Absence of Political Security in Ethiopian and Its Consequences on State Security

Absence of Political Security in Ethiopia

After the fall of the Dergue, the Ethiopian People Revolution Democratic Front(EPRDF) and security tool were extensively assumed to have carried out radical disarmament and demobilisation of both the Dergue’s and their own forces. However, recent research suggests that while the army was reduced, local police forces and militia were correspondingly expanded and given the support of various security forces at regional and zonal levels.

For deep-seated critics, the police and the security forces are ‘politicised instruments of control’. They form part of the state machinery of repression and are rarely seen as ‘friends and helpers’ or guardians of public order, particularly in the rural areas, away from paved roads and urban centres.

Although the federal police drew some institutional support in the early 1990s, the training of police and militia at the local level is an area that has received inadequate attention and assistance from donors concerned with democratisation.

Many of the interview informants replied that there has been speculation regarding the likely reorganisation of the military and its lines of command since 2001, following the replacement as Chief of Staff of the widely liked General Tsadkan Gebre Tensaie (and other key Generals) by General Samora, and the imprisonment of the popular military leader and vocal dissident Siye Abraha. Head of the Security and Immigration Agency has been, since 2001, Getachew Assefa, a veteran of the so-called bado shewate of the Tigray People Liberation Front (TPLF) (which is the leader party of EPRDF), and such connections raise concerns about the structure of accountability of the military and security.

The interviewees added that over and above concerns about the official and formally ‘sanctioned’ activities of the military and security, allegations persist as to the existence of a parallel system of detention (and indeed torture) operated outside state systems of accountability by security officers carrying over a system applied by the TPLF during the armed struggle. According to the reports of international human rights monitoring organisations, two categories of prisoners (political opponents, particularly those internal to the Front, and ‘international terrorists’, notably those linked to radical Islam) continue to be held outside the purview of the state, in significant numbers. Whilst few states can be expected to be transparent regarding the organisation of their secret and security services, the implication that the system remains effectively in the form evolved by the ruling party for use in an earlier period of civil war has particularly disquieting resonance.

According to the data source that the researcher found, torture and ill-treatment, political repression and disappearance continue to be major problems in Ethiopia. Ethiopian security personnel, including plainclothes security and intelligence officials, federal police, special police, and military, frequently tortured and otherwise ill-treated political detainees held in official and secret detention centres to coerce confessions for the provision of information.

Former security personnel, including military, have described using torture as a technique to extract information. There are serious due process concerns and concerns about the independence of the judiciary on politically sensitive cases. Outside Addis Ababa, many detainees are not charged and are rarely taken to court. The researcher attempted to discuss each political security problem independently according to the data source.

Generally, based on the informants, the Ethiopia government mostly strives for maintaining the status quo of the political regime than protecting and promoting the public interest. In doing so, the security sectors have frequently performed the political assignment of the party by torturing, disappearing and arresting political opponent groups. This political insecurity contributes its negative impact on state security.

The Existence of Mistrust on Security Sectors

At the nature of the study of the organisation of security in Ethiopia lies the fact that both peaceful and more forceful challenges to the rule of the EPRDF have been whichever disabled or suppressed. According to the interviewees (including some policymakers and security officials), one consequence is that it is difficult to distinguish the government from the party, and the security services are easily perceived as partisan executive agencies. This is mostly because the national interest continues to be defined and decided on the basis of a particular ideology and set of individual/group interests that brooks no competition and allows little public debate.

In addition to the party’s more strategic control over the security forces, the interviewees also identified several practical examples of how such control manifests itself in operational terms.

The interviewees explained that a number of top-level command positions across the security forces are held by individuals who are both members of the security forces and influential in the party.

Majority of the informants responded that this condition of party political control over the security forces contributes to a loss of popular confidence/trust in both the intent and the ability of these forces to provide security on an impartial and entitlement-oriented basis. On the other hand, some interviewees have argued that co-opting local leaders and groups, ensuring a degree of executive influence on the judiciary and using the party apparatus at different administrative levels to influence loyalty and behaviour are the more commonly used tools for ensuring political compliance; majority of interviewees saw Ethiopia’s security institutions as ‘guardians’ of TPLF/EPRDF political dominance. Reinforcing this perception are regular instances of security forces arresting leaders of the opposition, restricting opposition political activity and silencing unfavourable reporting. The 2005 elections remain a landmark in this regard and continue to influence international and opposition interpretative frames.

The majority interviewees indicated that, in a number of cases, party affiliation and personalised relations prevail over professional loyalties and institutionalised relations. At the highest levels, overlap between some senior security chiefs and membership of the TPLF’s central or executive committees indicates, for example, party political control as well as the potential existence of hybrid lines of command. Such overlap reinforces existing perceptions of the utilisation of security forces for partisan political purposes, or even of the securitisation of political decisions.

Interviews also indicated a broadly shared perception that the top ranks of the security forces remain dominated by party members of Tigrayan origin. For example, although the authors were unable to obtain hard data from the Ethiopian National Defence Forces on their staffing, feedback suggested that Tigrayans currently make up approximately 15 per cent of their overall strength. However, interviewees widely acknowledged TPLF dominance in the top ranks. The question is how this situation should be interpreted. If one recalls the replacement of the military junta’s army with the TPLF’s armed forces in 1991 and the two massive demobilisation exercises that took place between 1991 and 2001, today’s Ethiopian National Defence Forces feature a significant level of ethnic diversity in their lower and middle ranks.

Most interviewees highlighted two further consequences of security forces maintaining party political control, both of which relate to the risk of their servicemen and women using their party affiliation for other ends. The first is that Ethiopian security forces at times prioritise their operational performance in response to threats to public order (including interests of the party) over respect for individual and collective rights. The informants viewed that members of the state security organisations are rarely prosecuted for committing human right violations when these can be interpreted as acting against political unrest or threat. This situation of ‘selective impunity’ is compounded by the state of Ethiopia’s state judiciary which, although less plagued by favouritism and petty corruption than that of many other African countries, has a number of problems that it needs to address in order to ensure fair recourse to justice, such as a lack of pre-trial. This creates overlap between political and security responsibilities as well as informal lines of accountability.

Given Ethiopia’s limited resources and the uneven development of its regions, this can be seen as an achievement. However, with some interviewees clearly taking the view that the 15 years following the Ethiopian–Eritrean war should have been long enough to ensure rough proportionality of representation at all levels, Tigrayan dominance at the top does appear to be reflective of the interests of the party.

The second issue is corruption. Interviewees across the spectrum preached that corruption does occur throughout the Ethiopian security forces, particularly in the military and the police, but that it is largely of an individual nature. They did not see it as institutionalised or systemic and considered its extent to be relatively modest. Only a small subset of interviewees perceived corruption to be increasing. This view is supported by a large mixed-methods study published by the World Bank in 2012, which suggests that the levels of corruption not only in the security forces but in a broad range of sectors in Ethiopia are relatively low when compared with similar contexts, albeit with significant variation across sectors.

Lastly, the interviews identified two imminent challenges to the TPLF/EPRDF’s ability to continue organising security on the basis of the principle of party control. First, many of the original ‘revolutionary’ leaders of the TPLF are reaching retirement age and will need to be succeeded. The challenge here consists of ensuring that a new generation of leaders balances continuity with change.

Many interviewees suggested that the death of Prime Minister Meles Zenawi has resulted in a number of older TPLF leaders stepping up to play a key role in safeguarding his vision and policy legacy that may inhibit necessary changes in both policies and staffing. Second, the post-1991 emphasis on Ethiopia’s ethnic diversity is at odds with any over-representation of particular groups in any part of the federal administration (perceived or real)—but especially in the country’s security forces. A sustained discourse of valuing ethnic diversity, when this is still not reflected in appointments, policies and initiatives requires effective communication on progress being made to avoid pushing dissatisfied groups towards unrest.

The organisation and provision of security in Ethiopia are caught in a paradox that is well expressed by the contrast between a politically dominant Marxist-oriented party and a federal constitution that not only recognises socio-ethnic diversity, but also gives Ethiopia’s regional states appreciable powers to govern and provide security. The former points to centralised direction-setting and party-political control, whereas the latter points to local autonomy and the federal government serving in a function of last resort.

The interviews suggested that, on balance, this results in a patchwork of security provision in terms of its quantity and quality that radiates out from Ethiopia’s core, serves to preserve the present political order, limits de facto regional security autonomy and lacks in mechanisms for enabling citizens’ security concerns to be reflected in state security policy and operations. In short, it appears that the balance tilts towards central dominance, but given Ethiopia’s incredible diversity, it is not clear that this is a sustainable position.

A few points that emerged from the interviews stood out in particular and are briefly analysed below. To start with, a number of interviews indicated that the policies, methods of operation, budgets and interventions of Ethiopia’s state security forces are managed from the centre in a top-down fashion and less-than-public manner. Some security policies have been perceived to be rolled out across the country, when further reflection, consultation or adjustment to local realities would have been useful. This approach creates a substantial risk of ‘policy misfit’—in short, a situation in which the stated intent of a policy is significantly at odds with its popular perception and/or experience.

A good example is provided by something mentioned by various interviewees: the ‘one-in-five’ policy. This term dates back to the military junta’s rule during which it referred to an intrusive policy of surveillance based on intelligence gathered from informers in one out of every five households. This generated a legacy of distrust that persists today. More recently, the term referred to the TPLF/EPRDF’s 2005 post-election aim of having one in every five households being party-affiliated. Currently, it refers to an effort to promote better management and more dialogue at all levels of the public sector by engaging households directly in development issues.

While a number of interviewees saw this as positive, some opined that the initiative has outgrown the government’s capacity to guide and control it, resulting in local administrators using the ‘one-in-five’ network and the information this (can) generate(s) to increase or maintain their power. In contrast, other interviewees largely continued to consider ‘one-in-five’ as an effort to establish ‘deeper control’ over their daily lives and to perceive many of the ‘one-in-five’ households as party-affiliated. Such suspicion is understandable, given Ethiopia’s history of centralised rule supported by powerful law enforcement agencies, selective law enforcement and poor treatment of suspects. It suggests that either way, the policies implemented ought to be adjusted, or more time and effort need to be spent on bridging the perception gaps.

A second part of the problem is that Ethiopia’s states have primary responsibility for the provision of regional security within their boundaries, but are not necessarily capable of providing it and/or face sporadic/regular (depending on the region) intervention from the centre. From a resource viewpoint, a number of interviewees suggested that the federal police force is much better resourced than the regional police forces and that the latter’s (cap)ability is more varied. It tends to be lower especially in Ethiopia’s periphery (e.g. Somali state, Afar and Beni Shangul) compared with the country’s highland core. This situation results in a recurrent need in the states for intervention by federal forces for capacity reasons alone.

While an argument can be made that the ability to provide such support is helpful and constitutes a strength, differences in levels of competence, professionalism and experience between federal and regional forces will remain if primacy of the latter is not respected and resource allocation not improved. Addressing human rights violations in regional states also requires greater attention to the professional development of the forces that operate there.

At the same time, however, many interviewees also pointed to the gap that exists between the legal and policy frameworks that regulate the organisation and delivery of security across the country, and reality. Regional police have primacy and federal police or military forces intervene only at the invitation of the regional government. However, federal forces, as well as the armed forces, were said to intervene in situations that are legally beyond their remit or jurisdiction.

A number of interviewees furthermore opined that these interventions tended to happen when regional forces were unable to deal with certain issues owing to a lack of operational clarity in their mandates, insufficient resources or when (conflicting) political interests of sufficient import were at stake. An important aspect of such central ‘interference’ in regional security provision is the fact that the federal police are responsible for fighting terrorism; the 2009 anti-terrorism law has a broad remit and it has been used to silence unfavourable reporting and political opposition.

A recent example of the rhetoric this can involve is the government’s labelling of the protesters in Oromia who demonstrated against its intended expansion of the city limits of Addis Ababa as ‘linked to terror groups’. It creates a situation in which the federal police and armed forces have a broad licence to intervene across the country—in keeping with the letter of the law but perhaps not so much the spirit. In this unavoidably fragmented mix that results from the friction between the centralisation of power and regional autonomy, a key flaw is the failure to consult with the Ethiopian people on what they see as their security priorities.

A number of interviewees indicated that there is little space and ability for critical thinking at local levels of government. The absence of space for political dialogues beyond the confines of party doctrine and government policy, combined with the party’s penetration of the lowest levels of the administration, means there are few mechanisms to ensure that Ethiopia’s diverse inhabitants can express their perceptions of, and concerns about, security issues and that their voices will be heard. This creates the risk that important regional and local security concerns are not adequately addressed. The current absence of feedback loops to translate people’s security concerns into security policy and operations is also at odds with the Constitutions’ clear affirmation of support for Ethiopia’s regional diversity.

The Expansion of Mob Justice

According to Nalukenge (2001), the causes of mob justice are rooted in an insufficient legal structure where weak laws (and following punishment) do not match the impact of the crimes committed, whereby people take the law into their own hands.

The most common reason given by the interviewees was a lack of trust in the police and security policemen. A common view is that police officers receive bribes and release criminals instead of arresting them. Another cause brought up by the respondents is the absence of adequate police posts in remote areas. People in some parts of the country have nowhere to report cases and, in the absence of a judiciary, mob justice becomes a method to punish criminals and wrongdoers. Lack of government funds in order to address this issue on various levels is also mentioned by some respondents. Based on the respondents’ view that many people are killed by mobs and are wrongly accused of crimes and offences they never committed.

The Existence of Social Insecurity

Due to its double digit economic growth, Ethiopia has attracted global attention. It made significant effort in reducing poverty, improving life expectance and increasing per capita income. However, this gain has come with rising income inequality and inflation. As Ayob (1995) notes, economic vulnerability becomes threat of security only if it becomes acute enough to take on overtly political dimensions and challenges the most important tenets of state-boundaries, institutions and/or regime survival.

In Ethiopian case, income inequality also poses a serious threat to state internal security, especially to the extent that it breeds and abets rebellion, crime and dissidence. Despite the fact that the country is registering economic growth, urban Ethiopian families nationwide are affected by poverty. Consequently, the distribution of wealth has been skewed in favour of a wealthy minority. As certain segments of the society benefit from the economic growth before others, the resulting income inequality produces great tension between social classes.

The rise of domestic unrest might be fruitfully examined from the perspective of developmental economics. In the initial stage of economic expansion, traditional form of production (e.g. subsistence agriculture) are disclosed by the process of industrialisation and migration to urban centres. As certain segments of the society benefit from the economic growth before others, the resulting income inequality produces great tension between social class. More sever this form of internal security threat create favorable condition for insurgence group and external enemy to challenge the incumbent regime (interviewees).