Abstract
A Perpetual Desire for ‘Unclear’ Nexus
‘It is melancholy consolation to observe’, wrote Benedict Anderson in the second edition introduction of his magnum opus, ‘that history seems to be bearing out the logic of Imagined Communities better than its author managed to do’ (Anderson, 1991, p. xi). One would assume same fate for the second edition of Husain Haqqani’s important book. Pakistan: Between Mosque and Military was received with critical acclaim when it appeared first in 2005. The second edition has been ‘updated’ and Haqqani has added one new chapter to it ‘to cover developments of the last ten years’. Overall political scenario in Pakistan continues to be interplay between the mosque and the military, a relationship that Haqqani covers in detail.
In the last 10 years a lot has changed in Pakistan. First time in the history of the country, a democratically elected government could complete its full term. More importantly, it was replaced by the second democratically elected government. However, a lot has remained same. Apparently off the screen, the military continues to operate and ‘shape’ the domestic and foreign policies from the behind. Aqil Shah captures it aptly in his 2014 book: ‘the military’s tutelary beliefs and norms, a legacy of its formative experience … have profoundly shaped its political interventions and influence by justifying the authoritarian expansion of its role in state and society’ (Shah, 2014, pp. 2–3). Question that needs to be addressed at large is how has been the military able to, first, create an image of a ‘saviour’ for itself and then, second, imprint it in the common psyche of the Pakistanis? After all, Pakistan was created in the name of religion and the Islamist sections, the mosque, claim to be fighting for creating an Islamic state. The military is considered to be secular, despite the efforts by Zia to Islamise it. Why then the mosque keeps hobnobbing with the military, whose practices are anything but ‘Islamic’ (see Shaikh, 2009)?
The role of the mosque and the military in Pakistani politics indeed necessitate a critical analysis. These two institutions have been most visible, wielding significant influence on the overall political posturing and decision-making in Pakistan. At the outset, Haqqani argues that the book was first attempt to ‘explain’ the ‘expansion of militant Islamism’ in Pakistan (p. ix). Despite the change in country since 2005, Haqqani argues that ‘the complex strategic partnership between political Islamism and Pakistan’s military establishment is far from over’ (pp. ix–x). Haqqani bases his argument on the premise that the ‘Pakistan movement’ was meant to address the constitutional accommodations of the Indian Muslim political elite and the failure to reach a compromise ended up in the creation of Pakistan. For surviving thus a by chance gotten state, the political elite invoked emotions of the masses on the name of Islam. According to Haqqani, ‘This created a confusion about Pakistan’s raison d’être, which its leadership had attempted to resolve through a state ideology’ (p. 11). What would be that state ideology and how the military presented that to the people of Pakistan remains central focus of Haqqani’s book. Since the political elite in Pakistan was a thin minority and lacking legitimacy, it did not take much effort from the military side to takeover and steer the fate of the country. For that Ayub Khan developed what Haqqani calls the ‘tripod’ within few years of the country’s history: religious nationalism, confrontation with India and an alliance with the West, the US in particular (p. 17).
Ayub Khan failed and General Yahya Khan stepped in. Yahya held first general elections in the country after 23 years of its independence. He ‘tried to undercut the influence of left wing and ethnic political parties by covertly promoting religious ones’ (p. 58). At the same time, there was a rise in the ethnicity-based politics and parties. The ethnic groups were resisting the over-centralisation of the Pakistani state. It became difficult for the military to overlook this change. The military did not want to ‘ignore the popular sentiment’. Therefore, it formulated a strategy ‘for the military dominance by other means’ (p. 60) in which the military could act behind the scene.
The policy was quite efficiently used by General Zia-ul Haq for maintaining his dominance in the country’s affairs when there were chances of weakening of the military after the Bangladesh fiasco. Zia first relied on the cadre of Jamaat-e-Islami, which he thought was well organised. Soon, however, it occurred to him that ‘he had overestimated the Jamaat-e-Islami’s capabilities in being able to run a modern Islamic state’ (p. 155). According to Haqqani, the Islamisation process was now openly striving to how to create an ideological Islamic state (p. 156). It was significantly helped by the Afghan war. ‘As the scope of Afghan Jihad expanded’, argues Haqqani, ‘so did the influence of Islamist ideology in Pakistan’ (p. 212). In this mechanics of state using Islam for furthering its national interest, which revolved around the ‘tripod’, the Jamaat-e-Islami played a critical role.
One would have expected that once Zia gone, the subsequent democratically elected governments would at least attempt to roll back the Islamisation of the country (pp. 230–50). It never happened. Both the major political parties kept busy in fighting with each other, allowing the army to influence the outcome of the conflict. Haqqani argues that using of Islam for managing the internal demands and projecting it externally as circumstantial compulsion was also strategy of General Prevaiz Musharaf (p. 346), who was seen as less enthusiastic towards Islamism. Whenever the military has apparently unleashed any operation against the Islamic radicalism, it has been half-hearted and selective, sparing the elements handy for it.
Haqqani aims to touch upon an interesting aspect in Pakistani politics. However, due to some unknown reasons, either he abandons it without explanation or he has not thought through the problem in its entirety. The relationship between the mosque and the military appears to be more complicated than Haqqani tries to describe. In the interplay between mosque and military, the Islamists seem to have wielded minimal influence, without enjoying the ‘political’ power that they want. Therefore, the mosque has not influenced the policies of Pakistan to the level as Haqqani tries to argue. At the societal level, they enjoy some public support though.
The army has dominated the interaction between democratisation process, civilian rule and the military. Its tactics has been simple: defame and undermine democratic institutions, including the political parties. It can be argued that the army’s tactics to ally with the Islamists is to defer threats to it emerging from the civilian leadership (see Ayoob, 1983). According to its ‘tripod’ strategy, it has been using the ‘Islam card’ efficiently for appropriating the shrill Islamist voices to target credibility of the civilian leadership (see Nasr, 2001; Shaikh, 2009). It has also used it to woo the international community by cracking down on some terrorist groups and engaging USA by convincing it that without Pakistan war against terrorism is invincible as Haqqani refers to. On the other hand, it has not targeted groups like Afghan Taliban, Haqqani network, Lashkar-e-Taiba and Jaish-e-Mohammad as they are used strategically in Afghanistan and with India.
What makes then the Islamists to toe the line of army remains an intriguing question. It is difficult to fathom the Islamist support for the army. Since the creation of Pakistan, the direct role of Islamists has been negligible on the state institutions. For instance, despite the ‘powerful’ military on their side, the Pakistan National Alliance in 1976 elections (p. 170) and the Islami Jamhoori Ittehad (IJI) in 1988 elections (pp. 222–4), claiming to be supporters of Islamic government in Pakistan, could not have a significant effect on the voting behaviour of the Pakistanis. Therefore, Haqqani appears to have overlooked a crucial instrumental link, whose identifying may help us to explain how the military dominates the system. The role of political parties in providing the better alternatives to the common people of Pakistan needs to be analysed as well.
Pakistan: Between Mosque and Military appears to have been borne out by the Pakistani political system despite the change as the military continues to dominate. Pakistan can be bailed out from this situation none other than by Pakistan itself. For that purpose, there is a pre-requirement of a ‘functional’ state, ruled by civilians that would win the trust of common people. Political elite should be able to decide the state affairs. However, the army has invested profoundly in the status quo. Any change will weaken it institutionally and organisationally, which it will resist strongly.