India on Humanitarian Intervention and Responsibility to Protect: Shifting Nuances

Abstract

India’s opposition to humanitarian intervention has been influenced by its colonial experience and its predisposition towards the principles of sovereignty and non-intervention. However, India did not adopt a strident opposition in the post-Cold War due to the changed power configuration. The article discusses how India adopted a cautious approach and yet used every opportunity to remind the international community the baleful effect of intervention in the internal affairs. After securing concession to a considerable extent on the ambitious Responsibility to Protect (R2P) and when most of the countries showed an inclination to accept humanitarian intervention in the form of ‘R2P’ at the UN summit in 2005, India grudgingly went along accepting it. India participated in the deliberation on the implementation of R2P and took its stand on various crises in which R2P was evoked. The experience of NATO’s Libya operation under R2P was regarded as substantiation of India’s apprehension of the misuse of the concept, and India reverted its position to the sceptical view of humanitarian intervention/R2P. By mere complaining about the mixing of peace enforcement with peacekeeping, when the United Nations deployed ‘intervention brigade’ for the protection of civilians, India lost the opportunity to take the initiative to propose a new mechanism to deal with the humanitarian crisis in atrocious internal conflicts.

Keywords

Sovereignty non-intervention internal conflict humanitarian intervention respon-sibility to protect responsibility while protecting protection of civilian

Humanitarian intervention is one of the most contrasted issues in the post-Cold War era and the developing countries, including India, resisted its emergence as a doctrine. Historically, intervention has a negative connotation in international relations as it is always the strong states that intervene in the affairs of weaker states. For the first time, the principle of non-intervention became a corollary of the principle of sovereign equality under Article 2 of the UN Charter. State sovereignty has been fortified by the Article 2(4), which clearly prohibits the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state. In fact, the UN Charter attempted to make it illegal to ‘use force’ as an instrument of state policy. It allowed the ‘use of force’ only on two counts, namely, collective action authorised by the UN Security Council under Article 42, and the right to self-defence under Article 51. The principle of non-intervention has been reiterated in the UN Declaration on Friendly Relations. Its preamble paragraph states, ‘the practice of any form of intervention not only violates the spirit and letter of the Charter but also leads to the creation of situations which threaten international peace and security’ (UN Document, 1970). Both these principles are a crucial aspect of the ordering system of the state-centric international relations. They are particularly highly cherished by the developing countries, including India, and they jealously guard them as they are the bulwark to wanton intervention by the Great Powers.

These principles have become less sacrosanct in the post-Cold War due to the absence of strong countervailing force to restrain the remaining major powers. In fact, the increased cooperation and unanimity among the permanent members of the UN Security Council at the initial stage empowered the Council to address internal conflicts as well. The UN Security Council justified intervention in internal affairs on humanitarian grounds. Humanitarian intervention has been defined as follows:

the use of force across state borders by a state or group of states aimed at preventing or ending widespread and grave violations of the fundamental human rights of individuals other than its own citizens, without the permission of [the] government of the state within whose territory, force is applied. (Holzgrefe, 2003, p. 18)

Various justifications are cited for intervention, such as the provision of food for the people in a war zone, the protection of humanitarian aid workers and supply systems, to prevent dictatorial regimes from persecuting other ethnic groups and carrying out ethnic cleansing, and so on. By these justifications, it appears that a shift has occurred away from purely geopolitical interventionism to the direction of supporting humanitarian claims to alleviate human suffering (Falk, 1996, p. 25). The UN Secretary-General Javier Perez de Cuellar also alluded to the change in the traditional view of the sovereignty and inviolability of the state when he stated:

We are clearly witnessing what is probably an irresistible shift in public attitudes towards the belief that the defence of the oppressed in the name of morality should prevail over frontiers and a legal document. (UN Press Release, 1991)

From a purely normative perspective, this shift is a welcome development as it involves the benevolent act of saving strangers from suffering. However, a lack of concomitant reorientation of the state’s behaviour towards more non-statist globalist perspective exposes the dichotomy between justification based on morality and other motivations of the interveners. This dichotomy has given rise to anxiety in India and has constrained it from providing enthusiastic support to the practice of humanitarian intervention and later grudgingly accepted the idea of Responsibility to Protect (R2P) at the UN Summit of 2005. After the experience of NATO’s Libya operation under the R2P, India reverted to its stand of scepticism.

This article first lays out why India has been sensitive to intervention and how its stand on interventions by the Great Powers during the Cold War was not based on its principled position. Then it discusses how and why India’s stand on intervention had undergone a subtle shift in the post Cold War. Then it attempts to address following questions: why did India initially have a sceptical view of humanitarian intervention? How has this view reflected in its stand on various crises before the United Nations? What made India change its position to a grudging acceptance of the R2P from 2005 onwards? What are the indicators of India’s reluctance and wariness of R2P even after the acceptance in 2005? How did the event of Libya validate its apprehension of the practice of humanitarian intervention/R2P? How did India react when the United Nations seems to concentrate on ‘Protection of Civilian’ (PoC) in recent years? How did India lose out an opportunity to be a norm entrepreneur when the UN developed the practice of peace enforcement in the form of ‘intervention brigade’? These and related issues are the subject matter of this article.

Sensitivity to Intervention

India was one of the late entrants to nation-state system after prolong struggle against the colonial power. It inherited the characteristics of economic dependence and lack of societal cohesion, which made it vulnerability to internal dissension and external interference (Ayoob, 2004, p. 99). Therefore, it accorded priorities to the consolidation of state sovereignty and nation building. Under these circumstances, India prioritised the upholding principles of sovereignty and non-intervention in its foreign policy as they act as a normative barrier against unwanted external intervention. Even in its bilateral relationships, India accorded priority to the principle of non-intervention and non-interference in the internal matters of other countries as manifested in Panchsheel, the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence Agreement (Table 1). India initially signed the agreement with China in 1954 and later became the guiding principle of its bilateral relations with other countries as well.

Table 1.

Panchsheel (Five Principles of Peaceful Co-existence)

1	Mutual respect for each other’s territorial integrity and sovereignty,
2	Mutual non-aggression,
3	Mutual non-interference in each other’s internal affairs,
4	Equality and mutual benefit, and
5	Peaceful co-existence.

Source: Ministry of External Affairs, http://meahindi.nic.in/hindixpsite/celdemo/panchsheel.pdf, accessed on 3 November 2014.

However, in practice, India’s stand on interventions by the Great Powers during the Cold War was not based on its principled position. It varied according to its power equations with the interveners. Its criticism of the US intervention in Vietnam was harsh, whereas it chose to exercise considerable restraint in the cases of the Soviet interventions in Hungary and Afghanistan (Ganguly, 2013, p. 2). Further, India itself has intervened in the internal matters of its neighbours. In fact, India was the first country in the modern era who justified intervention in another country on the ground of humanitarian reason in the context of East Pakistan crisis in 1971. This justification was widely rejected by other states on the ground that the principles of sovereignty and non-interference should take precedence and that India had no right to meddle in what they all viewed as an ‘internal matter’ of Pakistan. Thus, India’s action was ‘widely viewed as a breach of the rules that jeopardized the pillars of inter-state order’ (Wheeler, 2010, p. 55). Under these circumstances, India retracted its humanitarian justification, instead resorted to justifying it as a self-defence measure under Article 51 of the UN Charter.

India’s stand on intervention had undergone a subtle shift in the post Cold War due to systemic change in international relations. The end of the Cold War and the collapse of the Soviet Union were perceived as a triumph of Western political and economic systems. There were more cooperation and understanding among the permanent members of the UN Security Council in the initial stage. Through creative interpretation of the UN Charter, they could not only expand the scope of the UN by making internal conflict as an international concern but also authorised intrusive intervention on humanitarian grounds. Since the early 1990s, several large-scale interventions have been carried out by the Western powers claiming humanitarian concerns as their main raison d’être. While these efforts have attracted varying degrees of criticism of their effectiveness, they received less of criticism on legitimacy ground. It is because, in the transformed international context, most of the states could not muster the courage to point out to the lone superpower and its allies that altruism of their actions was suspect (Ayoob, 2002, p. 87). The practice of humanitarian intervention generated palpable apprehension among the developing countries, including India.

India could not take on the leadership role of the developing countries to counter the Western powers’ activism in the post-Cold War era due to various reasons. India was affected severely by the collapse of the Soviet Union as it lost its trusted friend, the backbone support of veto-wielding ally at the UN Security Council and source of favourable arm transfer (Ganguly, 2013, p. 41; Nayar & Paul, 2003, p. 203). India has been left alone to fend for itself. It was also confronted with reduced relevance of non-alignment and no longer sure of the solidarity among the non-aligned countries. In the domestic front, it was confronted with the acute economic crisis with the verge of defaulting on its debt repayment to international financial institutions. Further, it was also confronted with a peak in insurgencies in Punjab, Kashmir and Northeast part of India (Mohan, 2011, p. 132). These global and domestic situations made India adopt a cautious, reactive, sporadic and episodic posture in its foreign policy (Murthy, 2010, p. 208).

Initial Cautious Approach

Keeping in view its burden of insurgency and internal violence in Punjab, Kashmir and the Northeast region, India had heightened apprehension of humanitarian intervention authorised by the UN Security Council. However, instead of taking stiff opposition against humanitarian intervention, India adopted a cautious approach, warning the international community of the baleful effect of such intervention. This posture is reflected in India’s position on the following situations.

Kurds in Northern Iraq

The first draft resolution on the humanitarian crisis was submitted by France and Belgium and was co-sponsored by the UK and the USA on the issue of treatment of Kurds by the Iraqi authority. It condemned Iraq’s repression of the Kurds and insisted that Iraq allows access by international humanitarian organisations to the areas affected. It also requested the Secretary-General to report on the Iraqi and Kurdish populations affected by repression. It insisted that Iraq opens a dialogue with the Kurds regarding their safety and return to their homes. Many countries expressed unease of the draft resolution as it could provide a precedent for intervention in internal affairs. The Indian representative condemned ‘the suffering and loss of lives of innocent people’, but reminded the Council members that it was not for the international community to decide ‘what should be done, for that would impinge on the internal affairs of States’. He further stated:

In our deliberations and decision-making within the Council, we should at all times keep in mind the need to respect the sovereignty and territorial integrity of states—including, in this case, of Iraq. This is a cardinal principle in international relations that deserves to be reiterated in the Council. (UN Document, 1991a, pp. 62–63)

The resolution was adopted by 10 votes in favour, three votes against (Cuba, Yemen and Zimbabwe) and two abstentions (China and India) (UN Security Council Resolution, 1991a). The US-led coalition of states militarily intervened to create a safe haven and a no-fly zone for the Kurds of northern Iraq and also imposed a no-fly zone to protect the Shias of southern Iraq. Neither of these actions, which seriously curtailed the sovereignty of the Iraqi state, was explicitly authorised by the UN Security Council. No government, apart from Iraq, publicly challenged the legality of the operation (Wheeler, 2010, p. 162). India did not adopt a position of very vocal opposition in this case. Instead, it just reminded the international community the need to respect the cardinal principle of the sovereignty and territorial integrity.

Somalia

Somalia represents a classic case in which a major military action, Unified Task Force, was explicitly authorised for humanitarian reasons. The crisis had been evolving since January 1991 with the ouster of the government of Siad Barrer and the ensuing civil war amongst different clan groups. The UN Security Council had taken no action to stop Somalia’s descent into chaos at the initial stage as it was too preoccupied with the crises in Iraq and former Yugoslavia, which were strategically more significant than Somalia for the Western powers (Wheeler, 2010, p. 175). Although United Nations Operation in Somalia (UNOSOM-I) deployed from April 1992 to March 1993 to monitor the ceasefire in Mogadishu and escort deliveries of humanitarian supplies to distribution centres and a UN special representative was sent to find a negotiated solution, the situation went from bad to worse. Only when the USA asked the UN for a mandate to send its 30,000 troops to Somalia for a humanitarian purpose, the Secretary General advocated effective action under Chapter VII (Wheeler, 2010, p. 183). The Security Council passed a resolution which is the first resolution to subcontract the UN operation explicitly to a member state, that is, USA, to militarily intervene in another member country (UN Security Council Resolution, 1992a). Resolution 794 was passed unanimously by the UN Security Council without any dissenting voice.

Keeping in view the sensitivity towards the erosion of sovereignty, India joined the group of countries that regarded Somalia as a unique case that required an exceptional response. Speaking after the vote, the Indian representative emphasised that the resolution was adopted against the background of an ‘extraordinary situation, with no Government in control, demands an immediate and exceptional response from the international community’ (UN Document, 1992a, p. 49). On the whole, Somalia was not a case of intervention against the will of the government, but of intervention where there was no effective government. India’s posture of not opposing the resolution cannot be construed as India straying from its traditional position of upholding principles of state sovereignty and non-intervention.

Bosnia-Herzegovina

The notion of humanitarian intervention gained further ground in the wake of Yugoslavia’s collapse in the early 1990s. Despite repeated calls for intervention to stop ‘ethnic cleansing’ in Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina, the Western states refused to commit their ground forces. The non-aligned member countries took a common position that the Security Council should not get involved unless Yugoslavia asked for help (Gharekhan, 2006, p. 94). India’s response to this crisis further illustrated its attempt to sensitise the need to safeguard state sovereignty and cautioned the member states of any action that would go against the ordering principles of the international system (UN Document, 1991b, p. 45).

The Western powers were willing to ‘keep [a] lid on the conflict’ by imposing an arms embargo on the whole of Yugoslavia and a no-fly zone over Bosnia, apart from sending a UN Protection Force (UNPROFOR) (UN Security Council Resolution, 1991b). When they proposed a resolution for the imposition of the arms embargo under Chapter VII, the non-aligned countries could get some of their amendments accepted (Gharekhan, 2006, p. 95). Resolution 713 was passed on 25 September 1991 and India supported it. However, its representative clarified, ‘Let us, therefore, note here today in unmistakable term[s] that the Council’s consideration of the matter relates not to Yugoslavia’s internal situation as such, but specifically to its implication for peace and security in the region’ (UN Document, 1991c, p. 46). It once again displayed India’s sensitivity to the principle of sovereignty.

The UNPROFOR was not given mandate to oversee the compliance of this and other sanctions. Instead, the UN subcontracted that task to NATO. NATO’s involvement in the Yugoslav crisis began on 16 July 1992 with the ‘Maritime Monitor’ operation to ensure compliance with a resolution that called for ‘a general and complete embargo on all deliveries of weapons and military equipment to Yugoslavia’ (UN Security Council Resolution, 1991c). Similarly, NATO was involved in the enforcement of the no-fly zone over Bosnia-Herzegovina in the form of Operation ‘Deny Flight’ began on 12 April 1993, policing the no-flight zone.

While the Security Council was discussing a draft resolution to authorise the use of force in August 1992, the Indian representative stated that the use of force would have to be under the command and control of the United Nations (UN Document, 1992b, p. 12). This insistence on a UN-commanded operation was because of Indian suspicious of the motive of the Western powers. The draft resolution was adopted by the Security Council as Resolution 770 on 13 August 1992 with 12 votes and three abstentions (UN Security Council Resolution, 1992b). India exercised abstention on it along with China and Zimbabwe. No immediate action resulted from this resolution as the sole purpose of the sponsor of the resolution was to ‘satisfy domestic public opinion and to blunt the pressure of Islamic countries’ (Gharekhan, 2006, p. 115).

The NATO’s air campaign from 30 August to 12 September 1995 is believed to have played a crucial role in bringing the Bosnian Serb leadership to the negotiation table, which resulted in the Dayton Agreement in December 1995. Both in the air campaign as well as subsequent negotiations and activities, the UN was conspicuous by its absence. The only role the UN was called upon to play was to give the authorisation to establish an Implementation Force (IFOR) consisting of both NATO and non-NATO member states under NATO command to ensure compliance with the military provisions of the Dayton Agreement. It was later called once again to authorise the deployment of the multinational Stabilisation Force (SFOR) to replace IFOR with more emphasis on the civilian component.

This experience indicates that not only the non-Western powers have no voice in the matter, but even the role of the UN shifted from ‘being the primary actor to providing collective legitimization for others’ (Bellamy & Williams, 2005, p. 167).

Rwanda

The United Nations deployed peacekeeping mission for Rwanda in October 1993 to monitor a cease-fire agreement between the Rwandan Hutu government and the rebel Rwandese Patriotic Front and help humanitarian aid deliveries and contribute to the security of the capital, Kigali. The mission proved insufficient after the government launched the slaughter of an estimated 800,000 minority Tutsis and moderate Hutus following the downing of the Rwandan president’s plane on 6 April 1994. Brazil and India supported a non-aligned initiative to strengthen the poorly equipped UN peacekeeping force in Rwanda. However, there was little political will within the Council, particularly the USA, to authorise a robust peacekeeping force. Instead, the mission was drastically reduced at the behest of the USA, abandoning the Rwandese to their fate. This case clearly manifested the selective nature of Western and international commitment to the protection of human rights (Krause, 2016, p. 15). India cites the international failure in Rwanda to make the argument that, contrary to conventional wisdom, it is not sovereignty that poses an obstacle for effective intervention. Rather, effective intervention is hindered by a lack of political will and, more importantly, the absence of strategic interests for the Great Powers to commit (Jaganathan & Kurtz, 2014, p. 467).

Kosovo

Kosovo is the first case where NATO used force without even implicit authorisation by the UN against a state that was believed to be violating the human rights of its citizens. India stated at the UN Security Council:

No country, group of countries or regional arrangement, no matter how powerful, can arrogate to itself the right to take arbitrary and unilateral military action against others. That would be a return to anarchy, where might is right. (UN Document, 1999a, p. 15)

Two days after the NATO bombing began, Russia, along with Belarus and India, tabled a draft resolution condemning NATO’s action as a breach of Articles 2(4), 24 and 53 of the UN Charter and demanding a cessation of hostilities. It was defeated by 12 votes to three (China, Russia and Namibia). Surprisingly, the majority of the non-permanent members also voted against it. Speaking after the vote, the Indian representative stated that it appeared that NATO:

believes itself to be above the law … NATO would have noted that China, Russia and India have all opposed the violence which it has unleashed. The international community can hardly be said to have endorsed their actions when already representatives of half of humanity have said that they do not agree with what they have done. (UN Document, 1999b, p. 1)

It is clear from the Kosovo case that India had become a much more vociferous critic of humanitarian intervention, especially of unilateral intervention.

Overall, the Indian position displayed sensitivity to the principles of sovereignty and non-intervention. It insisted that the state ought to be the sole arbiter of domestic conflict and if at all necessary, it must be undertaken not only with authorisation by the UN Security Council but also under UN command and only after all other avenues of conflict resolution had been exhausted. It also displayed its flexibility on exceptional grounds, as in the case of Somalia. India’s initial apprehension of the misuse of the humanitarian intervention was seemed to be proven by the deeds of the ‘coalition of states’and NATO in some of the operations discussed above. Keeping in view that it involves a cost to take an adversarial position against the great powers in the post-Cold War, India adopted a cautious approach on humanitarian intervention to protect its national interest.

Grudging Acceptance

As the practice of humanitarian intervention became very controversial, the Canadian government established the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS) in September 2000 with wide representation and held consultations at major capitals of the world in an attempt to develop consensus on humanitarian intervention. The Commission popularised the concept of R2P, which is meant to put the needs and interests of the victims of atrocities ahead of those of the intervening powers. Unlike humanitarian intervention, which is only about military coercion, R2P is presented as one which embraces a whole spectrum of preventive and reactive responses.

The ICISS report did not reflect a universal consensus on the issue. There was a common belief among the developing countries that the change of the term from humanitarian intervention to R2P is merely a clever twist of vocabulary. They felt that there was neither a serious attempt to address the apprehension of misuse by the Great Powers, nor is there a realistic blueprint for the changes in state practice that would be required to make the R2P a genuinely global response to humanitarian crises anywhere in the world. During the consultation, the non-aligned countries as a group stated that they ‘reject the so-called right of humanitarian intervention which has no legal basis in the UN Charter or the general principles of international law’ (International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty [ICISS], 2001, p. 162). India’s initial reaction to the deliberations of the International Commission was one of outright hostility. The Indian Ambassador to the UN insisted that ‘we do not believe that discussions on the question [of R2P] should be used as a cover for conferring any legitimacy on the so-called “right of humanitarian intervention” or making it the ideology of some military humanism’ (Sen, 2005).

The humanitarian intervention and its concomitant norm of R2P cannot be resisted or rejected normatively as it involve the noble act of saving strangers from harm’s way, the Indian negotiators geared towards ensuring that significant concessions to limit the application of the principle to four specific crimes (war crimes, crimes against humanity, genocide and ethnic cleansing), an omission of criteria for the use of force, an insistence on UN authorisation and changes in language that raised the thresholds for international action (Virk, 2013, p. 79). The ambitious proposal of the ICISS was watered down to a considerable extent and introduced more focus on preventing and halting mass atrocity crimes rather than plan for military intervention (Chowdhury, 2009, pp. 2–3). With these modifications, India gave grudging support to R2P at the 2005 World Summit. India was one of the last to give in as it was ‘not prepared to scuttle the summit by rejecting the R2P paragraphs at the last moment’ (Bellamy, 2009a, p. 88).

Even after the summit, reluctance and wariness remain the watchwords of India’s stand on R2P. For instance, in 2007 India refused to give its approval for the funding for the post of a Special Advisor on the R2P, pointing out that the R2P concept lacked acceptance in the UN General Assembly. Further stated that Indian delegation regarded the appointment of a Special Adviser on the Responsibility to Protect as premature and lacking a legitimate mandate (UN Document, 2007, p. 21).

As misgivings about the R2P still widely prevalent and the challenge to deepen the consensus around it seemed formidable, Secretary General Ban Ki-moon decided to take a bold initiative. UN Secretary General and the special representative for R2P, Edward C. Luck, decided to make explicit the content of paragraphs 138 and 139 of the World Summit Outcome Document, reframing them in a three-pillar institutional architecture:

Pillar 1, The protection responsibilities of the state

Pillar 2, International assistance and capacity-building

Pillar 3, Timely and decisive response (UN Document, 2009, p. 2).

India supports the first and second pillars of R2P. India is of the view that the task of the international community is to assist and support the capacity building of governments in fulfilling their obligations. However, India continues to hold strong reservations against the third pillar, which binds the international community ‘to timely and decisive collective action’. Hardeep Singh Puri, Permanent Representative of India, reminded the members that the 2005 World Summit Outcome Document had given only a ‘cautious go-ahead’. He restated India’s conviction that ‘responsibility to protect should in no way provide a pretext for humanitarian intervention or unilateral action’, arguing that ‘[t]o do so would not only give responsibility to protect a bad name but also defeat its very purpose’ (Puri, 2009, p. 25). India’s staunch opposition to pillar three stems from a belief that the R2P could be used a façade for the West to pursue their own interests and indulge in the regime change. Another reason of India’s intransigence towards the third pillar is due to its own various domestic unrests and its inability to protect the rights of its vast minority populations. It fears that a firm global embrace of the third pillar could very easily set a precedent that could come to haunt the country in future (Ganguly, 2016, p. 367). Puri also pointed out that non-action on some of the heinous events ‘was not due to lack of warning, resources or the barrier of state sovereignty but because of strategic, political or economic considerations of those on whom the present international architecture had placed the onus to act’ (Puri, 2009, pp. 25–26). So, according to him, the key aspect should be to address the ‘willingness to act’ by the major powers. Thus, till 2011, India’s official position was a grudging acceptance of R2P, while continuing to be apprehensive of Pillar III as manifested in the cases below. So despite its apprehension, India went along with the rest of the international community as it did not wish to be perceived as the obstructionist or outlier.

Darfur

Since 2003, the Darfur region of Western Sudan had been the theatre of violence, death and displacement. The United Nations has described it as ‘the world’s worst humanitarian crisis’ (UN News Center, 2004), and the United States government called it ‘genocide’ (Washington Post, 2004). The violence and destruction were often compared to the 1994 genocide in Rwanda. However, the rhetoric of the international community was not matched by actions. This dichotomy became all the more significant as it occurred at the time when the international community was debating over R2P. Although the Western countries took an active interest in Sudan due to geopolitical interests of not just the containment of Islamists but also of China, the United Nations could not evoke R2P to stem the atrocity, except referred the case to the International Court of Criminal Justice to investigate accusations of genocide.

India did not adopt the proactive role as it viewed the Darfur crisis as an internal matter. Nevertheless, India deployed a brigade in the UN peacekeeping mission in Sudan (UNMIS) established in March 2005. This mission was authorised to use force under Chapter VII of the UN Charter to protect UN personnel, facilities and equipment, ensure security and freedom of movement of humanitarian workers and to protect civilian under imminent threat of physical violence (UN Security Council Resolution, 2005). Darfur case shows that despite its apprehensive of interference in internal affairs, India participated in the UN peace operation with the intention to make a difference through participation, instead of standing off on principle ground.

Myanmar

When the majority of the international community strongly condemned the brutal crackdown on a peaceful protest movement by Myanmar’s junta and many Western nations called for tough sanctions, India had consistently maintained that all initiatives ‘should be forward-looking, non-condemnatory and seek to engage the Government of Myanmar in a non-intrusive and constructive manner’ (Singh, 2007). Due to India’s soft and engaging approach, India was allowed to provide humanitarian assistance to the afflicted population when Cyclone Nargis stuck Myanmar in 2008. However, the Myanmar junta was suspicious of the Western design and denied the major Western donors and non-governmental agencies the access to the affected people. This made France propose that R2P should be invoked to forcibly overcome the government’s recalcitrance (Asia-Pacific Centre for the Responsibility to Protect, 2008, p. 3). Neither the R2P cover humanitarian disasters nor the developing countries were prepared to broaden R2P’s scope beyond the four atrocity specified in the UN Summit’s 2005 outcome document. Myanmar’s case demonstrated the limits of Western powers and the need for the West to understand those limits and work with countries in the region rather than seek military intervention for the overt purpose of providing humanitarian assistance. India’s diplomacy of soft and engaging approach seems to have triumphed in this context.

Sri Lanka

A major humanitarian crisis of the twenty-first century was the Sri Lankan crisis of ethnic rivalry between Tamil and Sinhalese in which international community remained on the side-line. The Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) emerged as the self-declared representatives of the Tamil people. The final stages of the Sri Lankan civil war, from August 2008 until May 2009, saw a dramatic escalation of violence between the Sri Lankan government and LTTE.

By April 2009, the rebels had been pushed into a small area of jungle in the northern region. Alongside the LTTE were trapped approximately 150,000 civilians, which were used as human shields and bargaining chips by LTTE, and subjected to aerial bombardment and mortar fire directed against the LTTE by Sri Lankan government forces (Bellamy, 2009b). Both the parties to the conflict violated international humanitarian and human rights law. The concept of R2P was occasionally raised during the final stages of the conflict. However, many states argued that R2P did not apply to the situation in Sri Lanka. India used the language of R2P to remind the Sri Lankan government of its responsibility to protect its citizens. However, India did not endorse the humanitarian intervention/R2P. Its Foreign Minister observed that ‘There is no military solution to this on-going humanitarian crisis, and all concerned should recognize this fact’ (Government of India, 2009). On the whole, both India and the international community remain inactive as the Sri Lankan government carried out concerted military offensive over 100 days up to May 2009 when the LTTE was finally crushed (Puri, 2016, p. 179). All the above cases show the rhetoric on R2P was not matched by actions. India continued to express its reservation of military intervention in the internal conflicts, but it did not stand aloof on principle ground. Instead, India remained involve with intention to make a difference through engagement.

Return to Deep Scepticism

The first time R2P was formally evoked by the UN Security Council in Libya crisis. The cases of Libya, Syria, Côte d’Ivoire, South Sudan and DRC proved to be a turning point for the concept of R2P.

Libya

Libya was the first crisis where the UN Security Council evoked R2P. The Council adopted Resolution 1970 on 26 February 2011 under Chapter VII, warning the Libyan authorities for their crimes against humanity and called for ‘an immediate end to the violence in Libya’ and referred the situation to the International Criminal Court (ICC). The resolution also approved arms embargo, travel ban and asset freeze (UN Security Council Resolution, 2011a). While deploring the use of force by all the parties in the conflict and regarding it as totally unacceptable, Hardeep Singh Puri pointed out that India preferred a ‘calibrated and gradual approach’. However, India voted in favour of the resolution because, according to Puri, ‘several members of the Council, including our colleagues from Africa and the Middle East, believed that the referral of the situation in Libya to the ICC would have the effect of immediate cessation of violence and restoration of calm and stability’ (Puri, 2011a, p. 2). As there was overwhelming support for the resolution, it was unanimously adopted. It is erroneous to expect India to have adhered to the principle of non-intervention and be the lone nay voter as all the non-permanent members supported it and even Russia and China, which normally exercise their veto in such resolutions, supported it. So India’s vote in favour of the resolution cannot be construed as a change in its stance on R2P.

As there was no positive impact on the crisis, the UN Security Council passed another resolution on 17 March 2011 and this time under Chapter VII of the UN Charter sanctioning the establishment of a no-fly zone and the use of ‘all means necessary’to protect civilians within Libya (UN Security Council Resolution, 2011b). The members were sharply polarised over the scale and kind of intervention required to protect Libyans in peril. The resolution was adopted by 10 votes in favour consisted of all the Western countries except Germany, and several developing countries, including African countries. India along with China, Russia, Brazil and Germany exercised abstention, and none voted against it.

India’s position on humanitarian intervention has hardened by this time. It was against the Western’s enthusiastic willingness to resort to force without exhausting various diplomatic options. While explaining India’s vote, Indian representative Manjeev Singh Puri stressed the importance of political efforts, such as the Special Envoy of the UN Secretary General and the effort of the African Union in sending a high-level panel to Libya to make serious efforts to a peaceful end to the crisis. Further, India was of the view that the reasons for military intervention had not been convincingly established. He reminded the members that they had no objective analysis of the situation on the ground and under such situation it would not be proper to authorise ‘all necessary measures’. He highlighted that ‘We also do not have clarity about details of enforcement measures, including who will participate and with what assets, and how these measures will exactly be carried out’ (UN Document, 2011a).

Some have drawn an inference from this stand of India that value triumphed over the strategic interest of improved relations with the Western countries. It is reported that this stand disappointed many Western countries. They wondered whether India was ready to stake a claim for its place among the ranks of major powers and take on the responsibility for maintenance of international peace and security (Bajpai, 2011; Mohan, 2011, p. 1). Some were of the view that India’s stance had done lasting damage to its reputation and its aspirations (Ganguly, 2011; Pant, 2011). It seems to be erroneous to expect India to back Western decisions to use force to prove India’s worthiness as a major global power. At the same time, it is not fair to accuse India jettisoning its position of opposition to humanitarian intervention by just abstention, as an intervention in this case was desired by the African countries, Organisation for Islamic Cooperation (OIC) and Arab League. However, unlike its stand on Resolution 688 in the Iraq crisis of 1991, India’s opposition to Resolution 1973 was not on the grounds of principle, but on the timing of the authorisation as by this time, through the endorsement of 2005 Summit Outcome document, India had already grudgingly accepted in principle the R2P.

As feared by the abstaining countries, the authorisation opened the door for France, Britain and the USA to launch the military campaign, which was later taken over by NATO. The UN mandate, which was clear and limited to civilian protection, was extended to a military campaign for regime change. Further, NATO rebuffed any willingness of the Gaddafi regime to enter into negotiated ceasefire.

Two days after military action began, India was openly opposing the air strikes, and within a few weeks, all of the countries of BRICS took the view that NATO’s conduct had shifted decisively from enforcing a no-fly zone to actively seeking regime change. During the General Debate of the General Assembly in September 2011, Prime Minister Manmohan Singh reiterated India’s position by emphasising that ‘societies cannot be reordered from outside through military force’ and he further stated that the rule of law is ‘as important in international affairs as it is within countries’ (UN Document, 2011c, p. 10). Puri pointed out that almost all aspects of resolution 1973, namely, ‘pursuit of ceasefire, arms embargo, and no-fly zone, were violated not to protect civilians … but to change the regime’ (Puri, 2012). Thus, the NATO operation in Libya manifested the most dreaded apprehension of R2P as an instrument to cover up other motives of the Western powers. NATO left the country not only fragile but also triggered ethnopolitical frictions spreading across West Asia and North Africa, converting into fertile ground for the emergence of the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS). The experience of NATO’s intervention in Libya vindicated India’s original apprehensive of the possibility of misuse of R2P by the powerful countries. India once again returned to deep scepticism of R2P, which is manifested in its stand on the subsequent crises.

Syria

The misuse of the UN mandate by the NATO in Libya contributed to the paralysis of the UN Security Council in the grievous situation that subsequently unfolded in Syria. Unlike Gaddafi of Libya, President Assad of Syria has trusted friends like Iran and Russia, who stand by him. China and Russia remain resolutely opposed to any resolution on Syria which could trigger a chain of events leading to a similar situation to that of Libya. India’s position has focused on three things: first, condemnation of violence and human rights violations of all the parties in the conflict; second, encouraging a peaceful and inclusive political process to resolve the crisis; and third, ensuring Syria itself leads the resolution of the conflict (Parameswaran, 2012). In India’s first official statement on Syria in April 2011, the Indian representative stated: ‘It is essential that all efforts should be made to de-escalate tensions, rather than to exacerbate them’ (Puri, 2011c). India along with other members of IBSA launched a mission to Syria in August 2011 to encourage the Syrian authority to end the violent crackdown on anti-government protesters and urge to open a dialogue to implement democratic reforms. This mission is one of the first major diplomatic initiatives of IBSA and it reflects India’s preference of diplomatic initiative through partnership with the like-minded states, rather than taking it upon itself alone.

When the Western countries proposed a resolution on 4 October 2011 condemning the actions and documented crimes of the Assad regime in Syria (UN Document, 2011d), China and Russia exercised their veto power, whereas India abstained despite strong Western pressure to vote in favour. While explaining India’s abstention, Puri stated that the draft resolution did not condemn the violence that had been perpetrated by the Syrian opposition nor did it called upon the opposition to start a dialogue with the Syrian government to seek a redress of their grievances. He urged that ‘the international community should facilitate engagement of the Syrian Government and the opposition in a Syrian-led inclusive political process, and not complicate the situation by threats of sanctions, regime change’ (UN Document, 2011e, pp. 6–7). At the peace conference on Syria (Geneva-II) in January 2012, Indian Minister of External Affairs Salman Khurshid was more forthright in spelling out India’s position. He asserted that there could be no military solution to the Syrian conflict and societies cannot be ‘re-ordered from outside’ (Khurshid, 2012).

A draft resolution was tabled on February 2012 to demand the Syrian Government implement, ‘without delay’, the League of Arab States’ proposed Peace Plan (UN Document, 2012a). This resolution was vetoed by China and Russia because it was considered contains a thinly veiled attempt to impose regime change in Syria through armed struggle. However, India voted in favour of the draft resolution. During the debate, the Indian representative, highlighting the League of Arab States as an important regional organisation, called upon it to play a historic role in promoting political dialogue among the Syrian parties. He said India’s support for the resolution was to back the Arab League’s efforts to promote the Syrian-led inclusive political process. He emphasised that the text of the resolution did not call for a military option under Article 42 of the UN Charter (UN Document, 2012b, p. 8). India seemed to have supported the resolution because of the regional organisation’s initiation. It might also be because 6 million Indians are employed in the Gulf region and also because Saudi Arabia promised to fulfil India’s energy needs, which became necessary as imports from Iran were proving problematic owing to tightening of the USA and European sanctions on Iran due to its nuclear programme (Thakur, 2013, p. 71). So a combination of India’s principle stands on the role of the regional organisation as well as its national interests influenced India to vote in favour of the resolution.

However, surprisingly India vote for a resolution on 19 July 2012 that threaten sanctions against Syria if demands to end the spiralling violence were not met and also proposed an extension of the mandate of the United Nations Supervision Mission in Syria (UNSMIS) (UN Document, 2012c, p. 7). It is quite unusual for India to vote in favour of a resolution that threatened sanctions. India seemed to have come under considerable pressure from the United States to vote in favour of the resolution. This way of capitulation to pressure damages India’s aspiration for recognition as a great power.

Côte d’Ivoire

There were rampant abuses and widespread killings in Côte d’Ivoire, and the humanitarian crisis was more pressing for international intervention than Libya. As Côte d’Ivoire lacks strategic importance or oil, the post-election violence against the population continued unchecked from late 2010 and till early 2011. On 30 March 2011, the UN Security Council unanimously adopted resolution 1975 condemning the gross human rights violations committed by supporters of both ex-President Laurent Gbagbo and President Ouattara. The resolution cited ‘the primary responsibility of each State to protect civilians’, called for the immediate transfer of power to President Ouattara, the victor in the elections, and reaffirmed that the UN Operation in Côte d’Ivoire (UNOCI) could use ‘all necessary means to protect life and property’ (UN Security Council Resolution, 2011c). India voted for the resolution.

While explaining the vote, Puri confirmed that India was ‘seriously concerned’ about the human rights situation and urged ‘both parties [to] exercise maximum restraint and respect the outcome of the election’. Puri also confirmed that India supported the AU’s and ECOWAS’s attempts to resolve the crisis ‘peacefully and through dialogue’ and with ‘that objective in mind, we voted in favour of the resolution’. However, he expressed that the peacekeepers ‘cannot be made agents of regime change’ and ‘UNOCI should not get involved in a civil war’. He urged UNOCI not to ‘become a party to the Ivorian political stalemate’, instead, it should ‘carry out its mandate with impartiality and ensuring safety and security of peacekeepers and civilians’ (Puri, 2011b). This position of India once again highlighted that it was not in favour of outside intervention, instead emphasised the importance of a regional solution to the crisis.

South Sudan

When South Sudan became an independent country, the UN Security Council authorised the deployment of the UN peacekeeping mission in South Sudan (UNMISS) on 8 July 2011 to advise and assist the South Sudan government in fulfilling its responsibility to protect civilians. Following the crisis in South Sudan in December 2013, the Security Council reinforced UNMISS and reprioritised its mandate towards the protection of civilians, human rights monitoring and support for the delivery of humanitarian assistance and the implementation of the Cessation of Hostilities Agreement (UN Security Council Resolution, 2014).

India has devoted significant human and financial peacekeeping resources to the UN missions in Sudan, United Nations Mission in Sudan (UNMIS) and UNMISS in South Sudan. India has been consistently called for resolving all the issues through political negotiations between the two countries under the auspices of the African Union’s High-level Implementation Panel (AUHIP) led by President Thabo Mbeki (Sarna, 2012). Once again India emphasised the significance of the regional organisation to take the lead in finding a solution to the crisis.

Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC)

Although significant progress has been achieved to stabilise the DRC after the renewed crisis in 1998, the eastern part continued to be plagued by recurrent waves of conflict. Activities of the rebel groups, led by M-23, in 2012 have had a serious impact on the humanitarian situation. The fighting has uprooted nearly half a million people, including some 220,000 people in North Kivu and 200,000 in South Kivu. More than 51,000 have had to flee to neighbouring Uganda and Rwanda. There can be little dispute that the crisis in the Congo has gone beyond any R2P threshold but there is a lack of political will to apply R2P in this case.

Faced with international disapprobation on the one hand and a pressing need to take decisive action in the DRC on the other, the UN Secretary General in March 2013 made a radical proposal of deploying an Intervention Brigade to fight back and conduct offensive military operations against the rebels. Answering the call of governments in Africa’s Great Lakes region and taking into account the proposal of the Secretary General, the Security Council unanimously adopted resolution 2098 (2013), which not only extend the mandate of MONUSCO but also created a specialised ‘intervention brigade’ to strengthen the peacekeeping operation (UN Security Council Resolution, 2013). The brigade was the first-ever United Nations ‘offensive’ combat force meant to carry out peace enforcement action. The resolution stated that the brigade should operate under the direct command of the MONUSCO Force Commander, with the responsibility of neutralising armed groups and the objective of reducing the threat posed by armed groups to state authority and civilian security in eastern DRC and to make space for stabilisation activities. It is meant to carry out offensive operations, either unilaterally or jointly with the Congolese armed forces, ‘in a robust, highly mobile and versatile manner’ to disrupt the activities of those groups (UN Security Council Resolution, 2013).

Although India did not object to the ‘intervention brigade’ per se, it expressed its strong apprehension of the emerging proclivity of the Council to mix the normal peacekeeping operation with a new interventionist mandate in the same peacekeeping operation. India is of the view that such a mixing of mandates exposes traditional peacekeepers to become a target of attack by armed groups and risk in an increase of casualty. It is of the view that the UN troops ‘become liable to be treated as enemy combatants under international law, and thus effectively forgo both their impartiality and their immunity from prosecution’. Although the resolution stated that intervention brigade would be ‘exception’, India of the view that by this decision, the rule of peacekeeping operation has undergone change without requisite debate and consultation with Troop Contributing Countries (TCCs). Indian representative urged the Council to give the opportunity to the TCCs to participate in the Council’s decisions on the interventionist mandate (Mukerji, 2014). The Indian authorities have also instructed its peacekeepers in the DRC to be extra vigilant for retaliatory attacks by the deadly Congolese rebel group, M23 (The Times of India, 2013). This posture shows that India is more concern about protecting the sanctity of the UN peacekeeping operation rather than taking the initiative, as an emerging power, of devising new mechanism under the UN to protect civilians effectively.

Responsibility While Protecting (RwP)

Another major development during this period was the proposal on ‘Responsibility While Protecting’ (RwP) put up by Brazil a bid to build a bridge between the Western countries and the developing countries as the Libyan experience deepened the rift between them. The proposal highlighted the need for those undertaking humanitarian intervention to take extra care while using military force to protect civilians. The two key elements of the proposal are: to formulate an agreed set of guidelines to help the UN Security Council to achieve consensus on authorising an R2P military intervention; and monitoring or review mechanism to ensure that the Council has an oversight role over the operation during implementation (UN Document, 2011b). Initially, both sides rebuffed the proposal.

According to the German UN ambassador, for instance, RwP ‘limits the scope for timely, decisive and tailor-made solutions to situations of extreme gravity’. The UN Special Representative for R2P, Edward C. Luck, also criticised the strict sequencing requirement and warned against building high threshold for swift action (Benner, 2013, p. 4). The initial reaction by the P3 powers (USA, Britain and France) was very sceptical. They were of the view that, ‘these countries would want all those delaying and spoiling options …’ (Evans, 2013). It was also opposed by China, Russia and the developing countries as it contains an element of endorsing the need to intervene in grave cases and thus, accord legitimacy to R2P. India was also not in favour of it initially. During the visit of President of Brazil, Dilma Rousseff, to India in March 2012, the joint statement mentioned that the concept of RwP should be discussed further at the UN (India and Brazil Joint Statement, 2012). Because of the criticism from all sides, Brazil seemed to adopt an ‘enigmatic retreat’ from its initial norm entrepreneurship as it did not defend the concept against criticisms, nor did it make further clarifications.

However, the UN Secretary General picked up the RwP proposal and made it a part of his report on Pillar III of the R2P in 2012. Ban Ki-moon argues that the initiative was ‘welcome’ and that it ‘provides a useful pathway for continuing dialogue about ways of bridging different perspectives and forging strategies for timely and decisive responses to crimes and violations related to RtoP’ (Ki-moon, 2012). It also figures annually at the Informal Interactive Dialogue on the Report of the Secretary-General on R2P. In one of the informal discussions, the Indian Ambassador stated that the international community should not ignore the responsibility of those authorised to protect while they implement the authorisation. He suggested that ‘If R2P is to regain the respect of the international community, it has to be anchored in the concept of RwP’ (Puri, 2012). This statement can be taken as an indication that by then India had accepted the complementarity of R2P and RwP. Puri insisted that any action involving R2P must be taken under the auspices of the UN and that the effectiveness of implementation of R2P depends on the impartial discharge of the by the member states (Puri, 2013). Thus, although India continued to be apprehensive of humanitarian intervention/R2P, it did not play an obstructionist role. Rather, it remained engaged in deliberations and did not hesitate in spelling out its position, which was keenly watched as India’s weight in international relations augmented over the years.

However, R2P has reached its lowest point in the context of experience in Libya and Syria. Increasingly it has been replaced by the concept of Protect of Civilian (PoC) and the UN entrusted this task to the UN peacekeeping operations, as displayed in the various cases discussed above in the post-Libya cases. In order to enhance the effectiveness, United Nations started the practice of deploying ‘intervention brigade’, a robust peace enforcement as a part of the UN peacekeeping operations.

Conclusion

India’s opposition to intervention has been influenced by its colonial experience, and qualifying it with humanitarianism in a late twentieth century has not modified much its position. The different phases of its stance on humanitarian intervention reveal how India manoeuvre in challenging time to uphold both its values and interests. India’s apprehension of Western enthusiasm for humanitarian inter-vention has persisted throughout. During the Cold War, speaking for the developing countries, upholding principled position on sovereignty and non-interference enabled India to compensate for its military and economic weaknesses. However, India could no longer staunchly defend these two principles in the post-Cold War era without incurring a cost due to the changed power configuration. Instead of taking a high moral stand and engaging in strident criticism of the West, India adopted a cautious approach. This approach could be regarded as healthy scepticism, as it did not lead to India being an obstructionist or a spoiler, as displayed in the cases of Kurds in Northern Iraq, Somalia and Bosnia-Herzegovina crises. Its initial apprehension of the misuse of the humanitarian intervention seemed to have been vendicated by the deeds of the ‘coalition of states’ and NATO in some of the crises.

When the ICISS replaced the term humanitarian intervention with R2P, it is hard to reject or criticise it because of the intrinsic value attached to the term. India got actively involved in the process of fine tuning and negotiating on the concept and managed to wrench significant concessions of diluting the various components of the original proposal. After considerable pruning, India gave grudging support to the R2P at the 2005 World Summit. India supported the first and second Pillars of R2P which emphasise state responsibilities and capacity building assistance. However, India continued to hold strong reservation against the third Pillar of R2P, apprehending the possibility of manipulating it to the advantage of the strong state at the expense of the weak and vulnerable (Puri, 2016, p. 201). When most of the countries tended to concentrate on the details of implementation, India reminded them that the World Summit had only given a ‘cautious go-ahead’ and suggested international community tread cautiously. This position indicate that India did not want to jeopardise its national interests by taking firm stand on principle ground.

The litmus test of R2P’s capacity as an instrument to address humanitarian crises lies in the modus operandi in actual conflict situations. The way the international community deal with the crises of Darfur, Myanmar and Sri Lanka show that the rhetoric on R2P was not matched by actions. India’s apprehension of the possible misuse of R2P by the great powers has been vindicated by the experience in Libya. This experience made India adopt once again a deep scepticism about R2P. India stood its ground most of the time despite pressure from the United States to fall in line. In the subsequent crises like that of Côte d’Ivoire, Sudan, and South Sudan, India was not in favour of outside intervention, instead emphasised the importance of a regional solution to the crises. By this time, Indian diplomacy has been geared towards partnership approach in finding solution to the global problem.

When Brazil proposed RwP concept to bridge the gap between the Western countries and the developing countries, India took an ambiguous position as it did not want to endorse the necessity of the R2P. However, by the end of 2012, India seemed to have realised the value of the RwP proposal and its complementarity with that of R2P. Thus, instead of standing aloof on the grounds of principled positions, India actively engaged in deliberations on R2P and sometimes, under the pressure of the United States, it had to take contrary to its normal position. However, most of the time India could exercise its ‘strategic autonomy’ and from time to time remind the international community the baleful effect of the use of force. On the whole, India’s suggestion to tread cautiously of R2P proved to be judicious. India could use every opportunity to uphold its interests and values, without jettisoning its constituency of developing countries and augment its international stature. This way, India attempts to build its credibility to claim a seat at the high table of UN Security Council on its own right, rather than by toeing someone else’s line. Although there is no indication of India playing normative leadership in the post Cold War, its stand on R2P clearly indicates that it is entitle to be a global power on its own right.

When R2P has reached its lowest point in the context of experiences in Libya and Syria, it seems to have replaced by the concept of PoC. Many of the peacekeeping operations are deployed under Chapter VII with a mandate for PoC such as in Côte d’Ivoire, Sudan, and South Sudan. When the UN peacekeeping operations proved to be ineffective for PoC, the United Nations started a new practice of deploying ‘intervention brigade’ in DRC, a robust peace enforcement group along with traditional peacekeeping operation. Thus, instead of authorising Chapter VII mandate for humanitarian intervention/R2P and subcontracting the operations to Great Powers or NATO or the coalition of willing, the United Nations started the practice of conducting its own peace enforcement. This seems to be more practical in the current international system, where the states have not shown the tendency to move beyond state-centric behaviour.

India could have used the occasion to propose a new mechanism to deal with atrocious internal conflicts instead of just expressing reservation of mixing peace enforcement with traditional peacekeeping operation. After all the ‘intervention brigade’ meets many of India’s positions in the context of humanitarian intervention/R2P such as the need for authorisation of the United Nations, conduct under the command and control of the United Nations with accountability system and consultation with regional organisations and arrangement. Further, concern about the selectivity or lack of ‘willingness to act’ by the Great Powers could be addressed to some extent by acting through the United Nations, instead of delegating the operation to the Great Powers, a coalition of states or the NATO. This kind of peace enforcement would help in ‘shift the balance toward interventions which are rules-based, multilateral, and consensual’ instead of ad hoc, unilateral, and divisive (Thakur, 2013, p. 62). India seems to have missed the opportunity to be the shaper of global normative guideline for UN commanded peace enforcement. In future, Indian diplomacy should be watchful to capture such opportunity of initiative to augment its credential as a global power.

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