future: Examining Mechanisms for Successful Transfer and Diffusion

Abstract

The urge to adopt the proceedings at the recently concluded COP-21 with a binding legal status is indicative of the fact that nations now realise the seriousness of the issue, alike. The international community is just paving way for a low carbon, energy efficient planet. Rapid urbanisation has led to overpopulated cities that demand better quality of life for its residents. On the one hand, there is a global urge to reduce greenhouse gas emissions and on the other hand, the world is moving towards a ‘smart’ future. Both these suppositions are interspersed by a common goal of sustainable development. Alternately, the discussion tends to focus on use of clean energy technologies. Cities will be at the centre of this unique and unprecedented challenge. This research seeks to explore the role that city governance plays in climate mitigation and adaptation at the global level. Furthermore, the article examines and evaluates low carbon technology as a choice to be inculcated in encountering climate change hazards and essentially looks into the modus operandi of the transfer and diffusion of low carbon/clean energy technologies.

Keywords

Cities climate mitigation and adaptation low carbon technologies technology transfer and diffusion

Introduction

An unstoppable worldwide effort is underway to combat climate change where nations pledge to meet the objective of keeping the global rise in temperature under 2°C. Climate conditions are undoubtedly driven and intrinsically tied by the ways in which we build and run our cities. Naturally, cities are under the immediate threat resulting from the impacts of climate change and, therefore, need to act. With the recent ‘smart cities’ concept in vogue over and across the globe, it is interesting to note the responsibilities of the local governments to deal with the pressing issue of climate change. The article discusses the role of cities in general and does not refer to any specific city in a specific continent. Technology facilitation mechanism can be seen to play an important role in this. The draft text of the recently concluded COP-21 in Article 7 mandates cooperative action on technology development and transfer through improving endogenous capacities and enabling environments and specifically addressing, recognising and overcoming the barriers to the transfer of safe, appropriate and environmentally and socially sound technologies. Currently, there are major inequalities among countries in accessing technologies and finance. For example, 2010 had a record US$243 billion global investment in clean energy. However, only 10 per cent of these investments occurred outside of the G20 countries (UNDP, 2013). In most cases, the developing nations are yet to acquire the right kind of technologies and assistance in terms of development and facilitation. On the one hand, there is a global urge to reduce greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions and on the other hand, the world is moving towards a ‘smart’ future. Both these suppositions are interspersed by a common goal of sustainable development. Alternately, the discussion tends to focus on use of clean energy technologies. Local governments are uniquely empowered to address a range of activities that directly contribute to climate mitigation, from land use to electricity consumption (Outka & Feiock, 2012). The mostly ‘unprecedented’ local engagement with the global climate mitigation is widely considered to be both ‘perplexing’ as well as encouraging (Flatt, 2008). Scholars despite being skeptical about potentials of local governments in dealing with climate mitigation, recognise local efforts as significant in their ‘capacity to trigger regulation by others more than in the absolute amount of greenhouse gases these initiatives actually succeed in reducing’ (Engel, 2006). Scholars are also of the view that local governance programmes can facilitate compliance with a federal programme by reducing the overall cost of a given level of nationwide emissions reduction (Snyder & Binder, 2009). With ‘smart cities’ sprawling up at a catalytic speed, the legal authority of local governments to advance climate mitigation goals is an issue that needs to be seriously scrutinised. National adaptation plans are assuming a central policymaking role in many countries (Gremellion, 2011). Adaptation to climate mitigation requires more responsive local institutions. Cities in a wide-ranging spectrum reveal a three-fold link with issues concerning climate change. First, with a high level of energy consumption, concentration of economic activities and burning of fossil fuels, cities tend to be the cause of global climate change (Reid et al., 2007). Second, with rise in the number of urban dwellers, and subsequent concentration of man-made infrastructure, cities are also vulnerable to various local manifestations of climate change impacts, for example, sea-level rise, tropical cyclones, flooding and landslides, water crisis, and heat and cold waves (Bigio, 2002). Third, it is in cities where we find a higher concentration of resources and expertise (Roy, 2009). Adaptation necessarily involves some form of technology or another. Technology is not just a manifestation of materials or equipment, but diverse forms of knowledge. With the development and adoption of various climate change action plans by cities, a need for a mechanism to facilitate research and expert knowledge is felt. This will contribute to the development and effective implementation of urban climate change policies and programmes (Rosenweig, 2011). Cities will be at the centre of this unique and unprecedented challenge (ibid.). Cities need to deal with political and fiscal empowerment at the local level with specific emphasis on mitigation measures and mechanisms. This can rather be challenging with the state of confusion that prevails with the existence of multiple jurisdictions among cities, metropolitan regions, states and nations. To address this challenge, the article proposes the need for a science based policymaking that will delineate jurisdictional powers based on infrastructural functionality. Through this basic understanding of the needs of cities in being resilient towards climate change hazards, it is proposed that cities adopt efficient low carbon technologies in their efforts to reduce carbon emissions and contribute to global climate change patterns. This adoption will have two significant aspects—the development of new innovative capacity in low carbon technologies and the diffusion of these technologies (Shujing, 2012). The first aspect is dependent on a number of factors which enable and empower nations to innovate such technologies on their own. These factors range from sound capital investments to efficient and state of the art infrastructure and excellent R&D facilities. The second aspect is largely dependent on technology transfer mechanisms. In the case of the transfer of low carbon technology, the economic benefits are associated with the mitigation of the future costs associated with climate change (Ockwell & Lovett, 2005). With the goal of making significant contributions to reducing carbon emissions, cities have adopted Climate Action Plans (CAPs), which outline the measures they intend to take to reduce their carbon footprint (Dolan et al., 2010). Such measures frequently address transportation, land use, air quality, waste management, water conservation, energy resources and building energy efficiency (ibid.).

This research article is divided into four major sections. The first part introduces the reader to the potential challenges that cities today face in awe of unusual climatic conditions predominating across the globe. In the light of recent talks concluded at the COP-21, there has been a resolute shift in arriving at a unanimous resolution agreeing to engage cities into climate mitigation process at the global level through an efficient system of governance in place.

However, the more important question here is why do cities have a role to play and how is this task to be executed. The second part essentially probes into these inquisitions.

Having understood the exigencies and obligations of cities in addressing global climate change, and explored the pathway to where the solution lies, it was essential to scrutinise the solution that we proposed. The third part examines and evaluates low carbon technology as a choice to be inculcated in encountering climate change hazards.

The fourth part delves into the modus operandi of the transfer and diffusion of low carbon technology in the light of various international legal instruments. The key challenge in this respect is that low carbon sustainable technologies need to be adopted both by developed as well as developing countries.

The next part looks into how intellectual property (IP) fosters the transfer and diffusion of low carbon technologies. Compulsory licensing for low carbon technologies has been explored as a viable mechanism towards facilitating such technologies across the globe.

Finally, the authors draw to close the argument by establishing a link in the chain of events that take place and suggest a mechanism to be adopted at the local level.

How and Why Cities Matter for Climate Change

Prior to answering the how of the matter, it would be convenient to look into why. It is true that cities are responsible for the world’s energy related GHG emissions. Simultaneously, one cannot be oblivious to the fact that cities are instrumental in reducing GHG emissions through the adoption of various mechanisms and policy programmes at the local level. Building resilience and adapting to climate change is increasingly a high priority for cities. A municipality is the first line of defence in preparing for weather disasters, given the relationship a local government bears to land use, infrastructure, and public health and safety (McArdle, 2014). Moreover, climate change is not just environmental. It interacts with distinct areas of substantive law at multiple levels. With the ever growing trends of urbanisation, cities become important sites for mitigation and adaptation. Their land use planning aids in the determination of per capita emissions and preparedness for changes in the physical environment (Osofsky, 2014). With cities coming together to form voluntary networks to address important issues of climate change, they can come a long way in making a lasting impact on national governments, and thus being involved in the decision-making at the national and global level. As localities increasingly take actions within their power to mitigate (and also adapt), academics and policymaking institutes have considered the appropriate role of local action in addressing climate change (Ewing et al., 2008). Cities are particularly threatened by the impacts of climate change and thus have an incentive to act (VoneLehe, 2011). Cities also hold, individually and in aggregate, a vast suite of powers and influence over GHGs (ibid.). Cities are also particularly vulnerable to climate change—both because extreme weather events can be especially disruptive to complex urban systems and because so much of the world’s urban population live in low-lying coastal areas, particularly in Asia (OECD, 2014). Recognising and understanding the need of cities to address global climate change challenges, the ability to reduce carbon emissions will greatly depend on choices made by cities in terms of urban infrastructure, planning, policy and choice of technologies to be adopted. The active role of local governance in climate adaptation strategies will give a bottom-up approach to the entire problem. Owing to the benefits of participation of local governments in the climate change mitigation and adaptation process, the necessity and urgency of the role of a city becomes clearly evident. Local governments are in fact, key actors in the making and transformation of a sustainable city. Since local governments are closer to local residents and consumers, they are in a better position to frame nationally driven emission reduction policies at the urban level, based on their knowledge of local conditions (ibid.). Cities can also act as laboratories of social and technical innovation, and provide essential experience at the local level that could be scaled up at the national level (ibid.). In addition, local governments exercise authority over the selection of infrastructural projects at the municipal level. This gives them an edge over decision-making for land use purposes. Consequently, a range of tools is available to them to choose from, thus allowing inroads to climate resilient and low carbon technologies. Thus, cities act as policy laboratories for action on climate change. Climate change issues can therefore not be dealt in isolation of cities.

Having seen why cities are an inevitable part in the dialogue and discussion on climate change, what remains to be examined is how they contribute to the matter. Cities are at a subsidiary position in the hierarchical structure in relation to a state and national government; likewise, they operate within the national frame rather than comparatively and transnationally (ibid.). The convexity of cities operating in a global context as loci for developing increased resilience to climate change is further highlighted by the recent formation of the Medellín Collaboration on Urban Resilience at the conclusion of the 7th World Urban Forum (Andrews, 2014). The collaboration is an alliance between nine of the world’s largest UN and non-UN organisations joining forces to build urban resilience and to strengthen the social, economic and environmental fabric of the world’s urban spaces (World Urban Forum, 2014). The Medellín Collaboration on Urban Resilience, announced at the 7th World Urban Forum in Medellín, Colombia, includes the UN Human Settlements Programme (UN-Habitat); the UN Office for Disaster Risk Reduction (UNISDR); The World Bank Group; the Global Facility for Disaster Reduction and Recovery (GFDRR); the Inter-American Development Bank (IDB); the Rockefeller Foundation; 100 Resilient Cities—pioneered by the Rockefeller Foundation; the C40 Cities Climate Leadership Group; and ICLEI—Local Governments for Sustainability. Collectively, these organisations work in over 2,000 cities globally, with more than US$2 billion of existing funds committed annually towards advancing resilient and sustainable urban growth and development (Andrews, 2014). The collaboration is based on the challenges cities face in promoting sustainable urbanisation, in particular the increasing urban exposure to various shocks and stresses (ibid.). The aim of the collaboration is to facilitate the flow of knowledge and financial resources necessary to help cities become more resilient to disruptions related to climate change, disasters caused by natural hazards, and other systemic shocks and stresses, including the socio-economic challenges associated with rapid urbanisation (ibid.). Reflecting the impulse that cities share in addressing climate risks, the networks operating under the umbrella of UN organisations present a horizontal governance model (McArdle, 2014). Through the horizontal model, cities are capable of exchanging relevant knowledge and expertise on policy and ideas on climate change mitigation and adaptation through interurban dialogues. The transnational climate change networks similarly operate by creating norms, shaping policy, modelling behaviour and facilitating broader dissemination and adoption of policy related to adapting to climate risks (Resnik, 2007). These transnational, interurban networks expedite coordination and communication among cities and help them assemble critical financial and technical support (Nguyen, 2015). Furthermore, the networks help develop cities’ capacity to disseminate knowledge and methodologies, ideas, policy innovation, expertise and resources, and shape policy and problem solving on critical climate resilience issues (ibid.). Although such a model has its own limitations in that adaptability to different geopolitical conditions will depend upon a number of factors. However, looking to the brighter side, such models increase the participating cities’ resource and knowledge sharing opportunity across borders. It affords cities an opportunity to address climate change issues that are simultaneously local and global, thus calling for intergovernmental and multisectoral collaboration. This accumulated knowledge and practice can form the basis for an alternative modality of standards that governments can choose to be binding. The horizontal governance model isn’t an entirely novel experience, but with its application to climate change mitigation and adaptation programmes, it can spell success for technological advancements through the exchange of knowledge systems.

We now see how a nation’s internal political culture will affect climate change adaptation strategies at the global level. But, it must also be seen what relationships exist among different strata of jurisdictional governance in a country and its relationship to the world. The local governments are responsible for governance of municipalities and frame policies for the locality which comes under their jurisdiction. The municipal bodies are vested with a long list of functions delegated to them by state legislations. However, it is the national government with which the international community interacts.

Low Carbon Technology as a Choice

Before understanding what signifies low carbon/clean energy technologies, it would be insightful to understand the need for such technologies in the first place. Carbon-laden gases released by burning fossil fuels for buildings, transportation, industry and agriculture trap the sun’s energy and alter the atmosphere and climate in unpredictable ways (Kiefer, 2009). It takes decades between the release of carbon and its effect on the climate at the earth’s surface where we live (Meehl, et al., 2005). Carbon is also released by natural processes like the decay of vegetation and the like. This kind of release is absorbed by photosynthetic plants. Human activity has increased climate risks in the last few decades to an alarming level. The atmospheric carbon has been increased to a dangerously volatile level (ibid.). What has been done cannot be undone. However, we can try and prevent any further future harm. This problem can be resolved to a certain extent if we succeed in reducing the rate of GHG emissions. The use of low carbon, green technologies is the key solution to this problem faced by mankind. Currently, 69 per cent of global anthropogenic GHG emissions come from fossil fuels such as oil, coal and natural gas, which satisfy 81 per cent of global energy supply (IEA, 2007). The remainder of global energy is supplied by renewable energy (13 per cent) and nuclear power (6 per cent; ibid.). Stabilising GHG concentrations will therefore require large-scale and widespread substitution towards energy technologies with low to zero net GHG emissions throughout the global energy system (Reichman et al., 2008).

Technological advancement has the potential to solve many of the world’s most dire environmental problems. Investing in low carbon, climate resilient and energy efficient clean technologies has low incremental costs and multiple benefits at the local level. To encourage emissions reduction, the Kyoto Protocol (KP) introduced the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM). This mechanism encourages nations to adopt energy efficient low carbon technologies so as to reduce carbon emissions. Clean energy technology or low carbon technology as some prefer to call it, is not a very unique concept. In fact, it includes an array of renewable energy generation technologies such as solar, wind, hydro, wave and tidal, geothermal and biofuels, energy storage technologies such as fuel cells and advanced batteries, transportation technologies such as hybrid and electric vehicles, energy infrastructure technologies including smart grid, energy efficient power systems, building materials and lighting technologies, bio-based plastics and other materials, water filtration and desalination systems, technologies that reduce pollution and emissions, and even carbon trading schemes and other green policies and investment mechanisms (Lane, 2013). However, experts define clean technology by its goals and intentions (ibid.). Carbon dioxide capture and storage (CCS) technology is increasingly recognised as having critical potential to mitigate climate change (Coninck et al., 2009). Clean technology comprises a diverse range of products and services, from solar power systems to hybrid electric vehicles (HEVs), that

Harness renewable materials and energy sources or reduce the use of natural resources by using them more efficiently and productively cut or eliminate pollution and toxic wastes.

Deliver equal or superior performance compared with conventional offerings.

Provide investors, companies and customers with the promise of increased returns, reduced costs and lower prices.

Create quality jobs in management, production and deployment (Lane, 2013).

Thus, as is evident, clean technologies are to benefit the environment and mitigate climate change by generating energy through renewable sources, boosting energy efficiency and reducing GHG emissions (ibid.).

The transition towards the widespread use of green technologies should be rapid and extend throughout the world (Henry, 2010). The challenge is three-fold (ibid.):

Encouraging innovation in the field of green technologies,

Promoting the distribution of these technologies and prompting consumers to favour products and services which integrate such technologies, and

Permitting the transfer of green technologies to regions of the world which do not have the means to invest in research.

Transfer and Diffusion of Low Carbon Technology

The transfer and diffusion of clean energy, low carbon technologies pose a challenge for the international community. Access to existing technologies and technological innovations is commonly seen as a prerequisite for the reduction of emissions in developing countries (Schneider, 2008). The absence of reliable access to clean energy and the services it provides imposes a large disease burden on low-income populations and impedes prospects for development (Haines et al., 2007). Efficient technology cooperation is a means to accessing viable low carbon and energy efficient technologies (Shujing, 2012). The process of technology transfer is defined as ‘a process by which expertise or knowledge related to some aspect of technology is passed from one user to another for the purpose of economic gain’ (Ockwell & Lovett, 2005). Depending on the nature of technology and the capacity of the recipient, the process of technology transfer may be simple and straightforward but usually it is iterative, collaborative and fairly complex. In the latter case, it may require the users to acquire new information and skills and change old habits and ways of doing things. It may even require changes in the technology being transferred to improve the chances of ‘fit’ and optimal performance in the new situation. Technology transfer may happen from country to country, from industry to industry or from research laboratory to an existing or new business. It may be facilitated by financial or other types of assistance and support that may be provided by government or other agencies at national, regional, local or institutional levels. Technology transfer has three very significant dimensions to it—economic development, enhancing social welfare and environmental soundness. Ideally, technical cooperation should contribute positively to all three dimensions. There are various methods and legal arrangements through which technology may be transferred or acquired, being through sale or assignment of IP rights, MOUs, Licence contracts, know-how contracts, joint ventures, turnkey projects, foreign direct investments (FDIs) and research collaborations. There are various types of contractual relationships through which technology may be transferred. Businesses and institutions will need to evaluate on a case-by-case basis which type of relationship will be more suitable and then negotiate the specific terms to be included in the agreement. A number of market factors as well as factors that are internal to the recipient or specific to the technology in question will influence what type of agreement is reached between the two parties. The negotiation of a technology transfer contract may be a complex process and require parties to be flexible and willing to search for an agreement that will be beneficial to both parties. In the case of the transfer of low carbon technology, the economic benefits are associated with the mitigation of the future costs associated with climate change (ibid.).

Tracing the journey of the global response to climate change requires a tour of major conventions held across the globe. It begins in Rio de Janeiro, in 1992, with the conclusion of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (the UNFCCC or the ‘Framework Convention’; WIPOa, 2009). The origin of transferring sustainable energy technologies in the context of the international climate cooperation and in particular from industrialised countries to developing countries lies in Article 4.5 of the UNFCCC (Karakosta, 2010). The Article 4 states the developed country parties and other developed parties included in Annex II to take ‘all practicable steps to promote, facilitate and finance, as appropriate, the transfer of, or access to, environmentally sound technologies and know-how to other Parties, particularly developing country Parties’, and to ‘support the development and enhancement of endogenous capacities and technologies of developing country Parties’, and calls on other parties and organisations to assist in facilitating the transfer of such technologies (United Nations, 1992). The key challenge in this respect is that low carbon sustainable technologies need to be adopted both by developed as well as developing countries, which requires that developing countries avoid past unsustainable practices and being locked into old, less sustainable technologies. Instead, technology transfer should allow them to move quickly to environmentally sound and sustainable practices, institutions and technologies (Karakosta, 2010). In the context of the Marrakech Accords of 2001, a decision was adopted by the COP-7 on a framework for meaningful and effective actions to enhance the implementation of UNFCCC Article 4.5 (Gaast et al., 2009). Technology development and transfer are included as priorities in both the UNFCCC and KP. Article 4.1 of the convention requires all parties to promote and cooperate in the development, application and diffusion, including transfer, of GHG mitigation technologies (UNFCCC, 2010). The KP requires all parties to cooperate in the development, application, diffusion and transfer of environmentally sound technologies that are in the public domain (ibid.). In 1997, agreement of the KP placed the burden of reducing carbon emissions on the developed and transitioning countries responsible for the initial increase in carbon concentrations (Kim, Popp & Prag, 2013). However, With the United States’ withdrawal from the KP and a very low scale of overall emissions reductions in the industrialised countries during the first commitment period (2008–2012), it was unclear whether developing countries would regard their wealthy counterparts as having taken the lead by the time of the second commitment period (Zhang, 2007). Initiatives to help parties fulfil these commitments include the creation of an expert group on technology transfer to provide advice to parties, the establishment the Technology Information Clearing House (TTClear) by the climate change secretariat, and the preparation of technology needs assessments (TNAs) by many developing country parties (UNFCCC, 2010). Within the ambit of UNFCCC, parties have agreed to the use of a mechanism called TNA (UNDP, 2013). Through TNA, a country can identify and determine mitigation and adaptation policies. TNAs can assist countries to determine their own needs, enabling strategic decisions regarding technology and policy selection to meet their objectives (ibid.). Through the projects, countries are expected to develop a Technology Action Plan (TAP) for their technology transfer needs as well as to identify practical technologies with implementation potential (Kim, Popp & Prag, 2013).

Since the COP-7, issues about the CDM’s contribution to sustainable development have not directly been addressed in international policy negotiations but have rather been repackaged and addressed more indirectly in debates such as programmatic CDM (Olsen, 2008). Together, the UNFCCC and the KP have been major catalysts for incentivising and financing technology transfer and investments into low carbon technology in developing countries. In 2010, a Technology Mechanism was established under the Cancun Agreements. The mechanism is supported by two separate institutions: the Technology Executive Committee (TEC)—charged with advising parties on technology policy matters; and the Climate Technology Centre and Network (CTCN)—which is tasked with implementing support actions as requested by countries in regards to their technology needs (Zakkour, Scowcroft & Heidug, 2014).

The role of Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS) in the context of international technology transfer cannot be ignored. The agreement on TRIPS requires that all signatory member nations implement a minimum level of protections for Intellectual Property Rights (IPRs; Michaels, 2009). In the context of technology transfer, Article 8.2 is important as it acknowledges the necessity to prevent the resort to practices that adversely affect the international transfer of technology and at the same time has a rider, that the measures should be consistent with the provisions of TRIPS (Srinivas, 2009). The preamble to TRIPS makes explicit mention of the special needs of LDCs regarding implementation: ‘[r]ecognizing also the needs of the least-developed country Members in respect of maximum flexibility in the domestic implementation of laws and regulations in order to enable them to create a sound and viable technological base’ (Michaels, 2009). More clear and direct obligations with regard to assistance and technology transfer to LDCs are placed on developed countries by Articles 66.2 and 67 (ibid.). Article 66.2 states: ‘Developed country Members shall provide incentives to enterprises and institutions in their territories for the purpose of promoting and encouraging technology transfer to least-developed country Members in order to enable them to create a sound and viable technological base’ (ibid.). The negotiating history of Article 66.2 suggests that it was a ‘last-minute attempt by developing countries to rebalance the final [agreement]’, and that developed countries were not keen on it and ‘succeeded in limiting its scope to LDCs only’ (ibid.).

Researchers have examined and understood the barriers to technology transfer. Mostly, these barriers affect developing nations’ capacity to innovate and also prevent it from gaining access to such technologies. Import of technologies by the recipient country can prove to be a costly affair. Thus, the transfer may be affected by a lack of investment owing to poor financial mechanisms (Schneider, 2008). Frequently, a lack of access to capital hinders technology recipients from getting an investment financed (ibid.). Political barriers can impair the transfer process as well. In the absence of strong environmental policies, low carbon technologies will face restraints in the name of policy decisions and regulations. Moreover, recipient countries can make effective use of the transferred technology only if the know-how is also transferred along with it. Also, the recipient country must have resources to operate the transferred technology in the absence of geological barriers.

Intellectual Property Rights and the Transfer and Diffusion of Technology: Understanding the Debate

Ever since the UNFCCC Bali meeting in 2007, the role of the patent system in climate change discussions on technology transfer has taken centre stage (Awad, 2015). There is an ongoing discussion and debate on how the patent system can foster green innovation and promote dissemination of clean technologies on both national and international stage (ibid.). The IPRs system makes no distinction between environmentally friendly and other technologies. IPR contributes to the development and diffusion of new technologies for combating climate change as much as it does in any other innovative technology field: it encourages innovation by providing the means to generate a commercial return on investment in the development of low carbon technologies; it gives companies the confidence to license their proprietary technologies for use or further development where they are most needed (WIPO, 2009b). This section makes an analysis of how IPRs foster green innovation.

The debate is among the proponents of IPRs regime who emphasise the need of IPRs in encouraging innovation to green technologies on the one hand, and those who view intellectual property as barriers financially strapping developing countries from gaining access to such technologies (Gupta, 2011). Under the TRIPS agreement, developing and developed countries have the right—under certain circumstances—to exercise their right to emit compulsory licences (CL) for patents that have been determined necessary for the country (Karlsson, 2014). Nations that are not entirely capable of manufacturing green technologies can be benefitted if compulsory licensing for such technologies is accepted. Principally, technology transfer through compulsory licensing would speed up global green technology development by allowing companies in developing nations to begin innovating and improving on currently held patents without having to wait until the expiration of patent rights (Gupta, 2011). Article 31 of the TRIPS allows certain flexibilities for governments to issue CLs, under certain circumstances after required criteria has been met (Karlsson, 2014). The most important conditions that govern the use of compulsory licensing by WTO members are the following:

The entity (company or government) applying for a CL should have been unable to obtain a voluntary licence from the right holder on ‘reasonable’ commercial terms;

If a CL is issued, adequate remuneration must be paid to the patent holder; and a CL must be granted mainly to supply the domestic market.

However, TRIPS does not mention as to when a country can issue a CL, although it does mention national emergencies, other circumstances of extreme urgency, and anti-competitive practices as possible grounds for compulsory licensing (ibid.).

Escalating climate changes resulting in natural disasters of a grave nature, the situation can be treated as a case of ‘extreme urgency’ so as to enable grant of CLs to green technologies. IP can provide solutions if built upon the TRIPS and the Doha Declaration, with a strong emphasis on the connection between innovation and public health. Climate change conditions pose a serious threat to public health. The WHO has conducted many investigations, during an expert consultation, in connection with Rio + 20, air pollution was pointed out as a large and increasingly growing threat to public health (ibid.). Owing to lack of national capacities or fearing restraint and obstacles to FDIs, governments may avoid imposing a CL on green technologies. For major companies, the argument is based on IPR’s violation and product cost issues (Awad, 2015).

Conclusion

‘Cities’, ‘climate change’, ‘low carbon technology’ and ‘technology transfer’—at first glance, these terms may seem to have no relation to each other. However, on a close observation there seems to be something in common. We establish a relationship and a sequenced chain of events among all these entities. Cities have become the abodes of modern lifestyles. In the process of improvising the quality of life and in the mad race for development, we have somehow neglected much important issues of climate change that directly affect human health. It is unarguably established that cities have a vital role to play in the climate change debate at the international level. The mitigation and adaptation of climate resilient technologies is the key to improvising the quality of life in cities. This, in turn can be achieved when local governance is involved in decision-making processes at the global level. Since local governments are closer to local residents and consumers, they are in a better position to frame nationally driven emission reduction policies at the urban level, based on their knowledge of local conditions. In addition, local governments exercise authority over the selection of infrastructural projects at the municipal level. This gives them an edge over decision-making for land use purposes. Consequently, a range of tools is available to them to choose from, thus allowing inroads to climate resilient and low carbon technologies. Once the need to have low carbon technologies is understood, the mechanism by which it is to be accessed must be scrutinised. Through various modes of technology transfer, low carbon technologies can be accessed by countries across the globe. However, it is not as simply done. There are numerous issues and challenges that cling to the transfer mechanisms. IP is one such challenge. However, it is proposed that CLs be extended to low carbon/green technologies so as to derive the maximum benefit of it. This step would aid developing nations that are insufficient in resources and infrastructures to develop their own low carbon technologies by giving them a right to access such technologies for greater purposes of improving the quality of life of its citizens.

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