Abstract
This article is a brief overview of the main trends in the foreign policy of Uzbekistan under the new leadership of the Republic of Uzbekistan. The sections on bilateral relations and interaction of Uzbekistan with international organisations give an important insight into the dynamics of a strategically important Central Asian region and Eurasia as a whole. The article also reflects Uzbekistan’s perception of Eurasia as a region that is experiencing several geopolitical shifts.
Introduction
Ever since the vast Eurasian land mass opened up following the break-up of the Soviet Union in 1991, it has been witnessing power games by the major powers—primarily between Russia and the USA. In the process, there have been fundamental shifts in alignments, from cooperation to competition between Russia and the USA and from conflict to partnership between Russia and China. The cooperation seen among the major powers during the ‘war on terror’ indicated a common enemy, the non-traditional threats such as religious extremism, terrorism narco-trafficking and so on. These were highly dangerous forces carried out by non-state actors. Hence, there was an imperative need to fight them in a collaborative manner. On the other hand, the need to secure the rich natural resources of the region by building pipelines for energy and building over land routes for transportation became tools of the competitive politics that had emerged in Eurasia. Today, the focus of the competition is constructing transport corridors, in order to build up leverages and influence. In this regard, several projects have been initiated; for instance, the International North–South Transport Corridor (Russia), the Silk Road Economic Belt or often referred to as the Belt and Road Initiative (China), the New Silk Road Strategy (the USA) and the Southern Corridor (the West). Besides, Russia has also launched two integrationist projects: the Eurasian Economic Union and the Collective Security Treaty Organisation. A look at the map will show that, in all these transport and integrationist projects in Eurasia, Central Asia occupies a key position. The success of the projects depends on the support extended by the Central Asian Republics.
In the second decade of the present century, Russia and China have established firm strategic partnership and today are the leading actors on the Eurasian scene. Russia’s turn to Asia was evident in its ‘Pivot to Asia’ strategy, thereby emphasising the Asian vector of its policy. Subsequently, Russian academics have put forward the idea of ‘Greater Eurasia’. It is a geopolitical concept and highlights the significance of Eurasia in Russian strategic thinking. Greater Eurasia includes all the post-Soviet states in its ambit, whereas China has put forward its idea of ‘Greater Eurasian Partnership’. China’s turn to the West ‘Go West’ in its foreign policy reflects the importance of its western periphery in its strategic thinking. In both the concepts, the vast Eurasian space is the focus in which Central Asia occupies a key position.
Uzbekistan has always occupied a central position in the development of Eurasia. In the past, one branch of the fabled silk route passed through the Fergana valley; its cool oasis provided succour to weary travellers and traders. One branch of India’s ancient trade route reached Central Asia, probably through present-day Uzbekistan. Along with trade came culture and in the process renowned centres of learning sprang up, which attracted students and scholars from all over.
After gaining independence, Uzbekistan’s first President Islam Karimov focused on security and stability, as a fratricidal war was going on in neighbouring Afghanistan. Any attempt at destabilisation would impact on the transition process and impede the consolidation of the young nation state. Aware of its independence and importantly of its status as a landlocked country, Uzbekistan did not wish to get embroiled in the emerging cooperation–competition politics. Uzbekistan follows the principles of equidistance from world centres of power and their global politics. It has refused to participate in multilateral regional groupings and the supranational structures that are associated with these bodies. These envisage transfer to such bodies a part of sovereignty. These principles are enshrined in the Foreign Policy Concept of Uzbekistan. Uzbekistan interacts especially with major powers such as Russia, China and the USA mostly at the bilateral level. The principle position of the Republic’s foreign policy is adherence to the policy of non-alignment with any military–political bloc, preventing the deployment of foreign military bases and facilities on its territory and the non-participation of the country’s servicemen in peacekeeping operations abroad and resolving all contradictions and conflicts only with peaceful means. As a consequence, it opted for a multi-vector foreign policy. It did, however, join regional groupings the Commonwealth of Independent States and the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO).
Today, Uzbekistan’s economy has reached a high level of development. It is now in need of investments and an opening in the southern direction, which has emerged as the hub of investments and trade. In view of its growing population particularly the younger generation which is educated and have acquired skills, Uzbekistan under the leadership of President Shavkat Mirziyoyev has accorded top priority to economic development and reaching out to the world. One of the main and primary tasks of the foreign policy is forming the most favourable foreign policy conditions for efficient implementation of the democratic reforms in the country and dynamic processes of modernisation of society and economy and forming balanced and multidimensional system of strategic partnership with the leading states of the world and international organisations. Connectivity has, therefore, become a critical issue for Uzbekistan. From that perspective, the recent development of the Iranian port at Chabahar on the Persian Gulf is of immense significance. The Trilateral Agreement between Afghanistan, India and Iran of May 2016 and the operationalisation of the Chabahar route has opened up immense prospects for Uzbekistan. Its centrality in the region and being a huge market as it was a populous country hold promise of enhanced economic engagement. It is fairly developed infrastructure within the country according to the Asian Development Bank also offers prospects for connecting with other states of Central Asia and promoting intra- and inter-regional trade.
In the present century, the contours of its multidimensional foreign policy began to emerge. It was primarily ‘No Single Power’ shall dominate Central Asia. Consequently, Uzbekistan began to develop ties with all the major as well as regional powers. At the wider level, the geopolitical rivalry was no longer subtle. The military presence of Western coalition forces in 2001 and its bulk withdrawal in 2014 had sharpened the geopolitical realities. This evolving rivalry manifested in the form of connectivity projects, which had global ramifications, but were rooted in Central Asia. In order to understand Uzbek perspectives on Eurasia, a brief examination of its relations with the major actors is necessary as they are shaping the destiny of Eurasia.
Russia
Relations with Russia are important due to historical, strategic and economic factors. Over the past period, the two countries have signed more than 200 documents on cooperation in trade, economy, energy, agriculture, education, culture and other spheres. Among them, the most important is the Strategic Partnership Agreement signed on 16 June 2004, the Treaty on Allied Relations from 14 November 2005 and the Declaration on the Deepening of the Strategic Partnership between the Republic of Uzbekistan and the Russian Federation (4 June 2012).
After the assumption of the Presidency by President Mirziyoyev in 2016, the relations between the two countries got a shot in the arm. The relations with Russia remain one of the priority directions of Tashkent’s foreign policy. Russia ranks first in foreign trade turnover of Uzbekistan. President Mirziyoyev’s visit to Moscow on April 2017 resulted in signing a slew of bilateral documents for a total of 16 billion dollars—from the fuel and energy sector to high technology and healthcare industries. In spite of the fact that Russia’s investment in the republic is less as compared to China’s, its political influence cannot be underestimated. Uzbekistan and Russia are consistently cooperating in the field of strengthening peace and stability, combating regional threats and a wide range of world politics’ issues.
A significant aspect of cooperation is in the military field. Over the past 2 years, the Uzbek army officers have again started studying in military institutions of Russia. In October 2017 in the Uzbek training ground ‘Forish’ after a 12-year pause, the joint military exercise was held, and Uzbekistan began purchasing Russian military equipment. Military–technical cooperation has become an important part of modern bilateral relations. Hence, Uzbekistan’s ties with Russia are an important factor in Eurasia.
China
Uzbekistan’s relations with China are primarily marked by mutually beneficial economic cooperation at the bilateral level. Close or similar approaches on issues related to non-traditional threats and other security challenges contribute to the development of mutually beneficial cooperation between Uzbekistan and China. Apart from bilateral interaction, the two countries also work closely on the economic agenda of the SCO.
In September 2013, China announced a ‘new model of cooperation with a view to shape the silk road economic belt…’, aimed at the creation of a new infrastructure and relationships between the countries of Eurasia. Moreover, China expressed its readiness to co-invest national programmes which fit the ‘One Belt, One Road’ initiative. Uzbekistan has supported this initiative. On 15 June 2015, Uzbekistan and China signed the ‘Protocol on the expansion of mutually beneficial trade and economic cooperation within the framework of the initiative on the construction of the Silk Road Economic belt’. Uzbekistan expects numerous advantages would follow.
The state visit of the President Mirziyoyev to Beijing on 11–13 May 2017 is a landmark one in the relationship between the two countries. During the visit, the main attention was paid to economic cooperation, exploration and development of deposits, transport communications, processing of natural gas and Chinese investments in the economy of Uzbekistan. As a result, 105 agreements were signed for US$23 billion. At the same time, President Mirziyoyev emphasised the need for in the creation of transport and logistics routes, linking Central Asia through China and Russia to the markets of South and South East Asia and European countries.
Although the economic engagement is a priority in Uzbekistan’s foreign policy, security issues such as ‘extremism, terrorism and separatism’ are also of great significance. The cooperation is primarily through regional initiatives. Peace and stability are of utmost importance for Uzbekistan and earlier this year (March 2018) had organised Tashkent conference on Afghanistan: peace process, security cooperation and regional connectivity.
The SCO’s security agenda and activities are supported by Uzbekistan. At this juncture, it is difficult to foresee the extent of to which Uzbekistan-China cooperation will determine developments in Eurasia.
The USA
Being a pivotal player in the Central Asian region which includes Afghanistan, Uzbekistan’s ties with the USA are crucial. The nature of relationship lies in both security and economic sphere. Since the establishment of diplomatic relations between the two countries, cooperation with the USA is one of the priorities of the foreign policy of the republic, as reflected in the concept of the foreign policy of the Republic of Uzbekistan.
The parties demonstrated similar positions on a number of international and regional problems, cooperate on strengthening peace and stability in Central Asia and Afghanistan, as well as efforts to stand up to global challenges to security.
The Afghan crisis and combating international terrorism have become key issues on the agenda of bilateral relations. The successful implementation of the Tashkent meeting of the ‘6 + 2’ group on Afghanistan and later the Tashkent conference on Afghanistan in March 2018 were one of the outcomes of fruitful cooperation of the parties.
The events of 9/11 served as a catalyst for further development of bilateral relations. Uzbekistan provided an air base in Khanabad for the military campaign of the US and NATO forces in Afghanistan. Further development of the bilateral relations resulted in the signing of the Declaration on Strategic Partnership in 2002. Although the events of Andijan did cast a shadow on the relationship, nevertheless Uzbekistan and the USA have continued their bilateral cooperation on combating international terrorism and illicit drug trafficking, as Uzbekistan considered security issues as key factors for ensuring stability and development of the Republic. Along with this, Uzbekistan was interested in obtaining modern technologies and investment, and the USA was interested in establishing long-term cooperation with a key country in Central Asia.
The visit by President Mirziyoyev in 2017 gave a push to bilateral relations and added a new momentum. During his visit to the USA in September 2017 and May 2018 talks were focused on specific projects for modernisation of Uzbek economy and investment attraction. During May 2018 visit, more than 20 largest contracts worth more than US$4.8 billion were signed between companies of Uzbekistan and the USA. Donald Trump noted that Uzbekistan remains an important state and strategic partner for the USA.
At present, the USA may be on the margins of Eurasia, but it could emerge as a significant geopolitical player in the Eurasian region.
Uzbekistan’s foreign policy of President Mirziyoyev has, however, focused on a regional approach especially on issues and problems faced by the Central Asian Republics. His effort is to ensure that Central Asian Republics should not be treated as ‘objects’ of global powers, but as ‘subjects’ enjoying equal and sovereign status. Given the big picture of leading actors in Eurasia, Uzbekistan was of the view that only a regional approach could address the problems of Central Asia. That is why the main priority of Uzbekistan’s foreign policy is the region of Central Asia. As a key region in the Eurasian Heartland, the Central Asian region can play a key role in the ongoing interplay of interests among the leading Eurasian powers. Central Asia was, however, beset with differences especially the acrimonious border and water disputes. With the aim of forging ties among the states of Central Asia and to develop a regional approach, President Mirziyoyev launched hectic diplomatic parleys with his neighbours. He has visited the neighbouring countries 17 times in 2017 with the agenda of forging a common approach. To an extent, his efforts have paid off as the hotly contested borders with Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan are mainly resolved. Importantly, Uzbekistan is associated with the Ashgabat Agreement and its proposal of building the Uzbekistan–Turkmenistan–Iran–Oman transport corridor or the Persian Gulf Corridor as it is also referred to. Uzbekistan has launched various connectivity projects such as improving Uzbekistan–Afghanistan rail link and the border crossing with Turkmenistan.
The other connectivity projects launched by major powers open up vast opportunity in terms of investments and trade facilitation. At the same time, Uzbekistan is aware that major projects also contain integrationist tendencies. It will have to be cautious. For the present, Uzbekistan is focusing on its economic development and the connectivity issues. And it would be happy, if the cooperative tendencies continue to prevail so that it does not have to take sides.
Declaration of Conflicting Interests
The authors declared no potential conflicts of interest with respect to the research, authorship and/or publication of this article.
Funding
The authors received no financial support for the research, authorship and/or publication of this article.
