The Theory and Practice of Identities: South vs. Central Asia (with special emphasis upon India and Kazakhstan)

Introduction

Nowadays, the factor of identity to a greater or lesser degree becomes increasingly significant for virtually all categories and groups on the planet regardless of their attitude towards mental aspects of collective development. At that, it is deemed that the most intense manifestation of identity finds place in the oriental as well as not firmly established transitional societies. Over-individual identity in such societies tends to be intertwined with cultural and civilisational one and, therefore, is perceived, comprehended, expressed and utilised livelier and deeper, with more serious consequences as compared to the less traditional and more ‘matured’ public environments. In the former ones, closer attention towards identity acts as its own attribute—without the very being according to the particular identity there is no being at all, while any attempt to conceal either whole identity or any of its manifestations often causes massive surge of multiple new unpredictable identities.

In general, conventionally considered as a part of tradition, cultural paradigm and the politics of identity based upon it have always been closely interlinked with the processes of construction, functioning and reformations in the countries of South and Central Asian regions, being reflected in interaction of various actors of local, intra-and inter-regional levels. Within the conditions of global transformations, cultural paradigm here takes on additional, even deeper and diversified importance and value. On the one hand, being smoothed out by the processes of globalisation, and on the other hand it acts as a guarantor and surety for maintenance and development of country and regional uniqueness, allows to preserve civilisational and geographical identity and, therefore, contributes to more reasonable perception and adaptation of external trends and vagaries, as well as to more balanced entry of Central and South Asian states into the global arena. However, being an umbilical between these states, cultural identity can hinder the process of rapprochement of individual countries within regions, predetermining their differently directed foreign political and economic orientation, encumber their entry to the world arena as a single integrated unit, as well as generate in-country volatility along various split-lines. All these controversial phenomena require due consideration of relevant theories of identity and identity-based conflicts.

It should be emphasised here that, as one knows, in any ‘multi-society’ (and exactly this for a long time is the case of the societies in many countries of both regions) there has always been acute a problem of adoption or rejection of a genuine pluralism. At that, the question of ‘multi-society’ per se can be solved in two different ways: either through the acceptance of the very phenomenon of ‘multi-’ at the institutional level and its further development, or through forced assimilation of minorities, their imposition with cultural paradigm, worldview and hence the overall identity of the majority.

Thus, with regard to the regions of Central and South Asia, of special importance is to examine the whole range of identities, including ethnic, religious, linguistic and other components, as well as to perform analysis of friction processes emerging from them. It also seems appropriate to compare both situations generated by the set of identities and mechanisms of their regulation and optimisation in the two regions, in particular, on the example of Kazakhstan and India.

Dimensions and Manifestations of Identities

As a rule, in the extensive range of theoretical literature, there can be found one of three main generally recognised approaches towards the perception and the study of ethnicity as well as ethno-cultural identity imprescriptibly related to it: primordial concept (ethnicity is regarded as primary and natural characteristic of the anthropological communities); constructivism (ethnicity is considered an artificial formation having no original cultural grounds and demonstrating its group solidarity in imagined sign-symbolic form); and instrumentalism (ethnicity is interpreted as a kind of tool used by political leaders in their struggle for power, but at the same time as something alien to the wide masses). On the basis of differences in these approaches, there are formulated various, sometimes surprisingly contradicting, definitions of ethnicity and ethnic identity, accentuating these or another aspects of both. Thus, according to F. Barth, ethnicity is a set of delineated boundaries between neighbouring groups, and individuals are primarily concerned with maintaining these boundaries in order to explain one’s identity, often in a relative, comparative manner; R. Cohen, on the other hand, disputes Barth’s assertion by explaining that ethnicity is not so concrete or black-and-white, but rather a fluid concept by which members distinguish ‘in-groups’ from ‘out-groups’, and which can be in a state of constant change due to various situational applications (Modzelewski, 2004).

As for nationalism, in some studies, it appears as a phenomenon associated with ethnicity, in others these concepts are abruptly separated. While the concept of ethnos and ethnicity, being a primary one, is notable rather for its biological and geographical characteristics with objective anthropological and cultural value (although often has features usually inherent to the nation), the phenomenon of nation, being a secondary one, has a greater degree of ‘state’ expression and determines the socio-political aspect of personal and ethnic positioning. Therefore, ethnic identity is characterised as part of social identity of the individual and acts as a psychological category, while in the concept of ‘nation’, there can be seen a manifestation of not only biological, geographical and other principles but also of collective identity and self-consciousness that makes individuals belonging to it see themselves as something unique in its kind. As a result, nationalism is considered sometimes as an ideology, sometimes as a political doctrine and at times as an experience or feeling, and is based on parameters such as the commonality of territory, historical culture, mentality and so on. Depending upon the particular interpretation of nationalism and, of course, upon the particular practical situation, it can be either equated to the manifestation of patriotism or be perceived and used as a sign of chauvinism and exclusivity.

With regard to linguistic identity, one can argue that despite all the complexity and ambiguity of this phenomenon, here it should only be emphasised that language is fairly considered as one of the most important factors in origination and, what is more, in formation of ethnic identity.

In many countries and regions of the world, the ethnic component of cultural identity—along with linguistic and geographical components inextricably linked with it—is either inherently or artificially given a certain value. This situation is characteristic, besides other countries, for Kazakhstan, with its in many respects nominal, but nevertheless recognised differentiation of representatives of the titular nation upon linguistic-regional (patois of northern, southern, western Kazakhs), historical-regional (zhuzes) and linguistic-cultural (‘nagyz’ and ‘shala’ Kazakh) principles. In part, a similar situation is typical for India as well, where, in spite of many other dividing lines, the opposition on the basis of North-South is the most striking example of manifestation of ethno-cultural constituent. Analogous situation also could be seen in Pakistan, whose provinces are also to a large extent divided along ethno-linguistic lines and interact with the centre on this very basis.

However in general, for example, the problem of differences between North and South ethno-cultural paradigms in India at the level of identity only—without meddling of external and, as a rule, temporary factors of socio-political nature—rarely assumed a character of any serious confrontation or conflict. Of particular importance in this case is an all-embracing Hindu religious and philosophical identity, which despite all the possible elements of regional nuances, almost always very successfully overlapped its other variations; at the political level, an important role is also played by a positive factor of federalism and India’s position on the Tamil-Sinhala conflict in neighbouring Sri Lanka. The very emphasis upon this proximity and/or commonality, naturally maintained at the public level (including the representatives of scientific, spiritual and intellectual circles) and actively promoted by the official state level through various methods within the doctrine of multiculturalism, promotes the maintenance by the representatives of both the North and the South of their common Indian identity not only in ethno-geographical, but also in the political-administrative, cultural and civilisational senses, so that often for an outside observer, it is difficult at all to notice any differences and to separate on this basis the northerner-Aryans from the southerner-Dravidians. And though in Kazakhstani practice similar unifying function—and also very successfully—is performed by just a combination of even if natural, but nonetheless critically significant ‘national tolerance’ along with the officially promulgated ‘multiculturalism’ without any acute need for external ‘best-practice’ borrowings, but a constructive part of the mentioned practices in both countries should be mutually interesting and even useful for governments and societies.

To undertake an attempt of a brief comparative analysis of extra-institutional factors of religious mentality, namely, religious identity and confessional conflictogenity, one can make the following observations.

While ethnic and even national (unless the latter is associated with an elementary factor of citizenship) identity, being natural, cannot be changed during the lifetime of any individual, the identity of religion, regarded as artificial, may vary for unlimited number of times up to being absent altogether (atheism in its strict interpretation). However, historically ethnic and religious identities have often been considered in complex, inseparably from each other, and moreover, could mutually replace one another. Thus, in the medieval period, the entire population of Kazakhstan was defined as ‘Muslims’ that virtually eliminated the question of a particular ethnic origin of its individual representatives; the entire population of India is still erroneously called ‘Hindus’ that also formally eliminates the presence of representatives of Islam, Sikhism, Buddhism and other faiths in this country. Not infrequently even nowadays the artificial religious identity is ‘imposed’ by some natural features: in Kazakhstan, any representative of Kazakh ethnic group is seen as a Sunni Muslim, Russian—as Orthodox Christian, etc. This demonstrates a quite close connection between religious and national identities (self-consciousnesses), when any certain creed is perceived not only as a religious system, but also as a natural cultural environment, national way of life.

In addition, at present—especially in the modernised and modernising societies—the absence or diffusiveness of religious identity (the so-called freedom of religion—‘free belief’ or ‘religious cosmopolitanism’) are recognised as welfare, desirable circumstance promoting the development of true inter-religious dialogue and contributing to the formation of religious tolerance and mutual understanding.

At the same time, of the peoples of Central and South Asia there has always been characteristic certain vagueness, amorphousness of religious mentality—or rather, the ability (and, more importantly, the socially approved permissibility) to combine elements of different religions and beliefs. For example, in India, it has manifested and is still evident, particularly, in the syncretic religion of Akbar named ‘din-I Illahi’ as well as in religious synthesis of spiritual ideas of Mahatma Gandhi; in the fact that in the Hindus’ domestic shrine rooms Christian icons, images of Buddhist saints, Sikh teachers, as well as Muslim and Zoroastrian symbols peacefully coexist with images and statues of Hindu deities as such; in the possibility to be a Buddhist while professing any other religion(s), and so forth. In Kazakhstan, a ‘soft’ variant of Islam (contributing to the popular semi-joke about Kazakhs as ‘Muslims who eat bacon’) does not prevent them and other Turkic peoples to adhere to shamanistic or Tengrian rituals and paraphernalia, up to the appeals of some Kazakhs to replace Islam to the ‘native Turkic’ Tengrism; there is also evident a similar reverence for the Prophet and the pre-Islamic or semi-Islamic saints, etc.

Talking of the functions of religion, it should be noted that in both India and Kazakhstan (and to certain extent in their regions), they alternated in importance in various periods, but in the first place there were usually integrating and compensatory functions.

Thus, compensatory variant was characteristic of South Asia throughout its whole history, and this role was played by virtually all religions prevailing in the subcontinent. Vedism-Brahmanism tolerated inclusion on a fairly high positions within Indian society of representatives of some non-Aryan tribes; before the Christian Era, Buddhism and Jainism provided the low-and out-caste Hindus with opportunities to improve their social position—a similar role was later played by Islam and Christianity, while Sikhism all over was and is based upon the ‘special status’ of its adherents, etc. The integrating function of religion here has acted well on intra-religious level, but has quite rarely manifested on interreligious one, for excessive integration within separate religions, up to the mental and physical separateness of their individual adherents, often involves the potential for religious conflicts, which precipitates erosion and even complete rupture of the national identity.

Contrariwise, announcement of Islam as official religion in the Central Asian Qarakhanid state rather pursued the tasks of relative social integration, even unification, of the Turkic peoples within a certain administrative territory; however, since the profession of this religion did not give any significant benefits, Islam here has not acquired its ‘full’ form. Compensatory function of religion in present-day Central Asia has proved itself within the context of giving up the Soviet version of atheism, when referring to religion, albeit without deriving any social and/or economic benefits, has become for many people necessary and essential in raising their moral comfort, or so-called ‘religious well-being’—a concept once referred to by H.G. Koenig and his co-authors (Koenig, McCullough & Larson, 2001, p. 8). At the same time, integrative function here receded into the background, right up to imparting religious identity with just supporting, secondary role for the sake of achieving general purpose of preservation of the whole complex of historical-cultural and modern national identities.

Nowadays, with regard to the religious aspect, it may be noted that the two constitutionally secular and at the same time multi-religious states—Kazakhstan and India—are facing similar challenges of socio-political nature. First of all, this is a desire to unify their citizens belonging to various historical-cultural formations, including confessional ones, within the common national-civil concepts of, respectively, ‘Kazakhstanis’ and ‘Indians’ (not to be mixed with ‘Hindus’). India is known throughout the world as an embodiment of ‘unity in diversity’; Kazakhstan also performs a policy of combining ‘diversity into oneness’. Moreover, the majority of Indian researchers ascertain the fact of arrival of Islam in South Asia in its moderate form, mostly in the form of Sufism which has many parallels with an all-Indian cultural-religious concept of bhakti, from the very territory of Central Asia. It is also interesting that in both countries, there is observed the exaggeration of the role of religion in each other and at the same time, the mutual recognition of constructive achievements in this sphere.

All this definitely forms the basis of convergence between Kazakhstan and India, despite the fact that both states face problems pertaining to the physical aspect of religious identity. In India, along with all-state successes in achieving interreligious tolerance, there is a shortage of such tolerance in everyday life (in particular, the well-known problem of communalism), while in Kazakhstan this problem never arose. At the same time, the weakness of Kazakhstan in this area lies in the inherited from the Soviet period extremely tough and obviously out-dated interpretation of sects and sectarianism, that is, along with acknowledgement of the overall right for coexistence of various religions, the opportunity to practice certain persuasions within the frameworks of any religion is limited by their status of either ‘legalised’ or ‘destructive and hence prohibited’. In India, such a problem cannot find place, given the very religious specifics of this country.

Hence, in the display of certain elements of religious mentality, in the two states there are seen moments of similarity and difference. At that, the overall situation in Kazakhstan appears to be ‘more tolerant’ due to both the peculiarities of historical development and small—in comparison with India—population size, which facilitates control of the destructive religious potential. However, the experience of both countries is of considerable mutual value that necessitates its more detailed mutual learning and selective use in stabilising and/or preventive purposes, to eliminate or mitigate any relevant troubles, and in this area a real cooperation between the two countries for exchanging experiences also seems to be expedient.

Theory and Practice of Identity-based Conflicts

To widely address an issue of conflict-prone potential of the whole complex of identities by performing a comparison of the situation in Central and South Asia, it is possible to make the following remarks.

First of all, of some interest in this regard is the interactionist approach to the conflicts study, with the role theories and the theory of reference groups. Researchers operating within the frameworks of this approach have shown that in the self-perception of any individual a leading position occupies his/her social status and belonging or affiliation to certain groups, rather than personal qualities and characteristics. At that, the hierarchy of these categories, first, is different for individuals belonging to the same group (for one, more important is social, for second, ethnic and for third, confessional affiliation, etc.), and second, it changes over time depending on specific situations. In South Asia, for instance, in the time of separation of East Bengal from Pakistan, for Bengalis their unique ethnic and linguistic identities have overlapped all-Pakistani Islamic, that is, religious one. A striking example in relation to the Central Asian republics of the former USSR is replacement of the role of Soviet atheist person with the role of Muslim representative of the titular nation. The proponents of the role theories consider the inter-role conflicts as a physical disability of any individual or group of individuals to fulfil all his/her/their roles—both prescribed and achieved. This is especially characteristic of marginalised individuals simultaneously belonging to multiple conflicting groups, who usually are forced to make a choice in favour of one of them and, therefore, completely turn away from all others. This, for instance, very acutely manifested during the partition of British India in 1947; the same threat has arisen, but, fortunately, did not realise in respect of members of interethnic families in the states of Central Asia.

In the theory of reference groups (i.e., these which the individual associates or tends to associate his/her with), such groups are defined as either positive or negative. From this point of view, own ethnic group or denomination are perceived as positive, while all other ethnic groups or confessions as negative reference groups (although there are also found diametrically opposite situations, when an individual desires to change own reference group because of his/her uncomfortable position within it—as happened, in particular, while adopting Islam by many representatives of Central and South Asia in the medieval period).

Applicable in this regard is also a concept of ‘culture shock’, which refers to the shock of the new. The hypothesis of culture shock is based upon the fact that the experience of a new culture is either unpleasant or shocking partly because it is unexpected, and partly because it can lead to negative evaluation of one’s own culture. Moreover, the culture shock ‘is experienced not only by the visitors, but by the visited’ (Ward, Bochner & Furnham, 2001, p. xiv), and this often causes a ‘malfunction’ in the role expectations and self-identification. Something like this happened in South Asia during the initial stages of interaction of Aryans and Dravidians; the same was the case during the medieval contacts of Muslims who came from outside the sub-continent with adherents of indigenous religious beliefs. All of this, obviously, has also become an integral part of ethnic and religious contradictions in the region, especially since both the original Indian religions and Islam cause predominantly fatal locus of control among its adherents, and thus make them more vulnerable to cultural shock. Perhaps for the same reason, in Central Asia more tolerant in terms of ethno-confessional identities are these peoples who are considered by some as ‘not quite’ the Muslim ones. However, it is now becoming increasingly difficult to clearly identify such peoples: along with Kazakhs and Kyrgyzs recalling their Tengrian heritage, some Tajiks revive Zoroastrian ideas, while many Uighurs sincerely appreciate the fact of their ancestors’ adherence to Buddhism.

There are a number of theories considering the phenomenon of cultural (including ethnic, linguistic and confessional) identity with regard to its conflict potential. Without going into their details, it should be noted that in most studies as generally accepted (although not limited to them) causes of emergence and/or exacerbation of inter-ethnic and inter-religious conflicts, there are mentioned the following ones.

First, cultural and linguistic differences which, despite all the trends towards assimilation and integration, demonstrate their extreme resistance in almost all more or less heterogeneous societies, especially in those which are characterised by a high social and geographical mobility of population. Integrative attempts to form a ‘popular’ or ‘multicultural’ society almost never lead to the complete obliteration of ethnic or/and religious differences, but on the contrary, often result in the revival of ethno-confessional identity, which further creates various preconditions to use this factor as a platform for raising group requirements. Problems of such nature were characteristic of the South Asian countries during the first decades of their independence; fortunately, in the republics of Central Asia this factor did not become too crucial. So, in India, such a factor can sometimes display itself, for example, in the identification of Urdu and Punjabi languages with Islam and Sikhism respectively; in Kazakhstan, the propaganda of Kazakh language has never and by nobody been identified with the process of Islamisation.

Second, the revitalisation of the various levels of identity as a result of national liberation struggle in many formerly colonial countries, that leads to the appearance of active political leaders not only of the nation-wide scale, but also within certain ethnic and/or religious minorities. Even after the end of the struggle with outside enemies, these leaders through inertia, but sometimes because of unfavourable new conditions that emerged for their ethnic group or denomination, seek either a greater share of political power at the centre or some form of local autonomy. Moreover, often, following the liberation of the whole nation, they initiate own struggle for defending the rights of their ethnic or religious minorities to self-determination as an equal member of the international political system, as a nation among nations. A striking example is the Pakistani concept of ‘nation-confession’—a relative example, various requirements of Xingjian’s Turkic minorities. In the very religious aspect of South Asia, something like this is observed in the socio-political requirements of the north-western tribes of India emphasising their Christian identity, as well as in the confrontation between Hindu Tamils and Buddhist Sinhalese in Sri Lanka. Quite the contrary, in Kazakhstan even demands of some radical groupings of the ‘revival of the Caliphate’ do not pursue any solitary-group goals, but are rather focused upon the majority of the population. ‘Perhaps the most frequently invoked geopolitical concept of international relations in the twentieth century is the principle of self-determination…referred to as “secession”, “decolonization” and “ethnic separatism” […] As the modern concept of nation developed, the concept of self-determination developed too’ (Knight, 1983, p. 148). Something similar to this happens, in particular, in South Asian Kashmir.

Third, the presence in many multi-ethnic and multi-religious countries of elements of historically conditioned and long-existing social and economic inequality of various ethnic groups or confessions, which puts a question about either current or future status and group rights of the minorities. When economic and social inequality coincides with language and/or cultural differences, there is not rarely emerges a system of ethnic stratification. Often, class conflict and ethnic conflict complement each other and create a powerful impetus for changes. In the places where such differences are combined with specific territorial borders, this force most often takes the form of a nationalist movement aimed at achieving full independence from the dominant majority. In South Asia, such a problem has existed for centuries, and so far by today has lost its acuteness. In Central Asia, this situation has not led to serious conflicts as well: previously dominated Slavic ethnic groups in political (but not in social and economic) aspect simply switched the roles with titular ones. Here one can also notice the issue of intensified socio-economic development, particularly in the early stages of economic modernisation and reforms that strengthens mutual ethnic and religious isolation due to exacerbation of competition for the distribution of resources, benefits and privileges, including the fear of losing something which not just ‘must’ belong to any particular ethnic or religious group, but which was with such difficulty ‘dug up’ in the course of struggle for national liberation. In India in religious sense there appeared a paradoxical situation: the Muslims, who politically dominated there for many centuries, now consider themselves, though not well-grounded enough, to be one of the most oppressed and deprived minorities and seek to attain the ‘former high status’. In Central Asia, such a situation did not lead to serious negative consequences: again, previously dominated Christian ethnic groups in the political (but not in socio-economic) aspect simply swapped with the Muslim titular ones. Moreover, the role of religion here failed to surpass the role of ethnicity, and socio-economic factors do not play too crucial role in the interaction of various denominations; their relative equality in this aspect, as well as the fact of representatives of the dominant Muslim confession being both the uppermost and the lowermost within the overall society rather reduce socio-economic tensions on the line of religious identity.

Fourth, as an independent or indirectly associated with other ones, there is mentioned the factor of historically emerged irrational and hence virtually irreconcilable opposition between certain ethnic groups or religions (i.e., ‘pure’ ethnic or religious identity as it is). Here, any current situation, specifics of development and present status of the conflicting ethnic groups or/and confessions relative to each other could scarcely change the overall negative ideology of their interaction, since mental phenomenon of identity is not always amenable to correction by physical measures. Therefore, the above-mentioned aspects under their unfavourable scenario could just overlap/collide each other and even more exacerbate such a confrontation between ethnic groups or religions, but almost no positive state of affairs could weaken the latter. Relatively one may include here, for example, the Aryan-Dravidian issue of historically-based variance and religious ‘self-isolation’ of Sikhs in South Asia. Also relatively and even at a stretch it is possible to include here a historical dissection of the Central Asian region into the settled and nomadic parts, which, however, has been rather successfully levelled during the Soviet period. In addition, in particular, in Kazakhstan as more important could be considered sometimes quite a perceivable opposition between the supporters of religious modernism on one hand and fundamentalism within Islam on another, as well as some aggressive actions of domestic level by Christian sectarian groups.

Fifth, changes in ethno-demographic or confessional situation being a result of migration processes or differences in the growth rates of certain ethnic or religious groups, which break the previously formed system of stratification and position of one ethnic/religions group in relation to other(s), thus exacerbating interethnic and interreligious rivalries. Even an objective population growth both on an international scale and in individual regions gradually causes a steady physical contiguity and further contact between previously never contacted ethnic and religious groups, which can lead, among other things, to the emergence of conflict situations between them. In ‘ethno-contact’ zones, especially in large cities which are so many in the countries of South Asian region, relations between the various ethnic (ethno-racial, ethno-linguistic, ethno-religious, etc.) groups pose quite a significant cultural and social problem. However, in the republics of Central Asia there are just the very large cities that for centuries up to now should be considered the centres of tolerance and most conflict-free coexistence of various ethnic groups and confessions.

Sixth, a number of researchers perceive the emergence and escalation of ethnic, religious and other identity-based conflicts simply as a sign of either weak or ‘too traditional’ state. In the first case, the authorities cannot keep under control any centrifugal and other trends (for instance, the civil war in Tajikistan and notorious conflicts in Kyrgyzstan), in the second, the state favours any particular ethno-religious group or region and such a preference fuels conflicts situation. Here one may also include a theory of plural society which is segmented, divided into distinct groupings each of which possesses such individual features as its own religion, culture, language, worldview and the way of life, occupies certain niche in the system of specialisation of labour; in social aspect, the groupings are autonomous and contacts between them, dictated by the necessity, are of purely functional character. In such a society, social stratification is accompanied and finally cemented by differences, including ethno-religious ones, while an overall stability and internal communications are provided either by outside force—a metropolis, or by own state. This theory is generally applicable to the South Asian region both of the colonial and of modern periods; same can be assumed in relation to Central Asia during Soviet era.

Identity Transfigured by Migration

If to refer to the issue of identity within the context of South–Central Asian social interaction partially being realised through mutual migrations, one can make some interesting observations.

Regarding Indian migrants, it is appropriate to cite M. Hussain, who notes that

the Indian diaspora in Central Asia cannot be seen as one homogeneous model of identity that equally serves all members of a group; there are shifting levels of identity as for conflicting and contesting designs. There have been deconstruction and reconstruction of identities for the Indian diaspora. (Hussain, 2013, p. 313)

Provisionally, all representatives of India usually temporarily and only occasionally permanently residing in the Central Asian republics can be divided into four main groups.

The first group consists of employees of Indian embassies in these republics, who represent various ethno-religious groups, though do not maintain Indian linguistic identity because of its replacement by the universal English one. Due to rather significant public activity of these embassies (various mass events, activities of cultural centres, participation in conferences, etc.), many locals project their impression of representatives of the Indian diplomatic corps to the entire population of this country and on this basis draw, though not always accurate, conclusions about the general Indian identity. It is noteworthy that Indian embassies often extend their functions of ‘protector and caretaker’ to the representatives of other states of the South Asian region, for which India acts as an ‘elder brother’. For example, citizens of Bangladesh, Sri Lanka and other South Asian countries residing in the Central Asian republics can sometimes be invited to the internal activities of Indian embassies.

The second group includes businessmen who, unlike representatives of Indian trade diaspora of previous generations, much less spiritually integrate with the local population in terms of people-to-people contacts and usually hold an impersonal global ‘business’ identity.

The third important group is formed by Indian students. This is one of the most cohesive (albeit not necessarily closed) ethnic groups for whom inter-group communication and interaction is always more important than the external one. This is facilitated by their more or less compact staying in the so-called ‘Indian hostels’, as well as by the need for mutual assistance, since it is this very socio-ethnic group that is the most vulnerable in the face of the local population. Therefore, the probability of inclusion of representatives of local population into the Indian students’ environment is higher than the likelihood of entry of Indian students into the groups of local people, which contributes to the preservation and maintenance of their original identity. It is also important to note that cases of more or less close interaction of Indian and Pakistani students studying in Kazakhstan are quite frequent—a situation possible only outside of South Asia.

Finally, the fourth group is represented by Indians over quite a long period of time living and working in the Central Asian republics, who are spiritual preachers, yoga masters, invited Hindi language teachers and so on, that is, who promote Indian culture, religion and lifestyle—everything that is somehow connected with the very factor of identity. It is noteworthy in this regard that Indian embassy representatives are not very reluctant to accept the invitations of Indian spiritual preachers and yogis, as well as other adepts of Indian philosophy and culture in Central Asia (in particular, the representatives of the Indian Embassy in Kazakhstan practically did not visit the local Iskon-Temple even on the birthday of Lord Krishna even at the invitation of Kazakhstani Krishnaites, associating them more with the global Krishna-bhakts network rather than with India).

In general, Central Asia for centuries remains for Indians one of the most convenient places of residence and work, because there still remains certain cultural and civilisational commonality up to community of populations of India and Central Asia based upon the historical complex of identities.

As for the representatives of the Central Asian republics residing in India most of whom are students (along with diplomatic corps’ workers and owners or employees of joint ventures), here in the course of field studies, the paper’s author has made the following observations.

Provisionally, students from Central Asia can be divided into three ‘mental’ groups. The first one includes those who prefer to stay in their own ethnic-national environs or, as it is used to be said in India, the circle of ‘CIS-people’, and who avoid representatives of the local population as well as foreigners. The second group is formed by students who after coming to India gradually distance themselves from own and other CIS countries’ compatriots and side with the local population (usually, though not always, due to a strong influence of any Hindu, Muslim or Buddhist religious-philosophical organisation or entire system) or with foreigners from other states. The most numerous third group consists of these students who adhere to the balanced approach and almost equally interact with both ‘owns’ and ‘aliens’.

As a rule, because of sometimes inadequate activity of embassies of the Central Asian republics, students from these countries gravitate towards the Russian embassy. This embassy by force of habit perceives such students as their former USSR compatriots, though every year gives them lesser and lesser attention as well. Under these conditions, of particular importance for students from Central Asian and other CIS countries studying in India becomes an informal system of mutual assistance and support that, according to the author’s observations, is one of the most powerful above-national systems of such a nature existing in India. Although there may be some relative nationalistic contradictions between the representatives (mostly of titular nations) of various Central Asian states, in general the Central Asians present a strong consolidated group, and their historical cultural and civilisational identical community is manifested in India (as, incidentally, in many other foreign countries) even more explicitly than inside Central Asia—the case same to Indians and Pakistanis abroad. Therefore, in India, there is preferred to be talked not about Kazakh, Uzbek, Tajik and other ethnics, but rather about the Central Asian or wider ‘Soviet’ ethnic component and its corresponding identity.

Attempts to consolidate students from Central Asia staying in India are also undertaken by individuals or organisations pursuing their own goals, in particular, by the citizens of Turkey. Beyond their desire to ‘gather all students from Central Asia for friendly fellowship’, there are easily seen the purposes of promoting Pan-Turkic (and possibly simultaneously Pan-Islamic) unity and identity, which is immediately expressed, in particular, in hostile attitude towards Central Asian students of Slavic and other non-Turkic origins. Indian organisations—both official (such as the Indian Council for Cultural Relations) and informal (for example, religious organisation Hindu Heritage Pratisthan)—also work in this direction. And though the main goal of the Indian Council for Cultural Relations lies in the unification of all foreign students studying in India, but manifestation of their national and cultural identities are also warmly welcomed.

Of course, one should not forget about the phenomenon of Central Asian students receiving religious education (especially in Pakistan), but this aspect requires separate consideration.

Thus, based upon the above-stated arguments, one can see that the perception of personal and collective identity(s) in native and in alien conditions could be different, sometimes to a great extent. And if self-sufficient embassy workers, businessmen and spiritual preachers are less liable to variation of their identities in any conditions, then students, being relatively more vulnerable group, are more prone to this circumstance.

Conclusion

As proved by the performed analytical review, the situation in individual countries and in the whole regions of South and Central Asia somewhere confirms and in some cases denies the listed basic theories, approaches and postulates regarding understanding and scientific preference of identity-related concepts, as well as regarding formation and development of identity-based situations, including conflicts. It seems that this fact should be taken into account by states and societies/communities (or society/community) of these two regions in order to reduce the effect of negative and to raise the role of positive aspects. However, it is quite possible to argue that even the most ‘explosive’ forms of identity that could sometimes lead to irrational conflicts, should not be considered only in terms of their risk potential. In general, the factor of ethno-linguistic and confessional identity is a sphere that contains the alternative—positive and negative— potential.

Thus, to solve separate as well as complex problems related to manifestation of the identity factor, both the state and civil society in South Asia (in particular, India) proposes to accept and actually accepts—with varying order of alternation, combination, dosing, degree of concrete implementation, etc.—measures of a two-sided multidirectional, but at the same time complementary character.

On the one hand, an emphasis is placed upon the needs of minorities having been formed on the basis of any identity as opposed to the relative majority, that is, the individual and/or narrow-group interests are placed above national civil ones. First of all, the relevant provisions regulating such a mechanism are enshrined by the very Indian Constitution, which generally stresses upon the all-Indian secular identity and the fundamental democratic equality of all citizens (unlike, for example, the Constitution of Pakistan, which accentuates the role of Islam as the determinant of confessional identity and all physical aspects related to it).

On the other hand, the general emphasis here is placed upon a single national identity and an equality of all citizens regardless of their one or more ‘keeping aloof’ identities, that is, the question of correlation between the interests of minorities and the majority simply annihilates, being replaced by the unification of citizens in their private and collective rights. Exactly this option is preferred by many representatives of Indian civil society regardless of their immediate identity, since it is in such a mechanism there is seen the most effective and long-lasting solution to the identities problem. In this connection, popular is reference to Jawaharlal Nehru, who in turn referred to the words of Mahatma Gandhi that ‘I shall work for an India in which…all communities shall live in perfect harmony… Indian culture…is neither Hindu, Islamic, nor any other, wholly. It is a fusion of all’ (Nehru, 1985, p. 391). It is noteworthy that some authors propose to consider the identity factor not as a potential threat, but as a blessing inseparable from another good—the foundations of Indian democracy:

The multiple communitarian affiliations—religious, linguistic, regional, class and caste…called for a more nuanced configuration of the relationship between nationalism and democracy in the subcontinent. At the same time, discrimination and exploitation…as well as inequalities across lines of community and region made it imperative to forge a conception of sustainable democracy linked to equitable development. (Bose & Jalal, 2011, p. 3)

There are also supporters of combination of both abovementioned approaches on the basis of equating the all-national identity with the identity of the majority, in other words, of encouraging minorities to ‘adapt’ to the interests of the majority and to accept them. Along with the apologists of Hindutwa, similar position is adhered to by individuals and groups not associated with any identity related ideology, as well as by some representatives of minorities. In practice, as was noted, there is a combination of all these approaches depending on the short-, medium-and long-term goals and needs of the Indian state and society.

The most important and advantageous in this connection is the use by India of its identity (more precisely, a complex of identities) for achieving and realising the purposes of cultural diplomacy (‘soft power’). As Indian authors point out in this regard, India promotes itself as a Hindu country for other Hindu states, as a country with the maximum absolute number of Muslims for Islamic countries, for the Buddhist states, as a homeland of this religion, for Western democracies she propagates traditional and modern all-Indian values like yoga, Ayurveda, adapted trends within Hinduism, Bollywood, etc., at that generally being a multi-identical secular state.

With regard to the Central Asian, in particular, Kazakhstani practice, it can be noted that the Republic of Kazakhstan also having achieved through the joint coordinated efforts of the state and society almost complete set of internal positive results in terms of management and utilisation of the phenomenon of ‘multi-’, actively and purposefully positions itself in a similar vein on the global arena. Indeed, internally yet for the decades and even centuries being the multiethnic and multi-religious state, Kazakhstan (in many aspects similar to India) has become a place where various cultures and traditions have mixed and enriched each other; as believed by majority there, its Eurasian roots allow country’s population to connect the Eastern–Asian and the Western–European flows and to create a unique Kazakhstani model of a multicultural society. And since independence, the government of Kazakhstan has acted decisively to promote the cohesion and stability of its unique multiethnic and multi-religious society by implementing progressive citizenship and language laws.

On domestic level, it seems enough to mention the perennial activities of the Assembly of the Peoples of Kazakhstan, since certain time for obvious reasons renamed the Assembly of the People of Kazakhstan, as well as the annually convened Congress of Leaders of World and Traditional Religions, both of which serve the purposes of general (and not only country-scale) identity-based stability and security. At the external level, an illustrative example is the Kazakhstani initiative of the Conference on Interaction and Confidence-Building Measures in Asia (actively supported by the Indian side among others), which personifies the aspiration towards realisation of the phenomenon of ‘multi-’ at the international level. As has been stated from the very beginning of the CICA initiative,

the deepening and broadening of political and economic cooperation between Member States of the Asian region and the process of universalisation of democratic institutions will thus receive an additional and positive impetus. At the same time, the cultural identity and national features of the Asian States will be preserved and developed… Moreover, there should be coordinated views and identity common approaches for the realisation of the practical aims of CICA. (Kazakhstan: Commemorating 10 Years of Independence, 2001, p. 23)

Therefore, reference to the identity and its prudent and judicious use in various fields can appear greatly wholesome and able to bring significant dividends. At that, the deeper is historical (civilisational) background of ethnic, linguistic, religious and other identities, the stronger is political and social will to positively utilise them—the more effective and versatile could be a successful application of the overall politics of identity. And what is no less important, rather than accentuate identity induced problems and challenges (up to sometimes excessive artificial making heavy weather of and scaremongering), one should better stress upon objective identity-based achievements, benefits and future possibilities!