Islam’s role in Bangladesh–Pakistan Alignment against India under the BNP’s Rule

Abstract

This article engages with Bangladesh’s policy of seeking alignment with Pakistan, pursued by the Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP) government in different tenures from the 1990s on. In this endeavour, the article takes into account the BNP’s politics of Islamic identity as a key variable of analysis. This identity factor tacitly presents Bangladesh, Pakistan and India as ‘Muslim Bangladesh’, ‘Muslim Pakistan’, and ‘Hindu India’, respectively. It frames ‘Muslim Pakistan’ as a mutual ally of ‘Muslim Bangladesh’ and shares with Pakistan a view of ‘Hindu India’ as the enemy-other. It operates in foreign policy through domestic politics in Bangladesh, wherein for the BNP, being anti-Indian is synonymous with being pro-Islam. It is claimed in this article that this politics of Islamic identity draws Bangladesh into an alignment with Pakistan, dragging Bangladesh into Pakistan’s own conflict with India.

Keywords

Balancing neoclassical realism two-nation theory Islamic identity Bengali nationalism proxy war

Introduction

For both [Bangladesh and Pakistan], India is the key focal point. India’s aspiration for regional leadership—fueled by the country’s size, population, industrial and technological advancement, military power, and defense production—is viewed with suspicion by Dhaka and Islamabad… Both countries share an interest in preventing India from becoming too dominant (an outcome neither is in a position to significantly influence), or at the very least, from dictating terms to its smaller neighbours. (Grare, 2007, p. 212)

The above extract, taken from a work of a Western observer, posits from a realist position in International Relations that Bangladesh and Pakistan have strong interest in allying with each other with a view to balancing India’s dominant position in South Asia. Interestingly, Bangladesh’s seeking of alignment with Pakistan has been subject to regime change, particularly the alternation of Bangladesh regime between two major political parties—the Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP) and the Awami League (AL)—since the 1990s. With the BNP’s hold on power (1991–1996; 2001–2006), Bangladesh has pursued a policy of intransigence against India’s overhand approach on bilateral issues. Such policy dramatically shifted to engagement with India during the AL’s ascendancy to power (1996–2001; 2009–2013). This swing in Indian policy has been typically related to vacillation in the nature of Bangladesh–Pakistan relations from a state of alignment to a situation of tension. Evidently, the BNP has preferred a policy of seeking alignment with Pakistan, with a tacit anti-India bias. On the other hand, the AL’s ascendancy to power has caused tensions in Bangladesh–Pakistan relations.

This article engages with Bangladesh’s policy of seeking alignment with Pakistan, pursued by the BNP government in different tenures from the 1990s on (1991–1996; 2001–2006). In this endeavour, the article takes into account the BNP’s politics of Islamic identity—which is otherwise termed in this article as ‘Islamo-nationalism’—as a key variable of analysis. Here, Islamo-nationalism is understood as a phenomenon in which religion deeply intertwines with nationalism. The intertwinement of religion with nationalism involves a situation where ‘local religious boundaries coincide with national boundaries, [but religion becomes] the primary diacritical marker that enables one to identify ethnicity or nationality’ (Brubaker, 2012, p. 9). This variant of Islamo-nationalism in Bangladesh, advocated by the BNP, opposes India’s overhand approach on Bangladesh, and is claimed in this article to have motivated Bangladesh to seek alliance with Pakistan against India.

The analytical framework of the article is based on neoclassical realism. This framework offers a two-level analysis of foreign policy behaviour: at the external level, where relative power primarily determines the way a state behaves towards another; at the domestic level, factors like domestic competition, identity and ideology condition the way power relations are perceived by the state (Rose, 1998).

Based on this framework, this article posits that Bangladesh’s policy of seeking of alignment with Pakistan, as a mode of balancing against India, is fundamentally determined by power relations, that is, India’s regional superiority. But the policy is conditioned by the BNP’s Islamo-nationalist politics. This identity factor tacitly presents Bangladesh, Pakistan and India as ‘Muslim Bangladesh’, ‘Muslim Pakistan’ and ‘Hindu India’, respectively. It frames ‘Muslim Pakistan’ as a mutual ally of ‘Muslim Bangladesh’ and shares with Pakistan a view of ‘Hindu India’ as the enemy-other. It operates in foreign policy through domestic politics in Bangladesh, wherein for the BNP, being anti-Indian is synonymous with being pro-Islam—an ideological standpoint by which the BNP seeks to compete for power against its arch rival, the AL. As claimed in this article, this politics of Islamic identity draws Bangladesh into an alignment with Pakistan.

The article proceeds in three sections. The first section shows that when the bitter memory of Pakistani atrocities on Bangladesh people during the 1971 war of independence of Bangladesh dominates Bangladesh–Pakistan relation under the AL’s rule, a superficial Islamic bond receives overriding importance over any irritant issue in Bangladesh–Pakistan relation during the BNP’s term of office. While admitting the importance of India’s regional superiority as the fundamental factor behind Bangladesh–Pakistan alignment, the second section analyses the conditions that trigger such alignment. The section shows that when Bangladesh’s choice to seek alignment with Pakistan is triggered by the BNP’s anti-India cum pro-Islam stance in domestic politics, Pakistan’s conflict with India over the Kashmir issue is argued to have triggered its pursuit to engage Bangladesh in its anti-India postures. The third part discusses two alliance strategies: one is the coordination of Bangladesh–Pakistan diplomatic manoeuvring and the other is their alignment in a proxy war against India. As per the analysis of both strategies, Bangladesh is found to have been drawn into Pakistan’s own conflict with India.

The BNP’s Preference: Mitigating the Past, Facing a Common Threat

[C]ountries of the same religion may have a significant level of ideological affinity. States with the same religion or religious heritage see that they have a common cultural bond, which fosters a common identity that mitigates the “us versus them” dynamic of the international system…[Religion] may also operate at the level of realpolitik: a state may use claims to a common heritage to foster alliances. (Warner & Walker, 2011, p. 113)

The pertinence of the above statement in the context of Bangladesh–Pakistan relations must take into account the BNP’s view of Islamic identity, which is rooted in the historical past of the ‘two-nation’ idea. As conceived by some Muslim intellectuals in British India in the 1930s, the two-nation idea framed Hindus and Muslims of British India as two different nations. It eventually became the foundation for the partition of British India in 1947 through which Pakistan emerged as an independent Muslim state, claiming to free the Indian Muslims from Hindu-dominated India. At this historical juncture, present-day Bangladesh formed joint Muslim nationhood with Pakistan, subscribing to the notion of ‘Hindu India’ as the enemy other to Pakistan’s Muslim nationhood. This Pakistan legacy lies at the of the BNP’s view of Islamic identity. It directly runs in contrast to Bengali nationalism, the ideological force behind Bangladesh’s war of independence against Pakistan in 1971.

Hence polarised views of Bangladesh’s ideological origin are explicit: The AL—under the leadership of charismatic Sheikh Mujibur Rahman, who is popularly known as Bangabandhu, and venerated as the Father of the Nation—mobilised the struggle for independence. The party sees the origin of Bangladesh in 1971, that is, in secular Bengali nationalism. In contrast, the BNP originates Bangladesh in the two-nation idea, that is, in the creation of Pakistan in 1947, which is claimed by the party to have been necessary for Bangladesh to emerge as an independent state in 1971 (Schendel, 2009, p. 203).

Such polarised views of Bangladesh’s origin have had implications for Bangladesh’s relations with Pakistan. The AL’s politics of symbolism involves championing secular spirit of the war of independence against Pakistan in 1971. This politics commemorates Pakistani atrocities on Bangladesh people in 1971. Because of this, Islamic affinity as a source of justification for forgetting the bitterness of 1971 is extremely unimportant in Bangladesh–Pakistan relations during the AL’s rule. In contrast, the old Islamic bond, that is, Bangladesh’s past experience of joint Muslim nationhood with Pakistan achieves importance in the justification of a close Bangladesh–Pakistan relation during the BNP’s rule. With the BNP’s hold on power, Bangladesh and Pakistan share same identity perception, sharing a common interest of balancing against Hindu India.

This can be substantiated by examining the BNP’s view of ‘apology’ issue, a major irritant in Bangladesh–Pakistan relations. Examined from a comparative view of the BNP and the AL, one would see that the bitterness of 1971 is subsided in Bangladesh–Pakistan relations during the BNP’s rule, in sharp contrast to the bitter experience of 1971 being a major irritant in their bilateral relations during the AL’s ascendancy to power.

The issue of a formal apology sought by Bangladesh from Pakistan has its origin in the ‘atrocities of [Pakistan] armed forces – genocide, rape, arson and destruction – on unarmed [Bengali] civilians’ (Habib, 2002), inflicted during Bangladesh’s war of independence in 1971. It needs to be noted that following the independence of Bangladesh, a Tripartite Agreement in 1974 was signed by India, Pakistan and Bangladesh. India was a party to the agreement because its direct military intervention in favour of Bangladesh was crucial to a hasty defeat of the Pakistani forces. Alongside sorting out some pressing issues, the text of the Tripartite Agreement (as compiled in Bhasin, 2003, p. 87) incorporated Pakistan leader Bhutto’s appeal ‘to the people of Bangladesh to forgive and forget the mistakes of the past’. At this time, Bangladesh government was led by the AL. At the helm of this government was the Father of the Nation, Sheikh Mujibur Rahman (herein Mujib), who reciprocated Pakistan’s appeal for forgiveness by stating that he had ‘wanted the people to forget the past’ and that ‘the people of Bangladesh knew how to forgive’ (as compiled in Bhasin, 2003, p. 87).

Notably, the apology issue after the aforementioned overture seems to have never dominated Bangladesh–Pakistan relations during the remaining term (1974–1975) of the Mujib-led AL government. The state of their relations remained far from cordial because of an array of factors, but not the apology issue. What might further substantiate this argument is the reminiscence of a Bangladeshi journalist, who tells an interview with this author, quoting Mujib’s Foreign Minister Kamal Hossain as saying khoma chawa hoyeche, khoma kore deya hoyeche, meaning ‘[Pakistanis] have appealed to forgive, [and they] have been forgiven [by Bangladesh]’ (Khan, 2013).

Despite the above gestures from both sides, the language of Pakistan’s apology appeared to be vague leaving it opened to question. For example, using the term ‘mistakes’, Pakistan seems to have avoided the responsibility of ‘atrocities’ committed by Pakistan military on the Bengalis.

As discussed below, such vagueness would be later reinterpreted by Bangladesh, particularly under the AL’s rule, while repeating the urge for an apology from Pakistan. In contrast, the BNP would prefer keeping aside the apology issue while seeking cordiality and warmth with Pakistan in the name of Islamic bond.

The AL’s View: Commemorating the Memories of 1971

The apology issue in Bangladesh–Pakistan relations was an unimportant case until the AL, led by Sheikh Hasina, Mujib’s daughter, returned to power in 1996 and ruled the country till the mid of 2001. Initially, Hasina’s foreign policy did not completely ignore Pakistan, even though relations with India were her top priority. But later on, apology issue once again acquired overriding importance. Issue like the discovery of 1971 mass grave in Bangladesh; the declassification of Hamoodur Rahman Commission Report by the Pakistan government (which, among other issues, also revealed the atrocities of the Pakistan army on the Bengalis in 1971); and the comments by Irfan Raza, a senior Pakistani diplomat in Bangladesh, who called the 1971 Bangladeshi freedom fighters ‘miscreants’ (Habib, 2000) all combined to spark strong sensitivities in Bangladesh, particularly among different civil society groups. These developments triggered Bangladesh to again seek an apology from Pakistan.

There is no wonder that the AL (who takes credit for leading the war of independence and claims as the guardian of the secular spirit of the war) would entertain the issue, but not Pakistan. Pakistan’s mindset was obvious as Irfan Raza, the Pakistani diplomat who termed Bengali freedom fighters of 1971 ‘miscreants’, asked: [A]pology for what? Is it for losing half of Pakistan in 1971 (as cited in Habib, 2000)? It would not be surprising if such a comment represented the view of Pakistan’s military establishment, the institution which has had the ultimate say in Pakistan policymaking. This powerful institution in Pakistan is yet to overcome its psychosis arising from the bereavement of East Pakistan/Bangladesh in 1971. Therefore, there was no urge for Pakistan to tender an apology to Bangladesh.

Against this backdrop, serious diplomatic rows brought bilateral relations to a low during the last phase of the AL’s 1996–2001 incumbency, revealing the apology issue to be a dominant cause of Bangladesh’s concern, though it was neglected by Pakistan. From the Bangladesh side, the apology issue became closely linked to the AL’s championing of the secular spirit of the 1971 war of independence. The spirit of the war of independence primarily recalls the triumph of secular Bengali nationalism over Islamic bonds. Islamic factor is perceived by the AL as being a tool for suppressing the demands and aspirations of the Bengalis by the then ruling elites of Pakistan, which eventually led to the war of independence of Bangladesh in 1971. Thus, according to the AL, the triumph of secular aspirations over Islamic bonds with Pakistan constitutes the cornerstone of the spirit of the war of independence. Within this context, seeking apology from Pakistan became symbolically associated with the AL’s being the champion of the spirit of the war or independence.

Under the AL rule, Bangladesh rejected Pakistan’s urge to put aside the ‘tragic past’ and ‘forge ahead with stronger relations’ (Dawn, 2000). Contentious politics in Bangladesh played a significant part too. The AL, the ruling party of the day (1996-2001), needed to offset the anti-government agitation of the BNP. At this time, the BNP had as its ally, the Jamaat-e-Islami (JeI), a conservative Islamist force accused of collaborating with the Pakistan army in committing war crimes on the Bengalis during Bangladesh’s war of independence in 1971. The BNP-JeI alliance, who were in opposition during 1996–2001, denounced the ruling AL of being pro-India and anti-Islamic. Typically, the AL’s counter-tirade included its branding the BNP-JeI opposition as anti-liberation or pro-Pakistan. Such a tirade was considerably reinforced by the resurfacing of the apology issue and the resulting strains in Bangladesh–Pakistan relations during AL’s 1996–2001 term of office.

The exception was the term of 2001–2006 when the BNP-JeI alliance was in power and the Islamic factor resurfaced in Bangladesh–Pakistan relations. Before coming to this issue in the next section of this part, it is worth mentioning that the legacy of 1971 again came to the fore during the AL’s 2009–2013 incumbency, marking an extremely cool period of relations between Bangladesh and Pakistan. An extract from a diplomatic cable of the US Embassy in Dhaka of August 2009 published by the New Age, a leading Bangladeshi English national daily, quoting WikiLeaks provides evidence to this reality:

Outgoing Pakistan High Commissioner [in Dhaka] Alamgir Bashar Khan Babar told the [US] Ambassador [on] August 20 [2009] he was disappointed that [Bangladesh] Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina had not responded to an overture from Pakistan to overcome the bitter legacy of the 1971 Liberation War. Babar said that he had delivered two months earlier to the Prime Minister [of Bangladesh] the Government of Pakistan’s offer to do whatever it could – “within reason” – to overcome the deep rift which had characterized Bangladesh-Pakistan relations since the 1971 conflict. The… [Government of Bangladesh] had, however, provided no response to the Pakistani offer. (New Age, 2011)

In addition to the above, there was no exchange of high-ranking visits between Bangladesh and Pakistan during the above tenure of the AL until Pakistan Foreign Minister Hina Rabbani Khar visited Bangladesh in November 2013. The purpose of her visit was to invite Bangladesh Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina to attend the Summit of the D-8, a forum of eight Muslim states, hosted by Pakistan. Notably, the Bangladesh Prime Minster declined to attend the Summit, perhaps because Pakistan was the host. Interestingly, Bangladesh showed not only coolness in diplomatic protocol in welcoming the Pakistan Foreign Minister¹ but also asked her country to tender an apology.²

Here, one also needs to take into account the AL’s rivalry against the BNP in domestic politics since the 1990s. The symbolic nature of their rivalry has reached a point of bigotry. In particular, as one commentator argues, the AL’s bigotry has involved its claiming exclusive patriotic concern for protecting the spirit of the war of independence, and thus demonising any form of dissenters as being anti-liberation (Khan, 2014c). By implication, antagonism with Pakistan over the issue of an apology has reproduced this demonising of such dissenters by the AL. After returning to power in 2009, the AL initiated the trial of those individuals who had been accused of committing war crimes on the Bengalis during the war of independence in 1971. The trial has been opposed by the BNP and the JeI, and also by Pakistan. The BNP and the JeI’s opposition to the trial of war criminals further reinforced the AL’s way of demonising the BNP and the JeI as being pro-Pakistan and anti-liberation. Moreover, it reinforced the AL’s policy of distancing Bangladesh from Pakistan over the issue of an apology.

The BNP’s View: Forgetting the Memories of 1971

In contrast to the above, the Islamic factor, championed by the BNP, made the apology issue a secondary factor in Bangladesh–Pakistan rapprochement. Here, it is pertinent to look into the following statements:

Your brothers and sisters in Pakistan share the pains of the events of 1971. The excesses committed during the unfortunate period are regrettable. Let us bury the past in the spirit of magnanimity. Courage to compromise is greater than courage to confront. (The Daily Star, 2002a)

My brothers and sisters in Pakistan share with their fellow brothers and sisters in Bangladesh profound grief over the parameters of the events of 1971. As a result of this tragedy a family having common religious [i.e. Islamic] and cultural heritage and united by a joint struggle for independence and a shared vision of the future, was torn apart. We feel sorry for this tragedy, and the pain it caused both our peoples. (The Daily Star, 2002b)

These were two similar kinds of pronouncements from Pakistan President General Pervez Musharraf during his state visit to Bangladesh in July 2002. Notably, the Pakistani President brought in religious affinity as a reference to burying the pains of 1971. And on this occasion, the BNP, in coalition with the JeI, both advocates of Islamic identity, was in office in Bangladesh.

The above statements of the Pakistani President did not stem from anything that was in the formal agenda, but were made during two ceremonial functions.³ Interestingly, none of the formal agenda, in contrast to the above statements, generated much public debate in Bangladesh. Critics of Musharraf’s statements found it deceptive that terms like ‘regrettable’ or ‘sorry’ fell short of an apology and a cunning ploy of avoiding the responsibility of atrocities in 1971. One civil society critic in Bangladesh went on arguing:

In using the word ‘excesses’ to describe the actions of Pakistani forces, Musharraf carefully avoided references to who committed the ‘excesses’ and on whom the ‘excesses’ were committed, and also whether they were mere excesses or constituted a planned genocide executed by a military machine upon an unarmed people … The ‘tragedy’ that Musharraf referred to was ambiguous—was it a tragedy for the Bengalis of East Pakistan or for the people of the former West Pakistan? (Habib, 2002)

Hence, this critic urged emphatically for a clear and unconditional apology from Pakistan while discarding Musharraf’s call for healing the wounds of 1971 ‘on the basis of a theory of religious affinity’(Habib, 2002).

On this occasion of Bangladesh–Pakistan rapprochement, the BNP-JeI coalition was in power in Bangladesh (2001–2006). The AL, the opposition party of the day seeking to portray its image as a pro-liberation force, exploited the stance of the civil society which had asked Pakistan President to tender unconditional apology to Bangladesh. The party cancelled a prescheduled courtesy call of the party chief, Sheikh Hasina, to the Pakistani President. But what exposed the triumph of Islamic identity were the following statements of the incumbent Prime Minister Begum Khaleda Zia and her Foreign Minister Morshed Khan, respectively, in reaction to those of the Pakistani President:

Thank you, Mr President, for your candid expression on the events of 1971. This will, no doubt, help mitigate the old wounds. We are deeply committed to promoting and further strengthening the existing bonds of friendship between the two countries. Our relations have reached a high level of maturity. Therefore, we can together look confidently into the future. (The Daily Star, 2002b)

We welcome [the words by] President Musharraf…We don’t want to embarrass a guest by discussing issues like an apology for the 1971 war situation. It is the spirit of the people of the two countries that will decide that. (The Daily Star, 2002c)

No wonder, as the above pronouncements show, the BNP government in Bangladesh accepted Pakistan’s overture of a religious bond as being the basis of overcoming the ‘tragedy’ of 1971.

Moreover, Bangladesh–Pakistan ties were relatively cordial during the BNP’s 1991–1996 and 2001–2006 terms of office, unlike the cooler relations that existed during the AL’s tenures of power. Apology issue seemed unimportant in the BNP government’s Pakistan policy. Exchange of high-ranking visits, including the signing of various agreements for cooperation in different fields, provides evidence of increasing cordiality between the two countries (Gul, Noor, Shah & Ikram, 2006, pp.17–20; Shakoor & Ahmed, 1992, pp. 3–4; Wasi, Ahsan & Gul, 2002, pp. 3–5). Irrespective of the implementation of those agreements, Bangladesh and Pakistan claimed to have identical views on different regional and international issues (Gul et al., 2006, pp.17–20; Shakoor & Ahmed, 1992).

Just as important, with the BNP in power, Islam became the force for justification of Bangladesh–Pakistan cordiality. Both sides uttered the rhetoric of their past religious and historical bonds as a rallying point to bypass the bitter memories of 1971 for mutual benefits and also for working jointly for the cause of the Ummah (pan-Islamic community) (Shakoor & Ahmed, 1992; Gul et al., 2006, pp. 17–20). There would be no wonder if India had been a common concern behind such Bangladesh–Pakistan cordiality:

Pakistan and Bangladesh share strong bonds of religion and the legacy of a common struggle to rid themselves of the yoke of an impending enslavement by a Hindu majority in an undivided India. The break-up of the two wings of Pakistan [in 1971] is now history and need not cloud prospects for working together for common good of their people. A true reconciliation can only emerge if both countries boldly face the true or imaginary demons of the past, forgive the perpetrators on both sides and then bury the rancour and unpleasantness forever. (Iftikhar, 2012)

The above statement represents Pakistani views of the importance of Bangladesh–Pakistan alignment, to be shared by Bangladesh during the BNP’s term of office. The statement indicates to the historical domination of Hindus over the material life of the Muslims in British India, a factor that motivated present-day Bangladesh to form joint Muslim nationhood with Pakistan in 1947. In the present context, the statement points to the dominance of ‘Hindu India’ in South Asia, a concern shared by both Pakistan and Bangladesh. The statement, therefore, prescribes them to forget the bitterness of 1971 as a way to counterbalance India.

It would be no wonder if Bangladesh, with the BNP in government, shared such Pakistani perception. This is very much substantiated by the way BNP government gave a very low priority to irritant issues, particularly the apology issue, in Bangladesh–Pakistan relations while seeking cordiality with Pakistan in the name of an old Islamic bond.

Triggering Conditions for Alliance

As noted before, Bangladesh’s urge to ally with Pakistan is primarily determined by India’s overwhelming regional superiority. Similarly, the urge to balance against India motivates Pakistan to seek alliance with Bangladesh. From both Bangladesh and Pakistan sides, such urge, however, needs to be seen by taking into account some conditions on the ground that triggers alliance between them. As analysed in this section, the BNP’s politics of anti-Indianism inherently involves an Islamo-nationalist stance against India’s overhand approach on Bangladesh. This issue in Bangladesh’s domestic politics is a factor that triggered alliance with Pakistan, as a mode of balancing against India, with the BNP in power during its 1991–1996 and 2001–2006 tenures. From Pakistan side, the dynamics of its conflict with India over Kashmir since the 1990s is the most important factor on the ground, motivating it to seek alliance with Bangladesh.

India-factor in Bangladesh’s Domestic Politics

This section can be started with a stunt—herein ‘ulu dhoni’ thesis—proclaimed in 2006 by Khaleda Zia (herein Khaleda), the BNP Chairperson. Her ‘ulu dhoni’ thesis involved a prediction that ulu dhoni (Hindu ritual sounds stemming from mouths of women) would be heard in the mosques of Bangladesh in the event of AL’s emerging victorious in the national election to take over the government (Mohaiemen, 2006). Khaleda’s thesis reflected a long-held perception that the Hindus were the AL’s vote bank and, therefore, that the party was pro-India, and that voting for the AL would lead to the loss of the country to the Hindus and, thereby, to Hindu India.

Khaleda’s ‘ulu dhoni’ thesis obviously buttresses the postulation that the BNP’s Islamo-nationalist politics presents Hindu India as the enemy other to Muslim Bangladesh. This ideological stance frames Pakistan as mutual ally against India. It interplays with two factors: India’s overhand approach on Bangladeshis on external front and the BNP’s competition with the AL on domestic front.

For a deeper understanding of the way the BNP’s politics of anti-Indianism—which is otherwise synonymous with being Islamo-nationalist—motivates Bangladesh to seek alliance with Pakistan, one first needs to take into account the fact of India’s overhand approach on Bangladesh—a fact that can be illustrated by the following extracts.

[Friendship] cannot be one sided…[There is an ethical saying in Bangladesh society] which ‘teaches [us] to sacrifice one’s self-interest and devote one’s life and heart for the interest of others; and that happiness lies in sacrificing one’s self- interest.’ But we should know the amount of cost that we have to concede for the happiness of others. (Huq, 2011)

[India] continuously kills Bangladeshi nationals on the border by violating their own promises. The killings carry a symbol. By doing so, they want to create a feeling in the minds of the people of Bangladesh that they are weak and can do nothing against their overwhelming mighty opponent. And [the Bangladesh people] must accept this as their destiny. (Kabir, interview, December 21, 2011⁴)

To explain these extracts, Bangladesh and India came closer in 2011 to sign the Teesta Deal. The Teesta is a major river system shared by the two countries in question. India, being the upper riparian country, has the advantage of being able to control the flow of the Teesta at its whim, and to the detriment of Bangladesh’s interests. In 2011, the two countries came together to negotiate a deal over the use of water resources in the Teesta system. At this time, the AL, which is popularly known as a pro-India party, was in power; and the government of the AL, unlike the preceding BNP government, showed utmost commitment to deal with two issues of crucial importance to India’s interest: one that Bangladesh denied sanctuary for India’s Northeast insurgents; and second that without any formal agreement, Bangladesh granted India overland transit facility to connect India’s mainland with its North eastern states. In exchange for these gestures, Bangladesh expected India to honour its earlier commitment to sign the Teesta deal but finally India backed out. This is in this context the first statement is a satirical comment, reflecting popular displeasure in Bangladesh, deriving from India’s insensitivity towards Bangladesh’s interest. The second statement is another reflection of utter displeasure in Bangladesh resulting from some of the sensational killings of Bangladeshi nationals on the border by India’s Border Security Forces (BSF), despite repeated promises from India that such killings would not occur.

This kind of overhand approach of India on Bangladesh has been persistent ever since the independence of Bangladesh in 1971. This is a fact that has, over the years, earned for India the image of a hegemonic power in Bangladesh, reactivating the dormant force of historical past, that is, the legacy of the two-nation idea. Here, as a framework of understanding, Hudson’s (2014) postulation seems relevant. As she asserts, ‘Who are “we”? There are times, particularly in the wake of great systemic or subsystemic change, when a nation-state may encounter profound uncertainty about who “we” are, various power nodes within the nation-state will begin to answer that question according to their political aims’ (Hudson, 2014, p. 119). For gains from ‘steering that discussion’, continues Hudson, ‘these forces will have to tap into the cultural beliefs actively shared or lying dormant among a large majority of the populace’ (Hudson, 2014, p. 119). Under such circumstances, as Hudson further posits, ‘the primacy of the question “who are ‘we’?” may trump all other questions of success or failure or risk in foreign policy’ (Hudson, 2014, p. 119).

In Bangladesh politics, the issue of Islamo-nationalism, with an anti-India bias, seems to run on Hudson’s postulation. In 1947, also noted before, Pakistan was claimed to have been founded with a view to freeing the then Indian Muslims from what Muslim leaders called Hindu-dominated India. And the Muslims of Bangladesh formed joint Muslim nationhood with Pakistan to get rid of the domination of Hindus, particularly Hindu elites, on their material life. Conversely, in 1971, Indian help played a critical role in Bangladesh’s war of independence against Pakistan. But the collective historical memory of pre-1947 Hindu domination remained as a dormant force—a force that has been activated in Bangladesh in response to India’s overhand approach on Bangladesh. Who are ‘we’? Who are ‘they’? In Bangladesh, over the years, a perceived hostility between ‘Muslim Bangladesh’ ‘Hindu India’ has become a point of reference in answer to these questions. This is evident from the following extracts:

[In] the mindsof our [Bangladeshi] people, there is a direct link between India and Hindu. That is the reason why when the alleged smuggling of rice into India is talked about, it takes no effort to convince our gullible people that the Hindus are behind this. (Chatterjee, 1973, p. 43)

[I]n the backdrop of the communalization of the modern state, the development of the Indian security forces…is viewed in communal terms, jeopardizing further the state of inter-state relationship between India and Bangladesh. Indeed, a sizable section of the intelligentsia (including bureaucrats and military personnel) in Bangladesh view the might of Indian military, including the 1974 nuclear explosion at Pokhran, as something representing the might of the majority Hindu community (Ahmed, 1996, p. 287).

Politics of hegemony, trade-imbalance, and other outstanding border issues play an important role in the prevailing skepticism about India in Bangladesh. However, for many, anti-Indianism emanates from an attitude of bigotry, which is impervious to reason. Once I pressed a senior Bangladeshi professional…to give me a reason for India’s alleged role against the interests of Bangladesh,…in a low voice he confided: “You can’t trust the Hindus” [italics emphasised]. (Khondker, 2009)

The first statement—extracted from Chatterjee’s interview of Professor Muzaffar Ahmed who led the then pro-Moscow faction of the National Awami Party (NAP) in Bangladesh—reflects popular views from Bangladesh towards India just after the independence of Bangladesh in 1971. The second excerpt, taken from a work published in mid-1990s, is a finding from the interaction of a leading Bangladeshi scholar with members of Bangladeshi intelligentsia. And the third statement, excerpted from a column contributed by an expatriate Bangladeshi scholar, reveals another popular view of India in Bangladesh in the latter part of the first decade of the twentieth century. All the three extracts, in together, reflect views of a significant part of Bangladeshi population towards India in communal terms—that is, a perceived hostility of mighty ‘Hindu India’ against a far weaker neighbour, ‘Muslim Bangladesh’—a view that remains persistent since the independence of Bangladesh till today. Such perception from Bangladesh, also indicated by the second excerpt, has been reinforced by communal politics in India.

The BNP’s Islamo-nationalist politics plays upon such popular perception in Bangladesh, wherein opposing India’s dominance, as Pant (2007, p. 233) notes, is ‘the most effective way of burnishing one’s nationalist credentials’. Hence, any bandwagoning with India, preferred by the AL, is detested as being pro-India. As Pant (2007, p. 236) points out, ‘political parties opposing the Awami League have tended to define themselves in opposition to India, in effect portraying the Awami League as India’s “stooge”’. What is worth noting in the context is the BNP’s Islamo-nationalist stance, as revealed from the following observation by Momen (2012):

Pakistani rule taught us [twin parameters] of patriotism. [One] is opposing India and [the other] is a kind of love for Islam which will suspect and dislike followers of other religions, particularly Hinduism. Since then these twin attributes [of patriotism] still exist today for logical or illogical reasons. This view of [patriotism] has not subsided even after [Bangladesh became independent from Pakistan in 1971]…[Pakistani] rule vocally and visibly promoted the idea of India as a Hindu [state] and motivated to oppose anything associated with…Hinduism… This policy has been tacitly…pursued in Bangladesh in different periods [after independence from Pakistan]… The BNP has become lenient to [this] Pakistani…mindset in order to oppose its rival AL [in domestic politics]… The BNP seeks to prove that the AL [being a pro-India party] will sell off the country to India and that Islam will be at stake if the AL ascends to power.

This extract explicitly helps to explain the influence of Pakistani’s mindset on the BNP’s politics of Islamo-nationalism, implicitly helping an understanding of its influence on Bangladesh–Pakistan alignment. To explain the extract succinctly, Pakistan faced, and faces even today, its legitimacy as a monolithic Muslim nation-state since it was curved out like so from British India in 1947. In face of the non-monolithic character of its dominantly Muslim population of diverse ethnic background, Pakistan has had promoted passion for Islam as the dominant factor for unifying its diverse Muslim population. This whole process would involve constantly portraying Hindu India as a threat in order to indoctrinate the disparate population of Pakistan with the belief that Hindu India was persistently plotting to destroy Muslim Pakistan by undoing the partition of 1947.

This Pakistani mindset, also claimed by Momen in the above extract, has been inherited by the BNP’s politics of Islamic identity—a fact that is well supported by Khaleda’s ‘ulu dhoni’ thesis. For the BNP, Islamo-nationalist credential has been a powerful instrument of opposing India while competing for power with the AL in domestic politics. The BNP has presented itself as a pro-Islam force with a claim to safeguarding Bangladesh’s independence against India’s overhand on Bangladesh. In such nationalist posture, anti-Indian position has become synonymous with being a patriot and, moreover, it has also become synonymous with being pro-Islam. Alongside, bandwagoning policy with India, as it has been pursued by the AL, has become synonymous with being subservient towards Hindu India.

As for foreign policy implications, Bangladesh, during the BNP’s hold on power (1991–1996 and 2001–2006), pursued a policy of balancing against India’s overhand approach on Bangladesh—a policy characterised by nationalist assertion and intransigence, refusing to comply with India’s terms in dealing with bilateral disputes. The point to be noted is that balancing policy failed to force India to come to terms with Bangladesh in resolving some crucial disputes; but it claimed to have prevented Indian intention of making Bangladesh subservient, supporting the BNP’s Islamo-nationalist credentials.

This is in this context Islamo-nationalism as a variable helps explain Bangladesh’s policy of seeking alignment with Pakistan during the BNP’s incumbency, with both sharing the same threat perception vis-à-vis a common enemy, ‘Hindu India’. Indeed, the perception of a common enemy, tainted very much by ideological lens of Islam, drove Bangladesh to ally with Pakistan, dragging Bangladesh into Pakistan’s own strategic rivalry with India. As one scholar noted that

By ideological orientation and outlook BNP is very close to the spirit and psyche that Pakistan stands for… Pakistan has its own agenda against India, because India is their strategic adversary. So whenever BNP-[JeI]⁵are in power, Pakistan uses Bangladesh to achieve its strategic ambition of curbing and curtailing India’s interest’. (Hosain, interview, November 2012)

Also, in particular, one can take into account the ideological orientation of pro-Pakistan lobby in the BNP:

The BNP’s composition is such [that] it has a lot of people who served the Pakistan military establishment…[The] people from the military has shown a greater degree of reliable communication skills with the Pakistan military establishment. So the very origin of the BNP and its ultimate perception of security…[needs to be considered in Bangladesh-Pakistan relation]. (Shahiduzzaman, M. Interview with author, November 18, 2012 [M Shahiduzzaman is Professor, Department of International Relations, University of Dhaka].)

This account points to a group in the BNP who served in the Pakistan military before Bangladesh emerged independent from Pakistan in 1971. For an analyst to look into Islam’s role as a justifying force for Bangladesh to seek closer ties with Pakistan at the expense of India, it is important to reckon the identity perception of the above group within the BNP. It would not be surprising if this group still carries the legacy of the Pakistani military’s perception of Islamic identity with a prejudiced view of India as a Hindu state. The above statement indicates that such perceptual frame motivated this faction to seek links with Pakistan with an anti-India bias.

No less important is the influence of the Jamaat-e-Islami (JeI), another key pro-Pakistan force outside the fold of the BNP, but part of the BNP-led alliance against the AL in domestic politics. The influence of this force in state foreign policy was especially prominent in the period of 2001–2006, when the BNP led a four-party coalition government, with the JeI being its key partner. The JeI was at the forefront of the forces which joined the Pakistani ranks in anti-Bangladesh efforts during the war of independence in 1971. The JeI fervently believed that the war of independence of Bangladesh against Pakistan was a conspiracy of Hindu India to destroy Islam. This party, the main religious rightist group in Bangladesh politics, is still known as ideologically anti-Indian and pro-Pakistan. The urge for Bangladesh to ally with Pakistan during the BNP’s rule might have been also influenced by this factor.

Pakistan’s Conflict with India: The Kashmir Factor

Pakistan’s scar over Kashmir [in its conflict with India is a reason to engage Bangladesh in its anti-India move]…With the incumbency of the BNP in Bangladesh government, [Pakistan] can balance India. [Ideologically, Pakistan gets Bangladesh] in supporting Kashmir[i] [Muslims] against India. (Khan, 2013)

While the government and political parties [in Bangladesh] have been trading insults, calling each other a lackey of foreign countries [e.g. pro-Pakistan and pro-India], in recent years Bangladesh has been drawn into a proxy-war between India and Pakistan…[T]he proxy war…stems from the ongoing conflict over the disposition of Kashmir. (Riaz, 2008, pp. 76–77)

As noted in the previous subsection, Islam is an important component of the politics of anti-Indianism in Bangladesh. When this factor triggers an urge for Bangladesh to ally with Pakistan, Pakistan’s urge to ally with Bangladesh is triggered by its conflict with India over Kashmir issue. This is substantiated by the above statements which also show that the BNP’s politics of anti-Indianism triggers not only Bangladesh–Pakistan alignment but also drags Bangladesh into Pakistan’s own conflict with India. Here, a succinct discussion on the Kashmir issue seems necessary.

Kashmir, with its predominant Muslim population, had been a princely state of British India. The partitioning of British India in 1947 left this princely state, and others like it, to decide whether to accede to India or Pakistan or retain independence. It chose to remain independent. But a problem arose 2 months after the partition: Kashmir’s chief Maharaja Hari Singh—who was a Hindu—finally decided to accede to India under a wave of invasion by Pathan tribesmen from Pakistan’s North-West Frontier Province (NWFP). Hari Singh’s decision was contested by Pakistan because it expected that Kashmir, being a Muslim majority nation, would join the former as per the logic of the two-nation idea (Schofield, 2010).

This led to the first war between Pakistan and India—a war termed by Pakistan as its ‘holy war’, that is, jihad, against Hindu India (Swami, 2007). The war ceased in 1949 through a ceasefire agreement sponsored by the United Nations (UN). Across the ceasefire line, one-third of Kashmir went under Pakistan’s occupation, with two-thirds under India’s. As agreed by both Pakistan and India, UN resolutions recommended a plebiscite to give priority to the will of the people of Kashmir.⁶ But the plebiscite was not held, because both sides adopted opportunistic positions (Schofield, 2010, p. xii). Pakistan fought another ‘Islamic holy war’ against India in 1965 in its struggle over Kashmir. The war ended without any decisive result. Later, a provision of the 1972 Simla agreement, signed between India and Pakistan, renamed the 1949 ceasefire line as the Line of Control (LoC), and virtually established the LoC as a new international border between them. Pakistan had to accept this under ‘pressing compulsions’ dictated by its decisive defeat in its war with India in 1971 when India militarily intervened in favour of Bangladesh’s liberation war against Pakistan.⁷

In order to understand how the BNP’s politics of anti-Indianism, with its pro-Islam bias, dragged Bangladesh into an alignment with Pakistan against India, it is pertinent to mention a new phase of developments in the Pakistan–India–Kashmir conflict in the late 1980s. Since this time, a protest movement consisting of a considerable number of Kashmiri Muslims in the Indian part of Kashmir turned into an armed uprising against Indian rule, leading to their fight with the Indian forces (Ganguly, 1997). Pakistan sought to exploit the situation to influence the outcome of the Kashmir conflict, which it could not previously achieve through war or negotiations (Schofield, 2010, p. xiv). Moreover, Pakistan could not forget the scars caused by the loss of its eastern wing/Bangladesh in 1971 (S, interview November 18, 2012 [S, interviewed on condition of anonymity, is a retired officer, Bangladesh Army]).

In the Pakistani perception, this loss was caused by Indian intervention in favour of Bangladesh.

Against this backdrop, when Kashmir Muslims revolted against Indian rule, Pakistan responded, also observes Schofield (2010, pp. xiii–xiv), with a twin strategy. First, Pakistan happily offered its ‘moral and diplomatic’ support to the Kashmiris who were fighting the Indian forces in the Indian part of Kashmir. Second, ‘unofficially, Pakistan was also prepared to assist in reviving the spirit of the 1947‘jihad’ [Islamic holy war] in a covert war to assist the Kashmiri insurgents’.

Bangladesh does not share any stake in Pakistan’s conflict with India over Kashmir. But with the BNP in power, its politics of anti-Indianism seems to have triggered Bangladesh to share the above twofold strategy that Pakistan had devised in relation to its Kashmir conflict with India. These twin strategies, titled alliance in diplomatic praxis and alliance in proxy war, are explicated in the next section in the context of analysing Bangladesh–Pakistan alliance strategies.

Alliance Strategies: Diplomatic Praxis and Proxy War

Alliance in Diplomatic Praxis

With the BNP’s hold on power in Bangladesh, Bangladesh and Pakistan seem to have a commitment of coordinating their diplomatic praxis, tacitly directed against India. The signing of a Bangladesh–Pakistan protocol on bilateral consultation during Pakistan President Pervez Musharraf’s visit to Bangladesh in 2002 exemplified the existence of such a diplomatic alliance:

[T]he foreign secretaries of the two countries will hold regular consultations on an annual basis alternately in Dhaka and Islamabad…The two countries shall inform each other on key aspects of their internal and external policies and their positions on major international issues and will continue the practice of consultations in international organisations and other international for a. (The News, 2002, July 31)

By implication, India was the target of the consultations enunciated above. The timing of the signing of the protocol provides an important indication. This was a time when the incumbent BNP (2001–2006), unlike the previous government of the AL (1996–2001), gave India a low priority in Bangladesh foreign policy. Furthermore, Bangladesh–India relations were highly unstable. Similarly, Pakistan’s relations with India were characterised by serious crises, including the high potential of military confrontations following the Kashmir dispute. Thus, against the backdrop of resurging conflicts in the respective relations of Bangladesh and Pakistan with India, Pakistan President Musharraf visited Bangladesh in July 2002. This is in this context, the signing of the aforementioned protocol between Bangladesh and Pakistan was indicative of their alliance in diplomatic sphere, with a tacit anti-India posture.

The compulsions for both Bangladesh and Pakistan to join a diplomatic coalition have been different. When anti-India prejudice of the BNP’s politics of Islamic identity triggered the choice for Bangladesh to join hands with Pakistan in diplomatic pursuits against India, this seems to have had dragged Bangladesh into Pakistan’s strategy of creating pressure on India by offering ‘moral and diplomatic support’ for the Kashmiri Muslims. The Kashmiris, in Pakistan’s terms, are ‘freedom fighters’ fighting the Indian forces in India-held Kashmir. It has been mentioned in the previous section that Pakistan’s ‘moral and diplomatic’ support for the Kashmiris has been one of the twin strategies that it adopted to influence the outcome of the conflict with India over Kashmir.

Since the 1990s, Pakistan’s ‘moral and diplomatic’ support to the Kashmiris repudiated the LoC as the de facto solution to the Kashmir problem. With reference to the recommendation of a plebiscite, stipulated by original UN resolutions of 1948–1949, Pakistan instead stressed a solution based on securing the right to self-determination for the Kashmiri people (Hussain, 2007). In this task, Pakistan sought to use international organisations—like the Organisation of Islamic Conference (OIC), the UN, and the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM)—as a strategy of applying diplomatic pressure on India. The OIC is the pan-Islamic organisation of Muslim states. Moreover, Muslim states have their representations in other international organisations, particularly the UN. Pakistan, in rallying the support of the Muslim states for its position on Kashmir in these forums, considered its rhetoric of Islamic solidarity as a strategic asset (Sheikh, 2003, pp. 82–104). Perhaps, this is one of the contexts in which Bangladesh has been considered by Pakistan as a mutual ally against India.

Under the BNP’s rule, Bangladesh seems to have allied with Pakistan in Pakistan’s aforementioned diplomatic pursuit. This is backed up by evidence. The BNP’s hold on power prompted Pakistan to table the Kashmir issue as its core concern in almost every bilateral summit. Bangladesh inclined to take a moral stance, characterised by its utterance of concern for the Kashmir situation. This could be understood as subscribing by Bangladesh to the Pakistani view of the violation of the human rights of the Kashmiri Muslims by Indian security forces. Furthermore, Bangladesh emphasised the importance of seeking a solution to the problem through dialogue—a choice that was consonant with the views of Pakistan, but which was rejected by India.

Alliance in Proxy War

There is also evidence which suggests that Bangladesh, under the BNP-led government, joined hands with Pakistan in the latter’s war on India by proxy means. Here too when the Kashmir issue is at the centre of Pakistan’s proxy war on India, the anti-India cum pro-Islam politics of the BNP is revealed to have triggered Bangladesh in allying with Pakistan in such Pakistani venture.

Pakistan had a long-held strategy of ‘cutting India down to size’ by means of irregular warfare which received serious consideration by Pakistan’s military and intelligence establishment after its military defeat to India during the 1971 Bangladesh crisis (Pande, 2011, p. 49). The outbreak of a spontaneous insurgency in India-held Kashmir in the late 1980s was a fortuitous moment for the Pakistan military. Apart from offering moral and diplomatic support for the Kashmiris, Pakistan had readiness to sponsor the reactivation of ‘jihad’ in a covert war by proxy means to support the Kashmiri insurgents. Pakistan’s readiness for such a venture stemmed from its Afghan war model. Being the front line state of America’s proxy war on the Soviets in Afghanistan from 1979 to 1988, Pakistan hosted ‘jihadists’/’mujahideen’ (Islamic warriors) from various countries, particularly from Arab-Muslim states, in waging an anti-Soviet ‘jihad’ in Afghanistan. The Pakistan military and its intelligence wing, the Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI), played the key role in the whole process of training and arming the jihadists (Coll, 2004).

The Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan in 1988 made the Pakistan military establishment and the ISI believe in the promise of defeating a powerful army by proxy war, with international jihadists being the key instrument. They envisaged the Afghan war model as an instrument for combating a state, which had unmatchable superiority in all respects of power (Coll, 2004). The Kashmir uprising coincided with this strategic option. Afghan jihadists, being committed to fight for the pan-Islamic cause, became a means for Pakistan not only to fight India in Kashmir, but also imbibe Kashmiri insurgents with the ideology of jihad. This encouraged the Kashmiris to be trained in Pakistan and fight back the Indian forces (Schmidt, 2011, pp. 78–99). It was a venture that envisaged serving not only Pakistan’s territorial claim on India-held Kashmir, but also its strategy to cut ‘India down to size’.

With the BNP’s ascent to power, Bangladesh seems to have allied with Pakistan’s ‘India down to size’ strategy, particularly when Pakistan needed a second front of its proxy war against India concerning the Kashmir conflict. From Pakistan’s perspective, a second front on the Bangladesh–India border could build up more pressure on India. This second front could diminish India’s sole concentration on fighting Pakistan-backed jihadists in Kashmir. Notably, the event of 9/11 placed pressure upon Pakistan to open this second front. America’s need for Indian support in its ‘war on terror’ forced Pakistan to restrict its offer of jihadist facilities in Kashmir, which could be transferred to a second front on the Bangladesh–India border (Riaz, 2008, pp. 77–78). This Pakistani urge coincided with the incumbency of the advocates of Islamo-nationalism in Bangladesh led by the BNP during 2001–2006. At this time, both Bangladesh and Pakistani elements joined hands to support Indian rebels who had long been fighting Indian forces in India’s Northeast, a region geographically contiguous to Bangladesh border.

Perhaps, the ‘10 truckload arms and ammunition haul’ case in Bangladesh stands as the firmest evidence of Bangladesh–Pakistan alignment in a proxy war. This case involves an incident in which police intercepted the consignment of a huge cache of arms and ammunition at a government facility on the night of 1 April 2004 in Chittagong, the main port city in the South-eastern part of Bangladesh. The volume of the arms was extremely sensational. According to a Bangladeshi defence analyst, it could ‘equip several infantry brigades’ (Khan, 2014b). Judicial prosecution shows that the transhipment of the arms was part of a clandestine operation against India, perpetrated by some state machinery from Bangladesh and Pakistan. The arms haul lacked some sort of coordination (Khan, 2014b). As a result, the consignment of the arms was seized by law enforcing agencies, leading to legal action and judicial prosecution.

Facts based on the judicial prosecution (The Daily Star, 2014) and analyses of Bangladeshi defence experts (Khan, 2014b) seem to provide a very useful insight into Bangladesh–Pakistan alignment in a proxy war against India. First, the arms which originated from outside South Asia were being transported to India’s Northeast. Its intended recipient was perhaps the United Liberation Front of Assam (ULFA), an insurgent organisation in India’s North-eastern state of Assam fighting Indian forces for secession. Second, it was mainly perpetrated by Pakistan’s military intelligence service, the ISI, in coordination with the Pakistan High Commission in Dhaka. Third, the motive of the Pakistani agencies was to curtail India’s power by destabilising India’s Northeast. Fourth, the delivery of arms was assisted by top brass of Bangladesh’s two principal intelligence services: the Directorate General of Forces Intelligence (DGFI), the main military intelligence service of the country and the National Security Intelligence (NSI). Although the discovery of the arms haul was accidental, there was an administrative collusion on Bangladesh side. Perhaps, the administrative collusion provided a guarantee of impunity from Bangladesh so that the arms could reach to its destination (Khan, 2014a). The use of a key government installation of Bangladesh, and the involvement of the top brass in its key intelligence agencies, including two cabinet members of the BNP-JeI government, back this point.⁸

The association of Bangladesh’s top intelligence agencies with their Pakistani counterpart in supplying weapons covertly to an Indian dissident group with a view to curtailing Indian power evokes a conspicuous question—that is, whether this clandestine operation was an execution of the policy of the government of the day. The question revolves around the fact that the intelligence services of a state sometimes do something without the knowledge of the political authority of the state.

Any scrutiny of the above question would reckon the fundamental source of the guarantee of impunity that the Pakistani agency, the ISI, received from Bangladesh intelligence services to operate clandestinely against Indian interests using Bangladesh soil. And in this regard, experts in Bangladesh points to the anti-India cum pro-Islam politics in Bangladesh, pursued by the BNP-JeI government of the day (S, 2012), providing a favourable environment for some elements in state machinery to work clandestinely against India, in collaboration with Pakistan’s ISI.

Conclusion

This article has revealed the latent power of Islam in Bangladesh–Pakistan alignment. The article began by examining Bangladesh’s vacillating approaches towards Pakistan—one characterised by conflict and the other by cooperation—with the swing having been caused by the alternation of the regime in Bangladesh between the BNP and the AL since the 1990s. With the AL in power, the old Islamic affinity as a rallying point of Bangladesh–Pakistan rapprochement was unimportant; rather, the bitter memories of 1971 dominated to cause strains in Bangladesh–Pakistan ties. In contrast, the BNP entertained the old Islamic bond as the basis of forgetting the bitterness of 1971, while justifying Bangladesh–Pakistan cooperation and cordiality. Thus, by taking into account the BNP’s perception of Islamic identity as a variable, the article has examined how this factor influenced Bangladesh–Pakistan alignment, within the BNP’s ascent to power.

Interestingly, in no way alliance with Pakistan served Bangladesh’s interest. Rather, simply driven anti-Indianism in domestic politics, the alliance dragged Bangladesh into Pakistan’s own conflict with India. Here, anti-Indianism has been intertwined with the BNP’s view of Islamic identity, which frames a view Hindu India as the enemy-other to Muslim Bangladesh, with Muslim Pakistan as mutual ally.

Indeed, Islam’s role in Bangladesh–Pakistan alignment was conditional. Externally, asymmetric power relations with India dictated this alignment. But under the same situation of Indian supremacy, such alignment did not take place with the AL having been in power. Examining this situation, this article has attributed this vacillation to Bangladesh’s domestic politics. The anti-India bias of the BNP’s politics of Islamic identity, and its depiction of the AL as a stooge of India inherently found Pakistan as a Muslim ally against the supremacy of India. In other words, Islam itself was not the cause of Bangladesh–Pakistan alignment; rather, Islam as a cause of this alignment was intertwined with historical legacy, India’s regional supremacy, and the BNP’s anti-India cum pro-Islam stance in the domestic politics of Bangladesh. This conditional role of Islam in foreign policy contradicts the claim that Islam plays deterministic role in defining allies and enemies.

Footnotes

Notes

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