The AU’s Progress and Achievements in the Realm of Peace and Security

Abstract

When Organisation of African Unity (OAU) was formed, the problem confronting Africa continent then was colonialism. It is therefore not a surprise that its major preoccupation was how to liberate countries within the continent that were still under the grip of colonialism. However, the surge of conflicts in various African countries shortly after independence, manifesting in form of ethnicity, religious, struggle for political power among others, coupled with OAU policy of non-intervention in the domestic affairs of member states, combined to turn African continent to the bedlam of the world. The failure of OAU led to the formation of the African Unity (AU) to correct some of these ills. This article examines AU’s achievements in the realm of peace and security using secondary sources of data gathering. Since AU came on board, how far has it fared in promoting peace and security in the continent? Findings reveal that although AU has achieved much in the realm of peace and security in Africa, yet it lacks the needed human resources and institutional capacity to conduct effective peace operations and peace-making initiatives. The study therefore suggested among others the need to strengthen AU’s institutional capacity and more personnel should be donated by members countries

Keywords

Peace security African Union conflict management Peace and Security Council conflict prevention

Introduction

Since the Cold War ended, the role of regional organisations in maintaining peace and security cannot be over emphasised. In fact, Faleti and Odobo (2014) postulate that not only are they playing an active role in redrawing international security architecture, but they have emerged as viable tools for dealing with security challenges across the various regions of the globe. As it were, regional organisations have always been involved in peace-making, prevention of violent conflicts between and within members states, mediating among parties in conflict, monitoring ceasefire or peace agreement among parties in conflict, implementing peace plans among others. In addition, these bodies have engaged in post-conflict reconstruction in places where there were humanitarian crises. One of such regional organisation that engaged in such activities is the African Union (AU).

The AU was formed in July 2002. Since the AU was launched, leaders of African countries have taken a bold step towards creating African security regime for the maintenance of peace, security and managing conflict in the region instead of heavy reliance on the international community. The issues are: has the AU been able to manage peace and security in Africa better than its predecessors—Organisation of African Unity (OAU)? If no, why? If yes, how can AU improve its performance to maintain peace and security in the region? What are the problems confronting the AU? How can those problems be addressed?

This article focuses on the progress and achievements of the AU in maintenance of peace and security in Africa. The article draws on extensive secondary literature from academics and other secondary sources. Even though there are many studies on the AU, there seem to be few studies that focus on the opportunities and challenges as regards AU’s peace and security agenda (Powell, 2005). Following this introduction, the article reviews some related works that have been done by scholars before providing a background to AU formation; next is AU’s efforts in peace and security in Africa, challenges, recommendations and lastly conclusion.

Literature Review

Security has always been an issue of great concern to any human societies. This is predicated on the fact that security impinges on survival of every human being or society. Without security, there cannot be peace and development as it will be difficult to harness human and material resources for the benefit of such society. The continent of Africa is bedevilled or belaboured by civil strife and intractable conflicts within and between states. Suffice to say that anybody who is not a stranger to African affairs cannot but be disconcerted by the pervading climate of insecurity and uncertainty in the land (Imobighe, 2001). One of the major reasons for the establishment of the AU was the desire to address the various conflicts plaguing the continent and to promote peace. For instance, Agu and Okeke (2013) contend that prior to the birth of the AU, the OAU in its declaration in Cairo reaffirmed its commitment to work jointly and also to expedite actions in resolving conflicts peacefully in the region. Thus, it was observed that if there were to be socio-economic progress in the continent, then the scourge of conflict must be controlled. The organisation later established a mechanism for conflict prevention, management and resolution. However, the OAU conflict resolution mechanism was rendered ineffective because of its commitment to the principles of sovereignty, non-interference, respect for established borders and territorial integrity of member states (Powell, 2005).

The above and many other issues brought OAU under heavy criticism which will be discussed later.

From its founding documents developed in the late 1990s and early 2000s, it is clear that the AU was instituted and empowered to play a critical role in resolving African conflict. In the light of the above, the principal objective of the AU is the emergence of ‘an integrated, prosperous and peaceful Africa, driven by its own citizens and representing a dynamic force in the global arena’ (AU Commission, 2009, p. 11). As articulated by the former Chairman of the AU Commission, Alpha Oumar Konare, the evolution of the organisation from OAU to AU shows a change from the principle and norm of ‘non-interference’ in armed conflicts to a new posture of ‘non-indifference’ to member states’ internal affairs. Its conflict management plan projects the awareness that the AU’s vision for conflict management reflects an understanding that security and stability are the preconditions for achieving effective management of conflict in the continent.

The plan for continental peace and security steered the founding of the Peace and Security Council (PSC) in March 2004. The PSC is AU’s foremost decision-making body saddled with the responsibilities regarding peace and security. According to the Article 2(1) of the Protocol relating to the establishment of the Peace and Security Council of the African Union, PSC is a collective security and early warning arrangement to facilitate timely and efficient response to conflict and crisis situations in Africa (AU, 2002). Like the United Nations (UN) Security Council, AU-PSC is made up of 15 members. They are Algeria, Benin, Angola, Burkina Faso, Chad, Burundi, Ethiopia, Gabon, Nigeria, Mali, Rwanda, Tunisia, Uganda, Swaziland and Zambia (Murithi, n.d.). There are no permanent members with veto power. Five states are elected from each region every 3 years while the other 10 states are elected every 2 years based on stated criteria of political and financial commitment to the AU and its course, respect for democracy and democratic principles, respect for the rule of law and human rights as well as geographical representation (AU, 2002, Art. 5.2g).

The Council was assigned the principal responsibility of implementing the broad objectives of anticipating and preventing conflicts; promoting peace, security and stability; promoting and implementing peace-building activities; encouraging and promoting democratic practices; protecting human rights, the rule of law and good governance; developing a common defence policy for the AU; harmonising and coordinating efforts to prevent and fight international terrorism. In performing these roles, powers ranging from military intervention to assist in providing humanitarian assistance among others were granted to the Council (AU, 2002, Article 7 of the PSC Protocol).

Another important organ as stated before is the PSC. Although the AU-PSC has been the platform for the maintenance of peace in Africa, there are other structures or organs established to work with the PSC to make it realise its goals, namely the Rapid-Reaction African Standby Force (ASF) that is built across the sub-regions, North, East, Southern and East Africa; Panel of the Wise; a Military Staff Committee; Continental Early Warning System (CEWS); a Peace Fund; Humanitarian Acts organs; and Africa Standing Force. Also, UN Peace-building Commission as well as the framework for Post-Conflict Reconstruction and Development (PCRD) was established in 2006. The PCRD sought to establish the relationship between security, peace and development and stresses the importance of multilateralism (Paterson, 2012, p. 11). The backdrop of war and conflict of the 1990s as well as principles enshrined in the Constitutive Act of the African Union of 2002 led to the establishment of African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA) in the early 2000s (AU Constitutive Act, 2000). The institution and instrument was built by AU’s member states, bureaucrats and external donor states. The APSA platform is to permit African states and stakeholders to deliberate the obstacles to the actualisation of African peace and security (Berhe & Waal, 2015). The AU-PSC has under these arrangements recorded noteworthy successes in containing conflict in Africa. The next section situates AU within a historical context.

History of African Union (AU)

The history of African Union (AU) cannot be told without reference to the Organisation of Africa Unity (OAU). From this premise, it is necessary to take a historical excursion into the formation of the OAU and why it was replaced with the AU. The OAU came into existence on 25 May 1963 in Addis Ababa, when representatives of 32 African states signed a charter for the formation of the organisation. With the passage of time, 21 other African countries later joined, bringing the number to 53 (Zurmeyer, 2005).

As a result of colonial situation as at the time of formation, the OAU had onerous responsibility of freeing the continent from European colonialism, racism and apartheid among other roles. The implication of this scenario is the fact that decolonisation, therefore, became one of the priority tasks of the OAU. Aside from its role of liberation of African countries that were then under the grip of colonialism, the OAU was also confronted with numerous interstate and intrastate conflicts, which afflicted many countries in the continent shortly after their independence, from Great Lakes Region to the Horn of Africa, and virtually all the regions of the continent. Many of these conflicts originated from the struggles for political power, territorial acquisition, religious supremacy and ethnic domination, others were premised on the denial of popular participation in governance and the truncation of democratic process by military intervention in political affairs (Shinkaiye, 2005).

The OAU recorded success in its primary mission of liberating the continent from colonialism with the help of international actors when finally, on 27 April 1994, a new government based on one person, one vote became a reality in South Africa under the leadership of Nelson Mandela. Contrary to expectation, the OAU failed in the aspect of monitoring and policing the affairs of its own member states. This became obvious as a result of its inability to curb violent conflict, poor governance, economic mismanagement, gender inequality, human rights abuse and poverty in the region (Murithi, 2012).

Even though in 1993 in Cairo, the OAU established a Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management and Resolution, this instrument was ineffective going by its failure to resolve disputes in the continent. It is tragic to discover that the Rwandan genocide which started in April 1994 happened shortly after this mechanism became operational. In the same vein, it was also after the operation of the mechanism that the conflict that led to the collapse of Somalia, and violent conflicts that led to the death of millions of Africans in Angola, Democratic Republic of Congo, Liberia and Sierra Leone cropped up. These catastrophic events portrayed the weakness of the OAU as a framework for conflict resolution (Murithi, 2012).

The failure of the OAU in the realm of peace in Africa is predicated on its principle of non-interference with the sovereignty of the member states. In fact, this position stems from the ambiguity or misunderstanding as regards the preamble to the OAU Charter of 1963. While the Charter as outlined by the member states committed them to collectively maintain and sustain peace and security of the continent of Africa, it was later interpreted to mean non-intervention in the affairs of member states. Suffice to say that the key organs of the OAU Council of Ministers and the Assembly of Heads of State and Government could not intervene in any conflict within or between African states excepted invited by the parties in dispute (Murithi, 2012).

The implication of this is that the OAU was not legally or operationally obligated to either intervene in state or interstate conflict. In short, the African Union (AU) came into existence when the African space was suffused with conflicts. This development made conflict resolution a major function of the AU. It has also given indication that it will do better in this assignment than the defunct OAU. Where peaceful resolution has failed, the AU had recourse to military intervention (Agu & Okeke, 2013). The AU actually lays out the provisions to intervene in the internal affairs of a member state including the use of military force if need be, so as to protect vulnerable population from egregious human rights abuses. To AU, sovereignty is conditional and is predicated on state’s capability and willingness to protect its citizens (Powell, 2005). The next section deals with AU’s efforts in peace and security in Africa.

AU’s Efforts in Peace and Security in Africa

For AU to achieve its aim of maintaining peace and security in Africa, it established conflict management instruments. Thus, AU’s core conflict management instruments include sanctions regimes, mediation initiatives, minimising the occurrences of conflicts via peace-making, peacekeeping operations, peaceful negotiations and consensual interventions and maintenance of peace (Williams, 2011).

Unlike the OAU that upheld the principle of non-interference in the domestic matters of its members, the PSC since its first meeting in 2004 has deployed AU missions to conflict zones, for instance, the Comoros, Burundi (2003–2004), Sudan, Darfur (2004–2007), Democratic Republic of Congo, Cote d’Ivoire and Somalia to mention just a few of them. The AU has sent observers to monitor elections in a number of African countries such as Sudan and Somalia. The PSC has resolved post-election violence in Kenya and Cote d’Ivoire.

A lot could be deduced from the AU’s peace operations (the table in the Appendix gives more information on the AU’s peace operations from 2003 to 2017). First, it is clear that there is uneven support from AU members for its peacekeeping operations. Bulk of the troops for AU peace missions are from a collection of very few African countries. Of the 55 members of the AU, the major contributing states include Ghana, Rwanda, Senegal, South Africa, Ethiopia, Benin Nigeria and Egypt. Williams (2009a cited in Bergholm, 2010) posits that South Africa provided most of the troops deployed for the missions in Burundi (2003–2004) and the Comoros between 2006 and 2008; by early 2008 Uganda provided all the troops deployed under the platform of AMISOM to the peace operation in Somalia (2007–2012); and South Africa, Rwanda, Nigeria and Senegal were the main contributors of troops for the AU’s operation in Sudan (2004–2007). This depicts that without the contributions of these small groups of states, AU’s peace operations would not have functioned well. The involvement of Ethiopia via the provision of contingents to UNAMID and the support it provided to South African troops in AMIB is remarkable and commendable. Uganda also single-handedly provided troops for AMISOM for about a year before the arrival of Burundian troops. African Union Mission in Burundi (AMIB) recorded milestone success for the AU in terms of self-reliance in operationalising and implementing peace-building.

Also, AU’s peace-building role is through the prevention of violence, laying foundation for reconciliation as well as reconstruction. Other peace-building roles AU had engaged in include the protection of demobilisation centres that oversee the disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration (DDR) process, the integration of former militias into society, protection of returning politicians participating in the transitional government and the security of demobilisation centres. The AMIB also created platforms for the return of the displaced persons and refugees in Tanzania to their homes. At the end of the AU mission in Burundi, relative peace was built in most of the Burundi provinces. These successes of the AU enabled the establishment of a strong and effective UN peace operation.

The organisation has been able to ensure that forceful military and unconstitutional government take-overs are reverted to democratic rule for better democratic consolidation and good governance in Africa. Some of the cases where this has been done include Guinea and Mauritania in 2008, Madagascar in March 2009 and Burkina Faso in 2015. Offending members states are also suspended from the AU. They were given about 6 months to conform to its constitution. When positive changes are not recorded, due to the obstinate attitude of some states, the PSC has had to engage more coercive means of sanction regimes to ensure compliance. Sanctions such as travel bans and freezing of regime assets have been meted on the individuals tagged as conflict instigators. The sanctions are to cause a change to positive political behaviours, be a substitute for armed conflict and stigmatise the target. A good case in point is the suspension of Central African Republic (CAR) between March 2003 and June 2005 due to military coup.

However, when the sanctions were lifted in 2005, the junta retained power. Eritrea was also suspended between April 2009 and January 2011 due to its support to insurgents in Somalia. Between December 2010 and April 2011, Ivory Coast was suspended but the incumbent regime declined to hand over power after its defeat in the election. UN-France-AU force, however, forced the incumbent regime to step down and de jure government assumed office (Williams, 2011). Togo was also suspended between February and May 2005 and the Comoros when Mohamed Taki Abdoulkarim died in office and his son fraudulently retained power by manipulating the election then and also won another election in 2010. In Madagascar, Guinea and Niger, the PSC declared some persons in the military junta unqualified to contest in some elections. There are cases when presidents of some significant African states such as Uganda and Algeria abolished the stipulated presidential terms in their constitution and held on to power through the manipulation of election results. In such case, the AU-PSC lacked the capability to enforce sanctions against such elements for change (Omorogbe, 2008).

The AU approach to peace-making in the post-Cold War era reflects its member states’ preference for consensual decision-making conducted out of the public glance between the belligerent factions and the PSC. It involves the bargain among elites in arriving at a workable power-sharing agreements. A good example is the power-sharing agreement and deployment of 462 troops to support elections in the Comoros in May 2006 (Oguonu & Ezeibe, 2014). The drastic fall in the occurrences of coups and conflict as well as the increase in the number of successful elections in Africa in the past few decades are positive inferences that AU has been able to balance the actions of states and added to their political performances and values (Lisk, 2012). Other cases where AU had monitored power-sharing arrangements include Sudan, Ivory Coast, Chad and Zimbabwe (2008–2009), Libya and Liberia (1994–2003), Côte d’Ivoire (2002–2007) and Central African Republic (1996–2007) (Mehler, 2008). The next section focuses on challenges facing AU.

Challenges

AU’s efforts towards peace and security have not been all smooth outing. The organisation has faced a number of challenges in the pursuit of the continental agenda. One of the challenges it faces is the conflict between international mechanisms to protect and promote justice, the rule of law and African regionalism and respect for human rights. For instance, there was the resolution of the AU to move its July 2012 bi-annual summit from Lilongwe, Malawi to Addis Ababa in reaction to Malawi’s refusal to visit Omar Al-Bashir, Sudan’s Head of State on the pretext that the International Criminal Court (ICC) has charged and pronounced a warrant for Omar al-Bashir’s arrest for war crimes (Lisk, 2012). Malawi felt that going by the record of human rights abuse of Al-Bashir of Sudan, there was no basis for such visit.

The AU lacks the needed human resources and institutional capacity to conduct effective peace operations and peace-making initiatives. For instance, the internal assessment conducted by the AU reveals that the PSC itself suffers from limited personnel. The PSC lacks translators and dedicated legal experts. It has just one secretary, four professional staff and an administrative assistant (APSC, 2010, para 75–77). Apart from the issues at the PSC, AU Commission also lacks effective management system, human resources, lacks motivated personnel and professionals; it has weak bureaucratic processes, poor information technology and weak reputation among member states (AU Commission, 2009, p. 17). The absence of adequate personnel also affects the African Capacity for Immediate Response to Crises and undermines its ability to have ready to deploy personnel as it was the case in Mali despite the early warning (AU, 2013).

The AU headquarters is also bedevilled with difficulties in planning, limited logistical support and force generation when compared vis-à-vis other continental bodies embarking of operations of similar sizes. Williams (2011) avers that at each stage of the AU’s peacekeeping mission life cycle, that is, planning, deployment, operations and withdrawal, there are peculiar institutional challenges posed at the AU. While on the field, there are difficulties in assembling and retaining teams of qualified senior leaders, which includes the special representative, police commissioner, force commander and chief administrators.

Following the above challenge is AU’s capacity to organise the military assets and personnel needed for peace operations. Generally, AU lacks specialist and professionals such as engineers and skills for intelligence gathering. Paterson (2012) argues that although the AU missions in Darfur, Somalia and Burundi were commendable, they also uncovered the organisation’s logistical, financial weaknesses and capacity in terms of training, coordination, transport and equipment. Therefore, to fill these gaps, AU relies on external sources for personnel, equipment, funding and training. A callable example is the situation the Burundian forces faced in AMISOM. In Mogadishu, they lacked military equipment such as battle tanks which the US government eventually provided. The AMISOM also lacked the mortar radar system that could have reduced civilian casualties. Generally, the military equipment the AU lacked in tensed military situations like in its operations in Somalia and Sudan include attack and utility helicopters, unmanned aerial vehicles, communications and intelligence equipment, night vision goggles and armoured personnel carriers.

The AU is also faced with the problem of insufficient experts with conflict management abilities. There is deficit of experts in security institutions such as justice, police and correction officers. It also lacks adequate experts as far as application of democratic principles, rule of law and mediation is concerned. Article 4(h) of the Constitutive Act, which was also restated in article 4 of the Protocol to the Constitutive Act on the PSC, recognises the power of the AU to mediate in any member state in grave situations of war crimes, crimes against humanity and genocide; pulling continental strengths in the deterrence and fighting of terrorism, intervening in cases of human right abuses, enforcing sanctions in case of undemocratic change of government, authorise peace support missions, and to ‘take initiatives and action it deems appropriate’ in retort to latent or actual conflicts (Adebajo & Paterson, 2012, p. 1; Paterson, 2012, p. 11; Zoubir, 2013, p. 50). Due to the shortage of experts with mediation capability, persons appointed as mediation agents though persons of high societal calibre lack the experience and expertise to analyse conflict for the right cause and take appropriate mediation initiative. At other times, parties in most mediation processes are dictated by the key personalities involved in the conflict (Nathan, 2009). Therefore, AU has weak enforcement capabilities for peaceful negotiations. For instance, although the AU responded in the Libyan civil war through diplomacy and negotiated settlement and provided for political negotiation between the Libyan government and the oppositions for the transformation of Libya to a democratic system through immediate ending of all warfare and the acceptance and enactment of political reforms crucial for the elimination of the causes of the Libyan crisis, the opposition rebels rejected AU’s political roadmap while Ghadaffi accepted it. Therefore, a truce could not be reached and the war continued until foreign intervention by the UN and NATO.

Weak democratic governance is one of the structural causes of protracted conflict African countries face. Maru (2013, p. 36) avers that the uprising in North Africa exposed the weakness of Africa to violence and revolution, the illegitimate exercise of power phenomena that are indicative of the undemocratic nature of states, as well as the weakness of constitutional and peaceful avenues to change government. Military coups have also been a critical challenge to democracy in Africa. Madagascar witnessed a coup in 2009, Guinea-Bissau and Mali in 2012. African countries have been challenged by poverty despite their vast ownership of rich resources. Major conflicts, wars and insurgencies have been somehow linked to the economic frustrations, deprivations and poverty. Some of the cases in recent time include the Arab Spring in Tunisia, Egypt, the Boko Haram insurgency in Nigeria and the militancy in Nigeria’s Niger Delta. It is imperative to mention that sects such as the Boko Haram have become a threat to regional and global peace and security, meaning that the AU has a major security concern at hand.

Another challenge AU faces is the long amount of time it takes the PSC to make decisions after a crisis has been identified (Toga, 2016). Reasons behind this challenge include poor political will of African leaders and the lack of deep interest on AU matters (Adebajo & Paterson, 2012, p. 1). To Baker (2007, p. 121), these issues have made AU’s responses slow, ineffective and logistically clumsy. The AU was also unable to effectively take strong sanctions and measures against the governments of Tunisia and Egypt for the violations of human rights and forceful attacks on civilians during peaceful protests. Guesh (2013, p. 69) specifically notes that AU refused to issue any statement of condemnation on President Hosni Mubarak until he stepped down from power as it was in the case of Gbagbo.

Additionally, despite the early warning from Continental Early Warning System (CEWS) about the outbreak of conflict in Guinea-Bissau and Mali in 2012, the PSC did not take preventive actions against the conflict. Early and timely intervention of the AU in the conflicts could have prevented the indiscriminate killings of civilians, prevention of other crimes against humanity and the enactment of no-fly zones (Kabau, 2012). The AU’s actions appeared to oppose the essence of Article 4(h) of the Constitutive Act, which orders the AU to carry out forceful intervention in such situations. If this had been done, the crisis would not have degenerated to an uncontrollable situation, leading to crimes against humanity. These exemplified the deficiency of the AU in promoting effective and forceful intervention where necessary. In summary, AU has not been able to establish a synergy between state sovereignty and the need for humanitarian intervention.

In the case of the Libyan Crisis that began in February 2011, the AU-PSC established an Ad Hoc High-Level Committee made up of the heads of state of five countries: Mauritania, Mali, Republic of Congo, Uganda and South Africa (Bartu, 2014). The AU could not arrive at a decision on the policy that could be implemented to calm the crisis without undermining the sovereignty of Libya. Agreeing on a policy was undermined by the conflicting interest among AU members. Mahadew (2011) avers that the reason for the slow intervention in Libya is Ghadaffi’s influence over the AU. Ghadaffi has a very strong influence over the AU by virtue of his charisma and being a major contributor to the AU budget. The AU was severely divided between countries that had enjoyed Ghaddafi’s generosity and political support and those that had been grieved from his interferences, such as Sudan and Ethiopia and most West African states like Nigeria. In fact, from the beginning of the crisis both Tunisia and Sudan supported the National Transitional Council (NTC) based in Benghazi. Sudan provided significant ammunition, weapon and direct military support to rebel groups and the Islamist-led government in Tripoli (Waal, 2013). The decision of the PSC to pursue a political negotiation resolution was also constrained by the conflicting interest of external actors mostly channelled through the UN and its resolution.

The AU’s slow intervention in Libya crisis had neocolonial implications on Africa and Libya as a country. One of the manifestations of neocolonial manifestations was the West specifically, NATO, UN, US, France and UK’s disrespect of AU’s political dialogue approach towards resolving conflict in Libya. The NATO enforced airstrikes over Libya despite the AU’s dictate against it and despite pronouncement of the no-fly zone against Libya. The airstrikes empowered the rebel forces NTC to enter Tripoli in August 2011 and gain military successes on ground (Guesh, 2013, p. 65). This meant that NATO and the Security Council saw the AU as incapable of managing its own affair and needed the assistance of the powers. In fact, an additional instance that showed the disrespect of the AU by foreign powers is that notwithstanding the fact that the AU reacted to the launching of air attacks by the USA, France and the UK on targets in Libya on 20 March 2011, AU could not muster enough force against the Western countries to put an end to the air strikes (Neethling, 2012).

This has political underpinning as Jean-Paul Pougala contends that the major essence for Western countries to wage war against Libya was because of the threat that Colonel Ghaddafi posed to them. Ghaddafi had contributed US$300 million for the establishment of the Regional African Satellite Communication Organisation (RASCOM), by which Europe lost US$500 million annually for the hire of its satellite by Africa for communication. He opposed EU’s vision of a Union for Mediterranean (UPM), a plan to make the northern Arab African countries detached from the main African continent. Thus, the revolt of the Libyan people against the 42 years reign of Ghaddafi was embraced by Western-led coalition of NATO and UN as an avenue to unseat Ghadaffi.

The AU’s inability to protect civilian, for instance, in Mogadishu, Somalia and Darfur during their peace operations in the areas is another indictment on the organisation. NGOs, INGOs, state governments and even rebels have accused the AU of human rights violations and violation of international humanitarian law. This issue has been complicated by the absence of accountability and mechanisms to investigate and prosecute such acts (Itziar, 2011).

The AU’s dependence or over reliance on foreign funding for the Peace Fund is another challenge impeding its success in the realm of peace and security. The Peace Fund has the responsibility of providing the necessary funds for AU’s peace operations and other running costs for its operations but has been sternly underfunded. Many African governments have failed to adequately finance peacekeeping operations and the effective running of the AU’s bureaucracies needed to manage peacekeepers and the centres of excellence to train future peacekeepers (Malan, n.d.). Since 1 January 2006, 75 per cent of the total AU budget has been paid by only five countries: Egypt, Algeria, Libya, South Africa and Nigeria (Williams 2009b, p. 619 cited in Bergholm, 2010). While there has been a rise in the amount raised by the Peace Fund since 2006, it has been inadequate to effectively fund the AU’s conflict management operations and does not provide the bulk of the funds needed for peace operations. Yearly, the cost of African peace operation ranges between US$134 and 900 million (Nathan et al., pp. 77–78 cited in Albuquerque, 2016). Due to this huge financial involvement in peace operations, only one of every five AU-led peace operation has been funded by the AU budget between 2009 and 2015 (Nathan et al., pp. 77–78 cited in Albuquerque, 2016). In short, Mwanzia (2015) avers that AMISOM received about US$800 million from the UN between mid-2008 and mid-2012. Other financial supports for AU’s peacekeeping are mostly from states within NATO and the EU. Due to the financial weakness of Africa and the reliance on foreign funding for the running of the affairs of the AU, foreign powers and donors have undermines AU’s approach to conflict management, namely African solutions first. Additionally, dependent on foreign aid, could be an impediment to the independent functioning of the AU. For example, China donated a brand new US$200 million building gift to the AU in February 2012. With an understanding of the politics of foreign aid, there is the possibility that such aid is to access Africa’s resource, market and favours at Africa’s developmental detriment (Ramachandran, 2012).

Recommendations

The AU has been a vehicle for cooperation and advancement of peace and security as a panacea for development. However, the AU continues to have limited influence over some strategic decisions that are dominated by multilateral bodies and western powers. Therefore, for a stable and peaceful Africa to be sustained, there are some recommendations for the PSC and the AU in general. First, in relation to the peace-building as well as peacekeeping, the AU should endeavour to draft new strategies that will address the root or cause of the conflicts in Africa as to reduce the occurrences of conflict and the long duration of conflicts in the continent. The conflicts are not exclusive in themselves. African leaders should try as much as possible to address the causes of the conflicts. For instance, the establishment of infrastructure should become a priority and employments should be readily available this is because the presence of these will enhance the capacity of the continent to domesticate regional norms. In addressing the economic causes of the conflicts and underdevelopment on the continent, restrictions on goods and services such as delays at the borders and increased transaction costs, despite the signings of protocol in regard to facilitating free movement of goods and services should be resolved.

As already mentioned, one of the challenges of the AU is the negotiation power of the AU leaders. Although Africa claims not to need external intervention or influence in its matters, however, the limited capacity of the leaders in negotiation, administration so far has proven disappointing. Therefore, this article recommends that capable leaders should be appointed as the spokespersons of the continent on matters of global concerns to ensure better positive results.

The AU must address logistics and financial weaknesses. The reliance of external funding has been a major bane to the success of the AU as it has affected diverse areas such as peacekeeping operation, provision of equipment, deployment of troops and various administrative needs. The new funding decision of having at least 75 per cent of AU funding for peace operations provided by the international community and 25 per cent of the needed funds by the AU will not address the current funding challenge faced by the AU (Albuquerque, 2016). Therefore, the AU needs to implement strategies that will drive more effective mobilisation of funds from its members for its peace operation and the effective running of its institutions. The divisions of financial responsibilities according to the abilities of its members should be employed.

The lack of and delay in reaching political agreement among African leaders on collective security norms and practices should be reduced or absolutely eradicated.

AU needs to be more firm in its use of force. The organisation’s conflict management strategy lack effective coercive measures to ensure compliance of its members and implement forceful intervention as provided under Article 4(h) of its Constitutive Act and as proposed under the responsibility to protect (R2P) concept where and when consensual interventions and peaceful negotiations are inappropriate or inadequate. This is evident in places like Burundi, Sudan, Darfur and Somalia in which intervention and peacekeeping were founded on the approval of the territorial state and when the involved state refuses AU’s proposed peacekeeping operations, AU defers such operations at the detriment of people’s rights. The AU Security Council should improve its strength to mediate effectively and enhance its ability to implement regional norms at national levels.

Conclusion

The AU was set up to replace the OAU which was saddled with the responsibility of securing the sovereignty of the individual African state, ensuring the decolonisation of the continent and also promoting the unification and enhance all round prosperity of the nation. Furthermore, a major and critical goal of the AU this research is concerned about is also to promote peace and security of the continent in the twenty-first century and beyond. However, the performance of the AU in the sphere of peace and security has been challenged and limited in the face of increasing devastating conflicts, underdevelopment and economic dependence, corruption, lack of institutions, lack of adequate internal funding religious fundamentalism and absence of social amenities. Thus, in order to ensure and achieve more giants’ strides in the realm of peace and security, African leaders must address those factors that impede its strategic goals and weakens African’s voice in global politics and multilateral decision-making bodies such as the UN Security Council.

Footnotes

Appendix

The table below depicts AU’s peace operations between 2003 and 2017:

Mission	Location	Duration	Size (Approximate maximum)	Main troop Contributor	Main Task(s)
AU Mission in Burundi (AMIB)	Burundi	2003–2004	3250	South Africa	Peace-building
AU Military Observer Mission in the Comoros (MIOC)	Comoros	2004	41	South Africa	Observation
AU Mission in Sudan (AMIS)	Darfur	2004–2007	c.7700	Nigeria, Rwanda, South Africa, Senegal, Ghana	Peacekeeping/civilian protection
Special Task Force Burundi	Burundi	2006–2009	c.750	South Africa	VIP protection
AU Mission for Support to the Elections in the Comoros (AMISEC)	Comoros	2006	1260	South Africa	Election monitor
AU Mission in Somalia (AMISOM)	Mogadishu	2007–2017	c. 9000 Troop boosted to 17, 731 in February 2012 and 22,126 in 2017	Uganda, Burundi, Ethiopia, Kenya	Regime support
AU Electoral and Security Assistance Mission to the Comoros (MAES)	Comoros	2007–2008	350	South Africa	Election support
Democracy in Comoros	Comoros	2008	1350 (+450 Comoros)	Tanzania, Sudan	Enforcement
African Union Mission in Sudan (AMIS)	Darfur	2004–2007	7000		Peacekeeping
AU-UN Hybrid Operation in Darfur (UNAMID) (UN pays)	Darfur	2008–2011	c.23,000	Nigeria, Rwanda, Egypt, Ethiopia	Civilian protection/Peace-building
Mission internationale de soutien à la Centrafrique (MISCA)	CAR	12/2013 – 9/2014	5142		Peacekeeping
The African Union Mission in Sudan (AMIS)	Sudan	2004	9000		Peacekeeping/negotiation (to monitor an AU brokered N’djamena Ceasefire Agreement between)
African Union Election Observation Mission (AUEOM)	Sierra Leone	2012	40	14	Election observation
AUEOM	Ghana	2012	40	16	Election observation
African-led International Support Mission in Mali (AFISMA)	Mali	2013			Election observation
AUEOM	Togo	2013	32	13	Election observation
AUEOM	Equatorial Guinea	2013	41	28	Election observation
AUEOM	Kenya	2013	69	29	Election observation
AUEOM	Tunisia	2014	11	Various African countries	Election observation
AUEOM	Mozambique	2014	35	Drawn from 23 countries	Election observation
AUEOM	Mauritania	2014	46	21 countries	Election observation
AUEOM	Malawi	2014	52 observers, including 10 long-term observers (LTOs) and 42 short-term observers (STOs)	From 21 countries	Election observation
AUEOM	Mauritania	2013	32	18	Election observation
AUEOM	Madagascar	2013	7 LTOs and 50 STOs	Various African Countries	Election observation
AUEOM	Swaziland	2013	19	15	Election observation
AUEOM	Rwanda	2013	30	17	Election observation
AUEOM	Zimbabwe	2013	LTOs arrived in Zimbabwe on 15 June 2013 and were subsequently joined by sixty (60) STOs		Election observation
AUEOM	Nigeria	2015	84 STOs and LTOs		Observation of 28 March 2015 Presidential and National Assembly elections
AUEOM	Lesotho	2015	40	Drawn from various African countries	Election observation
AUEOM	Comoros	2015	16	12 countries	Election observation
AUEOM	Victoria, Seychelles	8–10 September 2016	26	Drawn from 21 African countries	First All-Woman Election Observation Mission
AU—(Economic Communities of Central African States) ECCAS Mission	Gabon	August 2016	75	Observers are drawn from 32 African States	Election observation
AUEOM	Zambia	August 2016	45 STOs and 10 LTOs		Pre-election assessment mission
AMOEUA	Benin	2016	15	From 14 countries	Election observation
AMOEUA	Gambia	2017	30		Observer national assembly election

Source: Williams (2011, p. 15), Coning (2017) and AU (2017) including authors’ compilations.

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