Abstract
The Chinese Communist Party (CCP) under the leadership of Xi Jinping proposed the One Belt One Road (OBOR) initiative in 2013. This is a grand economic plan designed to benefit China and the world at large by connecting the markets with the consumers. The Chinese government aims to be the centre of this initiative and also help the developing countries in achieving better growth rates while Xi Jinping has termed it as the ‘the project of the century’ (Chan, 2018). Some have also argued that the OBOR is a clear indication of a shift from the Deng Xiaoping dictum of ‘hide or capabilities and bide your time’ and the push from China to give birth to a ‘Eurasia (dominated by China), an economic and trading area to rival the transatlantic one (dominated by America)’ (Gill, 2017). A major summit was organised in May 2017 in China in which a total of 29 countries participated. The next summit is scheduled for 2019. During the closing of the summit, Xi reiterated the non-political and only economic aspect of the OBOR. He asserted, ‘The “Belt and Road Initiative” is not set by ideology. We won’t set a political agenda. It’s not exclusive’ (Leng, 2017). During the summit, Xi had also argued, ‘The primary intention and the highest goal of the “Belt and Road Initiative” is to allow each member to jointly address global economic challenges, find new growth opportunities and drivers, achieve a win–win situation and keep moving toward a community with joint destiny’ (Tang, 2017). The book China’s Asia Dream by Tom Miller attempts to portray the current picture of the China’s OBOR initiatives and how it is difficult to detach the ‘political’ from this economic exercise. Miller argues, ‘China’s new “empire” will be an informal and largely economic one, posited on cash and held together by hard infrastructure’ (p. 17).
The Chinese push for economic integration is driven from the standpoint of pushing for stronger role. Miller argues, ‘Beijing believes greater cross-border cooperation will help nurture new markets and strengthen China’s regional clout’ (p. 151).
With respect to Southeast Asia, the author argues, ‘China’s rollout of hard infrastructure could have far reaching consequences for the geopolitics of Southeast Asia’ (p. 105). The countries in the region had welcomed the Chinese investments in the initial stages. However, the practice of Chinese firms to employ their own people created a lot of anger within the domestic populations. Though the Chinese have invested in large-scale infrastructure developments, there has been no real addition to the overall employment of the local population. This has resulted in strong anti-China feelings and is thus making it difficult for the governments to accept Chinese investments. Most of the areas where the Chinese have been investing have been in major need of development, however, there are a large number of examples where the real beneficiaries of such projects have been the Chinese themselves, with no real addition to the local economy. One prominent example in this case is Laos. The author argues,
Laos is both underdeveloped and underpopulated, so there is plenty of scope for Chinese investment and controlled migration. If the Laos government ensures that Chinese capital, technology and expertise benefit the local economy, they could prove Laos’s ticket out of poverty. But there is very real danger, too, that Chinese companies will suck the country dry—grabbing its minerals, wrecking its landscape and dominating its trade. (p. 112)
South Asia is a very important part of the Chinese aim to achieve its ‘Asian Dream’. China will have to be a prominent actor in the South Asian region to be able to dominate the whole of Asia. India–China relations have not been very cordial because of the mutual distrust and China’s ‘all weather friendship’ with Pakistan. In the last few years, China has made huge investments in major infrastructure projects in South Asia, especially Sri Lanka and Pakistan. The China–Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) which forms a major part of the OBOR initiative greatly worries India. However, ‘government officials working on the Belt and Road project privately admit they expect to lose 80% of their investment in Pakistan’ (p. 176).
However, the geographical reality puts India in an advantageous position, but the unresolved border issue with China has been a major hurdle in New Delhi’s path to improve relations with Beijing. The heavy investments by China in the region are also a major cause of concern for India as it regards South Asia to be its natural sphere of influence. But the heavy investments by China have not had the expected returns for Beijing. The major example in this case is Sri Lanka. Though China has completed major projects in Sri Lanka and the relationship has been strengthening, Beijing has not succeeded in gaining the kind of clout it would have expected. With the change in government and leadership, the approach towards China and Chinese investments has changed. ‘China will have to learn to interact with democracies’, Saravanamuttu (Centre for Policy Alternatives) argues (p. 195). The backlash which China has faced vis-à-vis its investments in Sri Lanka can also be a good learning ground.
South China Sea has been a major hot bed of Chinese overtures and anti-China feelings. The countries with which China has territorial disputes are also economically dependent on Beijing to some extent for aid-and development-related investments. With time, the region has also witnessed that the countries have been pushing for closer relations with the United States while balancing Chinese feelings. The author asserts, ‘As it continues to upset its neighbours, China is pushing them ever more firmly into the arms of its only genuine strategic competitor—the USA’ (p. 214). This has been very obviously visible in the case of China–Vietnam relations.
China’s push for development and investment in the regions bordering Xinjiang and Yunnan have been motivated by the selfish interest that they will help in the development of its own underdeveloped regions. Income inequalities have become a major cause of concern for the CCP and one of the major factors behind the rising ‘mass incidents’. But the problem which the Chinese government faces is Xinjiang is very different. The general understanding with the Chinese leadership has been to push for development and hoping that it will satisfy the demands of the Uyghurs and help the CCP in gaining control of the region. Keeping this in view, China has been developing infrastructure in Xinjiang and has also been investing in the development of the Central Asian countries. Here, also the policy of employing Chinese labourers has not worked in China’s favour and there has been a rise in discontent towards Beijing. The author argues, ‘The historical fear of “yellow peril” remains alive in Central Asia, especially in black humour about Chinese immigrants pouring over the border’ (p. 81). This unparalleled rise in the economic capability of China and its keenness to invest in the Central Asian countries is viewed with apprehension by Russia (p. 85).
The book though very nuanced and detailed would have been more informative if it would have covered the current Chinese engagements with Nepal, Bangladesh and Bhutan in South Asia and also discussed the repercussions of consistent Chinese inroads and investments in Malaysia, the Philippines and Indonesia in Southeast Asia. The author does discuss other important countries like Sri Lanka, Vietnam, Pakistan and Cambodia. The author discusses how the Chinese investments and inroads have had adverse effect on the bi-lateral relations and has moulded the public opinion against the Chinese. The author sums up the problems with the Chinese investments lucidly when he argues,
For China to realize its Asian dream, it has to live up to its promises of delivering mutually beneficial development. For as long as the suspicion remains that Beijing’s much-vaunted ‘win–win’ diplomacy really represents a double victory for China—and that its friendly words about shared commercial gain are really a smokescreen for more self-interested objectives—it will fail to win the trust of its neighbours. (p. 195)
The general perception today within the countries where China has been investing heavily is one of trepidation of being ‘swallowed’ up by China. China has huge money at its disposal and is ready to use it to gain leverage, as has been seen in the case of Hambantota and Djibouti. However, these actions have not been perceived positively by the local populations and there has been a rise in anti-China sentiments and even protests. If China has to achieve its ‘Asian Dream’, it will need to look at ways to balance its economic might with more nuanced interaction with the people.