India’s Counter-Terrorism Diplomacy at the United Nations: Progress and Problems

Abstract

This paper analyses India’s counter-terrorism diplomacy at the United Nations and argues that it is based on five pillars namely, normative, coercive, legal, compliance and domestic implementation, and promotion of international cooperation. The normative pillar elucidates India’s stand on de-legitimisation of terrorism, the root cause approach and sectoral versus comprehensive approach, whereas the coercive pillar divulges India’s position on counter-terrorism sanctions and the use of force. The legal measure explains India’s contribution to the development of international legal framework against terrorism through its sponsoring, co-sponsoring, draft proposal and consensus-building initiatives. Methodologically, it is based largely on the analysis of the primary archival sources, speeches of Indian delegates at the UN General Assembly, its Sixth Committee, and India’s national reports submitted to the UN Counter-Terrorism Committee and 1540 Committee. By analysing India’s counter-terrorism diplomacy at the United Nations, this paper seeks to spark a discourse among researchers working in this field with cases of India and other states as well, and pave the way for further researches on India’s counter-terrorism diplomacy at the United Nations and comparative studies with cases of other states. It concludes with observations that state sovereignty remains at the core of India’s counter-terrorism diplomacy and given the divergence of preferences of states, India’s diplomatic endeavour could not yield desired results.

Keywords

Counter-terrorism diplomacy United Nations de-legitimisation use of force legal measures sanctions India

Introduction

Terrorism is one of the most severe threats to India’s national security. As a consequence of the persistence of terrorist threat, in 2018, India was the seventh most terrorism-affected state in the world (Global Terrorism Index, 2018, p. 25). Terrorism threatens India’s national security in various ways, including ‘killings, kidnappings, destruction of property and disruption of normal civic order’ (A/49/257, 1994, p. 02). Although various forms of terrorism have threated India’s national security yet, the use of terrorism as an instrument of foreign policy or state-sponsored terrorism is the foremost serious threat. In some high-profile terrorist attacks such as Parliament attack (13th December 2001), Jammu and Kashmir Legislative Assembly attack (1st October 2001), Mumbai attacks (26th November 2008), Uri attacks (18th September 2016) and most recent Pulwama attack (14th February 2019), foreign hands have been either claimed by involved terrorist organisations per se or links have been established by India’s investigating agencies and evidence have been submitted to concerned state parties to take appropriate action. The growing threat of cross-border terrorism has compelled India to opine that ‘the growing inter-linkages between terrorist groups, cross-border operations including terror financing networks, propagating ideologies of hatred through the exploitation of modern technologies and funding arms and weapons have certainly left no country aloof from the impact of terrorism’ (Umasankar, 2018). While underscoring the causes of complexity of India’s terrorist threat, India’s Syed Akbaruddin has noted that although terrorist organisations ‘use modern platforms such as social media, cyberspace and exist in parallel worlds alongside us’ (Akbaruddin, 2017a) yet, they ‘are not bound by the borders, norms, legal frameworks and bureaucratic inertia’ (Akbaruddin, 2017a; Lal, 2017). The emergence of terrorism as an instrument of foreign policy to wage proxy wars against India has further complicated the threat.

To counter the multi-layered and complex threats rendered by terrorism, India has adopted a multi-faceted counter-terrorism strategy. Given the predominance of cross-border terrorism, domestic, legal, and criminal-justice level responses could not yield expected results. New Delhi is convinced that ‘no one country, however rich or powerful, will be able to defeat this acting alone’ (Umasankar, 2017). Therefore, it has taken its counter-terrorism strategy beyond the domestic, legal, and criminal justice approaches and sought to tackle the menace at the diplomatic level. It is of the opinion that while countering terrorism, the international community ‘could not work in silos created either by boundaries or bureaucracy. There was never a stronger case for more multilateral action, more coordination and more cooperation on any matter amongst all stakeholders than on terrorism today’ (Akbaruddin, 2017a; Lal, 2017). As a result, India has invested more time, energy and diplomatic resources to counter-terrorism at the United Nations than other multilateral and multilateral destinations.

This paper analyses India’s counter-terrorism diplomacy at the United Nations. To provide an in-depth analysis of various facets of India’s counter-terrorism diplomacy at the United Nations, the paper has been divided into three sections. In addition to setting the context and figuring out the main argument that India’s counter-terrorism strategy at the United Nations is based upon five pillars, the first section underscores India’s terrorism challenge, its general response to the threat and factors compelling it to tackle the issue at the diplomatic level. The second section argues that India’s counter-terrorism diplomacy at the United Nations is based on five pillars namely, normative, coercive, legal, compliance and domestic implementation, and the promotion of international cooperation. The last section summarises the major findings of the paper.

India’s Counter-Terrorism Diplomacy at the United Nations

India’s counter-terrorism strategy at the United Nations is grounded on five pillars: normative, legal, coercive, compliance and domestic implementation, and the promotion of international cooperation. The details of these pillars are as follows:

Normative Measures

Normative measures are the most important part of the UN counter-terrorism mechanism. It has three aspects: de-legitimisation of terrorism, comprehensive versus sectoral approach and the route cause approach.

The De-legitimisation of Terrorism: De-legitimisation is a process of discrediting a targeted individual, group, organisations and other objects. It is defined as ‘categorization of groups into extreme negative social categories which are excluded from human groups that are considered as acting within the limits of acceptable norms and/or values, since these groups are viewed as violating basic human norms or values and therefore deserving maltreatment’ (Bar-Tal, 1989, p. 170). The de-legitimisers aim to significantly cut down the popular support base that the targeted objects enjoy in society. The de-legitimisation eventually results in creations of a new identity, however, necessarily negative.

On de-legitimisation of terrorism, India believes that terrorism is an issue of serious concern for the international community. It is ‘the most pervasive and serious challenge’ to contemporary international peace and security (Akbaruddin, 2017b) and one of the biggest scourges the international community is facing today (Rao, 2015; Umasankar, 2017). It is not just a destabilising force challenging the domestic political and social order but also ‘the biggest violation of human rights’ (Rao, 2016). India also perceives terrorism as a factor causing ‘the grossest violation of human rights’ in domestic affairs as well as the biggest hindrance to the realisation of universal human rights (Kalitheerthan, 2017). In addition to posing threats to innocent individual and critical infrastructure, terrorism not just ‘undermines the very foundations of the democratic political and social order’ but also ‘threatens the very existence of the States’ (Umasankar, 2017). For India, it is indeed a menace that knows no boundaries (Lal, 2017). To India, terrorism also constitutes a ‘crime against humanity’ (Rao, 2016).

India had opined that terrorism should not be treated merely as a political problem (A/C.6/42/SR.34, 1987, para 22) because unlike politics, terrorism is unjustifiable irrespective of its motivation, forms and manifestation: ‘no cause, no matter how just, can excuse terrorism’ (Sen, 2008). The member states of the United Nations cannot and should not distinguish between acceptable and unacceptable and good and bad terrorism (Rao, 2015, 2016). India also ‘condemns direct or indirect financial assistance’ to terrorist organisations and/or individuals either by states entities or individuals (Rao, 2015; Umasankar, 2017). India has also warned to those who instigate, sponsor, finance or give safe haven to terrorist and use terrorism as an instrument of foreign policy that ‘those who play with the sword, shall also perish by it’ (Rao, 2015).

The Route Cause Approach: The root cause approach has been one of the most controversial normative considerations in counter-terrorism at the United Nations. The supporters of this approach insist on addressing the underlying causes that lead to the birth, expansion and persistence of terrorism. The opponents led by European states, Israel and the United States initially refused to acknowledge: ‘no cause, however legitimate, could justify the use of violence and terror’ (A/C.6/44/SR. 21, 1989, para 57). However, when amidst mounting pressure from the Non-Alignment Movement (NAM) and the Organisation of Islamic Conference (OIC), the opponents were forced to acknowledge the existence of the root causes, these states recognised only those causes falling within the domestic jurisdiction of a state such as deprivation, poverty, multi-layered domestic injustices, and culture, racial and religious fault lines. The Third World and the Soviet Union supported the root causes lying largely in the international system such as colonialism, foreign occupation, external interference, unjust international economic order, etc.

In the 1970s and 1980s, India vehemently supported the root cause approach. India firmly believed that ‘if the menace was to be completely eliminated, it was essential to study and address the underlying causes. A clear distinction existed between terrorism… and the legitimate struggle of peoples under Colonial and racist regimes for self-determination’ should be made (A/C.6/42/SR.34, 1987, para 21). India insisted on differentiating terrorism and right for self-determination because it regarded colonialism and foreign occupation as roots behind the armed struggle against their oppressors. India opposed the West-sponsored root causes because in its perception these root causes were politically motivated and detrimental to developing states’ security. Hence, along with NAM states, India supported a list of root causes situated in the international system. The list included colonialism, racial discrimination, aggression, the use of force in a manner contrary to the UN Charter, foreign occupation, interference in the internal affairs, the persistence of an inequitable economic order and foreign exploitation of a country’s natural resources (Díaz-Paniagua, 2008, pp. 178–181).

However, India’s position on the issue of root causes of terrorism started changing in the 1990s. This change turned India’s prevailing approach diametrically opposed to the existing one. India ‘began to oppose the “freedom fighter” and “root causes” arguments, on the grounds that they are politically motivated and counterproductive. Their current position is that international legal mechanisms cannot, and should not, concern themselves with root causes’ (Sasikumar, 2010, p. 621). Unequivocally stating India’s changing position on the root cause approach, Indian Prime Minister A. B. Vajpayee asserted that ‘we must firmly rebuff any ideological, political or religious justification […] reject self-serving arguments seeking to classify terrorism according to its root causes and therefore justifying terrorist action somewhere while condemning it elsewhere’ (Sasikumar, 2010, p. 621). Further clarifying India’s position, Deputy Permanent Representative A. Gopinathan argued that ‘International law did not support the argument distinguishing terrorists from freedom fighters, nor did it permit impunity for crimes against humanity. Terrorists were criminals and no rationalizations advanced by advocates of so-called “root causes” could absolve them from culpability’ (A/C.6/57/SR.9, 2002, para 64). India’s position was once again reiterated in 2008 as follows: ‘no cause, no matter how just, can excuse terrorism’ (Sen, 2008). Nevertheless, the most vocal assault on the root cause approach by India came in 2016 when the Indian representative argued that ‘terrorist acts… are criminal acts; no matter whenever, wherever and by whomsoever, these are committed’ (Rao, 2016). ‘Terrorists are terrorists; “cause” does not justify terrorist acts’ (Rao, 2016).

The Comprehensive versus Sectoral Approach: In 1972, when for the first time the issue of terrorism was listed in the agenda of the General Assembly for discussion, the opinion of member states at the forum was deeply divided. States, particularly from the Third World, were insisting upon a comprehensive counter-terrorism approach, encompassing all aspects of terrorism. However, the United States and European states were insisting on sector-specific counter-terrorism measures because they believed that given the divergence of opinion and perspectives, reaching an all-encompassing, comprehensive approach would be a difficult task. These states were not against the comprehensive approach to the problem per se but were of the firm belief that reaching a consensus at a comprehensive approach would be a difficult task. Therefore, instead of waiting for the completion of a comprehensive convention, the international community should go ahead with sector-specific conventions.

However, the momentum started tilting in favour of the comprehensive approach in the 1990s. The lead role was taken by India and Algeria. These states regarded terrorist bombing, hostage taking, the kidnapping of diplomats, terrorist financing and the use of weapons of mass destruction, not as terrorism per se but distinct manifestations of terrorism. They argued that merely addressing the symptoms and various manifestations of the problem would not help to prevent and eliminate the menace like terrorism. For instance, India lamented that ‘no comprehensive international convention on the elimination of terrorism had been concluded’ despite the fact that the issue of international terrorism has been on the ‘agenda of the General Assembly for more than 20 years’ (A/C.6/48/SR.11, 1993, para 48). The international community could not finalise a comprehensive convention, despite the fact that ‘the (sectoral) conventions dealing with specific aspects of international terrorism could not deal adequately with the problem’ (A/C.6/48/SR.11, 1993, para 48). India went a step further from merely advocating for a comprehensive approach and proposed a draft of Comprehensive Convention on International Terrorism (CCIT) in the General Assembly in 1996.

Coercive Measures

The coercive counter-terrorism consists of sanctions and the use of force. The discourse on the relationship between coercive counter-terrorism and state sovereignty illuminates India’s position on coercive counter-terrorism. India regards states as main actors in the fight against terrorism (S/PV.6557, 2011, p. 03). It responds reluctantly to any coercive measure compromising state sovereignty. Given its adherence to sovereignty sacrosanctist position, India prefers to abstain on resolutions imposing sanctions on sovereign states. India’s preference is consistent with its general position on the use of force because India regards ‘the principle of state sovereignty, sovereign equality, territorial integrity, non-use of force and non-intervention in internal affairs… as sacrosanct’ (Murthy, 2010, p. 211).

Consistent with its general position on the use of force, India has not only recognised that states ‘has every right to suppress terrorism or any other kind of lawlessness inside its own State’ but also asserted that they ‘cannot exercise such a right outside it (border), and particularly to the detriment of the rights of other States’ (S/PV.1709, 1973, para 28). Similarly, India opined that the US military action against Libya ‘constitute(d) nothing less than clear cut aggression against the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Libya’ (S/PV.2675, 1986, p. 47). Criticising the US action for alleged violation of state sovereignty, international law, principles and purposes of the United Nations, and fear of conflict escalation, India suggested that such problems could be ‘best resolved through dialogue and not through pressure’ (S/PV.2675, 1986, p. 47).

India’s another argument against the use of force is consistent with its principled position to support the use of force as a last resort. It was the reason why India criticised the Israeli use of force against Uganda (1976) and questioned whether ‘would it not have been better to risk further negotiations than to risk a military operation that could conceivably have led to much greater loss of life?’ (S/PV.1942, 1976, para 145). In the case of Iraq invasion (2003), India stood with ‘a stringent regime of inspections designed to meet the international community’s desire to disarm Iraq of its weapons of mass destruction’ in accordance with the SC resolution 1441 (S/PV.4726, 2003, p. 23). But when the US-led forced invaded Iraq, India called the invasion ‘unjustified and avoidable’ (S/PV.4726, 2003, p. 23). It explicitly opposed the invasion because it was not authorised by the Security Council (Abhyankar, 2018, pp. 89–90). Similarly, in the case of Lebanon war (2006), India criticised Israel for ‘excessive and disproportionate military retaliation’ against Lebanon (S/PV.5493 (Resumption 1), 2006, p. 34). From the above analysis, it can be deciphered that India opposes the use of force against a state to counter-terrorism.

Nevertheless, despite its conviction to not support the use of force against states in counter-terrorism, India supports the use of force against non-state actors. When the US attacked selected targets in Afghanistan following the attacks on its embassies in Kenya and Tanzania, India co-sponsored a draft resolution (S/1998/810) in the Security Council that was ultimately passed as S/RES/1173. The resolution did not criticise the United States for breach of state sovereignty. Instead, it urged various groups in Afghanistan ‘to refrain from harbouring and training terrorists and their organizations and to halt illegal drug activities’ (S/RES/1173, 1998, para 15). In fact, India was more concerned about the ‘de facto invasion of Afghanistan by foreign military forces, in support of the Taliban’ than by the US strikes per se (S/PV.3921, 1998, p. 7). Therefore, instead of condemning US action, India decided to remain silent. Rather than highlighting the external interventions, Indian representative preferred to speak on ‘foreign interference’ and its ill-consequences (S/PV.3921, 1998, p. 07). India’s silence may be explained as growing acceptance to militarily targeting of non-state actors.

But what surprised the observers was the fact that despite India’s position to disprove the use of military force against another state to counter-terrorism, US-led coalition forces’ attack on Afghanistan (2001) went uncondemned. Unlike its established practice to condemn the use of force against sovereign states, India supported ‘the current campaign to eradicate the terrorist networks in Afghanistan’, without naming the use of force against the Taliban regime (S/PV.4414 (Resumption 1), 2001, p. 16). Although India ‘refuse(d) to put boots on the ground’, yet, offered ‘overflight, landing, and refuelling, facilities for US air mission and port calls by naval ships as well as intelligence sharing, and helping with investigation of the 9/11 incidents’ (Paliwal, 2017, p. 167). It was the case perhaps because the Taliban regime was largely run by actors that were not internationally recognised except for Pakistan, the UEA and Saudi Arabia (Paliwal, 2017, p. 126).

On countering terrorism through sanctions, India takes relatively less reluctant position. Usually, it abstains in voting on the resolutions authorising the use of sanctions against another state and criticises the sanctions in its explanation of the vote on the resolutions. For instance, when the Resolution 748 imposing sanctions on Libya came for voting, India abstained. While explaining its vote, India had underscored the violation of the last resort principle and argued that the Council should have taken the view of members before ‘taking such extremely significant decision’ (S/PV.3063, 1992, p. 57). India complained that enough time was not given to the Libyan authorities despite the fact that they had made good progress in this regard as the Secretary-General report (S/23672) had noticed. It also hoped that ‘more time and patience in the pursuit of current multidimensional efforts could have yielded better results’ (S/PV.3063, 1992, p. 57). Despite not supporting the imposition of sanctions on sovereign states, India voted in favour of SC resolutions 1988 and 1989, establishing two distinct terrorism sanction regimes for ISIL (Da’esh), and Al-Qaida Sanction Committee and the Taliban Sanction Committee, both against non-state actors (S/PV.6557, 2011, p. 02). It denotes India’s conviction to use sanctions to fight terrorism but not against another state.

As a supporter of the use of sanctions against non-state actors, India has tried to list and delist individuals and entities in various terrorism sanction regimes. Most recently, India has been trying to list Masood Azhar, chief of Jaish-e-Mohammed, a Pakistan-based terrorist outfit allegedly involved in Parliament and Pathankot attacks in Al-Qaeda and Taliban sanction regime. Following the Pulwama terrorist attack (February 2019), France has moved a proposal in the Security Council. It was also supported by the United States and the United Kingdom. Russia has also signalled its support for the proposal (NDTV, 2019). But China has put a technical hold on the proposal. China’s use of veto is not new as on earlier three occasions—2009, 2016 and 2017—too it had vetoed such initiatives.

Nevertheless, in a quid pro quo, China has put aside its technical hold in May 2019 resulting in the listing of Masood Azhar as a global terrorist in the ISIL (Da’esh) and Al-Qaida Sanctions Committee. However, the listing of Masood Azhar came at a great price for India because in a series of behind-the-curtain negotiations, India has to strike separate deals with the United States and China (Karnad, 2019). It is widely believed that in a quid pro quo India agreed to the United States to stop oil import from Iran and to China to refrain from overtly criticising its Belt and Road Initiative (Karnad, 2019). To comply with the behind the curtain deal, India ‘fully stopped’ importing oil from Iran after 2nd May 2019 (Basu & Venkatesh, 2019). Vis-a-vis China, unlike earlier, India remains silent during second Belt and Road Initiative held in late April.

Nonetheless, when there comes the issue of implementation of anti-terrorist sanctions, India wholeheartedly implements the SC authorised anti-terrorism sanctions. Despite abstaining in voting on resolution 748 (1992), India implemented the SC authorised sanctions under Libya Sanctions Regime (S/23911, 1992). It cut off all direct air service from India to Libya; cut off supply of arms, equipment, technical assistance and its delivery system; and cut down the diplomatic strength of Libyan diplomacy in New Delhi and imposed ban on diplomats’ travel beyond 60 km of the Delhi border without prior permission (S/23911, 1992, paras a, b and c). Moreover, despite not having an adequate say in shaping the sanctions regimes, through annual reposts (two reports to Counter-Terrorism Committee and five to 1540 Regime between 2014 and 2017), India has regularly kept the United Nations updated about its domestic implementation of the SC authorised sanctions. India has come up with a ‘robust domestic law-based system of controls on the export of strategic goods and technologies’ (S/AC.44/2017/2, 2017, p. 2). It has ‘harmonised its legislative and regulatory framework’ according to norms and best practices stipulated by non-proliferation regimes such as Australia Group, Nuclear Suppliers’ Group and Wassenaar Agreement (S/AC.44/2017/2 2017, p. 3). India’s Chemical Weapons Convention Act ‘prohibits development, production, stockpiling, retention, and use of any chemical weapon by unauthorized persons’ (S/AC.44/2004/(02)/62, 2004, para 6).

Moreover, dissatisfied with the modus operandi of the contemporary sanctions regimes, India has pressed for the procedural and implementation related reforms. India believes that terrorist sanctions regimes must ‘be fair and transparent in their functioning’ and advocates for ensuring the ‘due process in their working procedure and decision-making’ (S/PV.6557, 2011, p. 2). Therefore, India suggested a set reforms including, increasing role of the Ombudsperson; keeping political pressures and external influences away; and the reforms in the listing and delisting procedures should reflect transparency, fairness and credibility. This is the reason why India supported the SC resolution 2325 that sought ‘to enhance the architecture of resolution 1540 (2004) by promoting its full implementation through increased cooperation, assistance, transparency and outreach mechanisms’ (S/PV.7837, 2016, p. 51).

Legal Measures

India has played an important role in countering terrorism through legal measures at the United Nations. India has not only sponsored and co-sponsored the draft resolutions and other initiatives but also actively participated and proposed important amendments in the different legal instruments brought before the United Nations for negotiations. Its first major success in draft proposal came in 1976 when along with several NAM countries, India proposed a draft. It was passed by 86 votes in favour, eight against while 24 abstentions (Díaz-Paniagua, 2008, p. 158). This resolution reaffirmed the people’s inalienable right of self-determination, condemned the repressive and terrorist acts by colonial, racist and alien powers, and recognised the need for independence of peoples under colonial occupation. India had played a lynchpin role in drafting a resolution that was eventually passed as A/RES/40/61 in 1985 (A/C.6/42/SR.34, 1987, para 20). While retaining people’s inalienable right to self-determination, the resolution established the correlation between the underlying causes and prevention of terrorism. Two years later, in the 42nd session (1987) of the General Assembly, India also played an important role in drafting resolution A/RES/42/159. However, the uniqueness of the draft resolution was the inclusion of the prevention of state terrorism and the recognition of the need for a generally agreed definition of terrorism.

India also has a good track record in co-sponsoring draft resolutions. In 1972, when the UN Secretary-General ‘asked the General Assembly to place the issue of terrorism on its agenda’ for discussion, along with the NAM member states, India co-sponsored a draft resolution (Gorman, 2001, p. 219; Friedrichs, 2008, p. 41). In addition to establishing an ad hoc committee, the draft resolution (i) sought to mainstream the issue of state terrorism, (ii) recognised an inalienable right to self-determination and colonies legitimate right to launch liberation movements and (iii) need to study the underlying causes of terrorism. The draft resolution was passed as Resolution 3034(XXVII) by 76 votes in favour, 34 against while 16 states abstained (Díaz-Paniagua, 2008, p. 153). Again in 1998, India was a co-sponsor of the draft S/1998/810 in the Security Council on Afghanistan, which was eventually passed as S/RES/1173. The United Nations started a biannual new series of resolution correlating human rights and terrorism in 1994. India co-sponsored a draft titled Human Rights and Terrorism in 1997. It co-sponsored another draft resolution on Hostage Taking in 2002 (Anant, 2015).

However, the Measures to Prevent Terrorists from Acquiring Weapons of Mass Destruction (2002) and the Comprehensive Convention on International Terrorism (1996) are the two most noticeable drafts sponsored by India at the General Assembly. Para two of the Measures to Prevent Terrorists from Acquiring WMD draft resolution urged member states to take appropriate measures to prevent terrorists from acquiring weapons and its delivery system at the national level. The draft resolution also called upon member states to take measures to prohibit terrorists from acquiring weapons of mass destruction. Although India has sponsored various drafts and drafted many counter-terrorism resolutions at the United Nations, placing of the draft CCIT for the negotiation at the General Assembly is the most ambitious one. Reiterating the motives behind placing the draft CCIT, Indian representative argued that ‘India brought the proposal of a comprehensive convention against terrorism before the General Assembly in 1996 with the belief that such a convention would go a long way in strengthening the international legal framework and fill the gaps in the sectoral instruments against terrorism’ (Rao, 2016). India is of the view that ‘the adoption of a CCIT… is in the interests of all member States and would reinvigorate the multi-lateral and collective dimensions of counter-terrorism efforts’ (Sen, 2008). Four main tenants of the draft CCIT are as follows:

To agree upon a universal definition of terrorism;

To unite the international community to ban all terror groups and shut down terror camps;

To outline special laws under which all terrorists could be prosecuted;

To make cross-border terrorism an extraditable offence worldwide (Chada quoted in Thakker, 2018, p. 17).

Over two decades has elapsed since the negotiations started. However, the draft could not be finalised because of three major technical obstacles (Hmoud, 2006). First, the definition of terrorism is the most contentious issue. The United Nations could not reach at a consensus definition because ‘the OIC wants exclusion of national liberation movements, especially in the context of Israel-Palestinian conflict. The US wanted the draft to exclude acts committed by military forces of states during peacetime’ (Livemint, 2016). The second obstacle pertains to the scope of the convention. The issue of state terrorism and the legitimate struggle against the foreign occupation are the main contentions. One group led by the OIC wanted to make the realisation of the people right to self-determination, even armed, legitimate while others, led by Israel and the United States, vehemently opposed such move. Given its concern for the state-sponsored terrorism, in the first draft of the CCIT (submitted on 11th November 1996), India detailed the measures against state-sponsored terrorism and the use of terrorism as instrument of state policy (Article 3) but did not include the terrorist act committed by armed forces while countering terrorism or in the name of countering terrorism perhaps because Indian armed forces had been accused of committing terrorism and violation of human rights in Kashmir and Northeastern parts of India. Although today India stands with the adherence to international humanitarian laws and respect for human rights while countering terrorism, yet persistence criticism of Indian armed forces by Kashmiri people, international human right agencies and the Arab and Islamic world may have turned India not to consider or at least to not take seriously the issue of terrorist act committed by the armed forces while countering terrorism. The third obstacle pertains to the issue of overlapping: if there is a contradiction or overlap between the negotiated ‘sectoral conventions’ and the comprehensive convention which one should prevail. Some states including India favours the comprehensive convention, but a large part of the European and other developed states favour the sectoral.

Compliance and Domestic Implementation

UN counter-terrorism resolutions, declarations and conventions oblige member states to take appropriate measures commensurating UN measures. India is one of the leading states fulfilling its obligations zealously. In response to the UN call to become a signatory to counter-terrorism conventions, India has become the party to 14 major legal instruments on countering and suppressing international terrorism (Umasankar, 2017). India has ‘also signed the 2010 Beijing Protocol Supplementary to the Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Seizure of Aircraft (10 September 2010), and the 2014 Montreal Protocol to Amend the Convention on Offences and Certain Other Acts Committed on Board Aircraft (4 April 2014)’ (Rao, 2016). Nonetheless, India’s compliance measures are not merely limited to signing and rectifying international counter-terrorism conventions. India has submitted two national reports to the UN Counter-Terrorism Committee and five to the 1540 Committee.

Aimed at curbing and criminalising the act per se, legislative initiatives constitute the cornerstone of India’s compliance measures. Corresponding to the Security Council resolution 1373 call to implement the relevant resolutions, protocols and conventions (S/RES/1373, 2001, para 3), India had amended the Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act which criminalises fundraising ‘for terrorist activities, holding of proceeds of terrorism, harbouring of terrorists, unauthorized possession of any bomb, dynamite or hazardous explosive substance or other lethal weapon or substance capable of mass destruction or biological or chemical substance of warfare’ (Sen, 2008). Amidst the rising fear of falling weapons of mass destruction in terrorists’ hands, the Indian Parliament has passed the Weapons of Mass Destruction (Prevention) Act, 2005. It ‘provides detailed measures preventing the falling of weapons of mass destruction or dual-use materials in the hands of terrorists and non-state actors’ (Rao, 2016). The Foreign Contribution (Regulation) Act, 2010 aims to prohibit terrorist financing through strict monitoring of foreign funding to non-governmental and intergovernmental organisations. India has become a member of Financial Action Task Force, ‘an inter-governmental body, responsible for setting global standards on anti-money laundering (AML) and combating the financing of terrorism (CFT)’ (Embassy of India, 2010).

Administrative and law enforcement measures are also pivotal in India’s compliance. In national reports submitted to the Counter-Terrorism Committee and 1540 Committee, India has detailed different measures taken in this regard. India has directed its law enforcement agencies, airport authorities, and central-level and state-level investigation agencies, providing them updated consolidated lists of suspected terrorists and associated individuals, entities and groups to put them in the watch list. The Government has also asked the Central Bank (Reserve Bank of India) to issue appropriate directives to nationalised and private banks asking them to monitor and take immediate action if any suspected ‘financial asset is detected’ (S/AC.37/2003/(1455)/49, 2003, p. 3). The law enforcement agencies such as Police, Custom and Income Tax, and Enforcement Directorate have been provided with an updated list of offenders and property associated with them and directed to ensure strict adherence to the law and practices (S/AC.37/2003/(1455)/49, 2003, pp. 3–4).

At the diplomatic level, deporting of and bringing suspected terrorists back home through extradition treaties is a key pillar of India’s counter-terrorism. Indian Extradition Act, 1962 governs India’s extradition affairs and empowers the government to extradite any fugitive offenders to even those states with which India does not have an extradition treaty and request other states to extradite suspected offenders hiding in their territory. As of 12th December 2018, the number of signed extradition treaties has risen to 50¹ (Lok Sabha, 2018), whereas the number of extradition arrangements has gone up to 10² (Ministry of External Affairs, 2018a). Another significant aspect of India’s diplomatic counter-terrorism strategy is Mutual Legal Assistance in Criminal Matters (MLACM). Managed by the Ministry of Home Affairs, the legal assistance treaties aim to facilitate legal assistance in criminal matters. So far, India has signed the MLACM treaties with over 40 states³ (Ministry of External Affairs, 2018b). India has also formed Joint Working Groups (JWGs) with many states.⁴ The working groups have been formed around two themes: combatting international terrorism and counter-terrorism. The JWGs bring counter-terrorism bureaucracies of concerned states together, where among other things, they discuss and debate on information exchange, experience and expertise sharing, personnel training, and counter-terrorism technology exchange.

Promotion of International Cooperation

Being a victim of cross-border terrorism and convinced of the futility of the merely national level response, India ‘has an overriding interest in greater and more meaningful international cooperation to counter terrorism’ (Sen, 2008). Therefore, it regards international cooperation as ‘the key element in combating international terrorism’ (A/C.6/42/SR.34, 1987, para 21). India believes that ‘the only effective way to tackle an international threat like terrorism is by way of genuine collaboration among the States’ (Umasankar, 2018). The limited ineffectiveness of the state-centric counter-terrorism measures has further convinced India that ‘terrorism can be countered by combined international efforts and that the UN is best suited for developing this transnational effort’ (Umasankar, 2018). Hence, international cooperation has emerged as a cornerstone of India’s counter-terrorism strategy at the United Nations.

India has advocated that ‘We must step up our collective efforts with real-time cooperation among the Member States to confront the scourge of terrorism squarely and decisively’ (Umasankar, 2017). Based on its conviction, India has time and again advocated for and is ‘involved in a number of initiatives and actions undertaken to… share information regarding terrorists and assist each other in arresting, extraditing and prosecuting them … at the international, regional and bilateral levels’ (A/C.6/48/SR.11, 1993, para 50). Nevertheless, India insists that while cooperating on terrorism ‘the principles of peaceful coexistence, non-intervention and non-interference had to be recognized and upheld in practice by all nations if terrorism was to be eradicated’ (A/C.6/42/SR.34, 1987, para 22).

Following the SC resolution 1373 that urges to cooperate through bilateral and multilateral channels (S/RES/1373, 2001, para 3c), India has taken several new initiatives and strengthened existing ones at the international and regional levels in the post-September 2001 era. At the regional level, India ‘continues to work with fellow SAARC nations’ (Rao, 2016). Within the South Asian regional counter-terrorism framework, India has become a party to SAARC Regional Convention on Suppression of Terrorism (1987), its Additional Protocol on the financing of terrorism (2004), and SAARC Convention on Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters (Rao, 2016). Recently, it has started working on finding out the ways to de-radicalisation and dismantling of the drug-terrorism nexus through actively participating in the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO) counter-terrorism mechanism.⁵ India and the European Union have institutionalised counter-terrorism dialogue. In the recently concluded 11th round of dialogue in November 2018, both parties ‘reviewed threats posed by terrorist groups worldwide’ and ‘exchanged views on current counter terrorism challenges’ (Ministry of External Affairs, 2018c). They also discussed the ‘ways to deepen institutional linkages between Indian Agencies and their European counterparts’ and ‘agreed to strengthen cooperation in dealing with these challenges’ (Ministry of External Affairs, 2018c). In the commemorative meeting held between India and ASEAN in January 2018, both parties agreed to ‘deepen cooperation in combating terrorism through information sharing, capacity building and reiterated their commitment to battle the menace by disrupting and countering terror groups’ (NDTV, 2018). Earlier in 2012, the two parties had signed a Joint Declaration for Cooperation to Combat International Terrorism which sought to ‘to enhance the efficacy of those efforts to combat terrorism’ and ‘reaffirm the importance of having a framework for cooperation to prevent, disrupt and combat international terrorism’ (Association of South East Asian Nations, 2012).

Conclusion

From the above analysis, it is evident that India regards terrorism as a heinous crime, scourge and menace that poses threats not only to individuals and states but also to the organising principles of the international order and the principles and purposes of the UN Charter. India advocates that terrorism cannot and should not be seen in our versus their framework and fought through a strategy fragmented in lines with international borders. Rather, it should be universally defined as ‘criminal and unjustifiable act’ (Sen, 2008; Umasankar, 2018). The international community must adopt a universal ‘zero tolerance’ policy to tackle the menace effectively (Rao, 2015; Umasankar, 2017). Although India is a vehement supporter of the coercive measures against non-state terrorists, its voting record in the Security Council on resolutions authorising counter-terrorism sanctions and the use of force divulges that it is reluctant in using coercive measures against other sovereign states to counter-terrorism or in the name of counter-terrorism. The history of India approach to the use of sanctions or the force divulges that it stands with the coercive measures only if such measures fall in line with the principle of respect for state sovereignty, the last resort principle and proper authorisation of the Security Council. India confers the UN ‘coordination role’; however, states remain central in counter-terrorism. This is the reason why India insists that while cooperating with each other, states should be abided by Westphalia principles like respect for state sovereignty and non-intervention.

India has played a linchpin role in the UN counter-terrorism strategy in the 1970s and 1980s. In the form of a co-sponsor and drafting the draft resolution, India was among the leading norm setters. Through co-sponsoring and drafting, it has contributed immensely; however, the finalisation of the CCIT will establish India as a leading anti-terrorism crusader. India has an impressive track record of compliance and domestic implementation. On counter-terrorism, India is the supporter of the SC authorised coercive action to the extent that it implements such resolutions in spirit and letter even though it abstains on the voting of the same resolution. The SC resolution 748 is the best example, where India abstained in voting but wholeheartedly implemented the resolution at home. National report of India submitted to relevant UN bodies sheds ample light on it.

However, with the passage of time and its emergence as foremost victims of terrorism, India’s position on key issues has changed. For instance, pertaining the root cause approach, India’s position has evolved from a champion to leading opposer; on legal measures, it has evolved from co-sponsors to sponsor⁶; and on the legitimisation of national liberation movements, it has shifted from champions of the inalienable right to self-determination to support only in case of foreign occupation. Amidst continuity and changes, India has emerged as a state with firm conviction that terrorism is a threat without border; therefore, any effort to counter it effectively is bound to fail until and unless international community’s response to the menace would be a response without border. Therefore, India advocates for counter-terrorism based on international cooperation rather than strict compartmentalisation in line with state boundaries.

Footnotes

Acknowledgements

This paper benefitted from research done for my PhD thesis titled India’s Counter-Terrorism Approach at the United Nations: A Study of Objectives and Strategies. Earlier version of this paper was presented at All India International and Area Studies Convention 2019 entitled ‘Ascending India: Reflections on Global and Regional Dimensions’ convened on 30 January–01 February 2019 at School of International Studies, Jawaharlal Nehru University, New Delhi. The author would like to thank chair of the session professor P. R. Kumaraswamy and Professor C. S. R. Murthy for their constructive comments and Chandramoni Bhattarai, Surabhi Singh, Resham Lal and Saurabh Mishra for their useful suggestions on the earlier draft of this paper.

Declaration of Conflicting Interests

The author declared no potential conflicts of interest with respect to the research, authorship and/or publication of this article.

Funding

The author received no financial support for the research, authorship and/or publication of this article.

Notes

References

A/49/257 (1994). India’s reply to agenda item 145: Measures to prevent international terrorism, Report of the Secretary-General. Forty-ninth session. New York: General Assembly.

A/C.6/42/SR.34 (1987, October 28). Agenda item 126: Measures to prevent international terrorism. Sixth Committee, Forty-second session, 34th meeting. New York: General Assembly.

A/C.6/44/SR. 21 (1989, October 18). Agenda item 126: Measures to prevent international terrorism. Sixth Committee, Forty-fourth session, 34th meeting. New York: General Assembly.

A/C.6/48/SR.11 (1993, October 14). Agenda item 140: Measures to eliminate international terrorism. Sixth Committee, Forty-eighth session, 11th meeting. New York: General Assembly.

A/C.6/57/SR.9 (2002, October 3). Agenda item 160: Measures to eliminate international terrorism. Sixth Committee, Fifty-seventh session, 9th meeting. New York: General Assembly.

Abhyankar

R. M.

(2018). Indian diplomacy: Strategic autonomy and beyond. New Delhi: Oxford University Press.

Akbaruddin

(2017a). Agenda item 118: The United Nations Global Counter Terrorism Strategy. Statement by India’s permanent representative to the UN, 71st session. New York: General Assembly. Retrieved from https://www.pminewyork.org/statementgeneral?id=eyJpdiI6ImVcL0hKU0FLVURkTlJWWlpsXC9QNElYZz09IiwidmFsdWUiOiJBNFNoM3E4a2N5NGg1TjN

Akbaruddin

(2017b). The United Nations Global Counter Terrorism Strategy: Report of the Secretary General [A/71/858 (Item 118). Statement by India’s permanent representative to the UN, 71st session. New York: General Assembly. Retrieved from https://www.pminewyork.org/statementgeneral?id=eyJpdiI6IjJLaGg5U3BodFcxeklvekdmMnNhWnc9PSIsInZhbHVlIjoialo3aXY1ZHBqWUpLUWd0U3k0cGg

Anant

(2015). India in Global Governance: Engaging the counter-terrorism regime. Presentation made in Fellow’s Seminar, New Delhi: IDSA. Retrieved from https://idsa.in/event/IndiainGlobalGovernance_aanant

10.

Association of South East Asian Nations (2012). Joint Declaration for Cooperation to Combat International Terrorism. Retrieved from https://asean.org/?static_post=asean-india-joint-declaration-for-cooperation-to-combat-international-terrorism

11.

Bar-Tal

(1989). Delegitimization: The extreme case of stemtyping and prejudice. In Bar-Tal

, Graumann

, Kruglanski

A. W.

, & Stroebe

(Eds), Stereotyping and prejudice: Changing conceptions (pp. 169–188). New York: Springer.

12.

Basu

, & Mahua

(2019). India gives in to US pressure, fully stops import of Iran oil, The Print. Retrieved from https://theprint.in/economy/india-gives-in-to-us-pressure-fully-stops-import-of-iran-oil/233401/

13.

Díaz-Paniagua

C. F.

(2008). Negotiating terrorism: The negotiation dynamics of four UN counter-terrorism treaties, 1997-2005. (PhD thesis, submitted to the City University of New York).

14.

Embassy of India (2010). India becomes full-fledged member of financial action task force. Washington DC. Retrieved from https://www.indianembassy.org/archives_details.php?nid=1923 (accessed 17 January 2019 ).

15.

Friedrichs

(2008). Fighting terrorism and drugs: Europe and international police cooperation. Oxon: Routledge.

16.

Global Terrorism Index (2018). Global Terrorism Index 2018: Measuring the impact of terrorism. Sydney: Institute for Economics & Peace.

17.

Gorman

R. F.

(2001). Great debates at the United Nations: An encyclopedia of fifty key issues 1945-2000. Westport: Greenwood Press.

18.

Hmoud

(2006). Negotiating the draft comprehensive convention on international terrorism. Journal of International Criminal Justice, 4(5): 1031–1043.

19.

Kalitheerthan

(2017). Agenda item 72: Protection and promotion of human rights. Statement by Member of Parliament at the Third Committee, 72nd session. New York: United Nations General Assembly. Retrieved from https://www.pminewyork.org/statementgeneral?id=eyJpdiI6Im9nelBXWG01a1ZDRGQ1TE9kN0ROVkE9PSIsInZhbHVlIjoibVRLOWJsODNCS2psZjNFejN1

20.

Karnad

(2019). Azhar—high point of Modi’s foreign policy, at what cost? Security Wise. Retrieved from https://bharatkarnad.com/2019/05/03/azhar-high-point-of-modis-foreign-policy-at-what-cost/?fbclid=IwAR15s7PMOzm9yZYAJnXz8rp33RkFliMt6vduRZn4xSz3zJX8fwDQgFkuh8E

21.

Lal

(2017). Statement. By Deputy Permanent Representative at the UN Counter-Terrorism Centre Advisory Board, 14th meeting. Retrieved from https://www.pminewyork.org/statementgeneral?id=eyJpdiI6IlAya25MQXdNaVkzdUY2dzBobVE4S2c9PSIsInZhbHVlIjoiR0dpcUd2bFwvM09iOWozK0RPTW

22.

Livemint (2016). What is the comprehensive convention on international terrorism? Retrieved from https://www.livemint.com/Politics/Ee84kLhbyP5NJ9mFnMzkKO/Will-Sushmas-speech-at-the-UNGA-give-fresh-push-to-antiter.html

23.

Lok Sabha (2018). Unstarred Question no.394: Extradition of criminals. Answered by the Minister of State in the Ministry of External Affairs V. K. SINGH on 12th December.

24.

Ministry of External Affairs (2018a). Countries with which India has extradition treaties/arrangements. Retrieved from https://www.mea.gov.in/leta.htm

25.

Ministry of External Affairs (2018b). Mutual legal assistance requests. Retrieved from https://www.mea.gov.in/mlatcriminal.htm

26.

Ministry of External Affairs (2018c). 11th India-European Union counter terrorism dialogue. Government of India. Press release 14 November. Retrieved from https://www.mea.gov.in/press-releases.htm?dtl/30594/11th+IndiaEuropean+Union+Counter+Terrorism+Dialogue

27.

Murthy

C. S. R.

(2010). Assessing India at the United Nations in the changing context. International Studies, 47(2–4), 205–223.

28.

NDTV (2018). India, ASEAN Agree To Deepen Cooperation In Combating Terrorism. Retrieved from https://www.ndtv.com/india-news/india-asean-agree-to-deepen-cooperation-in-combating-terrorism-1804874

29.

NDTV (2019). US, Britain and France move UNSC to ban Masood Azhar: Over to China. Retrieved from https://www.ndtv.com/world-news/pressure-on-china-as-us-uk-france-move-un-security-council-to-ban-masood-azhar-2000415

30.

Paliwal

(2017). My enemy’s enemy: India in Afghanistan from the Soviet invasion to the US withdrawal. Landon: Hurst & Co.

31.

Rao

(2015, October 14). Agenda item 108: Measures to eliminate international terrorism. Statement by Counsellor [Legal Adviser], Sixth Committee, 70th Session. New York: General Assembly.

32.

Rao

M. K.

(2016, October 4). Agenda item 108: Measures to eliminate international terrorism. Statement by Counsellor and Legal Advisor, Sixth Committee, 71 Session. New York: United Nations General Assembly.

33.

S/23911 (1992). Note verbale dated 13 may 1992 from the permanent mission of India to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General. New York: Security Council.

34.

S/AC.37/2003/(1455)/49 (2003). Letter dates 10 June 2003 from the Permanent Representative of India to the United Nations addressed to the Chairman of the Committee. 1267 Committee of the Security Council. Retrieved from http://www.un.org/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=%09+S%2FAC.37%2F2003%2F%281455%29%2F49&Submit=Search&Lang=E (accessed 21 October 2018 ).

35.

S/AC.44/2004/(02)/62 (2004). India’s national report on the implementation of Security Council resolution 1540 (2004). Note verbale dated 1 November 2004 from the Permanent Mission of India to the United Nations addressed to the Chairman of the Committee established pursuant to resolution 1540. New York: Security Council.

36.

S/AC.44/2017/2 (2017). Implementation of Security Council resolutions 1540 (2004), 1977 (2011) and 2325 (2016). Note verbale dated 13 June 2017 from the Permanent Mission of India to the United Nations addressed to the Chair of the Committee, established pursuant to resolution 1540. New York: Security Council.

37.

S/PV.1709 (1973, April 18). Provisional agenda (S/Agenda/1709). Twenty-seventh session, 1709th meeting. New York: Security Council.

38.

S/PV.1942 (1976, July 13). Provisional agenda (S/Agenda/1942). Twenty-seventh session, 1942nd meeting. New York: Security Council.

39.

S/PV.2675 (1986, April 15). Provisional Verbatim Record of the Two Thousands Six Hundred and Seventy-Fifth Meeting. New York: Security Council.

40.

S/PV.3063 (1992, March 31). Adaptation of the agenda: Letters dated 20 and 23 December 1991 (S/23306, S/23307, S/23308, S/23309, S/23317); Report by the Secretary-General pursuant to paragraph 4 of Security Council Resolution 731 (1992) (S/23574); Further Report by the Secretary-General pursuant to paragraph 4 of Security Council Resolution, 731 (1992) (S/23672). New York: Security Council.

41.

S/PV.3921 (1998, August 28). Agenda: The situation in Afghanistan. Fifty-third session, 3931st meeting. New York: Security Council.

42.

S/PV.4414 (Resumption 1) (2001, November 13). Agenda: The situation in Afghanistan. Fifty-sixth session, 4414th meeting. New York: Security Council.

43.

S/PV.4726 (2003, March 26). Agenda: The situation between Iraq and Kuwait. Fifty-eighth session, 4726th meeting. New York: Security Council.

44.

S/PV.5493 (Resumption 1) (2006, July 21). The situation in the Middle East, including the Palestinian question. Sixty-first session, 5493rd meeting. New York: Security Council.

45.

S/PV.6557 (2011, June 17). Threats to international peace and security caused by terrorist acts. Sixty-sixth session, 6557th meeting. New York: Security Council.

46.

S/PV.7837 (2016, December 15). Non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. Seventy-first session, 7837th meeting. New York: Security Council.

47.

S/RES/1173 (1998). Resolution 1173. 3891st meeting. New York: Security Council. Retrieved from http://unscr.com/files/1998/01173.pdf

48.

S/RES/1373 (2001, September 28). Resolution 1373. 4385th meeting. New York: Security Council. Retrieved from https://undocs.org/S/RES/1373(2001)

49.

Sasikumar

(2010). State agency in the time of the global war on terror: India and the counter-terrorism regime. Review of International Studies, 36(3), 615–638.

50.

Sen

(2008, September 5). Agenda item 118: The United Nations Global Counter Terrorism Strategy. Statement by India’s permanent representative to the UN, sixty-second session, New York: General Assembly.

51.

Thakker

A. Y.

(2018). India at the United Nations: An analysis of Indian multilateral strategies on international security and development. Occasional Paper 148, New Delhi: Observer Research Foundation.

52.

Umasankar

(2017). Agenda item 109: Measures to eliminate international terrorism. Statement by Legal Advisor/First Secretary of Permanent Mission of India to the UN, Sixth Committee, seventy-second session. New York: General Assembly. Retrieved from https://www.pminewyork.org/statementgeneral?id=eyJpdiI6Im5kZmhYZ1lkY2NmRGJxWjc1b3ZQOEE9PSIsInZhbHVlIjoiaEkzdmNuYkFFbjZyYXJZXC9Be%E2%80%A6

53.

Umasankar

(2018, October 3) Agenda item 111: Measures to eliminate international terrorism. Statement by First Secretary/Legal Adviser, Sixth Committee, 73rd session. New York: General Assembly.