The Ganges River Negotiation: Idealism of Regional Cooperation or Pragmatic Bilateralism

Abstract

Negotiations between neighbours over river disputes are not only about water, they come embedded with other bilateral concerns. Thus, the solution of a river dispute depends on comparative bargaining capabilities of riparians on their many other contentious matters. This assumption has been applied in investigating and analysing the Ganges River negotiation between India and Bangladesh. The literature on the Ganges has focussed on integrated river development perspectives. The present analysis underlines the convergence of water with other bilateral concerns. The examination of a quarter-century negotiation on the Ganges confirms the correlation between positive outcomes and better linkages between multiple issues.

Keywords

Ganges River bilateral negotiation United Nations Nepal Indo-Bangladesh relationship

Introduction

Transboundary nature of a river makes the relationship between neighbours interdependent. More than 200 river basins in the world are shared by two or more countries, covering almost 47 per cent of the world’s landmass (Elhance, 1999). In South Asia, almost every country shares a river with a neighbour or two. The Ganges, one of the largest rivers in South Asia, is shared largely by India, Bangladesh and Nepal. Hydro-politics is very active on the Ganges; this can be traced to the Indian proposal of constructing a barrage on the river which became a bone of contention, first between India and Pakistan and later between India and Bangladesh. Meaningful deliberations on the river coincided the birth of Bangladesh as an independent nation-state in 1971. A quarter of a century negotiation concluded with the formalisation of the Ganges treaty in 1996. Since then, it has been functional. All along, there had been a constant tussle over the choice of negotiation strategies: bilateral versus multilateral. While India always favoured a bilateral approach, Bangladesh’s preference was multilateral negotiation. Interestingly, this preference has been along the geographical position of the neighbours—India upstream and Bangladesh downstream.

Many theories have analysed international conflict and cooperation over river waters. While the hegemonic stability theory argues that the powerful riparian prefers to negotiate and sign bilateral treaties (Hensel, Mitchell, & Sowers, 2006), the coalition theory underlines that concluding a bilateral treaty is easier because riparians’ hydrological needs can be accommodated easily (Just & Netanyahu, 1996). Scholars Neda and Sara have examined three contexts: bilateral treaties on bilateral basins, bilateral treaties on multilateral basins and multilateral treaties on multilateral basins: their analysis of the nature of cooperation is based on three considerations such as state interest, transaction costs and the distribution of power. They concluded that cooperation on water took place more than conflict; the nature of cooperation was mostly bilateral even on multilateral basins (Zawahri & Mitchell, 2011, see also Song & Whittington, 2004). Scholars Robert Axelrod and Robert Keohane studied how cooperation was made possible in world politics. ‘Cooperation can only take place in situations that contain a mixture of conflicting and complementary interests. In such situations, cooperation occurs when actors adjust their behaviour to the actual or anticipated preferences off others’ (Axelrod & Keohane, 1985, p. 226). They further underline that cooperation depends on mutuality of interest, the shadow of the future and the number of actors. The authors underscore that better results are achieved in bilateral conditions. Those who have specifically argued for linkage have grounded their theories on a combination of factors. Hensel et al. underline that generally the upstream state would not be interested to go for an agreement because of the unbridled ability to control river water unless the downstream state has some other bargaining leverage (Hensel et al., 2006). Espey and Towfique also maintain that countries with significant control over water resources would be generally reluctant to seek formal arrangements but additional benefits associated with a treaty would make riparian states sign the treaty (Molly & Towfique, 2004).

There is a sizeable body of literature on the Ganges, but the focus of scholarship has been on regional water cooperation (Crow, Lindquist, & Wilson, 1995; Parua, 2010; Verghese & Iyer, 1993). This article seeks to address some of the gaps. It argues that water disputes between neighbours come embedded with other bilateral concerns; thus, the solution depends on comparative bargaining capabilities of negotiating parties on their many other contentious matters. The possibility of cooperation goes higher when negotiators acknowledge and appreciate that potential linkage of one issue with another would lead to additional gains. The author underlines linkage aspects after going through negotiation processes of river water disputes in South Asia in general and Ganges River water disputes in particular. The examination of Bangladesh popular media (from 1976 to 1996) has assisted the analysis. The author has done a field study of Bangladesh and India between 2009 and 2011. This includes both structured and semi-structured interviews with foreign secretary, political leaders, ex-water minister, academicians, activists and members of civil society who were associated with negotiations at various levels.

The investigation suggests that India has always preferred a bilateral approach as it intends to leverage its position (in terms of size, economy and other variables) to manoeuvre Bangladesh. India has been insisting on bilateralism because this approach corroborates its geostrategic and political interests in South Asia.

It is important to mention here that linkage is not meant as in a chess game where one move is exactly reciprocated by another move of an opponent. In river water negotiation, a single move from one side can lead to multiple opportunities provided the opposite party appreciates that a particular move would have proliferating impacts on its various other concerns; the linkage is further buttressed by perception of the overall state of relationship between two neighbours.

The Ganges treaty is a bilateral one with its own salient features and dynamics. The present article analyses and explains the negotiation process of India and Bangladesh, leading to signing of the treaty in 1996. The article is structured in the following manner. The first part evaluates India’s initial water negotiation with Pakistan and Nepal and its impact on the country’s future course of interactions with Bangladesh. The second part analyses negotiations on the Ganges. The third section investigates the phase where there was an exploration of multilateralism in bilateral discussion. The last section examines dichotomous preferences of negotiation strategies. The article has also drawn from debates in the Indian Parliament to underline evolution of consensus in the polity for bilateral negotiation with neighbours especially when it comes to issues of river water.

Evolution of India’s Negotiating Strategy on River Waters

India initiated river water negotiations with two immediate neighbours in the 1950s. One was with Pakistan on the western rivers, and the other was with Nepal on the eastern rivers. These two riparian discussions were guided by diverse requirements and circumstances. While India interacted with Pakistan on the Indus River because of the existential threat faced by the latter, nation-building demands made the newly independent nation-state sign two agreements with Nepal.

India and Nepal signed the agreements on the Kosi and Gandak in 1954 and 1959, respectively. However, political parties severely criticised both agreements because they believed that India secured disproportionate benefits out of them at Nepal’s expanse. The relationship between two neighbours deteriorated further after a number of internal political upheavals in Nepal (removal of the Rana regime, introduction of democracy and later the China card; Rasgotra, 2016; Untawale, 1974). As India was already suffering from conflicts on the western front with Pakistan (1948 and 1965 wars), it was very keen to diffuse the tension on the eastern side. Prime Minister Lal Bahadur Shastri assured the Nepalese government of India’s eagerness for revision of the treaties in his visit to Nepal in 1965. As a result, Nepal’s term of contract improved, and it gained better control over the rivers after the amendment in 1966 (Salman & Uprety, 2002).

India’s experience with Pakistan on the Indus was completely different. The Upper Bari Doab canal system was built to supply water to the Punjab Province. With partition, lower portions of the canal system went to West Punjab that was in Pakistan and upper portions came to East Punjab of India which had most of headwaters. The 1947 partition affected Pakistan water supplies severely (Gulati, 1973). After a decade of deliberations, both countries decided to accept the principles of division of the Indus River intermediated by the World Bank. India agreed to restrict its usage of water on the western rivers just for irrigating existing areas and to develop only 70, 1,000 acres of irrigation from these rivers subject to specific conditions. The then Prime Minister of India Jawaharlal Nehru heralded the treaty in the following words:

[G]reater than these material benefits are the psychological, perhaps the emotional benefits, that come from such a treaty, which is a happy symbol not only in this domain of the use of the Indus valley waters, but in the larger cooperation between the two countries. (Nehru quoted in Gulati, 1973)

This optimistic exclamation of Prime Minister Nehru for the treaty substantiates the arguments presented earlier by Axelrod and Keohane and Espey and Towfique.

But soon after, this optimism evaporated. After a year of signing the treaty, the Prime Minister Nehru expressed the despair, ‘this agreement would open the way to settlement on other problems, but we are where we were’ (quoted in Gulati, 1973). India was expecting that the successful negotiation would have positive impacts on other issues including Kashmir. But nothing of this sort happened. Although this treaty was commended all over the world for successful negotiation of such a contentious issue between not two friendly neighbours, the Indian government’s efforts were not appreciated internally. Members of Parliament blamed the government for a policy of appeasement and projected the settlement as surrender to Pakistan. It was alleged that the Indian interests had been compromised. These negotiations definitely had a major impact on the Ganges’ deliberations which ensued soon after.

Brief History of Indo-Bangladesh Negotiation

The Ganges originates in the southern slopes of the Himalayas in India and moves in a southeast direction towards Bangladesh. Seven major tributaries augment the river’s flow. Most important of them are the Gandak, Karnali (Ghagra) and Kosi which run through Nepal. They supply approximately 60 per cent of the Ganges’ flow. The largest portion of the Ganges falls within India. Mainstream Ganges bifurcates into two channels which are known as Bhagirathi–Hooghly in India and Padma in Bangladesh. Kolkata (earlier Calcutta), the capital of West Bengal, is situated on the Hooghly River. The river joins Brahmaputra in Bangladesh and their combined flow then runs into the Bay of Bengal. Out of the total drainage area of the Ganges, 79 per cent belongs to India, 4.2 per cent to Bangladesh and almost 14 per cent to Nepal (Chellaney, 2011).

The Calcutta port was very important for industries and eastern provinces of India during the colonial and the immediate post-independence period (Verghese & Iyer, 1994). The port faced difficulties because large ships were unable to navigate in the Hooghly River. The Indian government decided to build the Farakka barrage (a barrage across the Ganges River, located in the Indian state of West Bengal, almost 16.5 kilometres from the border with Bangladesh) on the Ganges for desilting and resolving drinking water problems in Calcutta (present-day Kolkata). Pakistan protested the decision as it believed that this would reduce volume of water to its eastern part.

Pakistan was formally informed about the Farakka barrage in January 1961. Secretary-level talks were held throughout the 1960s. But India did not entertain Pakistan’s continuous demand for ministerial-level discussion. The Indian response to Pakistan’s request for negotiation on the Ganges was very different from that of the Indus. It seems that India was not ready to compromise its interests on both the eastern and the western rivers because of its perpetual animosity with Pakistan. Other reason could be that since India had already begun work on the barrage, negotiation would have put some limitations on the construction which it was in no mood to oblige. Another probability seems that the Indian government did not consider the overall atmosphere favourable for a ministerial talk. Prime Minister Indira Gandhi informed the Lok Sabha that ‘her government believed ministerial talks to be premature; the technical exchange had to be completed first’ (Crow, 1995, p. 91). On being questioned later as to why India did not have ministerial meetings with Pakistan, the prime minister replied, ‘Talks can only be held if there is an atmosphere of confidence and amity. This was a period when there was acute distrust, and no respect, therefore there was no agreement even on much lesser issue’ (Quoted in Crow, 1995, p. 94).

When Bangladesh became an independent country, India held a ministerial talk immediately. This underlines the role of atmospherics. Since India had an important role in Bangladesh’s liberation, the government was interested in facilitating the new regime. In fact, the Ganges issue was discussed at the prime ministerial level. In their first meeting in 1974, both prime ministers, Mujibur Rahman and Mrs Indira Gandhi, agreed that while the Farakka barrage could be commissioned, the option to optimise the lean season flow (from January 1 to May 31) of the Ganges would be explored. India commissioned the Farakka barrage on 21 April 1975. But deliberations on the Ganges were disrupted as Mujib was assassinated in August 1975. India did not extend the same warmth to the new Bangladesh government as was the case to the previously elected government. Since negotiation did not move forward, the military administrator Ziaur Rahman adopted a tough position against India and tried to internationalise the Ganges issue. But a thaw came in the relationship when synergies of interests coalesced between the two governments.

Bilateral Agreements: Linkage of Water with Other Bilateral Issues

After elections in 1977, a first non-Congress (Janata) government came to power in 30 years of India’s independence. The new regime was very keen to demonstrate to the domestic constituency as well as the outside world, particularly neighbouring countries, that it was really a friendly government. This was intended to be accomplished by achieving quick success in foreign policy. In fact, the Janata Party Manifesto said, ‘the party will strive to resolve such outstanding issues as remain with some of its neighbours and will consciously promote a good neighbour policy’ (The Janata Party Manifesto quoted in Crow, 1995, p. 115). Thus, the new government came to power with its strong intent to resolve contentious issues.

India’s then Prime Minister Morarji Desai met Bangladeshi leader Ziaur Rahman at the Commonwealth Heads of Government meeting in London in 1977. Soon, an understanding was reached between the leaders of the two governments that ‘see that no shelter was given to criminal elements from across the border, whatever might have taken place under the previous regime’ (The Hindu, 1977). Thus, it initiated the process of ‘beneficial bilateralism’ regarding neighbours. The ‘beneficial bilateralism’ stood for personal rapport, economic accommodation, political neutrality and non-interference in internal affairs of neighbours.

After the assassination of Mujibur Rahman, some of his sympathisers had come to India and were involved in raiding Bangladesh; they were also engaged in anti-Zia activities. The Janata government stopped all support to anti-Zia guerrilla forces that were operating from India. According to some sources, the Janata government was not discreet in expelling the guerrilla. There are evidences to suggest that force and pressures were used in pushing the Awami League adversaries of President Ziaur Rahman into Bangladesh, who eventually went into the hands of the military regime. The Awami League leader, Phani Majumdar, explained the experience, ‘some of our workers had sought refuge in India (after the 1975 crackdown). But since the new government came to power in New Delhi, these workers have been sent back, often at gunpoint, only to be jailed or tortured by the military rulers’ (Muni, 1979). Similarly, another Awami guerrilla leader Kader Siddiqui, popularly known as ‘tiger’, was also pushed back (Muni, 1979). This gesture of the Indian government was reciprocated by the Zia regime in his changed attitude on the Ganges. Thus, issue linkage worked symbiotically in this case. Issue linkages are ‘attempts to gain additional bargaining leverage by making one’s own behaviour on a given issue contingent on others’ actions towards other issues’ (Ernst Haas was quoted in Axelrod & Keohane, 1985, p. 239).

Consequently in April 1977, after three days of deliberations with Bangladeshi leaders, the Indian minister announced that an ‘understanding’ had been reached on sharing of the Ganges water. Interestingly, the Bangladeshi negotiating team was not ready to accept less than 40,000 cusecs but General Zia overruled them and agreed for 35,000 cusecs. The Indian minister persuaded General Zia further to accept his demand of another concession of 500 cusecs. Thus, the deal was secured at 34, 500 cusecs. This was a thorough political deal with hard bargaining from both sides to make the deal sellable in each other’s constituency. This underlines political leaders’ role because this kind of bargaining cannot be accomplished by technical experts and professional diplomats, as it requires quick and most importantly, decisive decision-making. In the name of friendship, both parties agreed to climb down from their stated positions (Mehta, 2010). In India, the minister overruled his advisors.

After the collapse of the Janata government, the Congress party came to power again in 1980. Although the Farakka Agreement signed by the Janata government was not abrogated, the new government allowed the agreement to lapse after 1982.

Interregnum of Multilateralism in Bilateral Negotiation

Acceptance of Nepal Option by India

With the change of government after the assassination of Mrs Indira Gandhi in 1984, Indian Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi showed keenness to initiate a discussion with Bangladesh afresh to resolve the long-pending Ganges dispute. Thus, a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) was signed between India and Bangladesh in November 1985. An important aspect of the MOU was the establishment of a Joint Committee of Experts (JCE). This was mandated to undertake a joint study to work out a long-term scheme for augmenting the flows of the Ganges at Farakka. Interesting to note here is that negotiations over water had been exclusively bilateral between India and Bangladesh till a meeting in Nepal in October 1986.

Since the Indian prime minister and Bangladeshi president had agreed to jointly approach Nepal, identical letters were sent in 1986 which proposed that the JCE would visit Nepal to examine the potential of augmenting flows of the Ganges through the construction of storages in its territory (Mehta, 2010). As expected, Nepal was interested to know how it would be benefitted by fulfilling India and Bangladesh’s demand of constructing storage projects in its territory. The joint India–Bangladesh delegation explained that the project had not reached planning stage, that this visit was only a preliminary exploration to see whether projects in Nepal were the right answer to the water-sharing problem at Farakka and that if and when any project planning was undertaken, Nepal would be involved on a mutual benefit basis. Nepal did not find India and Bangladesh’s response to be satisfactory and suggested that the joint delegation should come back with a clear indication of the potential benefits to it.

Another opportunity came in January 1987 when a meeting of the foreign ministers of India, Nepal and Bangladesh was held at the inauguration of the temporary SAARC secretariat premises in Kathmandu. At that meeting, a decision was taken to seek a regional resolution of the Ganges dispute. According to Bangladeshi analysts, though India had taken the responsibility to provide a detailed report to Nepal outlining future benefits from such projects, it did not do so and dissuaded Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi from pursuing a trilateral approach to resolve the Farakka issue. Bangladesh’s former Foreign Secretary, Reaz Rahman, particularly stressed that, in his view, ‘the Indian bureaucracy had proved to be a hurdle in this case’ (Reaz Rahman, Former foreign secretary of Bangladesh at Dhaka, personal interview, October 25, 2009). In contrast, one of the former Indian water secretaries underlined that the bureaucrat’s job was limited to preparing procedural details citing advantages and disadvantages of particular policy options; ultimately, the decision would have to be taken by the political leaders.

The meeting imposed on India the job of preparing a paper on the subject, and this was reluctantly accepted by the Indian foreign minister. On return to Delhi, although Indian bureaucracy did take the initiative in proposing a change from bilateralism to regionalism, without a political direction, the draft therefore stated the arguments for both courses and sought a political direction. No such political direction came and the paper died the natural death. (Water resource secretary at New Delhi, personal interview, March 11, 2009)

After returning to India, when Indian bureaucrats forwarded the note citing advantages and disadvantages of the bilateral versus multilateral approach, political leadership did not recommend a change. The minister seems to have realised that it was a deviation from the conventional Indian thinking of pursuing bilateralism with neighbours. This incident highlights that the Indian minister’s concurrence to the trilateral meeting seemed to be very momentary which did not go far. Following this ‘episode’, there has not been any attempt to explore trilateral or multilateral options on the Ganges.

After the end of the MOU in 1988, there was no agreement between two neighbours for 8 years. In 1996, Sheikh Hasina came to power in Bangladesh and India also had a change of government. Both New Delhi and Dhaka seemed to be determined to take the negotiations undertaken thus far (serious negotiations on the resolution of the Ganges had started towards the end of Khaleda Zia’s regime in 1995) to its logical conclusion and conclude a deal on water sharing (Iyer, 2003). Year 1996 was also a year when Bangladesh was celebrating 25 years of its independence which India had supported; it was interested to strengthen the Hasina government. An important stakeholder, the West Bengal government and its chief minister, was included in the Ganges negotiation, and this led to a successful conclusion of the Ganges treaty for 30 years. Scholars Choudhury and Islam have argued that transboundary water issues are context specific, not only in terms of basin characteristics, but also in terms of knowledge capacity, development trajectories and power asymmetry of stakeholders (2015, p. 46). They further underline that water-governing formulations should be anchored in principles of sustainability and equity. Configurations of all these aspects for successful negotiation were appropriate in 1996.

Although the treaty does not have the provision of a guarantee clause of 1977, the burden-sharing formula of MOUs, it stipulates that India would make every effort to protect flows of 40 years (1949–1988) on an average at Farakka. Another provision is also that if the water level goes below 50,000 cusecs, both governments would hold consultation to improve the situation. The treaty also provides for a conflict resolution mechanism by prescribing a joint monitoring of flows, which should eliminate or minimise the possibility of disagreements over the data. There is a provision of a Joint Committee to solve any dispute if it arises. But if it is unable to resolve the dispute, the matter will then be referred to the Joint Review Committee (JRC) and failing resolution at that level, the issue will be referred to two governments. The annual report of the committee is submitted to both governments after joint observations are completed in May every year. Since the report is not made public, people have little idea about its functions. There is also a provision for review of the treaty if either party asks for it.

Thus, the treaty has survived for two decades despite occasional hiccups. Although the Ganges is a bilateral treaty, there has always been divergent preference for modes of negotiation between neighbours. The next section examines the rationale for these dichotomous preferences.

Bilateralism versus Multilateralism

Above discussion underlines that most of the treaties on transboundary rivers in general and in South Asia in particular are bilateral in nature. Consensus emerged in India very early that it has been ‘generous’ with its neighbours. This is based on the assumption that it went to the UN on Kashmir as a complainant against Pakistani aggression and then found the tables turning against itself (India; Iyer, 2003). It seems that successive governments have taken the Kashmir experience as a ‘lesson’ and none of them have shown interest for multilateral dialogue on any issue. In fact, even during the Indus water negotiations, Prime Minister Nehru was reluctant in seeking advice from multilateral agencies and especially was not agreeable to third-party adjudication. For example, on 8 October 1950, Prime Minister Nehru wrote to the then Pakistani Prime Minister Liaquat Ali Khan suggesting an International Commission consisting of an equal number of judges from both countries. Nehru said,

It is true that there is always a possibility of a lack of agreement between the members of the Commission, but if they are judges of the highest standing, they will consider the issues before them in a judicial spirit and are highly likely to come to a unanimous or majority decision. Even if they fail to agree, the area of difference will have been narrowed down by the measure of agreement reached and only the outstanding point or points of difference will remain to be dealt with. The two Governments could then consider the matter afresh, including the question of reference to a third party. To think, ab initio, of a third party will lessen the sense of responsibility of the judges and will also be a confession of our continued dependence on others. That would hardly be becoming for proud and self-respecting independent nations. (Quoted in Biswas, 1992)

Another view suggests that the World Bank mediation in the Indus case resulted into a situation where India had to pay heavy compensation to Pakistan for replacement works. This experience also probably led to a negative attitude towards third-party mediation in India. In fact, Nehru himself felt later that the Indus Water Treaty was generous to Pakistan. He said while speaking in Lok Sabha, ‘we went pretty far in the Canal Waters Agreement. …it was a generous agreement on our part’ (Lok Sabha Debates, 1961). Studying successful mediation in international relations, scholars underline that the outcome of mediation efforts is contingent upon contextual and process variables (Bercovitch, Anagnoson, & Wille, 1991). In India, parliamentarians have been vigilant to ensure that the government of the day should not commit to a multilateral agency.

In 1977, after knowing details of the agreement, Members of Parliament questioned the Janata government about the survival of the Calcutta port. The Indian Minister Jagjivan Ram made a statement in Parliament clarifying the government’s position on Bangladesh and the Ganges issue which is as follows:

India wanted to decide the question of the Farakka by herself. And, Sir, the question was taken by Bangladesh to the United Nations and there, our friend, mutual friends, friends of India and Bangladesh, all the non-aligned countries, made efforts and emphasised the necessity of India and Bangladesh resolving their differences by themselves. Was it not a challenge to India? Does it require much advocacy and argument to show that in a dispute between two parties, the sympathises go always to the weaker party? Anybody who has dealt with that, will appreciate this aspect. Therefore, it has been our approach to resolve this Farakka question without the intervention of any third party. There are several parties which were very willing to offer their good offices to negotiate between us and resolve our differences. I put it to my friend: will it be very creditable to India to say that we have failed and now we require the services of some third party to resolve out differences? We will resolve our differences ourselves, a few cusecs on this side and a few cusecs on that. But what I think is that friendship with the neighbouring countries is of much more value than that. (Rajya Sabha Debates, 1977)

In fact, while speaking in the General Assembly of the United Nations on 4 October 1979, Atal Bihari Vajpayee stated that the Farakka Accord vindicated India’s faith that complex problems affecting two neighbouring nations could be resolved only ‘in a spirit of shared sacrifice and mutual accommodation through sincerely motivated bilateral negotiations’ (Muni, 1979). As negotiation processes are lengthy if three or more countries were to be involved, they would become even more complicated and entangled. India, it is believed, fears that smaller countries may join hands to make a ‘common cause against the bigger country’ (Iyer, 2003). It is also argued that India easily dictates the signing of bilateral agreements, which facilitates it to secure its interests and prevent coalitions between Bangladesh and Nepal (Crow & Singh, 2000).

As discussed earlier, linkage can be beneficial to both sides in a negotiation and can facilitate agreements that might not be possible otherwise (Axelrod and Keohane). This is also preferred keeping in mind the long-term interests of the negotiating parties. Commending the Ganges treaty, the Indian Prime Minister, Deve Gowda, told the Lok Sabha that the visit of Bangladeshi Prime Minister, Sheikh Hasina Wajed, to Delhi to sign the agreement ‘has placed our relations on an entirely new footing’, which would be ‘of immense benefit to India in the long term in all areas of bilateral relations including security, trade and other areas’ (Lok Sabha Debates, 1997). This also highlights how the treaty on river water uplifted the mood in other spheres as well. Similarly, the West Bengal Chief Minister Jyoti Basu expressed the optimism that the Ganges treaty would facilitate improvements in other bilateral areas as well. While speaking to the press after the treaty, late Jyoti Basu mentioned that the pact has benefitted us (West Bengal) and with no doubt, Bangladesh would not be without its rewards. The following remark made by the West Bengal chief minister underlines the significance of linkage aspect and reinforces the argument that the resolution of the river dispute is never only about water.

To our advantage, the option of using the Chittagong Port by our industrialists has opened up significantly so in the context of the State’s plans for industrial rejuvenation. Improved relations with Bangladesh could also mean better commerce, trade, easier inter-border transit facilities and the overall development of the entire North-Eastern region. (The Statesman, 1996)

Here it is important to understand other river water negotiations in Asia that would explicate the Indian process. A brief discussion of them demonstrates variable characteristics adopted by the negotiating parties according to predominant concerns prevailing at the bilateral and multilateral set-up of the region. China is upstream to many rivers including Brahmaputra, Mekong. After a hard pursuit, India signed a limited agreement with China on the supply of hydrological data of the Brahmaputra River during monsoon seasons between 15 May and 15 October. The data are mainly of the water level of the river to alert the downstream neighbour in case of floods. Governments have not signed any bilateral treaty on river water sharing. India has also been asking for non-monsoon flows of the river because there have been suspicions that China could divert the waters of the Brahmaputra to its parched regions during dry seasons. But it always asserts that its dam-building activity on the river would have no negative impact on the downstream flow.

China’s discussions with Mekong neighbours have been somewhat little different. The Mekong River runs through Burma, Cambodia, China, Laos, Thailand and Vietnam. Although China has not signed any treaty on Mekong because it follows the principle of absolute sovereignty and nationalism about its territory including river water, it has joined different multilateral forums in the region operating on myriad aspects of interstate relationship ranging from navigation, trade, to infrastructure projects. China has also made massive investment in these lower-Mekong countries. If these Mekong countries adopt a confrontational attitude with their upstream neighbour on the sharing of river water, there would be disproportionate opportunity costs for them in other significant aspects of multiple relationships. So China is leveraging dominance in other areas to benefit it in the river water area and command a disquiet peace in the region. It is important to underline that the difference in China’s posture to India on the Brahmaputra and Mekong neighbours is that it wants to maintain a status quo with the first and ‘will consider any significant forward movement in cooperation on the Brahmaputra only when there is substantial progress towards resolving the other outstanding issues’ (Ho, 2016).

Another river, the Nile, courses through 11 countries before falling in the Mediterranean Sea. The Nile Basin Initiative (NBI) was set up in 1999, and its members are Burundi, DR Congo, Egypt, Ethiopia, Kenya, Rwanda, South Sudan, Sudan, Tanzania and Uganda. Its main objectives were to develop the Nile Basin water resources in a sustainable and equitable way and ensure cooperation between riparian countries. Roughly 85 per cent of the water that makes its way to Egypt comes from Ethiopia, which supplies the majority of seasonal water during the rainy season. Presently Egypt receives water under a 1959 treaty with Sudan, and this is the continuation of the Nile Water Agreement of 1929 brokered by the British (a colonial power). Ethiopia has begun construction of the Grand Ethiopia Renaissance Dam for irrigation and hydropower which Egypt feared would reduce its supplies. Egypt fears that members of NBI have ganged up against its interests.

Regional Cooperation Versus Reality on Integrated Development of the Ganges

There has always been Bangladesh’s demand for integrated basin management of the Ganges. Ecologically and hydrologically, this is the best strategy for optimum utilisation of water. But the idea of integrated development does not conform to reality. If integrated management of the Ganges has to be accepted, there should be a clear picture of availability of water present in the river from the source to the end destination—total record of rains, water from the melting of ice, a suitable location for building reservoirs, assessment for resettlement and rehabilitation cost, each country’s water requirement for consumptive as well as industrial usage, further water for ecological survival of rivers and removal of salinity and other aspects. This requires progressive thinking where all minute information up to the basin level needs to be planned. Here not only involvement of engineers but also intersectional groups of people like sociologists, anthropologists, hydrologists, geologist, horticulturalists and agricultural scientists are required to sit together to discuss the integrated development of the river. The prevailing situation does not come closer to these expectations.

In India, water is a classified subject; access to water records is highly restricted (Pandey, 2014). In fact, how Bangladesh is utilising the present available water of the lean period is not made public. Most importantly, whether Nepal will be interested to sacrifice its precious land and forest for its neighbours is not known. India and Nepal have already bilateral concerns about river water development. No real progress has taken place on Mahakali after signing the treaty in 1996. If another country also becomes involved, generating consensus on any project would be challenging further. In fact, political uncertainly has been afflicting Nepal for almost a decade. These are some of the important obstacles which need to be sorted out before planning a basin-wide development of a river.

India has a riverine relationship with many immediate neighbours. It is an upstream as well as downstream country. For Nepal and Bhutan, India is downstream, but for Bangladesh, it is upstream. The multilateral context of cooperation would increase the transaction cost in South Asia. As discussed earlier, the river water issue does not move independent of other matters of bilateral concerns; the riparians would always have their own basket of issues along with water. The sharing of costs, benefits and modalities of execution of the project has been the bone of contention between India and Nepal. When it comes to India and Bangladesh, however, the sharing of the lean season flows, especially of the Ganges, and the augmentation below Farakka, have been the key concerns.

Till now, the relationship between India and Bhutan has been of a special kind. This relationship is economic in nature. India helps Bhutan in the construction and operation of hydroelectric projects for the sale of the generated power to India. The previously negotiated price for electricity was low, and this has been corrected subsequently. This underlines that though India, Bangladesh, Nepal and Bhutan are sharing common rivers, it is India which is in the centre of transboundary relationship and the kind of dispute India is having with one neighbour is very different from that of another neighbour.

For an illustration, Pakistan has a river dispute with India, it would like to have control over headwaters of the Indus that lie in Jammu and Kashmir which, according to Pakistan, will ensure the security of water supply to it. If the Indus is discussed at the SAARC level, it will not attract the interests of other members of SAARC because it has nothing to do with them except that this kind of occasion can be used for the strategic purpose of scoring points with either India or Pakistan, depending on the political calculations of different countries. In multilateral negotiations, states with least interest in cooperation can increase the obstacles negotiators face and decrease the possibilities of reaching an accord (Swain, 2002).

It is true that signing a treaty is a big definite step towards the resolution of the dispute; executing changes after treaties contains substantial challenges; and post-treaty management of shared rivers can involve continuous deliberations over such aspects as construction and operation of dams along the river and other operational aspects (Wolf, Yoffe, & Giordano, 2003). Whenever India plans to construct a dam on the rivers allocated to it by the Indus treaty, Pakistan raises objections consistently. Sometimes fears are reasonable and other times inspired by exaggerated threats to its flow because of lack of cordiality in their bilateral relationship. This multiplies the cost of the project and causes immense delay. In other cases, the presence of agreements provides predictability to states’ interactions and enables them to draw on institutionalised mechanisms to manage disputes if the bilateral relationship is cordial. The assured supply of water has been Bangladesh’s demand for the conclusion of a long-term treaty; the term of 30 years provides a modicum of predictability for long-term planning.

The bilateral bargaining privileges not only India but neighbours too. Both have been using this strategic advantage according to their own strengths. In 2011, when it seemed almost certain that India and Bangladesh would sign an interim agreement on Teesta (another river shared between two countries) during the Indian prime minister’s visit to Bangladesh, it could not be done because the West Bengal chief minister refused to be a part of the deal at the last minute. West Bengal shares the Teesta River with a neighbouring provincial state Sikkim. The agreement on Teesta was supposed to be for a 15-year interim term for the lean periods between October and April, until complete data were collected through joint hydrological observation. The non-conclusion of the Teesta agreement was reciprocated by Bangladesh’s refusal to sign the transit pact. India has been looking at routes for transporting food grains to Northeast India via Bangladesh. As of now, Food Corporation of India transports food grain from Punjab and Haryana to Northeast for public distribution by rail. It is a time- consuming journey which is often interrupted by natural calamities. The route via Bangladesh’s Ashuganj port would have been a useful alternative. Bangladesh can earn millions of dollars as transit fee. Since India did not satisfy Bangladesh’s expectations on Teesta, the latter was not interested to share its strategic advantage with its upstream neighbour. The West Bengal ruling party was not interested to sacrifice its electoral prospects in northern Bengal (a beneficiary of Teesta) for the sake of national interest in general and Northeast India in particular. The non-actualisation of this bargaining also underlines the changing dimensions of Indian federalism (Pandey, 2014).

Interestingly, the challenges of intrastate river disputes outweigh that of interstate river disputes in India. With weather becoming unpredictable as a result of climate change, treating the river water as a zero-sum issue is getting stronger among provincial states. West Bengal has not come around to terms of the Teesta agreement since 2011 because of water needs for boosting agriculture production in North Bengal. It intends to bring 1.5 lakh acres of farmland under irrigation. West Bengal also complains about damming of Teesta in Sikkim. There are at least 26 projects on the river mostly in Sikkim, aimed at producing some 50,000 MW. Since Sikkim is upstream, it does not have any strong views on the Teesta agreement with Bangladesh. West Bengal is an immediate affected party and agriculture is mainstay in these areas, and any increase in Bangladesh’s share is considered negatively. Thus, West Bengal is always asserting its rights.

Among many river disputes, the Cauvery imbroglio between Karnataka and Tamil Nadu is one of the oldest. It seems that India’s attitude to neighbours on river matters operates rather more intensely at the subnational level. States are not willing to have conciliatory posture to riparians’ concerns. Compassionate hearing to the other party is construed as compromising the state’s interests; thus, both parties adopt a maximalist approach. During scarcity of water time, sharing of river water is not preferred. At the national level, negotiating parties have so many issues to bargain for; accordingly, they harden and soften their attitudes on the river water issue as earlier discussions suggest. At the regional level, scope for manoeuvring really goes down because of electoral calculations in the competitive party system. Even the same party sharing power in the disputes does not soften their attitude. Thus, chances of leverage seem to be high at the national level than at the regional level.

It can be observed that gradually India is becoming pragmatic about its preference of negotiating strategies. On many occasions in recent times, it has opted for international litigation. India and Pakistan have gone for international arbitration several times for resolving issues related to the Indus and other matters. In fact, both countries referred the Rann of Kutch dispute for arbitration long ago. India and Bangladesh also went to the Permanent Court of Arbitration for resolving maritime boundary in 2009. Although the verdict was in favour of Bangladesh, India accepted it. More recently, India accepted arbitration on the issue of the Italian marines that killed two Indian fishermen off the coast of Kerala. Although the subject was emotive, the country went for international adjudication. But, until now, the Government of India has been keeping the river water issue a bilateral one except the Indus.

Conclusion

Thus, bilateral negotiation has been a core principle followed by majority of upstream states. India and Bangladesh have had a protracted negotiation for almost a quarter of a century before signing the treaty on the Ganges in 1996. This period was fraught with failure and success. But finally, the agreement in 1977 and treaty in 1996 were possible because of strong linkages on their many other contentious matters. In 1977, when the new government in New Delhi took strong measures against forces that were operating from India against the interests of the Zia regime, this softened the perception of the Bangladesh government towards India. This, in turn, facilitated the signing of an agreement for the first time in five years. In a similar way, though in unrelated context in 1996, new governments in India and Bangladesh displayed their resolve to go for the treaty by delinking the water sharing and augmentation issue because augmentation was always a deal spoiler due to different preferences on going about it. Thus on both occasions, the governments adopted a pragmatic approach to resolve the dispute keeping the overall picture in mind. Going for an agreement with the Zia government in 1977, the Indian government was looking for additional gains in the form of creating a positive perception among neighbours and its people.

Despite India’s insistence on bilateralism with a neighbour on a river dispute, past deliberations have not been linear. As earlier discussions brought out that India has deviated from its stated position in the 1980s, the demand from other dimensions of the bilateral relationship has pushed the actor to deviate from its stated position as the delimitation of the India–Bangladesh maritime boundary and Italian marine cases suggest.

Thus, the above analysis underscores that neighbours, India and Bangladesh, are definitely able to play to their strengths in bilateral negotiations. When the relationship moves positively in one direction, it leads to corresponding changes in other spheres as well. Since India and Bangladesh share another 53 rivers, they should identify potential linkages for the resolution of the long-pending disputes. This linkage analysis is effective for maintaining long-term peace and stability in the region.

Declaration of Conflicting Interests

The author declared no potential conflicts of interest with respect to the research, authorship and/or publication of this article.

Funding

The author received no financial support for the research, authorship and/or publication of this article.

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