Strategic-Maritime Triangle in the Indian Ocean: An Emerging Indo-US Naval Entente?

Abstract

The increasing Chinese naval presence in and around Indian ocean, coupled with the rise of the home-grown Indian Navy and the US naval dominance over the global commons, has brought about a strategic maritime triangle in the Indian Ocean. This article looks into the evolving role, capacity and objectives of the Indian, Chinese and US Navy vis-à-vis their strategic interests in the Indian Ocean region. The article argues that the ascendency of China’s naval prowess in Indian Ocean will prod India to opt for a tactical naval entente with the USA. Few impediments to the potential formation of a close-knit Indo-US partnership like India’s fear of losing strategic autonomy, its aversion in being an east Asian naval power, US–Pakistan ties and the difference in the Indian and USA’s interpretation of the concept of ‘Freedom of Navigation’ have been discussed. The article contends that an effective Indo-US naval cooperation will depend on how these impediments are taken into considerations within the make-up of their partnership.

Keywords

Indian Ocean Indo-US maritime strategy Chinese maritime strategy Indo-US naval co-operation Indo-US naval entente

Introduction

The Asia-pacific region has gained in geopolitical prominence with varying powers jockeying for clout and strategic space. Within Asia, The Indian Ocean has emerged as one of the key strategic regions (Kaplan, 2011). A large quantum of trade including 64 per cent of oil trade in the world passes through the ocean (Jaishankar, 2016). Moreover, the world is witnessing the parallel rise of two home-grown maritime powers in Asia: India and China. This has been termed as a ‘historical anomaly’ as far as the seas of Asia are concerned (Holmes & Yoshihara, 2008a, p. 41).

Bolstered by their growing economy and concerned over the safety of their maritime trade and rising energy imports, India and China have been increasingly strengthening sea-based deterrent forces as part of their respective maritime strategies in the Indian Ocean region, where the USA continues to be a dominant maritime power. In 2008, an Indo-US-Sino strategic triangle was still ‘emerging’ (Holmes & Yoshihara, 2008a) in the Indian Ocean, and now in the current scenario, with all the three navies having permanent bases and regular naval deployment in the region, a strategic maritime triangle has truly formed.

Through this article, we intend to make a perceptual analysis on the strategic triangle, that is, the triangular interplay of maritime competition, rivalry and co-operation among India, USA and China in the Indian Ocean. Abetted by the studying of existing literature, we make an analysis on the threat perception and maritime strategy of the three Powers in Indian Ocean. It is our contention that the rising threat of a Chinese navy would push the Indian Navy to safeguard its interest through greater co-operation with the US Navy. An Indo-US naval entente or an informal alliance in the Indian Ocean may emerge as the pressure from the Chinese Navy mounts in the region. The few impediments that can hamper the growth of Indo-US partnership are India’s insecurity regarding losing its ‘strategic autonomy’, strong US–Pakistan defence ties and the difference in the interpretation of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) among others. The level of maritime co-operation will depend on how these impediments are accommodated within the framework of the emerging Indo-US naval entente.

Chinese Maritime Power

Since the 1990s, Chinese Navy has made impressive progress from being a brown water navy, limited to coastal waters, to an increasingly blue water capable navy with ships plying different oceans. With the tremendous economic growth of China, its dependence on energy imports have skyrocketed and overwhelming amounts of these imported energy supplies have to traverse through the Indian ocean. Over 1.5 trillion of China’s maritime trade passes through Indian Ocean every year (Can, 2016). These trade shipments passes through several choke points like the Malacca straits, where China fears a rival maritime power can blockade its energy supplies and starve its economy. This fear has propelled the Chinese Navy into the Indian Ocean.

China’s Maritime Threat Perception in the Indian Ocean

In 1993, the interception of a Chinese merchant ship by the US navy in the waters of Persian Gulf highlighted the vulnerability of Chinese sea-borne energy shipments to interception by rival sea powers (Tyler, 1993). In 2000, Qian Guoliang wrote that the Chinese ‘threat perception is centred on the danger of “one point” and “one lane”’. By ‘one point’ he referred to the issue of Taiwan and by ‘one lane’ he meant the long shipping lanes through which Chinese freighters have to traverse to bring energy imports to mainland China (Khurana, 2008, p. 9). In 2003, Hu Jintao warned that ‘certain powers have all along encroached on and tried to control navigation through the Strait’. and he called for a strategy to ‘ensure (China’s) energy security’ (Lanteigne, 2008).

The need to ensure China’s energy security is not overstated. In 2003, China overtook Japan to become the second biggest oil consumer in the world. According to US Energy Information Administration, foreign imports would account for 75 per cent of China’s oil demand by 2020 (Holmes & Yoshihara, 2008, p. 368). Most of the Chinese sea-borne oil imports have to pass through the Malacca straits. The excessive reliance on the Malacca straits for oil imports has made China susceptible to potential blockade of the strait by a rival power. This is widely known as China’s ‘Malacca Dilemma’ (Ji, 2007).

Bypassing the Malacca Straits

China has made effort to open secondary routes that avoid this geostrategic chokepoint.¹ But due to the lack of economic viability of this ambitious project, the plans have not manifested in the ground (Wongcha-um, 2017). The Sino-Pakistan and Sino-Burmese pipelines face security concerns in the form of potential sabotage by insurgents and terrorist groups (Tunningley, 2017). Even if these concerns are taken care of, these measures to bypass the Malacca strait can only partly mitigate China’s Malacca dilemma.²

Chinese View of India’s Maritime Power

The geopolitical configurations in Asia has often led the two rising Asian giants to see each other as rivals. The dominant position of India in the Indian Ocean and its potential of becoming a great power are well recognised by the Chinese scholars (Walgreen, 2006). Zhu Fenggang reasons that India will aggressively try to expand its naval reach and its nautical ambition will push the Indian Navy to secure control over the various choke points like the Malacca straits and Gulf of Aden. (Fenggang, 2006).

The Chinese are also well aware of the geostrategic advantages that India enjoys in the Indian Ocean. The geography of India has also been compared to a ‘never-sinking aircraft carrier’ and has been termed as ‘the most important strategic point guarding the Indian Ocean’ (Yoshihara & Holmes, 2008, p. 51). One Chinese analyst using geostrategic terms described the Andaman and Nicobar Islands as a ‘metal chain’ that can chain shut the Western exist of the Malacca straits (Brewster, 2012, p. 133). Zhang Ming, another Chinese scholar, contends that ‘once India commands the Indian Ocean, it will not be satisfied with its position and will continuously seek to extend its influence, and its eastward strategy will have a particular impact on China’ (Ming, 2006, pp. 22–23). According to the same author ‘India is perhaps China’s most realistic strategic adversary’ (Ming, 2006, p. 23).

The Chinese strategists are also wary about the growing US overtures towards India, which many Chinese scholars see as a part of US encirclement policy against China. The US base of Diego Garcia, which lies at a strategic location amidst the Southern Indian Ocean, has been integrated into the ‘first Island Chains’ by some Chinese scholars (Holmes & Yoshihara, 2008b, p. 373). These geostrategic linkages between the Pacific with the Indian Ocean highlight the inevitable intermingling of the two theatres from the Chinese perspective.

Chinese Soft Power and Rising Strategic Footprints in the Indian Ocean

China’s bid to bolster its naval presence in the region was accompanied by strong soft power diplomacy and economic investments. Much of China’s soft power diplomacy was based on the famous Ming Admiral Zheng He’s voyages to present a benign picture of its naval build up and forays in the Indian Ocean region.³

The Chinese maritime soft power has to compete with India’s maritime history and linkages. The Hindu mariners, at least till the thirteenth century, plied the length and breadth of the Indian Ocean and moved beyond the Malacca straits and into the waters of South East Asia. The maritime outreach of the Indian seamen had profound political and cultures influences on the littoral nations of the Asia-Pacific region and gives India significant soft power potential, which can rival the Ming admiral’s seven voyages. Moreover, the rising Chinese assertiveness in the South China Sea can squander the soft power that China has so assiduously built in the region.

Another aspect of rising Chinese influence in the Indian Ocean region has been its investment in maritime infrastructure in the littorals surrounding the Indian Ocean (Krupakar, 2017). On 2 October 2013, the Chinese president Xi Jinping announced the maritime Silk Road initiative to the world. Through the initiative China intends to invest in maritime infrastructure to connect the nations of South East Asia, South Asia, Middle East and Africa, and to bolster sea-borne connectivity and trade (ASEAN–China Centre, 2013).

China is building or developing several ports in the Indian Ocean and these ports have potential for dual purposes: economic as well as military (Khurana, 2008). Moreover, China has constructed its first full-fledged overseas military base in Djibouti near the strategic chokepoints of Bab el Mandeb and the Gulf of Aden. The geographical position of these ‘Chinese’ Ports in the Indian Ocean, from Burma in South East Asia to Kenya in Eastern Africa, has built credibility surrounding the idea of ‘String of Pearls’—a theory that contends that China is geostrategically positioning itself in strategic maritime areas to project power and to control vital SLOCs during conflict. Chinese soft power offensive in the IOR and its investment on maritime infrastructure may not safeguard its SLOCs and energy imports during times of war and conflict but these can be seen as a precursor to China’s naval build up in the region. For if the Chinese increases its naval presence significantly in the region then its ‘pearls’ may act as bases in strategic locations and its soft power can justify that very presence.

Growth of Chinese Naval Prowess

From the 1990 onwards, the Chinese navy has registered an impressive growth and has transformed itself from a coastal navy to a navy that is interested in both the ‘near seas’ and the ‘far seas’. Chinese navy has been making deployments in the Indian Ocean region either in the form of anti-piracy operations or through port calls to friendly states in the region (O’Rourke, 2018, p. 54). In 2006, similar to the then Chinese President’s rhetoric creating a ‘great maritime power’, the China’s defence white paper called for ‘gradual extension of the strategic depth for offshore defensive operations and enhancing its capabilities in integrated maritime operations’ (Erickson, 2008, p. 656).

Some Chinese scholars assert that ‘the safety of the oceanic transportation and the strategic passageway for energy and resources’ could be ensured by building a powerful navy (Erickson, 2008, p. 656). Holmes and Yoshihara contend that ‘recognizing how tenuous Beijing’s position in the Indian Ocean basin remains, some Chinese analysts espouse a stronger, outward looking navy able to deter or defeat attempts by other powers to stop the flow of energy resources through regional SLOCs’ (2008b, p. 380)

Chinese navy has focused on its submarine arm to maintain an asymmetrical threat to the US Navy, and in recent years, submarines are increasingly being used to make forays into the Indian Ocean and inside Indian navy’s traditional maritime zone of operations. The People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) has been rapidly inducting nuclear attack submarines like the type 093 and its advanced variant type 093G into their inventory. Furthermore, ballistic missile submarines like the type 094 are being inducted in an expedite manner, with a plan to double its numbers in the Chinese navy to eight from the current strength of four (Fisher, 2015). The current Chinese Submarine fleet consists of five nuclear attack submarines, four Nuclear Ballistic Missile submarines and more than 50 diesel attack submarines (Page, 2015). In regard to the Indian Ocean, the powerful Chinese submarine fleet may not play a very important role in SLOC defence operations but their interdiction capabilities can be used as a ‘punishment’ strategy against hostile maritime power in the region (Khurana, 2008, p. 86).

Since 2012, the Chinese Navy has launched more ships than any other navies in the world and it has boosted its tally of surface ships to 26 destroyers, 52 frigates, 56 amphibious ships, 20 corvettes and 86 missile patrol crafts. Moreover, the Chinese ships are getting armed with newer and deadlier anti-ship cruise missiles. The Luyang III class of destroyers have been fitted with the YJ-18 anti-ship ballistic missile, which has more than doubled the range of anti-ship cruise missiles in the Chinese inventory (Pilger, 2015, p. 2). This technological advancement gives the Chinese Navy an excellent anti-access/ area denial capabilities in the ‘near seas’.

The Chinese decision to construct aircraft carriers has been seen as a part of Chinese strategy in the Indian Ocean.⁴ The increasing blue water capabilities of the PLAN has wider ramification for the naval competition in the Indian Ocean where the Chinese maritime power faces aircraft carrier-based fleets of the Indian and US Navy. The PLAN’s drive towards blue water capabilities will facilitate China, in the future, to match both the Indian and US naval prowess in the Indian Ocean and in effectively extending its geopolitical reach in the region.

Indian Navy and Its Geostrategic Imperatives

The position of India with its peninsular South driving deep into the Indian Ocean has been noted by Indian maritime thinkers as a strategic advantage for a navy that can project power deep into the Indian Ocean in three directions.⁵

One of the early exponents of Indian sea power was the historian and diplomat Kavalam Panikkar. He was one of the first to understand the geographical advantages for a strong Indian Navy and emphasised on the imperativeness of securing maritime and national interests by fielding a strong blue water navy. Panikkar asserted that ‘while to other countries, the Indian Ocean is only one of the important oceanic areas, to India it is the vital sea … the Indian Ocean must therefore remain truly Indian’ (Panikkar, 1971, p. 84). Taking India’s geography into consideration, he noted that ‘Indian interests have extended to the different sides of this Oceanic area’ (1971, p. 84) and contended that India’s interests in the Indian Ocean are based on ‘inescapable facts of geography’ (1971, p. 84) that are spread around distant bases like ‘Singapore, Mauritius, Aden and Socotra’ (1971, p. 91). He called for a strong ‘oceanic policy’ for the Indian Navy that would look to strengthen India’s maritime position by building a ‘steel ring’ linking ‘the islands of the Bay of Bengal with Singapore, Mauritius and Socotra’ (Panikkar, 1971, p. 15).

Keshav Vaidya was a contemporary of K. M. Pannikar and like him he too envisaged a strong Indian Navy. In his book, The Naval Defence of India (1949), he emphasised the importance of India’s maritime security and called for an assertive positioning of the Indian Navy in the Indian Ocean. According to Vaidya,

[T]he points which must be within India’s control are not merely coastal, but oceanic, and far from the coast itself … our ocean frontiers are stretched far and wide in all directions … these ocean frontiers extend as far as Sumatra and Malacca Straits in the east, including all territories within that limit. In the west, India’s frontiers extend up to the Cape of Good Hope, Madagascar, Mauritius, Socotra, Aden and the Persian Gulf. In the south, there is the grand expanse of the sea, and India would be required to maintain a constant vigil by means of floating bases and floating castles to watch that limitless frontier. (1949, p. 29)

These aforementioned statements present an early Indian views on maritime geostrategic imperatives in the Indian Ocean, which in the twenty-first century, baring the overly assertive connotations, still largely hold true.

Naval Power Projection and Impact during Times of Conflict

It was during the 1971 Indo-Pak war that the utility of a strong and efficient Indian navy came to the fore. The Indian Navy successfully blockaded both the Western and Eastern Pakistani ports and severed the Pakistani sea lanes of communication between its two wings. Furthermore, the spectacular naval bombardment of Karachi port reiterated the dominant position of the Indian Navy, which held sway over both the Arabian Sea and the Bay of Bengal. The 1971 war highlighted the efficacy of the Indian Navy in safeguarding national interest and in exacting tangible results in times of war.

The Kargil conflict in the year 1999 proved to be an unlikely opportunity for the Indian navy. During the localised land conflict in the Kargil region, the Indian Navy’s submarines, frigates and destroyers were deployed aggressively against Pakistani ports, especially the Karachi harbour. This assertive positioning of naval warships led the Pakistanis to believe that the Indian Navy might enforce a blockade against Karachi harbour and that apprehension might have led the Pakistanis to withdraw from Kargil (Scott, 2006, p. 107).

The naval deployments had a real effect on the outcome of a land conflict. It emphasised the importance of the Navy in safeguarding national interest. With India’s growing economy and rising international stature, the emphasis on fielding the blue water navy only grows.

India’s Maritime Strategy

The Indian Maritime Doctrine, published in 2004, mentions that India’s maritime strategy is not limited to ‘just guarding the coastline and island territories, but also extends to safeguarding’ India’s trade and interests in and beyond the exclusive economic zone (Ministry of Defence, 2004, p. 63). The document declares that India enjoys tremendous geostrategic advantages in the Indian Ocean region and that these advantages put her ‘in a position to greatly influence the movement/security of shipping along the SLOCs in the IOR [Indian Ocean Region]’ (p. 64). It openly admitted that ‘Control of the choke points could be useful as a bargaining chip in the international power game, where the currency of military power remains a stark reality’ (p. 64). This alludes to the growing realisation among India’s strategists that naval arm will be of strategic importance in the years to come.

In the 2015, maritime document titled Ensuring Secure Seas: Indian Maritime Security Strategy, the ‘primary’ area of interest for the Indian Navy, was extended taking a southwest trajectory to include the South Western Indian Ocean and the Red sea. The ‘Secondary’ area of interest was expanded to fit two choke points of Mozambique Channel and Ombai-Wetar Straits into its ambit (Indian Navy, 2015). The document highlights the Indian Navy’s focus on keeping shipping lanes free and to assert freedom of operational manoeuvre.

The Indian Navy has undertaken an ambitious expansion and modernisation plans; as Navy Vice Chief P. Murugesan acknowledged in 2015 that the navy aims at fielding a 200 ship strong navy by 2027 (Defense World, 2015b). It is currently constructing one indigenous Aircraft Carrier, the INS Vikrant and plans to construct a nuclear powered super carrier of 65,000 tonnage. In an urgency to bolster its weak submarine arm, the Indian navy is currently constructing three nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarines, five kalvari class conventional submarine and has plans to induct further six nuclear Attack Submarines and six conventional submarines (Chawan, 2017; Sen, 2014). The ballistic missile nuclear submarines under construction may be equipped with the K-5 SLBMs, which are currently under development and are said to have a range of 6,000 km. The Indian Navy has two stealth-guided missile destroyers (Vishakhapatnam class) under construction and has plans to construct further two in the future. The Indian navy plans on inducting further 10 stealth-guided missile frigates and 32 corvettes of various classes including kamorta class and the next generation missile vessels (Defense World, 2015a; Loiwal, 2015; Peri, 2016; Prasad, 2013; Raghuvanshi, 2016; Sengupta, n.d; Shukla, 2015). If these inductions happen according to their planned schedule, then by the 2030s, India can boast of a navy that has potent ASW capabilities.

India’s View of the Chinese Naval Forays

In 2004, Indian Maritime Doctrine, New Delhi, mentions the ‘obvious’ unease that the presence of extra-regional navies, in India’s immediate oceanic periphery, has caused to the country’s security mandarins (Ministry of Defence, 2004, p. 64). The Chinese investments in the ‘pearls’ around the Indian Ocean and the lack of transparency (Khurana, 2008) surrounding these infrastructural projects and agreements coupled with increasing Chinese naval presence in the Indian ocean have given rise to Indian apprehensions on China’s intent. Although China has largely conveyed that their naval deployments in the Indian Ocean are carrying the functional role of protecting its sea-borne shipments and trade, China’s growing maritime prowess and capacity in the region can also allude to the intent of projecting power in the region.

The perceived threat to its geopolitical position in the Indian Ocean from China has further accentuated India’s effort of expanding its naval forces and to counter Chinese investment in maritime infrastructure in the region. The expediency with which India partnered with Iran to open the Chahbahar port showcased the geostrategic significance that India attaches in outmanoeuvring Chinese naval infrastructural projects, in this case it being the Gwadar port in Pakistan (Chaudhury, 2017). India has used diplomatic agreements and installations of naval infrastructure to counter the growing presence of the Chinese navy. India signed a defence co-operation agreement with Qatar in 2008; whereby Indian navy could access Qatari sea space to provide maritime security to the strategic sea lanes of the Persian Gulf. In the Gulf, apart from Qatar, India has close relations with Oman, which offer berthing rights and logistical support to the Indian naval vessels.

Similar agreement was also signed earlier with Singapore, an island city state astride the Malacca strait, where maritime security was one of the major areas of bilateral co-operation between India and Singapore (Ministry of External Affairs, 2015). The Indian and Singapore navy have long been conducting naval exercises in the form of SIMBEX and MILAN off the coast of Andaman and Nicobar Islands and have also participated in anti-submarine war games. India has been developing networks of coastal radars with a plan to install 32 radar stations in Island littorals of the Indian Ocean like Seychelles, Mauritius and Sri Lanka. India has also donated a maritime surveillance aircraft to the Seychelles Coast guards and has exported the first Indian Naval ship Baracuda to Mauritius.

Furthermore, India has secured the development rights for two islands, Agalega in Mauritius and Assomption in Seychelles (India TV News, 2015). India has employed naval diplomacy and has built maritime security structure through bilateral and multi-lateral arrangements to promote its influence in the region and to guard against the rising spurts of Chinese naval forays.

It has been suggested that naval confrontation between India and China is an unlikely possibility given the vast distances between the Indian and Chinese Naval headquarters (Holmes & Yoshihara, 2008, p. 56) but naval relations do not exist in a vacuum. Any major escalation in the Himalayan frontier between India and China can provoke coercive naval actions in the Indian Ocean. Both the navies have rising stakes in the Indian Ocean that supplement their great power aspirations and would try to counter each other’s maritime influence in the Indian Ocean. The rivalry, driven by security dilemma and growing national ambitions, will continue as both India and China hedge against each other in Indian Ocean.

A Receding USA Navy?

The withdrawal of the Royal Navy from the Indian Ocean after the ‘East of Suez’ declaration of 1971 created a naval vacuum in the Indian Ocean, which was ultimately filled by the US Navy. The strategic importance of the Indian Ocean, as major shipping lanes run through it, and the USA’s geopolitical involvement in the littorals around the Indian Ocean, particularly the Persian Gulf, had made the Indian Ocean one of the most vital areas of operation for the US Navy.

The US naval presence in the Indian Ocean received a boost when the island of Diego Garcia was leased from the UK in 1966. Historically, the USA Navy has largely focused on the Atlantic and the Pacific theatre and this naval approach was termed as Two-Ocean strategy. In 2007, the maritime document A Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century, in the US, declared a Pacific-Indian Ocean strategy (Department of the Navy, 2015). Although the US navy enjoyed a dominant position over the global commons, the main US naval presence in the waters of the Indian Ocean was limited to the Arabian Sea and the Persian Gulf. The Gulf wars boosted USA’s naval presence in the area as the military involvement led to significant US naval deployment in the region, which ultimately led to the reactivation of the 5th US Fleet in the Persian Gulf. Currently, the Indian Ocean falls under the operational area of three US Fleets: the 5th, 6th and 7th US Fleets. Apart from the Indian Ocean, the 6th and the 7th Fleets have the Atlantic and the Pacific Ocean in their operational area, respectively. Only the 5th fleet is wholly centred on the Indian Ocean, particularly in the Persian Gulf.

Despite being the global superpower and having the largest Navy with the most tonnage in the world, USA’s Navy had been slowly shrinking in the past few years. In 2016, with a total of 272 ships, the US navy was the smallest since 1917. The receding US Naval prowess has made the absolute US dominance over the global commons an uncertain matter (Holmes & Yoshihara, 2008, p. 41). Despite going through a period of naval decline, the USA had to face the challenge of Chinese assertiveness in the South East and Eastern Asia. Now as the US navy seeks to ‘rebalance’ Asia-Pacific, the Chinese navy has been making deep forays into the Indian Ocean.

The challenge of dealing with the China’s rise has made the USA to increase its fleet size, despite economic constraints and fiscal deficits. According to Ray Mabus, the former secretary of Navy, the US navy would be expanding its size to 300 by 2020 (Gady, 2015) and that 60 per cent of US navy’s ships will be stationed in the Asia-Pacific region (Gady, 2015).

US Maritime Strategy and China’s Assertiveness

The USA’s maritime strategy is centred on protecting maritime commons, providing security to maritime trade, effective Humanitarian intervention, disaster relief operations and on defending national interests through forward deployments. The US maritime document mentions that deployment of naval forces would be done to create ‘regionally concentrated, credible combat power’ to provide regional security and to deter potential rivals. Strategically, the deployments would be ‘globally distributed’ but with forces that would be ‘mission-tailored’ according to their operational requirements (Department of the Navy, 2015). A chief element of USN deployment strategy is war prevention, whereby naval deployments dissuade revisionist powers from aggression and sustain a balance of power that promotes regional stability.

The importance of maritime trade in the global economy and the imperativeness of keeping access open to maritime commons for USA’s economic and geopolitical interest make it necessary for the US navy to play a leadership role in keeping order over international waters. It is in the interest of the USA to effectively maintain a rule-based international system, especially, in the maritime realm. Its maritime policy is oriented towards creating rule-based regional orders so as to provide security and stability in maritime regions.

The rise of china and its assertive stance in the Asia-Pacific region challenges key concepts of US maritime strategy. The Chinese advances in anti-access/area denial (A2/AD) capabilities have increased the potential threat to US naval forces in East China and South China Seas. Moreover, China’s excessive sovereignty claims in the region and the construction of artificial islands, which are being used to build military facilities, presents a serious challenge to freedom of navigation. The lack of adherence to international law and unilateral claims on vast maritime areas in the South China Sea has serious ramifications for the stability of the region.

The lack of transparency associated with China’s strategic-military capabilities and geopolitical intentions is a cause of worry for the USA. The significant increases in Chinese defence budget and its expeditious modernisation effort is further accentuating USA’s concerns. Moreover, the increasing naval presence of China in the Indian Ocean is making the USA look for cooperation with friendly maritime powers like India. In its maritime strategy document, the USA acknowledged that no single Institution or state has the capacity to guarantee order at sea at the global level and that necessitates co-operation with allies and friendly powers. It vouched for ‘integrated maritime operations, either within formal alliance structures … or more informal arrangements’ (United States, 2015).

Trump Factor

Donald Trump won the 2017 US presidential race on the back of an ‘America First’ campaign, which called into question many long-held US policies. One of the first jolts was the announcement of US withdrawal from the Trans-Pacific Partnership, a trade grouping that was intended to strengthen USA’s economic engagement with the states of the Pacific in the face of rising Chinese economic might. It led to the assumption that Trump may not keep up the ‘rebalancing’ of the Asia-pacific.

Since the inauguration of Trump presidency, the USA maritime engagement with the Indo-Asia-Pacific region has not waned. Moreover, Trump regime has looked to bolster US naval forces and has continued Freedom of Navigation Operation (FONOP) in the region. Trump himself publicly promised to ‘build a Navy of 350 surface ships and submarines’ (Cronin, 2017). Under Trump, the naval budget has continued to increase and the budget of the fiscal year 2018 would support a naval force of 292 ships, including 11 aircraft carriers and 32 large amphibious ships. Furthermore, it will fund the delivery of 12 new combatant ships; construction of eight new ships; and pay for a variety of naval aviation platforms, including 91 airframes. (Cronin, 2017)

The Trump regime has declared continued commitment in safeguarding maritime common and freedom of navigation in the Asia-Pacific region.⁶ The USA may look to augment their strategic posture in the region with a new Asia-Pacific stability initiative, which is currently under progress, to build capacity of the states around the South China Sea and to reinforce its own naval capabilities in the region. (Cronin, 2017)

In regard to India, the Trump presidency has continued to emphasise greater cooperation with India. While recommending on the possible sale of F-18 and F-16 fighter jets to India in US congress, the trump administration contended that defence co-operation will be a chief feature of Indo-US bilateral relations. Moreover, they expressed that USA needs India to be ‘a net security provider’ in the Asia-Pacific region (Times of India, 2017). In the National Security Strategy document released by the Trump administration, India has been designated as a ‘leading global power’ and it provided rationale for building a strong Indo-US partnership in the ‘competition between free and repressive visions of world order in the Indo-Asia-Pacific region’ (The White House, 2017).

The major area of divergence between Trump and his predecessors has been the economic-trade-environmental policies. In the strategic-maritime domain where US policies were shaped by geopolitical realities, the US approach has largely remained the same. Despite that there is an element of uncertainty regarding Indo-US relations under Trump, given the unpredictable decision-making that is commonly associated with the Trump presidency (Miller, 2017).

Growing Maritime Co-operation with India

One of the chief elements of the US maritime document of 2015 is the emphasis on ‘co-operation’ with other regional navies in creating a global network of navies to address security challenges (Department of the Navy, 2015). With its naval superiority at stake in Asia, the US navy is increasingly looking for partnerships with like-minded navies of the friendly countries (Richardson, 2016, p. 8).

In the Indian Ocean, the US navy is gradually moving closer to the Indian Navy as both the navies have increasingly started engaging in joint exercises, patrols and co-operation. Given the ‘geopolitical space’ (Yoshihara & Holmes, 2008, p. 14) in the Indian Ocean, the Indian and the US navy have mainly co-existed without any major tensions, baring the threatening presence of USA’s 7th Fleet in the Bay of Bengal during the Indo-Pak war of 1971. While India is the pre-eminent power surrounding the waters of south Asia, USA had been the dominant naval power, in terms of naval fire power and tonnage, in the larger strategic-maritime realm of Indo-Asia-Pacific.

In 2007, The Indo-US Defence Joint Working Group (JWG), meeting at New Delhi, is reported to have discussed China’s growing naval expansion in the Indian Ocean and its rapidly increasing military and maritime links with countries, such as Myanmar, Bangladesh and Sri Lanka (Khurana, 2008). During the visit of US President Barack Obama to India in January 2015, both countries issued a joint statement noting the importance of the peaceful resolution of maritime territorial disputes and ensuring the ‘freedom of navigation’ with specific reference to the South China Sea. In the 2016 joint statement issued after the Prime Minister Modi’s visit to the US, securing maritime domain formed an important part, where it reiterated the importance attached ‘to ensuring freedom of navigation and over flight and exploitation of resources as per international law, including the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, and settlement of territorial disputes by peaceful means’ (The White House, 2016). In 2016, India and the USA held the inaugural meeting of the Maritime Security Dialogue, where both sides ‘covered issues of mutual interest, including exchange of perspectives on maritime security development in the Asia-Pacific and Indian Ocean Region as well as prospects for further strengthening cooperation between India and the United States in this regard’ (Ministry of External Affairs, 2016).

The Malabar naval exercise between India and USA has emerged as a platform for greater Indo-US naval partnership. The navies of Japan, Australia and Singapore have also taken part in Malabar exercises. In 2015, Japan was included as a permanent partner in the exercise, which transformed the Malabar exercise into a formally structured trilateral naval exercise. The Malabar exercises which started off as an Indo-US joint naval drill have now developed into a multi-lateral platform, which can facilitate wider regional collaboration among the navies of Indo-Pacific (Parameswaran, 2016).

There has been greater anti-submarine warfare co-operation and joint drills between the Indian and US navy in recent years. In May 2016, there were talks between Indian and US authorities on devising strategies on how to keep track of the growing number of Chinese submarines making forays into the Indian Ocean (Gady, 2016). In April 2016, US Defence Secretary Ashton Carter and his Indian counterpart, Defence Minister Manohar Parrikar, pledged to deepen Indo-US military ties in a joint statement where the need for more talks on ASW co-operation was highlighted (para 4). One of the likely areas for future ASW co-operation would be naval aviation, wherein both the Indian Navy and US navy operate Boeing P-8 maritime patrol planes.

With both the countries operating Air craft carriers, the future co-operation between Indian and US navy regarding Aircraft carrier operational know how and technology is very likely. The two sides formed a JWG on carrier technology cooperation, whose first meeting took place on 17 June 2015. One major area of success has been the transfer of Electromagnetic Aircraft Launch System (EMALS) technology to India, which can be installed on India’s future aircraft carriers (The Economic Times, 2017)

India and USA share common interests and have existing co-operative arrangements within maritime domain awareness (MDA), search and rescue (SAR), non-combatant evacuation operations (NEO) and humanitarian assistance/disaster relief (HA/DR) areas of maritime security.

The signing of Logistics Exchange Memorandum of Agreement (LEMOA) in 2016 between India and the USA have opened the gates for further Indo-US military co-operation. It is one of the four ‘foundational agreements’ that the USA enters into with its defence partners (George, 2016). It enables the military of both the countries to access each other’s facilities for supplies and repairs. The signing of LEMOA has firmly established Indo-US military co-operation and has created immense potential for future maritime synergy and co-operation in the Indo-Pacific.

An Emerging Indo-US Naval Entente?

The interest and goals of both the Indian and US navy converge as far as protecting sea lanes of communications, upholding freedom of navigation and countering the growing threat of Chinese naval might in the Indian Ocean region are concerned. The ‘string of pearls’ and the maritime Silk Road Initiative, which seek to build extensive network of Chinese maritime infrastructure from the Western pacific to the Mediterranean Sea through the Indian Ocean, manifest as an Chinese geostrategic push in the region and are the matter of concern for Indian as well as the US navy.

With an Indian Navy, which looks to ensure ‘secure seas’ by being the ‘net security provider’ through partnership with friendly navies in the Indian Ocean Region, and a US Navy, which seeks to create a wide network of friendly regional navies to rebalance against the increasing Chinese naval might, a strategic understanding is emerging between the two navies in the Indian Ocean. The confluence of strategic maritime interests of India and the USA has motivated greater cooperation between their armed forces in general and between their navies in particular. The continuance of their guarded perception regarding increasing Chinese naval presence in the region can further strengthen the existing Indo-US collaboration and can lead to the materialisation of an India-US Naval entente. The emergence of Indo-US naval entente can lead to effective freedom of operational manoeuvre and it can further deter revisionist tendencies of rival powers. The synergy of a well-coordinated Indo-US naval cooperation can help to buttress their respective strategic domains within the Indian Ocean and beyond. Moreover, it can put pressure on China to accede to a rule-based regional arrangement for mediation and cooperation in the maritime realm.

Why an Entente and Not a Full-fledged Alliance?

Despite the growing strategic congruence between India and the USA, there are some issues related to the inherent characteristics of India’s world view and complex geopolitics of Asia-Pacific region that can restrict a more close-knit Indo-US partnership. India’s national security has always had strong underpinnings of ‘strategic autonomy’ (Khurana, 2017, p. 435). Its historical and national experiences as a nation-state have shaped modern India’s strict adherence to ‘autonomy’ in foreign policy and strategic decision-making.

India’s sensitivity in entering into an agreement with a foreign power to share each other bases can be seen as a major factor that prolonged the negotiation surrounding the signing of the LEMOA between India and the USA. Although India has signed LEMOA, after some safeguards were put in place to allay India’s fears, two more foundational agreements remain that India is reluctant to sign the Communication and Information Security Memorandum Agreement (CISMOA) and the Basic Exchange and Cooperation Agreement for Geo-Spatial Cooperation (BECA). Signing these agreements will give India access to USA made encrypted communications and enable exchange of geospatial data that can be used in navigation and targeting (Samaranayake, Connell, & Limaye, 2017). India is legitimately concerned that these agreements will infringe on India strategic autonomy by making it overly dependent on USA for military equipment, communication systems and data gathering. India’s foreign policymakers might intend to keep strategic relations with multiple powers instead of entering into a close and rigid partnership framework with the USA to the detriment of its strategic autonomy.

India’s stress on maintaining ‘autonomy’ has prevented the country in letting her armed forces operate under command and control of a foreign power. Only in UN mandated operations have India contributed its armed forces under an international command and control. Thus, apart from conducting joint naval exercises, India may not engage in joint operations with the US Navy in the future. Furthermore, difference in capacity and difficulty in interoperability between the two navies make the prospect of joint operations difficult. The Indo-US emerging maritime entente may rather be augmented with co-ordinated ‘joint operations’ where each navy will maintain its own independent command and control over their respective forces.

A feature of South Asian geopolitics that can impede closer strategic relations between the India and the USA is the latter’s close geopolitical and military ties with India’s regional rival Pakistan. Pakistan has emerged again, due to the protracted Afghan war, as a frontline state in American war on terrorism. Despite Pakistan’s involvement in the US-led war against Terrorism, terrorism emanating out of Pakistan with covert assistance of Pakistan state agencies remains a constant challenge for Indian security establishments. The USA’s economic and military aid to Pakistan invariably affects India’s strategic concerns in South Asia. The sale of prime military assets to Pakistan like F-16 fighter aircrafts while strengthening the Indo-US strategic partnership presents a conflicting picture to Indian strategists as far as USA’s imperatives in South Asia are concerned.

One of the chief elements of Indo-US collaboration in the Indian Ocean is their emphasis on ‘Freedom of Navigation’, but their understanding of the concept differs. India’s Interpretation of the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) is that non-military activities and flow of maritime trade comes under the purview of freedom of navigation. This interpretation differs from that of USA, which seeks absolute Freedom of Navigation through EEZs. Whereas, India is only concerned with free flow of trade through EEZs of foreign countries or South China Sea in particular, USA seeks free movement of Military vessels along with merchant vessels through EEZs. Thus, India is unfavourably disposed to the idea of FONOPs, of which she herself has been at the receiving end in the recent past (Panda, 2018).

Another factor that can hinder further growth of Indo-US maritime alliance is India’s reluctance in countering China in South East Asia through real deployments of naval assets or conducting FONOPs in South China Sea. Despite the strategic rivalry between India and china in the Indian Ocean and the existing border dispute in the Himalayan frontier, India shares vibrant trade relations with China and has favourable ties with China in multilateral organisations like the WTO and BRICS (Brahm, 2018; Sengupta, 2017; Times of India, 2018). It is in India’s interest to limit conflict with China without ceding strategic space and to avoid further antagonism in Sino-Indian relations. From India’s point of view, it is highly unlikely that china would obstruct the flow of trade in the South China Sea. As far as military activities in the EEZs are concerned, India’s position is closer to china than the USA. Thus, India is opposed to the idea of conducting FONOPs in the South China Sea.

Despite the presence of various issues that can hamper closer ties between India and the USA, the strategic maritime convergence that has already emerged between the two countries and the favourable momentum that their relationship has obtained in the past decade, it is very plausible that the current trajectory of Indo-US naval partnership will continue its upward ascent. Nonetheless, these irritants in Indo-US relationship need to be sorted out in the long run for their strategic partnership to reach its full potential.

With rise in India’s international profile, it is aspiring to be a global player and is aiming for strategic outreach in Asia and beyond. The Indian Ocean offers a vast geostrategic conduit through which India can project influence in its wider neighbourhood. Thus, the Indian Navy emerged as a strategic arm for augmenting India’s strategic position in the Indian Ocean. Despite the growth of Indian navy, it may be lacking in capacity to carry out Out-of-Area Contingency (OOAC) operations in far flung geographical areas to which India’s maritime interests have expanded (Khurana, 2017, p. 436). Thus while it seeks to be a net security provider in the Indian Ocean, it is open to co-operation with friendly navies, chief among which is the US navy, which has operated in the region beside the Indian Navy for decades. Given the alignment in India’s and US’s maritime interests, naval cooperation between the two countries has increased many folds. But opting for a full-fledged maritime alliance with the USA may have the danger of subverting India’s strategic interests and choices, thus a special arrangement—an informal naval entente between the two countries—can be envisaged.

Conclusion

China has achieved a permanent presence in the Indian Ocean with its substantial infrastructural investments in the countries of the region and the setting up of its overseas military base in Djibouti. Augmenting its strategic presence through frequent naval deployments, China has bolstered its naval prominence in the region where India and the USA have been the only major maritime powers, thereby creating a strategic triangle in the maritime domain of the Indian Ocean. The upward trajectory of Chinese naval power in the Indian Ocean has put pressure on both Indian and the US navy. While the Indian Navy seeks to secure its strategic space in the Indian Ocean against Chinese naval penetration and to expand its area of operations to compliment India’s overall geopolitical ambition in the region, the US navy aims to rebalance the pacific and seeks to build a favourable balance of forces through co-operation with regional navies to counter China in the larger Indo-Pacific area. The convergence of Indian navy and US navy’s strategic interests, combined with the rising defence ties between the countries, is leading to closer naval collaboration in the Indian Ocean. Keeping view of India’s fear of limiting strategic autonomy and some fundamental but limited differences in their respective interpretation of the UNCLOS, a loosely structured Indo-US naval entente may emerge in the Indian Ocean. Without entering into any rigid alliance framework, an arrangement for strategic collaboration between the Indian and the USA navy, based on co-ordinated operations, intelligence sharing and logistical support, is possible. Integrating the benefits of Indo-US naval synergy into its geopolitical strategy of countering the rising clout of China in the Indian Ocean region will likely form a chief feature of India’s maritime geostrategy in the Indian Ocean. Moreover, the efficacy of Indo-US maritime cooperation will depend upon the degree to which they can accommodate India’s emphasis on maintaining strategic autonomy, its aversion in directly countering the Chinese navy in the Pacific, their differences regarding FONOPs, their naval prerogatives and geopolitical aspirations in the region within the framework of their emerging naval entente.

Declaration of Conflicting Interests

The author(s) declared no potential conflicts of interest with respect to the research, authorship and/or publication of this article.

Funding

The author(s) received no financial support for the research, authorship and/or publication of this article.

Footnotes

Notes

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