Abstract
The main question of the present study is: How is it that despite the West’s insistence on negotiation on Tehran’s missile programme and the possibility of sanctions being intensified in the event of Iran’s refusal, the Tehran authorities reject any negotiations in this regard? The findings of the present study indicate that Iranian political authorities, and in particular, the Iranian Leader, have a realistic view towards the country’s defence issue and continue to lay emphasis on such measures as increasing military capability, establishing a balance of power and self-sufficiency in arms manufacturing. Iran’s fears of replication of Iraq’s and Libya’s disarmament and the subsequent overthrow of the political systems of these governments, distrust in the West in the negotiations and the related consequences, lack of a strategic partner, the bitter experience of war with Iraq, and the continuous threats made by the USA and Israel have caused Iran to reject any request for negotiations about its missile programme.
Introduction
One of the serious US concerns since the 1990s has been Iran’s military and nuclear programmes. To be specific, these concerns date back to the time when Iran began developing relations with such countries as Russia, China and North Korea, and later missile tests and completion of the construction of Bushehr Nuclear Power Plant (Freedman, 2006, pp. 3–4). American intelligence and military officials continuously reported Iran’s ambitious efforts to acquire nuclear weapons and long-range missiles and pressured Russian and Chines companies to stop these actions (Hunter, 2010, p. 125). The plan for discussing Iran’s nuclear programme at the International Atomic Energy Agency in Vienna (IAEA) followed by the European Troika talks (France, Germany, and Britain) with Iran in 2003 were in the same vein. Although for 2 years, for the sake of confidence-building in the West, Iran suspended its nuclear programmes, nonetheless, unfulfillment of the pledges made in the package proposed to Iran by the West led to the opposition to the nuclear deal in Iran so much so that those opposed to the deal in Iran called Seyed Mohammad Khatami’s administration as compromising and idealistic and branded the nuclear deal ‘black mark’. By taking power in the administration of Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, they resumed nuclear programmes. They even considered the slowdown of the construction of the Shahab mid-range missile and the lack of adequate funding for military units as further evidence of his betrayals of the country. During the presidency of Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, Iran was able to achieve significant success in the nuclear and military programmes. In the nuclear sector, the number of Iran’s nuclear centrifuges increased to 20,000 and uranium enrichment increased to 20 per cent. In addition to Bushehr Nuclear Power Plant, which was the legacy of the former regime, Iran constructed Fordow Nuclear Complex and the Nuclear Facilities of Arak and Natanz (Dagres, 2013, pp. 191–192). In the military dimension, in addition to the range of Iran’s missiles reaching 2,000 km from 1,000 km, missile fuels changed from liquid to solid and they were equipped with precision-guided technology. These advances and the government’s lack of resolve to hold serious nuclear talks with the West resulted in Iran’s nuclear case to be sent to the United Nations Security Council and a new round of international sanctions were imposed against Iran. Economic sanctions were nothing new for Iran, and since 1979, following the occupation of the US embassy, Iran had experienced a variety of US sanctions. However, this time, in addition to sanctions becoming international, they targeted the main financial and economic sectors of the government so much so that in a short span of time, the inflation rate in Iran increased up to 31 per cent, and a lot of pressure was exerted on the Iranian people and government. These pressures caused the Iranian people to elect Hassan Rouhani in the presidential election in 2013, who promised to end the nuclear sanctions. He called the international sanctions against Iran ‘cruel’ and attributed these sanctions to the ‘mismanagement’ of Iran’s then authorities (Iran Review, 2013). The nuclear deal in 2015, with 5 + 1, was the result of the promises made by the Iranian government to its supporters. The nuclear deal between Iran and the West reduced the number of Iran’s centrifuges to 5,670 and lowered uranium enrichment to 3.67 per cent. Iran even accepted the Additional Protocol, which many governments, including the USA itself, had not signed, and was put under the most intense IAEA regulatory regime (Davenport, 2018). However, these actions and the submission of 16 reports by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA Board Reports, 2019) were not adequate for Donald Trump, who considered the nuclear deal with Iran to be a ‘bad deal’. According to Donald Trump, although the agreement delayed Iran’s access to a nuclear bomb by over 1 year and provided the West with the opportunity to confront Iran, nonetheless, it did not eliminate Iran’s nuclear threat.
Therefore, the USA feels that two important steps must be taken: one is to renegotiate the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, known commonly as the Iran nuclear deal or Iran deal and another is to bring Iran back to the negotiating table for its military and missile programme (Holland, 2018). However, the important point is that Iranian officials, and, at their highest level, the Iran’s Supreme Leader, Seyed Ali Khamenei, have banned any negotiations on military and missile programmes. The continuation of this situation can once again revive the crisis in the relations between Iran and the West. The main question is, while the continuation of the current situation can catapult Iran back to the conditions of the past and to the international sanctions, why are Iranian officials not willing to negotiate on their missile programmes? Military decisions made by the Iranian authorities depend on which strategic logic? To address the questions raised above, first, the Iranian military doctrine and the status of the missile programme in this doctrine will be outlined, then, the reasons why the Iranian authorities do not want to negotiate on its missile programme are given. Consistent with James Rosenau’s Decision-making Theory, which emphasises that in political decision-making in developing countries, the variable of ‘individual’ is more influential than the variables of the international system, role, society and bureaucratic system (Rosenau, 1971, pp. 108–109), and given the structure of the Constitution in Iran (Principle 110), which places the leader above the three legislative, executive and judiciary systems, and commander-in-chief of the armed forces, the main arguments of the present study are based on the speeches made by the Iranian Supreme Leader, Seyed Ali Khamenei. In this article, the assumption is that, as experienced in the case of the nuclear talks with the West, as long as the Iranian Leader does not give the green light in talks over Iran’s missile programme, none of the Iranian political and military officials will be engaged in these talks.
Iran’s Military Doctrine and the Position of Missile Programme in It
The term ‘doctrine’ lacks a universally agreed-upon definition. This article uses the definition provided by Fritz Ermarth. According to him, doctrine refers to ‘a set of operative beliefs, values and assertions that in a significant way guide official behavior with respect to strategic research and development, weapons choice, forces, operational plans, arms control, etc.’ (Ermarth, 1981, p. 51). A range of factors, such as the international military milieu, the international political milieu, the military doctrines of other countries, the military history, the level of existing technology, the ideology and the internal economic, political and social constraints combine to form the military doctrine of a country (Adelman, 1985).
Although all the above-mentioned factors have somehow been influential in shaping the military doctrine of Iran, nonetheless, the role of the two factors of ideology (Islam) and military history is more pronounced than other factors. The ideology of Islam in Iran has practically permeated all the institutions of the country, ranging from domestic policy to economy and society. More than anything else, this is due to the main component of the formation of the Iranian Islamic Revolution (i.e. religion) and the role of the clergies in the revolution. The effects of Islam in the military sphere, and in particular here, the military doctrine of Iran, can be investigated from a number of perspectives: first, the role of Islam in the choice of deterrence strategy. In verse 60 of the Al-Anfal Sura, in the Qur’an, God says: ‘And prepare against them what force you can and horse tied at the frontier, to frighten thereby the enemy of Allah and your enemy and other besides them, whom you don’t know’ (Holy Quran, 2000, Surah VIII:60).
This verse even appears in the logo of the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps and perhaps, there are very few military sites in Iran where one cannot find this same verse, either on its walls or on its billboards. The reference to this verse and the necessity of military commanders’ paying attention to it are abundantly found in the words of the leaders of Iran. In a speech addressed to the military commanders, referring to this verse, Ayatollah Khomeini, the Founder of the Iranian Islamic Revolution, said, ‘The Islamic Republic of Iran should create such a military force that its mere existence would prevents its enemies from even thinking about the invasion of the land’ (Musavi Khomeini, 1983, p. 189). Ayatollah Khamenei, the current leader of Iran, in addition to emphasising the above verse in his speeches, also refers to verse 110 of Surah Al-Imran, which states: ‘You are the best nation produced [as an example] for mankind. You enjoin what is right and forbid what is wrong and believe in Allah’. In addition, the Iranian Leader states, ‘We will continue our way with strength and power, will build the country, and will increase our economic, military, political and cultural power’. In this statement, not only is there no restriction placed on the military sector, but also there is clear reference to achieving the best possible position (Khamenei, 1989, October 20). Iran’s President, Hassan Rouhani, also believes, ‘We will strengthen our military and defense capabilities as we deem it necessary; we will strengthen not only our missiles, but also our ground, air and sea forces, which are supported by the people of this land. We will not seek anybody’s permission to defend our land’ (Online News, 2017, September 22).
Apart from the Islamic ideology, Iranian military history also had a profound impact on the adoption of a deterrence strategy. In the views of Iranian leaders, what encouraged Saddam Hussein to invade Iran was his perception of a weakened Iran and the loss of its deterrence during and in the aftermath of the revolution and the subsequent events (Hshim, 1994, p. 162). According to them, if Iran had enough missile capability during the imposed war, Saddam would not have dared to attack Tehran and to bombard it with missiles.
At the New Zealand Institute of International Affairs meeting, Mohammad Javad Zarif, Iran’s foreign minister, explains this issue as follows:
You (who raise the issue of the development of nuclear program) were not the target of an 8-year long war, a war in which cities were continuously bombarded and chemical attacks were unabating. You were not in a situation in which you did not have a single missile so that out of fear of that single missile, Saddam Hossein would stop bombarding your cities. We would go from country to country, begging for a deterrent missile. (Pars Today, 2017, February 3)
Therefore, what can be deduced from the discussion so far is that Iran has adopted conventional deterrence as its military doctrine and this deterrence is mainly based on missile capability. Ballistic missiles have three characteristics that make them ideal for conventional deterrence: the ability to penetrate the enemy’s defence network, survival capability before firing and a relatively high range (Carus, 1990, pp. 27–28). Given that the speed of ballistic missiles is several times the speed of sound, these missiles can travel long distances over a short period of time. This, in turn, means that if the country being targeted has a warning system in place, it can become aware of the missile attack shortly before it hits the target. This issue and the high speed of ballistic missiles when hitting targets have made the existing anti-missile defence system ineffective against ballistic missiles. Another feature that increases deterrent capabilities of ballistic missile is their ability to survive in combat situations. This is due to their mobility and lack of need for additional installations. The vehicles carrying ballistic missiles, that are also launchers of the missiles, are on the move and thus it is difficult to destroy them during wartime.
In addition, because ballistic missile systems do not need an air base, a runway and similar facilities for launching, it is easier to hide them, which increases their survival in the war. According to what the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC, is a branch of the Iranian Armed Forces, founded after the Iranian Revolution on 22 April 1979 by order of Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini) has claimed, and the footages broadcast on Iran’s state television, Iran has several hidden underground bunkers (Reuters News Agency, 2017, May 25). In fact, the Islamic Revolution Guards Corps has now prepared itself to use these secret bases to retaliate if its military and nuclear centres are targeted in missile or aerial bombardment. Still another characteristic of ballistic missiles which promotes their deterrent capability is their relatively long range. One of the factors contributing to deterrence is the possession of weapons that have enough range to reach enemy forces or enemy soil. In other words, ballistic missiles have made it possible for countries with average power to push the battlefield to their enemy’s territory.
Reasons for Iran’s not Abandoning its Missile Programme
The High-level Political and Military Documents of the Country
In all the strategic documents and general policies of the Islamic Republic of Iran, the necessity of deterrence has been taken into consideration in numerous cases. Among these documents, there is a 20-Year Strategic Outlook that outlines the horizons facing Iran until 2020. The defence section of this document, in its third paragraph, focuses on the concept of deterrence and defines the creation of a defence system based on all-out deterrence, as a strategic objective in defence. The document states that Iran 2025 is a ‘secure, independent, and powerful country, based on all-out deterrence’ (The 20-Year National Vison, 2003). Apart from this document, the deterrence issue has been clearly referred to in Paragraph 32 of the General Policies of the Third Plan, Paragraph 24 of the General Policies of the Fourth Plan, Paragraph 45 of the General Programs of the Fifth Program, and Paragraph 52 of the General Policies of the Sixth Development Plan of Iran. This document, prepared by the presidents and endorsed by the Islamic Consultative Assembly, is as important as the US National Security Strategy.
In the body of the General Policies of the Sixth Development Plan, which is the latest document on this issue, in Paragraph 52, the promotion of the country’s deterrent capacity in three ways has been referred to, the first of which is ‘Development of missile capability and technologies, and the capacity to manufacture major defense weapons and equipment, which could give the country the upper hand, with deterrent power and commensurate with various threats’ (Rouhani, 2017, p.101). Explicit reference of this clause to the development of a missile programme virtually impedes any negotiation and bargaining with other states.
Hobbes’ Perspective of the World
Alexander Wendt talks about the existence of the three Hobbesian, Lucky, and Kantian cultures in understanding the outside world (Wendt, 1999, pp. 246–312). If we want to define the Iranians’ perception of the outside world within the framework of one of these three cultures, undoubtedly, the Hobbesian culture will be the relevant framework. This can be clearly understood from the words of the Supreme Leader of the Islamic Republic of Iran, Seyed Ali Khamenei, who directly controls all military forces. He explicitly states, ‘In a situation where the bullying powers of the world have expanded their power and there is no mercy in them, we must increase our defensive strength and power so that the bullying powers will feel threatened’ (Khamenei, 2016, August 31). He believes
In the current system of international affairs with its law of the jungle, if the Islamic Republic merely seeks negotiations and economic exchanges, and even science and technology, but has no defensive power, won’t it be the case that even small states will dare to threaten the Iranian nation? In today’s and tomorrow’s complicated situation, we must use all political, economic, social and defense tools to promote Iran’s position. (Khamenei, 2016, March 30)
These statements and positions clearly indicate that in the field of national security, the Iranian Leader has a realistic view. However, this view is not ‘aggressive realism’ in nature, which interprets international politics in terms of attempts to increase relative power and to reach the stage of hegemony (Mearsheimer, 2010, pp. 30–31).
In this approach, acquisition of missiles has just a defensive and deterrent purpose and military and defensive power of Iran should develop to such an extent that would make the enemy fearful of carrying out any attack or doing any harm. Therefore, Ayatollah Khamenei considers the maintenance of balance of power necessary and has numerously emphasised its persistence or continuation. ‘If the country does not have the necessary defense capability, enemies will have more opportunity to harm the nation’ (Khamenei, 2016, September 25). Given these statements, Ayatollah Khamenei’s decisions in military issues depend on the strategic environment surrounding Iran and are based on realistic principles and assumptions. Thus, it seems unlikely that he will agree with any negotiation on Iran’s missile programme.
Historical Memory of Iranians
Iran has experienced 8 years of war with Iraq. The war that broke out in February 1988 resulted in the urban warfare and bombardment of cities. At this stage of the war, Iraqis launched a total of 189 missiles during nearly 50 days. Most of the Iraqi missiles were Al-Hussein ones, which were Scud-B Missiles, modified and manufactured in Iraq. Of these, 135 were launched in Tehran, 23 in Qom, 22 in Isfahan and some in Tabriz, Shiraz and Karaj. These attacks killed more than 2,000 Iranians and forced about a quarter of Iran’s capital, Tehran, to leave the city. (Perrimond, 2002, p. 6). Although Iranians responded by firing 75 to 77 Howasong-5 Missiles manufactured by North Korea, they underwent a lot of hardships to acquire these missiles. Mohsen Rafiqdost, the Iranian then Defense Minister, said in his memoirs: ‘The commanders of the war continually asked me to acquire TOW Missiles, but no country gave us any’. Iran had even difficulty acquiring barbed wire, the least valuable tool in a war. ‘We bought three truckloads of barbed wire from the former Yugoslavia, and carried it, passing the border of the former Soviet Union to the border with the Republic of Azerbaijan, but Kremlin ordered a confiscation of the consignment’, said Rafiqdost (Rafighdoost, 2010, October 4). Ali Akbar Velayati, elaborating on the problems that Iran had in acquiring weaponry, states
During the war, the most severe sanctions were imposed against Iran. For example, Iran wanted to buy Toyotas from Japan but the Japanese did not sell these to us because they thought we would use these vans in the war. We purchased barbed wire through intermediaries. However, when the consignment reached the Russian border, they did not let it in. (Velayati, 2012, July 6)
Iran took strategic lessons from these hard days to defend the country against foreign invasion. Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani, a person who spent 8 years in office as the president and 19 years as the Chairman of the Iran’s Expediency Council, says: ‘We learned a lot from this war. We have gained experiences in weaponry. We have learned what weapons are now effective. Missiles are the most important weapons today and we have solved the most important problems facing these missile industry’ (Chubin, 1994, pp. 22–23). Given that the bulk of research, development, construction and testing of missiles in Iran is conducted by the Revolutionary Guard Corps and on 26 July 2017, the US House of Representatives imposed sanctions on IRGC by passing the Counter-Americans Adversaries through Sanctions Act, it is highly unlikely that Iran will repeat a bitter experience twice. In the views of Iranian authorities, engagement in negotiations about the missile programme is tantamount to disarming oneself. They are well aware of the fact that even if they negotiate on what Trump calls ‘Iran’s destructive actions in the Middle East’ and ‘concerns about Tehran’s missile programs’, the USA will continue to pressure them.
On 9 April 2014 Iran’s supreme leader on the US excuses for imposing sanctions on Iran said:
The [US] sanctions and pressure are not due to the nuclear issue, rather they are due to the independent identity of Iran and the Islamic Republic, which is rooted in Islamic faith and belief. They are also opposed to the future horizons awaiting this nation and system and also opposed to Iranians’ not giving in to US bullying. Therefore, the only option is to continue our path of success with strength and not to yield to bullying.
The Iranian leader takes as evidence the nuclear talks and the USA breaking its promises, suggesting that you cannot enter into negotiations with them on any issue and be optimistic about the future. Seyed Ali Khamenei, addressing Iranian authorities said
We experienced something in the nuclear talks; we should not forget this experience. The experience is that, if we make compromises, the USA will not stop its devastating function…. The Islamic Republic has fulfilled its obligations. However, the other party which breaks its promises, cannot be trusted and cannot be counted on, is finding faults. (Khamenei, 2016, May 23)
In other words, it is possible to find both the pessimism underlined by theoreticians of Realism and the necessity to take lessons from history (Molloy, 2006, p. 82).
Maintaining the Balance of Military Power
Realists believe that states try to strike a balance in order to increase their chances of survival against a centralised power. In addition, the threat to their survival is eased only through the acquisition of a degree of military power over other states or a coalition with them (Waltz, 1979, p. 73); that is, countries attach great significance to their position in the balance of power. They struggle to be more powerful than their potential rivals, because this superiority promotes their security. Ayatollah Khamenei considers the security achieved through war and invasion neither wise nor smart. In his view, the only way to security is striking a balance of power and preparation to confront any offensive. Unlike its Arab neighbours, Iran has been subjected to Western arms embargoes and has had no reliable partner in the world. Moreover, its defence budget is not comparable to that of such countries as Israel and Saudi Arabia. Nor does it have access to advanced military technology. This is in spite of the fact that, compared with regional countries, there are more threats against the Iranian regime. In other words, Iran sees itself enclosed in an anarchic environment. In such a situation, a realistic view necessitates that Iran preserve the balance of power in the Middle East and prepare itself for any threat. A look at the report on the transfer of arms by the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute on 20 February 2017 suggests that out of 10 of the world’s largest arms importers in the world during the years 2012–2016, 5 countries are located in the Middle East and in the Iranian neighbourhood (Figure 1; SIPRI, 2017).
The report by this institute also is indicative of the fact that Saudi Arabia’s military budget is US$87 billion and is ranked the third after the USA and China. This is five times the military budget of Iran (i.e., US$12.6 billion). Iran’s military budget is even less than that of the United Arab Emirates (22.8) and Israel (16.1), whose geographical extent and population are less than the capital of Iran. According to the same report, while Saudi Arabia’s military budget increased by 97 per cent from 2006 to 2015, Iran’s defence budget has fallen by 30 per cent in this same period (Freeman et al., 2016). In such circumstances, the Iranian Leader insists, ‘Through accelerating advances and promoting defense preparation, armed forces should bring about such an authority that the enemies won’t even dare to think of invading the country’ (Khamenei, 2015, October 1). This emphasis is nothing new. A review of his speeches during the last three decades, in which he has been leading the country, clearly indicates that he has always attached significance to Iran’s military power and capability and the conditions of balance of power. As for the balance of power, Ayatollah Khamenei states ‘The balance of power in the world is not all about the outward appearance and the image of a superpower, it also requires resistance. Our people resisted and won—in the Revolution, in war, during the post-war period—it is resisting today and will win’ (25 July 2001). The Iranian Leader is optimistic that one day the balance of power in the world will change in favour of Muslims. In elaborating on this optimism, Ayatollah Khamenei says, ‘There are many indications at hand, clearly suggesting the direction of movement of world events, and undoubtedly the balance will change in favor of Islam and the Islamic Republic of Iran’ (Khamenei, 2016, March 11). Given the aforementioned issues about threats against Iran and the Iranian leader’s hoping for a change in the balance of power in favour of Iran and the Islamic world, Iran cannot be expected to accept any restrictions on its military and missile programmes. Defence experts’ analyses also suggest that in the absence of adequate defence capabilities, Iran’s behaviour in tracking and upgrading its indigenous missile programme and its quest for seeking qualitative and quantitative superiority in this area, in line with striking a balance with defence budget of the Persian Gulf states and Israel can be understood in this context (Rezaei, 2015, p. 1). In order to camouflage its military weakness in the issue of purchasing modern equipment, Iran has even been engaged in striking a political balance with its regional rivals. Iran stood beside Bashar al-Assad to prevent the Syrian regime from falling, and subsequently Lebanon’s Hezbollah and the Islamic Jihad in Palestine being weakened. It supported the Yemeni Ansar-Allah Group to prevent the turning of power in favour of Saudi Arabia. It helped the Iraqi government to force ISIS out of the country and prevented the formation of a Kurdish state in the north. When the relations between Qatar and Saudi Arabia began to deteriorated, it opened its doors to the Qatari government and prevented the sanctions imposed by Saudi Arabia and other Arab states from pressuring it too much. Iran has even succeeded in attracting Turkey, which was sympathetic to Saudi Arabia in the Syrian issue and managed to sit Turkey at peace talks on the future of Syria in Kazakhstan.
Lessons Taken from Iraq and Libya
To Iranian authorities, US demands for Iran’s restricting its missile programmes and providing access to its military bases for inspection by IAEA are more than anything else reminiscent of the fate of the Iraqi government and Saddam Hussein. Although, unlike Saddam Hussein, the Iranian government has never used chemical weapons against his own people and others and has not invaded any country over the past 300 years, nevertheless, it considers the USA as hostile to Iran as it was to Baghdad. In the eyes of the Iranian authorities, when Saddam was no longer effective for the West, all the dangerous tools should have been taken out of his reach. Therefore, after Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait, the USA and his Western allies had the pretext for intervening in Iraq and passed Resolution 687 in the Security Council against Iraq. UN Resolution 687 provided for a ceasefire and elimination of weapons of mass destruction and long-range missiles in Iraq after the Second Persian Gulf War. To implement the disarmament programme, the Security Council established the UN Special Committee (UNSCAM). In 1996 the UN Security Council established the Iraq Oil-for-Food Program (OFP). Under strict U.N. control, Iraq would be allowed to export oil and import food and humanitarian supplies. UNSCAM is the name given to the scandal surrounding the United Nations Oil-for-Food Program, consisting of military personnel, scientists and technical experts. The task of the committee was to detect and dispose of Iraq’s chemical, biological and long-range missiles or their handover. UNSCOM and the IAEA sent over 250 inspection teams to Iraq over a period of 7 years (Black, 1999, pp. 62–69). In 1998, Iraq cut off its cooperation with the United Nations. However, this was inconclusive for Iraq. This was because all Iraq’s important military and strategic information was disclosed to Western intelligence services and the Iraqi army’s weaponry (e.g., Al-Hussein, Al-Thomud, and Ababeel missiles, missile launch pads) was destroyed. These made Iraq an easy target for the US invasion and in 3 weeks, Baghdad collapsed as the result of the Western military coalition in 2003 (Tasnim News Agency, 2015, May 31). Iranian authorities are also mindful of Libyan experience of Gaddafi’s time. Libya stopped all its nuclear programmes in 2003 and abandoned its regional ambitions. However, 9 years later, US-led NATO military strike caused it to collapse. Mohamed Elbaradei, the former director of IAEA, in his memoirs, called The Age of Deception, recounts his experiences with officials of different countries, especially Libya. Elbaradei talks about Libya’s decision to cooperate with the IAEA and the West, especially with the USA (Elbaradei, 2014, p. 176).
Since the beginning of Iran’s nuclear talks with 5+1, Libya’s and Iraq’s experiences have been extensively covered in the conservative media, which are close to the Iranian Leader. Those who are nicknamed as the hopeless inside Iran are constantly criticising JCPOA and contend that it has not had any tangible outcome. With the increased pressure on Iran to review JCPOA and to strike a new deal, there has been mounting pressure on the Rouhani administration. They are also opposed to the administration’s talk about its missile programme in its meetings with the officials of different countries. In such a situation, negotiations about Iran’s missile programme are far-fetched.
Iran’s Hostile Relations with the USA
Since the occupation of the US embassy in Tehran, relations between the two countries have been tense and hostile. In all the anti-Iranian activities in the world and even inside Iran, Iran has blamed the USA. Even street protests of November 2017, which according to many domestic analysts, are rooted in economic issues and the so-called inefficiency of the administration, were blamed on the USA, Israel and Saudi Arabia by some of the country’s political officials, including the Secretary of the Supreme National Security Council, Ali Shamkhani, Secretary of the Expediency Council, Mohsen Rezaei, and were considered as their attempts to overthrow the Iranian government (Entekhab News Agency, 2018, January 2). Iran’s Supreme Leader, Seyed Ali Khamenei, while acknowledging the economic problems of the country, blamed the USA and Israel as the cause of these incidents. Ayatollah Khamenei said, ‘The plot was the Americans’ and the Zionists’; they plotted. They have been plotting for months. They have spent billions of dollars. For years, they have created networks; they have trained mercenaries to create problems within the country’ (Khamenei, 2017, December 30). During 40 years after the victory of the Islamic Revolution, American hostility towards Iran has not ended, nor has Iran ended the slogan of ‘Down with USA’ and burning its flag. The Iranian people repeat the slogan ‘Death to America and Israel’ every week in nationwide Friday prayers. Analysts within the country always ascribe part of the problems in the country to US pressures and its hindrances. According to Iranians, in such an atmosphere of hostility that has even intensified with the assassination of Qasem Soleimani, the head of the elite Quds Force, by US Drone Strike on 3 January 2020, discussing the issue of missile programme is a kind of suicide and disarmament against the enemy, and this is not something that the Iranian leader would allow.
Mistrust of the West and the US Blackmailing
When nuclear talks were underway, in his speeches, the Iranian Leader repeatedly talked about ‘distrust’ in America and Washington’s being ‘deceptive’. On 3 November 2013, when the nuclear talks began in the administration of Hassan Rouhani, he said, ‘At the beginning of this year in the City of Mashhad’, I said that negotiations on certain issues are OK. However, I do not trust them. I am not optimistic. However, if they want to negotiate, it is OK’ (Khamenei, 2013, November 3). A point of great interest in this speech was his reference to the talks in 2003 and the 2-year suspension of enrichment in negotiations with the three European countries, what is currently being repeated with the US withdrawal from JCPOA and Europeans’ accompanying it. The Iranian leader said in this same speech:
Like the experience of suspending enrichment in the years 2003 and 2004, our progress was delayed for two years. However, it was in our interests. Why? This was because we learned that with the suspension of enrichment, there was absolutely no hope for cooperation from western partners. (Khamenei, 2013, November 3)
Even in his speeches, Seyed Ali Khamenei said negotiating with the USA has some disadvantages such as ‘high expectations’ (Khamenei, 2014, August 13). Also, on 14 June 2016, the Leader of Iran reiterated the remarks he had made a few years ago about the consequences of retreating in confrontation with the USA.
I said that the Americans should tell us right now how much retreat on the part of Iran would make them stop their enmity to Iran? If the nuclear issue is solved, is that all? So now the nuclear issue has been solved, isn’t there any other problem? They have raised the issue of missile program. If the missile program is solved, they will raise the issue of human rights; then the issue of the Constitution and Islamic Law will be raised. These are the issues which they will raise. The disputes are not over trivial things. Therefore, this is a wrong conception. (Khamenei, 2016, June 14)
After reaching a nuclear deal, the Iranian Leader repeatedly commented on the US breaking its promises and distrust in the USA. He said this is why the negotiations will be inconclusive. In a meeting with people from various walks of society on 1 August 2016, he clarified the issue:
When it was proven that the enemy is an evil one; it is an enemy that in practice does not care about breaking its promises, one should not engage in negotiations with this country. That is why for years I have said that we cannot engage in negotiations with the US. The experience has taught us that on no issue can we trust the US as a partner. (Khamenei, 2016, August 1)
The review of the speeches above is above all reminiscent of distrust in the US and fear of the rival’s deception. The same thing has been emphasised by Realists in Rousseau’s Stag Hunt (Lieshout, 1995, p. 81).
Having No Strategic Ally in the World
Iran experienced 8 years of war with Iraq, a war that, according to Ayatollah Khomeini, was a war ‘with the East and the West’ (Khomeini, 1992, p. 69). After that, even though relations with Russia improved, nevertheless, this did not prevent Russia from vetoing the UN sanctions resolutions against Iran (Basit, 2007, p. 2). However, Russia vetoed 12 resolutions against Syria. Before the Islamic Revolution, Iran was a US ally and part of Nixon’s Twin-Pillar Policy, but the outbreak of the revolution and the pursuit of the policy of neither East nor West effectively excluded the support provided for Iran by both superpowers. The Iranian authorities have taken a lesson from the events after the Iranian Revolution (ranging from war to coup and attempts to overthrow the Iranian government): In the world of anarchy, only self-help can be a way of survival and maintenance of a political system, and in order to accomplish this, there is no other way, but increasing the military capability (Booth, 2011, p. 9).
Concluding Remarks: What Shall We Do?
In an 11-page summary of the US National Defense Strategy document, six times mention is made of Iran, and North Korea as ‘rogue states’. In particular, this document has endeavoured to focus on North Korea and Iran’s nuclear and missile capabilities (United States Department of Defense, 2018, p. 2). This term has been used in the same way in the US Nuclear Security Strategy and mention is made of Iran and North Korea as ‘rogue states’ 17 times. This shows the White House’s resolve in confronting Iran. In particular, in this document, Iran has been mentioned as the largest country sponsoring terrorism (The White House, 2017, p. 26). Trump has shown that he has been consistent in expressing hostility towards Iran over the past 3 years. However, as for North Korea, this has not been the case, and Trump has talked about ‘Fury and War’ and has also invited the North Korean Leader to ‘Negotiations and Agreement’ in early November 2017. The American interpretation is that the ultimate goal of Pyongyang is survival of its regime through nuclear power. However, Iran is a different story. Iran is located in the Middle East where the most important US allies (i.e., Arabs and Israel) and rich resources of oil are located. Trump’s supporters in the USA are also very critical of Iran, which is due to the Israeli issue and religious factors. However, they are not critical of North Korea. In addition, a military conflict on the Korean Peninsula could have more than a million fatalities. However, this is not true of the Middle East. Therefore, it can be said that if Trump has a strategy in the Middle East, opposition to Iran and its containment are the main and central line. This line was revealed by Trump on 20 May 2017, during his trip to Saudi Arabia, which was his first foreign trip. Similarly, Tillerson announced this in an important speech at Stanford University on 17 January 2017, announcing that US forces would continue their presence to support Syrian Kurds, claiming that their goal was to fight Iran’s influence in Syria and to resolve the political crisis in Syria through elections to replace Bashar al-Assad, and also to prevent the return of ISIS and the al-Qaeda. The US state did not even hesitate to express explicit support for Iran’s street protesters in November 2017 and tried to take Iran’s internal unrest to the UN Security Council. The important thing is that although these measures would apply more pressure on Iran, nevertheless, they do not necessarily bring about the Trump’s intended results, which are reviewing the nuclear deal with Iran, restricting Tehran’s missile programme and putting an end to Iran’s ‘destructive actions’, as Trump puts it, in the Middle East. None of these measures would ease Iran’s concerns. They would even augment the situation. At best, these actions could once again expose Iran to the risk of political isolation and severe economic sanctions. These sanctions will not be effective even when it comes to Iran’s missile programmes and military institutions. Since January 2018, the Supreme Leader has ordered the suspension of all economic activities of military institutions in Iran in order to prevent any possible pressure on the military and financial sectors of the country in the future and this same situation will continue (ISNA News Agency, 2018, January 23). The solution to the problem of Iran’s missile programme is to reduce Iranophobia, to build confidence, to end the use of the threatening language, to speak with the language of reverence and to pave the way for Iran’s return to the regional security system. Given the bitter experiences of the past, and what has been quoted from the Iranian Leader, Iran will not enter into negotiations until it feels that its political system is in not in danger. This is a view shared by the two political factions in Iran. As Richard Nephew (2017) rightly pointed out in his article, the solution to negotiation with Iran is not threatening it or cancellation of the JCPOA. Rather, ‘the Trump administration’s more aggressive posture towards Tehran is likely to reinforce Iranian leaders’ sense that the USA is an unreliable negotiating counterpart and that ballistic missiles are necessary for their country’s self-defence. Instead of confronting Iran directly, the USA should pursue a different strategy-one predicated on sticking to the JCPOA and engaging with Iran and other regional players on the broader set of security challenges in the Middle East. Only when Tehran is convinced that its security could be guaranteed regardless of its ballistic missiles will it consider fundamental changes to its missile programme.
Footnotes
Declaration of Conflicting Interests
The author declared no potential conflicts of interest with respect to the research, authorship and/or publication of this article.
Funding
The author received no financial support for the research, authorship and/or publication of this article.