India–Canada Relations: The Nuclear Energy Aspect

Abstract

The India–Canada relationship has witnessed a number of highs and lows despite the two nations sharing common political views. This is perhaps best seen in the civil nuclear cooperation shared between the two. It is interesting to note that the relation between the two nations fractured twice due to nuclear issues in the past; today, nuclear cooperation is an important pillar, helping them to cement a new partnership. This article is an attempt to trace the civil nuclear relationship between India and Canada and to chart its future path. It has to be understood that the nuclear agreement between India and Canada is not restricted in its scope to just benefits for the two countries in developing nuclear technology and trade. It has larger economic and strategic benefits. India’s growing political and economic strength is promising. It is in Canada’s interest to pursue a closer relationship with India. It is in India’s interest to further strengthen this partnership in view of the resources and technology that Canada could provide India to achieve its development goals, especially its green agenda as ratified under the Paris Climate Change Agreement (2015).

Keywords

India–Canada relations energy security/diversification of energy mix nuclear energy civil nuclear cooperation nuclear industry Canada and uranium sale

Introduction

India and Canada share an uneven relationship. In the years following India’s independence till about 1974, cooperation between the two nations was based on India’s political stability, which was in sharp contrast to the turmoil of its neighbouring States. India’s continued commitment to the Commonwealth further cemented the foundations of a close working relationship. This period has been characterised by scholars as a time of budding ‘special relationship’ between the two Commonwealth nations. As proof, they point to the warm reception received by Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru on his maiden visit to the United States and Canada and the success of the visit to Canada, in contrast to developments with the United States. The Canadian foreign policy establishment was impressed by Prime Minister Nehru’s clear vision of the future that India wanted to experience. This was in parallel with Canada’s view that India should play an important role in Asia. By extension, it was thought, for Canada to be involved in the various political and economic aspects of South Asia, a secure relationship with India was essential. Nonetheless, by the end of the Korean War, the divergent views of the two countries on matters of international politics, governed by their own observations on Cold War foreign policy, became apparent. Canada was suspicious of the Indian policy of non-alignment and thought that India was heavily tilted towards the Soviet Union, as was the general perception of the ‘Western’ bloc led by the United States.

While suspicious of India’s non-alignment policy, the United States was not opposed to India receiving aid as part of its ‘Atoms for Peace’ programme. In his speech to the United Nations General Assembly (1953), President Dwight Eisenhower in introducing the programme stated that, ‘The United States knows that if the fearful trend of atomic military build-up can be reversed, this greatest of destructive forces can be developed into a great boon, for the benefit of all mankind’ (International Atomic Energy Agency, 1953). The programme envisioned to provide nuclear technology to countries to help them develop civil nuclear power and prevent nuclear proliferation. The programme was to help the United States develop economic, political and strategic partnerships with other countries, and discourage nations from developing nuclear weapons technology. It also allowed the United States some control on the spread of nuclear technology and helped maintain its pre-eminence in the arena of nuclear science, and international politics and security. Economically, it provided the United States the advantage of building a market for its new, but developing nuclear industry.

Within Asia, India’s ambition for nuclear technology was supported by the Western bloc led by the United States. India was seen as an asset due to its Commonwealth history and linkages to the United Kingdom, its emergence as the region’s largest democracy and possible role it could play as a bridge between Soviet Russia, Communist China and the Western bloc. ‘India continues to hold this strategic position even today due to its close relations with Russia and China along with the growth of a vibrant economy, the world’s largest democracy, a stable political system that remains a desired trading partner of the western nations’ (Maloney, 2011). Canada followed the United States to provide nuclear technology and assistance to India, and other countries of the developing world, through the Atoms for Peace programme. It further expanded this cooperation through the Colombo Plans for Cooperative Economic Development in Asia and the Pacific (1950).¹

Canada donated a nuclear reactor to India in 1956 under the auspices of the Colombo Plan. Ottawa’s donation was motivated by two main factors. First, the St. Laurent government hoped to carve a niche market for Canadian technology in India. Secondly, a Canadian reactor in Asia, and Canadian assistance in developing India’s nascent atomic energy program, had valuable Cold War propaganda points for the West. (Touhey, 2009, p. 01)

For India, the assistance to develop nuclear technology for peaceful use along with financial aid helped to implement its economic development plans. India’s commitment to non-proliferation and the peaceful use of nuclear power were reassuring to Canada, which held similar views.

The Beginning of the Relationship

Historical ties between the two countries go back to over a century when Indians began migrating in small numbers to British Columbia in late nineteenth century. In 1914, a Japanese streamer, the Komagata, carrying largely Indian Sikh migrants, was denied permission to enter a Canadian port. Today, a little over a century later, the Indian Diaspora is one of the largest communities in Canada and plays a significant role in the relationship, with the 19 Indian origin Members of Parliament in the current Canadian parliament. They also hold important positions in the government of Prime Minister Justine Trudeau.

As the relations developed after India’s independence, in the civil nuclear sphere, Canada was committed to the idea of peaceful use of nuclear energy and development of its ties with India, despite the doubts expressed on India’s intentions, by a few within the Canadian political establishment. The Canadian government’s decision to transfer nuclear technology was based on four arguments.

First, it was argued that if Canada did not provide nuclear technology, India would seek similar assistance from other States. An agreement with Canada, on the other hand, would allow the latter to be in a position to implement adequate safeguards to stop/check possible proliferation.

Second, it was stated that the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) would ensure adequate compliance with safeguards, thus, mitigating the doubts on India’s use of nuclear technology for less than benign use.

Third, the Canadian government did not think that India had the technical capabilities to pursue a military programme based on the CANDU (CANada Deuterium Uranium) reactor design (Singh, 2010, p. 235).

Lastly, Canada was keen to develop relations in nuclear technology to provide a boost to the Canadian nuclear industry and to become an important exporter in this extremely niche market.

In 1955, the Canadian government announced that it would transfer nuclear technology to India under the auspice of the Colombo Plan. In April 1956, Prime Minister Nehru and High Commissioner Mr Escow Reid formally signed the Canada–India Reactor (CIR) agreement.² Nonetheless, ‘questions concerning the application of IAEA safeguards, inspections and sale of uranium to India remained unsettled for the next three years’ (Touhey, 2007). The Canadian government sold the first CANDU reactors to India in 1956:

CIRUS was also the first reactor that Canada exported and as such, it marked a breakthrough into the international export market for the country’s nuclear industry. Canada had a twofold rationale for its early nuclear exports. First, Canada endorsed the USA-led Atoms for Peace program. Second, it felt a sense of responsibility to share the benefits of nuclear energy with underdeveloped countries. (Sethi, 2014)

The sale of the reactors was seen as a proof of the good relations shared between the two Commonwealth nations. However, the two countries expressed opposing views on the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT; 1970). While India supported and continues to support the goal of nuclear non-proliferation and nuclear disarmament, it has refused to sign the NPT, in its current format, stating that it is discriminatory in nature. ‘In India’s considered view, both the NPT and the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) are unequal in content and spirit and only sought to prolong the nuclear weapons monopoly of the five declared nuclear weapons States’ (Budhwar, 2014, p. 16). India supports the need for universal disarmament and the need to link it to nuclear non-proliferation. India is not a signatory to the NPT, but it has voluntarily followed all international protocols to prevent nuclear proliferation. ‘The NPT itself requires only that internationally traded nuclear material and technology be safeguarded—a condition that India has continually made clear it is willing to accept, even though it declines to disarm and join the NPT as a “non-weapon-state”’ (World Nuclear Association, 2016). India’s opposition includes its security concerns. For Canada, the NPT ‘is fundamental to Canada’s nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation policy’ (Global Affairs Canada, n.d.). As the treaty came into force, Canada urged India to join.

India’s position on the need to work towards universal disarmament, differing from the Canadian position on the NPT meant that nuclear cooperation, an aspect of the relationship that could strengthen the relationship between the two nations, became a cause for friction. India stood firm on its policy position and Canada could do little, despite repeated attempts, to persuade India to sign the treaty.

During the early 1970s, Canada’s concerns about the possible use of plutonium contained in the fuel irradiated in the CIRUS reactor for explosive purposes led the Prime Minister to write to Prime Minister Indira Gandhi to clarify Canada’s views and to state:

[T]he use of Canadian-supplied material, equipment and facilities in India, that is, at CIRUS, RAPP I or RAPP II, or fissile material from these reactors, for the development of a nuclear explosive device would inevitably call on our part for a reassessment of our nuclear co-operation arrangements with India.

In response, Mrs Gandhi agreed that the nuclear co-operation between Canada and India had been dedicated to ‘the development and application of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes’, but added that ‘it should not be necessary now in our view to interpret these agreements in a particular way based on the development of a hypothetical contingency’ (International Atomic Energy Agency, 1985).

‘Two developments in the mid-1970s led to a questioning of the non-proliferation regime. First, the interest in nuclear energy, particularly in advanced nuclear technologies, increased greatly owing to the “energy crisis” of 1973–1974’ (Ibid.). The other was India’s decision in 1974 to test a nuclear device for peaceful purposes. India upgraded its position from a ‘nuclear capable’ State to one which could, now, develop nuclear weapons. ‘The Canadian political establishment, which does not distinguish between nuclear weapons and nuclear explosives’ (Ibid.), suspected that India had extracted plutonium from the three CANDU reactors supplied under the CIRUS agreement. With the test, they felt that India had violated the trust developed between the two nations. ‘It was in this international environment that the major nuclear suppliers—the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG)—met in an effort to reach agreement on “guidelines” to cover their nuclear exports. This meeting was convened largely in response to a Canadian and US initiative’ (Ibid.).

As a result of the tests, Canada stated that India sign the NPT for further nuclear technology assistance to India. ‘It tried to secure upgraded non-proliferation arrangements for Canadian-supplied nuclear items and facilities in India, but its efforts proved unsuccessful. Canada announced in May 1976 that it was terminating its nuclear relationship with India’ (Ibid.). The tests also had a negative impact on other Canadian foreign aid and assistance programmes to India.

Canada’s strong reaction was partly a result of what it felt was its own failure in monitoring compliance and implementation of safeguards. It resulted in an immediate strengthening of safeguard mechanisms within Canada’s nuclear policy. To ensure that Canadian reactors or nuclear technology was not misused in the future, Canada supported the strengthening of the NPT regime. Its nuclear policy further stated that Canada would not engage in nuclear trade with any nation that was not a signatory to the NPT, it would insist on full compliance of safeguards on all transfers and would seize to do nuclear trade with nuclear testing States, indicating its clear decision to suspend all nuclear trade with India.

The suspension of civil liberties along with the imposition of ‘emergency’ in 1975 and the stagnation in the India economy further subtracted any possibility of reconciliation between the two nations. Throughout the 1980s, India was urged to join the NPT, which it refused. In 1988, the Indian government under Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi proposed ‘… a time-bound Action Plan to usher in a world-order free of nuclear weapons and rooted in non-violence’ (Ibid., 1988). The action plan was rejected by the international community. A relationship that had begun with much promise, become one that was handled at the periphery of foreign relations by both countries.

A Changing Relationship

The concluding years of the Cold War have been termed as a period of ‘bi-lateral indifference’ in the India–Canada relationship. As scholars from Canada put it, ‘As Canada and India entered the 1990s, virtually all vestiges of the earlier “special relationship” had vanished’ (Delvoie, 2006, p. 8). Nonetheless, with the end of the ideology based bloc politics, there was a visible change in the relationship in the mid-1990s. An important contributor to this change was the Indo-Canadian diaspora. While the initial wave went as manual labour, over the decades, Canada has attracted more educated and professional Indians. The second and third generation of Indo-Canadians play a key role in the economic and political life of Canada.

Since the 1990s, Indo-Canadians have become increasingly active in the mainstream political arena. Indo-Canadian intellectuals living in Canada promote positive change, both in Canada and in India in the political, social and cultural fields. With their deep understanding of both Canadian and Indian democratic traditions and practices of multiculturalism and accommodation of diversity, they are well equipped to foster useful exchange of views…. (Bhargava, Sharma, & Salehi, 2008, pp. 16–17)

With the perceived political disposition of India towards the Soviet Union no longer a valid concern, the economic reforms that the Government of India had implemented started to bear fruit, it was no longer prudent to overlook India. The large Indian middle class became the engine of entrepreneurship, industry and commerce and also one of the largest consumer markets requiring Canada to recognise the need for a changed relationship.

For Canada, this period coincided with economic recession, levels of economic activity were stagnant, and levels of unemployment and bankruptcy were high. The Government of Canada decided to pursue new and emerging markets in the interest of trade expansion and market diversification (Bhargava et al., 2008). It resulted in the then Minister for International Trade, Mr Rory MacLaren, leading a major trade mission to India in 1994. He was followed in January 1996 by a sizable delegation called ‘Team Canada’ led by the then Prime Minister, Mr Jean Chrétien, who remarked that, ‘Canada is back in India and we are here to stay’. While it was viewed as the first step in rebuilding a relationship that had been neglected for far too long, nonetheless, the political relationship remained cautious. The optimistic outlook of the relationship would suffer a setback when India conducted a series of underground nuclear tests in May 1998. With the tests, India became a Nuclear Weapons State (NWS).

The international community was critical of the test and condemned them; Canada recalled its High Commissioner; development aid worth US$ 54.5 million under the Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA) programmes were cancelled; talks on trade expansion were suspended; it opposed loans to India on non-humanitarian grounds from the World Bank; and in the G-8 meetings, it announced that it opposed India’s bid for a seat at the United Nations (UN) Security Council and all military exports to India were banned. (Delvoie, 2008)

Canada’s reaction was based on the belief that the tests conducted by India, and subsequently by Pakistan, hampered progress made in developing a non-proliferation regime and more importantly, stability in South Asia.

‘The freeze in relations affected ministerial visits, industrial cooperation and cultural exchanges. The Canadian sanctions hampered lucrative economic engagements and improved relations, which could facilitate the smooth immigration of well-trained Indian high-tech workers’ (Spearin, 2007).

The Canada’s sanctions had very little effect on India, since years of neglect meant that bilateral trade amounted to only a few hundred million dollars a year—a particularly small amount in comparison to India’s growing trade relationships with Europe, Asia and the United States. Bilateral aid between Canada and India was also nearly non-existent and thus left little room for punitive measures. The limited effect of these sanctions did have one important outcome. India and Canada’s economic relationship had fallen to such an extent that it changed the perception that India needed ‘Canada for its economic growth or humanitarian development’.³

The Indian economy was able to withstand the economic sanctions and Indian diplomacy was able to ensure that it was not isolated on the international platform. The G-8 nations started to ease sanctions or abandon them altogether. Canada came to the understanding that the sanctions proved to be ineffective in pursuing India to change its nuclear weapons stand.

As the sanctions were removed in 2001, Canada and India once again took steps to rebuild their relationship.

Rebuilding the Relationship

It is interesting to note that the relations between the two nations, twice fractured due to nuclear issues, once again view nuclear cooperation as an important pillar to cement a new partnership.

India’s growing political and economic strength is promising, but by no means, devoid of problems. Sustaining rapid economic growth in a country of 1.2 billion people requires access to reliable, high-quality resources: oil and gas to power industry, offices and homes, and build infrastructure to support the manufacturing and industrial sectors. Nearly half of India’s population lacks access to electricity, and even urban areas are plagued with a substandard and unreliable electricity grid. This has a detrimental effect on the social and economic well-being of the people. The lack of electricity contributes to the lack of economic opportunity, affects healthcare systems and also impacts education behaviour. ‘India has one of the largest grid networks in the world, but it needs investment to maintain this grid, to meet its growing energy demand and to extend access to energy across the country’ (The Canadian Chamber of Commerce, 2012, p. 31). To meet its needs, India has turned towards both renewable energy sources (solar, wind, bio-fuel) and conventional energy (hydroelectric, nuclear, clean coal). ‘It is also importing huge quantities of energy resources and is putting much political and private sector effort in seeking politically and logistically reliable sources of oil and gas’ (Verma & Rajagopal, 2013, p. 03).

In addressing the challenge of energy poverty, it is imperative for any government to pay adequate attention to the overall picture of sources of energy available to the country and their advantages and limitations.

For instance, it would be counter-productive for the nation to solely invest in those energy sources, which do not come with the assurance of secure supplies, or those that raise national vulnerability by increasing dependence on unreliable and unstable supplier nations, or cause significant environmental pollution. Therefore, the energy demands need to be met through safe, reliable, secure and environmentally sustainable fuel sources. (Sethi, 2010, p. 223)

It is in a bid to meet the growing demands of energy to propel its economy as well as diversify its energy base that India is actively pursuing nuclear energy as an option.

A nuclear energy program requires the development of a vast array of capabilities, including research, technology design and development, manufacturing, construction, project management, operations and maintenance, and nuclear policy development, to name a few. The extent of indigenous development and the level of localisation of each of these capabilities may depend on the size of the program as well as its goals. For a program like India’s that plans a massive and rapid expansion, each of these functions will be critically important and will also probably have to be scaled up. (Ibid.)

Canada can be a partner helping India meet its needs.

Canada’s leading role and eminent accomplishments in nuclear development encompass aspects as diverse as the design and sale of nuclear power reactors and research reactor technology, to the establishment of a corps of scientists, engineers and technologists with the expertise to address a wide scope of important nuclear science issues. (Rummery & Macpherson, 1995)

Canada is contributing to international fusion research through its experiences of with fusion fuel produced in CANDU reactors. It is also two reactors designs under development that are based on the reliable CANDU-6 reactors, the most recent of which are operating in China. The Enhanced CANDU-6 (EC6) and the Advanced Fuel CANDU reactor (AFCR) represent the next generation of heavy-water reactors. (Canadian Nuclear Association, n.d.)

India is also engaged in the development of such reactors and scientific collaboration would result in the development of safer and more efficient reactors.

Since 2001, both countries have taken steps to re-evaluate and expand relations with each other. In October 2003, a joint statement committed India and Canada to an ‘expanded partnership for the twenty-first century’ and India became a priority once again in Canadian foreign policy. Coincidentally, this also happened to be a time of substantive transformation in the Indo-US nuclear relationship (Sethi, 2014). The July 2005 India–US civil nuclear cooperation agreement (NCA) was positively received by the Liberal government in Canada. In 2008, following a brief interval, when Prime Minister Stephen Harper withdrew support to the agreement, Canada endorsed the agreement in both the IAEA and the NSG.

According to Dr Manpreet Sethi, an Indian security analyst, there could be four reasons for Canada to accept India into the international nuclear commerce regime.

First, as a close ally of the United States, it was influenced by the decisions taken in Washington. Second, India had made clear its ambition of exploring nuclear energy for its development. Canada’s advance nuclear industry would want to exploit the opportunities presented by this market. Third, the larger economic success of India and fourth the possibility of being viewed as a ‘responsible State with advanced nuclear technology’ by the United States. Often viewed with Pakistan, this difference could have impacted Canada’s support for the NSG and thereafter pursue a civil nuclear cooperation agreement with India (2009). (Ibid., pp. 39–40)

A fifth reason that needs to be also acknowledged is the role played by the Indian diaspora. As the disapora balances its links with the host country and country of origin, they have helped the overall development of the relations.

By supporting the Indo-US deal and concluding the Indo-Canada NCA, Prime Minister Harper indicated Canada’s commitment to strengthening a historically fluctuating relationship with India. ‘This agreement is a testimony to the undeniable potential that Canada and India can offer each other and the world’, said the Prime Minister Harper announcing the India–Canada agreement in 2009. He further added:

Increased collaboration with India’s civilian nuclear energy market will allow Canadian companies to benefit from greater access to one of the world’s largest and fastest expanding economies. . . Canada is committed to forging stronger trade, investment and educational ties with India. This agreement will allow Canadian firms to export and import controlled nuclear materials, equipment and technology to and from India. (Government of Canada, 2009)

It was also in keeping with the Canadian government’s policy of ‘India as a priority nation’. (Since 2013, India has been a priority nation for increased Canadian economic and political engagement in Asia.) In 2012, Prime Minister Manmohan Singh and Prime Minister Harper announced the conclusion of negotiations for the ‘Appropriate Arrangement’, pursuant to the formal NCA between the Government of Canada and the Government of India, for Cooperation in the Peaceful Uses of Nuclear Energy, signed between the two countries.

In supporting India, it was argued that Canada had diluted its long standing support to the NPT. It was also felt that it had succumbed to pressure from the United States. The arguments can be refuted. The sanctions applied on India in the aftermath of both the 1974 and 1998 tests proved that they were ineffective in halting India from charting its own nuclear policy or stop its progress in developing a nuclear device. India, despite being outside of the NPT regime, has adhered to all international regulations and has a clean record on the issue of nuclear proliferation. And while Canada would still like if India joins the NPT and the CTBT, Canada’s High Commissioner to India, Mr Nadir Patel, has acknowledged that ‘India’s nuclear credentials are sound enough and signing the NPT should not be mandatory to enter the NSG’ (Sharma, 2017). Second, and perhaps more importantly, the Indo-US agreement had prompted other States to pursue similar deals with India. Canada’s veto or disinterest in engaging with India would have meant that Canadian nuclear industry would have been unable to conduct business with India.

It has to be kept in mind that the nuclear industry is a very small, but highly competitive industry and India is projected to be a large market for the same. In such a situation, endorsing the agreement allowed Canada to mend its political and diplomatic relations with India, while at the same time re-establish economic relations for the nuclear industry as well.

Canada has been the world leader in nuclear research and development and is a leading exporter of nuclear technology for peaceful use, including medical diagnosis and cancer treatment.

The Canadian nuclear industry is a significant contributor to the Canadian economy in terms of Gross Domestic Product (GDP), government revenue and employment. There are over 150 companies that supply products and/or services to Atomic Energy of Canada Limited (AECL) and its utilities. The Canadian nuclear energy program contribution to the economy and society is over and above energy benefits. The industry generates revenues of over $6 billion per annum (this includes value of nuclear electricity produced which represents about $5 billion per annum and over $1 billion in uranium exports per annum). These figures do not take into account the health and environmental benefits of nuclear technology. Canada’s annual uranium exports contain energy equivalent to approximately 1 billion barrels of oil, comparable to Canada’s oil exports in 2015; Federal and provincial revenues through taxes of about $1.5 billion; Canadian companies are important global suppliers of medical isotopes. Canada normally supplies approximately 75% of the world’s supply of Cobalt-60 used to sterilize 45% of the world’s single-use medical supplies. The most recent data indicated that the nuclear industry in Canada provides over 30,000 direct jobs. (Government of Canada, 2016)

According to the World Nuclear Association, the greatest growth in nuclear energy generation is expected to be in Asia, particularly in India and China. In India, the demand for energy is increasing rapidly and will continue to increase as the Indian economy grows. It is to fuel this growing economy that India is exploring all options in the energy sector including nuclear energy. India has developed an indigenous civil nuclear base, but is looking for international partners for collaboration. It is India’s aim to play a responsible role in the export of nuclear technology in the future.

A civil nuclear agreement with India allows Canada to sell nuclear technology to India. This will benefit both nations: economically, it would be viable for Canada, whereas with its past experience of CANDU reactors, India would be willing to expand the relationship and build on exiting knowledge base. In such a situation, it would not be in Canada’s interest to ignore these developments in India. Similarly, for India, which has the ambition of being a great power, it would be counter-productive if it did not engage with Canada.

In 2013, Canada’s nuclear regulator, the Canadian Nuclear Safety Commission, and India’s Department of Atomic Energy co-signed the Appropriate Arrangement. ‘The NCA and supporting Appropriate Arrangement allow Canadian firms to export and import controlled nuclear materials, equipment and technology to and from India to facilities subject to safeguards applied by the IAEA’ (Government of Canada, 2013), lifting an embargo that was placed after the 1974 tests.

During his visit to Canada in 2015, Prime Minister Modi and Prime Minister Harper announced the successful signing of an agreement between Department of Atomic Energy of the Government of India and Cameco of Canada for long-term supply of uranium to India to meet its energy needs. Announcing the deal at a joint press conference with Prime Minister Harper, Prime Minister Modi noted that the agreement ‘launches a new era of bilateral cooperation and a new level of mutual trust and confidence’. He framed the importance of the deal in terms of its relevance for India’s move towards cleaner energy:

The supply of uranium is important as India is keen to have clean energy. The world is worried about global warming and climate change. We want to give something to humanity through clean energy… For us, uranium is not just a mineral but an article of faith and an effort to save the world from climate change. (Panda, 2015)

Cameco will supply India 7.1 million pounds of uranium concentrate under a long-term contract through 2020. The contract is Cameco Inc.’s first with India, which is the world’s second fastest growing market for nuclear fuel (Cameco, 2015). India operates 22 nuclear reactors providing 6,780 megawatts of nuclear capacity (Nuclear Power Cooperation of India Limited, 2015) meeting about 3 per cent of the country’s electricity needs. ‘By 2032, India expects to have 45,000 megawatts of nuclear capacity’ (Cameco, 2015). ‘With known uranium resources of 572,000 tonnes of U3O8 (485,000 tU), as well as continuing exploration, Canada has a significant role in meeting future demands of India’ (World Nuclear Association, n.d.). Canada has expressed interest in reaching an agreement to supply more uranium to India (The Hindu, 2016). India continues its efforts to develop an indigenous nuclear energy programme; nonetheless, cooperation with other nations would allow it to build safer and more secure programmes, through exchange of knowledge and best practices. Indian scientists need to interact and collaborate so that nuclear science in India can grow and develop a stronger foundation. India also needs to source the raw material for its reactors. It has modest reserves of discovered deposits of uranium, which would not be adequate for the nuclear energy expansion that India plans. The agreement with Canada and the subsequent contracts reaffirm India and Canada’s interest in developing a partnership in nuclear energy in India.

The nuclear cooperation deal is also important for Canada as it allows it to sell nuclear technology to India. Canada needs a share of the Indian nuclear market that is estimated to be worth US$ 150 billion.

For Canada, ‘a nuclear agreement with India would provide it with a stronger footing in negotiations at the international nuclear table, a position weakened by pervious years of Canadian nuclear policy’ (Singh, 2010, p. 247). The deal has strengthened Canada’s position on non-proliferation as it allows Canada to include safeguard measure within the agreement, which would be in addition to the strong safety tradition it follows. With the division of India’s civil and military nuclear programmes, Canada can place further restrictions on transfers of technology from the former to the latter units.

It has to be understood that the nuclear agreement between India and Canada is not restricted in its scope to just benefits for the two countries in developing nuclear technology and trade. It has larger economic and strategic benefits. The two nations have established a process of annual strategic dialogue, the first of which was held in 2013. The aim of the dialogue is detailed discussions on bilateral issues and on regional and international issues of mutual interest. It is part of India’s growing global footprint and ambition to be a world power.

As India undergoes massive urbanization, the rapidly expanding middle classes will be demanding wealth management and other financial services, education, cleaner technology and environmental improvements, all of which Canadians do well. As such demands grow, the region’s global supply chains will become more complex, and services, investment and sales by foreign affiliates will be at the heart of trading arrangements. Canada cannot afford to be left out. (Dobson, 2011)

As relations develop on the ‘sensitive’ issue of nuclear technology trade and more collaboration in this field, it is possible that other sensitive issues of defence collaborations, intelligence, etc., could also witness more exchanges. As India’s security perimeter extends beyond the Indian Ocean into the Indo-Pacific, Delhi will find the partnership with Ottawa quite beneficial. Canada is a founding member of the forum for the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) and has taken an active part in shaping the debates about Asian security in the ASEAN regional forum. Canada, however, is not a member of the East Asia Summit that India is part of. Delhi, however, is not a member of the APEC. Delhi and Ottawa have a shared interest in building a stable architecture of regional cooperation in Asia and can assist each other in raising their respective roles in the Indo-Pacific. Canada is also a leading player in the Arctic, which has acquired a new strategic significance in recent years. ‘Ottawa was helpful in India gaining the status of permanent observer at the Arctic Council in 2013. Maritime security cooperation, then, could be a powerful instrument for bringing India and Canada together in the coming years’ (Rajamohan, 2015). It could lead to larger security engagements with other countries in such areas as development of weapons technology, advanced hardware as well as software for the security forces of the country.

As India becomes more visible at various international platforms on the issue of nuclear trade and technology distribution, it will be able to contribute more to the debate and build an understanding for its position on the above issues.

Conclusion

‘India, the third largest economy (in PPP terms), is the fourth largest consumer of oil’ (Pant, 2015). As the infrastructure improves, the economy grows and the purchasing capacity of the citizens increases, demand for energy will also rise. Thus, India would need to develop foreign relations with nations that have the energy resources it needs.

The energy sector forms an important area of India’s development strategy.

Several opportunities exist for cooperation in the energy sector with Canada, which is a lead economy globally in this sector. Expectation runs high in India where it can collaborate with Canada in areas like hydrocarbons, nuclear fuel and clean technology in energy sector, etc. Thus, energy could be an important pillar of Indo-Canada future bilateral relations. (Research and Information System for Developing Countries, 2013, p. 3)

The CANDU reactor and Canada come with a reputation which is built on safety. This is an advantage when concerns from the public are being addressed by the political leadership. The two nations can also build close cooperation based on Canada’s expertise in Research and Development capabilities in this sector. The Indian nuclear scientific community has worked on Canadian reactors and this technical expertise could be taken forward with join collaborations to help build and develop designs for new advanced reactors. They can also work towards building technology for disposal of nuclear waste. There are good opportunities for substantial productive nuclear collaboration among governments, R&D institutions, nuclear plant operators, equipment suppliers and service providers in both countries (Research and Information System for Developing Countries, 2015).

India has recognised that its present energy mix is not able to meet the growing energy demands and it is diversifying its energy mix. Nuclear energy is rather unique as a source of energy. Unlike other sources of energy, an accident in a nuclear power plant anywhere in the world has a cascading impact on nuclear energy production worldwide. It could be said that the nuclear energy is dependent on safe working of plants all across the globe, because of the consequences that arise as a result of an accident anywhere in the world. There is little doubt that nuclear energy is going to be an important element of the energy mix of the future.

Nuclear power programmes the world over are dependent on two factors: one, the country has developed its goals and implements them in time-bound phases. The second is the ability to achieve its goals through adequate financial funds, political capital and resources, both technical and technological, and ensuring the availability of all materials required for the realisation of its goals.

The two countries are building a comprehensive relationship that will cover economic and trade relations, security relations such as energy and bilateral nuclear energy cooperation, food security, social development through collaborations in education and scientific research and defence cooperation. Disagreements over India’s nuclear weapon programme are likely to continue to be a factor in the relationship, but a successful civil nuclear relationship would go a long way in helping rebuild India–Canada relations that have twice been fractured due to nuclear differences.

Footnotes

Notes

References

Bhargava

Sharma

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Budhwar

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(2014). Canada–India: Partners in progress. New Delhi: Vij Books.

Cameco. (2015). Cameco announces contract with India to provide uranium for electricity generation. Retrieved 6 April 2017, from https://www.cameco.com/media/news/cameco-announces-contract-with-india-to-provide-uranium-for-electricity-gen

Canadian Nuclear Association. (n.d.). Research and development. Retrieved 6 April 2017, from https://cna.ca/technology/research-development/

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