The Rise of Iran as a Regional Power

Introduction

The twenty-first century has witnessed the rise of a multi-polar world in which the United States of America’s (USA’s) hegemonic role has begun to slowly wane. In this era, the emerging power(s), such as China, India, Brazil, etc., around the globe seek to carve out their respective areas of influence, and Iran is no exception to that rule. To put it simply, ‘An emerging power is a country whose conquest of space in the international arena occurs gradually, through economic and political means’ (Derolle, 2015). ¹

The region of West Asia/Middle East has borne witness to the emerging power of Iran, which has, in certain cases through the exploitation of the tumult of the Arab Spring, spread its far-reaching tentacles to Syria and Yemen. In the case of Yemen, before the chaos of the Arab Spring had completely engulfed it, the Islamic Republic of Iran only had a minor support base within it, among the Houthis. As a result of the persistent Saudi-led bombing, the Yemenis found themselves alienated from the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. The devastating bombing campaign has reinforced the Iran-Houthi strategic alliance and made it even stronger.

Today, the situation is such that the Iranian-backed proxy groups have made penetrations deep into the heart of the country, consolidating Iran’s hold over the power centres. As far as Syria is concerned, the insurgency backed by all the gulf powers and Turkey, who want to ensure that President Assad’s downfall will also dismantle Iran’s hegemonic designs, has only provided Iran with an opportunity to play an even more aggressive, commanding, as well as a dominating role in its affairs. The Arab Spring has provided Iran with a good opportunity to emerge as one of the most important power brokers in the region and in the country itself.

In other cases, its influence is also very much visible in Iraq, Lebanon and Palestine. If we seek to contextualise the rise of Iranian influence in the above-mentioned countries, we must make note of the unsalvageable incursions by the USA, Israel and Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) member states headed by Saudi Arabia, either directly or indirectly. These incursions include the strategic and political debacles which allowed Iran to establish its footprint in a region, especially after 2011, where it could previously hardly make any headway with its expansionist policies.

Iran realised as its fatalities mounted during the Iran–Iraq war (1980–1988) that it would never be able to establish itself as a dominant power in the region without loyal allies and proxy control over important territories in the Middle East. Therefore, its axis of resistance with Syria, Hamas and Lebanese Hezbollah came into being. As discussed later on in the paper, these two entities would be nurtured in a manner that they would go on to become its staunchest supporters against the most devastating blows aimed at it.

After the removal of Saddam, Iran increased its influence in Iraq because of the following reasons:

For the first time after the Iranian revolution, a Shi’a government formed in Iraq, Al Maliki became the prime minister of the country and high-level visits from both sides took place.

Due to failed intervention by the GCC, Western powers and Israel in the region, Iranian influence has increased. The recent example is Saudi and its coalition forces’ invasion in Yemen and their extended support to opposition Millia in Syria. Moreover, Israel’s attempts to engage in the campaign aimed at curtailing the power of Iran-backed militias in the region has rallied them together in their collective fight against the Zionist state. For example, when Israel attacked the city of Aqraba (Syria) in August 2019, it brought together the Hezbollah, Al Fatah and Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine on the same page (Aboudouh, 2019). ² Israeli influence in the region has begun to weaken with the increasing assertiveness of the Russians, especially in the post-2011 era.

The new round of sanctions on the Islamic Republic that have been imposed by the USA, under the Trump administration, and the internal disturbances witnessed because of the protests, in 2018, have certainly shaken the Iranian state, but it is soon to pass a judgement on whether or not it will be able to pull itself through it. The recent sanctions were imposed after the USA declared that it would unilaterally withdraw from the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), which in 2015 set the terms of the nuclear deal between Iran and P5 +1 (USA, France, UK, Russia, China and Germany). It imposed certain restrictions on Iran’s civilian nuclear enrichment programme which would be subject to constant monitoring and verification by the UN’s nuclear watchdog, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). Through 2 years of intense negotiations, Iranian nuclear ambition was largely curbed by the Obama administration, backed by the other stakeholders. In return, P5+1 committed themselves to the withdrawal of the nuclear-related sanctions imposed on Iran (Laub, 2019). ³

In the light of these events, Iranian blamed the European Union (EU) and its partners for failing to fulfil the commitment made in the agreement of JCPOA.

Another reason for the US withdrawal from JCPOA is the fear within the American administration that once Iran regains its lost economic potential (reference being made to the economic growth under the rule of the Pahlavi dynasty), it would ultimately lead to the demise of the influence of its Arab allies, primarily that of Saudi Arabia. This highlights the paranoia embedded deep within the psyche of the anti-Iran establishment which solely seeks to reverse Iran’s regional penetration.

The consequences of its collapsing economy have been visible in the escalating protests and unrest across the country. The Iranian Rial (2018) has lost more than 70 per cent of its value against the US dollar since the beginning of the year (Nasseri, Motevalli, & Shahla, 2018). ⁴ In November 2018, the US dollar was being offered at 119,000 Iranian Rial on the unofficial market in Tehran (Financial Tribune, 2018). ⁵ Moreover, the inflation rate in Iran has risen to over 39 per cent.

Anti-government rhetoric was explicitly visible in the slogans raised by the protestors, such as ‘Mullahs, get lost’, ‘Death to dictator’, ‘Death to Khamenei’, ‘Let go of Syria and think about us’, etc. (Weinthal, 2018). ⁶ The Iranians seem to have become more brazen in challenging the regime. President Rouhani has responded to the widespread protests in a much more conciliatory manner than the hardliners in the country.

Iran: A Rising Regional Power

Late Supreme Leader of Iran Ayatollah Khomeini, as part of his foreign policy objectives, had sought to export the Islamic Revolution beyond Iran, but that vision had hardly met with any initiative from the rest of the leaders spread across the region. Today, however, the drastic shift in the power dynamic in the region has resulted in Iran emerging as a leading influential player to occupy the dominant seat in deciding how the regional affairs are being shaped.

A shift had begun to be observed in the Iranian foreign policy from the time the Rafsanjani government was ushered into power. The policies adopted denoted a shift from idealism to pragmatism. The Khatami presidency saw an unprecedented engagement with the European countries and a remarkable improvement in Iran–Gulf relations. President Khatami was perceived to be a hope, a torchbearer, if I may say so, for the liberal ideals of Europe. Steps were taken for more constructive engagement with the outside world, although it was placed on the backburner under the Mahmoud Ahmadinejad presidency. It saw a resumption as President Rouhani was elected in August 2013. Despite the paradigm shift, one major aspect which seems to have remained static in its policy is that Iran’s designs to emerge as the dominant power in the region have not changed. The different facets that I have put forth in the examples below will seek to highlight that.

Iran’s Influence in Iraq

From 1980–1988, Iraq and Iran were at war with each other. Their regional rivalry since then had continued to destabilise the region, and the resources of both the countries had suffered a massive hit as a result of the consequences of the war. However, with the USA toppling the Saddam Hussein regime in Baghdad, Iran began to make multifaceted opportunistic moves across the chequerboard to make inroads into the territory of a former rival power. It, for example, began to ‘lightly’ nudge its allies and proxy groups into the political arena to consolidate its hold over the key state structures and the political system of the country. It has, over the years, also extended its support to various armed and non-armed groups or actors, to solidify a loyal support base there. The predominantly Shi’a cities such as Basra have evolved into theatres for the Iranian allies to proudly display their rising economic influence.

The ideological perspective and the principles on which the Islamic Republic of Iran was founded on are deeply revered by Iraq’s Shi’a population. It is not simply because of their affiliation and kinship with the Iranians. It also has to do with late Ayatollah Khomeini’s stay in the holy city of Najaf for over a decade as he established contacts with his students and Islamic scholars in Iraq, particularly in Najaf and Karbala and beyond. His extended exile in Iraq thus sowed the seeds for the existing Iran–Iraq relations. Over the course of time, he had devised the existing structure of the Islamic Republic (Alaaldin, 2019). ⁷

Beside wanting to spread its influence across Iraq, Iran also wants to ensure that the Iraqi state never threatens its interests again, as it did during the course of the Iran–Iraq war. The 2010 general elections in Iraq saw the Islamic Republic-backed candidate, Nouri al-Maliki, emerging as the prime minister despite having fewer seats than his primary opposition, Ayad Allawi, who is one of the Islamist republic’s fiercest critics. This was made possible by Iran persuading its allies to back al-Maliki. Iran, because of its decades-old linkages with the important Kurdish groups in the country, ensured that the 2012 no-confidence motion proposed against the former prime minister suffered an eventual defeat (Abouaoun et Hamasaeed). ⁸

Harakat Hezbollah al-Nujaba has struck a rhythmic chord with the Islamic Republic of Iran. In al- Nujaba’s opulent office in Baghdad, a massive portrait of the current supreme leader of Iran—Ayatollah Ali Khamenei—hangs in a large room, symbolising one of the 44 out of 66 militias fighting in Iraq who are in favour of the Islamic Republic. It has its satellite TV station (Peterson, 2017). ⁹

A universally accepted article of faith in the capital city is that the defeat of Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS)/Daesh in June 2014 was largely a result of the swift intervention of the Shi’a republic. Hashim al-Moussawi (spokesman for the militia) explains the reason for the growing support for their neighbouring country. According to him, in the fight against Daesh, no other country except Iran supported the Iraqis with the necessary arms and advisors. Iran is known to have poured billions of dollars’ worth of aid into the country in its quest to defeat ISIS and further its influence. Iran was the first country to come to Iraq’s aid, in June 2014. However, in the following months, coalitions led by the USA, France and Russia and intervention by Turkey provided further momentum to the fight against Daesh.

Also, the controversial militias (on account of them being backed by Iran), branded under the umbrella of the Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF/ Hashd al-sha’abi), were, through a December 2016 legislation, incorporated into the Iraqi security forces. It is an autonomous entity whose rights and privileges would almost rival those of the national army. Asaibh Ahl al-Haq, Kata’ib Hezbollah and the Badr Organization (formerly known as Badr Brigade) are some of the most important Iran-backed militia based in Iraq (Rasheed, 2018). ¹⁰ They are known to play an important role in Western Mosul.

According to the Wilson Center:

The Badr Organization, the most powerful Shitte militia is considered Iran’s oldest proxy in Iraq. Formed in 1982 in Iran to fight Saddam Hussein, it was initially funded, trained, equipped and led by the IGRC. It moved back to Iraq after the U.S. invasion in 2003 and integrated into the new Iraqi government. Its forces became the largest faction within the state security forces, particularly the police. It competed in elections; its leaders joined the new government in cabinet positions. But it maintained its militia. The Badr Organization has Tehran’s ongoing military support; its political wing also has close ties to Iran. (Nada & Rowan, 2018) ¹¹

With the victory of Muqtada al-Sadr’s Sairoon coalition in the general elections in May 2018, analysts were divided on whether or not this particular electoral outcome would have any impact on the growing hegemonic role of Iran in the country’s domestic affairs. After all, al-Sadr is known to be both anti-USA and anti-Iran. According to some on one end of the divide, Iranians were believed to have been rather displeased with the outcome of the results. Al-Sadr’s approach of putting Iraq first is said to have ruffled the feathers of many in Iran.

However, Iranian influence, which had over decades spread its tentacles deep within the Iraqi society, was not going to fade away simply because of whose party secured the majority of the parliamentary seats. It was rightly prophesied by Zaid al-Ali who had aptly summed it up:

But just as the Iranians cannot control who will occupy the prime minister’s position, they are also fully aware that al-Sadr’s options are equally limited. He may be in pole position, but he cannot fully exclude both Fatah and the State of Law coalitions from the next government. That would be interpreted as a deliberate and explicit snub against Iran’s interests, which would invite an equally important strong response. And al-Sadr would rather avoid direct confrontation with Iran. (Al-Ali, 2018) ¹²

In June 2018, Fatah (Iran-backed militia) and Sairoon joined hands to enter into a coalition together. Fatah is led by Hadi al-Amiri, a pro-Iran leader (Hadi, 2018). ¹³ This is nothing short of a major victory for Iran, which seeks to deepen its hold over Iraq, and a major blowback in the face of the USA, which had been aiming towards constraining the rising influence of the Islamic Republic. While this was an exhilarating moment for the Iranian officials and pro-Iran supporters in Iraq, as the months went by, November 2018 brought with it more political complications. While both Al-Amiri and pro-Iran lobbyists in PMF want Faleh al-Fayyad (chairman of the PMF) to be the new interior minister of Iraq, Al-Sadr stands in firm opposition to this proposal. This has put the stability of the coalition in a precarious position and the parliament in a deadlock (Arab Weekly, 2018). ¹⁴

Grand Ayatollah Ali Sistani has long been fiercely critical of Iranian involvement and interference in Iraq’s domestic affairs. Although for the first time in March 2019 he bestowed on President Rouhani the honour of being the first sitting Iranian president to be received by him, he subtly pointed out what he thought of Iran’s pervasive and unwelcomed manoeuvers within the Iraqi territory. He said he ‘welcomed the steps to strengthen Iraq’s relations with neighboring countries based on mutual interests, respect for sovereignty and non-interference in domestic affairs (Rubin, 2019)’. ¹⁵ It became clear that Tehran would receive no endorsement from Sistani regarding its breach of Iraqi sovereignty in the foreseeable future. Previously, he gave the call for PM Maliki’s resignation largely due to the account of him being under Iran’s thumb.

Iraq has, apart for oil resources, become quite dependent on the Islamic Republic as far as its trade relations are concerned, since the trade is almost entirely one-sided. According to Vahid Gachi, (Iranian official in charge of the Iran–Iraq border): ‘Iraq doesn’t have anything to offer Iran. Except for oil, Iraq relies on Iran for everything.’ The Iran–Iraq checkpoint witnesses 200 Iranian trucks, filled with fruits, yoghurt, cement and bricks, making daily deliveries in Iraq. The market shelves in Iraq are filled with Iranian goods, while petrochemicals, household appliances, cars, etc. make the list of pivotal things that Iran has blessed Iraq with (Arango, 2017). ¹⁶

Through the means of economic manipulation, Iran has further concretised its hold over the Iraqi territory. The southern region of Iraq is primarily financed by the credit that is provided by the Iranians as an incentive for the Iraqi businessmen to keep their money within the Iranian banks. There are shell companies that Iran has set up in the country to secure access to the American dollars to finance its geopolitical aims (Arango, 2017). ¹⁷ Pledging funds for reconstruction efforts is another route that Iran has taken to increase its economic role in the country. For example, on 7 March 2018, Iran’s Vice President Eshaq Jahangiri pledged $3 billion in credit towards reconstruction efforts in Iraq (Badawi, 2018). ¹⁸ According to Hamid Hosseini (head of the Iran–Iraq Joint Chamber of Commerce), ‘Iran aspires to increase its non-oil exports to around $15 billion, within the next 2 years, up from the current $10 billion’ (Badawi, 2018). ¹⁹

In March 2019, President Rouhani undertook a 3-day visit to Iraq. It was his first visit in the capacity of a president. According to Ali Musawi, this visit could not have been planned at a better time. There have been increasing meetings between the government officials between the two countries over the course of the past few months, resulting in greater cooperation between them.

By the conclusion of the visit, the two countries had signed various trade agreements and also decided on the plans to build a railway line directly linking the two countries. Iran’s MAPNA Group is planning to build electric power plants in Basra, Najaf and Baghdad. A total of 4,300 MW (3000, 300 and 1000 MW, respectively) worth of electricity will be supplied to these three cities annually. The construction of three different power plants is being undertaken by Iranian engineers (Taghvai, 2019). ²⁰

After the talks, Rouhani had commented: ‘We have the right conditions for cooperation in all areas, including trade and investment…energy, electricity, and gas, banking ties, and cooperation on roads and railways. Iraq is an important state in the region and it can play a bigger role in providing security’ (Rfe/rl, 2019). ²¹

Iranian Involvement in Syria

In a region that has witnessed an evolving shift in regional alliances, the Iran–Syria relationship has proven to be an exception. It has weathered several challenges, beginning from the Iran–Iraq war to well beyond the outbreak of the civil war in Syria. One of the important components of their relationship is shared animosity against Israel and the USA. They have shared strategic outlooks on issues such as Palestinian resistance and maintaining a strong presence in Lebanon. Syria was the first country in the Arab world to recognise the Islamic Republic of Iran. Their alliance has been called as the Axis of Resistance, indicating that it is based on a defensive outlook (Wikipedia). ²² For Iran, Syria is a crucial piece in the jigsaw puzzle connecting it to the Levant. This is why Syria is of key strategic importance to the Iranians.

Since the beginning of the Syrian conflict, Iran has, without wavering, supported the government of President Bashar al-Assad. One of its end goals might be to transform Syria into a client state, similar to the approach it adopted in Iraq. Iran’s strategic interests in the Syrian conflict have to do with its aim of retaining and expanding its influence via the Assad regime. Its role in the conflict is not limited to the military support it provides, a fact highlighted by a report produced by Omran Center for Strategic Studies (think tank based in Istanbul, Turkey) (Omran Center for Strategic Studies, 2018). ²³

To further strengthen its links with Hezbollah, Iran is determined to ensure that the Assad regime survives the turbulence presented by the ongoing civil war. Syria plays a pivotal role in thwarting the rising influence of its Sunni rival nation, Saudi Arabia, and in shaping the Arab world’s interests and policies. A pro-Sunni government in Syria would thus be detrimental to its interests. The importance that this country holds for Iran has been clearly outlined by Medhi Taeb. He has claimed: ‘Syria is the 35^th province of Iran and a strategic province for us…. If we lose Syria, we cannot keep Tehran’ (Wastnidge, 2017). ²⁴

Tehran has immersed itself so deeply into the Syrian economy that no matter what the future outcome might be it will continue to maintain its hold over the territory. Several agreements have been signed between the two governments. In May 2017, the Ministry of Electricity signed an MoU with the Iranian Reconstruction Authority aimed towards setting up a power station to provide electricity to the towns of Zahraa and Nubl. In October 2017, the Iranian Reconstruction Authority, in collaboration with the Local Defence Forces (LDF), undertook the rehabilitation project in the Ali Abdo School in Zahraa as well as Ibn Hazm School of Andalusia in the Saladin district (Omran Center for Strategic Studies, 2018). ²⁵

Syria has emerged as the logistical hub and the kernel of the Iranian projection of power. It is yet another reason why Iran is so determined to protect the Assad regime. It aims to construct a bridge from its borders to the Mediterranean Sea to cover at least 800 mi of territory, which would require it to maintain its hold over Syria. The movement of its proxies, arms and Iranian-backed armies in the region, from one territory to another, would be facilitated by somewhat of complete freedom that this 800-mile bridge would allow it.

Reformists, pragmatists and hardliners in Iran, despite their differences, have continued to support the Assad regime. Their intention has never been to address the underlying causes of conflict in the country. Their sole concern has been the preservation of the existing government for Iran’s geo-strategic interests. In 2012, just a year after the Arab Spring broke out in Syria, the former Iranian President Ahmadinejad had spoken out in support of his country’s involvement in the Syrian conflict: ‘There was no limit to expanding ties with Syria, and Iran would do all in its power to support the country’ (Alrowaiti, 2017). ²⁶

In February 2019, President Assad paid a visit to Iran and met the Supreme Leader and President Rouhani. The Supreme Leader at their meeting put forth the statement that Iran has felt pride in supporting Syria (Musawi, 2019). ²⁷ This meeting was an indication of the strong alliance that exists between their two countries, despite all the upheavals they have had to face. It is believed that Iran will bear the responsibility of constructing hundreds of thousands of homes in Syria, effectively rebuilding the war-torn country. However, since the war has still not come to a close, Iran will not let its closest ally to fend for itself. It will continue to help it navigate through the possible tumults in the future and re-establish itself, stronger than ever before.

Iran’s Penetration in Lebanon

The roots of Iran’s rising influence in Lebanon can be traced back to the creation of Hezbollah in 1982, following Israel’s invasion of the country in the same year. Backed by the financial, political and military support provided by Iran, it rose to become the most powerful militant Shi’a group in the country, infiltrating the key state institutions. Today, it is a key player in the Lebanese politics and society and is in complete control of southern and eastern parts of Lebanon, with its influence existing within the rest of the country as well. Iran has been able to play a pivotal role in the country simply because of the influence it has on the ground.

To ensure the withdrawal of the foreign forces in 1983, at Iran’s behest, Hezbollah had bombed the US Marine Corps in Beirut, following which these troops withdrew from the country. This paved the way for Iran to consolidate its power in the country. Iran, through its proxy, has spread not only its hard power but also its soft power in Lebanon. Via Hezbollah, it has been able to formulate an expansive and effective network of social services, hospitals, mosques and charities, a satellite TV network, Al-Manar (which has an annual budget of US $15 million), etc. (UANI, 2018). ²⁸ As a result of the provisions of healthcare and social services, among others, it has been able to provide the Lebanese citizens with the necessities at times when even the government itself found itself unable to do so. Therefore, it has emerged as a state within a state. Through various projects such as those mentioned above, Iran became justifiable in its presence in the country.

The results of the 2018 general elections reinforced Iranian influence over Lebanon. Hezbollah and its allies won a small majority, giving them considerable leverage in post-election negotiations. The ultimate goal of Iran is to use its subsequent victories in the political arena is to make sure that soon there is no difference between Hezbollah and the state, a distinction which has slowly become blurred to an extent. President Michel Aoun is an ally of Hezbollah. Thus, Iran, out of the three key actors in the political system—the president, the prime minister and the speaker—is today able to control the first^t and the third. As per the Taif Agreement (1989) which brought to an end the civil war in Lebanon, the president of the country would always be a Christian Maronite, the prime minister a Sunni Muslim and the speaker of the house a Shi’a.

According to Joseph Bahout (scholar at the Carnegie Foundation think tank), with the combination of the military experience gained while fighting across the region at the call of Iran and political acumen, Iran has emerged as the ‘crown jewel’ of the Islamic Republic in the Middle East. Iran’s agenda is also promoted by the Imam Khomeini Relief Committee (IKRC). Under the guise of being a philanthropic organisation, since its establishment in 1986, IKRC has been involved in providing social services to at least 400 Lebanese rural and urban areas.

Yemen: A New Battleground

To further expand its influence in the region, Iran has established close linkages with the Houthis in Yemen. The extent of its support to the rebels is based on the same strategy adopted in Lebanon concerning Hezbollah. Despite Iran overtly claiming that it has no involvement in the Yemeni conflict, the situation on the ground and its ambitious strategy to export the Islamic Revolution across the region speak otherwise. Repeated attempts have been made by the hardliners in Tehran to empower the Houthi rebels to consolidate their hold over the region. According to a former senior security official in Iran: ‘They are planning to create Hezbollah-like militia in Yemen. To confront Riyadh’s hostile policies…Iran needs to use all of its cards’(Saul, Hafezi, & Gregory, 2017). ²⁹

Iran has certain geopolitical aims in mind which it seeks to fulfil by establishing itself as a dominant power over the Yemeni territory. It will able to create a sphere of influence near one of the key international strategic corridors, allowing it the perfect vantage point to control the traffic in areas such as the Gulf of Aden as well as the strait of Bab-e-Mandab. Control over this area would mean that Iran would control what is considered to be one of the main waterways of the world’s oil trade and maritime traffic (Badam, 2017). ³⁰

Media has to a great extent been used to propagate the Iranian narrative of the conflict among the people. As far as the extension of Iranian hard power in the country is concerned, it is believed to have sent in a plethora of arms and ammunition, in particular, explosive-laden drones (Majidyar, 2017). ³¹ Training and technical assistance have been provided by Hezbollah fighters (Feltman, 2019). ³² Certain reports have claimed that additional aid has been supplied to the rebel forces at the behest of General Soleimani. Iran, in the words of Major General Ali Jafari (former commander-in-chief of IRGC), had provided advisory and spiritual support to the rebel forces (Majidyar, 2017). ³³

The Yemeni conflict has become a theatre where the regional struggle is being played out between Iran and its primary Sunni rival, Saudi Arabia. The Iran-backed rebels have continued to launch attacks in Saudi Arabia, without the latter backfiring in such a manner as to completely destabilise them. Through its intervention in this conflict, Iran is carefully placing its pawns across the aisle to entrap the Saudi kingdom in an indefinite war, and if such a move can bring down any more of its rivals, then the Islamic Republic will have more of a reason to celebrate.

Iranian officials have continued to, despite all the indications, refute the allegations of providing military support to the Houthis.

Iran and Palestine

Under Reza Shah Pahlavi, Iran and Israel had enjoyed a strong diplomatic and commercial relationship, as well as an arms trade worth millions of dollars. What united the two countries and their leaders, above all else, was their shared enmity towards the Arab world (Sachs, 2019). ³⁴ These ties had suddenly and drastically plummeted after the Islamic Revolution, 1979. As a means of rallying the masses driven by the revolutionary fervour, late Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini used to regularly chant words such as ‘Death to Israel’ and ‘Little Satan’(Rafizadeh, 2018). ³⁵

Since 1979, supporting the Palestinian cause has been understood by the Iranians as an important means through which the Islamic Republic’s influence can be deeply entrenched within the region. The first example of the latter taking such a step was when the decision was made to extend a hand of friendship towards the Palestinians, starting with the transformation of what was the Israeli embassy in Tehran to the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO) (Brandenburg, Glenn, & Nada, 2016). ³⁶ Through this step, the Iranians signalled that they stood in solidarity with the Palestinian cause through and through, against the Zionists. Although the Iranians have not been able to deliver on their promise of delivering the occupied territories back to the Palestinians, they have, however, been able to exploit the situation to their benefit over a long period. Every year, on the ‘Jerusalem Day’ or ‘Quds Day’(with its roots in 1979, every year, on the last Friday of the Ramazan, an event is organised by the Islamic Republic to express its support for the Palestinian cause and to rally the masses against Zionism and Israel), Iran broadcasts its support for the Palestinian cause (Ghattas, 2017).

Like in the case of Hezbollah (Lebanon) and Houthis (Yemen), Iran has armed and trained the Palestinian militant group Hamas and Islamist Jihad (PIJ). A significant number of weapons used by these groups against Israel were supplied by Iran. Although there have been periods of disruption in the Iran–Hamas and Islamist Jihad relations, recently, it has been observed that there is now a sense of renewal of ties.

Iran has over some time filled a political vacuum, due to the combination of two factors: the lack of any kind of efforts of a substantive peace process and fading hopes of a viable two-state solution (Chubin, 2009). ³⁷

On the other hand, in an attempt to re-establish its presence and influence in Palestine as well as to increase its presence along the Israeli border, Iran has renewed the financial support worth millions of dollars to Hamas and PIJ.

In recent months, drastic changes have emerged in the relationship between Egypt and Hamas. The Al-Sisi administration brought an end to Hamas’ isolation and gave recognition to its sovereignty in the Gaza Strip, much to the dismay of President Abbas (N WORLD, 2019). ³⁸ Curious eyebrows are now being raised about what this means, particularly regarding whether it would threaten Iran’s dynamic with Hamas and its objectives for Palestine. Egypt seems willing to open a channel of reconciliation with Hamas, if reports are to be believed.

Conclusion

The current scenario in West Asia is a clear message to nations worldwide. Iran can and will dictate the internal affairs of Iraq because it has the manpower on the ground to do so. Examining the above, we can understand that Iran is there to stay and its overtly explicit presence in the country is nowhere near dissipating, despite the attempt of its Sunni rivals and the USA. Iran had one clear objective in mind, that is, to make Iraq a client state and, therefore, neutralise any future threat from its neighbouring country. It is a war that it had almost successfully won before the USA decided to unilaterally impose sanctions on it.

Moreover, the fear that was looming from the threat of anti-Iran candidates securing victory in the 2018 elections was nipped in the bud when Hadi al-Amiri, a pro-Iranian leader, became part of the ruling coalition. It was aptly explained by Yossef Bodansky (the director of research at the International Strategic Studies Association [ISSA]):

Iran has effectively won the struggle to dominate the future of Iraq. It has done so against the formidable Shi’ite Arab populace, and after nearly a month of raw pressure, manipulations, special operations, threats and cajoling. This victory is a major step in Iran’s determination to consolidate the on-land corridor to the Mediterranean. (Bodansky, 2018) ³⁹

A paradoxical trend, however, now threatens to dismantle the hard labour that the Iranians have put in over decades. As a result of the increasing pressure of the US sanctions, Iran, in a reversal of trend, has become dependent on Iraq for trade and transit. In the face of weakening Iranian economy, Iraq has become sustenance of hope in preventing the former’s economic growth in becoming stagnant. Iraq is a vital trading partner for Iran. The current bilateral trade is valued at $12 billion (Chazan, 2019). ⁴⁰

There is a visible trend of schism within the Shi’a order. Both Sistani and Al-Sadr, despite sharing the same religious affiliation with Iran, are at odds with it. They have repeatedly called for the Iranian intervention in the Iraqi affairs to be brought to a closure and allow for their country to be operated independent of external meddling. However, Iran seems determined not to let these actors become its Achilles heel.

As far as the Syrian case is concerned, the pace at which Iranian influence is becoming embedded in the very structure of the society is an indication of a future where Syrian affairs will be dictated by the national interests of the Islamic Republic. Iran is bound to capitalise on the favours that President Bashar owes it if the situation evolves even further in the direction it intends it to. Securing the victory in Syria would allow it to replicate the standard template it has altogether successfully applied in Iraq and, more importantly, in Lebanon. Perhaps, one of the major factors that have influenced it to take such a step is establishing another strong front against one of its arch-nemesis, Israel.

There is, however, the permeating Russian influence within Syria which threatens the long-standing Iranian authority. Both the external powers are engaged in a fierce competition to emerge as the victor who would control the lion’s share of the Syrian economy. To countervail the Iranian influence on the Assad administration and on the Syrian infrastructure, Russia is believed to have established different units within the security and political apparatus to offset the pervasive Iranian control.

Moreover, Saudis and Americans do not seem to realise that they are gravely mistaken in deluding themselves into believing that pushing Iran out of Yemen, because of their superior military technology, would be an easy task. Iran, exploiting the unrest in the Yemeni territory, has been able to embed itself in the conflict.

The dominance of Iran over Lebanese politics via Hezbollah can be understood through a statement made by the latter’s general secretary in June 2016: ‘We are open about the fact that Hezbollah’s budget, its income, its expenses, everything it eats and drinks, its weapons and rockets, are from the Islamic Republic of Iran…’(UANI). ⁴¹ This statement barely scratches the surface of the extent of the Iranian hold over Lebanon.

Despite the financial costs and the internal turmoil it has suffered, the Iranian support for the Palestinian cause shows no sign of dissipating. Instead, there has been observed an exponential increase in the financial and military support provided to the Iran-backed groups. Iran is thinking of its long-term goals concerning the future of Palestine, which is to transform it into a sovereign state on the surface but, in reality, to operate it as another capital of the Islamic Republic. The question of whether that is a feasible long-term goal is yet to be determined, particularly with the warming up of ties between Cairo and Hamas. It may remain a wishful desire of Iran after all.